No More Learning

On hearing of this blocking of their westward route, Sulaiman
Shukoh's army rapidly melted away, his captains openly deserted


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PURSUIT OF DARA SHUKOH
223
him for their homes or for Aurangzib's standard, and within two
days of the arrival of the news of Samogarh and Dara's flight to the
north-west, Sulaiman's army shrank from 20,000 men to less than
6000. Aurangzib, holding the inner line, moved his divisions with
great ease and rapidity and blocked every ferry by which Sulaiman
tried to reach the Punjab by skirting the foot of the central Himalayas,
so that the young prince became in effect a hunted fugitive.
Thus, freed for the time being from all danger on the east,
Aurangzib turned his undivided attention to the pursuit of Dara.
That luckless aspirant to the throne was neither a general himself,
nor had he the wisdom of being guided by veteran generals whose
devotion to him was manifest. His sole strategy was to flee before
Aurangzib's forces, however small, without hazarding any action.
His timid and contradictory orders took the heart out of such of his
subordinates as were prepared to hold up the advancing vanguard
of the pursuers at the rivers of the Punjab, which are so admirably
situated to favour a defence by delaying tactics. The result was that
Dara, in spite of his getting possession of the imperial treasuries at
Delhi and Lahore (the latter estimated to contain ten million
rupees), besides the money and jewels that Shah Jahan had sent to
him from Agra, could not get time enough to give cohesion and
training to the 20,000 soldiers that he had gathered together at
Lahore. He merely fled from town to town down the Punjab river
at the first news of the arrival of Aurangzib's troops behind him.
The only difficulties of the pursuers came from the heat of the season,
the rapidity of the marches they had to make (which led to large
numbers of soldiers lagging behind), the exhaustion and death of
their horses and camels, and their inability to overtake the enemy
and bring him to a decisive action. Dara had left Delhi on 22 June,
1658, and reached Lahore on 13 July. His rear-guard, holding the
Sutlej at Talwandi and Rupar, had its left turned by Bahadur Khan's
crossing the river at Rupar on 15 August and fell back on the Beas
at Govindwal and finally on Lahore. Once more Dara's genius
quailed before that of Aurangzib; he despaired of success, and his
despair infected his troops.
Leaving Lahore on 28 August, at the head of 14,000 men, the fugi-
tive prince reached Multan on 15 September with his army reduced
to one-half by desertion. Eight days afterwards he vacated this city
and fled down the Indus towards the sea, finding rest nowhere and
daily losing men. Finally, he left the province of Sind at Badin (4
December) and entered the Rann of Cutch, at the news of which his
pursuers turned back from Tatta on 15 December.
Meanwhile, Aurangzib himself had given up the chase from Multan
(10 October) and hastened to Delhi by rapid marches, because a
new storm-cloud was reported to be gathering in the east. Shuja'
was making preparations for a second advance on Agra. The deposi-


## p. 224 (#258) ############################################

224
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
tion of Shah Jahan and the imprisonment of the once-beloved ally
Murad Bakhsh had taught him the true value of Aurangzib's solemn
promise to let Shuja' enjoy Bengal and Bihar in full sovereignty
unmolested. At Monghyr he heard of Aurangzib's march in full force
to the Punjab and imagined the road to Agra to be open. Now was
the opportunity to seize the capital and release his father.
So, early in November, 1658, Shuja' had advanced from Patna
with 25,000 cavalry and a good train of artillery, got easy possession
of the forts on the way up to Allahabad, and arrived at Khajuha
(in the Fatehpur district), ninety-five miles west of Allahabad, on
9 January, 1659. Here he was held up by an imperial army under
Aurangzib's eldest son, Muhammad Sultan.
That emperor had reached the environs of Delhi from Multan
on 20 November and repeatedly sent detachments to strengthen his
army near Allahabad so as to close Shuja''s path effectively. But
as the latter had not given up his ambitious movement, Aurangzib
had made a rapid march from Soron and reached Kora, eight miles
west of Shuja''s position, on 12 January, 1659. Here Mir Jumla,
released from his collusive imprisonment in Daulatabad fort, joined
him on that day.
The decisive battle took place on the 14th. But the night before
it, Maharaja Jasvant Singh, who commanded Aurangzib's right wing,
made a treacherous and quite unexpected attack on his master,
plundered the camp of prince Muhammad Sultan and also much
of Aurangzib's baggage, and then fled to his own country with his
Rajput contingent (14,000 strong). Aurangzib's cool courage and
strict discipline in making the other divisions keep their own places
during this night of alarm, prevented the confusion and panic from
spreading and saved his army from further loss. With daylight many
of his dispersed troops returned to his standard, and he advanced
to the attack at the head of 50,000 to 55,000 men, as against Shuja''s
23,000.
With great judgement, Shuja' tried to make up for his hopeless
inferiority in numbers by drawing up his troops not in the usual
six divisions of Mughul battle-array but in one long line behind his
artillery and taking the offensive himself. His right wing under
Sayyid ‘Alam charged the imperial left and after scattering it feil
upon the centre, driving in front three furious war elephants, each
brandishing a heavy iron chain with its trunk, before which no man
or horse could stand. At the same time the imperial right wing was
assailed and partly dispersed by Shuja''s vanguard and left under
prince Buland Akhtar. A false rumour spread through the field
that Aurangzib himself had been slain, and many of his followers
fled away. One of these Bengal elephants, maddened by wounds,
approached the emperor's elephant. If the latter had turned back,
the entire imperial army would have broken and run away at the


## p. 225 (#259) ############################################

STRUGGLE WITH SHUJA
225
sight of it. But in the crisis, Aurangzib's cool courage and power of
quick decision saved the situation : he stood like a rock, chaining the
legs of his elephant to prevent its flight, and soon the attacking
beast's driver was shot down and it was brought under control by
an imperial mahout. Sayyid 'Alam was at last repulsed with woefully
thinned ranks. His centre thus saved, Aurangzib turned to succour
his hard-pressed right wing, which on being rallied and reinforced
made a counter-charge and swept away the enemy divisions before
it with great carnage. Meanwhile, the imperial vanguard had ad-
vanced, shaking the front line of Shuja'. And now, emitting a thick
shower of cannon-balls and bullets, Aurangzib's entire army made
a simultaneous advance and enveloped the centre, which alone
remained of Shuja''s host. That prince saved his life only by dis-
mounting from his elephant and galloping away on a fleet horse.
His army at once broke and fled, giving up its entire camp and
baggage, artillery (114 pieces) and elephants to the conqueror.
From the field of victory Aurangzib sent a division, 30,000 strong,
under his son Muhammad Sultan and Mir Jumla in pursuit of
Shuja', who fled eastwards, making a stand only at Monghyr and
again at Sahibganj (near the Sakrigali or Teliyagarhi pass) by
blocking the narrow road there. But at each of these places Mir
Jumla turned his left by making a détour through the jungles under
the guidance of the local zamindars. Finally, after a short halt at
Rajmahal, Shuja' evacuated the right bank of the Ganges and crossed
over to the Malda district. The imperialists immediately occupied
Rajmahal (23 April, 1659).
In the campaign that ensued, Shuja' was hopelessly inferior on
land, his regular troops having shrunk to 5000 men, while Mir
Jumla's army was five times as large and man for man superior in
fighting capacity. But the imperialists were a purely land force,
with few pieces of cannon and not a single boat for operations in this
land of waterways. On the other hand, Shuja' had an artillery of
big guns admirably served by European and half-breed gunners, and
the entire flotilla (navvara) of Bengal was at his disposal, which gave
wonderful mobility to his army and multiplied its striking force,
while the lack of boats at first paralysed Mir Jumla's efforts.
Shuja', making Tanda (four miles west of the old fort of Gaur)
his base, entrenched various places on the eastern bank of the Ganges
to prevent the enemy from crossing. But Mir Jumla with great
diligence procured a small number of boats from remote places, and
making the best use of them twice surprised and defeated Shuja''s
advanced outposts, but his third coup (13 May) failed with heavy
loss, as the enemy had prepared an ambush for him. On 18 June,
prince Muhammad Sultan, chafing under Mir Jumla's tutelage, was
lured by the offer of the hand of Shuja''s daughter and secretly went
over to his uncle. But Mir Jumla restored order and control among
15


## p. 226 (#260) ############################################

226
AURANGZIB (1658-1681).
.
the prince's leaderless troops, and at a council of war all the other
generals agreed to obey him as their leader. Next, during the tor-
rential rains of Bengal, while the city of Rajmahal was completely
girt round by water, its grain supply was cut off by the Bengal
flotilla and Shuja' by a sudden attack recovered it, the surprised
imperial division of the city fleeing away (1 September).
In the following December Shuja' resumed operations on land and
twice attacked Mir Jumla, whose inferiority in artillery forced him
to fall back from Belghata towards Murshidabad. But Daud Khan,
the governor of Patna, with a second army and plenty of boats and
artillery, was advancing along the Ganges to co-operate with Mir
Jumla, and on hearing of this Shuja' evacuated Rajmahal and fell
back on Tanda. Thus, the whole country west of the Ganges was
finally lost to Shuja' (21 January 1660), who, however, held a line
from opposite Rajmahal to Tanda. Mir Jumla easily crossed the
Ganges with the help of the 160 boats received from Patna and then
made a wide circuit round the north of Shuja''s position, reaching
Malda on 16 March. A month before this prince Muhammad Sultan
had left Shuja' and returned to the imperial camp, but only to be
sentenced to imprisonment for the rest of his life. On 15 April, Mir
Jumla crossed the Mahananda and threatened to complete a circle
round Shuja', who could no longer resist, but fled precipitately with
his family to Dacca, abandoning all his soldiers, servants and pro-
perty in Tanda to the imperialists. Only sixty boats accompanied
him, while 402 became the victor's prize.
But even at Dacca Shuja' could make no stand. The zamindars
rose against him, and Mir Jumla arrived there hard on his heels.
So, the prince finally abandoned Bengal on 22 May, 1660, and sailed
for Chittagong to seek an asylum with the Magh Raja of Arakan.
Here his unquiet ambition brought him to a tragic end. With the
help of the Musalman settlers in Arakan he planned to seize the
throne of his protector and then advance once more for the recovery
of Bengal. But the conspiracy was betrayed and the Mughul prince
in trying to escape was pursued and cut down in the jungle (January,
1661).
We now turn to the last days of Dara Shukoh. After leaving Sind
(early in December, 1658), with the small remnant of his army, he
received help from the Rajas of Cutch and Navanagar, and reached
Ahmadabad at the head of 3000 men. Here Shah Navaz Khan, the
governor of the province, joined him and opened the royal treasury
to him (January, 1659). Dara now raised his army to 22,000 men,
took away the artillery of Surat castle, and, learning that Shuja'
had advanced beyond Allahabad to attack Aurangzib, he made a dash
towards Agra. On the way he turned towards Ajmer on receiving
an invitation from Jasvant Singh, who promised to join him with
1 See also chap. -XVII, p. 480.
9


## p. 227 (#261) ############################################

END OF DARA SHUKOH
227
all the Rajputs. But in the meantime Aurangzib had crushed Shuja',
and he now won Jasvant over by mingled threats of invasion and
promises of favour, and arrived near Ajmer with his victorious army.
Thus, Dara had no alternative but to fight. He entrenched the pass of
Deorai, four miles south of Ajmer, his flanks protected by the hills of
Bithli and Gokla and his front by a low wall bristling with guns.
Aurangzib attacked this formidable position from the south, suf-
fering heavy losses on account of the low and exposed position of his
troops. In the evening of the third day (24 March, 1659), under
cover of a furious massed attack on Dara's left wing and a general
cannonade along his entire front, a body of hillmen belonging to
Raja Rajrup of Jammu climbed the back of the Gokla hill unper-
ceived and thus seized the rear of Dara's left wing. Then these
trenches were stormed, the general in command, Shah Navaz Khan,
was killed, and shortly after nightfall Dara fled from the field.
When these facts became known the rest of his troops submitted to
Aurangzib.
Dara, accompanied by his family and only 2000 troops, moved
towards Ahmadabad by rapid marches, undergoing extreme misery
from the heat and dust and the death of transport animals. On the
way he learnt that that city had turned against him and he would
not find any safe refuge in Gujarat. After a scene of unspeakable
agony, so pathetically described by Bernier who was attending his
sick wife, the prince, now "reduced to the poorest and sorriest dress,
his retinue shrunk to a few men”, fled to Kathiawar, crossed the
terrible Rann again and entered Sind a second time (middle of May).
A strong imperial detachment under Jay Singh and Bahadur Khan
pursued him all the way with equal speed. In Sind Aurangzib's
local officers had closed Dara's path to the north and the east. So
he fled westwards, crossed the Indus and entered Sehwan, intending
to flee to Persia by way of the Bolan pass and Qandahar. But his
beloved wife Nadira Banu died of illness and privations, and Dara,
now almost mad with grief and despair, sent away all his remaining
troopers and his most devoted officer with her corpse to Lahore for
burial in the graveyard of his patron saint Mian Mir. He then
accepted the offered hospitality of Malik Jivan, the chieftain of Dadar
(nine miles east of the Bolan pass), and was seized by this Baloch
traitor (19 June) and delivered to Aurangzib's general.
Arrived at Delhi, Dara and his second son Sipihr Shukoh were
paraded through the streets with disgrace. He was put to death
on the charge of apostasy from Islam by the sentence of Aurangzib's
court theologians (9 September). His remains were buried in a vault
of Humayun's tomb.
Dara's eldest son, Sulaiman Shukoh, on his way back from the
war with Shuja', had heard of the disaster to his father at Samogarh,
and on being deserted by most of his troops and headed off by


## p. 228 (#262) ############################################

228
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
Aurangzib's forces from the west, he failed to reach his father in the
Punjab. He therefore sought refuge with the Raja of Srinagar in the
Garhwal hills, who gave him a royal welcome. But a year later
(July, 1659) Aurangzib sent a force to coerce or bribe the raja into
giving up the refugee. Sulaiman was delivered up by his host and
brought to Delhi on 12 January, 1661. He was ordered to be con-
fined in the fort of Gwalior and was there done to death (May, 1662)
with overdoses of opium. In the same state prison, Murad Bakhsh
was beheaded (14 December, 1661) under judicial sentence for the
murder of 'Ali Naqi, his divan in Gujarat, whose son, instigated by
Aurangzib, insisted on the retaliation of blood for blood allowed by
Islamic law. The very young sons of Dara and Murad were spared,
nly to be kept in prison for life. Thus, all possible rivals having
been removed from his path, Aurangzib became the indisputable lord
and master of Mughul India.
In four severely contested battles for the throne, fought in the
course of less than a year in widely separated provinces, Aurangzib
had marched rapidly and triumphed uniformly at the total cost of
only two generals killed and one dead from sunstroke, while his
opponents were crushed with terrible carnage among officers and
privates alike. There could be no greater proof of his genius and
efficiency than this.
The reign of Aurangzib naturally falls into two equal divisions of
about twenty-five years each, the first of which he passed in northern
India and the second in the Deccan. During the earlier half of his
reign the centre of interest lies unmistakably in the north, because
the most important developments, civil and military, concerned this
region. In the second half, the situation is reversed : all the resources
of the empire are concentrated in the Deccan; the emperor, his court
and family, the bulk of his army, and all his best officers live there,
and Hindustan sinks back to a place of secondary importance; the
administration in northern India grows weak and corrupt at the
withdrawal of the master's eye and all the ablest officers; the upper
classes decline in morals, culture, and useful activity; and finally
lawlessness breaks out in most parts, dimly heralding the great
anarchy which covered the eighteenth century.
After his final victory over Dara, Aurangzib celebrated his grand
coronation on 15 June, 1659,1 in the first month of his second regnal
year, at Delhi, with prolonged rejoicings. Thereafter he lived for
nearly twenty years at Delhi and Agra, making only a trip to Kashmir
which kept him away for one year (1663) and an eighteen months'
halt at Hasan Abdal (1674-75) to direct operations against the
frontier tribes. Early in 1679 he went to Ajmer to annex Marwar,
and thus became involved for the next two years and a half in the
1 The official date was put twenty-three days earlier on the 1st Ramazan,
A. H. 1068.


## p. 229 (#263) ############################################

FOREIGN EMBASSIES TO AURANGZIB
229
Rajput war, whose strange sequel drew him to the Deccan, there to
pass the last quarter century of his life in strenuous but unavailing toil.
During the years 1661-67, Aurangzib received complimentary
embassies from many foreign Muslim powers, such as the Sharif of
Mecca, the kings of Persia, Balkh, Bukhara, Kashghar, Urganj
(Khiva) and Shahr-i-nau, the Turkish governors of Basra, Hadra-
maut, Yaman and Mocha, the ruler of Barbary, and the king of
Abyssinia. The only embassy from Constantinople in his reign arrived
in 1690, charged with a letter for him. His policy was to dazzle the
eyes of these princes by the lavish gift of presents to them and to
their envoys, and thus induce the outer Muslim world to forget his
treatment of his father and brothers. The fame of India as a soft
cow spread throughout the middle and near East, and the
minor embassies were merely begging expeditions, as Bernier
shrewdly noted. The Sharif of Mecca in particular used to send his
agents to the Delhi court every year with the object of levying con-
tributions in the name of the Prophet, till at last the emperor's
patience was worn out and he refused to make the Sharif his almoner
at the holy city, but began to send his gifts to its scholars and mendi-
cants through his own agents. On the embassies received and the
return-embassies sent out Aurangzib spent in presents nearly three
million rupees in the course of seven years, besides the large sums
which he annually distributed at Mecca and the gift of a million to
'Abdullah Khan, the deposed king of Kashghar, who had taken refuge
in India in 1668 and died at Delhi in 1675.
The grandest and most costly of these diplomatic intercourses was
with Persia. But the overweening pride of Shah 'Abbas II, who could
not forget how the Mughul emperor Humayun had been a suppliant
before. his ancestor, how Shah Jahan had thrice failed to recover
Qandahar, and how a petty chief like Shivaji had sacked the greatest
port of the Mughul empire with impunity, led to a rupture between
the two sovereigns, which was aggravated by the Shah's exaltation
of the Shiah religion in his letters to an orthodox Sunni like Aurang-
zib. At last after sending two insulting letters to Aurangzib and
barbarously humiliating the Indian ambassador at the Persian court
(Tarbiyat Khan), Shah 'Abbas threatened an invasion of India, but
his death (August, 1667) dispersed the war clouds, and the Persian
monarchy soon afterwards sank into sloth and decay, to the immense
reltef of the Delhi court.
Many minor conquests were made in the outskirts of the empire
during the first half of Aurangzib's reign, the most valuable of which
were the annexations of Palamau (in south Bihar) by Daud Khan
the governor of Patna in 1661 and of Chittagong by Shayista Khan
the governor of Bengal in 1666. A more romantic success was that
of a mission from the province of Kashmir (1665) which forced the
ruler of Tibet (evidently little Tibet or Ladakh) to acknowledge the


