"
Therefore
the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
Summa Theologica
First in a strict
sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger,
strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly,
the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to
the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed.
It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a
passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment.
Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not
distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the [3607]FP,
Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend,
pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive
appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is
common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that
the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a
part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as
applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed
also to the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, "Thou
hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i. e. from the
proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed
them to little ones," i. e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction. " The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths
be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and
if they know of them they cannot relish them. " Hence it is written
(Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3608]Q[161], AA[2], 6),
humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true
self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for
he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an
inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to
believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite
is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently
whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to
pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings,
just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17),
"holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves. " Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of
the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general
signification, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
"love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is
in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority
over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?
Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks
by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either
when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe
it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits;
or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and
wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have. " For pride
is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue
from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not
received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through
his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of
pride.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species
of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
stated above ([3609]Q[110], A[2];[3610] Q[112]). Therefore it should
not be accounted a species of pride.
Objection 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride,
which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
excuse oneself of a sin one has committed. " Again, presumption whereby
one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do
with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently
account for the different species of pride.
Objection 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq. ] divides the uplifting of pride,
saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
deed. " Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq. ] also reckons
twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense
of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
habit. " Now these apparently are not comprised under the species
mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned
unfittingly.
On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3611]AA[1],2,3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered
in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the
good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has,
it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure
exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride,
namely "boasting of having what one has not. "
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we
have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has
from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that
which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. "
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we
have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others
and wishes to be singularly conspicuous. "
Reply to Objection 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways.
First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is
a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their
merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to
unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast
of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own
merits.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what
he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is
reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he
has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good
of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above
one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists
in wishing to be preferred to others.
Reply to Objection 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
above ([3612]Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to "be
humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed
on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in
looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second
degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be
loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man
is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily
moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth. "
The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is
asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is
"to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the
monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to
seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe
and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed
"arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh
degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for
all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
one's sins. " The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under
difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed "deceitful
confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins
confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is
"obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness. " The eleventh degree
of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to
this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely
whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this
is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated
above with regard to humility ([3613]Q[161], A[6]).
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Whether pride is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss
on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely,
the universal sin which is pride. " Therefore if pride were a mortal
sin, so would every sin be.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of
God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence
which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to
God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride
is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime
and heavenly virtues. " Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most
evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
elect. " But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ([3614]Q[161],
A[1], ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in
so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but
according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us. "
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of
man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is
found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His
rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very
nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and
consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as
in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication
and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of
their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and
being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens
that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not
consent to them.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3615](A[2]) pride is a general
sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all
sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all
sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we
have stated to be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God,
inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule
as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established
order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins.
For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would
seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment
of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy
them. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater
good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above
(Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser
evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom.
1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men
of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously,"
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride. "
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a
mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets
inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of
virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance
or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever;
whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling
to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de
Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride
alone withstands God"; for which reason it is specially stated (James
4:6) that "God resisteth the proud. " Wherefore aversion from God and
His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins,
belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of
God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of
greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it
follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because
it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First,
on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult
is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin
diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more
grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine
says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written
(Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6,
'The proud have hidden a net for me. '] [Vulg. : 'they'] have hidden a
snare for me. " Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of
pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the
judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily
avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus.
10:9, "Why is earth and ashes proud? " and by considering God's
greatness, according to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against
God? " as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
man prides himself, according to Is. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all
the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (Is.
64:6), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous
woman. "
Reply to Objection 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is
inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of
conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins,
as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the
greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other
sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of
ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal
lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful
nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than
pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls
into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from
his abasement. "
From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to
contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be
more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to
fall into other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is the first sin of all?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For
the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De
Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done
with pride. " Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning
of . . . pride is to fall off from God. " Therefore falling away from
God precedes pride.
Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to
the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and
seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's
beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the
greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is
not the first sin.
Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality.
Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
daring.
" Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. "
I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is
essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from
God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
sins," as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating
of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief
part of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin,"
not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of
sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.
Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning
of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that
pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in
consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be
the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made
shipwreck concerning the faith. "
Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins
because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence
pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to
pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And
as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
from God. "
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
daring or brave.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion. " Now envy is
reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ([3619]Q[36], A[4]). Much more
therefore is pride a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among
the capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3620]AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be
considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds
of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a
special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the
capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
vices. " Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they
may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the
cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while
vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice,
arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but
that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?
