No More Learning

The "good man as a tyrant. -Mankind has
always repeated the same error: it has always
transformed a mere vital measure into the measure
and standard of life;-instead of seeking the
standard in the highest ascent of life, in the
problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the
preservative measures of a very definite kind of
life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of
life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select
from among its forms. That is to say, man
ultimately forgets that measures are a means to
an end, and gets to like them for themselves :
they take the place of a goal in his mind, and
even become the standard of goals to him-
that is to say, a given species of man regards his
means of existence as the only legitimate means,
as the means which ought to be imposed upon all,
as “truth," "goodness," "perfection”: the given
“
species, in fact, begins to tyrannise. . . . It is a
form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species
of man does not perceive that his kind has been
conditioned, when he does not understand his
relation to other species. At any rate, any species
of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed
as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights,
and no longer desires to be master,


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
289
355.
"
“All good people are weak: they are good
because they are not strong enough to be evil,”
said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.
“Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a
Russian proverb.
356.
Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate:
thus you would that men were ? —that good men
were ? But such men I can only conceive as
slaves, the slaves of the future.
357.
The metamorphoses of slavery; its disguise in
the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through
morality.
358.
The ideal slave (the “good man”). --He who
cannot regard himself as a "purpose," and who
cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in-
stinctively honours the morality of unselfishness.
Everything urges him to this morality: his
prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And
even faith is a form of self-denial.
Atavism : delightful feeling, to be able to obey
unconditionally for once.
日​*
VOL. I.


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290
THE WILL TO POWER.
Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance,
are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign
sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose,
of noble existence for one's self.
It is not a question of going ahead (to that end
all that is required is to be at best a herdsman,
that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is
rather a matter of getting along alone, of being
able to be another.
359.
We must realise all that has been accumulated
as the result of the highest moral idealism: how
almost all other values have crystallised round it.
This shows that it has been desired for a very
long time and with the strongest passions—and
that it has not yet been attained : otherwise it
would have disappointed everybody (that is to say,
it would have been followed by a more moderate
valuation).
The saint as the most powerful type of man:
this ideal it is which has elevated the value of
moral perfection so high. One would think that
the whole of science had been engaged in proving
that the moral man is the most powerful and most
godly. —The conquest of the senses and the
passions—everything inspired terror;—the un-
natural seemed to the spectators to be super-
natural and transcendental, . . ,
-


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
291
360.
Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet
who combats the order of rank among souls, in
favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual
hierarchy"all alike before God. ”
Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish
man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus
Aurelius !
361.
I have declared war against the anæmic
Christian ideal (together with what is closely
related to it), not because I want to annihilate it,
but only to put an end to its tyranny and clear
the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals.
. . The continuance of the Christian ideal belongs
to the most desirable of desiderata: if only for
the sake of the ideals which wish to take their
stand beside it and perhaps above it—they must
have opponents, and strong ones too, in order to
grow strong themselves. That is why we im-
moralists require the power of morality: our
instinct of self - preservation insists upon
opponents maintaining their strength — all it
requires is to become master of them.
our
C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called
Evil Qualities.
362.
Egoism and its problem! The Christian
gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism


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292
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
reduced the worth of things and virtues ! In
opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that
nothing else could exist save egoism,—that in
those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power
A to love also grows weak,—that the greatest lovers
are such owing to the strength of their ego,—that
love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter
of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of
those who find it useful, whom it helps in fact,
the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards
the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the
most glorious and most well-constituted men (out
of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper
hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni-
versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful
type of men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist : even the cleverest
regards his habits as more important than his
advantage.
364.
Egoism ! But no one has yet asked: what is
the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to
see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave
theory, of universal suffrage, and of “equality. "
365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of
a very complex set of motives : any word such as
"pity” betrays nothing of this complexity. The


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
293
most important factor is the feeling, “who am I?
who is the other relative to me? "-Thus the
valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral pheno-
mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought,
--that is to say, that pity is to be found at the
root of every moral impulse that has ever existed
hitherto,-is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense
and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who
is devoid of all historical instincts and who has
miraculously succeeded in evading the strong
schooling in history which the Germans, from
Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
6
367
My "pity. ”—This is a feeling for which I can
find no adequate term: I feel it when I am in
the presence of any waste of precious capabilities,
as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what
power and what tasteless problems fit for back-
woodsmen! (At a time when the brave and light-
hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already
possible in France ! ) Or when I see some one
standing below where he might have stood, thanks
to the development of a set of perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought of
man's destiny in my mind, I contemplate with
horror and contempt the whole system of modern
European politics, which is creating the circum-


## p. 294 (#318) ############################################

294
THE WILL TO POWER.
stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future
of mankind. Yes, to what could not "mankind”
attain, if- ! This is my “pity"; despite the
fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I
sympathise in this way.
368.
hriatha
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite
which is injurious to the health,“ it cannot possibly
be our duty to increase the evil in the world. ” If
one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self
and not one's neighbour that one is succouring.
Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon
emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity
is an infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps
within its bounds and does not exceed them
consequently, the “allowable,” the “morally in-
different” egoism of which some people speak,
does not exist at all.
“One is continually promoting the interests of
one's 'ego' at the cost of other people”; “Living
consists in living at the cost of others "-he who
has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first
step towards truth to himself.
370.
The “subject” is a piece of fiction: the ego of
which every one speaks when he blames egoism,
does not exist at all.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
295
371.
Our “ego”—which is not one with the unitary
controlling force of our beings ! —is really only an
imagined synthesis ; therefore there can be no
"egoistic" actions.
372.
Since all instincts are unintelliġent, utility cannot
represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned.
Every instinct, when it is active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain: in the end
it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of
everything owing to the waste it would bring
about. Thus: that which is “unegoistic," self-
sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular
-it is common to all the instincts; they do not
consider the welfare of the whole ego (because they
simply do not think ! ), they act counter to our
interests, against the ego: and often for the ego-
innocent in both cases !
373.
The origin of moral values. -Selfishness has as
much value as the physiological value of him who
possesses it. Each individual represents the whole
course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach,
something that begins at his birth.
If he re-
present the ascent of the line of mankind, his
value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about
his maintenance and the promoting of his growth
may even be extreme. (It is the concern about


## p. 296 (#320) ############################################

296
THE WILL TO POWER.
the promise of the future in him which gives the
well-constituted individual such an extraordinary
right to egoism. ) If he represent descending
development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have
him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case
society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid,
and seditious manner): whether it be a question
of the decline and pining away of single individuals
or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and
a religion of “ love," the curbing of the self-affirming
spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re-
signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the
confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their
rulers : for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of
resentment, and of envy,-feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched,—and
it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of
obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all
ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of “God on the Cross. "
The preponderance of an altruistic way of
valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact
that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex-
amination, this point of view turns out to be: I
am not worth much," simply a psychological valua-
tion; more plainly still : it is the feeling of im-
potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
«C


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À CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
297
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia).
This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or
religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture):
it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far
as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The
interpretation by means of which the Christian
sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt
at justifying his lack of power and of self-con-
fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather
than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom
of decay when interpretations of this sort are used
at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched
do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does),
but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be
guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure
his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
for it. The instinct of revenge and resentment
appears in both cases here as a means of enduring
life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the
favour shown to altruistic theory and practice.
The hatred of egoism, whether it be one's own (as
in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in
the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valua-
tion reached under the predominance of revenge;
and also as an act of prudence on the part of the
preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form


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298
THE WILL TO POWER.
»
of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and
unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in
the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self-
preservative instinct on the part of the bungled
and the batched. In short: the cult of altruism is
merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir-
cumstances,
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation,
cries for “justice,” “rights,” “equal rights,” it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade-
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers : he also finds pleasure in crying ;if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian : he curses, condemns,
and slanders the “world”—and does not even
except himself.
But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying,
and who find relief in slander.
.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its
opponents to caricatures, at least in its own
imagination,-as also to starve them. As an
example of this sort of caricature we have our
“ criminal. ” In the midst of the Roman and
aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
299
to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy
and the bourgeois” become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among
aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books
becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which morality
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as
those which it slanders and rejects: for instance,
justice as will to power, will to truth as a means
in the service of the will to power.
376.
The turning of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society,
powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive
harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi-
nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge,
and violence is reverted, “it steps backwards”;
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the
lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into
demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
377.
Falsity. --Every sovereign instinct makes the
others its instruments, its retainers and its syco-


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THE WILL TO POWER.
phants: it never allows itself to be called by its
more hateful name : and it brooks no terms of
praise in which it cannot indirectly find its share.
Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame in general crystallises into a rigorous
form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is one of
the causes of falsity.
Every instinct which aspires to dominion, but
which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all
the most beautiful names and the most generally
accepted values to strengthen it and to support its
self-esteem, and this explains why as a rule it
dares to come forward under the name of the
“master” it is combating and from whom it
would be free (for instance, under the domination
of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of
power act in this way). This is the other cause
of falsity.
In both cases complete ingenuousness reigns :
the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. It is the sign of a broken
instinct when man sees the motive force and its
"expression” (“the mask") as separate things-
it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less
formidable. Absolute innocence in bearing, word,
and passion, a "good conscience” in falseness,
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro-
priated-all these things are necessary for
victory.
In the other case: that is to say, when extreme
clearsightedness is present, the genius of the actor
is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
301
control, if victory is to be achieved.
That is why
priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo-
crites; and then come princes, in whom their
position in life and their antecedents account
for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and
diplomatists come third, and women fourth.
The fundamental thought : Falsity seems so
deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and
accurate self-classification, that one is very pro-
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to
truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest
obstacle in the way of truthfulness. )
378.
“Thou shalt not tell a falsehood”: people
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg-
ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they
actually recognised the unreality of this popular
“ truthfulness. ” There is too much or too little
being said continually: to insist upon people's
exposing themselves with every word they say, is
a piece of naïveté.
People say what they think, they are "truth-
“
ful"; but only under certain circumstances : that is
to say, provided they be understood (inter pares),
and understood with good will into the bargain
(once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in
the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would
attain to something, says what he would fain have


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302
THE WILL TO POWER.
2
people think about him, but not what he thinks.
(“ The powerful man is always a liar. ")
379.
"
9
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con
cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values :-
(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also
pity.
(6) Only the most impersonal intellect ("the
philosopher") can know the truth, “the true
essence and nature of things. ”
© Genius, great men are great, because they
do not strive to further their own interests: the
value of man increases in proportion as he effaces
himself.
(d) Art as the work of the "pure free-willed
subject"; misunderstanding of “objectivity. ”
(e) Happiness as the object of life: virtue as a
means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation of life by Scho-
penhauer is a moral one. Transference of the
gregarious standards into the realm of meta-
physics.
The “individual” lacks sense, he must there-
fore have his origin in " the thing in itself” (and
the significance of his existence must be shown
to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental
“
“
cause. ”—The mistake on the part of science in
considering the individual as the result of all
past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is
now becoming known,


## p. 303 (#327) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
303
380.
1. Systematic falsification of history; so that
it may present a proof of the moral valua-
tions:
(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(6) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people (“its culture”)
regarded as the result of high moral excellence.
2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, “immoral-
ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Cæsar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon ;
but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact—their " free will”-is always
suppressed.
381.
A great lie in history; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation !
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators—very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re-
quired a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to
be the emancipation from the will: he did not
wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre-
judices which is coincident with the emancipation


