No More Learning

"Those are vain words. The paracittajnana (knowledge of the mind of another), at the moment when it grasps a thing, does not grasp other things; because it does not know other things, it is not universal knowledge. The series also does not grasp (all), because it knows present being. In your system, it knows solely the general characteristics of a part of the dharmas. And if this is the case, it is only by metaphor that the Tathagata is called omniscient. . . "
70. Mahdvastu, iii. 327.
ye cdbhyatitasambuddhdye ca buddhd hy andgatdh / yai cdpy etarhi sambuddho bahundm /okandsakdh //
Vddnavarga, xxi. 10, frag. Stein, JRAS. Aprii, 1924. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 322a22, Samyutta, i. 40, Anguttara, ii. 21.
If the Buddha is a "self," it should enter into the fifth category, "the ineffable," distinct from the three time periods and from asamskrta (see above p. 1318).
71. Bhdrahdrasutra (Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 102) or simply the Bhdrasutta (Visuddhi, 479, 512). bhdram ca vo bhiksavo desayisydmi bhardddnam ca bhdraniksepanam ca bhdrahdram /
tacchrnutasddhucasusthucamanasikurutabhdsisye/ bhdrahkatamah/pancopdddnas- kandhdh / bhardddnam katamat / trsnd paunarbhaviki nandirdgasahagatd tatra tatrdbhinandini/ bhdraniksepanam katamat /yadasyd eva trsndydh paunarbhavikyd nandirdgasahagatdyds tatra tatrdbbinandinyd as'esaprahdnam pratinihsargo vyantibhdvah ksayo virago nirodho vyupasamo'staihgamah / bhdrahdrah katamah / pudgala iti sydd vacaniyam ? o'sdv dyusmdn evamndmd evamjdtya evamgotra evamdhdra evamsukhaduh- khapratisamvedi evamdirghdyur evamcirasthitika evam dyusparyanta iti (Vydkhyd; without doubt the text of the Ekottara, TD 2, p. 631cl6).
In the Samyutta, iii. 25, there is the order: bhdra, bhdhdra, bbaradana, bhdranikkhepana. Numerous variants. The "bearer" is defined: puggalo ti ssa vacaniyam /? ? yam evamndmo evamgotto ayam vuccati bhikkhave bhdrahdro.
Discussed by Sarhghabhadra, xxiii. 3, fol. 56a.
Nydyavdrttika (Bib. Ind. ) p. 342; Bodhicarydvatdra, ix. 72, Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 42, Bodhisattvabhumi, I. xvii, Warren, 159, 240, Minayev, Recherches, 225; E. Hardy, JRAS. , 1901, 573 (who explains the Sutra like Vasubandhu), Dialogues, i. 27. The prdnas and the burden, Deussen-Geden, Upanisads, 221.
72. The phrases between parentheses are the additions by Hsiian-tsang.
Vydkhyd: yadi dravyasan sydt pud galah / bhdrahdrah katamah / pudgala iti sydd vacaniyam ity etdvad evoktam sydt / tatra sutre parena sa na vibhaktavyah sydt yo'sdv dyusmdn iti vistarena ydvad evamdyusparyanta iti / prajfiaptisatpudgalapratipattyartham hy etat parena visesanam ity abhiprdyah.
If the pudgala exists as a thing, to this question "What is the bearer? ", the Buddha would simply respond, "What is suitable to be called the pudgala"; he would not add the explanations, "It is such a venerable one, of such a name . . . of such an end of life. " The aim of these is to show that the pudgala exists only through designation.
73. The Tibetan, according to Stcherbatski, gives, "The earlier skandhas torment the later ones; they are thus called burden and bearer of the burden. " Paramartha: the skandhas torment (lit. destroy) the skandhas, namely the earlier ones torment the later ones; in order to indicate that they present the characteristic of bearer and of burden, the text employs
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expressions. " It is thus that the Vydkhyd is understood: "The text has: among the skandbas, etc. The skandhas which cause one to suffer, the causes of suffering, receive for this reason the name of burden. The following, those which are tormented, receive for this reason the name of bearer of the burden. " (skandhdndm iti vistarah / tatraye upaghdtdya samvartante duhkhahetavah skandhds te bhdra iti krtvoktah / uttareye pidyante te bhdrahara iti krtvoktdh).
