No More Learning

It does appear that Arrian himself wrote a book on comets, which is un rtunately now lost to us. Ifthis is true, we can presume that Arrian had been initiated by Epictetus into the philosophical treatment of this kind of question. The way Photius de­ scribes the contents of the work even allows us to see what Arrian had retained om the lessons ofEpictetus-that is, the moral signi cance that was to be attributed to physical investigations:42 "Arrian, who wrote a little work on the nature, rmation, and apparitions of comets, tries to show in a number of discussions that appearances such as this do not retell anything, either good or evil. "
We shall have occasion to return to Epictetus' conception of the tripartite division of philosophy. For the moment, it is su cient to say that it would be utte y false to conclude, on the basis of the content of the Discourses as they have come down to us, that Late Stoicism under­ went an impoverishment in its theoretical teaching. 43 In the rst place, as we have seen, the Discourses only reproduce-certainly in a highly ag­ mentary way-that part of the course which was, by de nition, neither theoretical nor technical. Second, they are only the echo ofthe remarks that Arrian heard over a period of one or two years, during the time of his stay at Nicopolis. Epictetus, by contrast, taught r twenty- ve or thirty years. Finally, we must not rget that only the rst ur books of the Discourses have been preserved. This means that one or more books have been lost: Aulus Gellius quotes a long passage om book V. 44 Thanks to Marcus Aurelius, we can also get a glimpse ofthe existence of Epictetan texts otherwise unknown to us. Thus we can see that the
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
Discourses, at least in the condition in which they have come down to us, do not by any means give us an idea of everything that Epictetus said, much less ofwhat he did not say.
We know om Book I ofthe Meditations (chapter 7) that Marcus came to know Epictetus thanks to Junius Rusticus, who had instructed Marcus in Stoic doctrine be re going on to become one of his counselors. Marcus tells us that Rusticus lent him his personal copy ofthe hypomne­ mata ofEpictetus, that is, ofnotes taken at his classes. This assertion can be interpreted in two ways: in the rst place, we might think that the writings in question were a copy of the work by Arrian. Arrian himself, in his letter to Lucius Gellius mentioned above, represented his work as hypomnemata, or notes designed to serve as an aide-memoire. The letter to Gellius was probably written after the death of Epictetus, which took place sometime between 125 and 130 A. D. The book was probably in circulation by 130. Aulus Gellius tells us that during the year he spent studying at Athens around 140, he was present at a discussion in the course of which the mous millionaire Herodes Atticus had brought om the library a copy ofwhat Gellius calls the dissertationes ofEpictetus, put into order (digestae) by Arrian. 45 He also tells how, on a sea voyage om Cassiopoiea to Brindisium, he had encountered a philosopher who was carrying this work in his traveler's sack; what is more, the philoso­ pher had read him a passage om the now-lost book V. Thus, thanks to Rusticus, Marcus was able to read a copy of the Discourses as composed by Arrian, and this copy was more complete than the ones known by our modern editions.
Another hypothesis, proposed by Farquharson,46 could also be envis­ aged. The notes passed on by Rusticus to Marcus might have been Rusticus' own, which he himself had taken at the classes of Epictetus. From the point of view of chronology, if we assume that Epictetus died between 125 and 130 A. D. , and that Rusticus was born at the beginning of the second century (as can be surmised om his o cial cursus), it is entirely possible that he may have been Epictetus' student around 120 A. D. Moreover, since the Discourses ofEpictetus as reported by Arrian were widely known in Greece around 140, it is di cult to imagine that in the Rome of about 145-146 A. D. -at the time when Marcus had become converted to philosophy-no copy of the work was to be und. Marcus represents Rusticus' gift as something exceptional, so we are entitled to wonder ifthe gift was indeed Rusticus' own notes. Ifthis were the case, then these notes may have revealed to Marcus an Epictetus quite di erent om the one we know thanks to Arrian. A er ,
66 THE INNER CITADEL
Epictetus certainly did not say the same things, every year, to all of his students.
It is, in any case, virtually certain that Marcus did read Arrian's work, since the Meditations contain several literal quotations taken om it. Whether Marcus read only the Discourses as composed by Arrian, or whether he also had access to the notes ofRusticus, one thing is certain: Marcus was miliar with more texts pertaining to the teachings of Epictetus than we are today. We now possess only a part of Arrian's work; and the notes of Rusticus-if indeed they did exist-might well have revealed to Marcus teachings ofEpictetus other than those reported by Arrian. As we shall see, it is thanks to Marcus that we have access to several agments ofEpictetus which are otherwise unknown.
Quotations ofEpictetus in the Meditations
You are a little soul carrying around a co se, as Epictetus has said
(IV, 41).
When you kiss your child, says Epictetus, you must say to yoursel "perhaps you will be dead tomorrow . . . " (XI, 34).
These are the two explicit quotations of Epictetus which are to be und in the Meditations. 47 The rst text is not to be und in the ur books ofEpictetus' Discourses reported by Arrian which we possess today, and came to Marcus, as I have said, by some other channel. The "soul carrying around a corpse" also reappears in IX, 24, in one ofa series of descriptions of the miserable condition into which human life is plunged when it is not in con rmity with Nature and with Reason:
In ntile rages, in ntile games! Souls carrying corpses around! In order that the scene of the Evocation of the dead be be re your eyes in a yet more striking way.
In the other quotation om Epictetus (XI, 34), we can recognize a text om book III ofthe Discourses (III, 24, 88).
Yet it o en happens that Marcus repeats whole passages om Epictetus, without quoting him. When Marcus (VII, 63) quotes a passage om Plato (Republic, 4r2e-4rJa), r example, he gives the text in the rm which had been given it by Epictetus (I, 28, 4):
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
Each soul is deprived ofthe truth against its will.
We encounter this quote again, moreover, in the long series ofkephalaia against anger (XI, 18, 5).
Epictetus alluded to the Stoic theory ofsuicide as llows (I, 25, I 8):
So there's some smoke in the house? If there's not too much, I' stay; ifthere's too much, I'll leave. For what you must never rget, and keep rmly in mind, is that the door is wide open.
Marcus echoes Epictetus as llows 0f, 29, 2): Smoke? Then I'm leaving!
Epictetus gave the llowing recommendation to his disciple (III, 3, 14):
As soon as you go out in the morning, and whatever it is you see or hear, carry out this test. You respond, as if we were having an argument by questions and answers:
-What did you see?
-A handsome man, or a good-looking woman.
