To the extent that they are a cause they
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i.
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
"The defilements should be abandoned through separation from the object {alambandt kleidh prahdtavydh), for it is through the force of the "complete knowledge" {parijfidna) of the object that the defilements are abandoned.
The object of the anusayas is twofold:
sarhyogavastu or asamyogavastu. Possession (prdpti, ii. 36) of the anusayas which have for their object (or sphere, visaya = dlambana) a sarhyogavastu, and also of the anus'ayas which do not have such an object but which are produced by the first anuiayas, exists in the series which constitutes a being; even when this series is of non-defiled mind, this possession continues uninterruptedly, the effect and the cause of past and future defilements respectively. The same holds for possession of the anuiayas which has for its object an asarhyogavastu and for anuiayas not having such an object and which becomes active immediately after the defilements which have such an object: presently existing possession
is the cause of the production of the future defilement, and the outflowing effect of the former defilement.
But the possession of the anuiayas is opposed {viruddha) by the presence {samavad- hdna) in the series of the possession which proceeds from a path of abandoning opposing the anuiayas: for it is this possession of the anuiayas which supports the present and the future defilements which are possessed thanks to it. It results from this--some defilements produced through a certain object setting into motion some defilements which have another object--that when [a good possession is produced], the outflowing of a path embracing the abandoning of this certain object, the possession of the defilements disappears, and the possessed defilements, even though they remain the same with respect to their object, nevertheless no longer have [the possession] which is their cause and their result; so one cannot say that they are abandoned. When the object is not "completely known," the possessions, effects and causes of past and future defilements, continue uninterruptedly as possessions of the defilments bearing on this object as well as the possessions of the defilments having anohter object but produced by the first. When the object is "completely known," the possession is interrupted. Thus the abandoning of the defilements takes place through separation from its object {alambandt)"
But, if one means to say that the defilements are abandoned through "the abandoning of their objects, etc. ," why say that they are abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the object? They are in fact abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the Truth of Suffering, etc. , existing when this latter is missing, and not existing when this latter is present. Those who say that the defilements are abandoned through the force of their opposition should admit that the defilements abandoned through Meditation are abandoned through the force of the complete knowledge of the Truth of Suffering, etc. , which is their object. {Vyakhyd).
204. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 83a8; Prakarana, TD, p. 26a6. For other removings, ii. 67a, iv. 7c, p. 571.
205. The Abhidharma says: dure dharmah katame / atttdndgatd dharmah / antike dharmah katame / pratyutpannd dharma asarhskrtam c<*. Quoted by Aryadeva, Catuhiatikd, 258, Memosres As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8 (1894, p. 492), argument concerning past and future. On distant and near rupa, see i20a-b (English trans, pp. 77 and following).
206. This is the explanation of the Sautrantikas; according to the Vyakhyd: evarh tuyuktam sydd iti svamatam dearyasya.
207. de dag gi / bral ba'i thob pay an dan yan / = [visamyogaldbhah tebhyah punah punah ] One takes possession many times, and in a firmer and firmer manner, of the unconditioned dharma which is Nirvana, the pratisarhkhydnirodha or visamyoga of the defilements (i. 6, ii. 55d, 57d).
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208. This refers to the five faculties (ii. 2a-b, English trans, p. 155) (sraddhd, etc. ) that the ascetic increases (vivfddhi), makes evolve or transposes (samcdra), and makes sharp (ttksna).
209. Hsiian-tsang introduces into his translation {TD 29, p. 112al-l6) the following commentary: "Let us consider the ascetic whose faculties are weak (mrdu): a. There six times when the acquisition of disconnection from the defilements of Kamadhatu abandoned through Seeing the Truths takes place: 1. arising of the opposition, namely diverse dharmajrldnas of Suffering, etc. ; 2-5. the acquisition of the four results; and 6. at the moment when the moral faculties become strong {ttksna).
The same for disconnection from the defilements of the two higher spheres abandoned through Seeing the first three Truths. (Here the opposition is anvayajndna).
b. For the defilements of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu abandoned through Seeing the fourth Truth, only five moments are counted, because the time of the arising of their opposition (namely marge'nvayajfidna) is also the time of the acquistion of the first result {srotadpattiphala).
c. For the first five categories of defilement of Kamadhatu abandoned through Meditation, only five moments are counted: for one should exclude the acquisition of the first result which is earlier than the abandoning of these first five categories.
d. For the sixth category of these same defilements, four moments: for the time of the arising of the opposition (namely the sixth vimuktimdrga) is also the time of the acquisition of the second result {sakrddgdmiphala).
e. For the seventh and eighth categories of these same defilements, four moments are counted, since the acquisition of the first two results is earlier than the abandoning of these two categories.
f. For the ninth category of these same defilements, three moments are counted: (1) arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktimdrga) which is confused wiht the acquisition of the third result {andgdmiphala), (2) acquisition of the fruit of Arhat, and (3) perfectioning of the indriyas.
g. For the defilements of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu abandoned through Meditation, with the exclusion of the ninth category of Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjndyatana), three moments are counted, since the first three results have already been acquired.
h. For the ninth category of the defilements of Bhavagra, two moments are counted, because the arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktimdrga) is confused with the acquisition of the result of Arhat.
When the ascetic has strong faculties, he should avert, in the eight cases, the moment of the perfectioning of his faculties. [Thus, disconnection from the last category of defilements is obtained only once. If the author says: 'and, by reducing the number, down to two times,' this is because he has in view the case of repeated acquisitions {punarldbha)].
The Ascetic who does not pass through all of the results (ii. l6c-d, vi. 33a) may reduce these numbers. "
210. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 175al2-18: What is j&dnaparijnd! Jndna, darsana, vidyd, bodhi, abhisamaya . . . What sort of jndna is called jndnaparijnd} According to some only pure jndna, because the definition employs the term abhisamaya {Kofa, vi. 27): now lokasamvrtijndna {Ko/a, vii2b) cannot be called abhisamaya.
What is prahdnaparijfid? The complete abandoning of rdga, the complete abandoning of pratigha and vicikitsd, the complete abandoning of all the defilements, is called prahdnaparijnd. Petfectly knowing (pari-jfid) an object is called parijnd. Now abandoning does not have an object and does not know. How can one speak of prahdnaparijn'd "parijnd which is abandoning? " But prahdna, being the result of knowledge, also receives the name of parijnd.
The Sautrantikas say that there are two parijnd: 1. jfiaparijnd, which is jndna by nature, and 2. prahdnaparijn'd, which is prahdna by nature.
? 211. In the Jnanaprastbana, according to Takakusu, p. 89; the three "worldly" parinnas (relating to nourishment) are in Childers and Visuddhimagga, 606, 692.
