The formula thus contains the words pramadasthana in order to have one
understand
that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Then what would the fast be, distinct from its rules, and yet embracing eight parts?
According to the Sautrantikas, it is the very collection of parts which
one says possesses parts; it is to this very collection that one attributes
parts. The expression, "a fast having eight parts" should be understood
in the same way as the expressions, "a part of a carriage," "a four-part
army" (caturangabala), or "a powder made up of five parts" (pancdn- 113
gapisfa).
iii. According to the Vaibhasikas, the abstaining from food at forbidden times is at one and the same time the fast and a part of the fast. In the same way that Right Views (samyagdrsti) are at one and the same time the Path and a part of the Path (mdrgdnga); in the same way that Investigation into the Dharmas (dharmapravicaya) is at one and the same time Bodhi and a part of Bodhi (vi. 68); and in the same way way that Samadhi is at one and the same time dhydna and a part of dhydna (viii. 7-8).
iv. But we would say [with the Sautrantikas] that it is impossible for
Karma 597
? Right Views, Investigation into the Dharmas, and Samadhi to be parts of themselves. Would you say that earlier Right Views, etc, are parts of later Right Views, etc ? This would be to admit that the first moment of the Path does not have eight parts. This would be to admit that the last
114 moment of the parts of Bodhi is itself not a part.
*#*
Is the possession of the discipline of the fast kept only by
115 Upasakas?
30a-b. Others can possess the fast, but not without taking the Refuges.
When a person who is not a Upasaka, takes, in the same day and night, the Three Refuges before he undertakes the rules of the fast, then the discipline of the fast is produced within him. But not without taking the Refuges; on the condition that there has been no error, etc (iv. 3 Id).
The Mahandma-sutra says, "Oh Mahanama, the layman with white clothes, male and possessing the male organ, who, after having taken refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Sangha, pronounces these words, 'Consider me as an Upasaka:' only through this does he
116
become an Upasaka. " Does this mean that one becomes an Upasaka
by only taking the Three Refuges?
The Aparantakas answer yes. (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 645cl9).
The Ka? mlreans affirm that one cannot be an Upasaka when one
does not possess the Upasaka discipline. But does this not contradict the Sutra?
117
No.
Because
3Qc-d The discipline is produced through the fact that he
118 accepts the qualities of an Upasaka.
The discipline of the Upasaka is produced in him by the mere
acceptance of the quality of the Upasaka, when he says, "Consider me, 119
from today onwards, for the rest of my life, as aprandpeta Upasaka. " [What is the meaning of the expression prdndpeta? ]
One should understand, pranatipatapeta through ellipis, as free
from killing, having renounced killing (see below, note 127).
? Thus, by accepting the quality of an Upasaka, one undertakes the discipline [since one shows himself as having renounced killing]. Yet, in order that he understands the points of the rule (siksapada),
30d One explains them to him, as is also the case for a Bhiksu.
Through an ecclesiastical action the Bhiksu has acquired the discipline of the Bhik$u: yet he is made to undertake the most important rules: "You are to abstain from this, from that. Your co-religionists will
120 m
tell you the rest. " The same holds for the Sramanera. The same
holds for the Upasaka: he obtains the discipline by undertaking once, twice, three time the Three Refuges; he is then made to undertake the rules, "Abandoning killing, I renounce killing. " Thus one is not an Upasaka without possessing the discipline of the Upasaka.
3 la-b. If all Upasakas possess the discipline of the Upasaka, how can an Upasaka be an ekadesakdrin, etc?
If all Upasakas place themselves within the discipline of the
Upasaka, why did the Blessed One describe four types of Upasakas, the
Upasaka of one rule (ekade/akdrin), of two rules (pradefakdtin), of
three or four rules (yadbhuyaskdrin), and of five rules (paripurna- 122
kdrin)?
31c These terms, say the School, refer to the faa of observing
123 the rules.
The Upasaka who in faa observes one of the rules [of all which he has accepted] is said to praaice (kar) this rule. [It should not be understood that the ekadesakdrin is an Upasaka who undertakes to praaice only a single rule]. Yet all the Upasakas are equally placed
124 within this discipline.
The Sautrantikas objea: Your doarine contradias the Sutra.
In what way does it contradict the Sutra?
i. You say that one acquires the discipline by the mere faa of
accepting the quality of a prdndpeta Upasaka, "Consider me . . . as a prdndpeta Upasaka. " But, such is not the text of the Sutra. In faa, the Sutra that interests us is the Mahdndma-sutra which gives the definition of an Upasaka, and not another Sutra. And the Mahdndma-sutra does not have the expression "prddndpeta. "
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125
You hold that you are authorized by another Sutra, which has,
"From today, for the rest of my life, [consider me as an Upasaka], risking
126
my life (pranopeta), having taken refuge, believing perfealy
(abhiprasanna). "Now this text refers to persons who have seen the Truths, who have acquired the faith of intelligence (avetyaprasdda, vi. 73), and who, as a consequence, adhere to the Good Law even at the price of their lives: "We are incapable of abandoning the Dharma, even in order to save our lives. " This text does not give a definition of the Upasaka discipline.
Further, the expression pranopeta, upon which you establish your
theory, is nowhere to be found, either in the Mahanama-sutra, nor the
Drstasatya-sutra. Whocouldadmitasimilarexpressionthesenseof 127
which is lacking in precision? Who, based on faith in this expression, would admit that the Upasaka has undertaken the five renouncings before he has undertaken them ritually?
ii. If the expression ekade? akarin designates a person who violates the discipline, the question raised in the Sutra (note 122) is not justified, nor its answer. In fact, who is it that, being acquainted with the discipline of an Upasaka and knowing that it is made up of five rules, would be incapable of explaining, "He who does not violate a rule observes a rule" and so oa
On the contrary, someone who does not know the extent of the discipline of an Upasaka, seeing the persons capable of observing one, or two, or three, or all the rules, would he be able to pose the question, "What does one do to become an Upasaka of all the rules? "
The Vaibhasikas answer: If one were an Upasaka without possess- ing the discipline of an Upasaka, one could also as well be a Bhiksu or a &ramanera with an incomplete discipline.
Answer: How can we know the extent, the number of the rules of
the disciplines of the Upasaka, the Sramanera, or the Bhiksu? Evidently
through the teaching of the Master. Now the Master speaks of the
Upasaka not possessing the discipline in its entirety; but he does not
speak of an incomplete discipline of the Bhiksus or of the Sra-
128 maneras.
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmir do not admit this opinioa
3 Id. All the disciplines are weak, etc, according to the mind
? The weakness, the mediocrity, and the force of the eight rules depend on the weakness, on the mediocrity, or on the force of the mind through which one has undertaken them.
But if such is the case, the Pratimoksa discipline of an Arhat could be weak, and that of a Prthagjana could be strong.
Is one an Upasaka if one solely undertakes the discipline (samvara) without undertaking the Refuges?
No; except in the case of ignorance by the person who gives and by the person who receives.
***
When a person takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and in the Sangha, what does he take refuge in?
32. He who takes the Refuges takes refuge in the asaiksa dharmas which form the Buddha, in the two types of dharmas
129 which form the Sangha, and in Nirvana.
i. He who takes Refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the dharmas
of the Arhat which form a Buddha, the dharmas which are the causes of
the designation "Buddha," that is, the dharmas by reason of which, as 130
principle cause, a certain person is called a Buddha; or rather the dharmas by the acquisition of which a certain person, understanding all things, is called a Buddha. These dharmas are the Knowledge of Extinction (ksayajndna), the Knowledge of Nonarising (anutpada-
jnana) and Right Views (samyagdrspi) (vi. 50, 67) with the dharmas B1
which accompany these jnanas, that is, with the five pure skandhas. 132
As for the material body (rupakdya) of the Buddha, that is not subject to modification through the acquistion of the quality of Buddha. Thus one does not take refuge in the material body of the Buddha which is, in fact, the material body of the Bodhisattva.
Does one take refuge in all the Buddhas or in one Buddha?
According to the nature of things, and in the absence of an explicit declaration, in all the Buddhas. For the Buddhas have always followed
133
the same path, a worldly path and a transworldly path (vii34).
ii. He who takes Refuge in the Sangha takes refuge in both the
iaiksa and the asaiksa dharmas, of the non-Arhat and of the Arhat,
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which form the Sangha, that is, the dharmas through the acquisition of which the Eight Saints become a Sangha; becoming unanimous they cannot be divided with regard to that which concerns the Path.
Does one take refuge in all the Sanghas or in one Sangha?
According to the nature of things, in all: for the Path followed by the
Saints is always the same. Without doubt, the Buddha said to the two
merchants, "Also take refuge in the Sangha which shall exist in the
134
future," but the Master expressed himself in this manner in order to
exhault the qualities of the Jewel of the Sangha which would soon be visible to the merchants.
iii. He who takes Refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in Nirvana, that is to say, mpratisamkhydnirodha (i. 5, ii. 55d). He takes refuge in all Nirvana, for Nirvana has for its unique charaaeristic the cessation of the defilements and suffering of oneself and others (see vi. 73c, the meaning of the word dharma in dharma avetyaprasada).
iv. Discussion.
If the Buddha is none other than the aiaiksa dharmas, the dharmas pertaining to an Arhat, how could the fact of wounding the Buddha with a bad thought constitute a mortal transgression (iv. 96)?
The Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 177b8) answer: "When one wounds the material elements which are the support of these dharmas, these dharmas themselves suffer injury. "
But the Sastra (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 177a27) does not say that the Buddha is solely aiaiksa dharmas. It says that the Buddha is the dharmas that form a Buddha, that is to say, either the worldly or transworldly dharmas which are the objea of the designation "Buddha," are the Buddha. Thus the Sastra does not deny that the diraya--the organism, the support made up of the five worldly skandhas--forms part of the quality of Buddha. Hence the objection taken from wounding the Buddha is without value.
If it were otherwise, if the Buddha was only aiaiksa dharmas, and if the Sangha (that is, the Saints, Saiksas and Arhats) were only iaiksa and aiaiksa dharmas, a person whose mind is presently "worldly" would not be able to be either a Buddha or a Sangha. And by virtue of these same principles, one would have to say that a Bhiksu is only morality, the discipline of a Bhiksu.
But, say the Vaibhasikas, if the body is, itself, among the dharmas
? which form the Buddha, why does the Sastra say, "He who takes refuge in the Buddha, takes refuge in the asaiksa dharmas which form the Buddha? "
We would answer: In the same way that one who honors Bhiksus, honors the morality which makes up the Bhiksus.
According to another opinion, one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the eighteen avenikadharmas (vii. 28) of the Buddha.
**#
What is the nature of the undertakings of the Refuges?
l35
They are vocal vijnapti (iv. 3d).
What is the meaning of "Refuge" (sarana)?
The Three Refuges are so named because, by going to them for
refuge one obtains definitive deliverance from all suffering.
136
The Blessed One said in fact, "Tormented by fear, persons most
137
frequently take refuge in mountains, in forests, in woods, and in
l38
sacred trees. This is not a good
taking refuge in these that one is delivered from all suffering. But one who takes Refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, when one sees through wisdom the Four Noble Truths,--Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinaion of Suffering, and the Holy Eightfold Path which leads to Nirvana,--this is the good refuge, this is the supreme refuge; by taking refuge in this, one is delivered from all suffering. "
This is why the undertaking of the Refuges is the enterance to the undertaking of all the rules of discipline.
***
The other rules of discipline contain the renouncing of all sexual activity (abrahmacaryavirati); but the discipline of the Upasaka only contains the renouncing of sexual misconduct (kamamithyacara, iv. 74). Why is this?
33a-b. Sexual misconduct, because it is much censured, because one easily abstains from it, because the Aryans have obtained abstention from it.
refuge, the supreme refuge; it is not by
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1. Sexual misconduct is much censured in the world because it is the corruption of another's wife, and because it leads to retribution in a painful realm of rebirth.
2. It is easy for householders to abstain from it, but it is difficult for them to abstain from all sexual activity: householders do not leave the world because they are not capable of difficult things. (Divya, 303).
3. The Aryans possess akaranasarhvara with regard to sexual misconduct, that is, they have obtained definite abstention from it; in fact, in their future existence, they will be incapable of violating this precept. Such is not the case concerning all sexual activity. As a consequence, the rules of discipline of the Upasaka contain only the renunciation of sexual misconduct: it is inadmissible in fact that the Aryans, in a susequent existence, would be capable of violating the discipline of an Upasaka which could happen if this contained the renuncation of all sexual activity. Akaranasarhvara means akriyani-
yama, (that is akriyayam ekantata, the certain abstention from one 139
action).
***
Has the man who marries after having undertaken the Upasaka discipline, undertaken renouncing with regard to the woman whom he marries?
Yes, answer the Vaibhasikas; for, in the contrary hypothesis, this man would have undertaken a restraining discipline (pradeiika, iv. 36a- b).
But then this man violates the discipline when he gets married! No:
33c-d They have acquired it as they have accepted the discipline; they have not accepted it with regard to some persons.
They have acquired it as they have undertaken the discipline. They
undertake it by saying, "I renounce sexual misconduct," that is, "I
renounce all sexual activity with all prohibited females;" they do not
undertake it by saying, "I shall refrain from all sexual activity with such
140
persons. " Consequently, they do not violate the discipline by getting
married
? Among the transgression of speech, why does the renouncing of lying constitute one of the rules of the Upasaka, whereas the renouncing of other transgressions of speech are omitted?
For the same reasons: because lying is much censured in the world, because householders abstain from it easily, and because the Aryans are not capable of lying; and also for a fourth reason:
41 34a-b. Because, having violated any other rule he would lie. *
[If lying were not forbidden], he would lie when he violates any other rule, saying, "I have not done it. " Consequently the Upasaka should renounce lying, thinking, "I shall confess what I transgress. "
###
142
Why are not the transgressions of disobedience included in the
discipline of the Upasaka?
The question is not justified:
34c-d One renounces strong liquor, which is a transgression of disobedience,
Why should the Upasaka renounce a single transgression of disobedience and not others?
34& In order that the other rules may be kept.
One who drinks strong liquor will not keep the other rules.
L The Abhidharmikas maintain that strong liquor does not have the characteristic of being a transgression by its nature. A transgression by its nature is committed only by a person whose mind is defiled: now it happens that, as a remedy, one can drink strong liquor in a quantity where it is not inebriating. But the mind of one who drinks knowing that such a quantity is inebriating is defiled; the mind is not defiled when one drinks knowning that such a quantity is not inebriating.
ii. Such is not the opinion of the Vinayadharas. [According to them, strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature. ]
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1. To Upali, who asked him, "How should one attend to illnesses? "
the Blessed One answered, "Except, Upali, by transgression of
143
nature. " And, the Blessed One did not permit strong liquors to sick
Sakyans: "Those who recognize me as their master should not drink any
144
strong liquor, even a drop on the point of a blade of grass. " Since the
Blessed One forbad only transgression by nature in the case of illness (as in the UpMisffira) and yet does not permit strong liquor, it is clear that strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.
2. The Aryans, even in a following existence, do not drink strong liquor, not any more than they would commit the other transgressions
145
146
3. Scripture,--the Nandikasutra and elsewhere,--places strong
147 liquor among the misdeeds of the body.
iii. The Abhidharmikas answer:
1. In general, the transgression of disobedience is permitted to the
ill, as the answer to Upali proves. But strong liquor is an exception:
though solely a transgression of disobedience, it is forbidden to the ill,
and this with a view to preventing the upleasant consequence of strong
148 149 liquor, because its inebriating quantity is undetermined.
2. If the Aryans certainly abstain from strong liquor, it is not because
it is a transgression by its very nature, but because they are filled with the
150 151
force of modesty; [if they do not drink in secret ], this is because
strong liquor makes mindfulness fail; even if they do not drink a drop, this is because the inebriating quantity is not determined, as for poison.
3. Scripture considers strong liquor as a bodily misdeed, because strong liquor is a "cause of non-vigilence. " In fact, the rule of training relative to strong liquor includes the expression, "Abandoning the pramddasthdna which is strong liquor, surd and maireya, I renounce pramddasthana. . . " Thisisnotthecasefortheothertransgressions: one does not say "I renounce the pramadasthana which is killing," and that is because the other transgressions are transgressions by their very nature.
The Scripture says that one is reborn in hell through the practice of
152
strong liquor. As a consequence of strong liquor, there is continual
activity of a series of bad thoughts; from whence, there is either projection of a new action retribuable in hell, or else the entry into activity, at the moment of death, of an old action.
of nature, killing, etc
? What is the meaning of the expression suramaireya madya- m
pramadasthana?
Sura is a fermented drink of rice; maireya is a fermented drink of
various ingredients (sugar cane juice, etc).
At a certain moment, the liquor is no longer inebriating; at a certain
moment, it is no longer that: this is why the word madya (inebriating) has been added. Even the areca-nut, the paspale (kodrava, etc. ) are
l54 termed sura and maireya when they inebriate.
Strong liquor is only a transgression of disobedience.
The formula thus contains the words pramadasthana in order to have one understand that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.
***
Do the three discipline have the same object?
35a-b. One acquires the discipline of Kamadhatu relative to all actions, relative to the two types of beings and to the two types of actions, relative to things of the present.
The discipline of Kamadhatu is the Pratimoksa discipline.
This discipline is relative to all actions, preparatory actions, actions
155 themselves, and consecutive action (iv. 68).
This discipline is relative to living beings and to non-living beings, for example persons and trees.
This discipline is relative to the transgressions by nature and to the transgression of disobedience, both of which are capable of relating to living beings (killing; touching the hand of a women when one is a monk) or to non-living beings (cutting the leaves of a tree; accepting gold when one is a monk).
This discipline is relative to things--skandhas, ayatanasand dhatus--of the present, for the things of the past and of the future are
156 neither living beings, nor non-living beings.
35c-d. One acquires the discipline of dhyana and the pure
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discipline relative to actions themselves and to things of the three time periods.
One acquires these two disciplines relative to actions themselves, not relative to preparatory actions or to consecutive action, and not relative to the transgression of disobedience; and relative to the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus of the past, present and future.
There are thus some skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus relative to which one acquires the Pratimoksa discipline and not the two others. Four cases: 1. Preparatory and consecutive actions, transgressions of disobedience, of the present--alluded to by the Pratimoksa. 2. Courses of action of the past and future--alluded to by the last two disciplines. 3. Courses of actions of the present--alluded to by the three disciplines. 4. Preparatory and consecutive actions of the past and the future, with regard to which one cannot undertake any of the three disciplines.
**#
Objection: It is not correct to say that one undertakes the discipline relative to the course of aaion of the present time: for, when one undertakes the discipline, no bad course of action is present relative to which one could undertake the discipline. One should say, "One undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action whose object is present. " I can abstain from a future aaion relative to a person or to a thing existing at the present time, but I cannot abstain from a past or future aaion.
***
Does one acquire discipline or undiscipline with regard to all beings, relative to all of their parts, and by reason of all causes?
36a-b. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings; one must distinguish regarding the parts and the causes.
1. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings, not with regard to only some of them.
The discipline of the Bhiksu is acquired relative to all parts:
? abstention from the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are acquired relative to four parts: abstention from killing, from stealing, from forbidden sexuality, from lying, for, by parts of the discipline, one should understand abstention from the courses of action.
If, by cause of the acquisition of discipline, one understands the three roots of good (non-desire, non-hatred, non-delusion), then the dis- cipline is acquired by reason of all these causes. If one understands by cause--the cause of the origin, samutthapaka (iv. 9b)--the mind by which one acquires the discipline, then this cause is considered as threefold: strong mind, mediocre mind, weak mind. The discipline is acquired by reason of one of these three minds.
From this last point of view, four alternatives can be distinguished (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 608a20).
1. There is a person abiding in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, but not disciplined relative to all the parts, nor disciplined by reason of all causes: he who, through a strong, or mediocre, or weak mind, has acquired the discipline of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha or the Sramanera. 2. There is a person abiding in the discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings and relative to all the parts, but not disciplined by reason of all causes: he who has acquired the discipline of the Bhiksu through a strong, mediocre, or weak mind. 3. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, relative to all the parts, by reason of all the causes: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Sramanera and the Bhiksu through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong. 4. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, disciplined by reason of all the causes, but not disciplined relative to all the parts: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha and the Sramanera through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong.
N o one abides in discipline who is not disciplined with regard to all beings: he acquires the discipline through a good mind having for its object all beings. The person who makes a restriction is not completely rid of the intention of transgression.
The Pratimoksa discipline includes the absence of the fivefold restriction: 1. with regard to beings, "I renounce transgressions with regard to certain beings;" 2. with regard to parts of the discipline, "I
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renounce certain actions;" 3. with regard to place, "I renounce committing transgressions in a certain place;" 4. with regard to time, "I renounce transgressions for a month;" 5. with regard to circumstances, "I renounce transgressions except in the case of a quarrel. " He who undertakes such undertakings does not acquire the discipline; rather, he
157 does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline.
ii. How can one acquire the discipline with regard to all beings? How can one acquire the discipline with regard to beings who are out of range, or with regard to beings whom one cannot kill?
Because, we believe, one acquires the discipline through the intention of not killing any being.
The Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 623M9, second masters) give a different explanation. If the discipline was acquired only with regard to beings who are within range, the discipline would be liable to augmentation and to diminution: for some humans, who are now within range*, will be reborn as gods, which are out of range; and vice versa. The discipline would thus be acquired with regard to gods who become human, and lost with regard to humans who become gods, without there being any cause either of the acquisition, or of the loss of the discipline.
This argument does not move us: the transmigration of beings within range and out of range does not entail the augmentation or the diminution of the discipline. For the discipline that one undertakes with regard to grass neither increases nor diminishes when new grass arises, nor when old grass dries up.
The Vaibhasikas deny the value of this comparison. Grass exists after having been nonexistent, and no longer exists after having existed Living beings, on the contrary, continue to exist, sometimes as humans, and sometimes as gods. Humans, becoming gods, only pass out of range, whereas grass is annihilated.
But when living beings enter into Nirvana, they no longer exist, exactly like grass, so the discipline acquired with regard to living beings is subject to diminution. Thus the explanation of the Vaibhasikas is invalid
If one objects, "In the case where the Pratimoksa discipline would be acquired with regard to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas would be reduced in comparason with that of former Buddhas, for it
? would not be relative to beings who have already entered into Nirvana,
158
to former Buddhas and their disciples", we would reply: all the
Buddhas discipline all beings; and if former Buddhas were to exist again, later Buddhas would be disciplined by them.
36c-d Undiscipline, with regard to all, relative to all parts, and not by reason of all causes.
One acquires undiscipline with regard to all beings and relative to all courses of aaion. No one is undisciplined with an incomplete undiscipline. One is not undisciplined by reason of all causes, un- discipline being undertaken by a weak, mediocre, or strong mind. Let us suppose that an undisciplined person has undertaken his undiscipline with a weak mind and commits a murder with a strong mind: his undiscipline remains weak, but he is adorned with a strong vijnapti, with a strong murder.
The term "undisciplined" is explained etymologically as one "who resides in undiscipline (asamvara), one who possesses undiscipline. " The butchers of sheep, bird-catchers, the butchers of pigs, fisher-
man, hunters, bandits, exceutioners, jailers, elephant hunters, the slaughterers of dogs, and the vagurikas are all undisciplined. It also holds that kings, office holders, judges, etc, are undisciplined.
A butcher of sheep (aurabhrika) is the person whose profession is to kill sheep (urabfora). . The same etymology holds for the names of the
159 other professions.
ii. We understand that discipline, undertaken with the intention of universal benevolence, would be acquired with regard to all beings. But the butchers of sheep do not have the intention of maltreating their parents, their children, or their servants; they would not want to kill them, even at the price of their lifes. How, [ask the Sautrantikas], can one say that they are undisciplined with regard to all beings? (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608b20).
The Vaibhasikas: Because they have the intention of killing with regard to their parents who have become sheep through trans-
160
migration.
But they do not kill their parents who have become sheep knowing
that they are their parents! Furthermore, if their parents obtain the quality of an Aryan, these parents will not be reborn as sheep or as
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animals: hence the butcher is not undisciplined with regard to them. Finally, the argument turns against you: if the butcher is undisciplined with regard to his present parents because he will kill his parents who have become sheep, one would say as well that he is not undisciplined with regard to some other sheep since he is not disposed to kill the sheep which are reborn as humans, as his own children.
The Vaibhasikas: He who has the intention to kill his parents who have become sheep is certainly undisciplined with regard to them.