Then apply the rule (epage ton kanona), [and ask yourself] : -Does their beauty depend upon their will, or not?
-It does not depend upon their will.
-Then reject it.
Once more, Marcus picks up the tune (V, 22) :
That which does not harm the State does not harm its citizen either. Each time you imagine you have been injured, apply this rule (epage touton ton kanona).
In both cases, we see a theoretical position or dogma (the distinction between what does and does not depend on us, or the identity ofinterest between the State and the citizen) represented as a rule (kanon) which must be applied to each particular case.
The whole nal part ofBook XI (chapters 33-39) appears to be a series ofpassages om Epictetus. First, as we have seen, Epictetus is cited explicitly in chapter 3 4 . Chapter 3 3 also gives an anonymous summary of a passage om book III of the Discourses (III, 24, 86), while chapters
68 THE INNER CITADEL
35-36 cite still more texts om book III (III, 24, 92-93; III, 22, 105). In ct, it is as though we had be re us a collection ofnotes that Marcus had taken while reading book III ofthe Discourses.
The llowing chapter (XI, 37) is introduced by the phrase "he says," which gives us every right to suppose that Marcus is continuing to quote the same author as in the preceding chapters-that is, Epictetus. This text has no parallel in the Discourses, but it comes without any doubt om the lost portion ofEpictetus. In it, we can recognize Epictetus' usual vocabu­ lary (topos peri tas hormas, hypexairesis, kat'axian, orexis, ekklisis), and above all one ofhis ndamental teachings: that ofthe three rules ofli , or the disciplines of judgment, of desire, and of action, of which I shall be speaking throughout the present work.
Chapter 38 is also introduced by "he says," which can only designate Epictetus. It is perhaps a rather ee paraphrase of a text (III, 25, 3) in which Epictetus a rms that the ght r virtue is no small matter, since what is at stake is nothing less than happiness. Marcus remarks (XI, 38):
The struggle, then, is not about winning just any old prize, but about deciding whether one will be sane or insane.
The last chapter (XI, 39) is supposed to transmit various sayings of Socrates, but since chapters 3 3 to 3 8 are taken om Epictetus, it is quite likely that this passage should also be attributed to Epictetus.
There may be still other anonymous quotations om Epictetus in the Meditations. H. Frankel48 thought, with good reason, that IV, 49, 2-5 was one such quotation:
-I'm so unlucky that such-and-such a thing has happened to me! -Not at all! On the contrary, you should say: "How lucky I am, since now that such-and-such a thing has happened to me, I remain ee om grief I neither let myselfbe broken by the present, nor do I fear what is going to happen! For this event could have happened
to anyone, but not everyone would have remained ee om grief -Why, moreover, should we say that this particular event is a mis rtune, while that one is a piece ofgood rtune? In general, do you call anything a "mis rtune" r man which does not cause the nature of man to deviate om its goal? And do you think that that which is not contrary to the will ofNature causes the nature ofman
to deviate om its goal?
-What, then, is the will of Nature?
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
-You've lea ed it. Does the event which has happened to you prevent you om beingjust, om possessing greatness ofsoul, om being temperant and prudent, without haste in your judgments, without lsity in your speech, reserved, and ee, and everything else such that, when they are present together, the nature of man possesses that which is proper to it?
Frankel bases his contention on lexical and grammatical particularities which are quite convincing. 49 It could perhaps be objected-quite rightly-that this passage basically does nothing but express in dialogue rm the ndamental dogma of Stoicism: that the only evil is moral evil, in other words, that which prevents us om practicing the virtues. This is true, but it does not alter the ct that the tone and rm ofthis passage are in stark contrast with the rest of the Meditations. Normally, when Marcus uses the word " I , " he is speaking either about himsel or about the good man, speaking to himself Here, by contrast, the "I" represents the interlocutor of a dialogue which Marcus is reporting. It is highly probable that this is a dialogue which Epictetus has imagined be re his auditors, as he often does in the Discourses, and that Marcus has copied it down. It should be noted that, elsewhere in his Discourses (I, 4, 23), Epictetus tells his auditors that what is truly worthwhile is to work at eliminating all "Alas! " and "How unhappy I am! " om one's life.
It is thus probable that we have here an unrecognized a ent of Epictetus. Are there others? I think it likely that there are some. In general, moreover, we should not exclude the hypothesis that a given passage of the Meditations may be utilizing a text om an unknown author, or at any rate may be a paraphrase thereof As r as Epictetus is concerned, however, we must bear in mind the ct that Marcus had read so much of him as to become impregnated with his vocabulary, his stylistic habits, and especially his ideas. This situation was recognized perfectly by the unknown urteenth-century humanist who copied ex­ tracts om Books I to IX in a manuscript now kept at Darmstadt. At the beginning of Book II, he wrote: antikrus epiktetizei ("He is openly Epictetizing"; that is, he is llowing and imitating Epictetus).
The three rules oflife or disciplines according to Epictetus
We have already seen the important role played in the Meditations by what I have called the triple rule of li , which proposes a discipline of representations or judgments, of desire, and of action. This very triparti-
THE INNER CITADEL
tion of the acts and nctions of the soul, and the entire distinction betweenjudgment, desire, and impulse, is a doctrine which is peculiar to Epictetus, and which is not und in Stoicism prior to him. Its presence in Marcus Aurelius is, nevertheless, unmistakable. In VIII, 7, r exam­ ple, Marcus clearly draws an opposition between representations hanta­ siai), desires (orexeis), and impulses toward action (hormai), and he does so again in VIII, 28:
Everyjudgment, every impulse to action, and every desire or aver­ sion are within the soul, and nothing else can enter therein.
We have already encountered a briefmaxim which also makes use ofthe same schema:
Erase your representation hantasia), check your impulse to action (horme), extinguish your desire (orexis). Keep your directing princi­ ple (hegemonikon) within your power (IX, 7) .
The three rules oflife propose an askesis, or discipline, r these three acts of the soul. In the context of the cento of passages om Epictetus (XI , 3 3 -3 9) which we have already seen, Marcus himself cites an Epictetan passage which we know only through his intermediary (XI, 37):
We must discover the rule to b e applied in the case of the assent [to be given to representations and judgments] ,
-while in the matter of exercises relating to impulses to action, we must never relax our attention, in order that these impulses to action may be accompanied by a reserve clause, that their goal be to serve the community, and that they be proportionate to value,
-and, nally, we must abstain completely om desire, and pay no attention to things that do not depend on us.
Discipline of representations and judgment, discipline of impulsive action, discipline of desire: Epictetus rmulates these three rules of life not only in this text, but in several chapters ofhis Discourses. Moreover, they correspond precisely to the three rules oflife rmulated by Marcus, which are in a sense the key to his Meditations.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 71 The in uence ofAristo
In the context of Marcus' conversion to philosophy, I alluded to the in uence that the reading of the works of the third century B. C. Stoic Aristo of Chios may have exerted on the Emperor. I had once thought I could recognize an echo of Aristo's teachings in some of the Emperor's sayings. Aristo had de ned the supreme goal of life in the llowing terms: "To live in a disposition ofindi erence with regard to indi erent things. " Marcus, r his part, writes (XI, 16):
To spend one's life in the best way: the power to do this resides within the soul, ifone is indi erent to indi erent things.
I was once struck by the similarity of these rmulas. 50 In ct, how­ ever, Aristo was not the only Stoic to speak ofindi erence to indi erent things; moreover, Marcus, as a ith l adherent to the Stoicism of Epictetus and of Chrysippus, did not understand this principle in the same sense as Aristo, and interpreted it in a wholly di erent way.
The principle of all Stoicism is, moreover, precisely indi erence to indi erent things. This means, in the rst place, that the only value is moral good, which depends on our eedom, and that everything that does not depend on our eedom-poverty, wealth, sickness, and health-is neither good nor bad, and is there re indi erent. Second, it means that we must not make any distinction between indi erent things; in other words, we must love them equally, since they have been willed by universal Nature. This indi erence to indi erent things can be und, r example, in a passage om Philo ofAlexandria,51 which describes the exercise of wisdom-that is to say, philosophy-without there having been any particular in uence by Aristo on Philo: "Accustomed no longer to pay attention to bodily and external evils, exercising ourselves to be indi erent to indi erent things, armed against pleasures and desires . . . r such people, all oflife is a festival. "
As a matter of ct, the di erence between Aristo and the other Stoics b o r e p r e c i s e l y o n t h e v e r y n o t i o n o f " i n d i e r e n t . " F o r A r i s t o , t h a t w h i c h was indi erent was completely "undi erentiated,"52 and no element of daily life had any importance in and ofitself Such a view ran the risk of leading to a skeptical attitude such as that of Pyrrho, who was also indi erent to everything. Orthodox Stoics, while they recognized that the things which do not depend on us are indi erent, nevertheless ad­ mitted that we could attribute to them a moral value, by conceding the
72 THE INNER CITADEL
existence ofpolitical, social, and mily obligations, linked to the needs of human nature in accordance with reasonable probability. This was the realm ofthe kathekonta, or duties, ofwhich I shall have more to say later. Marcus Aurelius, like Epictetus, allowed r the existence of this entire order ofobligations and duties, which Arista had denied. In ct, Marcus uses the technical term kathekon in the Stoic sense a total of ve times. 53 There can thus be no question of any in uence by Arista on Marcus as r as the doctrine ofindi erence is concerned.
Moreover, Arista rejected the physical and logical parts ofphilosophy as useless. 54 At rst glance, Marcus appears to incline toward a similar attitude; r example, he thanks the gods r not having allowed him to be carried away with resolving syllogisms or studying celestial phenom­ ena (I, 17, 22). Elsewhere, he admits that he no longer hopes to excel in dialectics or in the philosophy ofnature (VII, 67). Here again, however, the underlying sense is wholly di erent. For Arista, logic and physics are strictly useless. For Marcus, by contrast, it is the theoretical discourse oflogic and physics which is no longer a matter of concern. He did, however, intend to practice a lived logic (the discipline ofjudgment) and a lived physics (the discipline ofdesire). As he says explicitly (VIII, lJ):
Continuously, and, if possible, on the occasion of every repre­ sentation which presents itself to you, practice physics, pathology, and dialectics.
We are thus rced to conclude that there is no trace of Aristo's doctrines to be und in the Meditations ofMarcus Aurelius. 55
5
THE STOICISM OF EPICTETUS
The general characteristics of Stoicism
It is probably scarcely necessary to remind the reader that when we speak of the doctrines of a philosopher om the period we are studying, we must not imagine that we have to do with a system invented lock, stock, and barrel by the philosopher in question. Ancient philosophy had noth­ ing in common with our contemporary philosophers, who imagine that philosophy consists, r each philosopher, in inventing a "new discourse" or new language, all the more original the more it is incomprehensible and arti cial. In general, ancient philosophy was situated within a tradi­ tion, and attached to a school. Now, Epictetus was a Stoic; this means that r him philosophy consisted in explicating the texts of Zeno and Chrysippus, the unders of the school, and above all in practicing him­ self, and having his disciples practice, the way oflife peculiar to the Stoic school. This does not mean that Epictetus' teaching was devoid of its own characteristic features. These features, however, did not modi the ndamental dogmas ofStoicism, or the essential choice ofa way ofli . On the contrary, they are to be und within his rm ofteaching, in his way of presenting the doctrine, and in the de nition of certain speci c points ( r instance, the distinction between desire and impulse), or else within the particular color and tonality which permeate the Stoic way of life proposed by the philosopher.
By the time Epictetus taught, it had been some ur centuries since Zeno of Citium had unded the Stoic school at Athens. One can say that Stoicism was born of the sion of three traditions: the Socratic ethical tradition, the Heraclitean physical and "materialistic" tradition, and the dialectical tradition ofthe Megareans and ofAristotle. The Stoic choice of li was analogous to the Socratic choice of life, according to which moral good or virtue is the only value, to which everything else
74 THE INNER CITADEL
must be subordinated. As Socrates says in Plato's Apology (41d): "For a good man, no evil is possible, whether he be dead or alive. " "No evil is possible, " precisely because such a man, since he is good, is a stranger to moral evil. Since r him there is no other evil than moral evil, he believes that those things which appear to be evil in the eyes of men-death, illness, the loss of wealth, insults-are not evils r him. This transmutation ofvalues, however, can on be carried out by means ofan operation which is, at the same time, both intellectual and ethical: it consists in examining oneselfin a dialogue, a logos, or a process ofreason­ ing which one develops either with someone else or with onesel The spirit of Socratism is thus the a rmation of the absolute value of moral good, as discovered by reason; it is also the idea according to which the moral li is a matter ofjudgment and ofknowledge.
