No More Learning

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Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to
rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey. " But idolatry
is the most grievous of sins, as stated above ([3182]Q[94], A[3]).
Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that
removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ([3183]Q[14], A[2]). Now
disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything,
prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. " Now the cause is
seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a
more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than
contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of
the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is
not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower
authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey
God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the
person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his
commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that
which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more
grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the
intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it
is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the
disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is
essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does
God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the
commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who
disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other
hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence,
when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not
through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that
which is more in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart
from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because
whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment.
And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin
is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a
man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who
made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should
give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that
directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is
more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the
sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality
but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy
Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the
contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy
Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy
Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin
against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin
was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special
sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
every sin.
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OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
virtues?

(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?

(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?

(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?

(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?

(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
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Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits
from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in
return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we
repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of
giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which
belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not
a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
received, is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent. Rhet. ii).

I answer that, As stated above ([3184]FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of
the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving
rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser.
Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He
is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our
father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and
upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity,
from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor,
from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of
which we are under particular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person
excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from
whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after
religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship
our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in
dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to
our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as
each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short
thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is
it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God
was reckoned above ([3185]Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to
religion.

Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is
contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that
belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral
debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful
when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).

Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue,
whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to
friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to
friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors,
although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of
gratitude.
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Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?

Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to
God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from
God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of
innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems
that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent.

Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes
him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing
his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to
his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had
less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn
to Thee? " And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered
from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from
the like torpor of sin preserved. " Therefore the innocent is also more
bound to give thanks than the penitent.

Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the
greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is
more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine
says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that
Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe
also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have
done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what
evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance
committed not. " Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
than the penitent.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven,
he loveth more [*Vulg. : 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Lk.
7:47]. " Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater
thanksgiving.

I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient
corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is
greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the
part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis":
wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two
counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this
way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a
greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous
gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be
greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the
penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what
he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was
deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the
gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet
the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even
as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great
gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in
matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now,
rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?

Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to
every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to
whom will he be good? " But a man cannot thank himself, since
thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.

Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But
some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own
profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.

Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is
belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his
master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .

Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably
and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very
well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a
favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor
from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem
equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor
man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not
always bound to repayment for favors received.

Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment
of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore
favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
thanks. "

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor,
as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires
that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to
his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with
regard to a father ([3186]Q[31], A[3];[3187] Q[101], A[2]), a man owes
his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands
to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him
assistance or support, if he need it.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a
man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who
forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his
own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on
himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to
resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable. " Wherefore in
things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or
ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping
it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to
others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the
Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit,
as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various
persons.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good
rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he
ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason
withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had
been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca
remarks (De Benef. ii. ) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor. "

Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters
much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for
ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and
benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a
man who seeks fodder for his cattle. " And farther on: "If he has done
it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was
profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of
malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has
been the loser thereby. "

Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave
does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:
when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as
soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be
his motive, it is no longer called service. " Wherefore gratitude is due
even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.

Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does
what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the
deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De
Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay
it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown
by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but
everywhere. " From this it is evident that however well off a man may
be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him
reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14):
"He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should
be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are
many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe
them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant
conversation without flattery. " Therefore there is no need for a man to
desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his
kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to
desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more
so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor! "

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart
has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he
has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
3).

Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a
favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore
repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,
however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to
him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back
and safeguard my repayment. "
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Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?

Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For
we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed.
Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet
this repayment is a duty, as stated above [3188](A[3]). Therefore a man
is bound to repay a favor at once.

Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more
praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now
earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.
Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to
a benefactor to act freely and quickly. " Now repayment ought to equal
the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay,
is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness. "

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be
considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also
must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the
affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore
Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it
graciously. " As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time
as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of
choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for
favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment.
For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too
soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful. "

Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the
equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's
property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of
the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as
the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it
be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall
the proper time through earnestness.

Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient
time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and
the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
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Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor's disposition or
at the deed?

Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the
benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to
beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself
denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.

Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part
of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather
than the disposition of the benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now
God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to
repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a
greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and
has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly. "

I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues,
namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when
the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the
like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the
quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different
ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has
the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we
have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship
that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the
usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship
based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or
disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue,
as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the
favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the
disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor
depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a
kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of
gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and
chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action
consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or
doer. "

Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a
species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of
justice, as stated above ([3189]Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that
we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but
in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is
thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he
does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and
readily.
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Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of
gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make
even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the
impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something
yet greater.

Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has
received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his
turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which
in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first
conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on
indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the
indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore
repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.

Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is
excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue,
it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
opposed to justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay
those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and
this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore
gratitude should incline to do something greater.

I answer that, As stated above [3190](A[5]), gratitude regards the
favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not
seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the
favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he
would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has
received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to
pay back something more.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying
favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed.
Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son
receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot
make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so,
the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which
the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another. " Wherefore it is not
unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.

Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
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OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?

(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?

(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
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Whether ingratitude is always a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca
says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful. " But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that
ingratitude is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who
commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract.
i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid. " Now sometimes it is not in
the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and
yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the
height of ingratitude. " Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything. " Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2),
where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked. " etc.

I answer that, As stated above ([3191]Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt
of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident
that every ingratitude is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that
helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and
so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good
will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help
him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary
to gratitude.

Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for
the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106],
A[6], ad 1).

Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment. "

Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that
anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of
love for his benefactor.
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Whether ingratitude is a special sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds
of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against
a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful
to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. " Now these do not seem to
belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
special sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness,
which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.

I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue,
because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more
opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to
the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner
than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more
opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude,
because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]),
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly
denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency
or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness
and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing.
Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so
also is ingratitude one special sin.

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according
to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is
first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of
ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he
declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the
third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception
of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover,
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it
belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to
the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to
esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.

Reply to Objection 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to
God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude.
But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this
is a special sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special
sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this
way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: These three are not different species but
different degrees of one special sin.
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Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one
ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God
by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.

Objection 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity, as stated above ([3195]Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is
contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that
virtue, as stated above ([3196]Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2).
Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver
and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
having received. " Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.

Objection 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
has received. " But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.

I answer that, As appears from what we have said above [3197](A[2]), a
man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his
appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt
of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however,
he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either
from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in
him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by
reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld,
this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of
necessity.

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the
debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that
is done.

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.

Reply to Objection 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful
to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.

Reply to Objection 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of
charity, but excludes some act thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say
that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a
mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a
thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we
mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. "

Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is
not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do
so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom
he is conferring the favor.
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Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?

Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful.
For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt
away as the winter's ice. " But this hope would not melt away unless
favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from
the ungrateful.

Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the
ungrateful.

Objection 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
deprived of the favor.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is
kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. " Now we should prove ourselves
His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not
withhold favors from the ungrateful.

I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an
ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it
is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is,
what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not
easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef.
iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps
he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he
should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he
does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a
second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing
his favors upon him.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful
man deserves to suffer.

Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person
affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if
the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not
to be imputed to the bestower.

Reply to Objection 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the
part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly
physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
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OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;

(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
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Whether vengeance is lawful?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps
what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written
(Dt. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay. " Therefore
all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one. " Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.

Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom.