Is
physical
matter {rupa) impermanent?
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
"
**#
[Objection:] When some beings in Kamadhatu produce the opinion that Brahma is a being, the opinion that he is permanent, they then entertain a belief in a self and a belief in extremes with regard to a thing belonging to a different, superior Dhatu. Thus you are wrong to exclude these two erroneous views from the list of the universal anusayas in a different Dhatu.
But one does not have the idea of a self and of things pertaining to a self with regard to Brahma: thus the idea that he is
views, bear on the superior.
? a being is not a belief in a self. And a belief in extremes is created by a belief in a self; thus the idea of the permanence of Brahma is not a belief in extremes (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a4ff).
What sort of views would a belief in a living being and a belief in permanence be with respect to Brahma?
The Abhidharmikas say that there are no erroneous views here, but only "false knowledge/* (All speculative knowledge which errs, viparitdlambana is not considered as views).
But why are the other false opinions which have Brahma for their object (the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, etc. ) considered as erroneous views, and not the two opinions of being and permanence?
The Siddhanta serves as authority (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a). ***
Are only the anusayas universals?
13c-d. With the exception of the praptis, dharmas coexist- ant with the universal anusayas are also universals.
"Coexistant dharmas* refer to sensation, etc. Not the praptis, because the prapti (adherence) and the prdpya (the thing adhered to) do not have the same result (ii. 36c).
Are universal anusayas universal causes (ii. 54c-d)?
1. Future universal anusayas are not universal causes. 2. Coexistents of past and present universal anusayas are universal causes, but not universal anusayas. 3. Past and present universal anusayas are universal causes. 4. Future coexistents of universal anusayas are neither universal anusayas nor universal causes.
##*
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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many have a pure dharma for their object, that is, the Third and Fourth Truth, the Truth of Extinction and the Path? How many have an impure dharma}
14. Wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance which is bound (yukta) to them, and independent ignorance, abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, make six
56 anusayas whose object is pure.
Except for the six,--that is, the three anusayas abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction, namely wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent of them, and these same three anusayas abandoned through Seeing the Path,--all the other anusayas have impure dharmas for their object.
15. The extinction of their own bhumi is the object of the anusayas which have extinction for their sphere; the Path with its six or nine bhumis, is the object of the anusayas which have the Path for their sphere, for the Paths depend
57 on one another.
The three anusayas (wrong views, doubt, and ignorance) which are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and which have Extinction for their object, do not have Extinction for their total object: when they belong to Kamadhatu, they bear on Extinction in Kamadhatu, and so on from bhilmi to bhumi, until: when they belong to Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjnanayatana) they bear on Extinction in Bhavagra.
When they are in the realm of Kamadhatu, the three anusayas which have the Path for their object bear on the totality of the Path as well as on a portion of the dharmajnana (vi. 26), with its six bhumis (namely anagamya, dhyanantara, and the four
? Dhyanas) (see ii. 52c, vii. 9).
When they are of the realm of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu (four Dhyanas, four Arupyas), these same anusayas bear on the totality of the Path, and on a part of the anvayajnana (vi. 26), with its nine bhumis (namely the preceeding six and the first three Arupyas). In fact the Paths are mutually dependent, (ii. 52).
Although dharmajndna and anvayajnana are mutually depend- ent, because anvayajnana is not opposed to Kamadhatu, the three anusayas of the realm of Kamadhatu which have the Path for their object do not have the Path which forms part of the anvayajnana for their object.
But the dharmajndna which is opposed to Kamadhatu is also opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu (vii. 9): consequently it will also be the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus which have the Path for their object.
Dharmajndna in its entirety is not opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, for the dharmajndna of Suffering and Arising are not opposed to these two Dhatus. [Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus. ]
And dharmajndna is not opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyad- hatu in their entirety [for it is not opposed to the dharmas abandoned through Seeing. Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus], because the first two dharmajndnas are not opposed to these Dhatus, and because the first category of the anusayas of these two Dhatus, namely those which one abandons through Seeing, are not opposed by any dharmajndna.
#**
Why do not lust (rdga), anger (pratigha), egotism (mdna), the esteeming of bad views {marsa), and . the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (pardmarsay* bear on pure dharmas, on the Extinction of Suffering or on the Path?
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16a. Lust does not bear on pure dharmas, because lust should be rejected.
The latent defilement of lust (raganusaya) should be aban-
doned; but if it has pure dharmas for its object, it will not be
rejected; in the same manner, the aspiration after good dharmas
[which takes the form of desire, but which is Right View] should
59 not be rejected.
16b. Anger does not, because pure dharmas do not do evil.
Anger arises with regard to a thing which does evil, and pure dharmas, the Extinction of Suffering or the Path, do not do evil.
16c. Egotism and the two esteemings do not, because pure dharmas are calm, pure, and excellent.
One cannot pride oneself on Extinction or the Path, for they
60 are calm.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is to hold as a cause of purification that which is not such: the pure dharmas are really purification, so one cannot have a false conception of purity (suddhigrdha), with regard to them.
The esteeming of bad views is to hold as excellent that which is vile: now the pure dharmas are what are best, so one cannot have a false conception of excellence (agragraha), with regard to them.
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many become anusaya 61
from the fact of being an object? How many become anusayana solely through association, (solely by reason of being dharmas
? associated with the mind, sensation, etc. )?
17. Universal anusayas, relative to the object, become anufayana in all their spheres; the non-universals, in their
62 one category.
From the point of view of the object, the universal anusayas (v. 12) become anusayana, that is, "become lodged in" the five categories of their sphere; the other in one category: the anusayas that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering become
anusayana in the dharmas that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering . . . the anusayas that one abandons through Meditation become anusayana in the dharmas that one abandons through Meditation.
This general rule calls for more precision.
18a-b. Not the anusayas that bear on the pure dharmas or a higher sphere, because their object is not "made one's own"
6 and opposes the anusayas. *
The six anufayas which have the pure dharmas--Nirvana or the Path (v. 14)--for their object, and the nine anusayas which have a higher sphere (v. l3a-b) for their object do not become anusayana in the object, because one does not do this thing by oneself either through the "view of self or through desire.
Other anusayas would apply (anusi) to the thing which one considers (through a belief in a self) as the self, or which one makes one's own through desire, and they become anusayana, as dust is applied to a wet piece of cloth (see Vydkhyd ad i. 4, p. 14. 2). But the pure dharmas and the higher bhumis are not susceptible of being considered as "self" or as "pertaining to self": thus the anusayas which have them for their object do not become anusayana in their object, because of the nature of their object.
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We would remark in fact that the desire that seeks either the pure dharmas or a higher sphere is not the anusaya called "desire," but rather "an aspiration for good dharmas' (p. 32,1. 8).
Further, the pure dharmas', Nirvana or the Path, are opposed to the klesas which take them as their object; the dharmas of a higher bhumi are opposed to the klesas of a lower bhumi: as a consequence the klesas cannot become anusayana there, that is, install themselves there; in the same way that the sole of the foot cannot install itself on a rock which is red hot with fire.
***
We have up to now understood the word anusayana, anusete, as "to become anusayana" in the sense of "to install," or "to become lodged in. "
According to some other masters, anusayana should be understood as anugunya. Nirvana, etc. , is not favorable (anuguna) to the arising and development of wrong views: in the same way that one says that if a person who has a cold takes a bitter medicine, there is no increase (anusayana) in the cold due to the medicine (Vydkhyd i. 4, p. 13).
18c-d. Any anusaya which is associated with a certain dharma becomes anusayana through association with this
64 dharma.
"With a certain dharma" that is, with sensation, etc.
The word eva indicates reservation: "as long as the anusaya is
not abandoned. "
***
Are there any anusayas which do not have the pure dharmas
? for their object, which do not have a superior Dhatu for their object yet which become anusayana solely through association with and not from the fact of the object?
Yes, universal anusayas which have a superior bhilmi for their object (namely the universal anusayas of the First Dhyana which have the three higher Dhyanas for their object).
***
Among the ninety-eight dhyanas, how many are bad (akusala), and how many are morally neutral, that is, without retribution (avydkrta)?
19. All the "higher" dhyanas are morally neutral. [The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are
65 neutral in Kamadhatu. The other anusayas, here, are bad. ]
All the anusayas belonging to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are neutral. In fact, all defiled dharmas, when they bear retribution, bear painful retribution. Now suffering does exist in these two spheres, for no causes (anger, etc. ) for doing evil to others are present there.
19b. The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are neutral in Kamadhatu.
In Kamadhatu, a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the ignorance which is associated with them, are neutral.
In fact, these anusayas are not in contradiction to giving and other good deeds. One thinks, "May I be happy in the future! ," and
66 one give gifts and observes the precepts.
The erroneous view of annihilation is favorable to deliverance.
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This is why the Bleesed One said, "Among the doctrines of the Tlrthikas, the best is that which says, 'I do not exist, things of mine do not exist; I shall not exist, things pertaining to me shall not exist. '"
These two views--a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes--are only aberrations relative to things which constitute the pseudoperson; they do not being about harm to another: thus they are morally neutral.
But these different reasons--because they are not in contradic-
tion to giving, etc. --could be applied to the "desire for heaven"
and to egotism {asmimana, v. 10), which should thus also be
67
also say, "An innate belief in a self, which is to be found among the
savage animals and birds, is neutral. But a cogitated belief in a self
68 extremes).
19c. The other anusayas, here, are bad.
The other anusayas of Kamadhatu are impure (asubha), that is, bad (akusala).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many are roots of evil (akusalamula)? How many are not?
20a-b. Lust, anger and mudi, in Kamadhatu, are roots of 69
evil.
All lust (rdga), all anger (pratigha), and all mudi (that is, all
70
delusion or moha) belonging to Kamadhatu--with the
neutral; but the School does not admit this. Some ancient masters
is bad. "
(The same holds for an innate and cogitated belief in the
? exception of the delusion which is a belief in a self and the belief in the extremes--are, in this order, the three roots of evil, greed, anger, and ignorance.
A belief in a self and a belief in the extremes are not roots of evil, for a root of evil is only that which is bad and is only a root of
71
evil.
The other anusayas are not roots of evil.
***
How many dharmas are neutral roots? How many are not?
20c. Three roots, desire, ignorance, and matt (that is,
72
The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir hold that desire, ignorance, and prajnd which are neutral, of whatever type they are up to and
73
prajnd) are neutral.
including the prajnd which arises from retribution,
are neutral
74
roots.
Doubt (vicikitsa) cannot be regarded as a root, being twofold and mobile by nature. Egotism (mdna), being "an elevation" of the mind, is not a root, since it consists of elevation, the opposite of a root. For in this world roots are firm and reach downward.
21b-d. Four, [say the Aparantakas]: desire, views, egotism,
and delusion which are neutral; in fact there are three
20d. The others are not roots, because their modality is of duality and elevation.
contemplations based on ignorance.
75
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One can distinguish "absorption of desire" {trsnottaradhyayin),
"absorption of (wrong) views" {drstyuttaradhydyin), and "absorp-
tion of pride" {mdnottaradhydyiri). Now these contemplations are 76
such by reason of delusion or ignorance.
***
Are the fourteen "undefined points" (avydkrtavastu) of which 77
Scripture speaks so called because they are neutral (avydkrtd) in the sense that we have just studied?
No. In the Sutra a neutral question is a question which should be set aside: that is, this type of question is called neutral, not answered, because it should be set aside, or rejected. The object of such a question is termed "an undefined point. "
There are four types of questions: 1. a question to which one responds in a categorical manner; 2. a question to which one responds by distinguishing; 3. a question to which one responds by another question; and 4. a question which one should not answer.
22. Categorical response, as for death; a distinguishing
response, as for rebirth; a response by a question, as for
superiority; and a response by rejecting the question, as for
78 non-identity.
1. If one asks, "Do all beings die/' one should answer in a categorical manner, "They do. "
2. If one asks, "Will all being be reborn? " one should answer by distinguishing, "Beings endowed with defilements will be reborn; being freed from defilements will not be reborn. "
79
3. If one asks, "Is a person superior or inferior? ," one should
answer by the question, "In comparison with whom? " If he answers, "In comparison with the gods," one should answer, "He is inferior. " If one answers, "In comparison with beings in the
? painful realms of rebirth,"one should answer, "He is superior. "
4. If one asks, "Are the skandhas the same thing as a sattva or living being, or are they different? ," this is a question that is to be rejected because the thing called a "living being" does not exist. In the same way one would reject the question, "Is the child of a sterile woman white or black? "
***
How can you say (in Karika 22) that one has responded to this fourth question, since one did not answer whether the skandhas are, yes or no, identical to a living being?
This question is answered by saying, "This question is to be
80 rejected": thus there is a response to it.
***
Another says that the second question, like the first question, calls for a categorical response, "All beings do not arise. "
But the author says that in order to justify the example given
[by the Vaibhasikas] to the second type of question, to someone
81
who asks, "Will those who die be reborn? ," one should answer by
distinguishing, ["All will not be reborn; those who are endowed with the defilements will be reborn, but not those who are freed from them. ]
[He says again that the third question also calls for a categorical response. ]A human being in fact is at one and the same time superior and inferior according to the point of comparison. In the same manner as if one were to ask, "Is consciousness (vijndna) a cause, or is it a result? ," [one should answer, "It is a cause with respect to its result, and it is a result with respect to its cause. "]But, says the author, to someone who asks in a categorical manner "Is a person superior or inferior? /' it is not suitable to respond
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categorically, "He is superior" or "He is inferior;" one should thus respond by distinguishing: one must first be assured of the intention of the questioner.
***
The Abhidharmikas
someone asks, "Is the Blessed One the Arhat Samyaksambuddha? Is the Dharma that he speaks well spoken? Is the Samgha of the Sravakas well instructed?
Is physical matter {rupa) impermanent? . . . Is consciousness (vijndna) impermanent? Can Suffering be known . . . Can the Path be known? ," then to these questions one should answer in a categorical manner, by reason of the superior
83
2. An answer by distinguishing: If a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable One teaches me the dharmas" one should distin- guish, "The dharmas are numerous, past, present, and future: which do you desire that I should teach you? . " If he answers, "Teach me the past dharmas** one should distinguish, "The past dharmas are numerous: rupa} vedana, samjnd, samskdras, and vijndna" If he asks, "Teach me concerning rupa** one should distinguish, "There are three rupas, the good, the bad, and the neutral. " If one asks, "Teach me concerning the good," one should distinguish, "There are seven types of good rupa: abstention from killing . . . and abstention from idle words. " If one asks, "Teach me abstention from killing," one should distinguish, "It is of three types, arisen from the three roots of good, non-greed (alobha), non-anger {advesa), and non-ignorance (amoha)** If one asks, "Teach me the abstention from killing arisen from non-greed," one should distinguish, "It is twofold, vijnapti and avijnapti. Which do you desire that I teach you? "
3. A response by a question: The same question, put by a false-hearted person, is a question to which one should respond by another question. If such a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable
benefit (of such an answer).
82
say: 1. A categorical response: If
? One teach me the dharmas" one should counter-interrogate him,
"The dfoarmas are numerous: which do you desire that I teach
you? " But one need not establish the distinctions (past, present,
and future dharmas); one should continue to counter-interrogate
84
But if a good-hearted person and a false-hearted person do not question you, but content themselves with expressing a desire, "Teach me the dharmas;" and if, on the other hand, one does not answer them, if one does not explain to them, and if one is content to interrogate them, "Which dharmas shall I teach you? ," how can you say that there is a question and a response?
The author answers: He who says, "Teach me the Path," asks concerning the Path, exactly as if he has said, "Which is the Path? " One the other hand, through this counter-interrogation, one explains to the questioner concerning his questions: is the Path then not explained (vj/dkrta)?
If this is the case, then is there an answer by means of a question in the second and third type of question?
No, the responses differ, for sometimes there is distinction,
85
4. A question to be rejected: If one asks "Are the number of persons finite or infinite, etc. ? ," then this question should be rejected.
***
One may find in the Sutra itself the definition of these four questions and answers: the venerable Mahasarhghikas read a Sutra (Dtrgha, TD 1, p. 51bl, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 609a24) which says, "Bhiksus, there are four responses to questions. What are these four? There are some questions which one should reply categori- cally . . . ; there are some questions which one should reject. What is
him until the questioner remains silent or he himself explains. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 76al5ff).
and sometimes there is no distinction.
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the question to which one should respond categorically? When one asks if all the skandhas are impermanent. What is the question to which one should respond by distinguishing? When someone asks what retribution in sensation a voluntary action requires. What is the question to which one should repsond by a question? When
84
someone asks if sarhjna is the soul of a person, counter-interrogate, "My friend, what do you think of the soul? ," and if he answers, "My friend, I think that the soul is coarse," one should respond that the sarhjna is other than the soul (Digha, i. 195). What is the question to be rejected? When someone asks if the world is eternal, non-eternal, eternal and non-eternal, neither eternal nor non-eternal; if the number of persons is finite, infinite,
87 finite and infinite, neither finite and infinite; if the Tathagata
exists after death . . . ; or if the vital principle is other than the body. These questions, Oh Bhiksus, are to be rejected. "
***
Within a certain person, an anusaya or latent defilement attaches itself to a certain object; this person is bound to this object by this anusaya.
We must examine to what object a person is bound by a past, present, or future anusaya.
From this point of view the anusayas or klesas are of two types: 88
specific Mesas, namely lust, anger, egotism; and general klesas^ namely views, doubt, and ignorance.
23. One is bound by lust, anger, and egotism, past and present, to the object from whence they have been produced without their having been abandoned.
When the specific klesas have arisen with respect to a certain object--an object past, present or future, an object abandoned through Seeing, etc. --and is thus found in the past or in the
one should
? present, when they have not been abandoned, the person in whom they are produced is bound to this object by these specific klesas. For, being specific, they are not necessarily produced within all persons with respect to all things, but rather within a certain person with respect to a certain thing.
24a-b. One is bound to all objects by the same future klesas, since they are mental states.
One is bound to any and all objects, past, present, and future, [and of the five categories: to be abandoned through Seeing, etc. , according to the case], by these same specific future klesas, since they belong to the tnanovijnana. For the sphere of the manas is tritemporal.
24b. One is bound to the object of their time period by the same future klesas, since they are not mental states.
One is bound to future objects through future lust and anger which differ from the preceeding--that is, non-mental states in a relationship with the five sense consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses, in fact, cognize only objects contemporaneous to them.
Sometimes this rule concerns only future lust and anger of the utpattidharmin or "destined to arise" category. It is otherwise when they are not destined to arise.
24c. Not destined to arise, one is bound everywhere by the same.
"Everywhere," this is, to all objects, past, present, and future.
24c-d. One is bound everywhere by the others, whatever they are.
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One is bound to all the objects of the three time periods and the five categories, according to the case, by the other, general klesas--which, having for their object the five upadanaskandhas, are produced within all and relative to all--in whatever period the said klesas belong.
***
89
[The Sautrantikas criticize this theory. ] Do the klesas, and
past and future objects, really exist?
If one says that they really exist, one admits that conditioned things always exist and are thus eternal; if they do not exist, how is it possible to say that a person is bound to these objects by the klesas, or that he is liberated from them?
The Vaibhasikas maintain that past and future dharmas really exist; conditioned things nevertheless are not eternal for they are endowed with the characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c-d) of conditioned things. In order to better illustrate their position we present, in summary fashion, their doctrine:
25a. The dharmas exist in the three time periods.
Why is this?
90 25a. Because the Blessed One has said it.
1. The Blessed One taught in his own words the existence of the past and the future, "Monks, if past rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would 'not take into consideration' past rupa . . . If future rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would
'not delight in' future rupa. It is because future rupa exists that the
learned holy Sravakas . . . "
91
? 25b. Because mental consciousness preceeds from two.
2. The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when
he says, "Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are
these two? The organ of sight and a visible thing. . . the manas and 92
the dharmas" Now if the past and future dharmas do not exist, mental consciousness which has them for its object would not arise by reason of these two.
[These are the proofs taken from Scripture. As for proofs ' taken from reasoning:]
25c. Because it has an object.
3. A consciousness can arise given an object, but not if an object is not present. If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no conciousness without an object.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
***
How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
96
its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
***
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
*##
[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma!
**#
[Objection:] When some beings in Kamadhatu produce the opinion that Brahma is a being, the opinion that he is permanent, they then entertain a belief in a self and a belief in extremes with regard to a thing belonging to a different, superior Dhatu. Thus you are wrong to exclude these two erroneous views from the list of the universal anusayas in a different Dhatu.
But one does not have the idea of a self and of things pertaining to a self with regard to Brahma: thus the idea that he is
views, bear on the superior.
? a being is not a belief in a self. And a belief in extremes is created by a belief in a self; thus the idea of the permanence of Brahma is not a belief in extremes (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a4ff).
What sort of views would a belief in a living being and a belief in permanence be with respect to Brahma?
The Abhidharmikas say that there are no erroneous views here, but only "false knowledge/* (All speculative knowledge which errs, viparitdlambana is not considered as views).
But why are the other false opinions which have Brahma for their object (the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, etc. ) considered as erroneous views, and not the two opinions of being and permanence?
The Siddhanta serves as authority (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a). ***
Are only the anusayas universals?
13c-d. With the exception of the praptis, dharmas coexist- ant with the universal anusayas are also universals.
"Coexistant dharmas* refer to sensation, etc. Not the praptis, because the prapti (adherence) and the prdpya (the thing adhered to) do not have the same result (ii. 36c).
Are universal anusayas universal causes (ii. 54c-d)?
1. Future universal anusayas are not universal causes. 2. Coexistents of past and present universal anusayas are universal causes, but not universal anusayas. 3. Past and present universal anusayas are universal causes. 4. Future coexistents of universal anusayas are neither universal anusayas nor universal causes.
##*
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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many have a pure dharma for their object, that is, the Third and Fourth Truth, the Truth of Extinction and the Path? How many have an impure dharma}
14. Wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance which is bound (yukta) to them, and independent ignorance, abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, make six
56 anusayas whose object is pure.
Except for the six,--that is, the three anusayas abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction, namely wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent of them, and these same three anusayas abandoned through Seeing the Path,--all the other anusayas have impure dharmas for their object.
15. The extinction of their own bhumi is the object of the anusayas which have extinction for their sphere; the Path with its six or nine bhumis, is the object of the anusayas which have the Path for their sphere, for the Paths depend
57 on one another.
The three anusayas (wrong views, doubt, and ignorance) which are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and which have Extinction for their object, do not have Extinction for their total object: when they belong to Kamadhatu, they bear on Extinction in Kamadhatu, and so on from bhilmi to bhumi, until: when they belong to Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjnanayatana) they bear on Extinction in Bhavagra.
When they are in the realm of Kamadhatu, the three anusayas which have the Path for their object bear on the totality of the Path as well as on a portion of the dharmajnana (vi. 26), with its six bhumis (namely anagamya, dhyanantara, and the four
? Dhyanas) (see ii. 52c, vii. 9).
When they are of the realm of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu (four Dhyanas, four Arupyas), these same anusayas bear on the totality of the Path, and on a part of the anvayajnana (vi. 26), with its nine bhumis (namely the preceeding six and the first three Arupyas). In fact the Paths are mutually dependent, (ii. 52).
Although dharmajndna and anvayajnana are mutually depend- ent, because anvayajnana is not opposed to Kamadhatu, the three anusayas of the realm of Kamadhatu which have the Path for their object do not have the Path which forms part of the anvayajnana for their object.
But the dharmajndna which is opposed to Kamadhatu is also opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu (vii. 9): consequently it will also be the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus which have the Path for their object.
Dharmajndna in its entirety is not opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, for the dharmajndna of Suffering and Arising are not opposed to these two Dhatus. [Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus. ]
And dharmajndna is not opposed to Rupadhatu and Arupyad- hatu in their entirety [for it is not opposed to the dharmas abandoned through Seeing. Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhatus], because the first two dharmajndnas are not opposed to these Dhatus, and because the first category of the anusayas of these two Dhatus, namely those which one abandons through Seeing, are not opposed by any dharmajndna.
#**
Why do not lust (rdga), anger (pratigha), egotism (mdna), the esteeming of bad views {marsa), and . the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (pardmarsay* bear on pure dharmas, on the Extinction of Suffering or on the Path?
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16a. Lust does not bear on pure dharmas, because lust should be rejected.
The latent defilement of lust (raganusaya) should be aban-
doned; but if it has pure dharmas for its object, it will not be
rejected; in the same manner, the aspiration after good dharmas
[which takes the form of desire, but which is Right View] should
59 not be rejected.
16b. Anger does not, because pure dharmas do not do evil.
Anger arises with regard to a thing which does evil, and pure dharmas, the Extinction of Suffering or the Path, do not do evil.
16c. Egotism and the two esteemings do not, because pure dharmas are calm, pure, and excellent.
One cannot pride oneself on Extinction or the Path, for they
60 are calm.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is to hold as a cause of purification that which is not such: the pure dharmas are really purification, so one cannot have a false conception of purity (suddhigrdha), with regard to them.
The esteeming of bad views is to hold as excellent that which is vile: now the pure dharmas are what are best, so one cannot have a false conception of excellence (agragraha), with regard to them.
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many become anusaya 61
from the fact of being an object? How many become anusayana solely through association, (solely by reason of being dharmas
? associated with the mind, sensation, etc. )?
17. Universal anusayas, relative to the object, become anufayana in all their spheres; the non-universals, in their
62 one category.
From the point of view of the object, the universal anusayas (v. 12) become anusayana, that is, "become lodged in" the five categories of their sphere; the other in one category: the anusayas that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering become
anusayana in the dharmas that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering . . . the anusayas that one abandons through Meditation become anusayana in the dharmas that one abandons through Meditation.
This general rule calls for more precision.
18a-b. Not the anusayas that bear on the pure dharmas or a higher sphere, because their object is not "made one's own"
6 and opposes the anusayas. *
The six anufayas which have the pure dharmas--Nirvana or the Path (v. 14)--for their object, and the nine anusayas which have a higher sphere (v. l3a-b) for their object do not become anusayana in the object, because one does not do this thing by oneself either through the "view of self or through desire.
Other anusayas would apply (anusi) to the thing which one considers (through a belief in a self) as the self, or which one makes one's own through desire, and they become anusayana, as dust is applied to a wet piece of cloth (see Vydkhyd ad i. 4, p. 14. 2). But the pure dharmas and the higher bhumis are not susceptible of being considered as "self" or as "pertaining to self": thus the anusayas which have them for their object do not become anusayana in their object, because of the nature of their object.
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We would remark in fact that the desire that seeks either the pure dharmas or a higher sphere is not the anusaya called "desire," but rather "an aspiration for good dharmas' (p. 32,1. 8).
Further, the pure dharmas', Nirvana or the Path, are opposed to the klesas which take them as their object; the dharmas of a higher bhumi are opposed to the klesas of a lower bhumi: as a consequence the klesas cannot become anusayana there, that is, install themselves there; in the same way that the sole of the foot cannot install itself on a rock which is red hot with fire.
***
We have up to now understood the word anusayana, anusete, as "to become anusayana" in the sense of "to install," or "to become lodged in. "
According to some other masters, anusayana should be understood as anugunya. Nirvana, etc. , is not favorable (anuguna) to the arising and development of wrong views: in the same way that one says that if a person who has a cold takes a bitter medicine, there is no increase (anusayana) in the cold due to the medicine (Vydkhyd i. 4, p. 13).
18c-d. Any anusaya which is associated with a certain dharma becomes anusayana through association with this
64 dharma.
"With a certain dharma" that is, with sensation, etc.
The word eva indicates reservation: "as long as the anusaya is
not abandoned. "
***
Are there any anusayas which do not have the pure dharmas
? for their object, which do not have a superior Dhatu for their object yet which become anusayana solely through association with and not from the fact of the object?
Yes, universal anusayas which have a superior bhilmi for their object (namely the universal anusayas of the First Dhyana which have the three higher Dhyanas for their object).
***
Among the ninety-eight dhyanas, how many are bad (akusala), and how many are morally neutral, that is, without retribution (avydkrta)?
19. All the "higher" dhyanas are morally neutral. [The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are
65 neutral in Kamadhatu. The other anusayas, here, are bad. ]
All the anusayas belonging to Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are neutral. In fact, all defiled dharmas, when they bear retribution, bear painful retribution. Now suffering does exist in these two spheres, for no causes (anger, etc. ) for doing evil to others are present there.
19b. The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are neutral in Kamadhatu.
In Kamadhatu, a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the ignorance which is associated with them, are neutral.
In fact, these anusayas are not in contradiction to giving and other good deeds. One thinks, "May I be happy in the future! ," and
66 one give gifts and observes the precepts.
The erroneous view of annihilation is favorable to deliverance.
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This is why the Bleesed One said, "Among the doctrines of the Tlrthikas, the best is that which says, 'I do not exist, things of mine do not exist; I shall not exist, things pertaining to me shall not exist. '"
These two views--a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes--are only aberrations relative to things which constitute the pseudoperson; they do not being about harm to another: thus they are morally neutral.
But these different reasons--because they are not in contradic-
tion to giving, etc. --could be applied to the "desire for heaven"
and to egotism {asmimana, v. 10), which should thus also be
67
also say, "An innate belief in a self, which is to be found among the
savage animals and birds, is neutral. But a cogitated belief in a self
68 extremes).
19c. The other anusayas, here, are bad.
The other anusayas of Kamadhatu are impure (asubha), that is, bad (akusala).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many are roots of evil (akusalamula)? How many are not?
20a-b. Lust, anger and mudi, in Kamadhatu, are roots of 69
evil.
All lust (rdga), all anger (pratigha), and all mudi (that is, all
70
delusion or moha) belonging to Kamadhatu--with the
neutral; but the School does not admit this. Some ancient masters
is bad. "
(The same holds for an innate and cogitated belief in the
? exception of the delusion which is a belief in a self and the belief in the extremes--are, in this order, the three roots of evil, greed, anger, and ignorance.
A belief in a self and a belief in the extremes are not roots of evil, for a root of evil is only that which is bad and is only a root of
71
evil.
The other anusayas are not roots of evil.
***
How many dharmas are neutral roots? How many are not?
20c. Three roots, desire, ignorance, and matt (that is,
72
The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir hold that desire, ignorance, and prajnd which are neutral, of whatever type they are up to and
73
prajnd) are neutral.
including the prajnd which arises from retribution,
are neutral
74
roots.
Doubt (vicikitsa) cannot be regarded as a root, being twofold and mobile by nature. Egotism (mdna), being "an elevation" of the mind, is not a root, since it consists of elevation, the opposite of a root. For in this world roots are firm and reach downward.
21b-d. Four, [say the Aparantakas]: desire, views, egotism,
and delusion which are neutral; in fact there are three
20d. The others are not roots, because their modality is of duality and elevation.
contemplations based on ignorance.
75
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One can distinguish "absorption of desire" {trsnottaradhyayin),
"absorption of (wrong) views" {drstyuttaradhydyin), and "absorp-
tion of pride" {mdnottaradhydyiri). Now these contemplations are 76
such by reason of delusion or ignorance.
***
Are the fourteen "undefined points" (avydkrtavastu) of which 77
Scripture speaks so called because they are neutral (avydkrtd) in the sense that we have just studied?
No. In the Sutra a neutral question is a question which should be set aside: that is, this type of question is called neutral, not answered, because it should be set aside, or rejected. The object of such a question is termed "an undefined point. "
There are four types of questions: 1. a question to which one responds in a categorical manner; 2. a question to which one responds by distinguishing; 3. a question to which one responds by another question; and 4. a question which one should not answer.
22. Categorical response, as for death; a distinguishing
response, as for rebirth; a response by a question, as for
superiority; and a response by rejecting the question, as for
78 non-identity.
1. If one asks, "Do all beings die/' one should answer in a categorical manner, "They do. "
2. If one asks, "Will all being be reborn? " one should answer by distinguishing, "Beings endowed with defilements will be reborn; being freed from defilements will not be reborn. "
79
3. If one asks, "Is a person superior or inferior? ," one should
answer by the question, "In comparison with whom? " If he answers, "In comparison with the gods," one should answer, "He is inferior. " If one answers, "In comparison with beings in the
? painful realms of rebirth,"one should answer, "He is superior. "
4. If one asks, "Are the skandhas the same thing as a sattva or living being, or are they different? ," this is a question that is to be rejected because the thing called a "living being" does not exist. In the same way one would reject the question, "Is the child of a sterile woman white or black? "
***
How can you say (in Karika 22) that one has responded to this fourth question, since one did not answer whether the skandhas are, yes or no, identical to a living being?
This question is answered by saying, "This question is to be
80 rejected": thus there is a response to it.
***
Another says that the second question, like the first question, calls for a categorical response, "All beings do not arise. "
But the author says that in order to justify the example given
[by the Vaibhasikas] to the second type of question, to someone
81
who asks, "Will those who die be reborn? ," one should answer by
distinguishing, ["All will not be reborn; those who are endowed with the defilements will be reborn, but not those who are freed from them. ]
[He says again that the third question also calls for a categorical response. ]A human being in fact is at one and the same time superior and inferior according to the point of comparison. In the same manner as if one were to ask, "Is consciousness (vijndna) a cause, or is it a result? ," [one should answer, "It is a cause with respect to its result, and it is a result with respect to its cause. "]But, says the author, to someone who asks in a categorical manner "Is a person superior or inferior? /' it is not suitable to respond
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categorically, "He is superior" or "He is inferior;" one should thus respond by distinguishing: one must first be assured of the intention of the questioner.
***
The Abhidharmikas
someone asks, "Is the Blessed One the Arhat Samyaksambuddha? Is the Dharma that he speaks well spoken? Is the Samgha of the Sravakas well instructed?
Is physical matter {rupa) impermanent? . . . Is consciousness (vijndna) impermanent? Can Suffering be known . . . Can the Path be known? ," then to these questions one should answer in a categorical manner, by reason of the superior
83
2. An answer by distinguishing: If a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable One teaches me the dharmas" one should distin- guish, "The dharmas are numerous, past, present, and future: which do you desire that I should teach you? . " If he answers, "Teach me the past dharmas** one should distinguish, "The past dharmas are numerous: rupa} vedana, samjnd, samskdras, and vijndna" If he asks, "Teach me concerning rupa** one should distinguish, "There are three rupas, the good, the bad, and the neutral. " If one asks, "Teach me concerning the good," one should distinguish, "There are seven types of good rupa: abstention from killing . . . and abstention from idle words. " If one asks, "Teach me abstention from killing," one should distinguish, "It is of three types, arisen from the three roots of good, non-greed (alobha), non-anger {advesa), and non-ignorance (amoha)** If one asks, "Teach me the abstention from killing arisen from non-greed," one should distinguish, "It is twofold, vijnapti and avijnapti. Which do you desire that I teach you? "
3. A response by a question: The same question, put by a false-hearted person, is a question to which one should respond by another question. If such a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable
benefit (of such an answer).
82
say: 1. A categorical response: If
? One teach me the dharmas" one should counter-interrogate him,
"The dfoarmas are numerous: which do you desire that I teach
you? " But one need not establish the distinctions (past, present,
and future dharmas); one should continue to counter-interrogate
84
But if a good-hearted person and a false-hearted person do not question you, but content themselves with expressing a desire, "Teach me the dharmas;" and if, on the other hand, one does not answer them, if one does not explain to them, and if one is content to interrogate them, "Which dharmas shall I teach you? ," how can you say that there is a question and a response?
The author answers: He who says, "Teach me the Path," asks concerning the Path, exactly as if he has said, "Which is the Path? " One the other hand, through this counter-interrogation, one explains to the questioner concerning his questions: is the Path then not explained (vj/dkrta)?
If this is the case, then is there an answer by means of a question in the second and third type of question?
No, the responses differ, for sometimes there is distinction,
85
4. A question to be rejected: If one asks "Are the number of persons finite or infinite, etc. ? ," then this question should be rejected.
***
One may find in the Sutra itself the definition of these four questions and answers: the venerable Mahasarhghikas read a Sutra (Dtrgha, TD 1, p. 51bl, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 609a24) which says, "Bhiksus, there are four responses to questions. What are these four? There are some questions which one should reply categori- cally . . . ; there are some questions which one should reject. What is
him until the questioner remains silent or he himself explains. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 76al5ff).
and sometimes there is no distinction.
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the question to which one should respond categorically? When one asks if all the skandhas are impermanent. What is the question to which one should respond by distinguishing? When someone asks what retribution in sensation a voluntary action requires. What is the question to which one should repsond by a question? When
84
someone asks if sarhjna is the soul of a person, counter-interrogate, "My friend, what do you think of the soul? ," and if he answers, "My friend, I think that the soul is coarse," one should respond that the sarhjna is other than the soul (Digha, i. 195). What is the question to be rejected? When someone asks if the world is eternal, non-eternal, eternal and non-eternal, neither eternal nor non-eternal; if the number of persons is finite, infinite,
87 finite and infinite, neither finite and infinite; if the Tathagata
exists after death . . . ; or if the vital principle is other than the body. These questions, Oh Bhiksus, are to be rejected. "
***
Within a certain person, an anusaya or latent defilement attaches itself to a certain object; this person is bound to this object by this anusaya.
We must examine to what object a person is bound by a past, present, or future anusaya.
From this point of view the anusayas or klesas are of two types: 88
specific Mesas, namely lust, anger, egotism; and general klesas^ namely views, doubt, and ignorance.
23. One is bound by lust, anger, and egotism, past and present, to the object from whence they have been produced without their having been abandoned.
When the specific klesas have arisen with respect to a certain object--an object past, present or future, an object abandoned through Seeing, etc. --and is thus found in the past or in the
one should
? present, when they have not been abandoned, the person in whom they are produced is bound to this object by these specific klesas. For, being specific, they are not necessarily produced within all persons with respect to all things, but rather within a certain person with respect to a certain thing.
24a-b. One is bound to all objects by the same future klesas, since they are mental states.
One is bound to any and all objects, past, present, and future, [and of the five categories: to be abandoned through Seeing, etc. , according to the case], by these same specific future klesas, since they belong to the tnanovijnana. For the sphere of the manas is tritemporal.
24b. One is bound to the object of their time period by the same future klesas, since they are not mental states.
One is bound to future objects through future lust and anger which differ from the preceeding--that is, non-mental states in a relationship with the five sense consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses, in fact, cognize only objects contemporaneous to them.
Sometimes this rule concerns only future lust and anger of the utpattidharmin or "destined to arise" category. It is otherwise when they are not destined to arise.
24c. Not destined to arise, one is bound everywhere by the same.
"Everywhere," this is, to all objects, past, present, and future.
24c-d. One is bound everywhere by the others, whatever they are.
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One is bound to all the objects of the three time periods and the five categories, according to the case, by the other, general klesas--which, having for their object the five upadanaskandhas, are produced within all and relative to all--in whatever period the said klesas belong.
***
89
[The Sautrantikas criticize this theory. ] Do the klesas, and
past and future objects, really exist?
If one says that they really exist, one admits that conditioned things always exist and are thus eternal; if they do not exist, how is it possible to say that a person is bound to these objects by the klesas, or that he is liberated from them?
The Vaibhasikas maintain that past and future dharmas really exist; conditioned things nevertheless are not eternal for they are endowed with the characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c-d) of conditioned things. In order to better illustrate their position we present, in summary fashion, their doctrine:
25a. The dharmas exist in the three time periods.
Why is this?
90 25a. Because the Blessed One has said it.
1. The Blessed One taught in his own words the existence of the past and the future, "Monks, if past rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would 'not take into consideration' past rupa . . . If future rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would
'not delight in' future rupa. It is because future rupa exists that the
learned holy Sravakas . . . "
91
? 25b. Because mental consciousness preceeds from two.
2. The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when
he says, "Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are
these two? The organ of sight and a visible thing. . . the manas and 92
the dharmas" Now if the past and future dharmas do not exist, mental consciousness which has them for its object would not arise by reason of these two.
[These are the proofs taken from Scripture. As for proofs ' taken from reasoning:]
25c. Because it has an object.
3. A consciousness can arise given an object, but not if an object is not present. If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no conciousness without an object.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
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How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
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its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
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The Latent Defilements 809
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
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[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma!
