No More Learning

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some
virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational
part. "

I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways:
first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according
as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from
natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is;
but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be
ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by
which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.

Reply to Objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an
inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are
no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to
obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in
so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be
rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Reply to Objection 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act
at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such
animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits
ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain
dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas
by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in
this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit
the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of
pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this
has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle. " But
the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not
that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the
notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no
habits in them.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to
be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57:
but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to
receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable
that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the
powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive
appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the
command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive
apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility
of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says
(De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory":
the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the
command of the reason.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing
and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their
fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the
members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the
powers which command their movements.
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Whether there is any habit in the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect.
For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above
[1455](A[1]). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as
stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the
intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore
the intellect is not the subject of a habit.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the
mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is
act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality
and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential
and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is
composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter.
Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being
a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only
in the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.

Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill
disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect
is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De
Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick
witted. " Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect,
which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of
the body.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science,
wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in
the intellective part of the soul.

I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various
opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible"
[*[1456]FP, Q[79], A[2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to
hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in
the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in
habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge
directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men.
Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men,
the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not
be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the
interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men.

Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational,
not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the
Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science
and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore
they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself.
Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the
"possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is,
when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible
species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in
act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself," i. e. by
considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not
in the same way as before learning and discovering. " Therefore the
"possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by
which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is
able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to
the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power
to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider
is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby
one considers is properly in the intellect itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his
Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is
to a certain extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the
soul only, but in the "conjunctum. " And from this it follows that no
habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the
argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not
a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of
the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power
which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the
power as its object.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body,
except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66.
But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive
intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the
intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and
not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And
therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of
habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all,
to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the
subject of intellectual habits.

Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to
corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the
"possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the
"possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
perfect act.

Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare
their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by
the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of
the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in
a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But
principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
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Whether any habit is in the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For
the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by
means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does
not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of
habit.

Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as
there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active
power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all
the powers to their acts, as stated above ([1457]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore
there is no habit in the will.

Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because,
by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the
will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which
reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.

On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it
is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1).
Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.

I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act,
needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the
will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And
therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it
is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit,
it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as
habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above
[1458](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which
is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive
power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its
object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain
inclination, as we have said above ([1459]Q[6], A[4];[1460] Q[22],
A[2]). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined
sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no
quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human
life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to
which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a
relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in
the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities
to incline them, and these are called habits.

Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no
way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover
and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison
between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to
that which is somehow in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power
inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in
many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some
fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
promptly.
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Whether there are habits in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For
Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not
proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i. e. spiritual) powers
in the divine intelligences (i. e. in the angels) after the manner of
accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject:
for accident of any kind is foreign to them. " But every habit is an
accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy
dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
things, in God's goodness. " But that which is of itself [per se] is
prior to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud].
Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto
conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this
seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage
adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain
in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of
itself. "

Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which
has parts. " Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems
that there are no dispositions and habits in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are
of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and
Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their
habits. "

I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their
dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through
the absence of matter in them. " And Simplicius says the same in his
Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its
habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself. "

Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said ([1461]Q[49], A[4]) that only a being
in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned
commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that
there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,
excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though
there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some
potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),
therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may
habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the
potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that:
"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here
below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it
contains in itself. "

However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we
said in the [1462]FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so
far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible
species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act,
through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in
De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it
understand.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,
being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that
is to say, that by them they are made like to God.

But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of
material habits and accidents.

Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their
essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of
themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore,
so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do
they need to have habits.

Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there
are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by
several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several
things.
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OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their
formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their
diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether any habit is from nature?

(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?

(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?

(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
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Whether any habit is from nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of
those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But
habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on
De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.

Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is
sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore
the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be
one.

Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits
are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above
([1463]Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems
that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.

On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to
understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature:
wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First
in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is
natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency.
Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to
Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in
accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of
both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly
from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when
a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but
when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from
nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.

Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in
relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the
foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by
the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this
disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since
such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different
grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of
the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from
nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle,
as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.

But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is
a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural
whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the
individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of
the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the
specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the
part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way
does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be
entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since
they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which
cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the [1464]FP,
Q[55], A[2]; [1465]FP, Q[84], A[3].

There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their
existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in
one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the
appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a
natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific
nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with
regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is
owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once
grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive
that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with
regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a
part---this he cannot know except through the intelligible species
which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the
Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge
of principles comes to us from the senses.

But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is
natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition
of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well,
since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.

In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its
beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the
habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the
principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue. " The
reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which
seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but
rather to the very nature of the powers.

But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there
are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are
disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or
such like.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against
reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of
man.

Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the
nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For
instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the
intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it
would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone.
Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual
likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of
the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act
of all things.
Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of
things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and
not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those
things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything
belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.

Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the
various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some
not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some
habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
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Whether any habit is caused by acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit
is a quality, as we have said above ([1466]Q[49], A[1]). Now every
quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity.
Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather
gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its
own acts.

Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to
that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled:
whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as
may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were
caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would
be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated
in Physics iii, 8.

Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause.
But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is
clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore
habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits
of virtue and vice are caused by acts.

I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active
principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active
principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by
its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is
to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive
principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved
by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the
intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as
it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore
by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with
regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle
of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is
passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent;
wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the
power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just
as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers,
according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science
are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first
propositions.

Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything.
But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives
something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.

Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot
be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by
itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text.
28,29.

Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it
comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent
principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a
more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the
appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first
principles is a more excellent principle than the science of
conclusions.
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Whether a habit can be caused by one act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For
demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of
one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be
caused by one act.

Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so
do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it
can be the generating cause of a habit.

Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens
that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can
cause a habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one
swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
time make a man blessed and happy. " But "happiness is an operation in
respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a
habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused
by one act.

I answer that, As we have said already [1467](A[2]), habit is caused by
act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in
order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active
principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that
because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not
enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so
that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now
it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely
overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power
is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a
single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and
circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the
majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue.
Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by
many.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See [1468]FP, Q[79], A[2]
ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De
Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason,"
that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard
then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain
active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its
passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the
intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a
probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs
to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the
"possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a
single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is
concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed
on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that
"meditation strengthens memory. " Bodily habits, however, can be caused
by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for
instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
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Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For
God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He
would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.

Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode
which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are
naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above [1469](A[2]).
Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.

Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can
by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is
caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the
same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this
seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in
the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the
spirit of wisdom and understanding. " Now wisdom and understanding are
habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.

I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two
reasons.

The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is
disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature,
namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above
([1470]Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that
to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human
nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine
infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second
causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the [1471]FP,
Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His
power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His
power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a
natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the
Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by
custom, but not so perfectly.

Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to
all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive,
gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.

Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode,
does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows
from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to
nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a
habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind
of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
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OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there
are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether habits increase?

(2) Whether they increase by addition?

(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
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Whether habits increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase
concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus
quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of
habits.

Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18).
But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it
cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.

Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are
subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is
proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.

On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith. "
Therefore habits increase.

I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).

Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.

In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.

In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health. "

Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.

But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.

Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i. e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance. "

Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.

This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.

It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.

We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.

Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.

Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
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Whether habits increases by addition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing. "
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.

Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.

Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.

I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph.