140
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action.
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action.
Revolution and War_nodrm
?
120 Interestingly, the most senior Shiite cleric in Lebanon, Ayatollah Said Muhammed Fad- lallah, was not a disciple of Khomeini, and he rejected the latter's concept of velayet-efaqih.
See Kramer, "Pan-Islamic Premise," 121-25.
121 The former Iranian ambassador to I. e. banon said in 1984 that "since the Republic of Lebanon does not have much power, there is no serious obstacle in the way" of an Islamic revolution. Quoted in Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, . Jran, Arab World, 61.
? 122 See Norton, "Lebanon," 13<r-33; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 126.
123 Accordingtonewsreports,RafsanjanipromisedtosupplySudanwithfreeoil,sellitarms, and send Revolutionary Guards to aid the government's efforts against the rebel movements in
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
Iran and Sudan are believed to have aided the election campaign of the Is- lamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1992, and National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi repeatedly referred to a global Islamic resurgence based on "the experiences of Iran in heart of Asia, Sudan in the heart of Africa, and Al- geria which is very near to the European continent. " 124 Together with the rise of fundamentalism in Egypt and Algeria, these events sparked renewed fears
of a rising Islamic tide posing an ominous threat to the West. 125
Although the growth of Islamic fundamentalism clearly merits careful at- tention from Middle Eastern governments and their foreign allies, this phe- nomenon should not be seen as the emergence of an "Islamic monolith" or as a case where a revolution was successfully exported. In the first place, most contemporary Islamic movements predate the revolution in Iran, and their growing popularity is due more to indigenous trends than to the trans- mission of revolutionary ideas from Tehran. This qualification is especially true of Sudan-the only other regime that openly espouses fundamentalist principles-where the process of Islamization was not the result of a mass
revolution. On the contrary, the Islamization campaign was begun by Jifar Nimeiri (a former general who seized power in the early 1970s) and com- pleted following his ouster by a military coup in 1989. 126 Similar obser- vations apply to North Africa as well. According to Fran\ois Burgat, "Khomeinism was . . . not responsible for the creation of the Islamist move- ment" and none of his successors "could be considered to be the conductor of an Islamic orchestra responding to his solicitations. "127 Although the
? the south. See Middle East International, no. 418 (February 7, 1992), 18-19; and "Fundamentalism Alters the Middle East's Power Relationships," New York Times, August 22, 1993, 4:1.
124 See Middle East International, no. 416 (January 10, 1992), 7-8; no. 418 (February 7, 1992), 1? 18; no. 421 (March20, 1992), 17-18; no. 465, (December 17, 1993), 13; and MECS 1991, 183-84. 125 In 1993, an unnamed U. S. official warned, "From the Iranian point of view, Sudan is strategically located: south to Africa, north and west to Egypt and North Africa. It gives the Iranians a strategic toehold, which can help promote its revolutionary cause in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan itself, and south. " Quoted in "Fundamentalism Alters the Middle East's Power Relationships. " For other examples of Western alarmism about the rise of Is- lamic fundamentalism, seeJohn L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1992), chap. 6. For a predictably extreme assessment by a member of the Iranian opposition, see Mohammed Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat (Washington, D. C. : Seven Locks Press, 1993); for a critique, see Leon Hadar, "What Green Peril? " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (1993).
126 According to John 0. Voll, "the Iranian revolution seems to have had little direct impact on Sudan. The basic developments of Islamization and Islamic revivalism . . . during the 1970s and 1980s were primarily shaped by the long traditions of Sudanese history. . . . The re- lationship between Sudan's Islamization program and the Iranian revolution tends to dis- prove the hypotheses that view the Islamic resurgence as a tightly bound network of events or even some form of international conspiracy. " "Islamization in the Sudan and the Iranian Revolution," in Esposito, Iranian Revolution, 283, 288.
127 See Fran? ois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, Tex. : Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993), 3? 37? According to G. H. Jansen, "the Irani-
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Egyptian and Tunisian governments have repeatedly accused Iran of sup- porting the Islamic radicals, their statements have clearly been intended to encourage foreign support and to provide a scapegoat for their own fail- ures. Such reports should not be dismissed entirely, perhaps, but they should be discounted. 128
The belief that Islamic fundamentalism is a unified movement directed or inspired by Iran also ignores the considerable diversity among the various fundamentalist groups. The Iranian revolution was conducted by Shiite Muslim Persians, while the other Islamic movements are led by Sunni Arabs. None of the Sunni movements have embraced Khomeini's doctrine of ve- layet-e faqih, and their specific political programs differ significantly as well. 129 Among other things, this diversity suggests that, should additional
"Islamic" movements gain power in other countries, they are as likely to quarrel over the "correct" form of Islamic government as to cooperate in a jihad against the West.
Furthermore, despite the many problems that presently afflict a number of Middle Eastern governments, they have been able to contain the Islamic challenge through a combination of cooptation, repression, and external support. 130 If the revolution in Iran helped inspire fundamentalists else- where, it also gave fair warning to potential victims and encouraged them to join forces against the perceived danger. Although the more extreme movements have responded with violent campaigns against government officials and Western tourists and business interests, none of these regimes had fallen as of mid-1995. Iran has had more than fifteen years in which to
replicate its own revolution; the ability of regimes as fragile, corrupt, and economically troubled as Egypt and Algeria to resist its efforts is compelling
ans may even flatter themselves that the Algerians are only following the Iranian example, but that would not be true. . . . If there has been any outside influence in Algeria it has come from Saudi Arabia. " See Middle East International, no. 416 Oanuary 10, 1992}, 8.
128 One recent congressional study noted that although Tunisian leaders blamed the rise of fundamentalist attacks on the "Tehran-Khartoum-Tunis axis," "no evidence has been re- leased that these attacks were part of a 'Fundamentalism International' conspiracy to take power in Tunisia. " George Pickard, The Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the Middle East, a Re- port to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 103d Congress, 1st sess. (Washing- ton, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 12. See also Middle East International, no. 417 aanuary 24, 1992), 5-6.
129 See Bassam Tibi, "The Iranian Revolution and the Arabs: The Quest for Islamic Iden- tity and the Search for an Islamic System of Government," Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1986).
130 When the Islamic Salvation Front gained a majority in first stage of the December 1991 elections, the Algerian Army promptly canceled the second stage and began a brutal cam- paign against the Algerian fundamentalists. A similar campaign in Tunisia resulted in the ar- rest and sentencing of three hundred members of the main fundamentalist party in August 1992.