Prima cie, it does not appear that the physical tradition of Her­ aclitean "materialism" has anything to do with the Socratic ethical tradi­ tion. We shall soon see, however, that the originality ofStoicism consists precisely in the intimate and indissoluble sion of these two traditions. For the moment, it is su cient to emphasize the in uence of Heraclitus upon the Stoic vision of a universe in perpetual trans rmation, of which the original element is re, and which is set in order by a logos or Reason, in accordance with which events are linked by mutual necessity.
Finally, it is not surprising that Stoicism is situated as well within the dialectical tradition ofthe Megarians, but also within that ofthe Platonic Academy and ofAristotle. In this period, instruction in philosophy con­ sisted above in training r discussion and argumentation, and conse­ quently in dialectical exercises. Here again, we encounter a logos: this time it is human discourse, but one which is rational andjust, inso r as it imitates that logos which maintains the universe in order.
We can thus glimpse the extraordinary unity which held the parts of the Stoic system together. It is the unity of one single logos, or Reason, which permeates all things. In the words ofEmile Brehier:
It is one single, unique reason which, in dialectics, links consequent propositions to their antecedents; which, in nature, links together all causes; and which, in human conduct, establishes perfect con­ cord between acts. It is impossible that a good man should not be a physicist and a dialectician; it is impossible r rationality to be realized separately in these three areas; it is impossible completely to grasp the reason within the course of events in the universe with­ out, at the same time, realizing reason within one's own behavior. 1
The Stoicism ofEpictetus 75
Stoicism is a philosophy of self-coherence, based upon a remarkable intuition of the essence of li . From the very rst moment of its exist­ ence, every living being is instinctively attuned to itsel that is, it tends to preserve itsel to love its own existence, and to love all that can preserve this existence. This instinctive accord becomes a moral accord with onesel as soon as man discovers by means ofhis reason that the supreme value is not those things which are the objects ofthis instinct r self­ preservation, but the re ective choice of accord with onesel and the activity ofchoice itse This is because voluntary accord with oneself coin­ cides with the tendencies of universal Reason, which not only makes each living being into a being in accord with itsel but makes the entire world as well a being in accord with itself In the words of Marcus Aurelius (IV, 23):
that is in accord with you is in accord with me, 0 World.
Human society, which is the society of those who participate in one single logos or Reason, also rms-at least in principle-an ideal City, whose Reason, which is the Law, ensures its accord with itself Finally, it is obvious that the Reason ofeach individual, in the mutual linkage ofits thoughts or speech, demands logical and dialectical coherence with itself
This coherence with oneself is thus the ndamental principle of Stoi­ cism. For Seneca,2 all wisdom may be summed up in the rmula: "Al­ ways want the same thing, and always re se the same thing. " There is no need, Seneca continues, to add the tiny restriction "as long as what one wants is morally good. " Why? Because, he says, "One and the same thing can be universally and constantly pleasing only if it is morally right. " This is nothing but the distant echo of the rmulas by which Zeno, the under ofStoicism, used to de ne the sovereign Good: "Live in a coherent way omologoumenos);3 that is to say, live in accordance with a rule oflife which is one and harmonious, because those who live in incoherence are unhappy. "
This coherence with oneself is, as we have seen, based on the self­ coherence ofuniversal Reason or Nature. The well-known Stoic theme of the Eternal Return is only one other aspect of this theme. Universal Reason wishes this world to be as it is: that is to say, arising om the original re, and returning to this original re, and there re having a beginning and an end. Nature's will, however, is always the same; and the only thing its continuous action can accomplish is the repetition of this world, with precisely this beginning, precisely this end, and the
THE INNER CITADEL
entire course of events situated between these two moments. Thus, this world returns eternally: "There will be another Socrates, a Plato, and every man with the same iends and the same fellow-citizens . . . and this renewal will not happen once, but several times; rather, all things will be repeated eternally. "4 This is why the sage, like universal Reason, must intensely wish r each instant: he must wish intensely r things to happen eternally exactly as they do happen.
I have just mentioned the gure of the sage. It was characteristic of Stoic philosophy to make of this gure a transcendent norm, which can only be realized in rare and exceptional cases. Here we encounter an echo ofPlato's Symposium (204d), where Socrates appears as the gure who knows that he is not a sage. Socrates' situation places him between the gods, who are wise and know that they are wise, and men, who think they are wise but do not realize that they are not. This intermediary situation is that of the philosopher: he who loves and aspires to wisdom precisely because he knows that he lacks it. It is also the situation ofEros,
who loves Beauty because he knows he lacks it; neither man nor god, Eros is there re a daimon, intermediary between the two. The gure of Socrates thus coincides both with that of Eros and with that of the philosopher. 5
Similarly, the Stoic sage is the equal of God, since God is nothing other than universal Reason, producing in self-coherence all the events of the universe. Human reason is an emanation or part of this Universal Reason. It can, however, become obscured and de rmed as a result of life within the body, owing in particular to the attractions ofpleasure. It is only the sage who is able to make his reason coincide with universal Reason. Such perfect coincidence, however, can only be an ideal, r the sage is necessarily an exceptional being. There are very few of them­ perhaps only one, or perhaps none at all. He is an almost inaccessible ideal, and, in the last analysis, more ofa transcendent norm than anything else, which the Stoics never tire ofdescribing, even as they enumerate all its paradoxes. Philosophy is not wisdom, but only the exercise of wis­ dom, and if the philosopher is not a sage, he is necessarily a non-sage.
There is thus a contradictory opposition between sage and non-sage: either one is a "sage" or one is not, and there is no middle term. There are no degrees of unwisdom, relative to wisdom. As the Stoics used to
say, it doesn't matter much ifyou are one cubit below the surface ofthe water, or ve hundred thoms: you'll drown in the one case just as much as in the other. Since, then, the sage is extremely rare, all humanity is out ofits mind, and men su er om an almost universal corruption of
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
77
or deviation om Reason. Yet the Stoics still urge people to philoso­ phize-that is, to train themselves r wisdom. They there re believe in the possibility of spiritual progress.
The explanation ofthis apparent paradox is that, although it is true that there is a contradictory opposition between wisdom and unwisdom, and there re that there are no degrees ofunwisdom as opposed to wisdom, it is nevertheless the case that, as in Plato's Symposium, there are two categories ofpeople within the state ofunwisdom itself those non-sages who are not conscious of their state-these are the olish ones-and those non-sages who are aware oftheir state, and who attempt to progress toward inaccessible wisdom. Those in the latter category are philoso­ phers.
