138 See Mao, Selected Works, 1 : 1 17-18, 2:132-36; 4:10o-101; and Van Ness,
Revolution
and Chi- nese Foreign Policy, 4o-41.
Revolution and War_nodrm
Gawryeh, "Kemal Atatiirk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1918-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle," Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no.
3 (1988).
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
? ? Revolution and War
France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks. Britain and France tried to arrange a negotiated settlement, but the Nationalists Jl'efused to modify the terms of the National Pact and continued their preparations for an all-out offensive. The attack was finally launched in August 1922, the Greek forces were routed, and the remnants of the Greek Army had withdrawn by the end of the month. JJ9
n& According to Kemal, the agreement with France "proved to the whole world that the treaty [of Sevres) was merely a rag. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 135-38; and see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:97-99.
117 ItalyreporiedlyprovidedKemal'sforceswithadditionalmilitaryequipmentduringthis period, although the precise sources and magnitude of the support is hard to determine. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938) 2:1 349; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1 9 1 9-1925: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 264; and Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 135.
118 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 194; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:263-69.
119 SeeShawandShaw,OttomanEmpireandModernTurkey,2:362-63;Sonyel,TurkishDiplo- macy, 171-73; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 267-68.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
This campaign caused a final crisis with Great Britain, briefly bringing the two sides to the brink of war in September 1922. The Nationalists sought the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Turkish territory, including the removal of the remaining Greek forces in eastern Thrace. Lloyd George was still committed to the Greek cause, however, and the British government was worried that a further Turkish advance would jeopardize freedom of navigation in the Turkish Straits. As the Greeks withdrew, therefore, Great Britain reinforced its positions in the neutral zone established by the Treaty of 5evres and the Cabinet ordered the British commander, Lieutenant-Gen- eral Charles ("Tim") Harington, to oppose any attempt to force the straits. The French and Italian commanders sent small contingents in response to
Harington's request for a show of Allied solidarity, but both states subse- quently withdrew their forces after Lloyd George and Winston Churchill dispatched a bellicose message to the Dominions requesting support to de- fend the neutral zones. The rift was soon patched, and a joirit proposal for armistice negotiations was dispatched to the Turks on September 23, but it was clear that neither France nor Italy would go to war over this issue. Sup- port within England and the rest of the British Empire was doubtful as well, leaving Lloyd George virtually alone in his willingness to confront the Turks. 120 Egged on by the Soviets and by hard-liners within the Nationalist movement, elements of Kemal's forces entered the neutral zone and even- tually stood face-to-face with the outnumbered British garrison at Chanak.
Lloyd George was still determined to resist, however, and the British Cab- inet issued an ultimatum on September 29 demanding that the Turkish forces pull back from Chanak or be fired upon. Convinced that such an ulti- matum would merely provoke the Turks and make it more difficult to reach a negotiated solution, Harington and the British high commissioner, Horace Rumbold, chose to ignore the Cabinet's order. This decision prevented an immediate clash and gave time for cooler heads to prevail. Negotiations be- tween military representatives began on October 3, and a compromise was finally reached on the eleventh, just seventy-five minutes before the British troops were to have opened fire on the Turkish positions. 121 The Nationalists agreed to remain outside the neutral zones at Istanbul, Gallipoli, and Ismit pending a final peace settlement, while the Allies pledged that Greece would withdraw from eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa River. 122
121 See Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatiirk, 1919-1938 (Beverley, Eng. : Eothen Press, 1982), 63; and Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 351-55.
120 See Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975), 578.
122 On these events, see Evans, Slow Rapprochement, chap. 5; David Walder, The Chanak Af- fair (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 34o-58; Sonyel, Turkish Diplo- macy, 173-76; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 269-73; Nicolson, Curzon, 274-75; Laurence Evans,
United States Policy and the Partition ofTurkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
? ? Revolution and War
The armistice set the stage for the Lausanne Conference in 1923, which formally dismantled the Treaty of sevres and placed Turkey's relations with the West on a new basis. The Nationalists' primacy was now unchallenged, and when the Allies tried to invite representatives from the Istanbul and Ankara regimes, the Assembly simply abolished the sultanate and placed the office of the caliphate under its authority. After two separate rounds of negotiations, a final agreement was reached in July. With the exception of a clause granting Britain control over Mosul, Turkey's new borders corre-
sponded almost perfectly to the principles of the National Pact. 123 The En- tente accepted the borders established by the Treaty of Kars, and the restoration of eastern Thrace gave Turkey a foothold in Europe as well. The treaty abolished the foreign capitulations established during the Ottomall1l period (meaning that foreign residents and companies would now be sub- ject to Turkish law) and opened the Turkish Straits to international shipping under the control of an international commission. The parties also agreed to
conduct a compulsory population exchange between Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion. The exchange agreement eliminated the main source of Greco-Turkish ri- valry and paved the way for a major rapprochement at the end of the decade. 124
The Lausanne Conference also signaled Turkey's reemergence as a mem- ber of the international community. Elections for a new National Assembly were held in August 1923, the new Republic of Turkey was officially pro- claimed in October with Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) as its first president, and the capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara. With their triumph now complete, Kemal and his followers launched the extensive program of west- ernization that created the modem Turkish state. 125
Is the Turkish Revolution an Exception?
The Turkish Revolution differs in a number of ways from the other cases examined in this book, but many familiar features are present as weH.
sity Press, 1965), 378-86; Davidson, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197-<;9; and Kenneth 0. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 311)-23.
123 The text of the treaty is reprinted in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:119-127.
124 See Psomiades, Eastern Question, chap. 7; and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange ofMinorities and Its Impact on Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
125 Turkish diplomacy at Lausanne is described in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 199-208; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 185-229; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policrj, 1918-1948 (Ambilly-Annemasse: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950), 3&-50; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, chap. 9; and Evans, U. S. Policy and Turkey, chap. 14. For an account emphasizing Curzon's success in weaning Turkey away from Russia, see Nicolson, Curzon, chaps. 1o-11.
? ? ? [306]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Turkey's fragility in the aftermath of World War I led Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Russia to seek territorial acquisitions at the Turks' expense, and their conflicting ambitions gave rise to serious disagreements once the war was over. The revolution was not responsible for this power vacuum, how- ever, as Turkey's weakness was a direct result of its decision to align with the Central Powers and their subsequent defeat in 1918. Instead, the Na- tionalist revolution was itself a response to the sultan's inability to defend
Anatolia. Thus, although Turkey's vulnerability made it the object of intense foreign competition and encouraged direct military intervention, this was not directly attributable to the revolution.
Once the revolution was underway, however, both sides quickly con- cluded that the other was hostile and potentially threatening. The National- ist movement arose from Turkish opposition to foreign (especially Greek) intervention, and Kemal remained suspicious of the Entente for quite some
time. 126 Similarly, Britain and France saw the Kemalist movement as a threat to their postwar ambitions in the Near East, leading them to occupy Istan- bul in March 1920 and to endorse the Greek offensive later that summer.
