No More Learning

Life is only a means to something : it is the
expression of the forms of growth in power.
»
707.
The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
In comparison with the enormous and compli-
cated antagonistic processes which the collective life
of every organism represents, its conscious world
of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small
slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate
this particle of consciousness as the object, the
wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the.
attainment of conseiousness. is obviously only an
additional means to the unfolding of life, and to. .
the extension of its power. That is why it is a
piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, or
intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual
sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and
maybe to justify " the world” with it.


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176
THE WILL TO POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo-
sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to
allwherefores and highest values that have appeared
in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto.
A kind of means is misunderstood as the object
itself: conversely life and its growth of power were
debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of
life it would not necessarily be related in any way
with the category of conscious life; it would
require rather to explain conscious life as a mere
means to itself. . .
The “denial of life” regarded as the object of
life, the object of evolution ! Existence—a piece of
tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta-
tion is only the outcome of life's being measured
by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain,
good and evil). Here the means are made to stand
against the end-the" unholy,” absurd, and, above
all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any
use when it requires such means ? But where the
fault lies is here instead of looking for the end
which would explain the necessity of such means,
we posited an end from the start which actually
excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum
in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable,
rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only
did we decide what end would be desirable. .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact
that, instead of regarding consciousness · as an
instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in
general, we made it a standard, the highest value
in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a parte ad
.


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
177
totum,—and that is why all philosophers are
instinctively seeking at the present day for a col-
lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills
consciously with all that happens, a “Spirit,” a
“God. ” But they must be told that it is precisely
thus that life is converted into a monster; that a
“God” and a general sensorium would necessarily
be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned.
Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
general consciousness which postulates ends and
means—in this way we ceased from being neces-
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment
of life was the existence of God.
.
708.
Concerning the value of “Becoming. ”—If the
movement of the world really tended to reach a
final state, that state would already have been
reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is
that it does not tend to reach a final state: and
every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e. g.
materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world
which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought
to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Becoming must appear justified at
every instant (or it must defy all valuation : which
has unity as its end); the present must not under
any circumstances be justified by a future, nor
must the past be justified for the sake of the
M
VOL. II.


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178
THE WILL TO POWER.
present. Necessity” must not be interpreted
in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective
force or as a prime motor; and still less as the
necessary cause of some valuable result. But to
this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,—a “God,” in order
that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a
being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills
nothing: “God” is useless if he wants nothing;
and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which
lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun-
ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering
God overlooking everything, a general sensorium
and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict-
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain, because in
that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the
illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to
originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based
upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing
as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this
hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all
the calumny that has been directed against the
world (the “Better world,” the “True world” the
“World Beyond," the “ Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not
tend towards stability.


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
179
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance;
the world of Being is probably only
appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other-
wise, it has no value; for that according
to which it might be measured, and in
regard to which the word value might
have some sense, is
is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies
valuation ; for this reason philosophical
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the
judges of existence ! Neither should we make
culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the
"absolute " which stands behind evolution !
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the
extent in which it has been able to make use of
number and measure. It might be worth while
to try and see whether a scientific order of values
might not be constructed according to a scale of
numbers and measures representing energy. . .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity,
and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures represent-
ing energy.
The ascent in this scale would


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180
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a
diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against
one (moral values are only apparent values com-
pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of “value” lapses :-
Because in the " whole process of the universe”
the work of mankind does not come under considera-
tion; because a general process (viewed in the
light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole ;
because no depreciation of human existence or
human aims can be made in regard to something
that does not exist.
Because “necessity," causality,” “ design,” are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not “the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase of power;
in which increase the utility of consciousness is
also contained; and the same holds good of
pleasure and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of
consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con-
sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all,
but a thing of chaos; because the development of
“intellectuality” is only a means tending relatively
to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all desirability” has no
sense in
regard to the general character of existence.


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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
181
712.
“God” is the culminating moment: life is an
eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there is no zenith of values, but only a
zenith of power.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material-
istic interpretations: they are both only expres-
sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all
spirit (of the “will to power ').
The retrograde movement from the zenith of
development (the intellectualisation of power on
some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the
result of the highest degree of energy turning
against itself, once it no longer has anything to
organise, and utilising its power in order to
disorganise.
(a) The ever-increasing suppression of societies,
and the latter's subjection by a smaller number of
stronger individuals.
(6) The ever-increasing suppression of the
privileged and the strong, hence the rise of
democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the
elements,
713.
Value is the highest amount of power that a
man can assimilate-a man, not mankind! Man-
kind is much more of a means than an end. It
is a question of type: mankind is merely the
experimental material; it is the overflow of the
ill-constituted a field of ruins.


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182
THE WILL TO POWER.
714.
Words relating to values are merely banners
planted on those spots where a new blessedness
was discovered—a new feeling.
>
715
The standpoint of “value” is the same as that
of the conditions of preservation and enhancement,
in regard to complex creatures of relative stability
appearing in the course of evolution.
There are no such things as lasting and
ultimate entities, no atoms, no monads: here also
permanence was first introduced by ourselves
(from practical, utilitarian, and other motives).
“The forms that rule”; the sphere of the sub-
jugated is continually extended; or it decreases
or increases according to the conditions (nourish-
ment) being either favourable or unfavourable.
“Value” is essentially the standpoint for the
increase or decrease of these dominating centres
(pluralities in any case; for “unity” cannot be
observed anywhere in the nature of development).
The means of expression afforded by language
are useless for the purpose of conveying any facts
concerning “development”: the need of positing
a rougher world of stable existences and things
forms part of our eternal desire for preservation.
We may speak of atoms and monads in a relative
sense : and this is certain, that the smallest world
is the most stable world. . . . There is no such thing
as will: there are only punctuations of will, which are
constantly increasing and decreasing their power.


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NII.
THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLI-
FIED IN SOCIETY AND THE IN-
DIVIDUAL.
I. SOCIETY AND THE STATE.
716.
We take it as a principle that only individuals feel
any responsibility. Corporations are invented to
do what the individual has not the courage to do.
For this reason all communities are vastly more
upright and instructive, as regards the nature of
man, than the individual who is too cowardly to
have the courage of his own desires.
All altruism is the prudence of the private man:
societies are not mutually altruistic. The com-
mandment, “Thou shalt love thy next-door
neighbour," has never been extended to thy
neighbour in general. Rather what Manu says is
probably truer: “We must conceive of all the
States on our own frontier, and their allies, as being
hostile, and for the same reason we must consider
all of their neighbours as being friendly to us. ”
The study of society is invaluable, because man
in society is far more childlike than man in-
183


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184
THE WILL TO POWER.
dividually. Society has never regarded virtue as
anything else than as a means to strength, power,
and order. Manu's words again are simple and
dignified : “Virtue could hardly rely on her own
strength alone.
Really it is only the fear of
punishment that keeps men in their limits, and
leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own. ”
717
The State, or unmorality organised, is from
within--the police, the penal code, status, com-
merce, and the family; and from without, the will
to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.
A multitude will do things an individual will
not, because of the division of responsibility, of
command and execution; because the virtues of
obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment
are all introduced; because feelings of pride,
severity, strength, hate, and revenge-in short, all
typical traits are upheld, and these are character-
istics utterly alien to the herd-man.
718.
You haven't, any of you, the courage either to
kill or to flog a man. But the huge machinery of
the State quells the individual and makes him de-
cline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience,
loyalty, etc. ).
Everything that a man does in the service of
the State is against his own nature. Similarly,
everything he learns in view of future service of the