## p. 304 (#328) ############################################

304
THE WILL TO POWER.
"
see
a
-
of a great mind; he refused to see what is the
typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured
self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual activity: "objective" contemplation.
“Truth,” even in art, only manifests itself after
the withdrawal of the will
. .
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd
distinctions as "genius” and the world of will, of
morality and immorality, I know nothing about at
all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed he is a
type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own.
He is a copy; at the best, a good
copy—the standard of his worth lies without him.
I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will: not according to the
enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con-
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. . . . I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain
and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than
it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to
Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge
that all is to no purpose-in short, to recognise
what the good man already does instinctively.
.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
305
He denies that there can be higher states of
intellectuality-he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness; its highest value (as art, for
instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise
the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin-
ance of moral values.
Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise
Kant: there was nothing Greek in Kant; he was
quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to
the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see
Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element in human nature *). Saintliness also
lurked somewhere in his soul. . . . I require a
criticism of the saintly type.
Hegel's value: "Passion. "
Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total
absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.
a
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. —This is doubtless a reference to a
a
passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June
1793, from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which
the following words occur :- -“ Dagegen hat aber auch Kant
seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes
Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel-
haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schand-
fleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch
Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen. ”-
("Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout
his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre-
judices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable
stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that
Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem. ") From
this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated
Nietzsche's view of Kant ; namely, that he was a Christian
in disguise.
U
VOL. I.


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306
THE WILL TO POWER.
Fundamental instinct of all philosophers,
historians, and psychologists: everything of value
in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable
and morally conditioned, in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this
highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question
concerning civilisation, “ Will it make man grow
better? "-a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of
civilisation,
383
Religious morality. - Passion, great desire; the
passions of power, love, revenge, and property :
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all
these things, and “purify” the soul by driving
them out of it.
The argument is : the passions often lead to
disaster—therefore, they are evil and ought to be
condemned. Man must wring himself free from
them, otherwise he cannot be a good man.
This is of the same nature as: “If thy right eye
offend thee, pluck it out. " In this particular case
when, with that “ bucolic simplicity," the Founder
of Christianity recommended a certain practice to
His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement,
the result would not be only the loss of a parti-
cular member, but the actual castration of the
whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of
insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
307
their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only
the emasculated man is a good man.
Instead of making use of and of economising
the great sources of passion, those torrents of the
soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming,
and impetuous, morality—this most shortsighted
and most corrupted of mental attitudes—would
fain make them dry up.
384.
Conquest over the passions ? --No, not if this is
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
They must be enlisted in our service : and to this
end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good
deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races,
etc. ). At length we should trust them enough to
restore their freedom to them: they love us like
good servants, and willingly go wherever our best
interests lie.
385.
Intolerance on the part of morality is a sign of
man's weakness: he is frightened of his own
“immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts,
because he does not yet know how to use them.
Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe
remain uncultivated longest: the power is lack-
ing that might become master here. . . .
386.
There are some very simple peoples and men
who believe that continuous fine weather would be


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308
THE WILL TO POWER.
a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in
rebus moralibus, that the “good man" alone and
nothing else than the “good man” is to be desired,
and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth
(and that it is only to that end that all efforts
should be directed). This is in the highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have
already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the “good man" creates (he
gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation,
he gives what one is able to take).
With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse that is to say, an ever
greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa-
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of
morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions in one's service,
387.
The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions :
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason-whereas the passions are abnormal,
dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires
for pleasure.
Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it
only manifested itself in an unseemly way and
were not necessary and always the motive force,


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
309
>
(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high
purpose-merely at pleasure. .
The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various
passions and desires; and as though every passion
did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .
>
388.
How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality,
it was precisely the passions—love, goodness, pity,
even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood :
It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of
it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its
instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative
attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from
strong and godlike personalism as surely as do
the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner
certainty that one has a right to everything. The
opposite views, according to the most accepted
notions, are indeed common views; and if one
does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs,
one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless
to stretch out one's hand either to protect or to
support others. . .
How was it possible to transform these instincts
to such an extent that man could feel that to be
of value which is directed against himself, so that
he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the


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THE WILL TO POWER.
psychological baseness and falseness which hither-
to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !
If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he
does himself; the love of man requires a justifi-
cation, and it is found in the fact that God
commanded it. From this it follows that all the
natural instincts of man (to love, etc. ) appear to
him to be, in themselves, prohibited ; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God.
Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this ! let any one examine his
relations to his sister. “Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,
389.
Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such
as this ("an ideal”) makes us pay. (Its enemies
are-well ?
The "egoists. ")
The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld)—inner en-
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption
of the non-gregarious man.
The perpetual process of laying stress upon
mediocre qualities as being the most valuable
(modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).
Pangs of conscience associated with all that