In addition to the obvious conflicts of interest-the Allies wished to partition Turkey while the Nationalists sought to reestablish Turkish sover- eignty-Allied hostility was increased by several unfortunate mispercep- tions, particularly by the British. Lloyd George's belief that the Kemalist movement was a linear descendant of the Young Turks' Committee on Union and Progress (CUP) reinforced his pro-Greek sympathies, and the suspicion that Kemal harbored the same pan-Turkic tendencies displayed by earlier Turkish nationalists made the Nationalists seem even more threat- ening. 127 Lloyd George regarded the Turks as an "unspeakable" race that had "forfeited! their title to rule majorities of other peoples," and he once re-
ferred to Kemal as "no better than a carpet seller in a bazaar. " Stephen Evans reports that British officials placed the Nationalists "side by side with the CUP and the Bolsheviks," a view that nicely reveals British ignorance about the true character of the Nationalist movement. In particular, British leaders seem to have been unaware that Kemal had broken with Enver Pasha and the CUP in 1914, had explicitly rejected a pan-Turkic agenda, and had repeatedly expressed his desire for harmonious relations with the West. 12. s
126 In 1921, he told his followers, "I am not sure of the good faith of England, who wants to play us a trick. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95?
127 TheCUPhadplayedacentralroleintheOttomandecisiontoallywiththeCentralPowers, and CUP leaders such as Enver Pasha were strongly committed to a pan-Turkic foreign policy.
128 See Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 64? 5; Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, 319; and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 171-72. On the rivalry between Kemal and Enver Pasha, see Salahi R. Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1918-1922," Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1<)89).
? ? ? Revolution and War
Not surprisingly, these suspicions encouraged intransigence on both sides. Several unfortunate incidents reinforced perceptions of hostility, in- cluding the execution of a British subject on charges of espionage (which the British high commissioner in Istanbul saw as sign of the Nationalists' "un- compromising hostility towards His Majesty's government" ), a Nationalist raid on the British ship Palitana, and Britain's open support for the Greeks. 129 These events sustained the Nationalists' desire for the complete removal of all foreign troops and help explain why Lloyd George sought to oppose the Turkish advance on Istanbul in 1922Y0
The Nationalists' opponents also seem to have consistently underesti- mated Kemal's popularity and the military prowess of his troops while ex- aggerating their own capacity to impose a solution by force. This was most evident in the case of Greece and its British patron; although a number of British, French, arid Greek officials argued that Kemal would be difficult to defeat, Prime Minister Venizelos assured the Allies that the Greeks "would be able to clear up the whole of the neighborhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in the course of fifteen days. "131 The Greeks' initial successes boosted this overconfidence and silenced opposition but failed to overcome the Nationalist resistance and left the Greek forces badly overextended.
Nonetheless, Venizelos's successor as prime minister described Kemal's forces as a "rabble worthy of little or no consideration" and promised that a new offensive would "scatter the Kemalist forces and . . . impose the will of the powers" within three months. 132
As usual, these problems were exacerbated by uncertainty and misinfor- mation. In June 1919, for example, the British foreign office representative stated that he "knew nothing of Mustapha Kemal," and another Allied re- port declared that "the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken. " Other British agents re- ported that the Nationalist Congress at Erzerum had been a failure, and as noted earlier, top British officials were convinced that Kemal was either a Bolshevik or a follower of the CUP or else was under the control of the offi-
129 The remarks were made by High Commissioner Horace Rumbold; quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 115.
130 Lloyd George later blamed the failure of his policy in part on lack of information. De- scribing the initial emergence of Mustafa Kemal, he wrote that "no information had been re- ceived as to his activities in Asia Minor in reorganizing the shattered and depleted armies of Turkey. Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent. " Tru th about the Peace Treaties, 2:1285.
131 See Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 259? On the ill-advised nature of the Greek advance, see Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 54-58, 102-105.
132 The Greek government opposed any modification of the 5evres agreement at the Lon- don conference in February 1921, and the deputy chief of staff told the delegates that a re- newed Greek advance would proceed "up to Ankara as a first stage. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 96 (emphasis added); and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 239-40.
[3o8]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cial government in Istanbul. Moreover, the lack of official contacts forced Kemal to rely on unofficial channels, allowing these misconceptions to sur- vive intact. 133
Thus, although the Nationalist revolution in Turkey did not lead directly to war, it does provide partial support for my main propositions. Foreign powers did seek to exploit the vacuum resulting from the Ottoman collapse, and the revolutionary movement was seen as threatening to their interests and objectives. The level of threat was exaggerated, however, and opposing states overstated their ability to defeat the revolutionary movement by force. These misperceptions and miscalculations stemmed in part from a lack of information and inadequate channels of communication (although the impact of this factor varied). Finally, although all-out war was avoided, Britain and Turkey did come close in 1922 and could easily have stumbled into a serious clash. In short, the Turkish case is a partial exception at best: although war did not occur, the pressures for war that did arise are consis- tent with the theory.
Why were Turkey and the great powers able to avoid war, and why were the Turks able to integrate themselves into the existing order with far less di. fficulty than other revolutionary states?
First, the Turkish Revolution owed much of its moderate impact to its character as an elite revolution. Its leaders were for the most part prominent members of the old regime, and they were willing and able to seize power because the sultanate had been discredited by defeat and because they re- tained the loyalty of key institutions (especially the army). In addition, the Nationalists did not have to wage an extended struggle against internal op-
ponents, because the sultan lacked the capacity to resist and was increasingly dependent on foreign support. As a result, the Nationalist movement did not develop an elaborate ideology of social revolution in order to mobilize sup- porters and to justify its rule. The principle of national independence was sufficient, especially after the Greek invasion galvanized Turkish resistance. Although pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic programs were actively debated dur- ing the Young Turk period, Kemal explicitly rejected these more ambitious programs in favor of the limited goal of independence based on Turkish na- tionalism. Thus, the Nationalist program was limited to restoring national sovereignty within a specific geographic area, exporting the revolution was precluded by definition, and the revolution posed no ideological threat to its neighbors. 134 Thus, whereas the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, and the Iranian
133 "Thislackofdiplomaticcontactonlyreinforcedthe[British]HighCommission'sfalse assumptions concerning the Nationalists, and had the effect of keeping the two sides apart. " Stephen Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 65; and see Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 16cr72.
1 34 Armenia is a partial exception in this regard, because it had established itself on territo- ries that the Nationalists regarded as part of the Turkish homeland. See Shaw and Shaw, Ot- toman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:376.
? ? Revolution and War
clerics saw their opponents as intrinsically evil and endorsed revolutionary transformations at home and abroad, Kemal and his followers sought a rapnd reconciliation with the West in order to concentrate on modemization. 135
Second, like Mexico in 1916 and the United States after 1787, the revolu- tionary Turks profited from favorable international conditions. The Central Powers had been defeated and disarmed. The Entente was exhausted and war-weary. Russia was weakened and distracted by its own revolution. Great Britain tried to use the Greeks as surrogates but was unwilling to es- calate when this expedient failed, giving Kemal and the Nationalists the time they needed to consolidate their position. The revolution in Russia and the antipathy between Moscow and the West was a valuable asset for the Turks as well. In addition to obtaining modest amounts of financial and mnl-
itary assistance from the Bolsheviks, Kemal was able to play off the two sides, wnth considerable success. As in the French and Russian cases, in short, divisions among the other great powers prevented joint action to ar- rest or reverse the revolution.
The Turkish case reveals many familiar dynamics of revolutionary situa- tions, but in a muted and less dangerous form. The preferences and goals of the Nationalists differed from those of the old regime and threatened the in- terests of several foreign powers. These states found it difficult to formulate an effective response to the revolutionary movement because they overesti- mated its hostility and underestimated its capabilities, giving rise to exag- gerated perceptions of threat and making the use of force somewhat more attractive. These states revised their estimates over time, however, and
eventually reestablished more or less cordial relations.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
As my theory would predict, the revolution in Chi. na contributed to the emerging security competition between the United States and the Sovieft Union and played a major role in bringing the Cold War to Asia. The new regime went to war in Korea less than a year after gaining power, and the origins of its involvement bear a striking resemblance to those of the wars that followed the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) also highlights the tension between revolutionary objectives and systemic constraints. Al- though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly endorsed the goal of
135 Kemal warned in a 1923 speech: "The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. . . . Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for the new victories in science and economics. " Quoted in Lewis, Emergence ofModern Turkey, 255-56.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
world revolution and saw its victory as a model for other developing coun- tries, Chinese foreign policy tended to be cautious and defensive, focused more on preserving Chinese security than on promoting revolution. On the whole, therefore, the Chinese Revolution provides strong support for the main argument of this book.
Maoist Revolutionary Ideology
Maoist political thought closely resembles the ideal type of revolutionary ideology described in chapter 2. 136 During its long struggle against both the Guomindang (GMD) and Japan, the CCP developed a body of revolution- ary doctrine designed to inspire prolonged sacrifices and provide tactical guidance to the Communist cadres. As a Marxist-Leninist, CCP leader Mao Tse-tung viewed politics as inherently competitive and regarded oppo- nents-e- specially the imperialist powers-as hostile. 137 The Maoist world- view was also intrinsically optimistic: although enemies might appear stronger, they were actually "paper tigers. " "In appearance [they] are terri- fying but in reality they are not so powerful. " As a result, victory was in- evitable provided the cadres did not lose heart. 138 Like Lenin, Mao tempered this optimism with a sense of realism, stressing the need to analyze political and strategic problems systematically and warning against both rightist de- viations (passivity and fear of struggle) and leftist deviations (overconfident recklessness). In his words, the CCP should "despise the enemy strategi- cally while taking full account of him tactically," meaning that although vic- tory was inevitable, achieving it required prolonged effort, careful preparation, and tactical flexibility. 139 Maoist ideology combined nationalist
136 In addition to Mao's writings, this summary of Maoist ideology is based on Stuart Schram, The Thought ofMao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), chap. 2; J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplo- macy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); chaps. 1-2; Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," Political Science Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1955); and Tang Tsou and Mor- ton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behav- ior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 1 (1965).
137 Likening imperialism to a "wild beast," Mao told his followers not to show "the slight- est timidity. " In his words: "Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him-one or the other. " He also warned that "when we say 'imperialism is ferocious,' we mean that its nature will never change, the imperialists will never lay down their butcher knives, they will never become Buddhas, till their doom. " Selected Works ofMao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-65), 4=416, 428.
138 See Mao, Selected Works, 1 : 1 17-18, 2:132-36; 4:10o-101; and Van Ness, Revolution and Chi- nese Foreign Policy, 4o-41.
139 See John Shy and Thomas Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Makers ofModern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), esp. 842-43; Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture
? ? ? Revolution and War
arid universalistic themes: the removal of foreign (i. e. , imperialist) influence from China was a central goal of the revolution, but the struggle in China was merely one part of the worldwide transition to socialism. 140 Mao also stressed the importance of identifying the "principal contradiction"-de- fined as the main threat at any given time-and endorsed Lenin's strategy of the "united front," which permitted temporary alliances with non-Com- munist groups against the most dangerous adversary, combined with preparations to undermine one's present allies when the opportunity arose. 141
The Chinese Revolution and the Balance ofThreats
The Balance of Power. As in the French, Russian, and Iranian cases, other states saw the revolution in China as a potential threat to the balance of power and as an opportunity to improve their own positions. Such perceptions were not entirely new, as China had been the object of great-power competition since the nineteenth century, and the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 had intensified foreign involvement in China's domestic affairs. The Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States continued to compete for influence during the interwar period, and Japanese expansionism in China was a crucial underlying cause of World War II in the Pacific.
The GMD became the main Asian ally of the United States during the war, although relations between Washington and Chongqing were strained by Chiang Kai-shek's (Jiang Jieshi's) constant requests for assistance and U. S. irritation at his preoccupation with fighting the CCP instead of the Japanese. 142 The United States also sent a small military mission to CCP headquarters in 1944, but support for Mao's forces never approached the level of aid provided to Chiang. 143 Nonetheless, U. S. president Franklin Roosevelt was convinced that U. S. -Soviet cooperation would continue after
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 17cr89; Tsou and Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy"; and Mao, Selected Works, 4:181-82.
? 140 See Mao, Selected Works, 2:342-47. After the Sino-Soviet split, Chinese commentators em- phasized that "world revolution relies on frhe thought of Mao Tse-tung. . . . [It] belongs not only to China but also has its international implications. " Quoted in Tsou and Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy," 82.
141 See Mao, Selected Works, 2:441-49; Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy, chap. 2; and Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front Doctrine in Chinese Communist His- tory2(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
1 4 See Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1 9 1 1 - 1 945 (New York: Macmillan, 1971); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in Chinafrom Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 74-77, 151-54, 187-<JW and Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), chap. 4?
143 See David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1 944 (Berkeley, Calif. : Center for Chinese Studies, 1970).
[)12]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
the war and envisioned a peaceful resolution of the CCP-GMD conflict that would grant the "so-called communists" a legitimate (albeit minority) posi- tion in a postwar Chinese government. 144
As World War II came to an end, however, U. S. officials became increas- ingly concemed that Communist control of Manchuria would lead to an ad- verse shift in the balance of power in Asia. 145 Truman and his advisors therefore favored the emergence of a strong and unified China that would help prevent Soviet expansion in the Far East, and Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in December 1945 in a last-ditch attempt to broker a settlement between the rival Chinese factions. Although Marshall's efforts were initially promising, he was unable to overcome the mutual sus- picions between the GMD and CCP, and a full-scale civil war was underway by the spring of 1946. In the meantime, the United States continued to send military aid to Chiang's forces and helped transport GMD units to northern China in an attempt to limit Communist influence there. 146
As U. S. -Soviet relations deteriorated and the CCP gained the upper hand, U. S. officials became even more concerned about the impact of a Communist victory on the global balance of power. Although U. S. officials disagreed over the magnitude of the threat, by 1949 there was a widespread belief that a Communist victory in China would constitute a major gain for the Soviet Union. 147 Truman and Acheson faced growing domestic criticism for having "lost China" after the CCP victory, and though the administration still refused to commit itself to defend Taiwan (where the remnants of the GMD had fled), U. S. policy in the Far East increasingly sought to contain Communist expan- ? ion and "drive a wedge" between the Soviet Union and the PRC. 148
144 See Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American ! Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 24-27.