But, [the Sautrantikas say,] he who does not have the intention of killing the sheep who have become his children is certainly not undisciplined in their regard Another point: how can the butcher who does not steal, who is not an adulterer, and who is mute, be undisciplined relative to all these transgressions?
The Vaibhasikas: Because his intention is perverted. A mute can express himself through gestures.
But what is there to say of a man who has accepted two or three parts of morality?
For the Vaibhasikas, nondiscipline is never incomplete, that is, relative only to certain parts; nor is it partial, that is, including restrictions (time, place, etc) in the practice of a certain transgression.
For the Sautrantikas, discipline and undiscipline with the exception
of the Pratimoksa discipline can be incomplete and partial. This
depends on the manner in which one undertakes discipline or
,f
undiscipline: one binds" oneself to a part of immorality, or to a certain
part of morality.
***
How does one acquire undiscipline? How does one acquire the avijnaptis which are neither discipline, nor undiscipline?
37a-b. One acquires undiscipline through action or through
161 accepting it.
Persons born in a family of undisciplined persons acquire un- discipline when they accomplish the actions preparatory to killing (iv. 68c). Persons born in other families acquire undiscipline when they adopt such a style of life, thinking "We too shall live in this manner. "
? 37c-d One acquires the other avijnaptis by reason of the field, of 162
undertaking, of an action seriously undertakea
1. Certain persons are a field of such a nature that by offering them a garden, etc, one reduces avijnapti. [See below, iv. 112, the doarine of good material works. ]
2. One produces avijnapti by undertaking vows, for example, "I shall not eat unless I have paid homage to the Buddha," "I shall give alms
163
3. Action undertaken seriously, with a burning faith, with a burning
food on the fast day, for a fortnight, for a month, for a year," etc passion (iv. 22d), produces avijOapti.
***
How does one lose discipline?
38. The Pratimok? a discipline is lost through abjuration, through death, through hermaphroditism, through the cutting off of the roots, and by the night coming to an end.
The stanza calls the Pratimoksa discipline dama because it subdues (damyati) the six organs.
Excluding the discipline of the fast, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost:
164
1. through abjuration, intentionally renouncing the rule in the
presence of a person capable of understanding it; 2. through the death or abandonment of the nikdyasabhaga (ii. 41); 3. through the ap- pearance of the male or the female organ according to the case; and 4. through the cutting off of the roots of good (iv. 79).
The discipline of fast is lost through these four causes and, further, when night come to an end.
Abjuration constitutes a vijnapti in contradiction to the under- taking; death and hermaphroditism constitute the abandoning and the overturning of the personality who undertook the Pratimoksa (see iv. 27a); the cutting off of the roots is the cutting off of the foundation of the discipline itself. Finally the discipline of the fast has been created, or projected, for a day and a night: it comes to its end when the night is finished.
39a. Some say through a patamya.
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According to the Sautrantikas, the discipline of the Bhiksu and the
novice is also lost through any one of the four polarityas, or 165
transgressions involving a falling away.
39b. Through the disappearance of the Good Law, say some other masters.
According to the Dharmaguptakas, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost when the Good Law disappears: there are no longer any rules, any boundaries, nor any ecclesiastic actions.
39c-d The Ka? mlreans believe that the transgressor possesses morality and immoraltity, in the manner that a person can have riches and debts.
i. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir say: A monk guilty of a grave transgression, that is, of 2, pataniya, does not lose his Bhiksu discipline. It is not admissible that one loses the entire discipline by destroying only a
166
part of the discipline. He who commits a transgression other than a
pataniya is not immoral. He who commits a pataniya is at one and the same time moral and immoral: as a person who has both riches and debts; but when this transgressor has confessed his transgression, he is no longer immoral, but solely moral: as a person who has paid his debts.
ii. But the Blessed One has said, "He is not a Bhiksu, he is not a monk; he no longer belongs to the sons of Sakya; he falls from the quality of Bhiksu; his quality of monkhood is cut off, fallen, erased,
167 tumbled down, annihilated. "
The Vaibhasikas: In this text "Bhiksu" signifies a "true Bhiksu:" the transgressor, being incapable of seeing the Truths, is not a true Bhiksu.
An inadmissable explanation: you avoid the question that the Blessed One made "in a clear sense:" furthermore, you lead defiled persons to the practice of immorality.
The Vaibhasikas: How can you prove that this quotation is of clear sense and should be taken literally?
The Blessed One has explained this himself. "There are four
Bhiksus: a samjnabhiksu, a Bhiksu in name only, is a person who is
called Bhiksu without his having been ordained; a pratijriabhiksu, a
self-styled Bhiksu, is one who is immoral, unchaste, etc; a person called
168
Bhiksu because he begs, is a begger only; and the person who is called
? Bhiksu because he has cut off the defilements, that is to say, the
169 17
Arhat. " In the text which concerns us ? ("He is not a Bhiksu, he is
not a monk. . . "), this refers to a fifth Bhiksu, namely a person who has been properly ordained but who, thtov^ipatantya, loses this quality and this discipline; it is certainly not a question of his being a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, for one capable of a polaritya is not a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, but is susceptible of losing the quality of being a true Bhiksu.
iii. The argument that one does not lose the entire discipline through the losing of one part of it, is refuted by the Master himself who in fact compares a transgressor monk to a palm tree whose head is cut off, henceforth incapable of becoming green, of growing, of developing,
m
or of growing larger:
the part which is the root of the discipline, is cut off, the rest of the discipline is incapable of growing. The potantya or the mauliapattt is in contradiaion to the state required of being a Bhiksu; he embraces an extreme absence of fear of transgression (anapatrapya, ii. 32a-b); he breaks off the root of discipline: all his discipline is lost.
The Master excludes persons guilty of pataniya from all com-
172
merce
them for even one mouthful of food, he forbids them from even setting one foot into the monastery. He says, "He who is not a Bhiksu but who has the aspect of a Bhiksu--destroy this tare, uproot this rotten tree,
173
drive out this plant without seed! " What indeed can be the Bhiksu
quality of this criminal?
iv. The Kasmireans answer: He possesses the quality which consists
of his quality of Bhiksu. For the Blessed One said, "Cunda, there are four
monks and not a fifth: the mdrgajina, who triumphs through the Path;
the margadaisika, who teaches the Path; the margajivin, who lives in
this means that, when one part of the discipline,
with the Bhiksus, he prohibits them from participating with
the Path; and the mdrgadusin, who soils the Path, the immoral 174
monk. "
We believe that the Blessed One gives the name of "monk" to an
immoral monk because his external form is that of a monk. Does one not speak of burning wood, of a dried up pond, of a parrot-nose (a motif of architectural decoration), of rotten seed, of a circle of fire, or of a dead being?
v. Answer of the Kasmireans: One does not lose the quality of monkhood through pataniya, since the Blessed One admits a monk
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175 guilty of unchastity as a penitent.
We do not say that any Bhiksu guilty of unchastity is a pdrdjika, a fallen or destroyed Bhik? u. But whoever is a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu. It is the idea of hiding the crime which is decisive here: if, thanks to the excellence of his moral dispositions, thanks to the excellence of his "series," the guilty one does not have the thought of concealing his fault for an instant, then the King of the Law admits him as a penitant.
The Ka? mlreans: If a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu, why is he not again admitted to ordination?
Because he is susceptible to discipline: his mental dispositions are ruined and overturned by the excess of imprudence (anapatrdpya, ii32a-b). Also, even if he had renounced the rules {niksiptafiksa, iv. 38) [after his transgression], he cannot be ordained again. To what good does this discussion lead? If a similar Bhiksu is a Bhiksu, we pay homage
176 to this quality of Bhiksu.
vi. When the Good Law disappears, all ecclesiastical acts become impossible, and as a consequence also all acquisition of the discipline. But he who possesses the discipline will not lose it (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608cll).
***
How does one lose the discipline of dhydna (iv. l7b) and the pure discipline?
40a-b. The "good" of the sphere of dhydna is lost through a 177
change of state and through falling.
All of the good of the sphere of dhydna, that is, material and non-material good, is lost through two causes: 1. through arising in a superior or inferior stage: this refers to the "good" which appears to persons arisen in the heavens of Rupadhatu; 2. through falling away: when the ascetic falls away from this absorption.
One should add a third cause, [according to vi.