## p. 230 (#264) ############################################

230
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
suzerainty of Aurangzib, stamp coins in his name, and build a mosque
at his capital where the Islamic call to prayer had never been heard
before. The conquests in Assam made early in the reign were all
lost by the year 1681.
The disturbances of internal peace during this earlier period were
neither very important nor successful. The outbreaks which inevitably
followed the collapse of civil authority during a war of succession
subsided with Aurangzib's assertion of his mastery. The Hindu risings
against his policy of religious persecution will be described later.
The vassal princes who revolted were all crushed like Champat Rai
Bundela (1661) and Rai Singh the usurper of Navanagar in Kathia-
war (1663), or forced to sue for pardon like Rao Karan of Bikaner
(1660). In fact, these few and strictly localised tumults hardly
disturbed the profound internal peace which northern India enjoyed
during the first half of this reign.
Aurangzib had claimed the throne as the champion of pure Islam
against the heretical practices and opinions of Dara Shukoh. Soon
after his grand coronation (June, 1659), he issued a number of
ordinances for restoring the orthodox rules of conduct taught by the
Quran. He abolished his ancestors' practices of stamping the kalima
(the Muslim credo) on their coins and of observing the nauruz or
New Year's day of the pagan Persians; forbade the cultivation of
bhang (Cannabis indica) throughout his realm; and appointed a censor
of public morals (Muhtasib) in every large city to enforce the Prophet's
laws and put down forbidden practices, such as drinking, gambling
and the illicit commerce of the sexes. The punishment of heretical
opinions, blasphemy and omission of the five daily prayers or of the
Ramazan fast by Muslims lay within the province of this officer.
His puritanical rigour grew with age. In the eleventh year of his
reign (1668) he forbade music at his court and pensioned off the
state musicians and singers, many of whom had enjoyed honour and
high rank under the preceding sovereigns. The royal band was, how-
ever, retained. The ceremony of weighing (wazan) the emperor's
person on his birthday against gold and silver, which were then given
away in charity, was discontinued; and so also the custom of the
emperor applying a spot of sandal paste (tika) to the foreheads of
the great rajas when newly investing them (1679), and the ceremony
of the emperor showing himself every morning at an outer balcony
of the palace for his subjects to look at him (darshan)-because all
these were Hindu practices.
Gradually the festivities which used to be held on his birthday
and the anniversary of his coronation were abolished (1677); only
"betel leaves and scents were distributed among those present at
court”, and the grandees were forbidden to make the customary
presents to the emperor. In many other minute points a literal
compliance with the practice of early Islam was enjoined.


## p. 231 (#265) ############################################

SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
231
But this attempt to elevate mankind by one stroke of the official
pen failed, as Akbar's social reforms had failed before. Aurangzib's
government made itself ridiculous by violently enforcing for a time,
then relaxing, and finally abandoning a code of puritanical morals
opposed to the feelings of the entire population, without first trying
to educate them to a higher level of thought. As Manucci observed,
there were few who did not drink secretly, and even the ministers and
qazis loved to get drunk at home. Gambling continued to be practised
in his camp, and his order to all the courtesans and dancing girls to
marry or leave the realm remained a dead letter. In 1664 he issued
an edict forbidding sati (the voluntary burning of Hindu widows),
but his government was powerless to enforce the prohibition every
where in the face of popular opposition. The castration of children
for sale as eunuchs, though again and again denounced by him,
continued in certain provinces.
Nevertheless much good was done in the economic sphere by the
pious emperor's determined opposition to uncanonical taxes and
illegal exactions (abwab). Immediately after his second enthrone-
ment (1659) he gave prompt and much needed relief to his subjects
in the scarcity which followed from the disturbances of the civil war
by abolishing the inland transport duty (rahdari), amounting to
10 per cent. ad valorem, and the octroi (pandari) on all articles of
food and drink brought from outside for sale in the larger cities.
This was done in the crown lands by the emperor's order (at a loss
of 212 million rupees per annum under rahdari alone), while the
jagirdars (assignees) and zamindars (landholders) were requested to
do the same in their estates.
The abwab or exactions made under various pretexts, in addition
to the regular land revenue or custom duty, were a prolific source
of oppression to the people, and were more burdensome in their
operation in proportion as their victims were poor and uninfluential
and distant from the imperial headquarters. These imposts were
again and again declared illegal and forbidden by Muslim sovereigns
of Delhi like Firuz Shah Tughluq (1375), Akbar (c. 1590) and
Jahangir (1605), but they invariably managed to reappear after a
short time. These abwab i included duties on the local sale of pro-
duce (i. e. octroi), perquisites exacted by the officials for their own
benefit, as well as fees and commissions levied on behalf of the state
on almost every conceivable occasion, licence tax for plying certain
trades, forced subscriptions, and gifts to officers, and special imposts
on the Hindus. Among the last were taxes on bathing in the
sacred waters (e. g. 644 rupees on every pilgrim at Allahabad) and a
fee charged on the bones of dead Hindus carried for being thrown
into the Ganges. As a tax was also levied on the father for the
birth of a male child, we may say that under the Mughuls illegal
1 The subject has been treated in detail in my Mughal Administration, chap. V.


## p. 232 (#266) ############################################

232
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
cesses pursued a man from birth to death. Aurangzib's edicts for
their abolition are dated 20 November, 1665, 29 April, 1673, and 1682.
But the timidity of the common people, the weakness of the central
government in the provinces and its lack of an adequate number of
reliable agents left the Indian population helpless under official
extortion, in spite of benevolent paper edicts from the court.
In the course of his enforcement of orthodoxy, Aurangzib's hand
did not spare the heretics of Islam. Even several Sufi philosophers
did not feel themselves safe, as their elastic pantheism was suspected
to be a coquetry with Hinduism and a veiled abjuration of the pure
dogmas of Islam. The emperor's accession was followed by the per-
secution of several holy men of liberal views but professed Muslims
whom Dara had favoured. The most notable victim of this class was
Sarmad, a Jew of Kashan (in Persia) converted to Islam, who com-
posed many smooth-flowing verses breathing the ardent mystical
fervour of the Sufi and the spirit of lofty catholicity which recognised
the truth inherent in all great creeds. Sarmad used to go about
absolutely naked, because like an uncompromising monist he denied
the existence of matter and felt no shame about anything pertaining
to the material body. He is said to have blessed Dara's banners in
the civil war, and was beheaded on the charge of heresy soon after
Aurangzib's accession. We also read of the execution of Shiahs for
cursing the first three Khalifs, and of converts to Islam for returning
to their old faith. The Isma'ilia (or Bohra) heretics of Gujarat were
subjected to bloody persecution by order of Aurangzib.
So long as Shah Jahan lived as a captive in Agra, Aurangzib
never visited that capital, for his relations with his deposed father
were extremely bitter and became the subject of public condemna-
tion throughout India and even outside. The court theologians,
particularly 'Abdul-Wahhab (who was rewarded with the chief
justiceship of the empire), justified his usurpation of a loving father's
throne on the ground that the old emperor had grown infirm and
intellectually unfit for governing the realm, and, therefore, the pro-
tection of the faithful required government by a pious and vigorous
man like Aurangzib. But the rest of the world denounced
Aurangzib's treatment of his father as an outrage on justice and
decorum.
A very acrimonious correspondence that plassed between father
and son during the earlier days of Shah Jahan's captive life can be
still followed in Aurangzib's replies, though Shah Jahan's letters to
him are lost. The ex-emperor's futile attempts to correspond with
Dara and Shuja' only led to an increase in the rigour of his captivity,
under Mu'tamid, the harsh eunuch in charge, who "sometimes
allowed it to be seen that he treated Shah Jahan as a miserable
captive" (Manucci). There were also disputes about the crown