145 At the end of 1945, U. S. officials feared that Communist control of Manchuria "would . . . place under the control of the Soviet Union the greatest agglomeration of power in the his- tory of the world. " Six months later, a State Department memorandum warned, "Our exclu- sion from China would probably result . . . in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials, and industrial power of Manchuria and China. The U. S. and the world might then be faced . . . with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelmingly strong in Europe and the Middle East as well. " Quoted in Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower: National Se- curit-y, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 127-28; and Steven I. Levine, "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: TheMarshallMissionandManchuria," DiplomaticHistoryJ, no. 4(1979), 354?
146 See Westad, Cold War and Revolu tion, 143-159, and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, vol. 4: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), 54-143.
147 See Leffler, Preponderance ofPower, 246-49. In May 1950, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that the loss of China "marked a shift in the balance of power in favor of So- viet Russia. " Quoted in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 195o-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 52:
148 On U. S. policy in the Far East, see John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History ofthe Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chaps. 4 and 6; Warren I.
? ? ? Revolution and War
. Soviet responses to the revolution in China reveal a similar preoccupation with the balance of power. Stalin's diplomacy in the Far East was aimed at securing specific territorial gains for the USSR and preventing either large- scale U. S. intervention or the emergence of a pro-Western Chinese govern? ment. 149 The Soviet Union had already obtained favorable territoriall concessions in China at the Yalta summit, and Soviet troops had occupied\ Manchuria at the end of the war and carried off a substantial quantity of in-
dustrial equipment. Soviet support for the CCP was quite limited during this period, however, and Stalin sought to preserve his gains by signing a friendship treaty with the GMD in 1945. Aid to the CCP rose substantially during the Chinese Civil War, but the Soviets refused to commit themselves to defend the CCP in the event that the United States intervened, and Stalin advised Mao to compromise with the GMD in order to further reduce the danger of a U. S. occupation. 150 Like his U. S. counterparts, in short, Stalin was primarily interested in preventing events in China from causing an ad- verse shift in the regional balance of power. And though U. S. officials be- lieved that Communist ideology created a strong bond between the Soviet Union and the CCP, Marxist solidarity had relatively little effect on Soviet
calculations. 151
PerceptionsofIntent. ThedeteriorationofSino-Americanrelationsalsoil- lustrates the tendency for revolutions to trigger spirals of exaggerated hos- tility. Of course, given the CCP's worldview and the onset of the U. S. -Soviet Cold War, the United States and the PRC were unlikely to es- tablish a close relationship. Yet Mao had predicted that the "international united front" of capitalist and socialist states would remain intact after
Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949-50," and Waldo Heinrichs, "American China Policy and the Cold War in Asia: A New Look," in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations 1947-1950, ed. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Columbia University Press, 198o); Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds. , Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A /oint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources, 1989); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Contro- versy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and David Allan Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U. S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
? ? 149 See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), chap. 1; and Westad, Cold War and Revolution, 118-21.
150 See Goncharov, Le? is, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 7, 25-26, 52-53.
151 SeeWestad,ColdWarandRevolution,chap. 2. UsefulaccountsofSovietrelationswiththe rival Chinese factions include Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners; Steven I. Levine, "Soviet-American Rivalry in Manchuria and the Cold War," in Dimensions ofChina's Foreign Relations, ed. Hsueh Chun-tu (New York: Praeger, 1977); and Robert Slusser, "Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1945-1950," in The Origins ofthe Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
World War II, and several CCP leaders hoped to minimize dependence on the Soviet Union by maintaining cordial relations with the United States as well. As Zhou En-lai told Marshall in 1946: "Of course we will lean to one side. But how far depends on you. "152 CCP officials repeatedly expressed their desire for diplomatic relations with all countries (including the United States), and the CCP made several overtures to U. S. officials in
1949. 153 Similarly, key U. S. officials did not think Sino-American hostility was inevitable (despite the widespread notion that the CCP was under Moscow's tutelage), and Secretary of State Dean Acheson apparently in- tended to pursue better relations with Beijing "when the dust had settled. " Indeed] despite his basic belief in U. S. hostility, even Mao assumed that recognition would be granted eventually and active U. S. opposition would be limited. 154
Unfortunately, a combination of real conflicts of interest and repeated misperceptions magnified each side's suspicions. 155 The idea that capitalist states were inherently aggressive was deeply rooted in Mao's worldview, and with the onset of Soviet-American rivalry he revised his earlier belief in postwar cooperation. Mao now concluded that war between the "two camps" was inevitable, and he predicted that U. S. imperialists would begin by trying to subjugate the "vast intermediate zone" (which included China). Thus, Mao's ideological image of imperialist behavior and his specific
152 Quoted in Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 45? After the arrival of the Dixie mission in 1944, Zhou En-lai told an aide that "with this channel established, future contacts will not be diffi- cult. . . . The prospects for future cooperation are boundless. " Mao declared in 1945 that the wartime cooperation between capitalist and socialist states would conHnue indefinitely, be- cause the Soviet Union was strong enough to deter a challenge and because "progressive forces" in the capitalist world would constrain the reactionary elements. Quoted in Westad, Cold War and Revolution, 61--&}, and Steven I. Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy towards lhe United States," in Borg and Heinrichs, Uncertain Years, 238-45.
153 Mao authorized Huang Hua to begin informal talks with U. S. ambassador J. Leighton Stuart in June, and another CCP official, Yao Yilin, began a similar initiative with Edmund Clubb, the U. S. consul-general in Beijing. U. S. military attache David Barrett also received a conciliatory message, allegedly from Zhou himself, but Stuart was ordered not to meet with Hua and nothing came of these initiatives. See Michael Hunt, "Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States," in Borg and Heinrichs, Uncertain Years, 207-209; and Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 47-48, 57? For a skeptical appraisal of these initiatives, see Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy," 274-78.
154 At the same time, the United States also began a series of initiatives-including covert actions-aimed at undermining the Communist forces in China. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford Univer- sity Press, 1990), 16; and Thomas J. Christensen, "A Lost Chance for What? Mao, Truman, and the Failure to Avoid Escalation in the Korean War," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (Boston, March 24-27, 1994), 7-9?
155 Summarizing the results of a 1986 conference between Chinese and American scholars, Harry Harding notes that the participants agreed that "each side also made decisions in the late 1940s that magnified the mistrust and skepticism of the other. " See Harding and Yuan, Sino-American Relations, xxi-xxii.
? ? Revolution and War
analysis of postwar international circumstances strongly inclined him to in- terpret U. S. actions in a negative light. 156
U. S. policy in the Far East did nothing to allay Mao's suspicions. The cen- tral problem was U. S. support for the GMD; although U. S. officials saw their earlier efforts to mediate between the CCP and GMD as evenhanded, U. S. policy makers had tried to minimize CCP influence and had consistently fa- vored Chiang. 157 Not surprisingly, Mao concluded that the United States could not be trusted and referred to Marshall's mediation effort as "a smoke screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way.
