No More Learning

It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci-
? The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power oi nlensive quantity in the cauie of a sensation, for example, redness, weight, Ac, is called in the Kantian terminology, Us moment. The term momentum which we employ, must not he confounded with the word com "conly employed ic :atural science. -- Ti.
? ? ? AXALOGIES OP EXPEllIEKCJt. 133
ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog
nition of objects of the senses, that of experience merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension only placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of necessity the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, to be discovered therein. But as experience cognition of objects means of perceptions, follows that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe rience not as put together time, but as objectively
time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place ny means of their connexion in time in general, consequently ouly means of priori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience possible only by means of representation of the necessary connexion of perception.
The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon determined in re-pect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience, and render possible.
The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse quently, as this unity lies priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com plex of all representations), and indeed relates priori to its form, that to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time, --
the a priori transcendental unity of ap perception, to which subjected all that can belong to my
e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become *n object for me. This synthetical and priori determine*?
necessity imposed
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? 134
7BAKS0IKDETITA1 DOOTBIJ'E.
unity in relntion of perceptions in time is therefore the rule : " All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.
These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, aid the synthesis of the empirical in tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the
mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its
? synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phe nomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determiuately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others.
The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic to phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan tities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose, and give a priori, that is con struct, the degree of our sensations of the "in-light. * We may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive.
The case is very different with those principles whose pro vince it is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con-
? Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads of " Aiioms of Intuition," and " Anticipations of Perception," authorize the application to phamacnena of determinations of size and number, that is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its dif
ferent effects on water, *c, and on mercury in a thermometer. -- 7V.
? ? ? ANALOGIES OF EXPEBIENCE. 13. 1
st. ucted, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perceptkin is given us, in a certain relation 01 time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can not then say a priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the for mer but only how connected, quoad its existence, in
Analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formule, which enounce
the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always constitutive, so that two terms of the proportion are given, the third also given, that can be constructed the aid of these formule. But in philosophy, analogy not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three given terms, can give a priori and cognize the relation to fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although certainly possess rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience therefore only rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (pheno mena) not as constitutive, but merely as regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought
general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phsenomena), the synthesis of per ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these
? For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con
perceptions).
stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both
Known the two terms and and the relation of to not only the relation of to some other number given, but that number itself, 12, given, that constructed. Therefore 3:6=6: 12. -- TV.
Given known effect, known cause, and another known effect, we reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but ? hose relation to the known effect we know from the comparison of the
Thus, our own known actions our own known motives -= the known actions of others x, that the inotivrs of others
three given terms.
which we cannot immediately cognize. -- TV.
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possess & priori, but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse quently also in the manner of demonstration.
But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently
the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con cerning them synthetically h priori. But they are nothing but phcenomena ; a complete knowledge of which -- a know ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate --is the only possible experience. It follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of plienomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phsenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the categories in the principles them selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under the title of formulce of the former.
A.
FIRST ANALOOY.
PBIKCIFLX OF THE PEBMAKEXCE OF STTBSTAWCE.
In all changes of phcenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi nished.
Pboof.
All phcenomena exist in time, wherein alone ns substratum, that as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co existence and succession can "ie represented. Consequently
? ? ? is,
? OT TUB PE11MANENCE OT SUBSTAVCE.
137
time, in which all changes of phsenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which buc- cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of per ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that
phsenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre sents time in general, and in which ail change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phsenomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per tains to the existence of things, substance all that per tains to existence enn be cogitated only as determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined,
substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phsenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished.
? Our apprehension of the manifold in
phenomenon always successive, consequently always changing. By
alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani fold, as an object of experience, co-existent or successive, unless had for foundation something that exists always, that something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) that to say, the permanent
the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time possible. Permanence
in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phsenomena time (just as co-existence cannot be regarded as modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive). * If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos sible. only by means of the permanent that existence
The latter part of thii sentence aetma to contradict the former. Th>> sequel will explain. -- TV.
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? 138 TltANSCEXDENTAL DOCTRINE.
in different pa. ts of the successive aeries of time receives k quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never' has even the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con dition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that of experience and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent the object in itself, that the substance (phenomenon) but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub stances, consequently to its determinations.
? find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as substratum of all change in phenomena indeed, am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself
more precise and definite manner, when he says " In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable. " But of this decidedly synthetical pro
nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof nay, very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as deserves to
do, at the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of na ture. In truth, the statement that substance permanent,
position,
For this very permanence the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenome
non and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable nothing but determination. But because proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that
Not tubt'antia noumenon. -- Tr.
tautological.
cannot be drawn from conceptions,
synthetical proposition priori, and as philosophers never re flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved exeep'. means of deduction of the possibility of experience, no wonder that while has served as the foundation of all ex-
inasmuch as concerns
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? OF THE FEBMANENCE 01 SUBSTANCE. li'J
perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it tins never been supported by proof.
A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke? " He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke. " Thus he presumed it to be incon trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like manner was the saying, *' From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- mena. For if that in the phsenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phsenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de nihilo nihil," -- " in nihilum nil posse reverti," are two propo sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even
? in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needier, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their
should arise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This permanence however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe nomenal world.
The determinations of substance, which are only par ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They
are always real, because they concern the existence of sub
substance)
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? 110 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
stance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe n particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation.
Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical, "Only the permanent
? is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that when certain deter minations cease, others begin. "
Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely determination of the permanent, cannot be possible perception, for this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of transition from one state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which perma nent. Grant that thing absolutely begins to be we must then have point of time in which was not. But how and
what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless that which already exists For void time -- preceding --
(substance)
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? OF THE BUCCE8&ION OF TIME. 141
is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin ning with objects which existed previously, and which con tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the per manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.
Substances (in the world of phsenomena) are the substratum of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and in that case phsenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as co-existent, but as successive.
Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor tunity to speak in the sequel.
B. SECOND ANALOGY
PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY.
All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.
Proof.
(That all phsenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that successive being and non-being of the de terminations of substance, which permanent; consequently that being of substance itself which follows on the non- being thereof, or non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, impossible --all this has been fully es tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin ciple might have been expressed as follows "All alteration (succession) of phenomena merely change for the changes
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? 142 TBANSCENDBHTAL DOOTBnrE.
of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with
I perceive that phsenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, whicft determines the in ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the
one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can
not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places one state before, and the other after ; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the
two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof. )
? relation of the successive phsenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is
determined as necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phsenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus ality, that experience itself, that empirical cognition of phte- nomena, becomes possible and consequently, that phsenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only virtue of this law.
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena always successive. The representations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the object also, second point for reflection, which was not contained in the former.
objective
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? OF THE 8UCC3SSSION OF TIME.
113
Now we may certainly give the name of object to every thing, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there of ; but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question re quiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects of con sciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,
that reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we
must therefore say " The manifold of phenomena always
produced successively in the mind. " If phenomena were things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our representations how this manifold con nected in the object for we have to do only with our repre sentations. How things may be themselves, without regard to ths representations through which they affect us, utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition.
Now although phenom- ena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phse- nomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold in
apprehension always successive. For example, the apprehen sion of the manifold in the phenomenon of house which stands before me,issuccessive. Now comes the question, whether the manifold of this house in itself also successive --which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon as raise my conception of an object to the transcendental signifi
? cation thereof, find that the house not thing in itself, but only phenomenon, that a representation, the trans cendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am to understand the question, How can the manifold be
connected in the phenomenon itself -- not considered as thing in itself, but merely as phenomenon? Here that which lies in mys'iecessive apprehension regarded as representation,
whilst the phenomenon which given me, notwithstanding that nothing more than complex of these representations, regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception,
drawn from the representations of apprehension, must har monize. very soon seen that, as accordance of the cog nition with its object constitutes truth, the question now beforo na can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth/
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? 144 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKHTE.
and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representation! of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom ns the object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the pheno menon which contains the condition of this necessary rule 01 npprehension, is the object.
That something happens, that is to say, that something or some state exists which be fore was not, cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phe
nomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which fol lows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an oc currence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phsenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is deter mined ; and by this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension of a house, might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice versd ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Ac cordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no de termined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon neeettary.
? ? ? ? or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME.
146
I mast therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjec tive sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter mined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the phsenomenou itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I caunot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.