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
185
State. This result is obtained through division of
labour (so that responsibility is subdivided too) :-
The legislator—and he who fufils the law.
The teacher of discipline and those who have
grown hard and severe under discipline.
719.
A division of labour among the emotions exists
inside society, making individuals and classes
produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind of
soul. Observe how every type in society has
become atrophied with regard to certain emotions
with the view of fostering and accentuating other
emotions.
Morality may be thus justified :-
Economically,—as aiming at the greatest possible
use of all individual power, with the view of pre-
venting the waste of exceptional natures,
Æsthetically,--as the formation of fixed types,
and the pleasure in one's own.
Politically,—as the art of bearing with the
severe divergencies of the degrees of power in
society.
Psychologically,—as an imaginary preference for
the bungled and the mediocre, in order to preserve
the weak,
720.
Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he
desires power, and this impulse, which is called
freedom, must be the longest restrained. Hence


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186
THE WILL TO POWER.
ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education
as shall restrain the desire for power; thus our
morality slanders the would-be tyrant, and glorifies
charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.
721.
-
Impotence to power,--how it disguises itself
and plays the hypocrite, as obedience, subordina-
tion, the pride of duty and morality, submission,
devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of
the commander is a kind of compensation, and
indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself further
under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-
tyranny, stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation,
hallowing. Other disguises are: criticism, pessim-
ism, indignation, susceptibility, “ beautiful-soul,”
virtue, self - deification, philosophic detachment,
freedom from contact with the world (the realisa-
tion of impotence disguises itself as disdain).
There is a universal need to exercise some kind
of power, or to create for one's self the appearance
of some power, if only temporarily, in the form of
intoxication.
There are men who desire power simply for the
sake of the happiness it will bring; these belong
chiefly to political parties. Other men have the
same yearning, even when power means visible
disadvantages, the sacrifice of their happiness, and
well-being; they are the ambitious. Other men,
again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have
power only to prevent its falling into the hands
of others on whom they would then be dependent.


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
1. 87
722.
If there be justice and equality before the law,
what would thereby be abolished ? -Suspense,
enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think that
you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans
rejoice in more happiness than the Continentals.
a
723
Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is
one of the most seductive forms of the devaluation
of mankind. It involves that equality which de-
preciates any gulf as immoral.
724.
Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to
be attained, the wherefore? And this wherefore,
this purpose, is again dependent upon the degree
,
of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a funda-
mental doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and
cannot be made obligatory for all.
725
Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as
a utilitarian institution; it has now become so
in a practical sense. The time of kings has gone
by, because people are no longer worthy of them.
They do not wish to see the symbol of their ideal
in a king; but only a means to their own ends.
That's the whole truth.


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188
THE WILL TO POWER.
726.
I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the
communal standard of judgment and valuation,
naturally without any intention of deducing morals.
The degree of psychological falsity and dense-
ness required in order to sanctify the emotions
essential to preservation and expansion of power,
and to create a good conscience for them.
The degree of stupidity required in order that
general rules and values may remain possible
(including education, formation of culture, and
training).
The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and in-
tolerance required in order to deal with exceptions,
to suppress them as criminals, and thus to give
them bad consciences, and to make them sick
with their own singularity.
727
Morality is essentially a shield, a means of
defence; and, in so far, it is a sign of the im-
perfectly developed man (he is still in armour;
he is still stoical).
The fully developed man is above all provided
with weapons: he is a man who attacks.
The weapons of war are converted into weapons
of peace (out of scales and carapaces grow feathers
and hair).
728.
The very notion," living organism,” implies that
there must be growth,—that there must be a


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
189
striving after an extension of power, and therefore
a process of absorption of other forces. Under the
drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people
speak of the right of the individual to defend himself;
on the same principle one might speak of his right
to attack: for bothm and the latter more than the
former-are necessities where all living organisms
are concerned: aggressive and defensive egoism
are not questions of choice or even of “free will,"
but they are fatalities of life itself.
In this respect it is immaterial whether one
have an individual, a living body, or "an ad-
vancing society” in view. The right to punish (or
society's means of defence) has been arrived at
only through a misuse of the word "right": a
right is acquired only by contract,—but self-
defence and self-preservation do not stand upon
the basis of a contract. A people ought at least,
with quite as much justification, to be able to regard
its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,
or colonisation, as a right—the right of growth,
perhaps. When the instincts of a society
ultimately make it give up war and renounce
conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy
and the rule of shopkeepers. In the majority of
cases, it is true, assurances of peace are merely
stupefying draughts.
.
729.
The maintenance of the military State is the
last means of adhering to the great tradition of
the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive it.
By means of it the superior or strong type of