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
? ? Revolution and War
France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks. Britain and France tried to arrange a negotiated settlement, but the Nationalists Jl'efused to modify the terms of the National Pact and continued their preparations for an all-out offensive. The attack was finally launched in August 1922, the Greek forces were routed, and the remnants of the Greek Army had withdrawn by the end of the month. JJ9
n& According to Kemal, the agreement with France "proved to the whole world that the treaty [of Sevres) was merely a rag. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 135-38; and see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:97-99.
117 ItalyreporiedlyprovidedKemal'sforceswithadditionalmilitaryequipmentduringthis period, although the precise sources and magnitude of the support is hard to determine. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938) 2:1 349; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1 9 1 9-1925: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 264; and Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 135.
118 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 194; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:263-69.
119 SeeShawandShaw,OttomanEmpireandModernTurkey,2:362-63;Sonyel,TurkishDiplo- macy, 171-73; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 267-68.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
This campaign caused a final crisis with Great Britain, briefly bringing the two sides to the brink of war in September 1922. The Nationalists sought the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Turkish territory, including the removal of the remaining Greek forces in eastern Thrace. Lloyd George was still committed to the Greek cause, however, and the British government was worried that a further Turkish advance would jeopardize freedom of navigation in the Turkish Straits. As the Greeks withdrew, therefore, Great Britain reinforced its positions in the neutral zone established by the Treaty of 5evres and the Cabinet ordered the British commander, Lieutenant-Gen- eral Charles ("Tim") Harington, to oppose any attempt to force the straits. The French and Italian commanders sent small contingents in response to
Harington's request for a show of Allied solidarity, but both states subse- quently withdrew their forces after Lloyd George and Winston Churchill dispatched a bellicose message to the Dominions requesting support to de- fend the neutral zones. The rift was soon patched, and a joirit proposal for armistice negotiations was dispatched to the Turks on September 23, but it was clear that neither France nor Italy would go to war over this issue. Sup- port within England and the rest of the British Empire was doubtful as well, leaving Lloyd George virtually alone in his willingness to confront the Turks. 120 Egged on by the Soviets and by hard-liners within the Nationalist movement, elements of Kemal's forces entered the neutral zone and even- tually stood face-to-face with the outnumbered British garrison at Chanak.
Lloyd George was still determined to resist, however, and the British Cab- inet issued an ultimatum on September 29 demanding that the Turkish forces pull back from Chanak or be fired upon. Convinced that such an ulti- matum would merely provoke the Turks and make it more difficult to reach a negotiated solution, Harington and the British high commissioner, Horace Rumbold, chose to ignore the Cabinet's order. This decision prevented an immediate clash and gave time for cooler heads to prevail. Negotiations be- tween military representatives began on October 3, and a compromise was finally reached on the eleventh, just seventy-five minutes before the British troops were to have opened fire on the Turkish positions. 121 The Nationalists agreed to remain outside the neutral zones at Istanbul, Gallipoli, and Ismit pending a final peace settlement, while the Allies pledged that Greece would withdraw from eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa River. 122
121 See Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatiirk, 1919-1938 (Beverley, Eng. : Eothen Press, 1982), 63; and Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 351-55.
120 See Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975), 578.
122 On these events, see Evans, Slow Rapprochement, chap. 5; David Walder, The Chanak Af- fair (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 34o-58; Sonyel, Turkish Diplo- macy, 173-76; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 269-73; Nicolson, Curzon, 274-75; Laurence Evans,
United States Policy and the Partition ofTurkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
? ? Revolution and War
The armistice set the stage for the Lausanne Conference in 1923, which formally dismantled the Treaty of sevres and placed Turkey's relations with the West on a new basis. The Nationalists' primacy was now unchallenged, and when the Allies tried to invite representatives from the Istanbul and Ankara regimes, the Assembly simply abolished the sultanate and placed the office of the caliphate under its authority. After two separate rounds of negotiations, a final agreement was reached in July. With the exception of a clause granting Britain control over Mosul, Turkey's new borders corre-
sponded almost perfectly to the principles of the National Pact. 123 The En- tente accepted the borders established by the Treaty of Kars, and the restoration of eastern Thrace gave Turkey a foothold in Europe as well. The treaty abolished the foreign capitulations established during the Ottomall1l period (meaning that foreign residents and companies would now be sub- ject to Turkish law) and opened the Turkish Straits to international shipping under the control of an international commission. The parties also agreed to
conduct a compulsory population exchange between Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion. The exchange agreement eliminated the main source of Greco-Turkish ri- valry and paved the way for a major rapprochement at the end of the decade. 124
The Lausanne Conference also signaled Turkey's reemergence as a mem- ber of the international community. Elections for a new National Assembly were held in August 1923, the new Republic of Turkey was officially pro- claimed in October with Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) as its first president, and the capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara. With their triumph now complete, Kemal and his followers launched the extensive program of west- ernization that created the modem Turkish state. 125
Is the Turkish Revolution an Exception?
The Turkish Revolution differs in a number of ways from the other cases examined in this book, but many familiar features are present as weH.
sity Press, 1965), 378-86; Davidson, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197-<;9; and Kenneth 0. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 311)-23.
123 The text of the treaty is reprinted in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:119-127.
124 See Psomiades, Eastern Question, chap. 7; and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange ofMinorities and Its Impact on Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
125 Turkish diplomacy at Lausanne is described in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 199-208; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 185-229; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policrj, 1918-1948 (Ambilly-Annemasse: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950), 3&-50; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, chap. 9; and Evans, U. S. Policy and Turkey, chap. 14. For an account emphasizing Curzon's success in weaning Turkey away from Russia, see Nicolson, Curzon, chaps. 1o-11.
? ? ? [306]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Turkey's fragility in the aftermath of World War I led Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Russia to seek territorial acquisitions at the Turks' expense, and their conflicting ambitions gave rise to serious disagreements once the war was over. The revolution was not responsible for this power vacuum, how- ever, as Turkey's weakness was a direct result of its decision to align with the Central Powers and their subsequent defeat in 1918. Instead, the Na- tionalist revolution was itself a response to the sultan's inability to defend
Anatolia. Thus, although Turkey's vulnerability made it the object of intense foreign competition and encouraged direct military intervention, this was not directly attributable to the revolution.
Once the revolution was underway, however, both sides quickly con- cluded that the other was hostile and potentially threatening. The National- ist movement arose from Turkish opposition to foreign (especially Greek) intervention, and Kemal remained suspicious of the Entente for quite some
time. 126 Similarly, Britain and France saw the Kemalist movement as a threat to their postwar ambitions in the Near East, leading them to occupy Istan- bul in March 1920 and to endorse the Greek offensive later that summer.