212. Hsiian-tsang comments on this first pdda: "all are the result of andgamya, because anagamy a is the support for the abandoning of the defilements of the Three Dhatus abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. " On andgamya, the absorption preparatory to the First Dhyana, see vi. 47c-d, and viii. 22a.
213. The second pdda shows that this refers to a sdmantaka of Aruupyadhatu; for andgamya is sdmantaka to the First Dhyana.
214. The pure path does not exist in the Fourth Arupya.
215. Vikalikrti, "mutilation," is the abandoning of one part of Bhavagra, bhavdgrapradeia- prahdna, the abandoning of a part of the defilements relative to the highest stage of existence.
216. According to the Vydkhyd: the Abhidharmikas. Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 322b9.
217. Even though the category of klesas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, as long as the universal cause abandoned through the Seeing of Arising (and which bears on the first category) is not abandoned, there is no destruction of the two causes, and no parijnd. Even though the first eight categories of klesa (strong-strong . . . weak-medium) of a sphere is abandoned, as long as the ninth (weak-weak) is not abandoned, the sphere is not transcended.
Hsiian-tsang adds: "There can be destruction of the two causes without there being 'transgression of a sphere. '" Thus we establish the fourth alternative. In fact, the destruction of the two causes in the three bhumis (three lower Dhyanas, three lower Arupyas) do not constitute parijnd (the seventh and the eighth patijUd according to the case).
218. The sixteenth moment {marge'nvayajndna) forms part of the Path of Meditation.
219. The Aryan who has obtained detachment from Kamadhatu through the wordly path before entering into the "comprehension of the Truths" becomes an Anagamin in marge'nvayajndna and possesses, from this jn~dna onward, only avarabhdgiyaprahdnaparijnd. - However the anupurvaka takes possession of this only later, when he becomes detached from Kamadhatu (ii. l6c-d; vi36d).
220. The Anagamin is called rupavitardga, "detached from Rupa. " 221. Hsiian-tsang corrects some items.
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The Path and the Saints1
o m. Homage to the Buddha.
We have said (v. 64) how the abandoning (prahdna) of the defilements receives the name of "perfea knowledge" (parijnd). As for abandoning,
la-b. It has been said that the defilements are abandoned
2 through Seeing the Truths and through Meditation.
We have explained in detail that some of the defilements are to be abandoned through Seeing, and others through Meditation (v. 3c-5a, etc. ). Is the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation pure (andsrava) or impure (sdsrava)?
lc-d. The Path of Meditation is of two types; the Path of Seeing
3 is pure.
The Path of Meditation is worldly or impure as well as trans- worldly or pure.
The Path of Seeing is opposed to the defilements of the Three Dhatus; it eliminates in one single stroke the nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of the defilements to be abandoned through Seeing: it is thus exclusively tratisworldly; now such a power does not belong to a worldly path.
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We have said (lb), "through Seeing the Truths. " What are the Truths?
4
In the First Chapter. By saying "The pure dharmas are the Truth of the Path . . . " (i. 5), we have designated the Truth of the Path by its name. By saying "Pratisamkhyanirodha is disconnec- tion," (i. 6) we have designated the Truth of Extinction. By saying "Suffering, origin, world . . . ," we have designated the Truths of Suffering and Origin (i. 8).
Is that the order of the Truths? No. Rather:
2b-c. Namely suffering, origin, extinction, and path.
The word "namely" (tatha) indicates that the nature of the Truths is indeed as has been mentioned in the First Chapter.
5
The Truth that is understood first is mentioned first. Other- wise there would be the occurance of first mentioning the cause (Origin and Path) and then the result (Suffering and Extinction).
Sometimes dharmas are arranged in the order in which they arise: this is the case for the applications of mindfulness, the
6
smrtyupasthanas, and for the Dhyanas.
Sometimes they are arranged in an order favorable for teaching: this is the case for the right abandonings, the samyak-
7
prahanas, --existent dharmas and the black dharmas are easier to
2a. The Four Truths have been mentioned.
Where?
2c-d. Their order is that in which they are understood.
? understand than non-arisen dharmas and the white dharmas,~for it is not a fixed rule that one should make an effort to abandon the existent dharmas before making an effort for the non-arising of non-arisen dharmas.
The Truths are mentioned in the order in which they are comprehended {abhisamaya).
Why are they comprehended in this order?
Because, in the period preparatory to the Path proper, that is,
8
the period of examination, the ascetic first creates an idea of that
to which he is attached, of that by which he is tormented, of that from which he seeks to be delivered, namely, suffering. Then he asks what is its cause, and he creates an idea of its origin. Then he asks what does extinction consist of, and he creates an idea of extinction. Then he asks what is the Path to extinction, and he creates an idea of the path. (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 404bll).
So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its origin, its disappearance, and its remedy. This illustration of the Truths is also given in the Sutra.
In which Sutra? In the Sutra which says, "Endowed with the
9
In the order in which, in the course of the period of examina- tion, he creates an idea of the Truths, in this same order, having reached the period of comprehension, he understands the Truths, because comprehension is projected by the preparatory exercises, the same way that a horse gallops without obstacle over familiar terrain.
***
What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya (comprehen- sion)? This word signifies abhisambodha, ''understanding, comprehension. " The root i signifies "to understand/'
four qualities, the doctor . . . "
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Why is comprehension only pure? Because it is a knowledge
{aya) turned towards {abhi) Nirvana and the true (sam, samyak). 10
Samyak means conforming to reality.
To the extent that they are a result, the five updddnaskandhas
(i. 8a-b) are the Truth of Suffering, that which one should see in
truth as being suffering.
To the extent that they are a cause they
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i. 8c). Consequently suffering and arising differ in name,
but do not differ in fact, since they are the same updddnaskandhas considered as result or as cause. But Extinction and the Path differ in fact as well as in name.
*##
The Sutra gives the name of aryasatya, truth of the Aryans, to the Truths. What is the meaning of this expression?
They are truth for the Aryans, truths of the Aryans: this is why
11 they are called aryasatya.
Does this mean that they are false for the non-Aryans? Not being erroneous {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26), they are true for everyone. [But the Aryans see them as they are, that is to say, under sixteen aspects (vii. 13): they see suffering, that is, the updddnaksandhas as suffering, impermanent, etc. Others do not. Therefore, the Truths are called "truths of the Aryans" and not truths of others, because the seeing of these latter is incorrect. In fact, they see what is suffering as being not suffering. ] As the stanza says,
"What the Aryans call happy (i. e. , Nirvana) others call painful;
13 what others call happy, the Aryans call painful. "
14
According to other masters, two are Aryan truths, and two
are truths of both Aryans and others.
? Since only a part of sensation (vedand) is painful by its nature (duhkhd vedana, i. 14). how can one say that all impure, conditi- oned things are suffering?