## p. 233 (#267) ############################################

SHAH JAHAN'S LAST DAYS
233
jewels and Dara's property lodged in Agra fort, which Shah Jahan
tried in vain to withhold from the victor. Then he wrote bitter letters
charging Aurangzib with being an unnatural son and a rebel subject,
a robber of other people's property and a hypocrite. The latter
replied in a lofty tone of self-righteousness, posing as the champion
of pure Islam and of good government, and the humble but favourite
instrument of God in the work of moral reform and popular bene-
ficence, which had been endangered by his father's incompetence,
sloth and unjust rule : "Kingship means the protection of the realm
and the guardianship of the people. . . . A king is merely God's
elected custodian and the trustee of His money for the benefit of
the subjects” (Adab-i-'Alamgiri). Worsted in this contest with the
pen, Shah Jahan resigned himself to his fate and prepared for the
next world under the religious ministration of Sayyid Muhammad
Qanauji and the tender nursing of his eldest daughter Jahanara,
the Mughul Antigone. "All the ex-emperor's time was divided bet-
ween professing obedience to God, prayer, performance of all the
religious services, reading the Quran and listening to the histories
of the great men of the past. ” Seven and a half years passed in this
way, and then he died on 1 February, 1666, aged seventy-four,
The first great war of Aurangzib's reign was the invasion of
Assam.
Early in the sixteenth century a Mongoloid soldier of fortune
had founded a kingdom in Cooch Behar, north of Bengal. Lakshmi
Narayan, the third king of this dynasty (r. 1584-1622), had professed
allegiance to Akbar. A younger branch of the family had been
installed over its eastern districts or Kamrup, i. e. the country between
the Sankosh and Bar Nadi rivers, which the Muslim writers called
Kuch Hajo. In 1612, taking advantage of a contest between the
two branches, the Mughuls conquered and annexed Kuch Hajo, but
this brought them into collision with the Ahoms. These Ahoms were
a branch of the Shan race, who had crossed the Patkai range in
the thirteenth century and established a kingdom of their own over
eastern and central Assam. They were a hardy race of demon-
worshippers, expert in building stockades, plying boats, and making
night attacks. Their society was organised on a feudal basis, under
a number of official nobles, who cultivated their estates by slave
labour. Their army consisted entirely of infantry, stiffened with
elephants; but during their wars with Bengal they had learnt the
use of firearms. Their king was the patriarch of the clan and was
venerated as a semi-divine being. After much desultory fighting with
.
the Mughuls of Kuch Hajo, the Ahom king made peace in 1638,
recognising the boundary line of the Bar Nadi.
During the war of succession, when Bengal was depleted of soldiers
and left without a governor, the Rajas of Cooch Benar and Assam
had sent troops from the west and the east respectively to seize the
Mughul district of Kamrup lying between their realms. The Muslim


## p. 234 (#268) ############################################

234
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
local officers had fled away from their charge, and the Ahoms had
occupied Gauhati and plundered the whole district, driving out the
Cooch Behar forces. When the civil war ended, Mir Jumla was
appointed viceroy of Bengal (June, 1660), with orders to punish these
rebel rajas. Leaving Dacca on 11 November, 1661, with an army of
12,000 horse and 30,000 foot, and a flotilla of 323 vessels of different
classes, Mir Jumla captured the capital of Cooch Behar (29 Decem-
ber) without a blow, as the raja and his officers had vacated it in
terror. The kingdom was annexed to the Mughul empire, and then
the general set out (14 January, 1662) on the invasion of Assam.
His men had to undergo unspeakable hardship in making their way
through the dense jungle and across numberless streams, but all their
sufferings were shared by their chief. The Ahom army offered
feeble resistance and kept retreating up the Brahmaputra, so that
the imperialists captured the successive forts on the way-Jogigupha,
Gauhati, Srighat, Pandu, Beltala, Kajali, Samdhara and Simla-garh.
In a naval battle fought on 13 March Mir Jumla annihilated the
enemy's naval power, and finally on 17 March entered their deserted
capital Garhgaon. The spoils taken were immense : 82 elephants,
three hundred thousand rupees, 675 pieces of artillery, 1345 zam-
buraks (swivels), 6750 matchlocks, and 1000 odd boats, besides much
gun-powder and paddy.
The Raja of Assam and his nobles having fled far away to the
hills, Mir Jumla could not conclude any treaty with them, but
decided to hold the country during the coming rainy season. The
Ahom capital, containing all the artillery, elephants, stores and
property of the Mughul army, was occupied by a strong garrison,
while the general himself went into quarters at Mathurapur, a high-
lying village, seven miles south-east of it. Many outposts were set
up for guarding the routes. The fleet could not sail up to Garhgaon,
on account of the shallowness of the river near that city; it, therefore,
anchored at Lakhau, some eighteen miles north-west. This was the
fatal weakness of the imperialists' position.
During the rainy season, from May to October, the country was
flooded, the movement of troops by land became impossible, the
imperial outposts were isolated, and the Mughul army in Assam
had to live in a state of siege. No provisions or news could come
from Bengal or from the fleet, as the gun-boats were too heavy to
navigate the shallow river near Garhgaon and the roads were sub-
merged. For lack of proper food, cavalry horses and draught cattle
perished by the thousand. On 20 May the Ahoms captured the
outposts at Gajpur and thus cut off communications between the
Mughul army and navy. Around Garhgaon they concentrated and
kept the garrison in perpetual alarm by attacks almost every night.
Several assaults in force were delivered, and in one of them the
bamboo fence of the fort was pierced and half the enclosure seized.
1
1