Thus, om the point ofview oflogic, we have here a contrary oppo­ sition between the sage and the olish, who are unaware of their state. This opposition does, however, admit ofa middle tem1: the non- olish non-sages-in other words, philosophers. 6
The ideal sage would thus be one who could, at each moment and de nitively, make his reason coincide with that universal Reason which is the Sage that thinks and produces the world.
An unexpected consequence of this Stoic theo of the sage is that Stoic philosophy-and I do mean Stoic philosophy; that is, the theo and the practice oftraining r wisdom-allows r a great deal ofuncer­ tainty and simple probability. A er all, only the Sage possesses a per ct, nece�sa , and unshakable knowledge of reality; the philosopher does not. The goal, project, and object ofStoic philosophy are thus to allow the philosopher to orient himself or herself within the uncertainties of daily li , by proposing probable choices which our reason can accept, even ifit is not always sure it ought to. What matters are not results or e ciency, but the intention to do good. What matters is to act out ofone motive alone, without any other considerations of interest or pleasure: that ofthe moral good. This is the only value, and the only one we need.
The Stoics on the parts ofphilosophy
By the time Zeno unded the Stoic school, the custom ofdistinguishing various parts ofphilosophy, and ofdetermining their mutual relationship, was already traditional within the teaching provided by the philosophical schools. Since the time of Plato, and especially since that of Aristotle, philosophers had been paying the most care l attention to questions
THE INNER CITADEL
concerning the di erent types of knowledge, and the various methods which characterize them. 7
We can presume that within the Platonic school, also known as the Old Academy, there was already a distinction between three parts of philosophy: dialectics, physics, and ethics. Dialectics was the noblest part ofphilosophy, inasmuch as, in the sense that Plato had given to this term, it corresponded to the discovery ofthe Ideas or Forms ( r example, the notion ofJustice or of Equality) . This discovery was brought about by a "dialectical" method of discussion; that is to say, r the Platonists, by means of rigorous argumentation. Physics, as the study of the visible world, was an in rior part ofphilosophy, but it did have as its object, to some degree at least, celestial phenomena, or the necessary, eternal movement ofthe stars. Ethics was lower still, inasmuch as its objects were the uncertain, contingent actions of mankind. Thus, the division of the
parts ofphilosophy re ects the hierarchy which the Platonists had intro­ duced among the various degrees of reality.
The Stoics, at the same time as they took up this division, trans rmed it completely. Their terminology appears to remain the same, but it no longer corresponds to the hierarchy of the Platonists, but rather to the dynamic, unitary conception of the world which was peculiar to the Stoa. Among physics, ethics, and dialectics, there was no longer any preeminence of one discipline over the others, r all three were related to the same logos or divine Reason. This Reason was equally present in the physical world, in the world of social life-since society is based upon the reason common to all mankind-and in human speech and thought; that is, within the rational activity ofjudgment.
Moreover, om the point of view of perfect action, which is that of the sage, these three disciplines mutually imply one another, since it is one and the same logos or Reason which is to be und within nature, the human community, and individual reason. This is why, to return once more to the remarks ofEmile Brehier, "it is impossible r a good man [that is, one who practices ethics] not to be a physician and a dialectician; it is impossible r rationality to be realized separately in these three areas, and, r instance, to grasp reason lly in the course of events in the world, without at the same time realizing reason within one's own con­ duct. "8 The perfect exercise ofany one ofthese disciplines implies that of all the others. The sage practices dialectics by maintaining coherence in his judgments; he practices ethics by maintaining coherence in his will, and in the actions which result om it; and he practices physics by behaving like a part which is coherent with the whole to which it
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
79
belongs. For the Stoics, the parts ofphilosophy are virtues9 which-like virtues, in their view-are equal and mutually imply one another: to practice one of them is necessarily to practice of them.
Thus, om this point ofview, there is a sense in which logic, physics, and ethics are not really distinct om one another; no one of them precedes the others, and they are all mixed up together. The Platonic­ Aristotelian model ofa hierarchy ofknowledge and oflevels ofreality is thus replaced by the representation of an organic unity, in which there is complete compenetration. For the Platonists and the Aristotelians, the whole of reality is heterogeneous, and is composed of zones in which substantiality and necessity are completely di erent. For the Stoics, on the contrary, reality is homogeneous, and the sequence of events wholly necessa . The distinction between physics, as the science of the sensible world, and a science of the transcendent world of Ideas (that is, Platonic dialectics) or of the gods (theology) is completely abolished. Physis or nature, which, r the Platonists and the Aristotelians, was only a small part-and the lowest part at that-of the whole of reality, be­ comes all ofreality.
The word "dialectics" also changes its meaning. It no longer denotes, as it does r Plato, a method of reasoning which starts om notions common to all mankind, and rises, by means ofquestions and answers, to the discovery of those essences which make reasoning and language possible. Nor does it denote, as it did r Aristotle, a method ofreasoning which starts om notions which are common to mankind-and there re not scienti c-and makes possible, by means of questions and answers, the attainment of probable conclusions in every area of reality. Although Stoic dialectics also takes its point of departure in common notions, it is able to obtain true and necessary conclusions because it re ects the necessary interrelation ofcauses within the sensible world.
To be sure, r the Stoics, physics, ethics, and dialectics are- rmally at least-to be related to three di erent sectors of reality: the physical world, human conduct, and the nctioning of thought. Nevertheless, the Stoics did not consider these three parts as corpora of theoretical doctrines, but as inner dispositions and practical conduct of the sage, and hence of the philosopher in training r wisdom. From this perspective, the living exercise of physics, ethics, and dialectics, and the practice of these three virtues, in ct corresponds to one attitude: the single act of placing oneself in harmony with the logos, whether it be the logos of universal Nature, the logos of rational human nature, or the logos as it is expressed in human discourse.
So THE INNER CITADEL
Although physics, ethics, and dialectics are practically merged together into a single act when it comes to the concrete exercise ofphilosophy, they must nevertheless be well distinguished when it comes to teaching them. Philosophy must be set rth and described be re the disciple. Thus, philosophical discourse introduces a temporal dimension which has two aspects: there is the "logical" time of the discourse itsel and then there is the psychological time which the disciple requires to assimi­ late what he or she is being taught. Logical time corresponds to the inner requirements of theoretical discourse: there must be a series of argu­ ments, which must be presented in a speci c order, and this is logical time. All expositions of doctrine, however, are addressed to an auditor, and the auditor introduces another component: the stages ofhis spiritual progress; and here we are dealing with a time which is purely psycho­ logical. Until the auditor has assimilated a given doctrine inwardly and spiritually, it is either useless or impossible to speak to him or her about anything else. There is, moreover, a kind of con ict between these two times, r it is often di cult to safeguard the logical order while still taking the auditor's spiritual state into account.