3. Impure dharmas, whether they are agreeable, disagreea-
ble, or otherwise, are, without exception, suffering, by
reason of the three types of suffering, each according to its
15 type.
There are three types of suffering: suffering which is suffering in and of itself {duhkhaduhkhata), suffering through the fact of being conditioned (samskdraduhkhatd), and suffering which is change or transformation (parindmaduhkbata).
By reason of these three, all impure conditioned things, without exception, are suffering: agreeable things are suffering because they are subject to transformation; disagreeable things are suffering in and of themselves; and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable things are suffering because they are conditioned. What are the agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable dharmas?
The three sensations, in this order; and, by reason of the three sensations, all the samskdras which result in agreeable sensation, etc. , receive the name of agreeable, etc.
Agreeable sensation is suffering through transformation, as the Sutra says, "Agreeable sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable while it lasts, but suffering in its change. "
Disagreeable sensation is suffering by nature, as the Sutra says, "Suffering sensation is suffering when it arises, and suffering while it lasts. "
Neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation is suffering
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because it is so decreed by its causes, as the Sutra says, "That which is impermanent is suffering. "
The same holds true for the samskdras which result in these
16
According to other masters, the expressions duhkhaduhkhatd, etc. , should be analysed: duhkham eva duhkhatd ("suffering is itself suffering''), viparindma eva duhkhatd ("transformation is itself suffering"), and samskara eva duhkhatd ("conditioned things are themselves suffering"). The meaning is the same.
***
Agreeable dharmas do not participate in suffering which is suffering in and of itself, nor do the disagreeable dharmas participate in suffering which is transformation: the second state of suffering belongs to the first ones, and the first to the second ones. But all conditioned things are suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned, and they are seen under this aspect only by the Aryans. Therefore it is said, "One does not feel a hair placed on the palm of the hand; but the same hair, in the eye, causes suffering and injury. So too the ignorant, resembling the hand, do not feel the hair which is suffering through the fact of being conditioned: but the Aryans, resembling
17
The Aryans make of existence in the most sublime heaven (Bhavagra) an idea more painful than do fools make of existence in the most dreadful hell (Avici).
***
sensations as for these sensations themselves.
***
the eye, are tortured by it. "
? But, one would say, the Path is conditioned; it should thus be suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being
18
The Path is not suffering, because the definition of suffering is to be hateful. Now the Path is not hateful to the Aryans because it produces the extinction of all of the sufferings of arising; when they consider Nirvana as peaceful, what they consider as peaceful is the extinction of what they consider as suffering [namely impure conditioned things, and not the extinction of the Path].
***
But, since the agreeable or happiness does exist, why is only suffering, and not the agreeable, a truth of the Aryans?
19
1. According to one explanation,
of happiness. In the same way that one calls a pile in which some peas are to be found "a pile of beans," so too no one with any intelligence would consider a wound as agreeable because one experiences a very small agreeable sensation when one washes this wound.
2. And further, "Because it is a cause of suffering, because it is
produced by many sufferings, because one desires it when one
20 suffers (see p. 903), the agreeable, they conclude, is suffering. "
21
3. But, even if accompanied by happiness,
totality has the same flavor of suffering through the fact of being conditioned: Aryans thus consider it as suffering. This is why suffering and not happiness is an Aryan Truth.
***
i. But how can Aryans regard sensations which are agreeable by nature as suffering?
conditioned.
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it is because of the slightness
existence in its
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They are hateful by reason of their impermanence in the same way that they consider the rupas, samjnds, etc. , as suffering, even though the rupas, samjnds, etc. , are not suffering in the same way as is disagreeable sensation.
ii. With regard to the proposed argument "The agreeable is suffering because it is a cause of suffering": (1) to be a cause of suffering is its aspect (akdra) or origin (vii. l3a); to see things as a cause of suffering is not to see them as suffering; (2) how could the Aryans born in Rupadhatu and in Arupyadhatu have an idea of suffering? For the skandhas of these spheres are not a cause of suffering; (3) why would the Sutra mention suffering through the fact of being conditioned? If Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, then suffering through the fact of being conditioned [that is, "What is impermanent is suffering"] would be useless.
iii. But if Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is impermanent, then what is the difference between the aspects of suffering and of impermanence? There would be confusion between "seeing things as suffering" and "seeing things as impermanent. "
One sees things as impermanent because their nature is to arise and perish; one sees them as suffering because they are hateful. When one has seen them as impermanent, they become hateful. The characteristic of impermanence implies the characteristic of suffering, but it is not subsumed in this characteristic.
22
iv. Certain masters deny any agreeable sensation, affirming
that all is suffering. They prove this thesis by Scripture and by reasoning.
Scripture: The Blessed One said, "Suffering is to be found in
any and all sensation"; "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as
suffering"; and "It is an error to regard what is suffering as
23 agreeable. "
Reasoning: 1. Because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure. The things that one pretends to be causes of
? pleasure,-food, drink, cold, warmth, etc. ,-when they are grasped or experienced to excess or out of season become causes of suffering. Now it is inadmissible that a cause of pleasure, because it has increased, or presents itself at a different moment,--even if it remains completely the same,--would produce suffering. Conse- quently these pretended causes of pleasure are, from their origins, the causes of suffering and not the causes of pleasure: for later suffering will grow and become felt. The same holds for the four positions (tryapatha), the position of lying down, sitting down, etc. (p. 907).
2. Because the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but sometime a remedy for suffering or a modification of suffering, (a) As long as a person is not tormented by sufferings which are caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, he will not have any sensation which he will feel to be agreeable. Consequently the ignorant have the idea of pleasure, not with regard to true pleasure, but with regard to the relief of suffering,
(b) Fools also have the idea of pleasure with regard to the
modification of suffering: for example to pass a burden from one
24 shoulder to another.
Consequently agreeable things do not exist.
v. They exist, say the Abhidharmikas; and we would say, this is well proved.
1. We would ask him who denies the existence of pleasure,
25 What is suffering? If he answers, "That which is painful," we
would then ask, "How is it painful? " If he answers, "Because it does evil," we would say that "that which does good" is agreeable. If he answers, "Because it is not desired," we would say that "that
26 which is desired" is agreeable.
2. But, one would say, this same "desire" is no longer cherished by the Aryans when they obtain detachment. Thus the quality of "desirable" is not proved.
This objection is useless, for if Aryans, once they become
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detached, no longer cherish it, it is then from another point of view that it is undesirable to them.
The sensation which, in itself, is desirable, will never become, in itself, undesirable. Consequently, it is not from the point of view of its intrinsic nature, but from another point of view that Aryans do not cherish agreeable sensation. Rather, they hate it for its defects: it is the occasion for the loss of good dharmas, it is acquired only at great effort, it is directed toward suffering, and it is impermanent. If this sensation were undesirable in and of itself, who would ever be able to become attached to it? From the fact that, with a view to detaching themselves from it, Aryans consider it in its defects by placing themselves in a point of view distinct from that of its intrinsic nature, it then follows that agreeable sensation does exist in and of itself.
3. The meaning of the declaration of the Blessed One,
"Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation" has been fixed by
the Blessed One himself: "Oh Ananda, it is with regard to
impermanence, it is with regard to the transformation of the
samskdras that I said that 'Suffering is to be found in any and all
27
sensation. "'
not made with regard to the suffering which is suffering in and of itself.
If all sensation were, by its nature, suffering, then the Arya Ananda would not have asked, "The Blessed One taught that there are three types of sensation, agreeable, suffering, and neither-suf- fering-nor-agreeable. The Blessed One taught that any and all sensation is suffering. With what intention, from what point of view did the Blessed One teach that any and all sensation is suffering? " Ananda would have asked, "From what point of view did the Blessed One teach that there are three types of sensation? " And the Blessed One would have responded, "It was intentional, with a definite motive, that I taught that there are three types of sensation. "
Therefore if the Blessed One said, "I have declared, with a definite motive, that any and all sensation is suffering," this is because, by its nature, sensation is of three types.
Consequently it is proved that this declaration was
? 4. As for the declaration "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering," agreeable sensation is, on the one hand, agreeable in and of itself, being pleasant; but on the other hand, it is in a certain sense suffering, since it changes and as such is impermanent. Persons not free from desire are bound to regard it as agreeable, because they savor its taste; Aryans are free from regarding it as agreeable, because they are free from desire with regard to it. This is why the Buddha enjoined one to regard agreeable sensation in a manner which would lead one to obtain deliverance.
How do we know that agreeable sensation is agreeable in and of itself? It is said, "The perfect, omniscient Buddha, knowing the impermanence and the transformation of the samskdras, declares that sensation is suffering. " (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 121a8).
5. The declaration "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable" (v. 9a) is also made with a certain intention. The world attaches the idea of agreeable to agreeable sensation, to delectable objects, to existence. Now agreeable sensation is in a certain sense suffering: to consider it as absolutely agreeable is an error. Delectable objects contain much suffering, but little pleasure; to consider them as absolutely agreeable is an error. The same with regard to existence.
Consequently this text does not demonstrate the non-existence of agreeable sensation.
6. If all sensation is suffering in and of itself, how does one explain that the Buddha taught the existence of three types of sensation?
Perhaps the Buddha, in this teaching, is conforming to the views of the world.
This hypothesis is inadmissible: a. The Buddha said, "If I said that all sensation is suffering, then this is with a certain intention" (see above, p. 904).
b. The Buddha, on the subject of the three types of sensation (ii. 7 and foil. ), uses the expression, "conforming to reality. " In fact,
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after having said, "The organ of pleasure and the organ of satisfaction are agreeable sensation/' he then said "He who, conforming to reality and through correct discernment sees the
28
c. Furthermore, how would the world arrive at the conclusion
that sensation is of three types if it were exclusively suffering?
Would you say that one has the idea or impression of agreeable
sensation with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of
neutral sensation with regard to a medium sensation of suffering,
and the idea of a suffering sensation with regard to a strong
sensation of suffering? But pleasure also presents three degrees,
and it then follows that one would have the idea of great pleasure
with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of medium
pleasure with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the
idea of little pleasure with regard to strong sensation of suffe-
29
ring.
Furthermore, when one experiences pleasure arisen from some
excellent smell, taste or tangible thing, what is then the weak
suffering through a relationship to which the idea of pleasure is
30
[And if you maintain that the idea of pleasure is produced through a relationship with a weak sensation of suffering,] then this weak sensation of suffering has not arisen or when it has disappeared, one will all the more have the idea of pleasure, suffering having completely disappeared.
The same for smells, etc. , and the same for the pleasure of desire.
Furthermore, in your system, a weak sensation of suffering is transmitted by a clear and strong sensation [of pleasure]; a sensation of medium force is transmitted by an indistinct sensation [a sensation neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable]: and this would appear to be inconsistent. So too the Sutra teaches that the first three Dhyanas are accompanied by pleasure: there one will find, according to you, some weak suffering. The Sutra teaches that, in
five organs [or sensations], abandons the three bonds . . . "
produced?
? the Fourth Dhyana and above, sensation is neither-disagreeable- nor-agreeable: there one will find, according to you, medium suffering. Consequently your theory that agreeable sensation, etc. , correspond to weak suffering, etc. , is not admissible.
Finally, the Blessed One said, "Oh Mahanaman, if physical matter were exclusively suffering, not agreeable nor accompanied by pleasure,. . . there would be no reason why one would become
31 agreeable sensation exists at least a little.
attached to physical matter . . . "
We are thus assured that
Consequently the alleged scriptural arguments do not hold.
7. The first logical reason presented by our adversary, "because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure" is worthless. Our adversary does not take into account what is the cause of pleasure.
A given object is the cause of pleasure or suffering through the function of the state of the person who experiences it; it is not a cause of pleasure or suffering in an absolute manner. If a given object is a cause of pleasure when it is in a relationship with a body found in a certain state, then it will always be a cause of pleasure when it is again in a relationship with this body in the same state. A cause of pleasure is thus always a cause of pleasure.
A comparison: The same fire will give forth different results of cooking according to the state of the rice which one is cooking: the food will be edible or not. But when the rice is in a certain state, the fire will always produce the same result.
Furthermore, how can one dispute that, in the Dhyanas, the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?
8. As for the argument that "the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but a remedy of suffering or a modification of suffering," we would say:
i. a. When one experiences the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc. , what is the suffering whose remedy is the object of the idea of pleasure? b. Before this suffering has arisen or when it is
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destroyed, in the absence of any remedy, one will all the more experience pleasure, c. The pleasure of the Dhyanas certainly cannot consist of a remedy of suffering, since suffering does not exist in the Dhyanas.
ii. When one moves a burden to another shoulder, this is truly a
pleasure that arises from a new bodily state and which continues to
arise as long as this bodily state does not disappear. If it were
otherwise, then the idea or impression of pleasure would become
32
stronger.
pleasure brought about by the changing of bodily position which has caused fatigue.
9. You ask, "If suffering does not begin from its beginning, how could there be, at its end, an impression of suffering? "
We would answer: By reason of a certain transformation of the body [consecutive to the absorption of food, etc. : suffering will not appear while the state favorable to pleasure lasts]; so too, in the case of alcohol, etc. , sweetness and tartness succeed one another.
It is thus proved that there is agreeable sensation, and that all impure conditioned things are suffering from the fact of the three types of suffering.
***
This thesis of the Abhidharma that the Truth of Suffering is the Truth of Origin, that is, that the updddnaskandhas, which are suffering, are at the same time the origin of suffering (see above p.
sarhyogavastu or asamyogavastu. Possession (prdpti, ii. 36) of the anusayas which have for their object (or sphere, visaya = dlambana) a sarhyogavastu, and also of the anus'ayas which do not have such an object but which are produced by the first anuiayas, exists in the series which constitutes a being; even when this series is of non-defiled mind, this possession continues uninterruptedly, the effect and the cause of past and future defilements respectively. The same holds for possession of the anuiayas which has for its object an asarhyogavastu and for anuiayas not having such an object and which becomes active immediately after the defilements which have such an object: presently existing possession
is the cause of the production of the future defilement, and the outflowing effect of the former defilement.
But the possession of the anuiayas is opposed {viruddha) by the presence {samavad- hdna) in the series of the possession which proceeds from a path of abandoning opposing the anuiayas: for it is this possession of the anuiayas which supports the present and the future defilements which are possessed thanks to it. It results from this--some defilements produced through a certain object setting into motion some defilements which have another object--that when [a good possession is produced], the outflowing of a path embracing the abandoning of this certain object, the possession of the defilements disappears, and the possessed defilements, even though they remain the same with respect to their object, nevertheless no longer have [the possession] which is their cause and their result; so one cannot say that they are abandoned. When the object is not "completely known," the possessions, effects and causes of past and future defilements, continue uninterruptedly as possessions of the defilments bearing on this object as well as the possessions of the defilments having anohter object but produced by the first. When the object is "completely known," the possession is interrupted. Thus the abandoning of the defilements takes place through separation from its object {alambandt)"
But, if one means to say that the defilements are abandoned through "the abandoning of their objects, etc. ," why say that they are abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the object? They are in fact abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the Truth of Suffering, etc. , existing when this latter is missing, and not existing when this latter is present. Those who say that the defilements are abandoned through the force of their opposition should admit that the defilements abandoned through Meditation are abandoned through the force of the complete knowledge of the Truth of Suffering, etc. , which is their object. {Vyakhyd).
204. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 83a8; Prakarana, TD, p. 26a6. For other removings, ii. 67a, iv. 7c, p. 571.
205. The Abhidharma says: dure dharmah katame / atttdndgatd dharmah / antike dharmah katame / pratyutpannd dharma asarhskrtam c<*. Quoted by Aryadeva, Catuhiatikd, 258, Memosres As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8 (1894, p. 492), argument concerning past and future. On distant and near rupa, see i20a-b (English trans, pp. 77 and following).
206. This is the explanation of the Sautrantikas; according to the Vyakhyd: evarh tuyuktam sydd iti svamatam dearyasya.
207. de dag gi / bral ba'i thob pay an dan yan / = [visamyogaldbhah tebhyah punah punah ] One takes possession many times, and in a firmer and firmer manner, of the unconditioned dharma which is Nirvana, the pratisarhkhydnirodha or visamyoga of the defilements (i. 6, ii. 55d, 57d).
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208. This refers to the five faculties (ii. 2a-b, English trans, p. 155) (sraddhd, etc. ) that the ascetic increases (vivfddhi), makes evolve or transposes (samcdra), and makes sharp (ttksna).
209. Hsiian-tsang introduces into his translation {TD 29, p. 112al-l6) the following commentary: "Let us consider the ascetic whose faculties are weak (mrdu): a. There six times when the acquisition of disconnection from the defilements of Kamadhatu abandoned through Seeing the Truths takes place: 1. arising of the opposition, namely diverse dharmajrldnas of Suffering, etc. ; 2-5. the acquisition of the four results; and 6. at the moment when the moral faculties become strong {ttksna).
The same for disconnection from the defilements of the two higher spheres abandoned through Seeing the first three Truths. (Here the opposition is anvayajndna).
b. For the defilements of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu abandoned through Seeing the fourth Truth, only five moments are counted, because the time of the arising of their opposition (namely marge'nvayajfidna) is also the time of the acquistion of the first result {srotadpattiphala).
c. For the first five categories of defilement of Kamadhatu abandoned through Meditation, only five moments are counted: for one should exclude the acquisition of the first result which is earlier than the abandoning of these first five categories.
d. For the sixth category of these same defilements, four moments: for the time of the arising of the opposition (namely the sixth vimuktimdrga) is also the time of the acquisition of the second result {sakrddgdmiphala).
e. For the seventh and eighth categories of these same defilements, four moments are counted, since the acquisition of the first two results is earlier than the abandoning of these two categories.
f. For the ninth category of these same defilements, three moments are counted: (1) arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktimdrga) which is confused wiht the acquisition of the third result {andgdmiphala), (2) acquisition of the fruit of Arhat, and (3) perfectioning of the indriyas.
g. For the defilements of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu abandoned through Meditation, with the exclusion of the ninth category of Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjndyatana), three moments are counted, since the first three results have already been acquired.
h. For the ninth category of the defilements of Bhavagra, two moments are counted, because the arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktimdrga) is confused with the acquisition of the result of Arhat.
When the ascetic has strong faculties, he should avert, in the eight cases, the moment of the perfectioning of his faculties. [Thus, disconnection from the last category of defilements is obtained only once. If the author says: 'and, by reducing the number, down to two times,' this is because he has in view the case of repeated acquisitions {punarldbha)].
The Ascetic who does not pass through all of the results (ii. l6c-d, vi. 33a) may reduce these numbers. "
210. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 175al2-18: What is j&dnaparijnd! Jndna, darsana, vidyd, bodhi, abhisamaya . . . What sort of jndna is called jndnaparijnd} According to some only pure jndna, because the definition employs the term abhisamaya {Kofa, vi. 27): now lokasamvrtijndna {Ko/a, vii2b) cannot be called abhisamaya.
What is prahdnaparijfid? The complete abandoning of rdga, the complete abandoning of pratigha and vicikitsd, the complete abandoning of all the defilements, is called prahdnaparijnd. Petfectly knowing (pari-jfid) an object is called parijnd. Now abandoning does not have an object and does not know. How can one speak of prahdnaparijn'd "parijnd which is abandoning? " But prahdna, being the result of knowledge, also receives the name of parijnd.
The Sautrantikas say that there are two parijnd: 1. jfiaparijnd, which is jndna by nature, and 2. prahdnaparijn'd, which is prahdna by nature.
? 211. In the Jnanaprastbana, according to Takakusu, p. 89; the three "worldly" parinnas (relating to nourishment) are in Childers and Visuddhimagga, 606, 692.
212. Hsiian-tsang comments on this first pdda: "all are the result of andgamya, because anagamy a is the support for the abandoning of the defilements of the Three Dhatus abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. " On andgamya, the absorption preparatory to the First Dhyana, see vi. 47c-d, and viii. 22a.