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
evidence of the advantages even weak states possess when facing a revolu- tionary challenge. 131
To be sure, the revolution in Iran did inspire fundamentalist groups in a number of other Muslim societies, primarily by demonstrating that a movement based on Islamic principles could overthrow a seemingly im- pregnable regime. As in the French and Bolshevik cases, however, success in one context did not lead to rapid triumphs elsewhere. Most important of all, the claim that the revolution in Iran "caused" sympathetic upheavals elsewhere is almost certainly spurious; instead, it is merely one part of a much broader political process whose ultimate outcomes will take many forms.
Iran's Arab Allies. Although the revolution left Iran isolated from most of its neighbors, it did establish close alignments with a number of other "rad- ical" states. The Syrian-Iranian relationship was probably the most impor- tant for the first decade after the revolution-an alignment based almost entirely on realpolitik. Despite serious ideological differences, the two states were united by their mutual antipathy to Iraq, Israel, and the United States. Syria backed Iran during the hostage crisis, provided modest amounts of Soviet weaponry from its own stockpiles, and aided the Kurdish insurgents within Iraq itself. Syria also shut down Iraq's oil pipelines in 1982, and it and Iran joined forces to support the Islamic fundamentalists in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Although President Hafez al-Assad still referred to Syria's alignment with Iran as "strategic" in 1986 and President Khameni described the relationship as "profound" and "brotherly" the following year, Syrian-
Iranian ties were strained when Syria began to favor the more moderate Lebanese Shiite faction, Amal, over Hezbollah. The end of the Iran-Iraq war reduced the value of the Syrian-Iranian alignment, and Syria subsequently refused to allow Iran to send additional Revolutionary Guards and a ship- ment of arms to Lebanon in January 1990. Syria also joined the UN coalition against Iraq in the wake of the latter's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (a move that Iran regarded with misgivings), but relations between Tehran and Damascus remain cordial at present. 132
Iran also enjoyed good relations with Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen for most of the 198os, based primarily on their mutual opposition to the United States and Israel. Algeria also served as the principal intermediary with the United States during the hostage crisis, but relations deteriorated sharply
131 See F. Gregory Gause III, "Revolutionary Fevers and Regional Contagion: Domestic Structures and the Export of Revolution in Middle East," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (1991).
132 See Yosef Olmert, "lranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and Muslim World, 172--'75; Ramazani, Revolu tionary Iran, 81-82; "Chronology," ME] 40, no. 4 (1986), 699; MECS 1987, 419; 1989, 367.
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after the Algerian government voided the results of the 1991 elections and launched a major crackdown on the fundamentalist movement. The Islamic Republic also established cordial diplomatic relations with a number of rev- olutionary movements and Third World states during its first decade, being particularly friendly toward radical states such as Nicaragua, Cuba, and North Korea. 133 These policies, which were consistent with Khomeini's com- mitment to protecting the "oppressed" peoples against great-power domi- nance, confirm that Iran's postrevolutionary foreign policy had made a decisive break with the policies of the old regime.
CONCLUSIONS: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND BALANCE-OF-THREAT THEORY
The independent impact of revolutions on the level of security competi- tion is probably most apparent in the Iranian case. The revolution altered virtually the entire spectrum of Iranian foreign relations and led directly to a protracted war with Iraq. Although Iran faced a number of opponents under the shah, it had not been involved in a major war since 1945, and it enjoyed good relations with most of the great powers. The revolution transformed U. S. -Iranian relations from a close alignment to one of bitter enmity; undermined Iran's wary but cordial relationship with the Soviet Union; caused the severing of diplomatic relations with several European states; and alarmed and provoked the gulf states and several other re- gional powers. It is virtually impossible to imagine these destabilizing events occuHing had the shah retained his throne. Moreover, the evidence suggests that these effects occurred for most (if not all) of the reasons iden- tified in chapter 2.
The Balance ofPower
SuperpowerResponses. BecauseofIran'soilreservesandstrategiclocation, both the Uruited States and the Soviet Union viewed the revolution there in terms of its potential impact on the global balance of power. U. S. leaders feared that the fall of the shah had created a power vacuum that might be filled by the Soviet Union; indeed, some U. S. officials suspected that the So-
133 Khomeini told the Nicaraguan minister of education during the latter's visit to Iran in 1983: "Your country is very similar to our country; but ours has more difficulty. . . . We should all try to create unity among the oppressed, regardless of their ideology and creed. Other- wise, the two oppressors of East and West will infect everyone like a cancerous tumor. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 236, n. 9?
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viets had played an active role in bringing the shah down. 134 The ouster of the shah had direct strategic consequences as well, as the U. S. lost access to monitoring stations that provided intelligence data on Soviet missile tests, and U. S. officials worried that the Soviet Union might obtain secret military technology that had been sold to Iran.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 magnified these concerns. U. S. leaders saw the invasion as evidence of greater Soviet as- sertiveness: Carter warned that the invasion was "a stepping stone to possi- ble control over much of the world's oil supplies. " A U. S. Defense Department study argued that the Soviet Union might exploit the turmoil in Iran "in ordeir to seize a historical opportunity to change the worldwide bal- ance," and the United States established the so-called Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to defend its interests in Southwest Asia. 135 Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region . . . will be repelled by any means necessary. " Taken together, the "Carter doctrine" and the creation of the RDF were primarily intended to deter any Soviet attempt to exploit the power vacuum in Iran. 136
Concern for the balance of power was still evident even after it became clear the new Jregime was not pro-Soviet. For example, the American decision to provide arms to Tehran in 1985-86 was inspired by a 1985 Central Intelli- gence Agency report warning of a Soviet attempt to take advantage of Iran's "imminent" collapse. 137 Or as White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan put it, President Reagan "has this feeling, that we cannot allow Iran to fall into the
134 According to former deputy secretary of state Warren Christopher, U. S. policy makers "had to be concerned with the reality that Iran's internal divisions made it weaker and there- fore more vulnerable to Soviet opportunism. " Zbigniew Brzezinski distributed copies of a New Republic article blaming the revolution on Soviet interference among other U. S. policy makers, and former National Security Council aide Gary Sick reports that this view "found a ready audience among many policy makers in the United States and elsewhere. " CIA direc- tor Stansfield Turner stated, "I am sure that there is some Soviet influence behind it in one de- gree or another," and presidential candidate John Connolly suggested publicly that Iranian foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh was a KGB agent. See Christopher et al. , American Hostages, 2; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 277-78; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 356, 372, 379, 386, 397, 444, 451, 485-500; Sick, All Fall Down, 106; Howard Hensel, "Moscow's Perspective on the Fall of the Iranian Monarchy," Asian Affairs 14, no. 2 (1983), 154; and "Connolly Tells of Belief Ghotbzadeh is in KGB," New York Times, January 14, 1980, A13.
135 The Pentagon study also warned that Soviet conventional superiority in the region might force the United States to use nuclear weapons against a Soviet drive to the gulf. "Carter Embargoes Technology for Soviet," New York Times, January 5, 198o, A3; and "Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U. S. Atom Arms," New York Times, February 2, 198o, 1:1, 4?
136 "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times, January 24, 1980, A12. For background, see Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U. S. Strategy towards the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions," in The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulfand South Asia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Praeger, 1983), 68-76.
137 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 31o-11, and "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169, 173; and Draper, Very Thin Line, 148-51, 292-<)J
? ? ? Revolution and War
Soviet camp. " Similar motives underlay the decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and to provide a naval escort in 1987; Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger explained that failure to act "would have created a vacuum in the Gulf into which Soviet power would shortly have been projected. "138
Not surprisingly, Soviet leaders welcomed the collapse of an important U. S. ally, although they were also concerned that instability and chaos within Iran might force the United States and its allies to take military action, thereby bringing Western military forces up against the Soviet border. Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev issued an explicit warning against foreign inter- vention in Iran in November 1978, and the message was repeated on several subsequent occasions. 139 Soviet pronouncements and propaganda broadcasts repeatedly spoke of "American interference" and reminded Iranians of the dangers that Western intervention would pose for them, but these obviously self-serving efforts had little impact on Soviet relations with Iran.
140
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action. The fear of a Soviet re- sponse clearly inhibited the United States during the hostage crisis, for ex- ample, and the Soviets did nothing to aid the leftist Islamic Mujahedin and Tudeh Party as they were being decimated by the Islamic Republican Party. 141 The Iranians seemed to be well aware of the benefits they derived from this bitpolar stalemate, correctly inferring that each superpower would help protect them from the other. 142
Regional Responses. The effects of the revolution on the balance of power within the region were even more profound. Before the shah's departure, for
138 Quotations from Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169; and Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Influence," 37?
139 Brezhnev's first warning stated that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union, would be regarded by the Sovieft Union as a matter affecting its security interests. " Quoted in Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1988), no. After the U. S. attempt to res- cue the embassy hostages, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko declared, "We are against all measures of a military, or generally forcible, nature on the part of the United States or any- one else against Iran. " Similarly, Brezhnev declared, "We are not going to intervene . . . [in the Iran-Iraq war]. And we resolutely say to others: Hands off these events. " Quoted in Yodfaft, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 77-'79, 92.
140 See Hensel, "Moscow's Perspectives," 156-57; Dennis Ross, "Soviet Views towards the Gulf War," Orbis 28, no. 3 (1984), 438-39; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilem- mas," Problems ofCommunism 33, no. 1 (1981).
141 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 488-89, 493-94; Salinger, America Held Hostage, 106; and Gary Sick, "Military Options and Constraints," in Christopher et a! . , American Hostages in Iran, 15o-55.
142 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 58-59.
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example, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared that "the Arab states will have to support Iran and the Shah, because the stability of that country is important to the [entire] region . . . and any radical change will upset its secu- rity balance. "143 The conservative oil monarchies also worried that shah's de- parture would tilt the regional balance in favor of radical or pro-Soviet forces. Similar concerns were evident in Israel, which provided direct aid to the Is- lamic Republic despite its overtly anti-Zionist rhetoric. For Israel, Iran was still an effective cotmter to the more immediate threat it faced from states such as
Iraq, and aiding the Iranian war effort was consistent with the same balance- of-power strategy that had inspired Israel's tacit alliance with the shah. 144
The revolution's impact on the regional balance of power was also appar- ent in Iraq's decision to invade Iran in September 1980. The apparent weak- ness and vulnerability created by the revolution was not the only reason Iraq attacked, but it was clearly a central factor in its calculations. Thus, the Iraqi invasion was a direct response to the window of opportunity created by the revolution, even if that window turned out to be smaller than Sad- dam Hussein expected. 145
Finally, although Khomeini criticized the state system as an illegitimate human invention and welcomed Iran's isolation from other states, the Is- lamic Republic was not immune from the competitive pressures of balance- of-power politics. Although Baathist Iraq was condemned as an atheistic state, Baathist Syria had become Iran's principal ally by 1982. Indeed, the pressure of war convinced Iran to purchase arms from a diverse array of suppliers-including Israel and the United States-solely for the purpose of improving its military capabilities. This does not deny ideology's effect on
Iran's foreign policy, but it does suggest that external constraints set limits on the regime's ideological purity.
Thus, the effects of the revolution on the balance of power exacerbated the security competition between Iran and a number of other states and were an important cause of the war between Iran and Iraq.
Perceptions ofIntent
The fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and its replacement by the Islamic Repub- lic affected virtually every aspect of Iran's foreign policy. Whereas the shah
143 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 47?
144 On Israel's military aid to Iran, see Segev, Iranian Triangle; Cordesman, Gulfand Searchfor Stability, 717; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504; and Hiro, Longest War, 1 18.
145 See John W. Amos II, "The Iran-Iraq War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East," in GulfSecurity in the 19Bos: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions, ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus (Stanford, Calif. : HooverInstitutePress, 1984), 58-60; Jack Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization ofWarfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985), 137-39?
? ? Revolution and War
. ad been oriented toward the West and closely allied with the United States,
he Islamic Republic was suspicious of both. Whereas the shah had main- rained cordial if guarded relations with the Soviet Union, Khomeini viewed it as the "lesser Satan," condemned its atheistic ideology, and denounced its invasion of Afghanistan. The shah had supported Israel and the conserva- tive gulf states and opposed the radical Arab regimes; by contrast, the Is- lamic Rep1lbl lic broke diplomatic relations with Israel, aided efforts to overthrow the gulf states, and aligned itself with Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and later Sudan. And where the shah's objectives vis-a-vis Iraq were limited (he sought to dominate the region but did not try to overthrow the Iraqi regime), revolutionary Iran was calling for the ouster of the Baath even be- fore the war began.
These changes cannot be explained solely by shifts in the balance of power. They were also products of the radically different worldview that in- spired the revolution itself. Apart from its specifically Islamic content, the ideology of revolutionary Iran arose from hostility to the shah and his poli- cies, especially to his pro-Western orientation. It is not surprising that the new regime therefore took steps that alarmed Iran's former allies.
Iran's foreign relations also support the hypothesis that revolutionary states are especially prone to spirals of hostility. In particular, both sides tended to take the very dimmest view of each other's actions and dis- counted the possibility that their own behavior might be responsible for the opposition they were facing.