According to the Sautrantikas, it is the very collection of parts which
one says possesses parts; it is to this very collection that one attributes
parts. The expression, "a fast having eight parts" should be understood
in the same way as the expressions, "a part of a carriage," "a four-part
army" (caturangabala), or "a powder made up of five parts" (pancdn- 113
gapisfa).
iii. According to the Vaibhasikas, the abstaining from food at forbidden times is at one and the same time the fast and a part of the fast. In the same way that Right Views (samyagdrsti) are at one and the same time the Path and a part of the Path (mdrgdnga); in the same way that Investigation into the Dharmas (dharmapravicaya) is at one and the same time Bodhi and a part of Bodhi (vi. 68); and in the same way way that Samadhi is at one and the same time dhydna and a part of dhydna (viii. 7-8).
iv. But we would say [with the Sautrantikas] that it is impossible for
Karma 597
? Right Views, Investigation into the Dharmas, and Samadhi to be parts of themselves. Would you say that earlier Right Views, etc, are parts of later Right Views, etc ? This would be to admit that the first moment of the Path does not have eight parts. This would be to admit that the last
114 moment of the parts of Bodhi is itself not a part.
*#*
Is the possession of the discipline of the fast kept only by
115 Upasakas?
30a-b. Others can possess the fast, but not without taking the Refuges.
When a person who is not a Upasaka, takes, in the same day and night, the Three Refuges before he undertakes the rules of the fast, then the discipline of the fast is produced within him. But not without taking the Refuges; on the condition that there has been no error, etc (iv. 3 Id).
The Mahandma-sutra says, "Oh Mahanama, the layman with white clothes, male and possessing the male organ, who, after having taken refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Sangha, pronounces these words, 'Consider me as an Upasaka:' only through this does he
116
become an Upasaka. " Does this mean that one becomes an Upasaka
by only taking the Three Refuges?
The Aparantakas answer yes. (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 645cl9).
The Ka? mlreans affirm that one cannot be an Upasaka when one
does not possess the Upasaka discipline. But does this not contradict the Sutra?
117
No.
Because
3Qc-d The discipline is produced through the fact that he
118 accepts the qualities of an Upasaka.
The discipline of the Upasaka is produced in him by the mere
acceptance of the quality of the Upasaka, when he says, "Consider me, 119
from today onwards, for the rest of my life, as aprandpeta Upasaka. " [What is the meaning of the expression prdndpeta? ]
One should understand, pranatipatapeta through ellipis, as free
from killing, having renounced killing (see below, note 127).
? Thus, by accepting the quality of an Upasaka, one undertakes the discipline [since one shows himself as having renounced killing]. Yet, in order that he understands the points of the rule (siksapada),
30d One explains them to him, as is also the case for a Bhiksu.
Through an ecclesiastical action the Bhiksu has acquired the discipline of the Bhik$u: yet he is made to undertake the most important rules: "You are to abstain from this, from that. Your co-religionists will
120 m
tell you the rest. " The same holds for the Sramanera. The same
holds for the Upasaka: he obtains the discipline by undertaking once, twice, three time the Three Refuges; he is then made to undertake the rules, "Abandoning killing, I renounce killing. " Thus one is not an Upasaka without possessing the discipline of the Upasaka.
3 la-b. If all Upasakas possess the discipline of the Upasaka, how can an Upasaka be an ekadesakdrin, etc?
If all Upasakas place themselves within the discipline of the
Upasaka, why did the Blessed One describe four types of Upasakas, the
Upasaka of one rule (ekade/akdrin), of two rules (pradefakdtin), of
three or four rules (yadbhuyaskdrin), and of five rules (paripurna- 122
kdrin)?
31c These terms, say the School, refer to the faa of observing
123 the rules.
The Upasaka who in faa observes one of the rules [of all which he has accepted] is said to praaice (kar) this rule. [It should not be understood that the ekadesakdrin is an Upasaka who undertakes to praaice only a single rule]. Yet all the Upasakas are equally placed
124 within this discipline.
The Sautrantikas objea: Your doarine contradias the Sutra.
In what way does it contradict the Sutra?
i. You say that one acquires the discipline by the mere faa of
accepting the quality of a prdndpeta Upasaka, "Consider me . . . as a prdndpeta Upasaka. " But, such is not the text of the Sutra. In faa, the Sutra that interests us is the Mahdndma-sutra which gives the definition of an Upasaka, and not another Sutra. And the Mahdndma-sutra does not have the expression "prddndpeta. "
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125
You hold that you are authorized by another Sutra, which has,
"From today, for the rest of my life, [consider me as an Upasaka], risking
126
my life (pranopeta), having taken refuge, believing perfealy
(abhiprasanna). "Now this text refers to persons who have seen the Truths, who have acquired the faith of intelligence (avetyaprasdda, vi. 73), and who, as a consequence, adhere to the Good Law even at the price of their lives: "We are incapable of abandoning the Dharma, even in order to save our lives. " This text does not give a definition of the Upasaka discipline.
Further, the expression pranopeta, upon which you establish your
theory, is nowhere to be found, either in the Mahanama-sutra, nor the
Drstasatya-sutra. Whocouldadmitasimilarexpressionthesenseof 127
which is lacking in precision? Who, based on faith in this expression, would admit that the Upasaka has undertaken the five renouncings before he has undertaken them ritually?
ii. If the expression ekade? akarin designates a person who violates the discipline, the question raised in the Sutra (note 122) is not justified, nor its answer. In fact, who is it that, being acquainted with the discipline of an Upasaka and knowing that it is made up of five rules, would be incapable of explaining, "He who does not violate a rule observes a rule" and so oa
On the contrary, someone who does not know the extent of the discipline of an Upasaka, seeing the persons capable of observing one, or two, or three, or all the rules, would he be able to pose the question, "What does one do to become an Upasaka of all the rules? "
The Vaibhasikas answer: If one were an Upasaka without possess- ing the discipline of an Upasaka, one could also as well be a Bhiksu or a &ramanera with an incomplete discipline.
Answer: How can we know the extent, the number of the rules of
the disciplines of the Upasaka, the Sramanera, or the Bhiksu? Evidently
through the teaching of the Master. Now the Master speaks of the
Upasaka not possessing the discipline in its entirety; but he does not
speak of an incomplete discipline of the Bhiksus or of the Sra-
128 maneras.
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmir do not admit this opinioa
3 Id. All the disciplines are weak, etc, according to the mind
? The weakness, the mediocrity, and the force of the eight rules depend on the weakness, on the mediocrity, or on the force of the mind through which one has undertaken them.
But if such is the case, the Pratimoksa discipline of an Arhat could be weak, and that of a Prthagjana could be strong.
Is one an Upasaka if one solely undertakes the discipline (samvara) without undertaking the Refuges?
No; except in the case of ignorance by the person who gives and by the person who receives.
***
When a person takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and in the Sangha, what does he take refuge in?
32. He who takes the Refuges takes refuge in the asaiksa dharmas which form the Buddha, in the two types of dharmas
129 which form the Sangha, and in Nirvana.
i. He who takes Refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the dharmas
of the Arhat which form a Buddha, the dharmas which are the causes of
the designation "Buddha," that is, the dharmas by reason of which, as 130
principle cause, a certain person is called a Buddha; or rather the dharmas by the acquisition of which a certain person, understanding all things, is called a Buddha. These dharmas are the Knowledge of Extinction (ksayajndna), the Knowledge of Nonarising (anutpada-
jnana) and Right Views (samyagdrspi) (vi. 50, 67) with the dharmas B1
which accompany these jnanas, that is, with the five pure skandhas. 132
As for the material body (rupakdya) of the Buddha, that is not subject to modification through the acquistion of the quality of Buddha. Thus one does not take refuge in the material body of the Buddha which is, in fact, the material body of the Bodhisattva.
Does one take refuge in all the Buddhas or in one Buddha?
According to the nature of things, and in the absence of an explicit declaration, in all the Buddhas. For the Buddhas have always followed
133
the same path, a worldly path and a transworldly path (vii34).
ii. He who takes Refuge in the Sangha takes refuge in both the
iaiksa and the asaiksa dharmas, of the non-Arhat and of the Arhat,
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which form the Sangha, that is, the dharmas through the acquisition of which the Eight Saints become a Sangha; becoming unanimous they cannot be divided with regard to that which concerns the Path.
