Accordingly
one object of teaching is the matter or object of
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes
to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes
to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.
Summa Theologica
The "oblique" movement in the angels he describes as being
composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care
for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of
God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be
partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes
use of the light received from God.
Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from
the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of
reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from
the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below:
if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from
the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be
about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the
movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to
intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural
reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the
Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as
explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility
belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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Whether there is delight in contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is
no delight in contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to
delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when the soul strives to contemplate
God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because
even while tasting, it fails. " Therefore there is no delight in
contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative
life.
Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight.
Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
(Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face
to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31) . . . because he
touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore
seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable. "
I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in
two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. [3729]FS, Q[3],
A[5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits
him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the
truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the
result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as
bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in
itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the
contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of
which charity is the motive, as stated above ([3730]AA[1],2, ad 1), it
follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by
reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine
love.
In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both
because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated
above ([3731]FS, Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions,
and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all
love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is
sweet. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly
in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God.
And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the
term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when we see one whom we love,
we are so aflame as to love him more. " And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
not only seen but also loved.
Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of
an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights
not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights
yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more
peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph. " But
there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the
truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our
defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to
lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body ss a load
upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things. " Hence it is that when man attains to the
contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more
his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say
with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver
me from the body of this death? " Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ): "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He
withers all carnal pleasure in us. "
Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is
imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like
manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as
compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is
written (Ps. 35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure. " Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i,
5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime
beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly,
nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory
says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life is
sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above
itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes
of the mind. "
Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ). "Thus
when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while
the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on
that foot which is sound. "
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Whether the contemplative life is continuous?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
shall be destroyed. " Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I
sink down again. " Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15,
"When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does
not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for
it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the
light. " Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.
Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man. "
Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech. ), "the contemplative life begins here so that it
may be perfected in our heavenly home. "
I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13.
But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous---both because
it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul,
namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life---and
because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our
bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof,
as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here
as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks
in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life begins
here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of
love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when
we see Him Whom we love. "
Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now
the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we
have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot
last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the
other contemplative acts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life
to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us
something divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
longer.
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active
life?
(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?
(4) Of the duration of the active life.
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Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he
needs. " Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the
acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as
stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; [3732]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3). Therefore the
acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that Lia who
was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
offspring of good deeds. " Now this would seem to belong to charity,
whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
active life.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([3733]Q[180], A[2]), the moral
virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and
perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active
life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good
works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being
purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light. " Now
all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues.
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above ([3734]Q[179], A[1]) the active and the
contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men
intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration
of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the
other is external work to which the active life is directed.
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to
the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no
avail. " Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to
the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8)
subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by
which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the
Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described
with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists
in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
Reply to Objection 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral
virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this
is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition
to the contemplative life.
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Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active
life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive
power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence
belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore
prudence does not belong to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that the
"active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is
signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes,
so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems
that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above [3735](A[1]), so do the intellectual
virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life,
but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention
(De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; [3736]FS, Q[18], A[6]), if
one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in
moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for
instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather
than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it
is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of
the moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the
principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.
Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues
in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the
contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself
directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the
active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the
Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind
of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof,
belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5)
says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the
truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent
and wise. "
Reply to Objection 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
stated above ([3737]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6), wherefore the knowledge
pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active
life.
Reply to Objection 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention,
since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
[*Bell. Catilin. , LI].
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the
intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter
as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things
about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the
contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
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Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active
but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech. ) that
"the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least
through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they
inflame with love for their hidden beauty. " But this pertains to
teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the
same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an
indication of knowledge. " Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain
to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to
the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of
the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it
belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching
him, of the truth we have meditated.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The active life is
to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of
wisdom. "
I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching
is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior
concept.
Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes
to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the
active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be
directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the
contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the
consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De
Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better
part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word,
long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary
knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life.
The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and
thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all
doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine
as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration
and love of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this
argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it
pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in
so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
bring another man to understand the truth.
Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the
man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible
truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by
external action. Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether the active life remains after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this
life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as
stated above [3738](A[1]). But the moral virtues endure after this life
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life
remains after this life.