As one would expect, the tendency to spiral was most apparent in Iran's diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. Although both the Bazargan govern- ment and the Carter administration seemed genuinely interested in estab- lishing a new relationship after the shah's departure, relations between the United States and Iran soon deteriorated into a web of mutual suspicions. Throughout this period, each side's defensive responses and hostile infer- ences were reinforced by insensitive or unwitting actions by the other. 146 In the spring of 1979, for example, Iranian fears of a military coup inspired a series of purges and executions by the Revolutionary Courts, prompting the U. S. Senate to pass a condemnatory resolution. This action in turn derailed
an attempt to establish direct contact with Khomeini (who greeted the Sen- ate resolution by calling the United States a "defeated and wounded
146 In February 1979, Carter stated that the United States would "honor the will of the Iran- ian people" and expresdse his willingness to "work closely with the existing government of Iran. " Foreign Minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran still sought "friendly relations" with the United States, in the context of Iran's new policy of nonalignment. The United States agreed to resume military shipments to Iran in October, and Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi (who had replaced Sanjavi in April) expressed their own hope that relations "would soon take a turn for the better. " See Menashri, Iran, 97; and Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of Iran," 16-17.
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? The Iranian Revolution
snake") and sparked mass demonstrations in Iran denouncing U. S. interfer- ence. The U. S. decision to permit the shah to enter the country for medical treatment in October angered the Iranian revolutionaries and raised new fears of a U. S. plot to place him back upon the throne; together, these events confirmed Iranian images of American aggressiveness and discredited the mote moderate forces, thereby helping the more extreme forces consolidate their control. r. 47 On the other side, the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the prolonged detention of the hostages cemented U. S. hostility and solidified perceptions of Iran as a fanatical and dangerous regime. 148
However, each side's interpretation was at least partly mistaken. Con- trary to Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed counterrevolution, the United States had no intention of trying to restore the terminally ill shah; he had been per- mitted to enter the United States only after repeated requests from influen- tial individuals such as David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. 149 And contrary to the U. S. image of unlimited Iranian bellicosity, the seizure of the embassy was inspired as much by conflicts within Iran as by an overt desire to harm the United States. 150 Although serious differences did exist, there- fore, probably neither side was as aggressive as the other believed it to be.
Subsequent episodes heightened each side's paranoia. The abortive hostage rescue mission in April 1980 confirmed Iranian fears of U. S. military intervention and revealed that the United States still possessed an extensive intelligence network within their country, thereby reinforcing Iranian fears of U. S. -backed plots. 151 The trade embargo and the U. S. tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war only strengthened the impression of U. S. aggression. To the extent that Iranians failed to recognize the role of their own actions in pro- voking these responses, they were more likely to view U. S. policy as evi- dence of innate U. S. hostility. Similarly, Americans who were unfamiliar with the history of U. S. involvement in Iran or who saw the prior U. S. role as ben- eficial would be inclined to consider Iranian actions as unjustifiedly hostile.
147 Prior to his return to Iran, Khomeini warned that "America is an accessory" to the shah, and he later ded? red, "We will not let the United States bring back the Shah. This is what the Shah wants. Wake up. Watch out. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 315, 134-37. Meetings between U. S. general Robert Huyser and a group of Iranian military officers in Jan- uary 1979 probably intensified Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed coup. See Sick, All Fall Down, 131-32; Menashri, Iran, 97-98, 1 14, 146-47; and Wright, In the Name ofGod, 75-76.
148 In February 1979, a Gallup poll reported that 64 percent of all Americans held an "unfa- vorable" image of Iran, 21 percent expressed the most extreme negative rating, and 12 percent offered a mildly favorable view. In an identical poll taken after the seizure of the embassy, 90 percent reported an "unfavorable" image, with 6o percent giving Iran the most extreme nega- tive rating. Gallup Opinion Index, no. 169 (August 1979), 41, and no. 176 (March 1980), 29.
149 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 321-40; and Sick, All Fall Down, 179"-81.
150 On the role of Iranian domestic politics in the seizure of the embassy, see Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 136-39; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 74-81; Sick, All Fall Down, 198-205; Abra- hamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 57; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 139-40.
151 See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 154-56, 319-20; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 302. [255]
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Even worse, gestures of accommodation tended to backfire, because they were seen as nefarious attempts to reestablish U. S. influence. For example, the premature U. S. effort to cultivate moderate forces after the shah's depar- ture merely discredited these leaders and reinforced the radicals' belief that the United States was still trying to pull strings behind the scenes. Thus, Brzezinski's meeting with Bazargan in November 1979 helped force the lat- ter's resngnation, and Bani-Sadr's efforts to resolve the hostage crisis played a key role in discrediting him in the eyes of Khomeini and the clerics. This problem was exacerbated by the Iranians' fondness for conspiracy theories, which created fertile ground for the notion that the United States was still able manipulate events in Iran at will. 152 As a result, Iran blamed the United States for the assassinations of several leading clerics, the Iraqi invasion, and the activities of counterrevolutionary groups such as the Islamic Muja- hedin. 153 These accusations were either without foundation or greatly exag- gerated, but insofar as they reflected sincere Iranian beliefs rather than mere propaganda, they provide additional evidence of spiral dynamics at work. 154
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S. trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations.
121 The former Iranian ambassador to I. e. banon said in 1984 that "since the Republic of Lebanon does not have much power, there is no serious obstacle in the way" of an Islamic revolution. Quoted in Zonis and Brumberg, Khomeini, . Jran, Arab World, 61.
? 122 See Norton, "Lebanon," 13<r-33; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 126.
123 Accordingtonewsreports,RafsanjanipromisedtosupplySudanwithfreeoil,sellitarms, and send Revolutionary Guards to aid the government's efforts against the rebel movements in
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Iran and Sudan are believed to have aided the election campaign of the Is- lamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1992, and National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi repeatedly referred to a global Islamic resurgence based on "the experiences of Iran in heart of Asia, Sudan in the heart of Africa, and Al- geria which is very near to the European continent. " 124 Together with the rise of fundamentalism in Egypt and Algeria, these events sparked renewed fears
of a rising Islamic tide posing an ominous threat to the West. 125
Although the growth of Islamic fundamentalism clearly merits careful at- tention from Middle Eastern governments and their foreign allies, this phe- nomenon should not be seen as the emergence of an "Islamic monolith" or as a case where a revolution was successfully exported. In the first place, most contemporary Islamic movements predate the revolution in Iran, and their growing popularity is due more to indigenous trends than to the trans- mission of revolutionary ideas from Tehran. This qualification is especially true of Sudan-the only other regime that openly espouses fundamentalist principles-where the process of Islamization was not the result of a mass
revolution. On the contrary, the Islamization campaign was begun by Jifar Nimeiri (a former general who seized power in the early 1970s) and com- pleted following his ouster by a military coup in 1989. 126 Similar obser- vations apply to North Africa as well. According to Fran\ois Burgat, "Khomeinism was . . . not responsible for the creation of the Islamist move- ment" and none of his successors "could be considered to be the conductor of an Islamic orchestra responding to his solicitations. "127 Although the
? the south. See Middle East International, no. 418 (February 7, 1992), 18-19; and "Fundamentalism Alters the Middle East's Power Relationships," New York Times, August 22, 1993, 4:1.