In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne cessarily ; but 1 cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by npprehension) that which antecedes it.
For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the event.
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc
cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same Ij
? ? ? ? 146 TBAJJSCENDENTAl DOCTR1NE.
tort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phsenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, --not even in the phenomenal world.
Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phsenomena are determined in their sequence, that as they happen, the preceding state, can make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event possible.
No doubt appears as this were in thorough contradic
? tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained
in regard to the procedure rf the human understanding. Ac
cording to these opinions, means of the perception and
comparison of similar consequences following upon certain
antecedent phsenomena, that the understanding led to the
discovery of rule, according to which certain events always
follow certain phsenomena, and only by this process thnt we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such basis,
clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which furnishes us with -- " Everything that happens must have cause" --would be just as contingent as expe rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as would not in this case be priori, but founded on deduction. Bat the same the case with this law as with other pure priori representations g. space and time), which we can
draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experier. ce, only because we had already placed them therein, and thnt
means, nnd by that alone, had rendered
experience possible.
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147
Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori.
It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc cession or effect (of an event--that the happening of some thing that did not exist before), and distinguish from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when rule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed,
this necessity which first renders possible the representation of succession in the object.
We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre sentations are still nothing more than representations, that internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how happens that to these representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to them certain unknown objective reality clear that ob jective significancy cannot consist in relation to nnother re presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again arises " How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi cancy over and above the subjective, which proper to as
? determination of state of mind ? " If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our
and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our
representations in certain manner, and of subjecting them to rule and that conversely, only because certain order
necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significancy ascribed to them.
In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our repre sentations always successive. Now hereby not repre sented an object, for by means of this succession, which
subjective representations,
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common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive or assume, that in thia succession there ia a relation to a state antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule, so soon do
I represent something as an event, or as a thing that happens ; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign a certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because of the preceding state in the object. When, there fore, I perceive that something happens, there is contained in this representation, in the first place, the fact, that something antecedes ; because it is only in relation to this, that the phe nomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists after an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can receive ita determined place in time, only by the presupposition that something existed in the foregoing state, upon which it foUows inevitably and always, that in conformity with rule. From all this evident that, in the first place, cannot reverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede that upon which follows and that, in the second place, the antecedent state be posited,
? certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily follows. Hence follows that there exists certain order in our repre sentations, whereby the present gives sure indication of some previously existing state, as correlate, though still undetermined, of the existing event which given, -- cor relate which itself relates to the event as its consequence, conditions and connects necessarily with itself in the series of time.
If then be admitted as necessary iaw of sensibility, and consequently formal condition of all perception, that the preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inas much as cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding), must likewise be an indispensable law of empi rical representation of the series of time, that the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot take place, except in so far as the former determine their existence in time, that to say, establish according to rule. For of course only in phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity
the connection of times.
For all experience and for the possibility of experience, uu>>
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? OF THE BUOC1MTOH O1 T1MX. H9
derstanding is indispensable, and the first step . which it takes in
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,*
but to render the representation of an object in general, pos sible. It does this by applying the order of time to pheno mena, and their existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a consequence, a place in relation to preceding phenomena, determined & priori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time itself, which deter mines a place & priori to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception) ; but, on the contrary, phenomena must reciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of time. In other words, whatever follows or
must follow in conformity with an universal rule upon that which was contained in the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of phenomena, which, by means of the under standing, produces and renders necessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible perceptions, as is found & priori in the form of internal intui tion (time), in which all our perceptions must have place.
That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a possible experience, which becomes real, only because I look upon the phenomenon as determined in regard to iCa place in time, consequently as an object, which can always be found by means of a rule in the connected series of my per ceptions. But this rule of the determination of a thing ac cording to succession in time is as follows : " In what pre cedes may be found the condition, under which an event always (that necessarily) follows. " From all this obvious that the principle of cause and effect the principle of possible experience, that of objective cognition of phe- nomena, in regard to their relations in the succession of time.