In addition to the obvious conflicts of interest-the Allies wished to partition Turkey while the Nationalists sought to reestablish Turkish sover- eignty-Allied hostility was increased by several unfortunate mispercep- tions, particularly by the British. Lloyd George's belief that the Kemalist movement was a linear descendant of the Young Turks' Committee on Union and Progress (CUP) reinforced his pro-Greek sympathies, and the suspicion that Kemal harbored the same pan-Turkic tendencies displayed by earlier Turkish nationalists made the Nationalists seem even more threat- ening. 127 Lloyd George regarded the Turks as an "unspeakable" race that had "forfeited! their title to rule majorities of other peoples," and he once re-
ferred to Kemal as "no better than a carpet seller in a bazaar. " Stephen Evans reports that British officials placed the Nationalists "side by side with the CUP and the Bolsheviks," a view that nicely reveals British ignorance about the true character of the Nationalist movement. In particular, British leaders seem to have been unaware that Kemal had broken with Enver Pasha and the CUP in 1914, had explicitly rejected a pan-Turkic agenda, and had repeatedly expressed his desire for harmonious relations with the West. 12. s
126 In 1921, he told his followers, "I am not sure of the good faith of England, who wants to play us a trick. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95?
127 TheCUPhadplayedacentralroleintheOttomandecisiontoallywiththeCentralPowers, and CUP leaders such as Enver Pasha were strongly committed to a pan-Turkic foreign policy.
128 See Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 64? 5; Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, 319; and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 171-72. On the rivalry between Kemal and Enver Pasha, see Salahi R. Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1918-1922," Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1<)89).
? ? ? Revolution and War
Not surprisingly, these suspicions encouraged intransigence on both sides. Several unfortunate incidents reinforced perceptions of hostility, in- cluding the execution of a British subject on charges of espionage (which the British high commissioner in Istanbul saw as sign of the Nationalists' "un- compromising hostility towards His Majesty's government" ), a Nationalist raid on the British ship Palitana, and Britain's open support for the Greeks. 129 These events sustained the Nationalists' desire for the complete removal of all foreign troops and help explain why Lloyd George sought to oppose the Turkish advance on Istanbul in 1922Y0
The Nationalists' opponents also seem to have consistently underesti- mated Kemal's popularity and the military prowess of his troops while ex- aggerating their own capacity to impose a solution by force. This was most evident in the case of Greece and its British patron; although a number of British, French, arid Greek officials argued that Kemal would be difficult to defeat, Prime Minister Venizelos assured the Allies that the Greeks "would be able to clear up the whole of the neighborhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in the course of fifteen days. "131 The Greeks' initial successes boosted this overconfidence and silenced opposition but failed to overcome the Nationalist resistance and left the Greek forces badly overextended.
Nonetheless, Venizelos's successor as prime minister described Kemal's forces as a "rabble worthy of little or no consideration" and promised that a new offensive would "scatter the Kemalist forces and . . . impose the will of the powers" within three months. 132
As usual, these problems were exacerbated by uncertainty and misinfor- mation. In June 1919, for example, the British foreign office representative stated that he "knew nothing of Mustapha Kemal," and another Allied re- port declared that "the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken. " Other British agents re- ported that the Nationalist Congress at Erzerum had been a failure, and as noted earlier, top British officials were convinced that Kemal was either a Bolshevik or a follower of the CUP or else was under the control of the offi-
129 The remarks were made by High Commissioner Horace Rumbold; quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 115.
130 Lloyd George later blamed the failure of his policy in part on lack of information. De- scribing the initial emergence of Mustafa Kemal, he wrote that "no information had been re- ceived as to his activities in Asia Minor in reorganizing the shattered and depleted armies of Turkey. Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent. " Tru th about the Peace Treaties, 2:1285.
131 See Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 259? On the ill-advised nature of the Greek advance, see Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 54-58, 102-105.
132 The Greek government opposed any modification of the 5evres agreement at the Lon- don conference in February 1921, and the deputy chief of staff told the delegates that a re- newed Greek advance would proceed "up to Ankara as a first stage. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 96 (emphasis added); and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 239-40.
[3o8]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cial government in Istanbul. Moreover, the lack of official contacts forced Kemal to rely on unofficial channels, allowing these misconceptions to sur- vive intact. 133
Thus, although the Nationalist revolution in Turkey did not lead directly to war, it does provide partial support for my main propositions. Foreign powers did seek to exploit the vacuum resulting from the Ottoman collapse, and the revolutionary movement was seen as threatening to their interests and objectives. The level of threat was exaggerated, however, and opposing states overstated their ability to defeat the revolutionary movement by force. These misperceptions and miscalculations stemmed in part from a lack of information and inadequate channels of communication (although the impact of this factor varied). Finally, although all-out war was avoided, Britain and Turkey did come close in 1922 and could easily have stumbled into a serious clash. In short, the Turkish case is a partial exception at best: although war did not occur, the pressures for war that did arise are consis- tent with the theory.
Why were Turkey and the great powers able to avoid war, and why were the Turks able to integrate themselves into the existing order with far less di. fficulty than other revolutionary states?
First, the Turkish Revolution owed much of its moderate impact to its character as an elite revolution. Its leaders were for the most part prominent members of the old regime, and they were willing and able to seize power because the sultanate had been discredited by defeat and because they re- tained the loyalty of key institutions (especially the army). In addition, the Nationalists did not have to wage an extended struggle against internal op-
ponents, because the sultan lacked the capacity to resist and was increasingly dependent on foreign support. As a result, the Nationalist movement did not develop an elaborate ideology of social revolution in order to mobilize sup- porters and to justify its rule. The principle of national independence was sufficient, especially after the Greek invasion galvanized Turkish resistance. Although pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic programs were actively debated dur- ing the Young Turk period, Kemal explicitly rejected these more ambitious programs in favor of the limited goal of independence based on Turkish na- tionalism. Thus, the Nationalist program was limited to restoring national sovereignty within a specific geographic area, exporting the revolution was precluded by definition, and the revolution posed no ideological threat to its neighbors. 134 Thus, whereas the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, and the Iranian
133 "Thislackofdiplomaticcontactonlyreinforcedthe[British]HighCommission'sfalse assumptions concerning the Nationalists, and had the effect of keeping the two sides apart. " Stephen Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 65; and see Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 16cr72.
1 34 Armenia is a partial exception in this regard, because it had established itself on territo- ries that the Nationalists regarded as part of the Turkish homeland. See Shaw and Shaw, Ot- toman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:376.
? ? Revolution and War
clerics saw their opponents as intrinsically evil and endorsed revolutionary transformations at home and abroad, Kemal and his followers sought a rapnd reconciliation with the West in order to concentrate on modemization. 135
Second, like Mexico in 1916 and the United States after 1787, the revolu- tionary Turks profited from favorable international conditions. The Central Powers had been defeated and disarmed. The Entente was exhausted and war-weary. Russia was weakened and distracted by its own revolution. Great Britain tried to use the Greeks as surrogates but was unwilling to es- calate when this expedient failed, giving Kemal and the Nationalists the time they needed to consolidate their position. The revolution in Russia and the antipathy between Moscow and the West was a valuable asset for the Turks as well. In addition to obtaining modest amounts of financial and mnl-
itary assistance from the Bolsheviks, Kemal was able to play off the two sides, wnth considerable success. As in the French and Russian cases, in short, divisions among the other great powers prevented joint action to ar- rest or reverse the revolution.
