Unde quidam
domini illuis provincise adhuc hodie
despoti vocantur, quem princpatum
ad regalem possumus reduce re, ut ex
sacra liquet scriptura.
domini illuis provincise adhuc hodie
despoti vocantur, quem princpatum
ad regalem possumus reduce re, ut ex
sacra liquet scriptura.
Thomas Carlyle
It is
not easy to define his position in precise terms, for while his
1 Cf. vol. ii. pp. 63-67.
- Andreas de Isernia, ' Peregrina vel
Agnosia ad omnes regni Neapolitani
Constitutiones,' Fol. 38, v. : " Lege
regia transtulerunt regnum. Cum ad
hoc regem pertinet eo ipso quod est
rex ut subditis suis imponat legem et
condat. Unde si hodie liberi populi
constituerunt eibi regem, eo ipso super
eos rex haberet legis condende poles-
tatem. Sicut si faciat regem ille qui
potest, ut papa regem Sicilise, per ea
qun? dicta sunt, in prohemio. S.
dicitur Hieremie iii. ' Constitui te
super reges et regna,' de Vicario Christi
in terris qui Papa est. . . . Item primo
casu quando transtulit nunquam revo-
cavit, nisi ex causa, ut si rex fiat
tyrannus et sic abutitur . . . vel non
esset idoneus ad regimen. "
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? GS
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
treatment is characteristically lucid up to a certain point,
he, curiously enough, omits to deal explicitly with some im-
portant questions concerning the source of the legislative
power.
We have in an earlier chapter discussed the terms of
Aquinas' distinction between Natural and Positive Law, and
we have seen that he says that Positive Law arises from
a common agreement. 1 In another clause of the same article
he explains that an agreement might be either private or
public, and a public agreement is either that to which the
whole people agrees, or that which is ordained by the
prince who has the care of the people, and bears its
person (qui curam populi habet et ejus personam gerit),
and this is Positive Law. 2 The statement is significant
of the nature of law, but it does not explain how the
prince comes to have the care of the people and to bear
its person.
In another passage he indicates, indeed, very plainly the
nature and purpose of law--i. e. , the law of any particular
community. He begins by citing the words of St Isidore of
Seville, " Lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam majores
natu simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt," and continues
that law is directed to the common good. To order things
for the common good belongs either to the whole multitude
or to him who represents (gerens vicem) the whole multitude,
and therefore the authority to make law belongs either to the
whole multitude or to that public person who has the care
1 Cf. p. 39.
>> St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologies,' 2. 2, 67, 2 : " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut dictum est (art.
prsec. ) jus sive justum est aliquod opus
adequatum alteri secundum rcquali-
tatis modum : dupiiciter autem potest
alicui homini esse aliquid adsequatum :
uno quidem modo ex ipsa natura rei;
puta cum aliquis tantum dat, ut tan-
tundem recipiat; et hoc vocatur jus
naturalo : alio modo aliquid est adse-
quatum vel commensuratum alteri ex
condicto, sive ex communi placito;
quando scilicet aliquis roputat se con-
tentum, si tantum accipiat. Quod
quidem potest fieri dupiiciter: uno
modo per aliquod privatum condictum ;
sicut quod firmatur aliquo pacto inter
privatas personas : alio modo ex con-
dicto publico ; puta cum totus populus
consentit, quod aliquid habeatur quasi
adequatum, et commensuratum alteri ;
vel cum hoc ordinat princeps, qui
curam populi habet et ejus personam
gerit ; et hoc dicitur jus positivum. "
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? OHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OP THE STATE--n. 69
of the whole multitude. 1 The statement is clear and im-
portant, both in its description of the end or purpose of law
and in the words used to describe the legislator as "gerens
vicem''--that is, as the vicar or representative of the multitude,
and his responsibility for the good of the community; but
again Aquinas does not tell us how the " public person "
comes to have this authority.
The truth is that St Thomas clearly held that there were
two possible cases with regard to the law-making power.
In a passage to another part of which we have already
referred in dealing with the authority of custom, he says
that either the multitude may be free and can make laws
for itself, or it may not possess the free power of making
laws, or abrogating the laws made by a superior. 2 In
another place he relates the different kinds of laws to the
forms of the constitution of the State: in the kingdom there
are the constitutions of the prince; in the aristocracy, the
" responsa prudentum " or the " Senatus consulta " ; in the
democracy the " plebiscita," but again he does not discuss
the question how these various authorities came to have
the legislative power. He does, however, in this passage
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 90, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Isidores dicit in lib. v. Etym.
(c. 10) et habetur in Decrotis (Gratian,
Decretum, D. 2, 1). 'Lex est con-
stitute populi, secundum quam maj-
ores natu simul cum plebibus aliquid
sanxerunt,' non est ergo cujuslibet
facere legem.
Respondeo dicendum, quod lex
proprie primo, et principaliter respicit
ordinem ad bonum commune : ordinare
autem aliquid in bonum commune, est
vel totius multitudinis, vel alicujus
gerentis vicem totius multitudinis ; et
ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad
totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad
personam publicam, qua totius multi-
tudinis curam ha bet; quia et in
omnibus aliis ordinare in finem est
ejus, cuius est proprius ille finis. *'
>> Id. id. , i. 2, 97, 3 : "Ad tertium
dicendum, quod multitudo, in qua
consuetudo introducitur, duplicis con-
ditionis esse potest: si enim sit libera
multitudo, quse possit sibi legem facere,
plus est consensus totius multitudinis
ad aliquid observandum, quod con-
suetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas
principis, qui non habet potestatem
condendi legem, nisi inquantum gerit
personam multitudinis: unde licet
singulse personse non possint condere
legem tamen totus populus condere
legem potest: si vero multitudo non
habcat liberam potestatem condendi
sibi legem, vel legem a superiori potes-
tate positam removendi, tamen ipsa
consuetudo in tali multitudine prevalens
obtinet vim legis, in quanto per eos
toleratus, ad quos pertinet multitudini
legem imponere; ex hoc enim ipso
videntur approbare quod consuetudo
introduxit. "
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? 70
[PAST X.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
indicate his own clear preference for a mixed constitution
in which, as St Isidore had said, the laws are made by the
" majores natu cum plebibus. " 1
In the next chapter we shall have occasion to consider
more fully St Thomas' theory of the best form of govern-
ment and the nature and limits of political authority, and
we shall consider how far this may be thought to throw any
further light upon his theory of legislation.
In the meanwhile it would seem true that St Thomas had
no one definite theory as to the source of legislative authority,
but rather seems to think that in some constitutions the people
are the ultimate source of law, in some not. It is certainly
very singular that St Thomas, who was evidently well ac-
quainted with the Eoman law, should nowhere refer to the
universally accepted doctrine both of the Corpus Juris Civilis
and of the Bologna Civilians, that it was the Eoman people
who had conferred upon the prince his legislative authority.
If we were to venture a conjecture, we should be inclined to
say that this may possibly be a consequence of his study of
Aristotle's discussion of the various forms which government
may assume. Even so, it is curious that he should not show
the influence of Aristotle's consideration of the question
whether it was better to be governed by the best men or by
the best laws. 2
In the last years of the thirteenth century the theory of
1 Id. id. , i. 2, 95, 4 : " Tertio est de
rations legis humanse, ut instituatur
a gubernante communitatem civitatis,
eicut supra dictum est (i. 2, 90, 3) et
secundum hoc distinguuntur leges
humanse secundum diversa regimina
civitatum, quorum unum, secundum
Philos in ILT. Politic, est regnum,
quando scilicet civitas gubernatur ab
uno: et secundum hoo accipiuntur
constitutiones principum. Aliud vero
regimen est aristocratia, id est princi-
patus optimorum, vel optimatum : et
secundum hoc sumuntur responsa
prudentum et etiam senatus consults.
Aliud regimen est oligarchia, id est
principatus paucorum divitum et poten-
tum, et secundum hoo sumitur jus
practorium, quod etiam honorarium
dicitur: aliud autem regimen est
populi, quod nominatur democratia;
et secundum hoo sumuntur plebiscite.
Aliud aut est tyrannicum, quod est
omnino corruptum : undo ex hoo non
sumitur aliqua lex. Est enim aliquod
regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est
optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur
lex, ' quam majores natu simul cum
plebibus, sanxerunt,' ut Isidorus dicit "
(' Etym. ,' v. 10).
* Aristotle, ' Politics,' iii. 15.
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--II.
71
an absolute monarchy was asserted by an important writer,
by that Egidius Colonna to whom we have referred in an
earlier chapter, as illustrating the influence of Aristotle,1 not,
indeed, that in this matter he follows Aristotle; on the
contrary, as we shall see, he deliberately differs from him.
The origins of the position of Egidius are indeed obscure;
there is no trace in his work of the conception that this abso-
lute authority rests upon a " Divine Eight "--that is, upon
the theory that the prince was in such a sense the representa-
tive of God that he must be obeyed whether he was good
or bad, right or wrong. This theory was stated by St Gregory
the Great, and was known in the Middle Ages, and had even
been asserted by some writers in the course of the struggle
between Henry IV. and the Papacy,2 but it does not appear
that it had any importance in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, nor does Egidius Colonna appeal to it. What is,
however, much more remarkable is that Egidius Colonna
does not seem to derive his principles, at least directly, from
those Civilians who had maintained that the whole and sole
legislative authority in making law belonged to the emperor. 3
It cannot be doubted that he was acquainted with the Eoman
law and the work of the Bologna Civilians, but it is not from
these that he draws his arguments. It is possible that this
may partly be explained by his curious and somewhat laugh-
able contempt for the lawyers; in one place he speaks of
them as " ydiote politici. " 4
The immediate antecedents, therefore, of this defence of
absolutism are obscure, but the importance of it is great.
Some two hundred years later Sir John Fortescue drew a
sharp distinction between the "regimen politicum et regale "
of England and the " regimen regale " of France, between
the kingdom where the king governs according to laws made
by the whole community, and the kingdom where the king
makes the laws himself. 5 It may, indeed, be doubted whether
1 Cf. p. 13. ea de quibus est politics dicunt narra-
* Cf. vol. i. p. 152 aeq. ; vol. iii. tive et sine ratione, appcllari possunt
part ii. chap. 4. ydiote politici. "
* Cf. vol. ii. pp. 69-67. 5 Sir John Fortescue, 'Governance of
4 Egidius Colonna, ' De Rogimine England,' 1, 3, Ac. ; 'De Laudibus,'
Principum,' ii. 2, 8 : "Sic legiste quia 9, 18, 35, dfcc.
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? 72
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
Sir John Fortescue was not, for his own time, pressing the
distinction too far, whether it was really true that the con-
stitutional principles of the French kingdom were in his time
as clearly defined as he thought; but he was only anticipat-
ing the full developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.
However this may be, the distinction which Fortescue
made was one of the greatest significance, and it is here,
for our purposes, important to observe that the distinction
between the two forms of government was already being
made at the end of the thirteenth century, and that
Egidius Colonna expressed his preference for the "regimen
regale. "
Before we consider his position, we may, however, observe
that a distinction which is parallel, if not quite identical, is
discussed by Ptolemy of Lucca, to whom is now generally
ascribed the authorship of the greater part of the treatise,
' De Eegimine Principum,' which was begun by St Thomas
Aquinas. 1 In one place Ptolemy ascribes to Aristotle the
distinction between two forms of government, the political
and the despotic. He describes the first as that in which the
country or community is governed, whether by many or by
one, according to its own laws (ipsorum statuta), while in
the second the prince governs according to a law which is
in his own heart, and this form of government has the advan-
tage that it is more like that of God. On the other hand, the
despotic government, which is in its nature like the relation
of the master to the slave, is in its nature arbitrary, and
he illustrates this by the words in which Samuel described
the nature of kingship to the Israelites (1 Sam. viii.
10-18), and pointed out to them the advantages of the
" regimen politicum " which he and the judges had adminis-
tered. Ptolemy contends that there are considerations in
favour of each form, which he now distinguishes as the
" regimen politicum " and the " dominium regale. " The first
is well adapted to the state of innocence or to the rule of men
1 Cf. p. 24.
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--H. 73
who are wise and virtuous, like the ancient Eomans, but the
second to the government of those who are perverse and
foolish, and the number of the foolish is infinite. He also
urges that the characteristics of the peoples who inhabit
different parts of the world are different, and that some seem
adapted to slavery and some to freedom. There are therefore,
he concludes, some reasons for preferring the " polity " to the
kingdom, and some for preferring the " regale dominium " to
the "polity. "1
1 Ptolemy of Lucca (St Thomas
Aquinas), ' De Regimino Principum,'
ii. 8 : " Duplex enim principatus ab
Aristotele ponitur in sua Politica
quorum quilibet suos habet mimstros,
licet plures ponat in v. Politicorum,
ut supra est distinctum, et infra etiam
declarabitur, politicus videlicet, et
despoticus. Politicus quidem, quando
regio sive provincia, sive civitas, sive
castrum, per unum vel plures regitur
secundum ipso rum statuta, ut in
regionibus contingit Italise, et precipue
Romse, ut per senatores et consules
pro maj ore parte ab urbe condita. . . .
Et inde sequitur in regimine politico
diminutio, quia legibus solum rector
politicus judicat populum, quod per
regale dominium suppletur, dum non
legibus obligatus, per eam censeat,
quse est in poctore principis, propter
quod divinam magis sequitur provi-
dentiam, cui est cura de omnibus, ut
in libro Sapientise dicitur. . . .
ii. 9. Est autem hie advertendum,
quod principatus despoticus dicitur qui
est domini ad servum, quod quidem
nomen grocum est.