Does one take refuge in all the Sanghas or in one Sangha?
According to the nature of things, in all: for the Path followed by the
Saints is always the same. Without doubt, the Buddha said to the two
merchants, "Also take refuge in the Sangha which shall exist in the
134
future," but the Master expressed himself in this manner in order to
exhault the qualities of the Jewel of the Sangha which would soon be visible to the merchants.
iii. He who takes Refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in Nirvana, that is to say, mpratisamkhydnirodha (i. 5, ii. 55d). He takes refuge in all Nirvana, for Nirvana has for its unique charaaeristic the cessation of the defilements and suffering of oneself and others (see vi. 73c, the meaning of the word dharma in dharma avetyaprasada).
iv. Discussion.
If the Buddha is none other than the aiaiksa dharmas, the dharmas pertaining to an Arhat, how could the fact of wounding the Buddha with a bad thought constitute a mortal transgression (iv. 96)?
The Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 177b8) answer: "When one wounds the material elements which are the support of these dharmas, these dharmas themselves suffer injury. "
But the Sastra (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 177a27) does not say that the Buddha is solely aiaiksa dharmas. It says that the Buddha is the dharmas that form a Buddha, that is to say, either the worldly or transworldly dharmas which are the objea of the designation "Buddha," are the Buddha. Thus the Sastra does not deny that the diraya--the organism, the support made up of the five worldly skandhas--forms part of the quality of Buddha. Hence the objection taken from wounding the Buddha is without value.
If it were otherwise, if the Buddha was only aiaiksa dharmas, and if the Sangha (that is, the Saints, Saiksas and Arhats) were only iaiksa and aiaiksa dharmas, a person whose mind is presently "worldly" would not be able to be either a Buddha or a Sangha. And by virtue of these same principles, one would have to say that a Bhiksu is only morality, the discipline of a Bhiksu.
But, say the Vaibhasikas, if the body is, itself, among the dharmas
? which form the Buddha, why does the Sastra say, "He who takes refuge in the Buddha, takes refuge in the asaiksa dharmas which form the Buddha? "
We would answer: In the same way that one who honors Bhiksus, honors the morality which makes up the Bhiksus.
According to another opinion, one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the eighteen avenikadharmas (vii. 28) of the Buddha.
**#
What is the nature of the undertakings of the Refuges?
l35
They are vocal vijnapti (iv. 3d).
What is the meaning of "Refuge" (sarana)?
The Three Refuges are so named because, by going to them for
refuge one obtains definitive deliverance from all suffering.
136
The Blessed One said in fact, "Tormented by fear, persons most
137
frequently take refuge in mountains, in forests, in woods, and in
l38
sacred trees. This is not a good
taking refuge in these that one is delivered from all suffering. But one who takes Refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, when one sees through wisdom the Four Noble Truths,--Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinaion of Suffering, and the Holy Eightfold Path which leads to Nirvana,--this is the good refuge, this is the supreme refuge; by taking refuge in this, one is delivered from all suffering. "
This is why the undertaking of the Refuges is the enterance to the undertaking of all the rules of discipline.
***
The other rules of discipline contain the renouncing of all sexual activity (abrahmacaryavirati); but the discipline of the Upasaka only contains the renouncing of sexual misconduct (kamamithyacara, iv. 74). Why is this?
33a-b. Sexual misconduct, because it is much censured, because one easily abstains from it, because the Aryans have obtained abstention from it.
refuge, the supreme refuge; it is not by
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1. Sexual misconduct is much censured in the world because it is the corruption of another's wife, and because it leads to retribution in a painful realm of rebirth.
2. It is easy for householders to abstain from it, but it is difficult for them to abstain from all sexual activity: householders do not leave the world because they are not capable of difficult things. (Divya, 303).
3. The Aryans possess akaranasarhvara with regard to sexual misconduct, that is, they have obtained definite abstention from it; in fact, in their future existence, they will be incapable of violating this precept. Such is not the case concerning all sexual activity. As a consequence, the rules of discipline of the Upasaka contain only the renunciation of sexual misconduct: it is inadmissible in fact that the Aryans, in a susequent existence, would be capable of violating the discipline of an Upasaka which could happen if this contained the renuncation of all sexual activity. Akaranasarhvara means akriyani-
yama, (that is akriyayam ekantata, the certain abstention from one 139
action).
***
Has the man who marries after having undertaken the Upasaka discipline, undertaken renouncing with regard to the woman whom he marries?
Yes, answer the Vaibhasikas; for, in the contrary hypothesis, this man would have undertaken a restraining discipline (pradeiika, iv. 36a- b).
But then this man violates the discipline when he gets married! No:
33c-d They have acquired it as they have accepted the discipline; they have not accepted it with regard to some persons.
They have acquired it as they have undertaken the discipline. They
undertake it by saying, "I renounce sexual misconduct," that is, "I
renounce all sexual activity with all prohibited females;" they do not
undertake it by saying, "I shall refrain from all sexual activity with such
140
persons. " Consequently, they do not violate the discipline by getting
married
? Among the transgression of speech, why does the renouncing of lying constitute one of the rules of the Upasaka, whereas the renouncing of other transgressions of speech are omitted?
For the same reasons: because lying is much censured in the world, because householders abstain from it easily, and because the Aryans are not capable of lying; and also for a fourth reason:
41 34a-b. Because, having violated any other rule he would lie. *
[If lying were not forbidden], he would lie when he violates any other rule, saying, "I have not done it. " Consequently the Upasaka should renounce lying, thinking, "I shall confess what I transgress. "
###
142
Why are not the transgressions of disobedience included in the
discipline of the Upasaka?
The question is not justified:
34c-d One renounces strong liquor, which is a transgression of disobedience,
Why should the Upasaka renounce a single transgression of disobedience and not others?
34& In order that the other rules may be kept.
One who drinks strong liquor will not keep the other rules.
L The Abhidharmikas maintain that strong liquor does not have the characteristic of being a transgression by its nature. A transgression by its nature is committed only by a person whose mind is defiled: now it happens that, as a remedy, one can drink strong liquor in a quantity where it is not inebriating. But the mind of one who drinks knowing that such a quantity is inebriating is defiled; the mind is not defiled when one drinks knowning that such a quantity is not inebriating.
ii. Such is not the opinion of the Vinayadharas. [According to them, strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature. ]
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1. To Upali, who asked him, "How should one attend to illnesses? "
the Blessed One answered, "Except, Upali, by transgression of
143
nature. " And, the Blessed One did not permit strong liquors to sick
Sakyans: "Those who recognize me as their master should not drink any
144
strong liquor, even a drop on the point of a blade of grass. " Since the
Blessed One forbad only transgression by nature in the case of illness (as in the UpMisffira) and yet does not permit strong liquor, it is clear that strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.
2. The Aryans, even in a following existence, do not drink strong liquor, not any more than they would commit the other transgressions
145
146
3. Scripture,--the Nandikasutra and elsewhere,--places strong
147 liquor among the misdeeds of the body.
iii. The Abhidharmikas answer:
1. In general, the transgression of disobedience is permitted to the
ill, as the answer to Upali proves. But strong liquor is an exception:
though solely a transgression of disobedience, it is forbidden to the ill,
and this with a view to preventing the upleasant consequence of strong
148 149 liquor, because its inebriating quantity is undetermined.
2. If the Aryans certainly abstain from strong liquor, it is not because
it is a transgression by its very nature, but because they are filled with the
150 151
force of modesty; [if they do not drink in secret ], this is because
strong liquor makes mindfulness fail; even if they do not drink a drop, this is because the inebriating quantity is not determined, as for poison.
3. Scripture considers strong liquor as a bodily misdeed, because strong liquor is a "cause of non-vigilence. " In fact, the rule of training relative to strong liquor includes the expression, "Abandoning the pramddasthdna which is strong liquor, surd and maireya, I renounce pramddasthana. . . " Thisisnotthecasefortheothertransgressions: one does not say "I renounce the pramadasthana which is killing," and that is because the other transgressions are transgressions by their very nature.
The Scripture says that one is reborn in hell through the practice of
152
strong liquor. As a consequence of strong liquor, there is continual
activity of a series of bad thoughts; from whence, there is either projection of a new action retribuable in hell, or else the entry into activity, at the moment of death, of an old action.
of nature, killing, etc
? What is the meaning of the expression suramaireya madya- m
pramadasthana?