124 See Middle East International, no. 416 (January 10, 1992), 7-8; no. 418 (February 7, 1992), 1? 18; no. 421 (March20, 1992), 17-18; no. 465, (December 17, 1993), 13; and MECS 1991, 183-84. 125 In 1993, an unnamed U. S. official warned, "From the Iranian point of view, Sudan is strategically located: south to Africa, north and west to Egypt and North Africa. It gives the Iranians a strategic toehold, which can help promote its revolutionary cause in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan itself, and south. " Quoted in "Fundamentalism Alters the Middle East's Power Relationships. " For other examples of Western alarmism about the rise of Is- lamic fundamentalism, seeJohn L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1992), chap. 6. For a predictably extreme assessment by a member of the Iranian opposition, see Mohammed Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat (Washington, D. C. : Seven Locks Press, 1993); for a critique, see Leon Hadar, "What Green Peril? " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (1993).
126 According to John 0. Voll, "the Iranian revolution seems to have had little direct impact on Sudan. The basic developments of Islamization and Islamic revivalism . . . during the 1970s and 1980s were primarily shaped by the long traditions of Sudanese history. . . . The re- lationship between Sudan's Islamization program and the Iranian revolution tends to dis- prove the hypotheses that view the Islamic resurgence as a tightly bound network of events or even some form of international conspiracy. " "Islamization in the Sudan and the Iranian Revolution," in Esposito, Iranian Revolution, 283, 288.
127 See Fran? ois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, Tex. : Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993), 3? 37? According to G. H. Jansen, "the Irani-
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Egyptian and Tunisian governments have repeatedly accused Iran of sup- porting the Islamic radicals, their statements have clearly been intended to encourage foreign support and to provide a scapegoat for their own fail- ures. Such reports should not be dismissed entirely, perhaps, but they should be discounted. 128
The belief that Islamic fundamentalism is a unified movement directed or inspired by Iran also ignores the considerable diversity among the various fundamentalist groups. The Iranian revolution was conducted by Shiite Muslim Persians, while the other Islamic movements are led by Sunni Arabs. None of the Sunni movements have embraced Khomeini's doctrine of ve- layet-e faqih, and their specific political programs differ significantly as well. 129 Among other things, this diversity suggests that, should additional
"Islamic" movements gain power in other countries, they are as likely to quarrel over the "correct" form of Islamic government as to cooperate in a jihad against the West.
Furthermore, despite the many problems that presently afflict a number of Middle Eastern governments, they have been able to contain the Islamic challenge through a combination of cooptation, repression, and external support. 130 If the revolution in Iran helped inspire fundamentalists else- where, it also gave fair warning to potential victims and encouraged them to join forces against the perceived danger. Although the more extreme movements have responded with violent campaigns against government officials and Western tourists and business interests, none of these regimes had fallen as of mid-1995. Iran has had more than fifteen years in which to
replicate its own revolution; the ability of regimes as fragile, corrupt, and economically troubled as Egypt and Algeria to resist its efforts is compelling
ans may even flatter themselves that the Algerians are only following the Iranian example, but that would not be true. . . . If there has been any outside influence in Algeria it has come from Saudi Arabia. " See Middle East International, no. 416 Oanuary 10, 1992}, 8.
128 One recent congressional study noted that although Tunisian leaders blamed the rise of fundamentalist attacks on the "Tehran-Khartoum-Tunis axis," "no evidence has been re- leased that these attacks were part of a 'Fundamentalism International' conspiracy to take power in Tunisia. " George Pickard, The Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the Middle East, a Re- port to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 103d Congress, 1st sess. (Washing- ton, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 12. See also Middle East International, no. 417 aanuary 24, 1992), 5-6.
129 See Bassam Tibi, "The Iranian Revolution and the Arabs: The Quest for Islamic Iden- tity and the Search for an Islamic System of Government," Arab Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1986).
130 When the Islamic Salvation Front gained a majority in first stage of the December 1991 elections, the Algerian Army promptly canceled the second stage and began a brutal cam- paign against the Algerian fundamentalists. A similar campaign in Tunisia resulted in the ar- rest and sentencing of three hundred members of the main fundamentalist party in August 1992.
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
evidence of the advantages even weak states possess when facing a revolu- tionary challenge. 131
To be sure, the revolution in Iran did inspire fundamentalist groups in a number of other Muslim societies, primarily by demonstrating that a movement based on Islamic principles could overthrow a seemingly im- pregnable regime. As in the French and Bolshevik cases, however, success in one context did not lead to rapid triumphs elsewhere. Most important of all, the claim that the revolution in Iran "caused" sympathetic upheavals elsewhere is almost certainly spurious; instead, it is merely one part of a much broader political process whose ultimate outcomes will take many forms.
Iran's Arab Allies. Although the revolution left Iran isolated from most of its neighbors, it did establish close alignments with a number of other "rad- ical" states. The Syrian-Iranian relationship was probably the most impor- tant for the first decade after the revolution-an alignment based almost entirely on realpolitik. Despite serious ideological differences, the two states were united by their mutual antipathy to Iraq, Israel, and the United States. Syria backed Iran during the hostage crisis, provided modest amounts of Soviet weaponry from its own stockpiles, and aided the Kurdish insurgents within Iraq itself. Syria also shut down Iraq's oil pipelines in 1982, and it and Iran joined forces to support the Islamic fundamentalists in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Although President Hafez al-Assad still referred to Syria's alignment with Iran as "strategic" in 1986 and President Khameni described the relationship as "profound" and "brotherly" the following year, Syrian-
Iranian ties were strained when Syria began to favor the more moderate Lebanese Shiite faction, Amal, over Hezbollah. The end of the Iran-Iraq war reduced the value of the Syrian-Iranian alignment, and Syria subsequently refused to allow Iran to send additional Revolutionary Guards and a ship- ment of arms to Lebanon in January 1990. Syria also joined the UN coalition against Iraq in the wake of the latter's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (a move that Iran regarded with misgivings), but relations between Tehran and Damascus remain cordial at present. 132
Iran also enjoyed good relations with Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen for most of the 198os, based primarily on their mutual opposition to the United States and Israel. Algeria also served as the principal intermediary with the United States during the hostage crisis, but relations deteriorated sharply
131 See F. Gregory Gause III, "Revolutionary Fevers and Regional Contagion: Domestic Structures and the Export of Revolution in Middle East," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (1991).