Unde quidam
domini illuis provincise adhuc hodie
despoti vocantur, quem princpatum
ad regalem possumus reduce re, ut ex
sacra liquet scriptura. . . . Traduntur
enim leges regales per Samuelem pro-
phet am Israelitico populo quss servi-
tutem important. . . . Filios vestros
toilet, et ponet in curibus suis . . . et
prsecursores quadrigarum suarum, et
constituet aratores agrorum suorum
. . . et sic de aliis conditionibus ad
servitutem pertinentibus, quse in 1 Lib.
Re gum traduntur, per hoc quasi volens
ostendere quod regimen politicum,
quod erat judicum, et suum fuerat,
fructuosius erat populo, cujus tamen
superius contrarium est ostensum. Ad
cujus dubii declarationem sciendum
est quod ex duplici parte regimen
politicum regali preponitur: primo
quidem, si referamus dominium ad
statum integrum humanse naturse, qui
status innocentise appellatur, in quo
non fuisset regale regimen sed politi-
cum. . . . Unde apud sapientes et
homines virtuosos, ut fuerunt antiqui
Romani, seoundum imitationem talis
nature regimen politicum ejus fuit.
Sed quia perversi difficile corri-
gentur, et stultorum infinitus est
numerus, ut dicitur in Eoclesiastico,
? ? in natura eorrupta regimen regale est
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? 74
[past r.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
Ptolemy of Lucca was a pupil of St Thomas Aquinas,
but we must not attribute to St Thomas the responsibility
for the indifference with which he treats the two forms
of government. St Thomas does, indeed, recognise that in
some cases a people is free and makes its own laws, while
in others it does not possess this power; but in one place at
least, as we have seen,1 he does express his own preference
for the mixed constitution in which the laws are made by
the " majores natu cum plebibus. " Still less must we attri-
bute to St Thomas the responsibility for the dogmatic prefer-
ence which Egidius Colonna expresses for the " regimen
regale. "
We must now examine the position of Egidius in more detail.
The work with which we are here concerned is his treatise,
' De Eegimine Principum. ' It was written probably before
the death of Philip III. of France, to whose son, afterwards
Philip IV. , Egidius was apparently in some relation of tutor
or teacher. We have already drawn attention to his position,
as having learned, probably through St Thomas Aquinas,
to know of the Aristotelian political theories. We are here
concerned with his conception of law and its relation to the
prince.
Egidius makes a distinction between the " regimen regale "
and the " regimen politicum " like that of Ptolemy of Lucca.
The State may, he says, be ruled in two ways ; the " regimen
regale " is that under which the prince rules according to
his own will (arbitrium) and according to laws which he
has made himself. The regimen politicum is that where
the prince rules, not according to his own will or
according to laws which he made, but according to the
law which the citizens have made. 2 As he puts it in
another place, laws may be made either by the prince or
1 Cf. pp. 69, 70.
>> Egidius Colonna, ' De Regimine
Principum,' ii. 1, 14 : " Civital autem,
quantum ad prsesens, spectat, duplici
regimine regi potest, politico scilicet et
regali. Dicitur autem quia prseesso
regali dominio : cum preest secundum
arbitrium et secundum leges quas ipse
instituit. Sed tune prseest regimine
politico, quum non prseest secundum
arbitrium, nec secundum leges quas
ipse instituit, sed secundum eas quas
cives instituerunt. "
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOUBCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--II.
75
by the whole people, if it is the people which rules and
elects the ruler. 1
Like Ptolemy he recognises the two forms of government
as possible and legitimate, but he also contends that it is
better to be ruled by the king than by the law. This is the
more remarkable, because he carefully states that Aristotle
had maintained that the true prince was an instrument of
the law, and that it was better to be governed *by a
good law than by a good king. Egidius states Aristotle's
argument as he understood it, but only in order to main-
tain the opposite--namely, that it is better to be ruled
by the king than by the law; and he adds that, while
the king is under the natural law, he is not under the
positive law. 2
This is, indeed, a highly significant development of political
1 Id. id. , iii. 2, 27 : " Leges que
ordinant nos in commune bonum con-
dende sunt a principe, cui est ordinare
et dirigere alios in tale bonum, vel
condende sunt a toto populo, si tot us
populus principetur, et sit in potestate
ejus eligere principantem. Nulla est
ergo lex quse non sit edita ab eo cujus
est dirigere in bonum commune : nam
si est lex divina et naturalis condita
a Deo, cujus est omnia dirigere in
seipsum ; qui maxime est commune
bonum ; quia est bonum omnis boni:
lex vero humana et positiva condita
est a principe vel a toto populo, si
tot us populus principetur. "
>> Id. id. , iii. 2, 29 : " Nam ut dicitur
5 Ethicorum, princeps debet esse custos
justi id est justelegis. Est ergo princeps,
si debite principetur, quasi quoddam
organum juste legis, ut, quod lex fieri
prsecipit, rex per civilem potentiam
observari f acit: quare si quod est
principalius eligibilius est in regimine,
q. organum et instrumentum; regi
optima lege eligibilius est quam regi
optimo rege : hoc est ergo quod ait
philosophus III. Politicorum, quod
eligibilius est principari legem, quia
hos s. reges aut principes instituendum
esse servatores legis et ministros legum.
. . . Sciendum est regem et quemlibet
principantem esse medium inter legem
naturalem et positivam : nam nullus
recte principatur nisi agat ut recta
ratio dictat . . . . .
Quare positiva lex est infra princi-
pantem sicut lex naturalis est supra,
et si dicatur legem aliquam positivam
esse supra principantem, hoc non est
ut positiva sed ut in ea reservatur
virtus juris naturalis. Cum ergo
queritur utrum melius sit regnum aut
ci vita tem regi optimo rege aut optima
lege; si loquamur de lege naturali
patet hano principaliorem esso in
regendo quam sit ipse rex, eo quod
nullus sit rectus rex nisi in quantum
innititur illi legi
Sed si loquamur de lege positiva, melius
est regi optimo rege, quam maxime
in casibus illis in quibus talis lex deficit,
? ? et dicit universaliter quod non est
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? 76
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
theory, for this is a thoroughgoing contradiction of the prin-
ciples of Bracton, and practically of all mediseval theory ; for
the principle that the king is the servant and not the master
of law belongs not only to the feudal system, but to the
whole structure of mediseval society, and is expressed by
practically all the mediseval writers, except some of the
Bologna Civilians. 1 It is, indeed, with Egidius Colonna, as
we have said, that we come on the beginning of that con-
ception of the monarchy which was to be developed in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
It must, however, be observed that Egidius carefully and
consistently maintains the Aristotelian principle that the test
of all good government is that it is directed to the common
good, and that, just because the prince makes the laws and
is himself a living law, he must maintain justice; and that
if he fails to do this he is not worthy to be a king, and loses
the royal dignity. 2 He does not hesitate to describe the ruler
who pursues his private good and not the public welfare as
a tyrant. 3
1 Cf. especially vol. i. chap. 19 ; vol.
ii. part i. chap. 7; vol. iii. part i.
chap. 2 : part ii. chap. 5.