213. The second pdda shows that this refers to a sdmantaka of Aruupyadhatu; for andgamya is sdmantaka to the First Dhyana.
214. The pure path does not exist in the Fourth Arupya.
215. Vikalikrti, "mutilation," is the abandoning of one part of Bhavagra, bhavdgrapradeia- prahdna, the abandoning of a part of the defilements relative to the highest stage of existence.
216. According to the Vydkhyd: the Abhidharmikas. Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 322b9.
217. Even though the category of klesas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, as long as the universal cause abandoned through the Seeing of Arising (and which bears on the first category) is not abandoned, there is no destruction of the two causes, and no parijnd. Even though the first eight categories of klesa (strong-strong . . . weak-medium) of a sphere is abandoned, as long as the ninth (weak-weak) is not abandoned, the sphere is not transcended.
Hsiian-tsang adds: "There can be destruction of the two causes without there being 'transgression of a sphere. '" Thus we establish the fourth alternative. In fact, the destruction of the two causes in the three bhumis (three lower Dhyanas, three lower Arupyas) do not constitute parijnd (the seventh and the eighth patijUd according to the case).
218. The sixteenth moment {marge'nvayajndna) forms part of the Path of Meditation.
219. The Aryan who has obtained detachment from Kamadhatu through the wordly path before entering into the "comprehension of the Truths" becomes an Anagamin in marge'nvayajndna and possesses, from this jn~dna onward, only avarabhdgiyaprahdnaparijnd. - However the anupurvaka takes possession of this only later, when he becomes detached from Kamadhatu (ii. l6c-d; vi36d).
220. The Anagamin is called rupavitardga, "detached from Rupa. " 221. Hsiian-tsang corrects some items.
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o m. Homage to the Buddha.
We have said (v. 64) how the abandoning (prahdna) of the defilements receives the name of "perfea knowledge" (parijnd). As for abandoning,
la-b. It has been said that the defilements are abandoned
2 through Seeing the Truths and through Meditation.
We have explained in detail that some of the defilements are to be abandoned through Seeing, and others through Meditation (v. 3c-5a, etc. ). Is the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation pure (andsrava) or impure (sdsrava)?
lc-d. The Path of Meditation is of two types; the Path of Seeing
3 is pure.
The Path of Meditation is worldly or impure as well as trans- worldly or pure.
The Path of Seeing is opposed to the defilements of the Three Dhatus; it eliminates in one single stroke the nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of the defilements to be abandoned through Seeing: it is thus exclusively tratisworldly; now such a power does not belong to a worldly path.
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We have said (lb), "through Seeing the Truths. " What are the Truths?
4
In the First Chapter. By saying "The pure dharmas are the Truth of the Path . . . " (i. 5), we have designated the Truth of the Path by its name. By saying "Pratisamkhyanirodha is disconnec- tion," (i. 6) we have designated the Truth of Extinction. By saying "Suffering, origin, world . . . ," we have designated the Truths of Suffering and Origin (i. 8).
Is that the order of the Truths? No. Rather:
2b-c. Namely suffering, origin, extinction, and path.
The word "namely" (tatha) indicates that the nature of the Truths is indeed as has been mentioned in the First Chapter.
5
The Truth that is understood first is mentioned first. Other- wise there would be the occurance of first mentioning the cause (Origin and Path) and then the result (Suffering and Extinction).
Sometimes dharmas are arranged in the order in which they arise: this is the case for the applications of mindfulness, the
6
smrtyupasthanas, and for the Dhyanas.
Sometimes they are arranged in an order favorable for teaching: this is the case for the right abandonings, the samyak-
7
prahanas, --existent dharmas and the black dharmas are easier to
2a. The Four Truths have been mentioned.
Where?
2c-d. Their order is that in which they are understood.
? understand than non-arisen dharmas and the white dharmas,~for it is not a fixed rule that one should make an effort to abandon the existent dharmas before making an effort for the non-arising of non-arisen dharmas.
The Truths are mentioned in the order in which they are comprehended {abhisamaya).
Why are they comprehended in this order?
Because, in the period preparatory to the Path proper, that is,
8
the period of examination, the ascetic first creates an idea of that
to which he is attached, of that by which he is tormented, of that from which he seeks to be delivered, namely, suffering. Then he asks what is its cause, and he creates an idea of its origin. Then he asks what does extinction consist of, and he creates an idea of extinction. Then he asks what is the Path to extinction, and he creates an idea of the path. (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 404bll).
So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its origin, its disappearance, and its remedy. This illustration of the Truths is also given in the Sutra.
In which Sutra? In the Sutra which says, "Endowed with the
9
In the order in which, in the course of the period of examina- tion, he creates an idea of the Truths, in this same order, having reached the period of comprehension, he understands the Truths, because comprehension is projected by the preparatory exercises, the same way that a horse gallops without obstacle over familiar terrain.
***
What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya (comprehen- sion)? This word signifies abhisambodha, ''understanding, comprehension. " The root i signifies "to understand/'
four qualities, the doctor . . . "
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Why is comprehension only pure? Because it is a knowledge
{aya) turned towards {abhi) Nirvana and the true (sam, samyak). 10
Samyak means conforming to reality.
To the extent that they are a result, the five updddnaskandhas
(i. 8a-b) are the Truth of Suffering, that which one should see in
truth as being suffering.
To the extent that they are a cause they
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i. 8c). Consequently suffering and arising differ in name,
but do not differ in fact, since they are the same updddnaskandhas considered as result or as cause. But Extinction and the Path differ in fact as well as in name.
*##
The Sutra gives the name of aryasatya, truth of the Aryans, to the Truths. What is the meaning of this expression?
They are truth for the Aryans, truths of the Aryans: this is why
11 they are called aryasatya.
Does this mean that they are false for the non-Aryans? Not being erroneous {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26), they are true for everyone. [But the Aryans see them as they are, that is to say, under sixteen aspects (vii. 13): they see suffering, that is, the updddnaksandhas as suffering, impermanent, etc. Others do not. Therefore, the Truths are called "truths of the Aryans" and not truths of others, because the seeing of these latter is incorrect. In fact, they see what is suffering as being not suffering. ] As the stanza says,
"What the Aryans call happy (i. e. , Nirvana) others call painful;
13 what others call happy, the Aryans call painful. "
14
According to other masters, two are Aryan truths, and two
are truths of both Aryans and others.
? Since only a part of sensation (vedand) is painful by its nature (duhkhd vedana, i. 14). how can one say that all impure, conditi- oned things are suffering?
3. Impure dharmas, whether they are agreeable, disagreea-
ble, or otherwise, are, without exception, suffering, by
reason of the three types of suffering, each according to its
15 type.