74. On apparitional beings and the intermediate existence, see iii. 8c.
75. According to the Sdmmitiyanikdya/dstra, the Third Chapter.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 988a14, "This world does not exist; the other world does not exist;
there are no apparitional beings"; this is a false view, a negation of causes (Compare iv. 78, 79b and v. 7, p. 777). "There are no apparitional beings": there are some non-Buddhist (bdhya) masters who say that all beings arise by reason of seed and blood, etc. ; that there are no beings who arise without pratyayas, suddenly, of themselves . . . According to some, apparitional beings are beings in the intermediate existence (antardbhava); to deny this world and the other world is to deny upapattibhava; to deny apparitional beings is to deny antardbhava.
The text of the Karmaprajn*ddpti (chap. iv. Mdo, 62 fol. 218) differs from the usual version, "There is neither gift, nor sacrifice, nor oblation, nor good action, nor evil action, nor retributive result of good and evil actions. This world does not exist, nor does the other one. There is neither father, nor mother, nor apparitional beings. There is not in this world any well gone, well come Arhat, who knows and realizes by himself this world and the other, thinking, 'My births are destroyed, the religious life well practiced
76. Kola, Chap, v and vi, p. xvi. The pudgala, as you understand it, is not contained within the Truths: it is not Suffering (=the skandhas of attachment), nor Arising, nor Extinction, nor Path. Thus if the negation of the pudgala is, as you say, a false view (mithyddrstt), this false view cannot be expelled by Seeing the Truths. In fact a "view" idrsti) is expelled through Seeing the Truth with which it is in contradiction (yasmin sat ye vipratipanna). On the other hand, a defilement is abandoned through Meditation (bhdvand) when this defilement has for its object a thing abandoned through Meditation, a thing which is necessarily included within the Truth of Suffering or of Arising (bhdvandprahatavyo hi kief? bhdvandprahdtavyam eva vastu duhkham samudayam vdlambate) . . . Moreover no "view" is abandoned through Meditation.
77. Ekottara, TD 2, p. 561al8, p. 569b20. Paramartha: "A pudgala arises in this world; arisen, it is for the use, profit, and happiness of many"= Anguttara, i. 22, ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamdno uppajjati bahujanahitdya. . .
This text is used in the Sdmmitiyanikdydidstra.
78. The grain of tila is made up of eight substances, a word is made up of syllables. 79. Thus we recognize that it arises; but it is not, for that, "conditioned. "
80. Paramdrthaiunyatdsutra in the Samyukta, TD 2, p. 92cl5: When the eye arises, Oh Bhiksus, there is no place from whence it comes, and when it perishes, there is no place to which it goes. In this manner the eye is not real and yet it arises (pu shih erh sheng yff^ ? ^ ); having arisen, it perishes. There is retribution for action, yet there is no agent: when these skandhas are destroyed, other skandhas continue (hsiang hsu ? ? ): outside of any dharmasamketa. The ear . . . By dharmasamketa (su shu fa ? ? ? ) w e understand: if this is, then that exists . . . If ignorance exists, then the samskdras exist. . .
By bringing together the different fragments preserved in our sources, we obtain a section of the Sutra: caksur bhiksava utpadyamdnam na kutaf rid dgacchati / nirudhya- mdnarh ca na kva cit samnicayam gacchati / iti hi bhiksava/ caksur abhutvd bhavati bhutva
? ca prativigacchati {? ? fa, v. 27, trans, p. 814) / asti karma asti vipdkah / kdrakas tu nopalabhyate ? a imdmi ca skandhdn niksipati anydms ca skandhdn pratisamdadhdti anyatra dharmasamketdt (the text that we have here, and also Kofa, iii. 18, Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 101, Bodhicaryavatdra, ix. 73 which presents some variants) / atrayam dharmasamketo yad utdsmin satidam bhavati asyotpdddd idam utpadyate {Kosa, iii. 18, Bodhicaryavatdra, ibid. ) / avidydpratyaydh samskdrdh . . .