(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?
(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one
man many were made sinners. " Now the first man's first sin is the one
by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, "And the
devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
gluttony, as appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If thou
be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. " Therefore
the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the
devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore
inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
first sin.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1
Tim. 2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says:
"The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to
touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be
like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead .
. . " Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore
man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. " Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according
to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this world. " Therefore man's
first sin was pride.
I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement
of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not
forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the
inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being
moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and
consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite
to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the
state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against
the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness
in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason.
It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human
appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good.
Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according
to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that
man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his
measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's
first sin was pride.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not
willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned
God's commands. "
Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was
good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she
took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. " Yet the very goodness and
beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the
persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall
be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that
the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
sin of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first
parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent
began by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and
evil. "
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30),
"the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already
filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
self-presumption. " This does not mean that pride preceded the
promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that
she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness. " Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the
serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. " Now
the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of
the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men
naturally desire knowledge. " Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's
likeness.
Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them
with the knowledge of understanding. " Since then every sin consists in
a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the
first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is
impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex.
15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? " Therefore the
first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68],
"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says:
"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. "
I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. [3621]FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our
first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like,
according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike,
according as an effect falls short of its cause. " Now every good
existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.
It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is
a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational
creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in
reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this
likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on
man---of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image
and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12):
"Thou wast the seal of resemblance. " Secondly, as to knowledge: and
this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore
immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom. " But the first man, at his
creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in
potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel
nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his
creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby
to obtain happiness.
Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's
likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the
serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might
decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he
should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own
power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act
so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30)
that "the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power. " On the
other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards
power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to
enjoy his own power rather than God's. " Nevertheless both coveted
somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on
himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature:
and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee? " says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus
did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who
refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. "
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
sin. " Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because
they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of
our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin
of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
that sin was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the
greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first
parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little. " Now
our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one
results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is
a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results
from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is
more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to
be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other.
Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than
all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though
pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet
the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the
pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride
of our first parents, as stated [3622](A[2]).
But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must
accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not
simply.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as
resulting from the person of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that
first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first
must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the
first sin is the greatest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim.
sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger,
strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly,
the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to
the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed.
It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a
passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment.
Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not
distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the [3607]FP,
Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend,
pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive
appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is
common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that
the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a
part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as
applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed
also to the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, "Thou
hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i. e. from the
proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed
them to little ones," i. e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction. " The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths
be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and
if they know of them they cannot relish them. " Hence it is written
(Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3608]Q[161], AA[2], 6),
humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true
self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for
he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an
inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to
believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite
is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently
whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to
pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings,
just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17),
"holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves. " Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of
the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general
signification, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
"love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is
in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority
over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?
Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks
by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either
when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe
it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits;
or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and
wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have. " For pride
is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue
from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not
received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through
his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of
pride.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species
of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
stated above ([3609]Q[110], A[2];[3610] Q[112]). Therefore it should
not be accounted a species of pride.
Objection 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride,
which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
excuse oneself of a sin one has committed. " Again, presumption whereby
one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do
with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently
account for the different species of pride.
Objection 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq. ] divides the uplifting of pride,
saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
deed. " Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq. ] also reckons
twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense
of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
habit. " Now these apparently are not comprised under the species
mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned
unfittingly.
On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3611]AA[1],2,3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered
in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the
good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has,
it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure
exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride,
namely "boasting of having what one has not. "
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we
have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has
from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that
which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. "
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we
have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others
and wishes to be singularly conspicuous. "
Reply to Objection 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways.
First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is
a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their
merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to
unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast
of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own
merits.
Reply to Objection 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what
he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is
reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he
has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good
of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above
one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists
in wishing to be preferred to others.
Reply to Objection 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
above ([3612]Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to "be
humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed
on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in
looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second
degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be
loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man
is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily
moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth. "
The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is
asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is
"to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the
monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to
seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe
and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed
"arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh
degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for
all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
one's sins. " The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under
difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed "deceitful
confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins
confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is
"obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness. " The eleventh degree
of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to
this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely
whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this
is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated
above with regard to humility ([3613]Q[161], A[6]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss
on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely,
the universal sin which is pride. " Therefore if pride were a mortal
sin, so would every sin be.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of
God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence
which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to
God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride
is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime
and heavenly virtues. " Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most
evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
elect. " But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ([3614]Q[161],
A[1], ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in
so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but
according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us. "
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of
man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is
found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His
rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very
nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and
consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as
in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication
and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of
their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and
being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens
that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not
consent to them.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3615](A[2]) pride is a general
sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all
sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all
sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we
have stated to be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God,
inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule
as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established
order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins.
For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would
seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment
of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy
them. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater
good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above
(Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser
evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom.
1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men
of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously,"
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride. "
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a
mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets
inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of
virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance
or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever;
whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling
to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de
Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride
alone withstands God"; for which reason it is specially stated (James
4:6) that "God resisteth the proud. " Wherefore aversion from God and
His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins,
belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of
God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of
greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it
follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because
it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First,
on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult
is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin
diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more
grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine
says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written
(Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6,
'The proud have hidden a net for me. '] [Vulg. : 'they'] have hidden a
snare for me. " Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of
pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the
judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily
avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Ecclus.
10:9, "Why is earth and ashes proud? " and by considering God's
greatness, according to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against
God? " as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
man prides himself, according to Is. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all
the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (Is.
64:6), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous
woman. "
Reply to Objection 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is
inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of
conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins,
as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the
greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other
sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of
ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal
lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful
nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than
pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls
into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from
his abasement. "
From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to
contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be
more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to
fall into other sins.
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Whether pride is the first sin of all?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For
the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De
Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done
with pride. " Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning
of . . . pride is to fall off from God. " Therefore falling away from
God precedes pride.
Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to
the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and
seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's
beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the
greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is
not the first sin.
Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality.
Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
daring.
" Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. "
I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is
essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from
God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
sins," as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating
of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief
part of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin,"
not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of
sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.
Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning
of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that
pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in
consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be
the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made
shipwreck concerning the faith. "
Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins
because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence
pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to
pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And
as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
from God. "
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
daring or brave.
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Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion. " Now envy is
reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ([3619]Q[36], A[4]). Much more
therefore is pride a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among
the capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3620]AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be
considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds
of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a
special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the
capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
vices. " Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they
may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the
cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while
vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice,
arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but
that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
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OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?
(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?
(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
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Whether pride was the first man's first sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one
man many were made sinners. " Now the first man's first sin is the one
by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, "And the
devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
gluttony, as appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If thou
be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. " Therefore
the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.
Objection 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the
devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore
inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
first sin.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1
Tim. 2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says:
"The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to
touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be
like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead .
. . " Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore
man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. " Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according
to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this world. " Therefore man's
first sin was pride.
I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement
of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not
forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the
inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being
moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and
consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite
to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the
state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against
the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness
in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason.
It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human
appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good.
Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according
to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that
man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his
measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's
first sin was pride.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not
willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned
God's commands. "
Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was
good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she
took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. " Yet the very goodness and
beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the
persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall
be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that
the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
sin of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first
parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent
began by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and
evil. "
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30),
"the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already
filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
self-presumption. " This does not mean that pride preceded the
promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that
she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
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Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness. " Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the
serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. " Now
the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of
the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men
naturally desire knowledge. " Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's
likeness.
Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them
with the knowledge of understanding. " Since then every sin consists in
a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the
first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is
impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex.
15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? " Therefore the
first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68],
"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says:
"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. "
I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. [3621]FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our
first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like,
according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike,
according as an effect falls short of its cause. " Now every good
existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.
It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is
a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational
creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in
reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this
likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on
man---of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image
and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12):
"Thou wast the seal of resemblance. " Secondly, as to knowledge: and
this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore
immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom. " But the first man, at his
creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in
potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel
nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his
creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby
to obtain happiness.
Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's
likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the
serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might
decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he
should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own
power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act
so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30)
that "the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power. " On the
other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards
power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to
enjoy his own power rather than God's. " Nevertheless both coveted
somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on
himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature:
and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee? " says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus
did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who
refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. "
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
sin. " Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because
they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of
our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin
of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
that sin was more grievous than other sins.
Objection 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the
greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first
parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man
who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little. " Now
our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one
results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is
a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results
from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is
more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to
be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other.
Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than
all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though
pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet
the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the
pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride
of our first parents, as stated [3622](A[2]).
But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must
accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not
simply.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as
resulting from the person of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that
first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first
must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the
first sin is the greatest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim.