The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the following momenta of argument. To all empirical cog nition belongs the synthesis of the manifold the imagiration,
synthesis which always successive, that in which the representations therein always follow one another. But the order of succession in imagination not determined, and the series of successive representations may be taken retrogres<<
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lively 88 well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a syc thesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phe nomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or, to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of succes sive synthesis which determines an object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when this is po sited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my per ception is to contain the cognition of an event, that of something which really happens, must be an empirical judgment, wherein we think that the succession determined that presupposes another phenomenon, upon which this event follows necessarily, or in conformity with rule. If, on the contrary, when posited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, should be obliged to con sider merely as subjective play of my imagination, and
in this represented to myself anything as objective, must look upon as mere dream. Thus, the relation of pheno mena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something which antecedes, in conformity with rule, --in other words, the relation of cause and effect-- the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. The principle of the re lation of causality in the succession of phenomena there fore valid for all objects of experience, because itself the ground of the possibility of experience.
Here, however, difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The principle of the connection of causality among pheno mena limited in our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For example, there heat in room, which does not exist in the open air.
look about for the cause, and find to be the fire. Now the fire as the cause, simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room. In this case, then, there no succession as
regards time, between cause and effect, but they are simul taneous and still the law holds good. The greater part operating causes nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the latter produced only be
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? 0? THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 151
HUM the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality ofits cause, because if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remem bered, that we must consider the order of time, and not the lapte thereof. The relation remains, even though no time has
The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according to time. If, for ex ample, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in as cause, then simultaneous with the effect. But distinguish the two through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface but supposing the cushion has, from some cause or another, hollow, there does not thereupon follow leaden ball.
Thus, the law of succession of time in all instances the only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause. The glass the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface, although the two phse- nomena are contemporaneous. For, as soon as draw some water with the glass from larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into concave, which assumes in the glass.
This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action that of action, to the conception of force and through to the conception of substance. As do not wish this
critical essay, the sole purpose of which to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition priori, to be crowded with
analyses which merely explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, reserve the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for future system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this subject. But cannot at present refrain from making few remarks on the empirical criterion of substance, in so far as seems to be more evi dent and more easily recognised through the conception of
elapsed.
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? 152 TIUTJSCEWDENTAL DOCTRINE.
action, than througn that of the permanence of a pheno menon
Where action (consequently activity aud force) exists, sub stance also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately from the action to the -permanence of that whicli acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of sub stance (phenomenon) ? But after what has been said above, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of procedure --merely analysing our conceptions --it would be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, ""the last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that
changes, that substance. For according to the prin ciple of causality, actions are always the first ground of all
change in phenomena, and consequently cannot be pro perty of subject which itself changes, because this were the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From all this results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance
? Besides, this mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all
origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenom ena) arise and pass away, sound and safe conclusion, con clusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in existence, and consequently to the concep tion of substance as phenomenon.
When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that which occurs, an object requiring vestigation. The transition from the non-being of state into the existence of supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed the phenomenon, fart of itscll
comparison.
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demanding inquiry. Such an event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is therefore . only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be re garded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, be cause the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in themselves, and objects of understanding alone, they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as objects of possible ex
? perience.
How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon
one state existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception ^priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which can only be given empirically ; for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, Df certain successive phsenomena (as movements) which in dicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place ns
the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that the state which changed, what may), and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can very well be considered priori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of time. *
When substance passes from one state, a, into another state,
the point of time in which the latter exists different from, and subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as from sero. That to say, the state, differs from the state, a, only in respect to quantity, the change coming into existence of -- a, which in the former state did not exist,
=
must be remarked, that do not speak of the change of certain relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when bod) moves in an uniform manner, does not change its staU (of motion) but only Chea Ha ro? tion increases or decreases.
and in relation to which that state
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Now the question arises, haw a thing passes from one state =o, into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states existing in these moments, there is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quan
Consequently, every transition from one state into another, is always effected in a time contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing leaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the intermediate state be tween both, and as such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which the change takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at 4, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (6--a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in
bo far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.
Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state of thing passes in the process of
change through all these parts, as elements, to its second state. There no smallest degree of reality in phenomenon, just as there no smallest degree in the quantity of time and so the new state of the reality grows up out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the difference between and a.
not our business to enquire here into the utility of this principle in the investigation of nature. But how such pro position, which appears bo greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, possible completely priori, indeed question which
deserves investigation, although the first view seems to de monstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the quo*
tities).
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