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190
THE WILL TO POWER.
'
man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas
which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in
States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs,
etc. , may on that account seem justified.
730.
In order that a thing may last longer than a
person (that is to say, in order that a work may
outlive the individual who has created it), all
manner of limitations and prejudices must be
imposed upon people. But how? By means of
love, reverence, gratitude towards the person who
created the work, or by means of the thought
that our ancestors fought for it, or by virtue of
the feeling that the safety of our descendants will
be secured if we uphold the work-for instance,
the polis. Morality is essentially the means of
making something survive the individual, because
it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously
the aspect from above is different from the aspect
from below, and will lead to quite different inter-
pretations. How is organised power maintained?
-By the fact that countless generations sacrifice
themselves to its cause.
731.
Marriage, property, speech, tradition, race,
family, people, and State, are each links in a chain
-separate parts which have a more or less high
or low origin. Economically they are justified
by the surplus derived from the advantages of
uninterrupted work and multiple production, as


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
191
weighed against the disadvantages of greater
expense in barter and the difficulty of making
things last. (The working parts are multiplied,
and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of
producing them is greater, and the cost of main-
taining them by no means inconsiderable. ) The
advantage consists in avoiding interruption and
incident loss. Nothing is more expensive than
a start. “ The higher the standard of living, the
greater will be the expense of maintenance,
nourishment, and propagation, as also the risk
and the probability of an utter fall on reaching
the summit. ”
732.
no
In bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best
sense of the word marriage, there is no question
whatsoever of love any more than there is of
money.
For on love institution can be
founded. The whole matter consists in society
giving leave to two persons to satisfy their sexual
desires under conditions obviously designed to
safeguard social order. Of course there must be
a certain attraction between the parties and a
vast amount of good nature, patience, compati-
bility, and charity in any such contract. But the
word love should not be misused as regards such
a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong
meaning of the word, the satisfaction of sexual
desire is unessential; it is a mere symbol. For
the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol
of unqualified submission : for the other, a sign
of condescension-a sign of the appropriation of


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192
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
property. Marriage, as understood by the real
old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race
(but are there any nobles nowadays ? Quæritur),
—that is to say, the maintenance of a fixed definite
type of ruler, for which object husband and wife
were sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration
here had nothing to do with love; on the con-
trary! It did not even presuppose that mutual
sympathy which is the sine qua non of the bour-
geois marriage. The prime consideration was the
interest of the race, and in the second place
came the interest of a particular class. But in
the face of the coldness and rigour and calculating
lucidity of such a noble concept of marriage as
prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like
that of ancient Athens, and even of Europe
during the eighteenth century, we warm-blooded
animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts,
we "moderns,” cannot restrain a slight shudder.
That is why love as a passion, in the big meaning
of this word, was invented for, and in, an aristo-
cratic community-where convention and abstin-
ence are most severe.
733.
Concerning the future of marriage. -A super-
tax on inherited property, a longer term of
,
military service for bachelors of a certain mini-
mum age within the community.
Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish
boys upon the world, and perhaps plural votes
as well.


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
193
A medical certificate as a condition of any
marriage, endorsed by the parochial authorities,
in which a series of questions addressed to the
parties and the medical officers must be answered
(“family histories").
As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its
ennoblement, I would recommend leasehold
marriages (to last for a term of years or months),
with adequate provision for the children.
Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned
by a certain number of good men and true, of
the parish, as a parochial obligation.
734.
Another commandment of philanthropy. —There
are cases where to have a child would be a crime
--for example, for chronic invalids and extreme
neurasthenics. These people should be converted
to chastity, and for this purpose the music of
Parsifal might at all events be tried. For Parsifal
himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not
desiring to propagate. Unfortunately, however,
one of the regular symptoms of exhausted stock
is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the
presence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond
to the smallest sexual attraction. It would be
quite a mistake, for instance, to think of Leopardi
as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and
moralist play a hopeless game: it would be far
better to send for the apothecary. Lastly, society
here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the
demands that are made on it, there are few more
N
VOL II.