132 See Yosef Olmert, "lranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and Muslim World, 172--'75; Ramazani, Revolu tionary Iran, 81-82; "Chronology," ME] 40, no. 4 (1986), 699; MECS 1987, 419; 1989, 367.
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after the Algerian government voided the results of the 1991 elections and launched a major crackdown on the fundamentalist movement. The Islamic Republic also established cordial diplomatic relations with a number of rev- olutionary movements and Third World states during its first decade, being particularly friendly toward radical states such as Nicaragua, Cuba, and North Korea. 133 These policies, which were consistent with Khomeini's com- mitment to protecting the "oppressed" peoples against great-power domi- nance, confirm that Iran's postrevolutionary foreign policy had made a decisive break with the policies of the old regime.
CONCLUSIONS: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND BALANCE-OF-THREAT THEORY
The independent impact of revolutions on the level of security competi- tion is probably most apparent in the Iranian case. The revolution altered virtually the entire spectrum of Iranian foreign relations and led directly to a protracted war with Iraq. Although Iran faced a number of opponents under the shah, it had not been involved in a major war since 1945, and it enjoyed good relations with most of the great powers. The revolution transformed U. S. -Iranian relations from a close alignment to one of bitter enmity; undermined Iran's wary but cordial relationship with the Soviet Union; caused the severing of diplomatic relations with several European states; and alarmed and provoked the gulf states and several other re- gional powers. It is virtually impossible to imagine these destabilizing events occuHing had the shah retained his throne. Moreover, the evidence suggests that these effects occurred for most (if not all) of the reasons iden- tified in chapter 2.
The Balance ofPower
SuperpowerResponses. BecauseofIran'soilreservesandstrategiclocation, both the Uruited States and the Soviet Union viewed the revolution there in terms of its potential impact on the global balance of power. U. S. leaders feared that the fall of the shah had created a power vacuum that might be filled by the Soviet Union; indeed, some U. S. officials suspected that the So-
133 Khomeini told the Nicaraguan minister of education during the latter's visit to Iran in 1983: "Your country is very similar to our country; but ours has more difficulty. . . . We should all try to create unity among the oppressed, regardless of their ideology and creed. Other- wise, the two oppressors of East and West will infect everyone like a cancerous tumor. " Quoted in Hunter, Iran and the World, 236, n. 9?
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viets had played an active role in bringing the shah down. 134 The ouster of the shah had direct strategic consequences as well, as the U. S. lost access to monitoring stations that provided intelligence data on Soviet missile tests, and U. S. officials worried that the Soviet Union might obtain secret military technology that had been sold to Iran.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 magnified these concerns. U. S. leaders saw the invasion as evidence of greater Soviet as- sertiveness: Carter warned that the invasion was "a stepping stone to possi- ble control over much of the world's oil supplies. " A U. S. Defense Department study argued that the Soviet Union might exploit the turmoil in Iran "in ordeir to seize a historical opportunity to change the worldwide bal- ance," and the United States established the so-called Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to defend its interests in Southwest Asia. 135 Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region . . . will be repelled by any means necessary. " Taken together, the "Carter doctrine" and the creation of the RDF were primarily intended to deter any Soviet attempt to exploit the power vacuum in Iran. 136
Concern for the balance of power was still evident even after it became clear the new Jregime was not pro-Soviet. For example, the American decision to provide arms to Tehran in 1985-86 was inspired by a 1985 Central Intelli- gence Agency report warning of a Soviet attempt to take advantage of Iran's "imminent" collapse. 137 Or as White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan put it, President Reagan "has this feeling, that we cannot allow Iran to fall into the
134 According to former deputy secretary of state Warren Christopher, U. S. policy makers "had to be concerned with the reality that Iran's internal divisions made it weaker and there- fore more vulnerable to Soviet opportunism. " Zbigniew Brzezinski distributed copies of a New Republic article blaming the revolution on Soviet interference among other U. S. policy makers, and former National Security Council aide Gary Sick reports that this view "found a ready audience among many policy makers in the United States and elsewhere. " CIA direc- tor Stansfield Turner stated, "I am sure that there is some Soviet influence behind it in one de- gree or another," and presidential candidate John Connolly suggested publicly that Iranian foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh was a KGB agent. See Christopher et al. , American Hostages, 2; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 277-78; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 356, 372, 379, 386, 397, 444, 451, 485-500; Sick, All Fall Down, 106; Howard Hensel, "Moscow's Perspective on the Fall of the Iranian Monarchy," Asian Affairs 14, no. 2 (1983), 154; and "Connolly Tells of Belief Ghotbzadeh is in KGB," New York Times, January 14, 1980, A13.
135 The Pentagon study also warned that Soviet conventional superiority in the region might force the United States to use nuclear weapons against a Soviet drive to the gulf. "Carter Embargoes Technology for Soviet," New York Times, January 5, 198o, A3; and "Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U. S. Atom Arms," New York Times, February 2, 198o, 1:1, 4?
136 "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times, January 24, 1980, A12. For background, see Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U. S. Strategy towards the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions," in The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulfand South Asia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Praeger, 1983), 68-76.
137 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 31o-11, and "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169, 173; and Draper, Very Thin Line, 148-51, 292-<)J
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Soviet camp. " Similar motives underlay the decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and to provide a naval escort in 1987; Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger explained that failure to act "would have created a vacuum in the Gulf into which Soviet power would shortly have been projected. "138
Not surprisingly, Soviet leaders welcomed the collapse of an important U. S. ally, although they were also concerned that instability and chaos within Iran might force the United States and its allies to take military action, thereby bringing Western military forces up against the Soviet border. Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev issued an explicit warning against foreign inter- vention in Iran in November 1978, and the message was repeated on several subsequent occasions. 139 Soviet pronouncements and propaganda broadcasts repeatedly spoke of "American interference" and reminded Iranians of the dangers that Western intervention would pose for them, but these obviously self-serving efforts had little impact on Soviet relations with Iran.
140
Paradoxically, although both superpowers were concerned that the revo- lution in Iran might tempt the other to intervene, they were aware that such a step might provoke a major confrontation, and this knowledge probably discouraged either party from taking direct action. The fear of a Soviet re- sponse clearly inhibited the United States during the hostage crisis, for ex- ample, and the Soviets did nothing to aid the leftist Islamic Mujahedin and Tudeh Party as they were being decimated by the Islamic Republican Party. 141 The Iranians seemed to be well aware of the benefits they derived from this bitpolar stalemate, correctly inferring that each superpower would help protect them from the other. 142
Regional Responses. The effects of the revolution on the balance of power within the region were even more profound. Before the shah's departure, for
138 Quotations from Bill, "U. S. Overture to Iran," 169; and Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to U. S. Influence," 37?
139 Brezhnev's first warning stated that "any interference, especially military, in the affairs of Iran, a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union, would be regarded by the Sovieft Union as a matter affecting its security interests. " Quoted in Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1988), no. After the U. S. attempt to res- cue the embassy hostages, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko declared, "We are against all measures of a military, or generally forcible, nature on the part of the United States or any- one else against Iran. " Similarly, Brezhnev declared, "We are not going to intervene . . . [in the Iran-Iraq war]. And we resolutely say to others: Hands off these events. " Quoted in Yodfaft, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 77-'79, 92.
140 See Hensel, "Moscow's Perspectives," 156-57; Dennis Ross, "Soviet Views towards the Gulf War," Orbis 28, no. 3 (1984), 438-39; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilem- mas," Problems ofCommunism 33, no. 1 (1981).
141 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 488-89, 493-94; Salinger, America Held Hostage, 106; and Gary Sick, "Military Options and Constraints," in Christopher et a! . , American Hostages in Iran, 15o-55.
142 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 58-59.
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example, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared that "the Arab states will have to support Iran and the Shah, because the stability of that country is important to the [entire] region . . . and any radical change will upset its secu- rity balance. "143 The conservative oil monarchies also worried that shah's de- parture would tilt the regional balance in favor of radical or pro-Soviet forces. Similar concerns were evident in Israel, which provided direct aid to the Is- lamic Republic despite its overtly anti-Zionist rhetoric. For Israel, Iran was still an effective cotmter to the more immediate threat it faced from states such as
Iraq, and aiding the Iranian war effort was consistent with the same balance- of-power strategy that had inspired Israel's tacit alliance with the shah. 144
The revolution's impact on the regional balance of power was also appar- ent in Iraq's decision to invade Iran in September 1980. The apparent weak- ness and vulnerability created by the revolution was not the only reason Iraq attacked, but it was clearly a central factor in its calculations. Thus, the Iraqi invasion was a direct response to the window of opportunity created by the revolution, even if that window turned out to be smaller than Sad- dam Hussein expected. 145
Finally, although Khomeini criticized the state system as an illegitimate human invention and welcomed Iran's isolation from other states, the Is- lamic Republic was not immune from the competitive pressures of balance- of-power politics. Although Baathist Iraq was condemned as an atheistic state, Baathist Syria had become Iran's principal ally by 1982. Indeed, the pressure of war convinced Iran to purchase arms from a diverse array of suppliers-including Israel and the United States-solely for the purpose of improving its military capabilities. This does not deny ideology's effect on
Iran's foreign policy, but it does suggest that external constraints set limits on the regime's ideological purity.
Thus, the effects of the revolution on the balance of power exacerbated the security competition between Iran and a number of other states and were an important cause of the war between Iran and Iraq.
Perceptions ofIntent
The fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and its replacement by the Islamic Repub- lic affected virtually every aspect of Iran's foreign policy. Whereas the shah
143 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 47?
144 On Israel's military aid to Iran, see Segev, Iranian Triangle; Cordesman, Gulfand Searchfor Stability, 717; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504; and Hiro, Longest War, 1 18.
145 See John W. Amos II, "The Iran-Iraq War: Conflict, Linkage, and Spillover in the Middle East," in GulfSecurity in the 19Bos: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions, ed. Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus (Stanford, Calif. : HooverInstitutePress, 1984), 58-60; Jack Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization ofWarfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985), 137-39?
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. ad been oriented toward the West and closely allied with the United States,
he Islamic Republic was suspicious of both. Whereas the shah had main- rained cordial if guarded relations with the Soviet Union, Khomeini viewed it as the "lesser Satan," condemned its atheistic ideology, and denounced its invasion of Afghanistan. The shah had supported Israel and the conserva- tive gulf states and opposed the radical Arab regimes; by contrast, the Is- lamic Rep1lbl lic broke diplomatic relations with Israel, aided efforts to overthrow the gulf states, and aligned itself with Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and later Sudan. And where the shah's objectives vis-a-vis Iraq were limited (he sought to dominate the region but did not try to overthrow the Iraqi regime), revolutionary Iran was calling for the ouster of the Baath even be- fore the war began.
These changes cannot be explained solely by shifts in the balance of power. They were also products of the radically different worldview that in- spired the revolution itself. Apart from its specifically Islamic content, the ideology of revolutionary Iran arose from hostility to the shah and his poli- cies, especially to his pro-Western orientation. It is not surprising that the new regime therefore took steps that alarmed Iran's former allies.
Iran's foreign relations also support the hypothesis that revolutionary states are especially prone to spirals of hostility. In particular, both sides tended to take the very dimmest view of each other's actions and dis- counted the possibility that their own behavior might be responsible for the opposition they were facing.
As one would expect, the tendency to spiral was most apparent in Iran's diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. Although both the Bazargan govern- ment and the Carter administration seemed genuinely interested in estab- lishing a new relationship after the shah's departure, relations between the United States and Iran soon deteriorated into a web of mutual suspicions. Throughout this period, each side's defensive responses and hostile infer- ences were reinforced by insensitive or unwitting actions by the other. 146 In the spring of 1979, for example, Iranian fears of a military coup inspired a series of purges and executions by the Revolutionary Courts, prompting the U. S. Senate to pass a condemnatory resolution. This action in turn derailed
an attempt to establish direct contact with Khomeini (who greeted the Sen- ate resolution by calling the United States a "defeated and wounded
146 In February 1979, Carter stated that the United States would "honor the will of the Iran- ian people" and expresdse his willingness to "work closely with the existing government of Iran. " Foreign Minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran still sought "friendly relations" with the United States, in the context of Iran's new policy of nonalignment. The United States agreed to resume military shipments to Iran in October, and Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi (who had replaced Sanjavi in April) expressed their own hope that relations "would soon take a turn for the better. " See Menashri, Iran, 97; and Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of Iran," 16-17.
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? The Iranian Revolution
snake") and sparked mass demonstrations in Iran denouncing U. S. interfer- ence. The U. S. decision to permit the shah to enter the country for medical treatment in October angered the Iranian revolutionaries and raised new fears of a U. S. plot to place him back upon the throne; together, these events confirmed Iranian images of American aggressiveness and discredited the mote moderate forces, thereby helping the more extreme forces consolidate their control. r. 47 On the other side, the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the prolonged detention of the hostages cemented U. S. hostility and solidified perceptions of Iran as a fanatical and dangerous regime. 148
However, each side's interpretation was at least partly mistaken. Con- trary to Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed counterrevolution, the United States had no intention of trying to restore the terminally ill shah; he had been per- mitted to enter the United States only after repeated requests from influen- tial individuals such as David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. 149 And contrary to the U. S. image of unlimited Iranian bellicosity, the seizure of the embassy was inspired as much by conflicts within Iran as by an overt desire to harm the United States. 150 Although serious differences did exist, there- fore, probably neither side was as aggressive as the other believed it to be.
Subsequent episodes heightened each side's paranoia. The abortive hostage rescue mission in April 1980 confirmed Iranian fears of U. S. military intervention and revealed that the United States still possessed an extensive intelligence network within their country, thereby reinforcing Iranian fears of U. S. -backed plots. 151 The trade embargo and the U. S. tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war only strengthened the impression of U. S. aggression. To the extent that Iranians failed to recognize the role of their own actions in pro- voking these responses, they were more likely to view U. S. policy as evi- dence of innate U. S. hostility. Similarly, Americans who were unfamiliar with the history of U. S. involvement in Iran or who saw the prior U. S. role as ben- eficial would be inclined to consider Iranian actions as unjustifiedly hostile.
147 Prior to his return to Iran, Khomeini warned that "America is an accessory" to the shah, and he later ded? red, "We will not let the United States bring back the Shah. This is what the Shah wants. Wake up. Watch out. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 315, 134-37. Meetings between U. S. general Robert Huyser and a group of Iranian military officers in Jan- uary 1979 probably intensified Iranian fears of a U. S. -backed coup. See Sick, All Fall Down, 131-32; Menashri, Iran, 97-98, 1 14, 146-47; and Wright, In the Name ofGod, 75-76.
148 In February 1979, a Gallup poll reported that 64 percent of all Americans held an "unfa- vorable" image of Iran, 21 percent expressed the most extreme negative rating, and 12 percent offered a mildly favorable view. In an identical poll taken after the seizure of the embassy, 90 percent reported an "unfavorable" image, with 6o percent giving Iran the most extreme nega- tive rating. Gallup Opinion Index, no. 169 (August 1979), 41, and no. 176 (March 1980), 29.
149 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 321-40; and Sick, All Fall Down, 179"-81.
150 On the role of Iranian domestic politics in the seizure of the embassy, see Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 136-39; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 74-81; Sick, All Fall Down, 198-205; Abra- hamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 57; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 139-40.
151 See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 154-56, 319-20; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 302. [255]
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Even worse, gestures of accommodation tended to backfire, because they were seen as nefarious attempts to reestablish U. S. influence. For example, the premature U. S. effort to cultivate moderate forces after the shah's depar- ture merely discredited these leaders and reinforced the radicals' belief that the United States was still trying to pull strings behind the scenes. Thus, Brzezinski's meeting with Bazargan in November 1979 helped force the lat- ter's resngnation, and Bani-Sadr's efforts to resolve the hostage crisis played a key role in discrediting him in the eyes of Khomeini and the clerics. This problem was exacerbated by the Iranians' fondness for conspiracy theories, which created fertile ground for the notion that the United States was still able manipulate events in Iran at will. 152 As a result, Iran blamed the United States for the assassinations of several leading clerics, the Iraqi invasion, and the activities of counterrevolutionary groups such as the Islamic Muja- hedin. 153 These accusations were either without foundation or greatly exag- gerated, but insofar as they reflected sincere Iranian beliefs rather than mere propaganda, they provide additional evidence of spiral dynamics at work. 154
Lastly, the climate of suspicion and hostility between the United States and Iran made improving relations especially difficult. The United States did make conciliatory gestures on occasion, but the bulk of U. S. policy was hostile (for example, its support for the gulf states and the Iranian exiles, its efforts to deny Iran arms, and its gradual tilt towards Iraq). Not surpris- ingly, actions contrary to Iranian interests were seen as evidence of true U. S. preferences, while less harmful ones appeared as signs of U. S. duplicilfy. Thus, when the Senate passed a resolution condemning the executions lby the Revolutionary Courts (an action that ran counter to the Carter adminis- tration's efforts to reach a modus vivendi with Iran), the clerics saw it as a direct challenge to the new regime. In the same way, when Rafsanjani a111. d other moderates recognized that Iran was partly responsible for its own iso- lation, their efforts to cooperate with the United States in the Iran-contra arms deal were thwarted by extremists within Iran and by the incompetent bungling of the U. S. officials responsible for the initiative. 155 Because inter-
? 152 On this pervasive Iranian tendency, see Abrahamian, Khomeinism, chap. 5; Sick, All Fall Down, 33-34, 48, 346 n. 4; Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 16-17; Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 1 2? 30; and Salinger, America Held Hostage, 7o-71 .
153 Infact,U. S. officialswereupsetbytheIraqiinvasionbecauseitinterruptednegotiations for the release of the U. S. hostages. See Sick, All Fall Down, 320; Jordan, Crisis, 347; Christo- pher et al, American Hostages in Iran, 306; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 57; and Bani- Sadr, My Turn to Speak, 70, 76.
154 Iran's suspicions were sometimes justified, as the United States did provide modest lev- els of aid to the mujahedin after they had been driven into exile and tilted toward Iraq in 19B2. These decisions are consistent with the logic of spiraling: the U. S. was responding to Iraruan behavior, but Iran interpreted its acts as evidence of intrinsic hostility rather than as a defen- sive reaction.
155 Among other things, the mishandling of the first arms shipment in November 1985 (in which the U. S. sent Iran an obsolete version of the Hawk missile) and Oliver North's decision
? ? The Iranian Revolution
nal disagreements on both sides made bridging the divide politically risky, attempts to "unwind" the spiral were confined to unofficial channels and unreliable intermediaries, whose deceptive conduct did nothing to dispel the mutual lack of trust.
Iran's relations with a number of other states indicate spiraling as well, al- though it is often difficult to distinguish between the results legitimate con- flicts of interest and the effects of misperception. The Soviet Union was no more successful in shedding its satanic image than the United States, and Iran accused it of supporting Kurdish rebels and the Tudeh Party and re- peatedly criticized Soviet support for Iraq. There was obviously some basis for each of these charges, but the tendency of Iranian leaders to equate the two superpowers suggests that they did not fully grasp the Soviet Union's genuine desire to improve relations.
Diplomacy with Britain and France also combined elements of spiraling with legitimate perceptions of hostility. On the one hand, there were very real conflicts of interest between these states and revolutionary Iran, based on six factors: Iran's support for terrorist activities on British and French soil; the kidnapping of British and French citizens by pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon; the attacks on British citizens in Iran by members of the Revolutionary Guards; British and French arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; French willingness to provide asylum for Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and the leaders of the mujahedin; and European support for the U. S. -backed trade embargo during the hostage crisis. On the other hand, British and French moderation toward
Iran (most clearly revealed by their halfhearted participation in the U. S. trade embargo and Britain's willingness to permit Iran to conduct its private arms dealings through an office in London) failed to lead to cordial relations.
