No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is
from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord God,"
and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are,
to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the
elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God,
since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), and "the
Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore however
abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the
desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be
about the intellective knowledge of truth.

Objection 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for
Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of the
king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers
made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
unjust possessors. " Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge
cannot be sinful.

On the contrary, Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is
it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic
art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens,
walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind? " Now vanity of
understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity
about intellective sciences may be sinful.

I answer that, As stated above ([3642]Q[166], A[2], ad 2) studiousness
is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study
in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the
knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit
of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly
speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according
to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the
knowledge of truth in order to sin.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the
knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in
their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some there
are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the
majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are
doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they
explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a
pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very
heavens about which they argue. " In like manner, those who study to
learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study,
according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their tongue to
speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity. "

Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed
to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four
ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a
study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says
[*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the
prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral
idylls. " Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is
unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the
future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the philosophers were
debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge
from the demons. "

Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without
referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God.
Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures,
we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should
ever mount towards immortal and abiding things. "

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are
too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .
and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus.
3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath
detained their minds in vanity. "

Reply to Objection 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth;
yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth,
but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of
certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not
directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein
supreme happiness consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge
of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing
the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the
knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should
be regulated in due manner.

Reply to Objection 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and
commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired
through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,
however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the
faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by
philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and
not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp. ) of
certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things
against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy
the worship of God. "
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Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about
sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of
sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste.
Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not
curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice
of curiosity about things known by the sight.

Objection 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred in
the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and
overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes. " But it does not seem to
be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the
representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher
states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the
knowledge of sensible objects.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire
into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 Jn.
2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of
others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of
them commandment concerning his neighbor. " Therefore the vice of
curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular
sensible objects.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence
of the eyes makes men curious. " Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1
Jn. 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of
magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and
dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular
objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin,
even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members
of the same division (1 Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity
is about the knowledge of sensible things.

I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two
things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is
directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind,
man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those
things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second
place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective
knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ
study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two
ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something
useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more to see a dog coursing a
hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing,
that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and
draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness,
didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull. " Secondly, when
the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as
looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into
other people's actions is directed to detraction. on the other hand, if
one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason
of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of
intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible
things is virtuous.

Reply to Objection 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising
from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures
arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According
to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft;
but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these,
not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of
experiment and knowledge. "

Reply to Objection 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a
man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth. ] that such
sights make men adulterers and shameless.

Reply to Objection 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire
into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good---that is in
order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our
neighbor---or for our neighbor's good---that is in order to correct
him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the
duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,
"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works. " But
to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down
upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than
that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15),
"Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just,
nor spoil his rest. "
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OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of
the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of
the body that are done seriously?

(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?

(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;

(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.
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Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements
of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the
soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the king's daughter is
within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience. " Now the
movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can
be no virtue about them.

Objection 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in
man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow
of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward
movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.

Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions
directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as
temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed
to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is
connected with them.

Objection 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue,
as stated above ([3643]Q[166], A[1], OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is
censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements:
for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that
reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the
foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
affectation, but natural and artless movement. " Therefore seemingly
there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.

On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [*Cf. [3644] Q[145], A[1]]
pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the
beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of
the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether
they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be
our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of
honesty. " Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward
movement.

I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man
being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are
set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there
is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.

Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,
in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or
place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct
consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex
and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:
"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish
becoming to every action. "

Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward
movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to
the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is
becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness" [bona
ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and
to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical knowledge
of separation," i. e. of the distinction of "acts. "

Reply to Objection 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward
disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and
the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is";
and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in
the gesture of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of
the soul. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a
man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless
what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason.
Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement:
and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the
defect. "

Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are
indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the
passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that
"from these things," i. e. the outward movements, "the man that lies
hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful,
or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from
blemish. " It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form
their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by
his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his
countenance. " Hence moderation of outward movements is directed
somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his
Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend
the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of
your state. " Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be
reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv,
6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other
persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to
"friendliness or affability" [*Cf. [3645] Q[114], A[1]]. This regards
pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to
others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward
movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs
to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and
deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

Reply to Objection 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's
outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they
do not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves
one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may
be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be
without artifice, but not without correction. "
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Whether there can be a virtue about games?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who
laugh, for you shall weep. ' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only
excessive, games should be avoided. " Now that which can be done
virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a
virtue about games.

Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without
us," as stated above ([3646]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Now Chrysostom says
[*Hom. vi in Matth. ]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author
of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat
down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play. '" Therefore there can
be no virtue about games.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful
actions are not directed to something else. " But it is a requisite of
virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore
there can be no virtue about games.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare
thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high
pressure of his attention to work. " Now this relaxation of the mind
from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a
wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times.
Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the
virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness. "

I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with
his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of
work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work,
he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul
works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul
employs forces that operate through bodily organs.
Now sensible goods
are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above
sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there
results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the
operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of
the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be
occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised
higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of
the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case,
however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is
more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of
the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul
must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is
pleasure, as stated above ([3647]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3648]FS, Q[31],
A[1], ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs
consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension
of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21,
it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people
were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he
is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow.
And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether
he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued
doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the
inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension
were never relaxed.

Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the
soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary
at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the
soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of
rest that is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes
necessary to make use of such things.

Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious
deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind
of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene. " Another thing
to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind
altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware
lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony
which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29),
that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in
their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so
our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind. " Thirdly, we
must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to
persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances,
so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic.
i, 29).

Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can
be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness
({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy
turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn:
and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is
comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from {trepein} = 'to
turn'].

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and
persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the
audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something
novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
gravity of the subject. " Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with
things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I
will speak of great things. " Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether
exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he
begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,
nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since
how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy
Writ? "

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the
inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of
games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have
accounted our life a pastime. " Against these Tully says (De Offic. i,
29): "We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for
play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater
gravity and moment. "

Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their
species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such
actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to
make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to
sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by
grave and serious matters. "
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Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of
play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now
play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave
sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are
either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is
no sin in excessive play.

Objection 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven
capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play
does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would
seem not to be a sin.

Objection 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in
play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if
excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin;
moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any
payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem
untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii.
63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain
jester would be with him in the life to come.

On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled
with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A
mourning that will last for ever. " Now there is inordinate laughter and
inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin
therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the
excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which
falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated [3649](A[2])
that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to
reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of
reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very
species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of
jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be
"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man,
for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as
are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins.
And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due
circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times
or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This
may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to
play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love
of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the
Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it
is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to
amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience
to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the
intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such
an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of
which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin,
or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their
species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no
excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

Reply to Objection 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is
written (Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they
rose up to play. "

Reply to Objection 3: As stated [3650](A[2]), play is necessary for the
intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse
may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation
of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is
not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that
their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or
deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue
matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other
occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to
themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and
virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and
operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those
who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding
them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends too much on
such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth,
he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
c. in Joan. ) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin,
not a virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need,
in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic.
[*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for
whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed
him, thou hast slain him. "
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Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For
no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him
refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain
the grace of a full pardon. " Therefore there is no sin in lack of
mirth.

Objection 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy
men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for
it is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and
(Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither
have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness. "
Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

Objection 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the
virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor
receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack
of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack
of mirth to be a vice.

I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin.
Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by
offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.
Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De
Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt. , cap. De Continentia): "Let your
conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or
despise you as a cad. " Now a man who is without mirth, not only is
lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he
is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious,
and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iv, 8).

Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures
it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in
quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in
Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less sinful than excess
thereof. " Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make
few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness
suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat. "

Reply to Objection 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is
called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in
default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in
accordance with reason.

Reply to Objection 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the
times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he
adds: "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats. " The
words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from
his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
lightness. "

Reply to Objection 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all
pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it
would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
6) calls "friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness.
Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement
with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
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OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and
under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward
apparel?

(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?
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Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in
connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong
to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and
places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that "among
the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with
sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for
anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them. " Now
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural
aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about
such things.

Objection 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with
outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in
outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of
the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise
it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in
praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in
sheepskins and in goatskins. " Therefore it seems that there cannot be
virtue and vice in this matter.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or
intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter
of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of
truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since
that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues
enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it.
Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection
with this kind of attire.

On the contrary, Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a
certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says
(De Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without
affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not
with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that
nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to
increase its beauty. " Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the
outward attire.

I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man
uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them
immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in
comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary to
the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs
generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by
custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless
pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which
harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive. " Secondly, the lack of
moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate
attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too
much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of
those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "We must avoid excessive pleasure in
the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs
of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so
that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established
morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak. "

In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways.
First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so
far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory
says (Hom. xl in Ev. ): "There are some who think that attention to
finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the
word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was
tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one,
forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate)
"save for vainglory. " Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from
excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the
body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous [*Cf. [3651]
Q[55], A[6]] in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in
connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the
seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of
avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143],
OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he
says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with
what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his
manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8):
"Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be
content;"---and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude about
such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a
man contented with what he has. "

In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two
ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or
trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak
trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up. " Secondly,
by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire.
Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only the
glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of
mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as
being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a
subject of ostentation. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although outward attire does not come from
nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are
naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates
outward raiment.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or
again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel
than others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the
excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is
not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12):
"Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds
observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies
something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these
things for sensual pleasure or ostentation. "

Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not
always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be
done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above
others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame
the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of
temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever
uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with
those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious. "
Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting to those
who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets
of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a
gloss on Mat. 3:4, says: "He who preaches penance, wears the garb of
penance. "

Reply to Objection 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's
estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable
to the virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7)
assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something
connected with man's estate.
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Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of
mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is
a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of
the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): "Whose," namely
women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or
the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel. " Wherefore a gloss
of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot
sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls
and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body. " Now this
is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women
cannot be devoid of mortal sin.