Thus, om the point ofview ofthat discourse which transmits philo­ sophical instruction, the Stoics distinguished very sharply and clearly between the three parts ofphilosophy, and tried to establish among them not only a logical order, but also a pedagogical one. There was much discussion on this topic within the school, r there was no agreement on the order which was to be established between physics, ethics, and logic or dialectics. We know that the Stoics used to compare the parts of philosophy to the parts oforganic totalities such as an egg, a garden, or a living being. However, although logic was always presented in these comparisons as the part which ensures self-defense and solidity, the in­ nermost and most precious part was sometimes presented as ethics, and sometimes as physics.
In his treatise On Stoic Se Contradictions, Plutarch10 reproaches Chrysippus with having sometimes placed physics as the end-point of philosophical instruction, as ifit were the supreme initiation which trans­ mitted teachings about the gods, and at other times placing physics be­ re ethics, since the distinction between good and evil was only possible on the basis of the study of universal Nature and the organization of the world. In ct, these hesitations correspond to the various types of educa­ tional program which could be chosen. According to the logical order of exposition, physics should precede ethics, in order to give it a rational undation. According to the psychological order of education, however,
The Stoicism ofEpictetus 81
physics must llow ethics, because it is by practicing ethics that one prepares oneself r the revelation of the divine world, that is, of univer­ sal Nature.
It was in order to get past these di culties that some Stoics, while continuing to pro ss their own theory concerning the ideal priority ofa given part ofphilosophy within the overall educational program, urged that the parts ofphilosophy be presented simultaneously within the con­ text of instructional philosophical discourse: " Some Stoics held that no part of philosophy had any priority, but that they were all mixed to­ gether; andtheymadetheirteachingmixed, too. "11 Thepartsofphiloso­ phy were "inseparable. "12 How, indeed, could one wait until one nished the complete program r one part, be re beginning the study of another? Above all, how could one wait to practice philosophy itsel in all its three aspects? Chrysippus himself seems to have recommended this type of "mixed" instruction, r he writes: "He who begins with logic must not abstain om the other parts, but must participate in the other studies, when the opportunity arises. "13 In ct, the method of teaching must be integral at each ofits moments, since we are not trying to acquire three distinct theoretical bodies of knowledge, separate om one another, but rather to train ourselves r that unique act of wisdom which is, indissolubly, the practice ofphysics, ofethics, and oflogic.
In view of the preceding considerations, we are now better able to understand how the Stoics distinguished between philosophy and dis­ course conce ing philosophy. They a rmed that lo c, physics, and eth­ ics-which up until now I have been calling, in accordance with com­ mon usage, the parts ofphilosophy-were not in ct parts ofphilosophy prope y so called, but parts of discourse concerning philosophy. 14 The only time physics, logic, and ethics appear as distinct, separate, and per­ haps even successive, is within the context ofthe philosophical teaching discourse.
It is this teaching discourse which requires a theoretical exposition of logic, in the rm of an abstract study of the rules of reasoning. It also requires a theoretical exposition ofphysics, that is to say, an abstract study of the structure and coming-to-be of the cosmos. Finally, it requires a theoretical exposition of ethics-in other words, an abstract study of human behavior, and of the rules which it ought to obey. Chrysippus used to say explicitly that these were the " three kinds of theoremata proper to philosophy. "15 In philosophy itself, by contrast, understood as the exercise of wisdom, physics, ethics, and logic are mutually implicated within and interior to one another, in that act-at once multiple and
82 THE INNER CITADEL
uniqu w hich is the exercise of physical virtue, ethical virtue, and logical virtue. At this point, we are no longer conce ed with producing abstract theories of logic-that is, theories of the art of speaking and writing well; rather, we are conce ed with speaking and writing well in reality. We no longer construct abstract theories of ethics, or of acting well; instead we are concerned about whether we are in ct acting well. Finally, at this level we are no longer interested in developing abstract theories about physics, in order to prove that we are a part ofthe cosmic All; rather, we try to live as a true part ofthe cosmic .
These three exercises mutually imply one another, and in ct they constitute one single act or disposition, which is di erentiated only inso­ r as it is oriented toward the three aspects of reality: the Reason of human discourse, the Reason of human society, and the Reason of the cosmos.
Thus, logic, physics, and ethics are distinguishable when we talk about philosophy, but not when we live it.
The three acts ofthe soul and the three exercise-themes according to Epictetus
From Zeno (3 3 2-262 B. c. ) and Chrysippus (c. 28 1-204 B. c. ) to Epictetus (died c. 125 A. D. ), the rmulation of Stoic doctrine evolved-particu­ larly as a result of its polemics with other philosophical schools-and sometimes the rigor of the positions of the school's unders was some­
what attenuated. Yet its ndamental dogmas never changed.
Epictetus himsel at any rate-perhaps because ofhis teaching meth­ ods, which obliged him to explicate the works ofthe unding thers­ went back to the origins. As Brehier used to say, Epictetus cannot be too highly recommended to anyone wishing to understand the Old Stoa. 16 Already in 1894, in two remarkable studies devoted to Epictetus, A. Bonho er had reached similar conclusions. 17 It can be said that Epictetus subscribes to the most orthodox Stoic tradition: that which, beginning with Chrysippus, apparently continues through Archedemus and Antipater;18 he makes no allusions to Panetius or to Posidonius. Through Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius was able to go back to the purest Stoic sources, and the llowing exposition of the Stoicism of Epictetus
may consequently be regarded as a preliminary sketch of the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius.
It is true that, in the sayings of Epictetus as recorded by Arrian, we
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
nowhere nd a systematic exposition ofthe totality ofStoic doctrine; the reasons r this have been explained above. The subjects ofthe Discourses were inspired by occasional circumstances, such as the questions raised by his students, or the visit of a speci c personage. Epictetus' sayings are essentially anecdotal; but it is all the more precious to be able to observe within them the presence ofa highly structured theme, which equently recurs and can be said to summarize the essential points ofStoicism.
There is one highly structured theme that integrates right at the outset something which, it would seem, Epictetus is the only one within the Stoic tradition, besides Marcus Aurelius, to distinguish: the three activi­ ties or operations of the soul. These are the desire to accumulate that which is good, the impulse to act, andjudgment on the value ofthings.
