No More Learning

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the
child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence
(which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of
sin. " Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but
that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i,
18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Objection 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly,
no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine
is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
'luxury']. " Therefore lust is forbidden.

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay:
'luxury'].

I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De
Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed. " For it is
said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of
the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to
be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one
observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission
of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end
for which it is needed.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking
against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God
in your body. " Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp. )]): "God Who thus
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
thou hast begun to be. "

Reply to Objection 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since
men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether lust is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3
(Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital
vice.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as
pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
safeguard the chastity of the flesh. " Now it is seemingly contrary to
the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust
is not a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph.
4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness. " But
despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
sloth, as stated above ([3521]Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore,
is lust a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; [3522]FS, Q[84],
AA[3],4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of
which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now
the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore
this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both
on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like
concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust
is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3523]Q[148], A[6]), according
to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a
certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the
point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply
that it is caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony
provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final
cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the
cause of others.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3524]Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when
we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of
all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures
chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by
despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world. " For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin,
even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be
reckoned especially as daughters of lust.

Objection 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as
stated above (Q[128], ad 6;[3525] Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary,
not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a
daughter of lust.

Objection 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is
the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Objection 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut. , qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking. " There
the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent
on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the
vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the
reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart. " In this respect we have
"blindness of mind. " The second act is counsel about what is to be done
for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence
of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1), speaking of
lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation,
thou canst not control it by counseling. " In this respect there is
"rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above
([3526]Q[53], A[3]). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they
might not . . . remember just judgments. " In this respect there is
"thoughtlessness. " The fourth act is the reason's command about the
thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as
through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from
doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must
be referred. ] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
edition. ] Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1) of a man who
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will
undo those words. "

On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards
the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand
there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired
pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the
end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures
a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a
future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he
cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to
him.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.

Reply to Objection 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude
regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above ([3527]Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed
thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the
first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter
enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee
4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']. " Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death. "
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters
of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. [3528] Q[35], A[4], ad
2;[3529] Q[118], A[8], ad 1;[3530] Q[148], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man
desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the
special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned
a daughter of lust.

Reply to Objection 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate
external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a
fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this
we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart
the mouth speaketh" (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous. "
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words. " Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his
words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's
sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by
expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Into what parts is lust divided?

(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
seduction?

(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

(6) Of seduction;

(7) Of rape;

(8) Of adultery;

(9) Of incest;

(10) Of sacrilege;

(11) Of the sin against nature;

(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to
lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape,
and the unnatural vice. " For diversity of matter does not diversify the
species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of
matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is
married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems
that the species of lust are diversified in this way.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having
intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice.
Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of
lust.

Objection 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with
a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.

Objection 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin
is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the
species thereof.

Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again,
when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that
sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and
fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed. " Therefore it
seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned
species of lust, as well as fornication.

Objection 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its
parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']. " Therefore
it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36,
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

I answer that As stated above ([3531]Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In
this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice
against nature," which attaches to every venereal act from which
generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and
advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication,"
which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman.
Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be
discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in
two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has
connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus
there is "incest," which consists in the misuse of a woman who is
related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the
person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under
the authority of a husband, it is "adultery," if under the authority of
her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of violence, and "rape"
if violence be employed.

These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than
of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by
way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been
stated above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid species are assigned with
regard to a difference of matter.

Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected
with a formal difference of object, which difference results from
different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3532]FS, Q[18], A[7]), nothing
hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act,
and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is
this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the
lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is
thereby shown to be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a
spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the
violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the
other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to
other species of lust.

Reply to Objection 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not
connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not
constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above ([3533]FS,
Q[18], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness"
stands for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse
of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also
reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to
the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there
signifies any kind of excess.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with
one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that
are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain
from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things
strangled, and from fornication. " But there is not mortal sin in these
observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is
received with thanksgiving. " Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept.
But the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of
fornications, and have of her children of fornications. " Therefore
fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without
disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without
disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we
read (Gn. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further
on (Gn.
30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of
his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he
thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal
sin.

Objection 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the
love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as
regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured.
Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But
simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to
St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8,
"Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian
teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to
this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh,
doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish. " Therefore
simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what
food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to
the welfare of the human race. " But inordinate use of food is not
always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual
intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple
fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself
. . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a
crime. " Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all
intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.

Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But
fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.
5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds:
"They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. "
Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder
and other criminal offenses. " Therefore simple fornication is a
criminal or mortal sin.

I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be
a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
Deut. , qu. 37] on Dt. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going
with whores, whose vileness is venial. " For instead of "venial" it
should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make
this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly
against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an
inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be
born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of
the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come
together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female,
whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the
other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for
the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case
of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a
human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment,
but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under
whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human
nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands
that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide
with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in
the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of
offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and
this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for
the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however,
the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole
human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination,
as stated above ([3534]FS, Q[90], A[2]
), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called
matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us
will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q[50], seqq. ), where
we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since
fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something
incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's
upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication,
make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a
matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged
according to what happens in general, and not according to what may
happen in a particular case.

Reply to Objection 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these
things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the
matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between
Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For
among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of
the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the
Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned
were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into
their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the
Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because
they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above ([3535]FS, Q[103],
A[4], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is
contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is
ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that
which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not
contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general
order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine
power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual
course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being
willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although
considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general,
so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God's command.
Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it
be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God commands a thing to be done
against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never
done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he adds:
"For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is
obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all. "

Reply to Objection 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens
with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we
treat of matrimony ([3536]XP, Q[65], A[5], ad 2). As to Juda there is
no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Reply to Objection 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our
neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as
we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a
manner disadvantageous to the future child.

Reply to Objection 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety,
yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in
so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and
because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal
inconstancy impenitent until death.

Reply to Objection 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a
man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the
future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not
only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one
meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act
of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would,
however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food
which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with
Adam.

Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised
under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure
is a lesser sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of
sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds
from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is
in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the "flame of
sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust. " Therefore it seems that
fornication is the gravest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed
against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now
according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth
against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man.
Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to
be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is
seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from
what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ,
according to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ,
and make them the members of a harlot? " Therefore fornication is the
most grievous of sins.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the
flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first
with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some
accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin
itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the
good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the
good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its
species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as
theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are
directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one
already born, such as murder.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is
that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure
that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the
less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a
greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure
is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.
ccxciii; ccl de Temp. ; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of
all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of
chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and
Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to
the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to wit,
the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

Reply to Objection 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own
body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in
the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts
against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement
thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from
this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason
is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more
opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of
the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual
begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an
actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the
species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of
view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of
lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.
Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and
therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous.
Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the
fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as
all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's
members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor.
6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. " Wherefore also
spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and
kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all
uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you,
as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers
to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"),
"or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality---i. e. jocularity"), and
afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye this and understand
that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the
serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of
God," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of
foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

Objection 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being
prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing.
But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments.
Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Objection 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can
never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in
themselves.

On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a
kiss. But according to Mat. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to
lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. "
Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal
sins.

Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin. , Ep. lxii), "By their very
intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those
who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame,
acknowledge their disgrace and crime. " Therefore by doing these things
a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways.
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or
touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is
possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being
the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or
reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by
reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead
someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention.
Now it has been stated above ([3537]FS, Q[74], A[8]), that it is a
mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation
of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much
more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not
only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal
sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this
delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way
are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful,
they are mortal sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these
three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he
had mentioned before.

Reply to Objection 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very
nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust,
which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are
mortally sinful.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that such things are not
mortal sins in their species.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the
same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep
obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).
Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution
would seem to be a sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man
has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing,
or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that
nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing
that it is a sin according to its genus.

Objection 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who
cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is
instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, "By a dream
in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men
[*Vulg. : 'When deep sleep falleth upon men. ' St. Thomas is apparently
quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above[3538],
Q[95], A[6], OBJ[1]] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and
teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn. " Therefore a man,
while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is
to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal
pollution is a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same
image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind
of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the
imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved,
with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as
little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about
such things while one is awake. "

I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.
First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every
sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of
the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be
suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment,
there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment.
For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the
images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated
above in the [3539]FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Wherefore what a man does
while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to
him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its
cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is
excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated
either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the
sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this
excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is
cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the
discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination.
Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for
instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the
character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or
disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause,
nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and
the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account
of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was
awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks
about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while
sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of
concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to
arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such
pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to
acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree
pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of good
men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may have
conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition. " Thus it is
evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its
cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues
after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or
accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself
nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the
work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce
the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin,
namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the
words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no
uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and
through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the
Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer
from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this
about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it
is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes
the result of a previous sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God
while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It
is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to
God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in
sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less
overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the
evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be
unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the [3540]FP,
Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as
a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during
sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by
reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of
human thought.