Sura is a fermented drink of rice; maireya is a fermented drink of
various ingredients (sugar cane juice, etc).
At a certain moment, the liquor is no longer inebriating; at a certain
moment, it is no longer that: this is why the word madya (inebriating) has been added. Even the areca-nut, the paspale (kodrava, etc. ) are
l54 termed sura and maireya when they inebriate.
Strong liquor is only a transgression of disobedience.
The formula thus contains the words pramadasthana in order to have one understand that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.
***
Do the three discipline have the same object?
35a-b. One acquires the discipline of Kamadhatu relative to all actions, relative to the two types of beings and to the two types of actions, relative to things of the present.
The discipline of Kamadhatu is the Pratimoksa discipline.
This discipline is relative to all actions, preparatory actions, actions
155 themselves, and consecutive action (iv. 68).
This discipline is relative to living beings and to non-living beings, for example persons and trees.
This discipline is relative to the transgressions by nature and to the transgression of disobedience, both of which are capable of relating to living beings (killing; touching the hand of a women when one is a monk) or to non-living beings (cutting the leaves of a tree; accepting gold when one is a monk).
This discipline is relative to things--skandhas, ayatanasand dhatus--of the present, for the things of the past and of the future are
156 neither living beings, nor non-living beings.
35c-d. One acquires the discipline of dhyana and the pure
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discipline relative to actions themselves and to things of the three time periods.
One acquires these two disciplines relative to actions themselves, not relative to preparatory actions or to consecutive action, and not relative to the transgression of disobedience; and relative to the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus of the past, present and future.
There are thus some skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus relative to which one acquires the Pratimoksa discipline and not the two others. Four cases: 1. Preparatory and consecutive actions, transgressions of disobedience, of the present--alluded to by the Pratimoksa. 2. Courses of action of the past and future--alluded to by the last two disciplines. 3. Courses of actions of the present--alluded to by the three disciplines. 4. Preparatory and consecutive actions of the past and the future, with regard to which one cannot undertake any of the three disciplines.
**#
Objection: It is not correct to say that one undertakes the discipline relative to the course of aaion of the present time: for, when one undertakes the discipline, no bad course of action is present relative to which one could undertake the discipline. One should say, "One undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action whose object is present. " I can abstain from a future aaion relative to a person or to a thing existing at the present time, but I cannot abstain from a past or future aaion.
***
Does one acquire discipline or undiscipline with regard to all beings, relative to all of their parts, and by reason of all causes?
36a-b. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings; one must distinguish regarding the parts and the causes.
1. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings, not with regard to only some of them.
The discipline of the Bhiksu is acquired relative to all parts:
? abstention from the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are acquired relative to four parts: abstention from killing, from stealing, from forbidden sexuality, from lying, for, by parts of the discipline, one should understand abstention from the courses of action.
If, by cause of the acquisition of discipline, one understands the three roots of good (non-desire, non-hatred, non-delusion), then the dis- cipline is acquired by reason of all these causes. If one understands by cause--the cause of the origin, samutthapaka (iv. 9b)--the mind by which one acquires the discipline, then this cause is considered as threefold: strong mind, mediocre mind, weak mind. The discipline is acquired by reason of one of these three minds.
From this last point of view, four alternatives can be distinguished (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 608a20).
1. There is a person abiding in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, but not disciplined relative to all the parts, nor disciplined by reason of all causes: he who, through a strong, or mediocre, or weak mind, has acquired the discipline of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha or the Sramanera. 2. There is a person abiding in the discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings and relative to all the parts, but not disciplined by reason of all causes: he who has acquired the discipline of the Bhiksu through a strong, mediocre, or weak mind. 3. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, relative to all the parts, by reason of all the causes: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Sramanera and the Bhiksu through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong. 4. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, disciplined by reason of all the causes, but not disciplined relative to all the parts: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upasaka, the Upavasastha and the Sramanera through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong.
N o one abides in discipline who is not disciplined with regard to all beings: he acquires the discipline through a good mind having for its object all beings. The person who makes a restriction is not completely rid of the intention of transgression.
The Pratimoksa discipline includes the absence of the fivefold restriction: 1. with regard to beings, "I renounce transgressions with regard to certain beings;" 2. with regard to parts of the discipline, "I
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renounce certain actions;" 3. with regard to place, "I renounce committing transgressions in a certain place;" 4. with regard to time, "I renounce transgressions for a month;" 5. with regard to circumstances, "I renounce transgressions except in the case of a quarrel. " He who undertakes such undertakings does not acquire the discipline; rather, he
157 does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline.
ii. How can one acquire the discipline with regard to all beings? How can one acquire the discipline with regard to beings who are out of range, or with regard to beings whom one cannot kill?
Because, we believe, one acquires the discipline through the intention of not killing any being.
The Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 623M9, second masters) give a different explanation. If the discipline was acquired only with regard to beings who are within range, the discipline would be liable to augmentation and to diminution: for some humans, who are now within range*, will be reborn as gods, which are out of range; and vice versa. The discipline would thus be acquired with regard to gods who become human, and lost with regard to humans who become gods, without there being any cause either of the acquisition, or of the loss of the discipline.
This argument does not move us: the transmigration of beings within range and out of range does not entail the augmentation or the diminution of the discipline. For the discipline that one undertakes with regard to grass neither increases nor diminishes when new grass arises, nor when old grass dries up.
The Vaibhasikas deny the value of this comparison. Grass exists after having been nonexistent, and no longer exists after having existed Living beings, on the contrary, continue to exist, sometimes as humans, and sometimes as gods. Humans, becoming gods, only pass out of range, whereas grass is annihilated.
But when living beings enter into Nirvana, they no longer exist, exactly like grass, so the discipline acquired with regard to living beings is subject to diminution. Thus the explanation of the Vaibhasikas is invalid
If one objects, "In the case where the Pratimoksa discipline would be acquired with regard to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas would be reduced in comparason with that of former Buddhas, for it
? would not be relative to beings who have already entered into Nirvana,
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to former Buddhas and their disciples", we would reply: all the
Buddhas discipline all beings; and if former Buddhas were to exist again, later Buddhas would be disciplined by them.
36c-d Undiscipline, with regard to all, relative to all parts, and not by reason of all causes.
One acquires undiscipline with regard to all beings and relative to all courses of aaion. No one is undisciplined with an incomplete undiscipline. One is not undisciplined by reason of all causes, un- discipline being undertaken by a weak, mediocre, or strong mind. Let us suppose that an undisciplined person has undertaken his undiscipline with a weak mind and commits a murder with a strong mind: his undiscipline remains weak, but he is adorned with a strong vijnapti, with a strong murder.
The term "undisciplined" is explained etymologically as one "who resides in undiscipline (asamvara), one who possesses undiscipline. " The butchers of sheep, bird-catchers, the butchers of pigs, fisher-
man, hunters, bandits, exceutioners, jailers, elephant hunters, the slaughterers of dogs, and the vagurikas are all undisciplined. It also holds that kings, office holders, judges, etc, are undisciplined.
A butcher of sheep (aurabhrika) is the person whose profession is to kill sheep (urabfora). . The same etymology holds for the names of the
159 other professions.
ii. We understand that discipline, undertaken with the intention of universal benevolence, would be acquired with regard to all beings. But the butchers of sheep do not have the intention of maltreating their parents, their children, or their servants; they would not want to kill them, even at the price of their lifes. How, [ask the Sautrantikas], can one say that they are undisciplined with regard to all beings? (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608b20).
The Vaibhasikas: Because they have the intention of killing with regard to their parents who have become sheep through trans-
160
migration.
But they do not kill their parents who have become sheep knowing
that they are their parents! Furthermore, if their parents obtain the quality of an Aryan, these parents will not be reborn as sheep or as
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animals: hence the butcher is not undisciplined with regard to them. Finally, the argument turns against you: if the butcher is undisciplined with regard to his present parents because he will kill his parents who have become sheep, one would say as well that he is not undisciplined with regard to some other sheep since he is not disposed to kill the sheep which are reborn as humans, as his own children.
The Vaibhasikas: He who has the intention to kill his parents who have become sheep is certainly undisciplined with regard to them.