The Turkish case reveals many familiar dynamics of revolutionary situa- tions, but in a muted and less dangerous form. The preferences and goals of the Nationalists differed from those of the old regime and threatened the in- terests of several foreign powers. These states found it difficult to formulate an effective response to the revolutionary movement because they overesti- mated its hostility and underestimated its capabilities, giving rise to exag- gerated perceptions of threat and making the use of force somewhat more attractive. These states revised their estimates over time, however, and
eventually reestablished more or less cordial relations.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
As my theory would predict, the revolution in Chi. na contributed to the emerging security competition between the United States and the Sovieft Union and played a major role in bringing the Cold War to Asia. The new regime went to war in Korea less than a year after gaining power, and the origins of its involvement bear a striking resemblance to those of the wars that followed the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) also highlights the tension between revolutionary objectives and systemic constraints. Al- though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly endorsed the goal of
135 Kemal warned in a 1923 speech: "The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. . . . Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for the new victories in science and economics. " Quoted in Lewis, Emergence ofModern Turkey, 255-56.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
world revolution and saw its victory as a model for other developing coun- tries, Chinese foreign policy tended to be cautious and defensive, focused more on preserving Chinese security than on promoting revolution. On the whole, therefore, the Chinese Revolution provides strong support for the main argument of this book.
Maoist Revolutionary Ideology
Maoist political thought closely resembles the ideal type of revolutionary ideology described in chapter 2. 136 During its long struggle against both the Guomindang (GMD) and Japan, the CCP developed a body of revolution- ary doctrine designed to inspire prolonged sacrifices and provide tactical guidance to the Communist cadres. As a Marxist-Leninist, CCP leader Mao Tse-tung viewed politics as inherently competitive and regarded oppo- nents-e- specially the imperialist powers-as hostile. 137 The Maoist world- view was also intrinsically optimistic: although enemies might appear stronger, they were actually "paper tigers. " "In appearance [they] are terri- fying but in reality they are not so powerful. " As a result, victory was in- evitable provided the cadres did not lose heart. 138 Like Lenin, Mao tempered this optimism with a sense of realism, stressing the need to analyze political and strategic problems systematically and warning against both rightist de- viations (passivity and fear of struggle) and leftist deviations (overconfident recklessness). In his words, the CCP should "despise the enemy strategi- cally while taking full account of him tactically," meaning that although vic- tory was inevitable, achieving it required prolonged effort, careful preparation, and tactical flexibility. 139 Maoist ideology combined nationalist
136 In addition to Mao's writings, this summary of Maoist ideology is based on Stuart Schram, The Thought ofMao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), chap. 2; J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplo- macy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); chaps. 1-2; Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," Political Science Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1955); and Tang Tsou and Mor- ton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behav- ior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 1 (1965).
137 Likening imperialism to a "wild beast," Mao told his followers not to show "the slight- est timidity. " In his words: "Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him-one or the other. " He also warned that "when we say 'imperialism is ferocious,' we mean that its nature will never change, the imperialists will never lay down their butcher knives, they will never become Buddhas, till their doom. " Selected Works ofMao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-65), 4=416, 428.
138 See Mao, Selected Works, 1 : 1 17-18, 2:132-36; 4:10o-101; and Van Ness, Revolution and Chi- nese Foreign Policy, 4o-41.
139 See John Shy and Thomas Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Makers ofModern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), esp. 842-43; Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture
? ? ? Revolution and War
arid universalistic themes: the removal of foreign (i. e. , imperialist) influence from China was a central goal of the revolution, but the struggle in China was merely one part of the worldwide transition to socialism. 140 Mao also stressed the importance of identifying the "principal contradiction"-de- fined as the main threat at any given time-and endorsed Lenin's strategy of the "united front," which permitted temporary alliances with non-Com- munist groups against the most dangerous adversary, combined with preparations to undermine one's present allies when the opportunity arose. 141
The Chinese Revolution and the Balance ofThreats
The Balance of Power. As in the French, Russian, and Iranian cases, other states saw the revolution in China as a potential threat to the balance of power and as an opportunity to improve their own positions. Such perceptions were not entirely new, as China had been the object of great-power competition since the nineteenth century, and the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 had intensified foreign involvement in China's domestic affairs. The Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States continued to compete for influence during the interwar period, and Japanese expansionism in China was a crucial underlying cause of World War II in the Pacific.
The GMD became the main Asian ally of the United States during the war, although relations between Washington and Chongqing were strained by Chiang Kai-shek's (Jiang Jieshi's) constant requests for assistance and U. S. irritation at his preoccupation with fighting the CCP instead of the Japanese. 142 The United States also sent a small military mission to CCP headquarters in 1944, but support for Mao's forces never approached the level of aid provided to Chiang. 143 Nonetheless, U. S. president Franklin Roosevelt was convinced that U. S. -Soviet cooperation would continue after
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 17cr89; Tsou and Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy"; and Mao, Selected Works, 4:181-82.
? 140 See Mao, Selected Works, 2:342-47. After the Sino-Soviet split, Chinese commentators em- phasized that "world revolution relies on frhe thought of Mao Tse-tung. . . . [It] belongs not only to China but also has its international implications. " Quoted in Tsou and Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy," 82.
141 See Mao, Selected Works, 2:441-49; Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy, chap. 2; and Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front Doctrine in Chinese Communist His- tory2(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
1 4 See Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1 9 1 1 - 1 945 (New York: Macmillan, 1971); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in Chinafrom Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 74-77, 151-54, 187-<JW and Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), chap. 4?
143 See David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1 944 (Berkeley, Calif. : Center for Chinese Studies, 1970).
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the war and envisioned a peaceful resolution of the CCP-GMD conflict that would grant the "so-called communists" a legitimate (albeit minority) posi- tion in a postwar Chinese government. 144
As World War II came to an end, however, U. S. officials became increas- ingly concemed that Communist control of Manchuria would lead to an ad- verse shift in the balance of power in Asia. 145 Truman and his advisors therefore favored the emergence of a strong and unified China that would help prevent Soviet expansion in the Far East, and Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in December 1945 in a last-ditch attempt to broker a settlement between the rival Chinese factions. Although Marshall's efforts were initially promising, he was unable to overcome the mutual sus- picions between the GMD and CCP, and a full-scale civil war was underway by the spring of 1946. In the meantime, the United States continued to send military aid to Chiang's forces and helped transport GMD units to northern China in an attempt to limit Communist influence there. 146
As U. S. -Soviet relations deteriorated and the CCP gained the upper hand, U. S. officials became even more concerned about the impact of a Communist victory on the global balance of power. Although U. S. officials disagreed over the magnitude of the threat, by 1949 there was a widespread belief that a Communist victory in China would constitute a major gain for the Soviet Union. 147 Truman and Acheson faced growing domestic criticism for having "lost China" after the CCP victory, and though the administration still refused to commit itself to defend Taiwan (where the remnants of the GMD had fled), U. S. policy in the Far East increasingly sought to contain Communist expan- ? ion and "drive a wedge" between the Soviet Union and the PRC. 148
144 See Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American ! Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 24-27.