Basing his view on the traditional and ndamental Stoic distinction between those things which do not depend upon our will and those which do, Epictetus enumerates these three psychological operations as llows :
What depends on us are value-judgments ypolepseis), impulses toward action orme), and desire (orexis) or aversion; in a word, everything which is our own business. What does not depend on us are the body, wealth, honors, and high positions in o ce; in a word, eve thing which is not our own business. 19
Here, we can glimpse one ofthe Stoics' most ndamental attitudes: the delimitation of our own sphere of liberty as an impregnable islet of autonomy, in the midst of the vast river of events and of Destiny. What depends on us are thus the acts ofour soul, because we can eely choose them. We can judge or not judge, or judge in whatever manner we please; we can desire or not desire; will or not will. By contrast, that which does not depend on us-Epictetus lists our body, honors, riches, and high positions of authority-is eve thing that depends upon the general course of nature. Our body, rst: it is true that we can move it, but we are not completely in control of it. Birth, death, sickness, invol­ untary movements, sensations of pleasure or of pain: all these are com­ pletely independent ofour will. As r wealth and honors: we can, to be sure, attempt to acquire them, yet de nitive success does not depend upon us, but upon a series ofhuman ctors and events which are exte­ rior to us; they are imponderable and do not depend upon our will. Thus, the Stoic delimits a center ofautonomy-the soul, as opposed to the body; and a guiding principle (hegemonikon) as opposed to the rest of
THE INNER CITADEL
the soul. I t is within this guiding principle that eedom and our true self are located. It is also there, and only there, that moral good and evil can be und, r the only moral good and evil are voluntary good and evil.
The soul or guiding principle thus has three ndamental activities. In the rst place, as it receives the images which come om bodily sensa­ tions, it develops an inner discourse, and this is what constitutesjudgment. The soul tells itselfwhat a given object or event is; in particular, it tells itselfwhat the object isfor the soul, that is, what it is in the soul's view. Here we have the central node of the whole of Stoicism: that of inner discourse, or judgments expressed on the subject of representations. As Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius never tire ofsaying, everything is a matter ofjudgment. It is not things themselves that trouble us, but our repre­ sentations of these things, the ideas we rm of them, and the inner discourse which we rmulate about them. Desire and impulses to action are the necessary results ofthis inner discourse: ifwe desire something, it is because we have told ourselves that the thing in question is good; likewise, ifwe want to do something, it is because we have told ourselves that it was a good thing.
As is well known, the Stoics held that only those representations should be accepted into the mind which they called kataleptikai, a term which is usually translated as "comprehensive. " This translation gives the impression that the Stoics believed a representation to be true when it "comprehends," or seizes the contents ofreality. In Epictetus, however, we can glimpse a wholly di erent meaning of the term: r him, a representation is kataleptike when it does not go beyond what is given, but is able to stop at what is perceived, without adding anything extrane­ ous to that which is perceived. Rather than "comprehensive repre­ sentations," then, it would be better to speak of "adequate repre­ sentations. "
Here is a translation-slightly paraphrased, in order to make it more comprehensible-of a vital passage om the Discourses of Epictetus. It shows in action the inner discourse, or the soul's dialogue with itsel on the subject ofrepresentations (III, 8, 1-2):
In the same way as we train ourselves in order to be able to ce up to sophistical interrogations, we ought also to train ourselves to ce up to representations hantasiai), r they too ask us questions.
For example, let's say we rmulate within ourselves the contents of the representation: "So-and-so's son is dead. "
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
This representation is asking you a question, and you should reply: "That does not depend on the will, and is not something bad. "
"So-and-so's ther has disinherited him. What do you think of that? " Reply: "That doesn't depend on the will, and is not some­ thing bad. "
"He was very hurt by it. " Reply: "That does depend on the will, and is something bad. "
"He put up with it bravely. " "That depends on the will, and is something good. "
Epictetus continues:
Ifwe acquire this habit, we will make progress; r we will give our assent only to that ofwhich there is an adequate ataleptike) repre­ sentation.
It is quite remarkable that Epictetus here is representing moral li as a dialectical exercise, in which we engage in a dialogue with events, as they ask us questions.
Epictetus then goes on to give the llowing examples, in which representations ask us questions. "Her son is dead" is an inner repre­ sentation which we rmulate, and it asks us the question: "What hap­ pened? " This could lead us to enunciate a value-judgment, of the type " a great mis rtune," but we must reply: "Her son is dead. " The repre­ sentation, however, is not satis ed; it asks "Nothing more? " to which the soul responds: "nothing more. " Epictetus then continues along the same lines:
" His ship sank. " "What happened? " " His ship sank. "
"He was sent to prison. " But ifyou add the proposition "a terrible thing happened to him, " then that is coming om you.
What Epictetus means is that the idea according to which a certain event is a mis rtune-as well as the consequences that such a repre­ sentation may have on the desires and tendencies of the soul-is a repre­ sentation which has no basis in reality; rather, it goes beyond an adequate vision of reality, by adding to it a lse value-judgment. Such a repre­ sentation can arise only in a soul which has not yet assimilated the
86 THE INNER CITADEL
ndamental dogma of Stoicism: happiness is only to b e und in moral good, or virtue; and mis rtune is only to be und in moral evil, in ults and in vice.
If the only good is moral good, and the only evil is moral evil, how can the Stoic live his daily life, in which there are many things which are morally neither good nor evil, but are "indi erent," to use a term om the Stoic vocabulary? A person must, after all, eat, sleep, work, raise a mily, and l ll his or her role within the community. The Stoic, too, must act; and he or she has an impulse-both instinctive and rational-to act. Thus, the second of the soul's proper nctions, coming after the activity of representations, judgments, and assent, must be just this im­ pulse to act, as well as action itself The domain ofthe latter includes what Epictetus and the Stoics call the kathekonta; that is, those actions which, in all probability and r good reason, may be considered as "appropri­ ate" to human nature. These are the actions which con rm to the deep-rooted instinct which urges rational human nature to act in order to preserve itself Thus, both the active impulse and action itselfwill be exercised above all in the domain of society, of the state, of the mily, and ofrelations between human beings in general.
Human action cannot, however, hope to be completely e ective; it does not always attain its goal. Mankind is, there re, reduced to hoping and to desiring that what suits him actually happens, and that that which he fears does not. Desire is thus the third activity proper to the human soul, and its domain is not that which one does onesel but rather that which happens-in other words, the events which happen to us by virtue of Destiny, and the course of universal Nature. He who desires does not act, but is in a certain disposition of waiting. As was the case
with the impulse to action, desire depends on us, and the soul is ee either to desire a given object, or not to desire it.
The philosopher, then, must train himself in these three domains of activity: judgment, impulse toward action, and desire (III, 2, 1-2) :
There are three domains in which he who would become perfect must train himself
-the domain concerning desires and aversions, so that he may not nd himself frustrated in his desires, and may not encounter that which he was seeking to avoid;
-the domain concerning active impulses and repulsions, and in general, the domain which concerns what is appropriate (kathekon) r our nature, so that he may act in an orderly way, in accordance
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
with rational probability, and without negligence;
-the domain in which what matters is to preserve oneself om error and insu cient reasons; and, in general, that which concerns the assent [which we give to j udgments] .
If we gather together all the indications concerning this theme con­ tained in Epictetus' sayings, we can present this_ theory of the three rms or domains20 ofphilosophical exercise as llows:
The rst domain is that of desires and aversions. Humans are unhappy because they desire things which they consider good, but which they may either il to obtain or else lose; and because they try to avoid things which they consider as evils, but which are o en inevitable. The reason is that these apparent goods and evils-wealth and health, r example, or on the contrary poverty and sickness-do not depend on us. Thus, the exercise of the discipline of desire will consist in gradually renouncing these desires and aversions, so that we may nally desire only that which does depend on us-in other words, moral good-and may avoid only that which depends on us-in other words, moral evil. That which does not depend on us is to be considered as indi erent, which means that we are not to introduce any preferential order among such things, but accept them as willed by the will of universal Nature, which Epictetus some­ times designates by the term "gods" in general. To " llow the gods" means to accept their will, which is identical with the will of universal Nature (I, 12, 8; I, 20, I5). The discipline ofdesire thus has as its object the passions athe), or the emotions which we feel when events present themselves to us.
The second domain ofexercises is that ofimpulses to action. As we have seen, it is the eld ofthose actions which are "appropriate" (kathekonta) to our rational nature. These are actions-and there re something which depends on us-that have an e ect on things which do not de­ pend on us, such as other human beings, politics, health, mily life, and so rth. ofthese areas are, in themselves, "indi erent" in the Stoic sense of the term; but they may, in accordance with a rational justi ca­ tion or reasonable probability, be considered as corresponding to reason­ able nature's instinct r self-preservation. Since such actions are directed exclusively toward other people, and have their undation in that com­ munity of reasonable nature which unites humankind, they must be guided by our intention to place ourselves in the service of the human community, and bring about the reign ofjustice.
The third domain of exercises is that of assent (sunkatathesis). Each
88 THE INNER CITADEL
representation hantasia) which presents itselfto us must be subjected to criticism, so that our inner dialogue and the judgment we enunciate with regard to it may not add anything "subjective" to that which, within the representation, is " adequate " to reality; only thus will we be able to give our assent to a true judgment. We have already seen the importance of this theme in Stoicism, r which good and evil are not to be und anywhere else than in our culty ofjudgment.
It is tempting to compare the three acts ofthe soul as distinguished by Epictetus-rational activity ofjudgment and assent, impulse to action, and desire-with the three parts ofthe soul recognized by the Platonists. Following Plato, they distinguished between the rational part ofthe soul, its "choleric" part, which is the seat of action, and the "desiring" part, which is the principle of pleasure and of passion. This comparison is all the more attractive in that Plato, like Epictetus, based his system of virtues, and there re, in a sense, his "ascetic" system, on his distinction of the parts of the soul. For Epictetus, as we have seen, there is a discipline of the soul's intellectual activity, a discipline of impulses and tendencies to action, and a discipline ofdesire. In Plato's Republic, justice is the inner harmony of the individual as well as of the state, and it consists in the union ofthree elements: the rst is wisdom, which, in the soul, reigns over the rational part, and in the state is the characteristic of the philosopher-kings. Within the soul, courage reigns over the "chol­ eric" and impulsive part; whereas within the state it pertains to the class ofwarriors. Finally, that temperance which is to be und within the soul reigns over the "desiring" part; whereas within the state it must be the characteristic ofthe lowest class: that ofthe artisans. 21
In spite of these analogies, however, the schemes of Plato and of Epictetus are radically and completely di erent. For Plato, there is a hierarchy among the parts of the soul analogous to that which is estab­ lished between the classes ofsociety in the Republic: rulers, warriors, and artisans. The philosopher-kings impose their rule upon the warriors and artisans, who are their in riors. In the same way, good reason imposes its law upon the inferior parts of the soul.
For Epictetus, by contrast, both active impulse and desire are acts of the rational soul, or the "guiding principle" within each human being. There is thus no opposition or di erence oflevel between rational activ­ ity, impulses to action, and desire. Impulses and desire are located within the rational soul itsel and this is all the more true in that impulse and desire, even if they do have a ective repercussions upon the soul, are, according to Stoic teaching, essentially judgments made by the rational soul. Reason is not essentially good; rather, like impulses and desire, it
The Stoicism ofEpictetus
can be either good or bad, according to whether it emits true or lse judgments, which then determine conduct. A passage om Plutarch22
provides a good summary of Stoic doctrine as we nd it in Epictetus:
For the Stoics, virtue is a disposition ofthe ruling part ofthe soul . . . or rather it is reason when the latter is coherent with itsel rm, and constant. They do not believe that the passionate and irrational parts ofthe soul di er om the rational culty by means ofa natural di erence; but that it is the same part of the soul, which they call dianoia and hegemonikon (the culty of re ection and the directing principle) which changes and is completely trans rmed in the pas­ sions and the trans rmations which it undergoes, either in its state or in its dispositions, and that it becomes vice or virtue. In itself, however, there is nothing irrational about this culty, but it is called irrational when, owing to excessive impulses, it becomes very strong and triumphant, and is consequently led to something inap­ propriate and contrary to the choice of reason. Passion, thus, is reason, but reason which is vitiated and depraved, and which, owing to the e ect of bad and pe erted judgment, has acquired strength and vigor.
For Plato, we can say that the essence of human beings resides in reason; and reason is necessarily right, but the life of the concrete indi­ vidual does not necessarily coincide with it. For Epictetus, by contrast, as r the Stoics in general, the essence ofmankind does consist in reason, the principle of eedom, and the power to choose. Precisely because it is the power to choose, however, it can be either good or bad and is not necessarily right.