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194
THE WILL TO POWER.
urgent and necessary than this one. Society as
the trustee of life, is responsible to life for every
botched life that comes into existence, and as it
has to atone for such lives, it ought consequently
to make it impossible for them ever to see the light
of day: it should in many cases actually prevent
the act of procreation, and may, without any
regard for rank, descent, or intellect, hold in
readiness the most rigorous forms of compulsion
and restriction, and, under certain circumstances,
have recourse to castration, The Mosaic law,
“Thou shalt do no murder," is a piece of in-
genuous puerility compared with the earnestness
of this forbidding of life to decadents, “Thou shalt
not beget”! ! ! . . . For life itself recognises no
solidarity or equality of rights between the healthy
and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter
must at all cost be eliminated, lest the whole fall
to pieces. Compassion for decadents, equal rights
for the physiologically botched—this would be
the very pinnacle of immorality, it would be
setting up Nature's most formidable opponent as
morality itself!
735.
There are some delicate and morbid natures,
the so-called idealists, who can never under any
circumstances rise above a coarse, immature crime:
yet it is the great justification of their anæmic
little existence, it is the small requital for their
lives of cowardice and falsehood to have been for
one instant at least-strong. But they generally
collapse after such an act. ,


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
195
736.
In our civilised world we seldom hear of any
but the bloodless, trembling criminal, overwhelmed
by the curse and contempt of society, doubting
even himself, and always belittling and belying
his deeds—a misbegotten sort of criminal; that
is why we are opposed to the idea that all great
men have been criminals (only in the grand style,
and neither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be
inherent in greatness (this at any rate is the
unanimous verdict of all those students of human
nature who have sounded the deepest waters of
great souls). To feel one's self adrift from all
questions of ancestry, conscience, and duty-this
is the danger with which every great man is
confronted. Yet this is precisely what he desires :
he desires the great goal, and consequently the
means thereto.
737.
In times when man is led by reward and
punishment, the class of man which the legislator
has in view is still of a low and primitive type:
he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-
day culture, general degeneracy removes all sense
from reward and punishment. This determina-
tion of action by the prospect of reward and
punishment presupposes young, strong, and
vigorous races. In effete races impulses are so
irrepressible that a mere idea has no force what.
ever. Inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus,
and the feeling that one must react to it: this


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196
THE WILL TO POWER.
excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all
such systems of punishment and reform altogether
senseless.
The idea “ amelioration” presupposes a norma
and strong creature whose action must in some
way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be
lost and turned into an enemy of the community.
738.
The effect of prohibition. -Every power which
forbids and which knows how to excite fear in
the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience.
(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but
is conscious of the danger of gratifying it, and is
consequently forced to be secretive, underhand,
and cautious. ) Thus any prohibition deteriorates
the character of those who do not willingly
submit themselves to it, but are constrained
thereto.
739.
Punishment and reward. ”—These two things
stand or fall together. Nowadays no
one will
accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority
should have the power to punish. Warfare has
been reformed. We have a desire: it meets with
opposition: we then see that we shall most easily
obtain it by coming to some agreement—by draw-
ing up a contract. In modern society where
every one has given his assent to a certain con-


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
tract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
contract. This at least is a clear concept. But
in that case, anarchists and enemies of social
order could not be tolerated.
740.
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against
the social system. A rebel is not punished, he
A
is simply suppressed. He may be an utterly
contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion
in fact, in our particular society revolt is far from
being disgraceful. There are cases in which a
rebel deserves honour precisely because he is
conscious of certain elements in society which
cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us
from our slumbers. When a criminal commits
but one crime against a particular person, it does
not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him
to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act is merely a symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, a
weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish-
ment should not be associated in any way with
contempt. A criminal is at all events a man who
has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake;
he is therefore a man of courage.
Neither should
punishment be regarded as penance or retribution,
as though there were some recognised rate of
exchange between crime and punishment. Punish-