1 Id. id. , i. 1, 12: " Nam regens
multitudinem debet intendere com-
mune bonum. Prima via sic patet;
nam si lex est regula agendorum : ut
haberi potest ex 5 Ethic, ipse judex
et multum magis ipse rex cujus est
leges ferre debet esse quedam regula
in agendis. Est enim rex sive princeps
quivdam lex ; et lex est qusedam rex
sive princeps. Nam lex est quidam
inanimatus princeps. Princeps vero
est qusedam animata lex. Quantum
ergo animatum inanimatum superat,
tantum rex sive princeps debet supe-
rare legem. Debet etiam rex esse
tante justitie et tante equitatis ut
posset ipsas leges dirigere, cum in
aliquo casu leges observari non de-
beant ut infra patebit. Dubitare ergo
utrum rex debeat esse equal is et justus
est dubitare utrum ipsa regula debeat
esse regulata. Si enim regula ab
equalitate deficiat nihil regulatum erit,
quum omnia per regulam regulentur.
Sio si reges sunt injusti, disponunt
regnum ut non observetur justitia.
Maxime ergo studere debent ne sint
injusti et inequales; quia eorum in-
justitia et inequalitas tollit ab eis
rogiam dignitatem. Nam reges injusti
etsi dominant per civilem potentiam
non tamen digni sunt ut sint reges,
cum enim deceat regulam esse rectam
et equalem. Rex, quia est qusedam
animata lex, est qusedam animata
regula agendorum, ex parte ipsius
personse regise maxime decet ipse ser-
vare justitiam. "
* Id. id. , i. 3, 3 : " Nam ut superius
dicebatur et ut philosophus in Pol.
probat differentiam esse inter regem
et tyrannum, quod rex principaliter
intendit bonum commune, et intern-
dendo bonum commune intendit bonum
? ? privatum, quia salvato regno salvatur
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--H. 77
In a later work, written, as it is thought, in 1297, with
reference to the abdication of the Papal throne by Pope
Celestine in 1294, while Egidius maintains that those who
are superior in intelligence and energy should rule over others,
he also argues that this must be done by the consent of men,
and that by this same consent the ruler may retire or be
deposed. 1 This belongs, however, rather to the subject of
our next chapter, but we mention it here as confirming the
impression of the last passage cited.
It is, however, also noticeable that in one place he urges
that when it is considered how much good arises from king-
ship, not only when kings rule well, but even when in some
respects they play the tyrant, the people should strive to
obey, for some tyranny on the part of the ruler is more toler-
able than the evils which would arise from disobedience to
the prince. 2
The position of Egidius Colonna is, as we have said, re-
markable, and different from the normal mediseval tradition.
rex. Tyrannus autem e contrario
principaliter intendit bonum priva-
tum, ex consequenti autem et quasi
per accidens intendit bonum com-
mune. "
Cf. iii. 2, 2 and 6.
1 Id. , ' De Renuntiatione Papse,'
xvi. 1 : " Revertamur ergo ad pro-
positum, et dieamus, quod non est
super naturam negotii, nec supra con-
ditionem rerum, quod homines homi-
nibus prfflferuntur : immo est naturalis,
quod qui sunt potentiores in intellectu
et magis vigent industria, illi prsesint.
Et ideo videmus, quod homines natu-
raliter presunt bestiis, viri feminis,
senes pueris. . . . Inter adultos etiam
aliquibus dedit Deus majorem indus-
triam, quam aliis. Ex hoo ergo voluit,
quod non solum homines bestiis, viri
feminis, adulte pueris prseessent, sed
etiam voluit quod et ipsi adulti aliquem
super se praificerent, quia ut dieitur
in Proverbiis, ' Intelligens gubernacula
possidebit. '
Vult enim sapiens Solomon, quod
per intelligentiam homo sit aptus ad
alios gubernandum. Sed quamvis sic
requirit natura negotii, quod scientes
melius pericula pravidere aliis prse-
ficiantur, ut aub eorum gubernaculo
multitudo salvetur, oportet tamen
quod hoc compleatur per consensum
hominum. Et sicut per consensum
hominum perficitur et completur, ut
quia aliis praficiatur, sic per consensum
hominum contrario modo factum fieri
potest, quod prsefectus cedat, vel quod
etiam deponatur. "
>> Id. , ' De Regimine Principum,' iii.
2, 34 : " Si ergo consideretur quantum
bonum advenit ex rege; non solum
regibus recte regentibus, sed etiam
dato quod in aliquo, tyrannizarent,
studeret populus qbedire illis. Nam
magis est tolerabilis aliqualis tyran-
nides principantis, quam sit malum
quod consurgit ex inobedientia prin-
cipis, et ex prevaricatione mandatorum
? ? ejus. "
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? 78
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
It may possibly be suggested that we have here at least
some significant evidence as to the tendency of the political
institutions and theory of France. We must observe, how-
ever, that while it is true that Egidius was writing in France,
and for a French prince, he was not himself a Frenchman,
but an Italian.
There are two contemporary French writers with whom
we shall have more to do later, but whose work we may
examine with regard to our present point. The first is the
author of the tract entitled ' Disputatio inter Clericum et
Militem,' which deals with the conflict between Boniface VIII.
and Philip the Fair, written not earlier than 1296. In one
passage he claims that the legislative power of the king of
France is the same as that of the emperor, that as the emperor
has power to make and unmake laws for the whole empire,
so also the king of France has power not only to repudiate
the laws of the emperor, but also to promulgate new ones ;
he can add to, can diminish, or modify laws and privi-
leges, taking account always of equity and reason, for he has
no superior. The author seems to mean that he can do this,
either by his own authority or with his chief men. 1 The
author is clearly thinking of the legislative power of the
French king in terms of the position of the emperor in the
Eoman jurisprudence ; and while he formally allows for the
possibility of the king legislating with the advice of his " pro-
ceres," he does not seem to think of this as essential.