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MIR JUMLA IN ASSAM
233
But all these attacks were finally defeated by the exertion of every
man in the garrison.
In August a terrible epidemic broke out in Mir Jumla's camp at
Mathurapur. Fever and flux carried off hundreds daily, reducing the
army to nearly a quarter of its strength; no suitable diet or comfort
was available for the sick. Coarse rice and the meat of commissariat
bullocks were the food of all from the general down to the humblest
soldier. Indeed, the whole of Assam was infected, and 230,000 of its
people died of disease that year. At last the garrison of Mathurapur
fell back on Garhgaon (27 August), abandoning their numberless sick,
But the refugees only infected the garrison of Garhgaon.
Through all these months, the fleet at Lakhau had maintained its
ascendancy on water and kept up its touch with Bengal, and when,
towards the close of October, the land became dry again, it pushed
up large quantities of provisions, under escort, to Garhgaon. Mir
Jumla now resumed the offensive and marched eastwards by way of
Solaguri to Tipam, the Ahom raja and his nobles having again fled
to the hills of Namrup. But the Mughul army to a man refused to
enter these hills of pestilence and unknown magical terror. The
general himself was seized with fainting fits. Fever and pleurisy
supervened, which quickly turned into consumption, and he con-
sented to make peace (December, 1662). The Ahom king agreed
to pay an indemnity of 20,000 tolas of gold, 420,000 tolas 1 of silver
and 110 elephants, to send a daughter to the imperial harem, to
cede to the Mughuls all the territory west of the Bharali river north
of the Brahmaputra and west of the Kallang river on the south
(i. e. more than half the province of Darrang, rich in elephants),
and to give hostages. The princess, hostages and first instalment of the
indemnity having reached his camp, Mir Jumla set out on his return
from Tipam on 20 January, 1663, a dying man, and died on 10 April
before reaching Dacca. His genius had shone with supreme radiance
during this campaign. No other general of that age conducted war
with so much humanity and justice, or kept his soldiers under such
discipline; no other general could have retained to the last the
confidence and affection of his subordinates amidst such appalling
sufferings and dangers. From the first day of the campaign he shared
with the meanest soldier all the privations of the march and siege
and brought premature death upon himself by incessant hard labour.
The Mughuls continued to hold his acquisitions in Assam for four
years after his retreat. But in 1667, the vigorous Ahom king Chakra-
dhvaj renewed the war and recovered all the lost territory, and
even captured Gauhati. Thus, the imperial frontier was pushed back
to the Monas river. A desultory war continued for nine years; but
the Mughul forces were hopelessly small, they had lost their supre-
macy on water, and their general Ram Singh (Raja of Amber) had
1 A tola weighs about 180 grains.


## p. 236 (#270) ############################################

236
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
not his heart in the work, as he had been transferred to that pesti-
lential province as a punishment for his connivance at the escape of
Shivaji from Agra in 1666. After staying for some years at Ranga-
mati doing nothing, he was recalled to court in 1676. In 1679, the
Mughuls, taking advantage of the weakness of the Ahom kings and
dissensions among their nobles, recovered Gauhati by bribery, only
to lose it two years afterwards to the new and war-like king Gadadhar
Singh. Thus, Kamrup was finally lost to the empire. During Mir
Jumla's investment in Garhgaon, Cooch Behar had been recovered
by its raja. But when Shayista Khan came to Bengal as governor,
the raja made his peace (1664) by offering submission and half a
million rupees. Later in the century, the Mughuls annexed the
southern and eastern portions of the kingdom, including the present
districts of Rangpur and western Kamrup.
One of the tasks with which Mir Jumla was charged by the
emperor was the punishment of the pirates of Chittagong and the
recovery of Shuja's family. This work, which he did not live to
attempt, fell to his successor in Bengal, Shayista Khan. The Fenny
river was the boundary between the Burmese (Magh) kingdom of
Arakan and the Mughul empire, but during the reigns of Jahangir
and Shah Jahan the Magh pirates acquired complete domination
over the rivers and creeks of East Bengal. Their naval power was
strengthened by the settlement of Portuguese and half-caste (Feringi)
adventurers in Chittagong, who acted as the agents of the local raja
in these raids. “These pirates, both Magh and Feringi, used con-
stantly to come and plunder Bengal, carrying off the Hindus and
Muslims that they could seize, and employing some of the captives
in degrading tasks and selling others as slaves at the Indian ports. "
Deltaic Bengal was so long and so thoroughly devastated by them
that the riverside parts of the Backergunge and Dacca districts
remained desolate and bare of inhabitants even at the time of
Rennell's survey (1775).
The sailors of the Bengal navvara felt such a terror of the pirates that when-
ever a hundred war-boats of the former sighted only four of the latter, the
Bengal crews thought themselves lucky if they could save their lives by flight.
Latterly the Raja of Arakan had ceased to send his own fleet to plunder Mughul
territory, as he considered the Feringi pirates in the light of his servants and
shared the booty with them half and half. 1
Bernier describes these Portuguese as "Christians only in name; the
lives led by them were most detestable, massacring or poisoning one
another without compunction or remorse”. During their raids they
practised fiendish cruelty on the people, men, women and children,
whom they could catch, and their name Harmad (=Armada) is
associated with horror and loathing in contemporary Bengali lite-
rature. Their ravages caused great loss to the imperial revenue and
prestige in Bengal.
1 Sarkar, J. N. , in Journal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1907, p. 423.


## p. 237 (#271) ############################################

CONQUEST OF CHITTAGONG
237
Shayista Khan first set himself to create a navy anew, as the
Bengal flotilla had practically ceased to exist during the Assam war
and the subsequent confusion and maladministration, though there
was an annual grant of 142 million rupees for its maintenance. With
great energy within one year he built and manned a fleet of 300
vessels, and protected Dacca by water on the south. Next, he con-
quered the island of Sandwip, at the head of the Bay of Bengal,
as it was a convenient half-way house between Dacca and Chitta-
gong (November, 1665). He next bribed the Feringi colony of
Chittagong, who were then quarrelling with the local raja, to migrate
suddenly with their families and ships to Mughul territory (December,
1665)—the site of their new homes in Dacca town being still called
Feringi-bazar.
"The coming over of the Feringis gave composure to the minds
of the people of Bengal”, and on 24 December an expedition by land
and sea left Dacca for Chittagong, under the governor's son Buzurg
Ummed Khan and admiral Ibn Husain. The fleet moved close to
the coast, while the army marched parallel to it, cutting a way
through the jungle and naturally lagging some distance behind. The
brunt of the fighting fell on the fleet (288 vessels) or rather on the
forty ships of the Feringis which formed the imperial vanguard.
Two battles were fought at sea (2 and 3 February, 1666) in which
the Maghs were defeated and driven back upon Chittagong. A third
battle, in the river below that town, resulted in the entire Magh
squadron (135 vessels) of that region being captured. The fort of
Chittagong capitulated to the fleet on 5 February, when the land
force also arrived.
Chittagong was made the seat of a Mughul commandant and its
name was changed to Islamabad. Thousands of Bengal peasants, so
long held there in serfdom by the pirates, were now released and
restored to their homes. The Mughuls advanced up to the port of
Ramu, but soon abandoned it as too distant an outpost. Chittagong,
however, has remained attached to Bengal ever since.
Aurangzib was the champion of Muslim orthodoxy, and yet he
had to wage many wars with his fanatical Muslim subjects of the
north-western frontier. The causes were political and economic, not
religious. The Afghan clans living in and around the passes leading
out of India into Afghanistan have followed highway robbery as a
hereditary profession from time immemorial. Their fields yield too
scanty a sustenance for their fast growing numbers, and stout hearts,
strong muscles and cunning brains do not remain satisfied with the
poor and slow gains of agriculture, as compared with the plunder of
industrious and tame plainsmen and of rich traders passing within
easy reach. The Mughul emperors had learnt by bitter experience
that it was cheaper to bribe these hillmen, as a means of keeping
the passes open and the valleys at their foot safe, than to coerce the