But, [the Sautrantikas say,] he who does not have the intention of killing the sheep who have become his children is certainly not undisciplined in their regard Another point: how can the butcher who does not steal, who is not an adulterer, and who is mute, be undisciplined relative to all these transgressions?
The Vaibhasikas: Because his intention is perverted. A mute can express himself through gestures.
But what is there to say of a man who has accepted two or three parts of morality?
For the Vaibhasikas, nondiscipline is never incomplete, that is, relative only to certain parts; nor is it partial, that is, including restrictions (time, place, etc) in the practice of a certain transgression.
For the Sautrantikas, discipline and undiscipline with the exception
of the Pratimoksa discipline can be incomplete and partial. This
depends on the manner in which one undertakes discipline or
,f
undiscipline: one binds" oneself to a part of immorality, or to a certain
part of morality.
***
How does one acquire undiscipline? How does one acquire the avijnaptis which are neither discipline, nor undiscipline?
37a-b. One acquires undiscipline through action or through
161 accepting it.
Persons born in a family of undisciplined persons acquire un- discipline when they accomplish the actions preparatory to killing (iv. 68c). Persons born in other families acquire undiscipline when they adopt such a style of life, thinking "We too shall live in this manner. "
? 37c-d One acquires the other avijnaptis by reason of the field, of 162
undertaking, of an action seriously undertakea
1. Certain persons are a field of such a nature that by offering them a garden, etc, one reduces avijnapti. [See below, iv. 112, the doarine of good material works. ]
2. One produces avijnapti by undertaking vows, for example, "I shall not eat unless I have paid homage to the Buddha," "I shall give alms
163
3. Action undertaken seriously, with a burning faith, with a burning
food on the fast day, for a fortnight, for a month, for a year," etc passion (iv. 22d), produces avijOapti.
***
How does one lose discipline?
38. The Pratimok? a discipline is lost through abjuration, through death, through hermaphroditism, through the cutting off of the roots, and by the night coming to an end.
The stanza calls the Pratimoksa discipline dama because it subdues (damyati) the six organs.
Excluding the discipline of the fast, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost:
164
1. through abjuration, intentionally renouncing the rule in the
presence of a person capable of understanding it; 2. through the death or abandonment of the nikdyasabhaga (ii. 41); 3. through the ap- pearance of the male or the female organ according to the case; and 4. through the cutting off of the roots of good (iv. 79).
The discipline of fast is lost through these four causes and, further, when night come to an end.
Abjuration constitutes a vijnapti in contradiction to the under- taking; death and hermaphroditism constitute the abandoning and the overturning of the personality who undertook the Pratimoksa (see iv. 27a); the cutting off of the roots is the cutting off of the foundation of the discipline itself. Finally the discipline of the fast has been created, or projected, for a day and a night: it comes to its end when the night is finished.
39a. Some say through a patamya.
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According to the Sautrantikas, the discipline of the Bhiksu and the
novice is also lost through any one of the four polarityas, or 165
transgressions involving a falling away.
39b. Through the disappearance of the Good Law, say some other masters.
According to the Dharmaguptakas, the Pratimoksa discipline is lost when the Good Law disappears: there are no longer any rules, any boundaries, nor any ecclesiastic actions.
39c-d The Ka? mlreans believe that the transgressor possesses morality and immoraltity, in the manner that a person can have riches and debts.
i. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir say: A monk guilty of a grave transgression, that is, of 2, pataniya, does not lose his Bhiksu discipline. It is not admissible that one loses the entire discipline by destroying only a
166
part of the discipline. He who commits a transgression other than a
pataniya is not immoral. He who commits a pataniya is at one and the same time moral and immoral: as a person who has both riches and debts; but when this transgressor has confessed his transgression, he is no longer immoral, but solely moral: as a person who has paid his debts.
ii. But the Blessed One has said, "He is not a Bhiksu, he is not a monk; he no longer belongs to the sons of Sakya; he falls from the quality of Bhiksu; his quality of monkhood is cut off, fallen, erased,
167 tumbled down, annihilated. "
The Vaibhasikas: In this text "Bhiksu" signifies a "true Bhiksu:" the transgressor, being incapable of seeing the Truths, is not a true Bhiksu.
An inadmissable explanation: you avoid the question that the Blessed One made "in a clear sense:" furthermore, you lead defiled persons to the practice of immorality.
The Vaibhasikas: How can you prove that this quotation is of clear sense and should be taken literally?
The Blessed One has explained this himself. "There are four
Bhiksus: a samjnabhiksu, a Bhiksu in name only, is a person who is
called Bhiksu without his having been ordained; a pratijriabhiksu, a
self-styled Bhiksu, is one who is immoral, unchaste, etc; a person called
168
Bhiksu because he begs, is a begger only; and the person who is called
? Bhiksu because he has cut off the defilements, that is to say, the
169 17
Arhat. " In the text which concerns us ? ("He is not a Bhiksu, he is
not a monk. . . "), this refers to a fifth Bhiksu, namely a person who has been properly ordained but who, thtov^ipatantya, loses this quality and this discipline; it is certainly not a question of his being a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, for one capable of a polaritya is not a true Bhiksu, an Arhat, but is susceptible of losing the quality of being a true Bhiksu.
iii. The argument that one does not lose the entire discipline through the losing of one part of it, is refuted by the Master himself who in fact compares a transgressor monk to a palm tree whose head is cut off, henceforth incapable of becoming green, of growing, of developing,
m
or of growing larger:
the part which is the root of the discipline, is cut off, the rest of the discipline is incapable of growing. The potantya or the mauliapattt is in contradiaion to the state required of being a Bhiksu; he embraces an extreme absence of fear of transgression (anapatrapya, ii. 32a-b); he breaks off the root of discipline: all his discipline is lost.
The Master excludes persons guilty of pataniya from all com-
172
merce
them for even one mouthful of food, he forbids them from even setting one foot into the monastery. He says, "He who is not a Bhiksu but who has the aspect of a Bhiksu--destroy this tare, uproot this rotten tree,
173
drive out this plant without seed! " What indeed can be the Bhiksu
quality of this criminal?
iv. The Kasmireans answer: He possesses the quality which consists
of his quality of Bhiksu. For the Blessed One said, "Cunda, there are four
monks and not a fifth: the mdrgajina, who triumphs through the Path;
the margadaisika, who teaches the Path; the margajivin, who lives in
this means that, when one part of the discipline,
with the Bhiksus, he prohibits them from participating with
the Path; and the mdrgadusin, who soils the Path, the immoral 174
monk. "
We believe that the Blessed One gives the name of "monk" to an
immoral monk because his external form is that of a monk. Does one not speak of burning wood, of a dried up pond, of a parrot-nose (a motif of architectural decoration), of rotten seed, of a circle of fire, or of a dead being?
v. Answer of the Kasmireans: One does not lose the quality of monkhood through pataniya, since the Blessed One admits a monk
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175 guilty of unchastity as a penitent.
We do not say that any Bhiksu guilty of unchastity is a pdrdjika, a fallen or destroyed Bhik? u. But whoever is a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu. It is the idea of hiding the crime which is decisive here: if, thanks to the excellence of his moral dispositions, thanks to the excellence of his "series," the guilty one does not have the thought of concealing his fault for an instant, then the King of the Law admits him as a penitant.
The Ka? mlreans: If a pdrdjika is no longer a Bhiksu, why is he not again admitted to ordination?
Because he is susceptible to discipline: his mental dispositions are ruined and overturned by the excess of imprudence (anapatrdpya, ii32a-b). Also, even if he had renounced the rules {niksiptafiksa, iv. 38) [after his transgression], he cannot be ordained again. To what good does this discussion lead? If a similar Bhiksu is a Bhiksu, we pay homage
176 to this quality of Bhiksu.
vi. When the Good Law disappears, all ecclesiastical acts become impossible, and as a consequence also all acquisition of the discipline. But he who possesses the discipline will not lose it (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 608cll).
***
How does one lose the discipline of dhydna (iv. l7b) and the pure discipline?
40a-b. The "good" of the sphere of dhydna is lost through a 177
change of state and through falling.
All of the good of the sphere of dhydna, that is, material and non-material good, is lost through two causes: 1. through arising in a superior or inferior stage: this refers to the "good" which appears to persons arisen in the heavens of Rupadhatu; 2. through falling away: when the ascetic falls away from this absorption.
One should add a third cause, [according to vi.