1 ' Disputatio inter Clericum et Mih-
tem,' p. 80 : " Et ideo sicut omnia
quse infra terminos imperii sunt, sub-
jecta esse noscuntur imperio, sio quse
infra terminos regni, regno. Et sicut
imperator supra totum imperium suum
habet leges condere, addere eia, aut
demere : sio et rex Francise aut omnino
leges imperatoris repellere aut quam-
libot placuerit permutare, aut illis a
toto regno suo prascriptis et abolitis,
novas si placuerit promulgare. Alio-
quin si aliquid novi, ut ssepe accidit,
visum fuerit statuendum, si rex non
posset hoc qui est summus: tunc
nullus poterit. Quia ultra sum non
est superior ullus. Et ideo domine
clerice, linguam vestram coercete et
agnoscite re gem legibus, consuetudini-
bus, et privilegiis vestris et libertatibus
datis, regia potestate prse. esse, posse
addere, posso minuere quselibit, sequi-
tate et ratione consultis, aut cum suis
proceribus, sicut visum fuerit, tempe-
rare. "
Cf. for a critical discussion of the
date, &c. , of this work, R.
not easy to define his position in precise terms, for while his
1 Cf. vol. ii. pp. 63-67.
- Andreas de Isernia, ' Peregrina vel
Agnosia ad omnes regni Neapolitani
Constitutiones,' Fol. 38, v. : " Lege
regia transtulerunt regnum. Cum ad
hoc regem pertinet eo ipso quod est
rex ut subditis suis imponat legem et
condat. Unde si hodie liberi populi
constituerunt eibi regem, eo ipso super
eos rex haberet legis condende poles-
tatem. Sicut si faciat regem ille qui
potest, ut papa regem Sicilise, per ea
qun? dicta sunt, in prohemio. S.
dicitur Hieremie iii. ' Constitui te
super reges et regna,' de Vicario Christi
in terris qui Papa est. . . . Item primo
casu quando transtulit nunquam revo-
cavit, nisi ex causa, ut si rex fiat
tyrannus et sic abutitur . . . vel non
esset idoneus ad regimen. "
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? GS
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
treatment is characteristically lucid up to a certain point,
he, curiously enough, omits to deal explicitly with some im-
portant questions concerning the source of the legislative
power.
We have in an earlier chapter discussed the terms of
Aquinas' distinction between Natural and Positive Law, and
we have seen that he says that Positive Law arises from
a common agreement. 1 In another clause of the same article
he explains that an agreement might be either private or
public, and a public agreement is either that to which the
whole people agrees, or that which is ordained by the
prince who has the care of the people, and bears its
person (qui curam populi habet et ejus personam gerit),
and this is Positive Law. 2 The statement is significant
of the nature of law, but it does not explain how the
prince comes to have the care of the people and to bear
its person.
In another passage he indicates, indeed, very plainly the
nature and purpose of law--i. e. , the law of any particular
community. He begins by citing the words of St Isidore of
Seville, " Lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam majores
natu simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt," and continues
that law is directed to the common good. To order things
for the common good belongs either to the whole multitude
or to him who represents (gerens vicem) the whole multitude,
and therefore the authority to make law belongs either to the
whole multitude or to that public person who has the care
1 Cf. p. 39.
>> St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologies,' 2. 2, 67, 2 : " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut dictum est (art.
prsec. ) jus sive justum est aliquod opus
adequatum alteri secundum rcquali-
tatis modum : dupiiciter autem potest
alicui homini esse aliquid adsequatum :
uno quidem modo ex ipsa natura rei;
puta cum aliquis tantum dat, ut tan-
tundem recipiat; et hoc vocatur jus
naturalo : alio modo aliquid est adse-
quatum vel commensuratum alteri ex
condicto, sive ex communi placito;
quando scilicet aliquis roputat se con-
tentum, si tantum accipiat. Quod
quidem potest fieri dupiiciter: uno
modo per aliquod privatum condictum ;
sicut quod firmatur aliquo pacto inter
privatas personas : alio modo ex con-
dicto publico ; puta cum totus populus
consentit, quod aliquid habeatur quasi
adequatum, et commensuratum alteri ;
vel cum hoc ordinat princeps, qui
curam populi habet et ejus personam
gerit ; et hoc dicitur jus positivum. "
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? OHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OP THE STATE--n. 69
of the whole multitude. 1 The statement is clear and im-
portant, both in its description of the end or purpose of law
and in the words used to describe the legislator as "gerens
vicem''--that is, as the vicar or representative of the multitude,
and his responsibility for the good of the community; but
again Aquinas does not tell us how the " public person "
comes to have this authority.
The truth is that St Thomas clearly held that there were
two possible cases with regard to the law-making power.
In a passage to another part of which we have already
referred in dealing with the authority of custom, he says
that either the multitude may be free and can make laws
for itself, or it may not possess the free power of making
laws, or abrogating the laws made by a superior. 2 In
another place he relates the different kinds of laws to the
forms of the constitution of the State: in the kingdom there
are the constitutions of the prince; in the aristocracy, the
" responsa prudentum " or the " Senatus consulta " ; in the
democracy the " plebiscita," but again he does not discuss
the question how these various authorities came to have
the legislative power. He does, however, in this passage
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 90, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Isidores dicit in lib. v. Etym.
(c. 10) et habetur in Decrotis (Gratian,
Decretum, D. 2, 1). 'Lex est con-
stitute populi, secundum quam maj-
ores natu simul cum plebibus aliquid
sanxerunt,' non est ergo cujuslibet
facere legem.
Respondeo dicendum, quod lex
proprie primo, et principaliter respicit
ordinem ad bonum commune : ordinare
autem aliquid in bonum commune, est
vel totius multitudinis, vel alicujus
gerentis vicem totius multitudinis ; et
ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad
totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad
personam publicam, qua totius multi-
tudinis curam ha bet; quia et in
omnibus aliis ordinare in finem est
ejus, cuius est proprius ille finis. *'
>> Id. id. , i. 2, 97, 3 : "Ad tertium
dicendum, quod multitudo, in qua
consuetudo introducitur, duplicis con-
ditionis esse potest: si enim sit libera
multitudo, quse possit sibi legem facere,
plus est consensus totius multitudinis
ad aliquid observandum, quod con-
suetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas
principis, qui non habet potestatem
condendi legem, nisi inquantum gerit
personam multitudinis: unde licet
singulse personse non possint condere
legem tamen totus populus condere
legem potest: si vero multitudo non
habcat liberam potestatem condendi
sibi legem, vel legem a superiori potes-
tate positam removendi, tamen ipsa
consuetudo in tali multitudine prevalens
obtinet vim legis, in quanto per eos
toleratus, ad quos pertinet multitudini
legem imponere; ex hoc enim ipso
videntur approbare quod consuetudo
introduxit. "
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? 70
[PAST X.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
indicate his own clear preference for a mixed constitution
in which, as St Isidore had said, the laws are made by the
" majores natu cum plebibus. " 1
In the next chapter we shall have occasion to consider
more fully St Thomas' theory of the best form of govern-
ment and the nature and limits of political authority, and
we shall consider how far this may be thought to throw any
further light upon his theory of legislation.
In the meanwhile it would seem true that St Thomas had
no one definite theory as to the source of legislative authority,
but rather seems to think that in some constitutions the people
are the ultimate source of law, in some not. It is certainly
very singular that St Thomas, who was evidently well ac-
quainted with the Eoman law, should nowhere refer to the
universally accepted doctrine both of the Corpus Juris Civilis
and of the Bologna Civilians, that it was the Eoman people
who had conferred upon the prince his legislative authority.
If we were to venture a conjecture, we should be inclined to
say that this may possibly be a consequence of his study of
Aristotle's discussion of the various forms which government
may assume. Even so, it is curious that he should not show
the influence of Aristotle's consideration of the question
whether it was better to be governed by the best men or by
the best laws. 2
In the last years of the thirteenth century the theory of
1 Id. id. , i. 2, 95, 4 : " Tertio est de
rations legis humanse, ut instituatur
a gubernante communitatem civitatis,
eicut supra dictum est (i. 2, 90, 3) et
secundum hoc distinguuntur leges
humanse secundum diversa regimina
civitatum, quorum unum, secundum
Philos in ILT. Politic, est regnum,
quando scilicet civitas gubernatur ab
uno: et secundum hoo accipiuntur
constitutiones principum. Aliud vero
regimen est aristocratia, id est princi-
patus optimorum, vel optimatum : et
secundum hoc sumuntur responsa
prudentum et etiam senatus consults.
Aliud regimen est oligarchia, id est
principatus paucorum divitum et poten-
tum, et secundum hoo sumitur jus
practorium, quod etiam honorarium
dicitur: aliud autem regimen est
populi, quod nominatur democratia;
et secundum hoo sumuntur plebiscite.
Aliud aut est tyrannicum, quod est
omnino corruptum : undo ex hoo non
sumitur aliqua lex. Est enim aliquod
regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est
optimum : et secundum hoc sumitur
lex, ' quam majores natu simul cum
plebibus, sanxerunt,' ut Isidorus dicit "
(' Etym. ,' v. 10).
* Aristotle, ' Politics,' iii. 15.
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--II.
71
an absolute monarchy was asserted by an important writer,
by that Egidius Colonna to whom we have referred in an
earlier chapter, as illustrating the influence of Aristotle,1 not,
indeed, that in this matter he follows Aristotle; on the
contrary, as we shall see, he deliberately differs from him.
The origins of the position of Egidius are indeed obscure;
there is no trace in his work of the conception that this abso-
lute authority rests upon a " Divine Eight "--that is, upon
the theory that the prince was in such a sense the representa-
tive of God that he must be obeyed whether he was good
or bad, right or wrong. This theory was stated by St Gregory
the Great, and was known in the Middle Ages, and had even
been asserted by some writers in the course of the struggle
between Henry IV. and the Papacy,2 but it does not appear
that it had any importance in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, nor does Egidius Colonna appeal to it. What is,
however, much more remarkable is that Egidius Colonna
does not seem to derive his principles, at least directly, from
those Civilians who had maintained that the whole and sole
legislative authority in making law belonged to the emperor. 3
It cannot be doubted that he was acquainted with the Eoman
law and the work of the Bologna Civilians, but it is not from
these that he draws his arguments. It is possible that this
may partly be explained by his curious and somewhat laugh-
able contempt for the lawyers; in one place he speaks of
them as " ydiote politici. " 4
The immediate antecedents, therefore, of this defence of
absolutism are obscure, but the importance of it is great.
Some two hundred years later Sir John Fortescue drew a
sharp distinction between the "regimen politicum et regale "
of England and the " regimen regale " of France, between
the kingdom where the king governs according to laws made
by the whole community, and the kingdom where the king
makes the laws himself. 5 It may, indeed, be doubted whether
1 Cf. p. 13. ea de quibus est politics dicunt narra-
* Cf. vol. i. p. 152 aeq. ; vol. iii. tive et sine ratione, appcllari possunt
part ii. chap. 4. ydiote politici. "
* Cf. vol. ii. pp. 69-67. 5 Sir John Fortescue, 'Governance of
4 Egidius Colonna, ' De Rogimine England,' 1, 3, Ac. ; 'De Laudibus,'
Principum,' ii. 2, 8 : "Sic legiste quia 9, 18, 35, dfcc.
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? 72
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
Sir John Fortescue was not, for his own time, pressing the
distinction too far, whether it was really true that the con-
stitutional principles of the French kingdom were in his time
as clearly defined as he thought; but he was only anticipat-
ing the full developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.
However this may be, the distinction which Fortescue
made was one of the greatest significance, and it is here,
for our purposes, important to observe that the distinction
between the two forms of government was already being
made at the end of the thirteenth century, and that
Egidius Colonna expressed his preference for the "regimen
regale. "
Before we consider his position, we may, however, observe
that a distinction which is parallel, if not quite identical, is
discussed by Ptolemy of Lucca, to whom is now generally
ascribed the authorship of the greater part of the treatise,
' De Eegimine Principum,' which was begun by St Thomas
Aquinas. 1 In one place Ptolemy ascribes to Aristotle the
distinction between two forms of government, the political
and the despotic. He describes the first as that in which the
country or community is governed, whether by many or by
one, according to its own laws (ipsorum statuta), while in
the second the prince governs according to a law which is
in his own heart, and this form of government has the advan-
tage that it is more like that of God. On the other hand, the
despotic government, which is in its nature like the relation
of the master to the slave, is in its nature arbitrary, and
he illustrates this by the words in which Samuel described
the nature of kingship to the Israelites (1 Sam. viii.
10-18), and pointed out to them the advantages of the
" regimen politicum " which he and the judges had adminis-
tered. Ptolemy contends that there are considerations in
favour of each form, which he now distinguishes as the
" regimen politicum " and the " dominium regale. " The first
is well adapted to the state of innocence or to the rule of men
1 Cf. p. 24.
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--H. 73
who are wise and virtuous, like the ancient Eomans, but the
second to the government of those who are perverse and
foolish, and the number of the foolish is infinite. He also
urges that the characteristics of the peoples who inhabit
different parts of the world are different, and that some seem
adapted to slavery and some to freedom. There are therefore,
he concludes, some reasons for preferring the " polity " to the
kingdom, and some for preferring the " regale dominium " to
the "polity. "1
1 Ptolemy of Lucca (St Thomas
Aquinas), ' De Regimino Principum,'
ii. 8 : " Duplex enim principatus ab
Aristotele ponitur in sua Politica
quorum quilibet suos habet mimstros,
licet plures ponat in v. Politicorum,
ut supra est distinctum, et infra etiam
declarabitur, politicus videlicet, et
despoticus. Politicus quidem, quando
regio sive provincia, sive civitas, sive
castrum, per unum vel plures regitur
secundum ipso rum statuta, ut in
regionibus contingit Italise, et precipue
Romse, ut per senatores et consules
pro maj ore parte ab urbe condita. . . .
Et inde sequitur in regimine politico
diminutio, quia legibus solum rector
politicus judicat populum, quod per
regale dominium suppletur, dum non
legibus obligatus, per eam censeat,
quse est in poctore principis, propter
quod divinam magis sequitur provi-
dentiam, cui est cura de omnibus, ut
in libro Sapientise dicitur. . . .
ii. 9. Est autem hie advertendum,
quod principatus despoticus dicitur qui
est domini ad servum, quod quidem
nomen grocum est.