## p. 238 (#272) ############################################

238
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
robbers. A sum of 600,000 rupees was annually allotted by Aurang-
zib's government for paying subsidies to the various border chieftains
and headmen of families. But even these political pensions did not
always ensure peace on the frontier. In every generation some
leader of ungratified ambition would gather together a band of fiery
youths and raid the imperial territory or the villages of his rivals.
The pressure of growing population made peace and a static condition
impossible on this frontier.
Early in 1667 the Yusufzai clan, living in Swat and Bajaur and
the north Peshawar plain, rose under Bhagu, who crowned a pre-
tended scion of their ancient kings under the title of Muhammad
Shah, and crossing the Indus above Attock invaded the Hazara
district, and attacked the imperial outposts there. Other Yusufzai
bands plundered the western Peshawar and Attock districts. Then
they came over to the south side of the Indus at Harun, in order to
prevent any Mughul force from crossing into their country at this
ferry. But Kamil Khan, the commandant of Attock, defeated and
expelled them with heavy slaughter (11 April). Next month Shamsher
Khan, with a larger army, crossed the Indus, entered the Yusufzai
country, and leaving an entrenched camp at Und ravaged the corn-
fields in the level country of Mandrawar. Then advancing farther
he captured many of their villages, burning down the houses, looting
the property and destroying all vestiges of cultivation, up to the
Panjshir river.
At the beginning of September the supreme command was assumed
by Muhammad Amin Khan at the head of a large force, and his
hard blows quieted the rebel clansmen for some years.
In 1672 the tactless action of the commandant of Jalalabad caused
another explosion among the Khyber clans. The Afridis rose under
their chieftain Akmal Khan, a born general, who crowned himself
king and proclaimed a holy war against the Mughuls, summoning all
the Pathans to join the national movement. Muhammad Amin Khan,
now governor of Afghanistan, was enveloped and attacked by the
Afridis at 'Ali Masjid (1 May) and cut off from his water supply.
Disorder seized the Mughul army; horses, elephants and men became
mixed together in confusion. Then the Afghans charged down the
hillside, completing the ruin of the imperialists. Muhammad Amin and
some of his higher officers escaped, but everything else was lost : ten
thousand men were slain, the entire camp property, valued at twenty
million rupees, was plundered, and 20,000 men and women (including
the viceroy's mother, wife and daughter) were dragged into captivity.
This signal success lured more recruits to Akmal's banners, and the
rising rapidly spread through the entire Pathan land "from Attock
to Qandahar”. Khush-hal Khan, the poet and hero of the Khattak
clan, now joining Akmal, became the leading spirit of the national
rising and inspired the tribesmen with his pen and sword alike.


## p. 239 (#273) ############################################

WARS WITH FRONTIER AFGHANS
239
The emperor degraded Muhammad Amin Khan, and recalling
Mahabat Khan from the Deccan sent him to Kabul as viceroy for
the fourth time. But this general made a secret pact with the Afghans
on condition of mutual forbearance, and so the Khyber route
remained closed. Aurangzib was displeased and sent Shuja'at Khan
in independent command of a large force with abundant artillery
(November, 1673). He was a man of humble birth who had risen
to the emperor's favour by his ability, and therefore the high-born
officers regarded him with jealousy, while he treated them with
insolent contempt. This led to a lack of co-operation between them
and a Mughul disaster on 3 March, 1674, when Shuja'at Khan was
cut off in the Karapa pass, but the remnant of his force was rescued
by Jasvant Singh's Rajputs.
To restore imperial prestige in this quarter, Aurangzib himself
went to Hasan Abdal (6 July, 1674) near Peshawar, and stayed there
for a year and a half directing the operations. Mahabat Khan was
removed from the viceroyalty, and under the master's eyes imperial
diplomacy and imperial arms alike succeeded. Many clans were
bought over with pensions and posts for their headmen, while the
lands of the refractory were ravaged by strong detachments operating
from Peshawar. Thus, in a short time the Ghorai, Ghilzai, Shirani
and Yusufzai clans were crushed, and others peacefully submitted.
Great deeds were done by the Turki general Uighur Khan, who had
often before distinguished himself in fighting the Afghans. He first
defeated a Mohmand attack and ravaged their homes; but his
attempt to open the Khyber pass failed after heavy fighting near
‘Ali Masjid. He next occupied Ningrahar and opened the Jagdalik
pass, expelling the Ghilzais from it. Afghan mothers used to hush
their babies to sleep with Uighur Khan's dreaded name.
In the spring of 1675, Fidai Khan in coming back from Kabul
was attacked at Jagdalik; his van was defeated and its baggage
carried off by the enemy, but his courage and steadiness saved the
rest of the army, while reinforcements under Uighur Khan turned
the check into a victory. But in June next Mukarram Khan while
operating near Khapush in the Bajaur country was lured into an
ambush and repulsed with heavy losses. At the end of August there
were two local reverses; the thanadar of Jagdalik was slain and that
of Barangab and Surkhab was driven out of his post with severe
loss of men. But all the Mughul positions in Afghanistan were
strengthened, and by December, 1675, the situation had sufficiently
improved to enable the emperor to leave the Punjab for Delhi.
The good work done by his army under his eyes was confirmed
by his happy choice of an extraordinarily capable governor for
Afghanistan. Amir Khan, the son of Khalil-ullah, was appointed
viceroy of Kabul in 1677 and continued to govern the province with
signal ability and success till his death in 1698. He set himself to