Objection 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as
stated above [3739](A[3]). But in the life to come when "we shall be
like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is
in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge,"
according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that
the active life remains after this life.
Objection 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more
is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech. ) that "we
can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to
maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life. " Therefore the
active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after
this life.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The active life
ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be
perfected in our heavenly home. "
I answer that, As stated above [3740](A[1]), the active life has its
end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of
contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative
life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external
actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these
will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says
at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we
shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise. " And he had
said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without
end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the
occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3741]Q[136], A[1], ad 1), the
moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the
means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are
those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words
quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not
only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the
passions.
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life, as stated above
([3742]Q[180], A[4]), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and
as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Mat.
18:10, "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order,
"always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no
man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1
Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They
shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord:
for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. "
But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries
of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and
perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long
as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in
administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the
fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder---which refers to
contemplation---and "descending" ---which refers to action.
Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander
abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of
inward contemplation. " Hence in them the active life does not differ
from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the
active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the
administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by
reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of
our seeing God.
Reply to Objection 3: That the durability of the active life in the
present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises
not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our
own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation
by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the
mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height
recoils on itself. "
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life in comparison with the
contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
(4) Of their order.
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Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than
the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to
be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the
active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are
placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not love honor or power
in this life. " Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the
more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to
the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears
from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge the
people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see
the Lord. " Therefore the active life is more excellent than the
contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing
in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1
Cor. 12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Now some are taken away
from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the
active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state
of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her. " Now Mary figures the
contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent
than the active.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in
themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more
excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight
reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life
becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the
intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence
Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted
"the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,'
if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. ] whereas as
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who
was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can
be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of
contemplation, as stated above ([3743]Q[180], A[8], ad 2;[3744] Q[181],
A[4], ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is
signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's feet. "
Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the
active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that
"Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted. " Fourthly, because in the
contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer
things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. 10:41): "Martha,
Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. " Fifthly,
because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while
the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps.
36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after,
that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that
I may see the delight of the Lord. " Sixthly, because the contemplative
life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still
and see that I am God. " Seventhly, because the contemplative life is
according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human
things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the
beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made
flesh': Him was Martha serving. " Eighthly, because the contemplative
life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his
intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers
also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore
(Ps. 35:7) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O
Lord," that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light
we shall see light. "
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath
chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which
words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not---Thou
hast chosen badly but---She has chosen better. Why better?
Listen---because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of
necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of
truth is eternal. "
Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer
the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to
be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . . "
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they
should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says
(Pastor. ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted
than others in contemplation. "
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain
liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not
of temporal but of eternal things. " And Boethius says (De Consol. v,
2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze
on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things. "
Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command
the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life
as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves
rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in
Ezech. ) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative
life is freedom. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the
contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some
necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake
contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):
"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no
one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we
must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must
not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves
of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us. " Hence it is clear that
when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life,
this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.
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Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is
due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own
reward according to his own labor. " Now labor is ascribed to the active
life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from
labor, i. e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the
embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle. " Therefore the active
life is of greater merit than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, "So I
will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan. ):
"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come. "
And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "contemplation begins here,
so as to be perfected in our heavenly home. " Now the life to come will
be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits.
Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the
character of merit than the active, but more of the character of
reward.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech. ) that "no
sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls. " Now by the
zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater
merit than the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of
the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3745]FS, Q[114], A[4]), the root of
merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity
consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above
(Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love
of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains
directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life,
for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as
stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life
is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is
"busy about much serving" (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life
is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover
asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life
surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the
stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our
neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of
the coming rest," i. e. the contemplation of God.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the
active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For
instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer
separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time
being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the
Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from
Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows
(De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis. ]): "His mind was
so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to
be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ. "
Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived
at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice.
Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul,
according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God";
in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He
that heareth, let him say: Come. " And the more closely a man unites his
own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to
God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own
soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action.
Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God
than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life
is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is
more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of
others, than any other external gifts.
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Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain
stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am
God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Lk.
composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care
for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of
God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be
partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes
use of the light received from God.
Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from
the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of
reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from
the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below:
if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from
the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be
about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the
movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to
intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural
reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the
Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as
explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility
belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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Whether there is delight in contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is
no delight in contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to
delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when the soul strives to contemplate
God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because
even while tasting, it fails. " Therefore there is no delight in
contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative
life.
Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight.
Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
(Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face
to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31) . . . because he
touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore
seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable. "
I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in
two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. [3729]FS, Q[3],
A[5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits
him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the
truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the
result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as
bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in
itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the
contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of
which charity is the motive, as stated above ([3730]AA[1],2, ad 1), it
follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by
reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine
love.
In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both
because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated
above ([3731]FS, Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions,
and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all
love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is
sweet. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly
in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God.
And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the
term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when we see one whom we love,
we are so aflame as to love him more. " And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
not only seen but also loved.
Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of
an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights
not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights
yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more
peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph. " But
there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the
truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our
defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to
lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body ss a load
upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things. " Hence it is that when man attains to the
contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more
his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say
with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver
me from the body of this death? " Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ): "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He
withers all carnal pleasure in us. "
Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is
imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like
manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as
compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is
written (Ps. 35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure. " Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i,
5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime
beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly,
nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory
says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life is
sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above
itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes
of the mind. "
Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ). "Thus
when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while
the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on
that foot which is sound. "
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Whether the contemplative life is continuous?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
shall be destroyed. " Therefore the contemplative life is made void.
Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I
sink down again. " Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15,
"When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does
not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for
it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the
light. " Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.
Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man. "
Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech. ), "the contemplative life begins here so that it
may be perfected in our heavenly home. "
I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13.
But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous---both because
it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul,
namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life---and
because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our
bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof,
as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here
as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks
in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life begins
here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of
love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when
we see Him Whom we love. "
Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now
the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we
have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot
last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the
other contemplative acts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life
to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us
something divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
longer.
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active
life?
(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?
(4) Of the duration of the active life.
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Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he
needs. " Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the
acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as
stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; [3732]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3). Therefore the
acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that Lia who
was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
offspring of good deeds. " Now this would seem to belong to charity,
whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
active life.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([3733]Q[180], A[2]), the moral
virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and
perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active
life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good
works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being
purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light. " Now
all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues.
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above ([3734]Q[179], A[1]) the active and the
contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men
intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration
of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the
other is external work to which the active life is directed.
Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to
the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no
avail. " Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to
the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8)
subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by
which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the
Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described
with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists
in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
Reply to Objection 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral
virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this
is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.
It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition
to the contemplative life.
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Whether prudence pertains to the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active
life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive
power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence
belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore
prudence does not belong to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that the
"active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is
signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes,
so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems
that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above [3735](A[1]), so do the intellectual
virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life,
but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention
(De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; [3736]FS, Q[18], A[6]), if
one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in
moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for
instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather
than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it
is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of
the moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the
principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.
Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues
in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the
contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself
directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the
active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the
Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind
of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof,
belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5)
says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the
truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent
and wise. "
Reply to Objection 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
stated above ([3737]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6), wherefore the knowledge
pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active
life.
Reply to Objection 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention,
since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
[*Bell. Catilin. , LI].
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the
intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter
as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things
about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the
contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
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Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?
Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active
but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech. ) that
"the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least
through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they
inflame with love for their hidden beauty. " But this pertains to
teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the
same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an
indication of knowledge. " Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain
to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to
the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of
the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it
belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching
him, of the truth we have meditated.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The active life is
to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of
wisdom. "
I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching
is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior
concept.
Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of
the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes
to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the
active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be
directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the
contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the
consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De
Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better
part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word,
long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary
knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life.
The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and
thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all
doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine
as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration
and love of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this
argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it
pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in
so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
bring another man to understand the truth.
Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the
man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible
truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by
external action. Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether the active life remains after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this
life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as
stated above [3738](A[1]). But the moral virtues endure after this life
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life
remains after this life.
Objection 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as
stated above [3739](A[3]). But in the life to come when "we shall be
like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is
in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge,"
according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that
the active life remains after this life.
Objection 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more
is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech. ) that "we
can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to
maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life. " Therefore the
active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after
this life.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The active life
ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be
perfected in our heavenly home. "
I answer that, As stated above [3740](A[1]), the active life has its
end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of
contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative
life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external
actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these
will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says
at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we
shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise. " And he had
said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without
end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the
occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3741]Q[136], A[1], ad 1), the
moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the
means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are
those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words
quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not
only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the
passions.
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life, as stated above
([3742]Q[180], A[4]), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and
as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Mat.
18:10, "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order,
"always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no
man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1
Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They
shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord:
for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. "
But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries
of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and
perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long
as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in
administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the
fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder---which refers to
contemplation---and "descending" ---which refers to action.
Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander
abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of
inward contemplation. " Hence in them the active life does not differ
from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the
active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the
administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by
reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of
our seeing God.
Reply to Objection 3: That the durability of the active life in the
present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises
not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our
own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation
by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the
mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height
recoils on itself. "
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OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the active life in comparison with the
contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
(4) Of their order.
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Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than
the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to
be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the
active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are
placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not love honor or power
in this life. " Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the
more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to
the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears
from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge the
people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see
the Lord. " Therefore the active life is more excellent than the
contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing
in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1
Cor. 12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Now some are taken away
from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the
active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state
of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best
part, which shall not be taken away from her. " Now Mary figures the
contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent
than the active.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in
themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more
excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight
reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life
becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the
intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence
Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted
"the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,'
if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. ] whereas as
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who
was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can
be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of
contemplation, as stated above ([3743]Q[180], A[8], ad 2;[3744] Q[181],
A[4], ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is
signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's feet. "
Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the
active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that
"Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted. " Fourthly, because in the
contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer
things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. 10:41): "Martha,
Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. " Fifthly,
because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while
the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps.
36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after,
that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that
I may see the delight of the Lord. " Sixthly, because the contemplative
life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still
and see that I am God. " Seventhly, because the contemplative life is
according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human
things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the
beginning was the Word': to Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made
flesh': Him was Martha serving. " Eighthly, because the contemplative
life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his
intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers
also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore
(Ps. 35:7) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O
Lord," that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light
we shall see light. "
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath
chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which
words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not---Thou
hast chosen badly but---She has chosen better. Why better?
Listen---because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of
necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of
truth is eternal. "
Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer
the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to
be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . . "
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they
should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says
(Pastor. ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted
than others in contemplation. "
Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain
liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not
of temporal but of eternal things. " And Boethius says (De Consol. v,
2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze
on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things. "
Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command
the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life
as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves
rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in
Ezech. ) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative
life is freedom. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the
contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some
necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake
contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):
"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no
one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we
must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must
not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves
of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us. " Hence it is clear that
when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life,
this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.
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Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is
due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own
reward according to his own labor. " Now labor is ascribed to the active
life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from
labor, i. e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the
embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle. " Therefore the active
life is of greater merit than the contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, "So I
will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan. ):
"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come. "
And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "contemplation begins here,
so as to be perfected in our heavenly home. " Now the life to come will
be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits.
Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the
character of merit than the active, but more of the character of
reward.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech. ) that "no
sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls. " Now by the
zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater
merit than the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of
the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3745]FS, Q[114], A[4]), the root of
merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity
consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above
(Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love
of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains
directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life,
for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as
stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life
is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is
"busy about much serving" (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life
is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover
asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life
surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the
stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our
neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of
the coming rest," i. e. the contemplation of God.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the
active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For
instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer
separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time
being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the
Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from
Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows
(De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis. ]): "His mind was
so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to
be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ. "
Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived
at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice.
Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul,
according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God";
in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He
that heareth, let him say: Come. " And the more closely a man unites his
own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to
God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own
soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action.
Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God
than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life
is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is
more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of
others, than any other external gifts.
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Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain
stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am
God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Lk.