Unde quidam
domini illuis provincise adhuc hodie
despoti vocantur, quem princpatum
ad regalem possumus reduce re, ut ex
sacra liquet scriptura. . . . Traduntur
enim leges regales per Samuelem pro-
phet am Israelitico populo quss servi-
tutem important. . . . Filios vestros
toilet, et ponet in curibus suis . . . et
prsecursores quadrigarum suarum, et
constituet aratores agrorum suorum
. . . et sic de aliis conditionibus ad
servitutem pertinentibus, quse in 1 Lib.
Re gum traduntur, per hoc quasi volens
ostendere quod regimen politicum,
quod erat judicum, et suum fuerat,
fructuosius erat populo, cujus tamen
superius contrarium est ostensum. Ad
cujus dubii declarationem sciendum
est quod ex duplici parte regimen
politicum regali preponitur: primo
quidem, si referamus dominium ad
statum integrum humanse naturse, qui
status innocentise appellatur, in quo
non fuisset regale regimen sed politi-
cum. . . . Unde apud sapientes et
homines virtuosos, ut fuerunt antiqui
Romani, seoundum imitationem talis
nature regimen politicum ejus fuit.
Sed quia perversi difficile corri-
gentur, et stultorum infinitus est
numerus, ut dicitur in Eoclesiastico,
? ? in natura eorrupta regimen regale est
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? 74
[past r.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
Ptolemy of Lucca was a pupil of St Thomas Aquinas,
but we must not attribute to St Thomas the responsibility
for the indifference with which he treats the two forms
of government. St Thomas does, indeed, recognise that in
some cases a people is free and makes its own laws, while
in others it does not possess this power; but in one place at
least, as we have seen,1 he does express his own preference
for the mixed constitution in which the laws are made by
the " majores natu cum plebibus. " Still less must we attri-
bute to St Thomas the responsibility for the dogmatic prefer-
ence which Egidius Colonna expresses for the " regimen
regale. "
We must now examine the position of Egidius in more detail.
The work with which we are here concerned is his treatise,
' De Eegimine Principum. ' It was written probably before
the death of Philip III. of France, to whose son, afterwards
Philip IV. , Egidius was apparently in some relation of tutor
or teacher. We have already drawn attention to his position,
as having learned, probably through St Thomas Aquinas,
to know of the Aristotelian political theories. We are here
concerned with his conception of law and its relation to the
prince.
Egidius makes a distinction between the " regimen regale "
and the " regimen politicum " like that of Ptolemy of Lucca.
The State may, he says, be ruled in two ways ; the " regimen
regale " is that under which the prince rules according to
his own will (arbitrium) and according to laws which he
has made himself. The regimen politicum is that where
the prince rules, not according to his own will or
according to laws which he made, but according to the
law which the citizens have made. 2 As he puts it in
another place, laws may be made either by the prince or
1 Cf. pp. 69, 70.
>> Egidius Colonna, ' De Regimine
Principum,' ii. 1, 14 : " Civital autem,
quantum ad prsesens, spectat, duplici
regimine regi potest, politico scilicet et
regali. Dicitur autem quia prseesso
regali dominio : cum preest secundum
arbitrium et secundum leges quas ipse
instituit. Sed tune prseest regimine
politico, quum non prseest secundum
arbitrium, nec secundum leges quas
ipse instituit, sed secundum eas quas
cives instituerunt. "
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOUBCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--II.
75
by the whole people, if it is the people which rules and
elects the ruler. 1
Like Ptolemy he recognises the two forms of government
as possible and legitimate, but he also contends that it is
better to be ruled by the king than by the law. This is the
more remarkable, because he carefully states that Aristotle
had maintained that the true prince was an instrument of
the law, and that it was better to be governed *by a
good law than by a good king. Egidius states Aristotle's
argument as he understood it, but only in order to main-
tain the opposite--namely, that it is better to be ruled
by the king than by the law; and he adds that, while
the king is under the natural law, he is not under the
positive law. 2
This is, indeed, a highly significant development of political
1 Id. id. , iii. 2, 27 : " Leges que
ordinant nos in commune bonum con-
dende sunt a principe, cui est ordinare
et dirigere alios in tale bonum, vel
condende sunt a toto populo, si tot us
populus principetur, et sit in potestate
ejus eligere principantem. Nulla est
ergo lex quse non sit edita ab eo cujus
est dirigere in bonum commune : nam
si est lex divina et naturalis condita
a Deo, cujus est omnia dirigere in
seipsum ; qui maxime est commune
bonum ; quia est bonum omnis boni:
lex vero humana et positiva condita
est a principe vel a toto populo, si
tot us populus principetur. "
>> Id. id. , iii. 2, 29 : " Nam ut dicitur
5 Ethicorum, princeps debet esse custos
justi id est justelegis. Est ergo princeps,
si debite principetur, quasi quoddam
organum juste legis, ut, quod lex fieri
prsecipit, rex per civilem potentiam
observari f acit: quare si quod est
principalius eligibilius est in regimine,
q. organum et instrumentum; regi
optima lege eligibilius est quam regi
optimo rege : hoc est ergo quod ait
philosophus III. Politicorum, quod
eligibilius est principari legem, quia
hos s. reges aut principes instituendum
esse servatores legis et ministros legum.
. . . Sciendum est regem et quemlibet
principantem esse medium inter legem
naturalem et positivam : nam nullus
recte principatur nisi agat ut recta
ratio dictat . . . . .
Quare positiva lex est infra princi-
pantem sicut lex naturalis est supra,
et si dicatur legem aliquam positivam
esse supra principantem, hoc non est
ut positiva sed ut in ea reservatur
virtus juris naturalis. Cum ergo
queritur utrum melius sit regnum aut
ci vita tem regi optimo rege aut optima
lege; si loquamur de lege naturali
patet hano principaliorem esso in
regendo quam sit ipse rex, eo quod
nullus sit rectus rex nisi in quantum
innititur illi legi
Sed si loquamur de lege positiva, melius
est regi optimo rege, quam maxime
in casibus illis in quibus talis lex deficit,
? ? et dicit universaliter quod non est
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? 76
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
theory, for this is a thoroughgoing contradiction of the prin-
ciples of Bracton, and practically of all mediseval theory ; for
the principle that the king is the servant and not the master
of law belongs not only to the feudal system, but to the
whole structure of mediseval society, and is expressed by
practically all the mediseval writers, except some of the
Bologna Civilians. 1 It is, indeed, with Egidius Colonna, as
we have said, that we come on the beginning of that con-
ception of the monarchy which was to be developed in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
It must, however, be observed that Egidius carefully and
consistently maintains the Aristotelian principle that the test
of all good government is that it is directed to the common
good, and that, just because the prince makes the laws and
is himself a living law, he must maintain justice; and that
if he fails to do this he is not worthy to be a king, and loses
the royal dignity. 2 He does not hesitate to describe the ruler
who pursues his private good and not the public welfare as
a tyrant. 3
1 Cf. especially vol. i. chap. 19 ; vol.
ii. part i. chap. 7; vol. iii. part i.
chap. 2 : part ii. chap. 5.