There are three types of suffering: suffering which is suffering in and of itself {duhkhaduhkhata), suffering through the fact of being conditioned (samskdraduhkhatd), and suffering which is change or transformation (parindmaduhkbata).
By reason of these three, all impure conditioned things, without exception, are suffering: agreeable things are suffering because they are subject to transformation; disagreeable things are suffering in and of themselves; and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable things are suffering because they are conditioned. What are the agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable dharmas?
The three sensations, in this order; and, by reason of the three sensations, all the samskdras which result in agreeable sensation, etc. , receive the name of agreeable, etc.
Agreeable sensation is suffering through transformation, as the Sutra says, "Agreeable sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable while it lasts, but suffering in its change. "
Disagreeable sensation is suffering by nature, as the Sutra says, "Suffering sensation is suffering when it arises, and suffering while it lasts. "
Neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation is suffering
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because it is so decreed by its causes, as the Sutra says, "That which is impermanent is suffering. "
The same holds true for the samskdras which result in these
16
According to other masters, the expressions duhkhaduhkhatd, etc. , should be analysed: duhkham eva duhkhatd ("suffering is itself suffering''), viparindma eva duhkhatd ("transformation is itself suffering"), and samskara eva duhkhatd ("conditioned things are themselves suffering"). The meaning is the same.
***
Agreeable dharmas do not participate in suffering which is suffering in and of itself, nor do the disagreeable dharmas participate in suffering which is transformation: the second state of suffering belongs to the first ones, and the first to the second ones. But all conditioned things are suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned, and they are seen under this aspect only by the Aryans. Therefore it is said, "One does not feel a hair placed on the palm of the hand; but the same hair, in the eye, causes suffering and injury. So too the ignorant, resembling the hand, do not feel the hair which is suffering through the fact of being conditioned: but the Aryans, resembling
17
The Aryans make of existence in the most sublime heaven (Bhavagra) an idea more painful than do fools make of existence in the most dreadful hell (Avici).
***
sensations as for these sensations themselves.
***
the eye, are tortured by it. "
? But, one would say, the Path is conditioned; it should thus be suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being
18
The Path is not suffering, because the definition of suffering is to be hateful. Now the Path is not hateful to the Aryans because it produces the extinction of all of the sufferings of arising; when they consider Nirvana as peaceful, what they consider as peaceful is the extinction of what they consider as suffering [namely impure conditioned things, and not the extinction of the Path].
***
But, since the agreeable or happiness does exist, why is only suffering, and not the agreeable, a truth of the Aryans?
19
1. According to one explanation,
of happiness. In the same way that one calls a pile in which some peas are to be found "a pile of beans," so too no one with any intelligence would consider a wound as agreeable because one experiences a very small agreeable sensation when one washes this wound.
2. And further, "Because it is a cause of suffering, because it is
produced by many sufferings, because one desires it when one
20 suffers (see p. 903), the agreeable, they conclude, is suffering. "
21
3. But, even if accompanied by happiness,
totality has the same flavor of suffering through the fact of being conditioned: Aryans thus consider it as suffering. This is why suffering and not happiness is an Aryan Truth.
***
i. But how can Aryans regard sensations which are agreeable by nature as suffering?
conditioned.
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it is because of the slightness
existence in its
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They are hateful by reason of their impermanence in the same way that they consider the rupas, samjnds, etc. , as suffering, even though the rupas, samjnds, etc. , are not suffering in the same way as is disagreeable sensation.
ii. With regard to the proposed argument "The agreeable is suffering because it is a cause of suffering": (1) to be a cause of suffering is its aspect (akdra) or origin (vii. l3a); to see things as a cause of suffering is not to see them as suffering; (2) how could the Aryans born in Rupadhatu and in Arupyadhatu have an idea of suffering? For the skandhas of these spheres are not a cause of suffering; (3) why would the Sutra mention suffering through the fact of being conditioned? If Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, then suffering through the fact of being conditioned [that is, "What is impermanent is suffering"] would be useless.
iii. But if Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is impermanent, then what is the difference between the aspects of suffering and of impermanence? There would be confusion between "seeing things as suffering" and "seeing things as impermanent. "
One sees things as impermanent because their nature is to arise and perish; one sees them as suffering because they are hateful. When one has seen them as impermanent, they become hateful. The characteristic of impermanence implies the characteristic of suffering, but it is not subsumed in this characteristic.
22
iv. Certain masters deny any agreeable sensation, affirming
that all is suffering. They prove this thesis by Scripture and by reasoning.
Scripture: The Blessed One said, "Suffering is to be found in
any and all sensation"; "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as
suffering"; and "It is an error to regard what is suffering as
23 agreeable. "
Reasoning: 1. Because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure. The things that one pretends to be causes of
? pleasure,-food, drink, cold, warmth, etc. ,-when they are grasped or experienced to excess or out of season become causes of suffering. Now it is inadmissible that a cause of pleasure, because it has increased, or presents itself at a different moment,--even if it remains completely the same,--would produce suffering. Conse- quently these pretended causes of pleasure are, from their origins, the causes of suffering and not the causes of pleasure: for later suffering will grow and become felt. The same holds for the four positions (tryapatha), the position of lying down, sitting down, etc. (p. 907).
2. Because the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but sometime a remedy for suffering or a modification of suffering, (a) As long as a person is not tormented by sufferings which are caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, he will not have any sensation which he will feel to be agreeable. Consequently the ignorant have the idea of pleasure, not with regard to true pleasure, but with regard to the relief of suffering,
(b) Fools also have the idea of pleasure with regard to the
modification of suffering: for example to pass a burden from one
24 shoulder to another.
Consequently agreeable things do not exist.
v. They exist, say the Abhidharmikas; and we would say, this is well proved.
1. We would ask him who denies the existence of pleasure,
25 What is suffering? If he answers, "That which is painful," we
would then ask, "How is it painful? " If he answers, "Because it does evil," we would say that "that which does good" is agreeable. If he answers, "Because it is not desired," we would say that "that
26 which is desired" is agreeable.
2. But, one would say, this same "desire" is no longer cherished by the Aryans when they obtain detachment. Thus the quality of "desirable" is not proved.
This objection is useless, for if Aryans, once they become
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detached, no longer cherish it, it is then from another point of view that it is undesirable to them.
The sensation which, in itself, is desirable, will never become, in itself, undesirable. Consequently, it is not from the point of view of its intrinsic nature, but from another point of view that Aryans do not cherish agreeable sensation. Rather, they hate it for its defects: it is the occasion for the loss of good dharmas, it is acquired only at great effort, it is directed toward suffering, and it is impermanent. If this sensation were undesirable in and of itself, who would ever be able to become attached to it? From the fact that, with a view to detaching themselves from it, Aryans consider it in its defects by placing themselves in a point of view distinct from that of its intrinsic nature, it then follows that agreeable sensation does exist in and of itself.