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
311
is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the
unhappiness—the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted
men!
Gregarious consciousness
consciousness and timorousness
transferred to philosophy and religion.
Let us leave the psychological impossibility of
a purely unselfish action out of consideration !
390.
My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man
represents a much higher value than the “de-
sirable” man of any ideal that has ever existed
hitherto; that all “ desiderata" in regard to man-
kind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations
by means of which a particular kind of man has
sought to establish his measures of preservation
and of growth as a law for all; that every
" desideratum” of this kind which has been made
to dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength,
and his trust in the future; that the indigence
and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most
apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a desire;
that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been
developed too inadequately to do justice to the
actual, not merely to the “desirable,” worth of
man; that, up to the present, ideals have really
been the power which has most slandered man
and the world, the poisonous fumes which have
hung over reality, and which have seduced men to
yearn for nonentity. . . .


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THE WILL TO POWER.
D. A Criticism of the Words : Improving,
Perfecting, Elevating.
391.
The standard according to which the value of
moral valuations is to be determined.
The fundamental fact that has been overlooked :
The contradiction between “becoming more
moral" and the elevation and the strengthening
of the type man.
Homo natura : The “will to power. "
G
392.
Moral values regarded as values of appearance
and compared with physiological values.
393
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde:
the ultimate “ desiderata” concerning men, for
instance, have never been regarded as problems
by philosophers. They always postulate the
"improvement” of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had been
helped over the note of interrogation following
the question, why necessarily “improve"? Το
what extent is it desirable that man should be
more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happier?
Granting that nobody yet knows the "wherefore?
of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense
whatever; and if one aspires to one of them-


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
313
who knows —perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with
an increase of intelligence and insight ? Dubito:
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not
require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means ? And if the aim were to
arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase
in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten-
ment? . . . And suppose one will have happiness;
maybe one should join the ranks of the “poor
in spirit. ”
394.
The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called
moral improvement.
We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already—that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person-
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
" the older man. " . . . The man's aspect is altered,
but not his actual nature. . . It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease
from performing certain actions, and the fact
allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of
performing a certain action is entirely arrested,


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314
THE WILL TO POWER.
nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated.
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con-
tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con-
cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per-
form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his
particular nature. The Church,—which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
-starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a “soul” or the “salvation ” of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice-punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can-
not be undone. Because some one forgets some-
thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain
consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment,
or whether it has been “expiated,” “ forgiven,"
or "obliterated,” it matters not even if the Church
meanwhile canonises the man who performed
it. The Church believes in things that do not
exist, it believes in “Souls"; it believes in
"influences” that do not exist-in divine in-
.


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315
fluences; it believes in states that do not exist,
in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out
quite systematically.
395.
“ Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really
makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in it, one might be
allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded as
Regarded as a whole, could not the
improvement of mankind"-that is to say, the
unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the
last two centuries—be regarded as the result of a
long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made “ Euro-
peans » "better"? "Or, put into other words, is
not our modern soft-hearted European morality,
which could be likened to that of the Chinese,
perhaps an expression of physiological deteriora-
tion? . . . It cannot be denied, for instance, that
wherever history shows us "man” in a state of
particular glory and power, his type is always
dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares
O
"


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THE WILL TO POWER,
»
little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases
in which it seems otherwise, all that was required
was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently
below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro-
position : "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful,
and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well. " A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro-
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more
dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means
in our power—the humanising, the improving,
and the increased “civilisation" of man? Noth-
ing would then be more expensive than virtue :
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of
wisdom would be, “everybody must be everybody
else's nurse. " Then we should certainly have
attained to the “Peace on earth," so long desired!
But how little "joy we should find in each
other's company”! How little beauty, wanton
spirits, daring, and danger! So few “actions"
which would make life on earth worth living!
Ah! and no longer any “deeds”!
“ deeds”! But have not
all the great things and deeds which have re-
mained fresh in the memory of men, and which
have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
in the deepest sense of the word ? . .
"


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
317
396.