## p. 240 (#274) ############################################

240
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
win the hearts of the Afghans and enter into social relations with
them with such success that the chiefs of the clans gave up their shy
and unsocial manners and began to visit him without any suspicion.
Every one of them looked up to him for advice in conducting his
domestic affairs. Under his astute management, they ceased to
trouble the imperial government and spent their energies in inter-
necine quarrels. Once he broke up a confederacy under Akmal
Afridi by secretly instigating the chieftain's followers to ask him to
divide the conquered territory among them. When Akmal declined
on the ground of the insufficiency of the land, the disappointed hill-
men began to return home. And when at last he did make a division,
his other followers left him because of his having shown greater
favour to his own clansmen. Much of Amir Khan's administrative
success was due to the wise counsel, tact and energy of his wife
Sahibji, a daughter of 'Ali Mardan Khan.
The emperor triumphed in Afghanistan by following the policy
of paying subsidies and setting clan against clan. Amir Khan's
diplomacy broke up the confederacy under Akmal, and when that
able leader died the Afridis made terms with the empire. The Khyber
was kept open. But Khush-hal Khan Khattak continued the war
single-handed for many years afterwards, till his own son betrayed
him to the enemy. The fallen chieftain solaced his exile and captivity
by composing stinging verses against Aurangzib.
This Afghan war made the employment of Afghans in the ensuing
Rajput war impossible, though they were just the class of troops
required in that field. Moreover, it relieved the pressure on Shivaji
by draining the Deccan of the best Mughul soldiers and generals for
service on the north-west frontier. The Maratha king took advantage
of this diversion of his enemy's strength to make his dazzling conquest
of the Carnatic (1677) unchecked.
The most important feature of Aurangzib's internal administration
was his deliberate reversal of the policy of his predecessors towards
his non-Muslim subjects and vassal princes, which change of policy
is generally held to have caused the swift downfall of the empire
after his death. But with him it was not a matter of personal caprice
or earthly gain. According to the orthodox interpretation of the
Quranic law, it is the duty of every pious Muslim to "exert himself
in the path of God", or, in other words, to wage holy wars (jihad)
against non-Muslim countries (dar-ul-harb) till they are turned into
re ms of Islam (dar-ul-Islam). In theory the conquered infidel
population is reduced to the status of slaves, but in practice even
idol-worshippers were allowed to share in the modified form of
protection which early Islam granted to the “People of the Book"
(viz. Jews and Christians). A non-Muslim lived under a contract
(zimma) with the state; life and property were spared to him by the
Commander of the Faithful, but he had, in return, to undergo certain


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TEMPLE DESTRUCTION ORDERED
241
political and civil disabilities and pay a capitation tax; he was not
allowed to wear fine dresses, ride on horseback, or carry arms; he
must behave respectfully and submissively to every member of the
dominant sect; and he could not be a citizen of the state. He was
under certain legal disabilities with regard to testimony in law courts,
protection under the criminal law, and in marriage. He must avoid
any offensive publicity in the exercise of his faith and must not erect
any new temple. For not embracing Islam, he had to pay commuta-
tion money (jizya) with marks of humility (Quran, ix. 29). This tax
has been called by some modern writers a fee for exemption from
military service; but the analogy is entirely false, because the army
of the Mughul empire was a purely mercenary body and in no sense
a conscript force or a nation in arms. There was no compulsion on
the Muslim population to enter the army in India, and no fine on
those Muslims who did not enter it; every soldier, Muslim or Hindu,
enlisted voluntarily, and every soldier, Muslim no less than Hindu,
drew the regular salary.
Such was the legal position of the Hindus under Muhammadan
rule. But in practice they enjoyed religious freedom in many periods
through the moderation or indolence of their rulers. When an enemy
capital or rebel stronghold was captured, the temples of the place
were demolished or turned into mosques; but Hindu temples in
general were left unmolested except by certain bigoted sultans like
Firuz Tughluq or Sikandar Lodi.
In his Benares farman, granted on 10 March, 1659, before his
throne was secure, Aurangzib had declared that his religion forbade
the building of new temples but did not enjoin the demolition of
long-standing ones. But his own action both before and after his
accession had not respected this distinction. When acting as governor
of Gujarat (1645), he had not only demolished the new temple of
Chintaman (at Saraspur) but also several old ones. During his second
viceroyalty of the Deccan he had pulled down the temple of Khande
Rao on a hill south of Aurangabad. His first step after his accession
was to forbid old temples to be repaired (1664). A little later his
iconoclastic zeal burst forth in full force. On 19 April, 1669, he
issued a general order to "the governors of all the provinces to
demolish the schools and temples of the infidels and put down their
teaching and religious practices strongly”. Officers were sent to
every pargana to demolish the local temples and the governor had
to send the report of the execution of the order under the seal of
the gazi and attested by pious Shaikhs of the locality. The censors
of public morals (Muhtasibs) appointed to every subdivision and city
had it as their normal duty to go round and destroy Hindu places
of worship within their jurisdiction. So large was the number of
official temple-breakers that a darogha (superintendent) had to be
placed over them to guide and unite their activities. Besides number-
18


## p. 242 (#276) ############################################

242
AURANGZIB (1658-1681)
less minor shrines throughout the empire, all the most famous Hindu
places of worship now suffered destruction: the temples of Somnath
at Patan, Vishvanath at Benares and Keshav Dev at Muttra.
Even the loyal state of Jaipur did not escape, sixty-six temples being
demolished at Amber. During the Rajput war, in Udaipur and
Chitor alone in two months 239 temples suffered ruin by his order.
The work of destruction was often accompanied by wanton dese-
cration, such as the slaughtering of cows in the sanctuary and causing
the idols to be trodden down in public squares. 1
On 12 April, 1679, an edict was issued reimposing "the jizya tax
on the unbelievers with the object of spreading Islam and over-
throwing infidel practices". For the purpose of assessment the non-
Muslim population was roughly divided into three classes, poor,
middle class and rich, with incomes below 200 dirhams, 200-10,000
dirhams, and above 10,000 dirhams respectively, the rate of taxation
being 12, 24, and 48 dirhams a year. 2 The professional classes,
merchants and landowners were ranked as rich, and artisans as poor.
The last class paid the tax only when their income exceeded the cost
of maintaining their families. Women, children below fourteen years
of age, slaves, beggars and paupers were exempt from the tax; blind
men, cripples and lunatics paid only when they were “rich"; monks
were untaxed, unless they belonged to wealthy monasteries, in which
case the heads of these houses had to pay. All government officials
were exempted from the tax. A crowd of Hindus that gathered in
Delhi, blocking the road from the fort-gate to the Jami' mosque and
appealing to the emperor to withdraw the tax, was trodden down
by elephants when they did not disperse in spite of warning. A tem-
perate and closely reasoned letter of protest from Shivaji had no
better success. “Many Hindus who were unable to pay turned
Muhammadans to obtain relief from the insults of the collectors. . .
Aurangzib rejoices" (Manucci). The heaviness of the tax interfered
with the adequate flow of grain to the imperial camp bazaars in the
Deccan later in the reign.