3. The meaning of the declaration of the Blessed One,
"Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation" has been fixed by
the Blessed One himself: "Oh Ananda, it is with regard to
impermanence, it is with regard to the transformation of the
samskdras that I said that 'Suffering is to be found in any and all
27
sensation. "'
not made with regard to the suffering which is suffering in and of itself.
If all sensation were, by its nature, suffering, then the Arya Ananda would not have asked, "The Blessed One taught that there are three types of sensation, agreeable, suffering, and neither-suf- fering-nor-agreeable. The Blessed One taught that any and all sensation is suffering. With what intention, from what point of view did the Blessed One teach that any and all sensation is suffering? " Ananda would have asked, "From what point of view did the Blessed One teach that there are three types of sensation? " And the Blessed One would have responded, "It was intentional, with a definite motive, that I taught that there are three types of sensation. "
Therefore if the Blessed One said, "I have declared, with a definite motive, that any and all sensation is suffering," this is because, by its nature, sensation is of three types.
Consequently it is proved that this declaration was
? 4. As for the declaration "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering," agreeable sensation is, on the one hand, agreeable in and of itself, being pleasant; but on the other hand, it is in a certain sense suffering, since it changes and as such is impermanent. Persons not free from desire are bound to regard it as agreeable, because they savor its taste; Aryans are free from regarding it as agreeable, because they are free from desire with regard to it. This is why the Buddha enjoined one to regard agreeable sensation in a manner which would lead one to obtain deliverance.
How do we know that agreeable sensation is agreeable in and of itself? It is said, "The perfect, omniscient Buddha, knowing the impermanence and the transformation of the samskdras, declares that sensation is suffering. " (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 121a8).
5. The declaration "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable" (v. 9a) is also made with a certain intention. The world attaches the idea of agreeable to agreeable sensation, to delectable objects, to existence. Now agreeable sensation is in a certain sense suffering: to consider it as absolutely agreeable is an error. Delectable objects contain much suffering, but little pleasure; to consider them as absolutely agreeable is an error. The same with regard to existence.
Consequently this text does not demonstrate the non-existence of agreeable sensation.
6. If all sensation is suffering in and of itself, how does one explain that the Buddha taught the existence of three types of sensation?
Perhaps the Buddha, in this teaching, is conforming to the views of the world.
This hypothesis is inadmissible: a. The Buddha said, "If I said that all sensation is suffering, then this is with a certain intention" (see above, p. 904).
b. The Buddha, on the subject of the three types of sensation (ii. 7 and foil. ), uses the expression, "conforming to reality. " In fact,
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after having said, "The organ of pleasure and the organ of satisfaction are agreeable sensation/' he then said "He who, conforming to reality and through correct discernment sees the
28
c. Furthermore, how would the world arrive at the conclusion
that sensation is of three types if it were exclusively suffering?
Would you say that one has the idea or impression of agreeable
sensation with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of
neutral sensation with regard to a medium sensation of suffering,
and the idea of a suffering sensation with regard to a strong
sensation of suffering? But pleasure also presents three degrees,
and it then follows that one would have the idea of great pleasure
with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of medium
pleasure with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the
idea of little pleasure with regard to strong sensation of suffe-
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ring.
Furthermore, when one experiences pleasure arisen from some
excellent smell, taste or tangible thing, what is then the weak
suffering through a relationship to which the idea of pleasure is
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[And if you maintain that the idea of pleasure is produced through a relationship with a weak sensation of suffering,] then this weak sensation of suffering has not arisen or when it has disappeared, one will all the more have the idea of pleasure, suffering having completely disappeared.
The same for smells, etc. , and the same for the pleasure of desire.
Furthermore, in your system, a weak sensation of suffering is transmitted by a clear and strong sensation [of pleasure]; a sensation of medium force is transmitted by an indistinct sensation [a sensation neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable]: and this would appear to be inconsistent. So too the Sutra teaches that the first three Dhyanas are accompanied by pleasure: there one will find, according to you, some weak suffering. The Sutra teaches that, in
five organs [or sensations], abandons the three bonds . . . "
produced?
? the Fourth Dhyana and above, sensation is neither-disagreeable- nor-agreeable: there one will find, according to you, medium suffering. Consequently your theory that agreeable sensation, etc. , correspond to weak suffering, etc. , is not admissible.
Finally, the Blessed One said, "Oh Mahanaman, if physical matter were exclusively suffering, not agreeable nor accompanied by pleasure,. . . there would be no reason why one would become
31 agreeable sensation exists at least a little.
attached to physical matter . . . "
We are thus assured that
Consequently the alleged scriptural arguments do not hold.
7. The first logical reason presented by our adversary, "because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure" is worthless. Our adversary does not take into account what is the cause of pleasure.
A given object is the cause of pleasure or suffering through the function of the state of the person who experiences it; it is not a cause of pleasure or suffering in an absolute manner. If a given object is a cause of pleasure when it is in a relationship with a body found in a certain state, then it will always be a cause of pleasure when it is again in a relationship with this body in the same state. A cause of pleasure is thus always a cause of pleasure.
A comparison: The same fire will give forth different results of cooking according to the state of the rice which one is cooking: the food will be edible or not. But when the rice is in a certain state, the fire will always produce the same result.
Furthermore, how can one dispute that, in the Dhyanas, the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?
8. As for the argument that "the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but a remedy of suffering or a modification of suffering," we would say:
i. a. When one experiences the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc. , what is the suffering whose remedy is the object of the idea of pleasure? b. Before this suffering has arisen or when it is
The Path and the Saints 907
? 908 Chapter Six
destroyed, in the absence of any remedy, one will all the more experience pleasure, c. The pleasure of the Dhyanas certainly cannot consist of a remedy of suffering, since suffering does not exist in the Dhyanas.
ii. When one moves a burden to another shoulder, this is truly a
pleasure that arises from a new bodily state and which continues to
arise as long as this bodily state does not disappear. If it were
otherwise, then the idea or impression of pleasure would become
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stronger.
pleasure brought about by the changing of bodily position which has caused fatigue.
9. You ask, "If suffering does not begin from its beginning, how could there be, at its end, an impression of suffering? "
We would answer: By reason of a certain transformation of the body [consecutive to the absorption of food, etc. : suffering will not appear while the state favorable to pleasure lasts]; so too, in the case of alcohol, etc. , sweetness and tartness succeed one another.
It is thus proved that there is agreeable sensation, and that all impure conditioned things are suffering from the fact of the three types of suffering.
***
This thesis of the Abhidharma that the Truth of Suffering is the Truth of Origin, that is, that the updddnaskandhas, which are suffering, are at the same time the origin of suffering (see above p.