145 At the end of 1945, U. S. officials feared that Communist control of Manchuria "would . . . place under the control of the Soviet Union the greatest agglomeration of power in the his- tory of the world. " Six months later, a State Department memorandum warned, "Our exclu- sion from China would probably result . . . in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials, and industrial power of Manchuria and China. The U. S. and the world might then be faced . . . with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelmingly strong in Europe and the Middle East as well. " Quoted in Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower: National Se- curit-y, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 127-28; and Steven I. Levine, "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: TheMarshallMissionandManchuria," DiplomaticHistoryJ, no. 4(1979), 354?
146 See Westad, Cold War and Revolu tion, 143-159, and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, vol. 4: Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987), 54-143.
147 See Leffler, Preponderance ofPower, 246-49. In May 1950, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that the loss of China "marked a shift in the balance of power in favor of So- viet Russia. " Quoted in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 195o-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 52:
148 On U. S. policy in the Far East, see John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History ofthe Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chaps. 4 and 6; Warren I.
? ? ? Revolution and War
. Soviet responses to the revolution in China reveal a similar preoccupation with the balance of power. Stalin's diplomacy in the Far East was aimed at securing specific territorial gains for the USSR and preventing either large- scale U. S. intervention or the emergence of a pro-Western Chinese govern? ment. 149 The Soviet Union had already obtained favorable territoriall concessions in China at the Yalta summit, and Soviet troops had occupied\ Manchuria at the end of the war and carried off a substantial quantity of in-
dustrial equipment. Soviet support for the CCP was quite limited during this period, however, and Stalin sought to preserve his gains by signing a friendship treaty with the GMD in 1945. Aid to the CCP rose substantially during the Chinese Civil War, but the Soviets refused to commit themselves to defend the CCP in the event that the United States intervened, and Stalin advised Mao to compromise with the GMD in order to further reduce the danger of a U. S. occupation. 150 Like his U. S. counterparts, in short, Stalin was primarily interested in preventing events in China from causing an ad- verse shift in the regional balance of power. And though U. S. officials be- lieved that Communist ideology created a strong bond between the Soviet Union and the CCP, Marxist solidarity had relatively little effect on Soviet
calculations. 151
PerceptionsofIntent. ThedeteriorationofSino-Americanrelationsalsoil- lustrates the tendency for revolutions to trigger spirals of exaggerated hos- tility. Of course, given the CCP's worldview and the onset of the U. S. -Soviet Cold War, the United States and the PRC were unlikely to es- tablish a close relationship. Yet Mao had predicted that the "international united front" of capitalist and socialist states would remain intact after
Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949-50," and Waldo Heinrichs, "American China Policy and the Cold War in Asia: A New Look," in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations 1947-1950, ed. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Columbia University Press, 198o); Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds. , Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A /oint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources, 1989); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Contro- versy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and David Allan Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U. S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
? ? 149 See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), chap. 1; and Westad, Cold War and Revolution, 118-21.
150 See Goncharov, Le? is, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 7, 25-26, 52-53.
151 SeeWestad,ColdWarandRevolution,chap. 2. UsefulaccountsofSovietrelationswiththe rival Chinese factions include Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners; Steven I. Levine, "Soviet-American Rivalry in Manchuria and the Cold War," in Dimensions ofChina's Foreign Relations, ed. Hsueh Chun-tu (New York: Praeger, 1977); and Robert Slusser, "Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1945-1950," in The Origins ofthe Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
World War II, and several CCP leaders hoped to minimize dependence on the Soviet Union by maintaining cordial relations with the United States as well. As Zhou En-lai told Marshall in 1946: "Of course we will lean to one side. But how far depends on you. "152 CCP officials repeatedly expressed their desire for diplomatic relations with all countries (including the United States), and the CCP made several overtures to U. S. officials in
1949. 153 Similarly, key U. S. officials did not think Sino-American hostility was inevitable (despite the widespread notion that the CCP was under Moscow's tutelage), and Secretary of State Dean Acheson apparently in- tended to pursue better relations with Beijing "when the dust had settled. " Indeed] despite his basic belief in U. S. hostility, even Mao assumed that recognition would be granted eventually and active U. S. opposition would be limited. 154
Unfortunately, a combination of real conflicts of interest and repeated misperceptions magnified each side's suspicions. 155 The idea that capitalist states were inherently aggressive was deeply rooted in Mao's worldview, and with the onset of Soviet-American rivalry he revised his earlier belief in postwar cooperation. Mao now concluded that war between the "two camps" was inevitable, and he predicted that U. S. imperialists would begin by trying to subjugate the "vast intermediate zone" (which included China). Thus, Mao's ideological image of imperialist behavior and his specific
152 Quoted in Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 45? After the arrival of the Dixie mission in 1944, Zhou En-lai told an aide that "with this channel established, future contacts will not be diffi- cult. . . . The prospects for future cooperation are boundless. " Mao declared in 1945 that the wartime cooperation between capitalist and socialist states would conHnue indefinitely, be- cause the Soviet Union was strong enough to deter a challenge and because "progressive forces" in the capitalist world would constrain the reactionary elements. Quoted in Westad, Cold War and Revolution, 61--&}, and Steven I. Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy towards lhe United States," in Borg and Heinrichs, Uncertain Years, 238-45.
153 Mao authorized Huang Hua to begin informal talks with U. S. ambassador J. Leighton Stuart in June, and another CCP official, Yao Yilin, began a similar initiative with Edmund Clubb, the U. S. consul-general in Beijing. U. S. military attache David Barrett also received a conciliatory message, allegedly from Zhou himself, but Stuart was ordered not to meet with Hua and nothing came of these initiatives. See Michael Hunt, "Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States," in Borg and Heinrichs, Uncertain Years, 207-209; and Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 47-48, 57? For a skeptical appraisal of these initiatives, see Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy," 274-78.
154 At the same time, the United States also began a series of initiatives-including covert actions-aimed at undermining the Communist forces in China. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford Univer- sity Press, 1990), 16; and Thomas J. Christensen, "A Lost Chance for What? Mao, Truman, and the Failure to Avoid Escalation in the Korean War," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (Boston, March 24-27, 1994), 7-9?
155 Summarizing the results of a 1986 conference between Chinese and American scholars, Harry Harding notes that the participants agreed that "each side also made decisions in the late 1940s that magnified the mistrust and skepticism of the other. " See Harding and Yuan, Sino-American Relations, xxi-xxii.
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analysis of postwar international circumstances strongly inclined him to in- terpret U. S. actions in a negative light. 156
U. S. policy in the Far East did nothing to allay Mao's suspicions. The cen- tral problem was U. S. support for the GMD; although U. S. officials saw their earlier efforts to mediate between the CCP and GMD as evenhanded, U. S. policy makers had tried to minimize CCP influence and had consistently fa- vored Chiang. 157 Not surprisingly, Mao concluded that the United States could not be trusted and referred to Marshall's mediation effort as "a smoke screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way.