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198
THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does
not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from
making his peace with society, provided he does
not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter
case, however, he should be opposed even before
he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon
as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be
that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners
and his low degree of intelligence should not be
reckoned against him. Nothing is more common
than that he should misunderstand himself (more
particularly when his rebellious instinct—the ran-
cour of the unclassed has not reached conscious-
ness simply because he has not read enough). It
is natural that he should deny and dishonour his
deed while under the influence of fear at its failure.
All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,
psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to
an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a
motive to his deed by associating it with a merely
incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against
this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more
particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-
let us say no murder—on our conscience; why is
it ? It simply means that a few favourable circum-
stances have been wanting in our lives.
posing we were induced to commit such a crime
a
And sup-


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
199
As a
would our worth be materially affected ?
matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we
were not credited with possessing the power to kill a
man under certain circumstances. In nearly every
crime certain qualities come into play without
which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky
was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of
the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted
the strongest and most valuable portion of the
Russian people. The fact that in our society the
criminal happens to be a badly nourished and
stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our
system. In the days of the Renaissance the
criminal was a flourishing specimen of humanity,
and acquired his own virtue for himself. Virtue in
the sense of the Renaissance—that is to say, virtù ;
free from moralic acid.
It is only those whom we do not despise that
we are able to elevate. Moral contempt is a far
greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741.
Shame was first introduced into punishment
when certain penalties were inflicted on persons
held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a de-
spised class that was most frequently punished, and
thus it came to pass that punishment and contempt
were associated.
742.
In the ancient idea of punishment a religious con-
cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power


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200
THE WILL TO POWER.
of chastisement. Penalties purified : in modern
society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment
is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been
paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was
so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power
of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel-
ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is
not so very far removed from a state of conval-
escence and health. One has made one's peace
with society, and one appears to one's self more
dignified—"pure. " . . To-day, however, punish-
ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate
behind the sin has become so formidable that it is
almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still
.
an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet
another enemy against it. The jus talionis may
spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say,
from a sort of modification of the instinct of re-
venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it
is the need of having some equivalent in order to
do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in
the case of all more modern laws of punish-
ment is this: should not the punishment fit the
crime? —for in your heart of hearts thus would
you have it. But then the susceptibility of the
particular criminal to pain would have to be taken
into account. In other words, there should be no
such thing as a preconceived penalty for any crime
-no fixed penal code. But as it would be no


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· SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness
of each individual criminal, punishment would have
to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice !
a
Is it not ? Consequently
744.
Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That
is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not
even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even
among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the
oldest and most valuable significance of punish-
ment is still misunderstood-it is not even known.
So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a
new foundation-on history and comparative an-
thropology-it will never cease to quarrel over the
fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly
imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which
have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated
woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he
allows of the most varied interpretation,
745.
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that
when mighty empires were doomed they began to
have numberless laws.
746.
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast-
rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from


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202
THE WILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The
rascal has at least this advantage over other men-
that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior
to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight
of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the
gulf—that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would
become broader . .
. . but, after all, this is Fate, and
it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy
and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
747.
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and
reticence, and of good-natured respect for other
people's rights—even for the exactions of strangers.
To an even greater degree is there a certain charit-
able and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man
as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect
for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us
and the Christian mythologists. We also have our
good share of irony even when listening to moral
sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases
himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical.
Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of
the best signs of our age. In cases where it is
most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a
morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism
throughout Europe). If there is anything which
can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the
amount of immorality which it allows itself without


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
203
falling in its own estimation-very much the re-
verse! In what, then, does the superiority of culture
over the want of culture consist of the Renais-
sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages? In this
alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im-
morality.