1 Id. id. , i. 1, 12: " Nam regens
multitudinem debet intendere com-
mune bonum. Prima via sic patet;
nam si lex est regula agendorum : ut
haberi potest ex 5 Ethic, ipse judex
et multum magis ipse rex cujus est
leges ferre debet esse quedam regula
in agendis. Est enim rex sive princeps
quivdam lex ; et lex est qusedam rex
sive princeps. Nam lex est quidam
inanimatus princeps. Princeps vero
est qusedam animata lex. Quantum
ergo animatum inanimatum superat,
tantum rex sive princeps debet supe-
rare legem. Debet etiam rex esse
tante justitie et tante equitatis ut
posset ipsas leges dirigere, cum in
aliquo casu leges observari non de-
beant ut infra patebit. Dubitare ergo
utrum rex debeat esse equal is et justus
est dubitare utrum ipsa regula debeat
esse regulata. Si enim regula ab
equalitate deficiat nihil regulatum erit,
quum omnia per regulam regulentur.
Sio si reges sunt injusti, disponunt
regnum ut non observetur justitia.
Maxime ergo studere debent ne sint
injusti et inequales; quia eorum in-
justitia et inequalitas tollit ab eis
rogiam dignitatem. Nam reges injusti
etsi dominant per civilem potentiam
non tamen digni sunt ut sint reges,
cum enim deceat regulam esse rectam
et equalem. Rex, quia est qusedam
animata lex, est qusedam animata
regula agendorum, ex parte ipsius
personse regise maxime decet ipse ser-
vare justitiam. "
* Id. id. , i. 3, 3 : " Nam ut superius
dicebatur et ut philosophus in Pol.
probat differentiam esse inter regem
et tyrannum, quod rex principaliter
intendit bonum commune, et intern-
dendo bonum commune intendit bonum
? ? privatum, quia salvato regno salvatur
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? CHAP. VI. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--H. 77
In a later work, written, as it is thought, in 1297, with
reference to the abdication of the Papal throne by Pope
Celestine in 1294, while Egidius maintains that those who
are superior in intelligence and energy should rule over others,
he also argues that this must be done by the consent of men,
and that by this same consent the ruler may retire or be
deposed. 1 This belongs, however, rather to the subject of
our next chapter, but we mention it here as confirming the
impression of the last passage cited.
It is, however, also noticeable that in one place he urges
that when it is considered how much good arises from king-
ship, not only when kings rule well, but even when in some
respects they play the tyrant, the people should strive to
obey, for some tyranny on the part of the ruler is more toler-
able than the evils which would arise from disobedience to
the prince. 2
The position of Egidius Colonna is, as we have said, re-
markable, and different from the normal mediseval tradition.
rex. Tyrannus autem e contrario
principaliter intendit bonum priva-
tum, ex consequenti autem et quasi
per accidens intendit bonum com-
mune. "
Cf. iii. 2, 2 and 6.
1 Id. , ' De Renuntiatione Papse,'
xvi. 1 : " Revertamur ergo ad pro-
positum, et dieamus, quod non est
super naturam negotii, nec supra con-
ditionem rerum, quod homines homi-
nibus prfflferuntur : immo est naturalis,
quod qui sunt potentiores in intellectu
et magis vigent industria, illi prsesint.
Et ideo videmus, quod homines natu-
raliter presunt bestiis, viri feminis,
senes pueris. . . . Inter adultos etiam
aliquibus dedit Deus majorem indus-
triam, quam aliis. Ex hoo ergo voluit,
quod non solum homines bestiis, viri
feminis, adulte pueris prseessent, sed
etiam voluit quod et ipsi adulti aliquem
super se praificerent, quia ut dieitur
in Proverbiis, ' Intelligens gubernacula
possidebit. '
Vult enim sapiens Solomon, quod
per intelligentiam homo sit aptus ad
alios gubernandum. Sed quamvis sic
requirit natura negotii, quod scientes
melius pericula pravidere aliis prse-
ficiantur, ut aub eorum gubernaculo
multitudo salvetur, oportet tamen
quod hoc compleatur per consensum
hominum. Et sicut per consensum
hominum perficitur et completur, ut
quia aliis praficiatur, sic per consensum
hominum contrario modo factum fieri
potest, quod prsefectus cedat, vel quod
etiam deponatur. "
>> Id. , ' De Regimine Principum,' iii.
2, 34 : " Si ergo consideretur quantum
bonum advenit ex rege; non solum
regibus recte regentibus, sed etiam
dato quod in aliquo, tyrannizarent,
studeret populus qbedire illis. Nam
magis est tolerabilis aliqualis tyran-
nides principantis, quam sit malum
quod consurgit ex inobedientia prin-
cipis, et ex prevaricatione mandatorum
? ? ejus. "
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? 78
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
It may possibly be suggested that we have here at least
some significant evidence as to the tendency of the political
institutions and theory of France. We must observe, how-
ever, that while it is true that Egidius was writing in France,
and for a French prince, he was not himself a Frenchman,
but an Italian.
There are two contemporary French writers with whom
we shall have more to do later, but whose work we may
examine with regard to our present point. The first is the
author of the tract entitled ' Disputatio inter Clericum et
Militem,' which deals with the conflict between Boniface VIII.
and Philip the Fair, written not earlier than 1296. In one
passage he claims that the legislative power of the king of
France is the same as that of the emperor, that as the emperor
has power to make and unmake laws for the whole empire,
so also the king of France has power not only to repudiate
the laws of the emperor, but also to promulgate new ones ;
he can add to, can diminish, or modify laws and privi-
leges, taking account always of equity and reason, for he has
no superior. The author seems to mean that he can do this,
either by his own authority or with his chief men. 1 The
author is clearly thinking of the legislative power of the
French king in terms of the position of the emperor in the
Eoman jurisprudence ; and while he formally allows for the
possibility of the king legislating with the advice of his " pro-
ceres," he does not seem to think of this as essential.
1 ' Disputatio inter Clericum et Mih-
tem,' p. 80 : " Et ideo sicut omnia
quse infra terminos imperii sunt, sub-
jecta esse noscuntur imperio, sio quse
infra terminos regni, regno. Et sicut
imperator supra totum imperium suum
habet leges condere, addere eia, aut
demere : sio et rex Francise aut omnino
leges imperatoris repellere aut quam-
libot placuerit permutare, aut illis a
toto regno suo prascriptis et abolitis,
novas si placuerit promulgare. Alio-
quin si aliquid novi, ut ssepe accidit,
visum fuerit statuendum, si rex non
posset hoc qui est summus: tunc
nullus poterit. Quia ultra sum non
est superior ullus. Et ideo domine
clerice, linguam vestram coercete et
agnoscite re gem legibus, consuetudini-
bus, et privilegiis vestris et libertatibus
datis, regia potestate prse. esse, posse
addere, posso minuere quselibit, sequi-
tate et ratione consultis, aut cum suis
proceribus, sicut visum fuerit, tempe-
rare. "
Cf. for a critical discussion of the
date, &c. , of this work, R.