81. See Koia, v. 27, p. 814; Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi, 602, quotes the Ancients {Pordna): kammassa kdrako natthi vipdkassa ca vedako. (We see, p. 513, that dukkha, kamma, nibbuti, and magga exist, but not dukkin, kdraka, nibbuta . . . )
Same doctrine, or same text, in the sources of the Mahayuna, Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 84, Siksdmuccaya, 244, 262, Sutrdlamkdra (which depends on Vasubandhu), xviii. 101.
82. The meaning of the expression anyatra dharmasamketdt {chos su brdar brtags pa ma gtogs pa) is not in doubt. The Vydkhyd explains: dharmasamketdd iti prdtityasamutpddala- ksandt: "outside of the combination of the dharmas, that is to say, outside of the successive causation of the dharmas"\ and elsewhere {ad iii. 18): samketa- hetuphalasambandhavyavas- thd. But Paramartha understands samketa as "metaphorical designation," from whence the translation, "One does not maintain the existence of an agent. . . except when, conforming to worldly usage, one says that the dharmas are a pudgala. "
83. Sarhyukta, TD 2, p. 182al7; Samyutta, ii. 14. Paramartha: "I do not say that a being, apart from the series of the dharmas, takes up the elements. " The Sanskrit edition has: upddatta iti ph dig una na v ad ami / aharh ced evarh vadeyam upddatta iti atra te kalpah sydd vac an ay a ko nu bhadanta upddatta iti.
Note nevertheless that the Bhagavat speaks of the man "who casts off this body and takes up another body," tarn ca kdyam nikkhipati annarh ca kdyam upddiyati {Samyutta, iv. 60). (In the way that the flame which goes far without fuel has for the mind its support (updddna) so too the being who casts off this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst for his support, ibid. 400). We have seen above, note 41, the etymology of pudgala: punah punar. . .
84. Saeki quotes the Sammitiyanikdya Sdstra, i. 7 (fol. 2b).
85. Parinantum means to transform oneself, anyathdtvamdpattum.
On parindma, iii. 43a, lOOa-b, v. 26, p. 809; the samtatiparindma of the Sautrantikas is
very different, ii. 36c, iv. 4a.
86. On the relationship between the primary elements {mahdbhuta) and secondary matter
{updddyarupa, bhautika rupa), see i. 35, ii. 22,65.
87. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 66lcl4: "Buddhadeva maintains that rupa is solely mahdbhutas, that mental states {caittas) are solely mind {citta)\ he says: updddyarupa is solely a type {viiesa) of the mahdbhutas; the mental states are solely a type of mind . . . The mahdbhutas see (when they form the organ of the e y e ) . . . There is no upddayasabda apart from the primary elements (that is to say: sound, iabda, is not a separate thing existing independently of the primary elements).
It is the primary elements which are called upaddyafabda. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 730b26: Buddhadeva says: Twenty-two names {mahdbhumikas, etc. ), but solely one real thing, the mana-indriya. . . The conditioned dharmas are of two natures, mahdbhutas and citta. Apart from the mahdbhutas, there is no updddyarupa: apart from citta, there are no caittas.
Compare i, note 146; ii, p. 188.
Saeki: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc. , that the primary elements and secondary matter do not differ; but, as this is not the "correct meaning" {ch'eng # ? ? ) ? * t r i e Sarvastivadins, he says that it is dosa, an "error. "
88. The Sutra of Vatsagotra, Sarhyukta, TD 2, p. 245cl0. The Bhagavat said to the monk
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Vatsagotra, "If one is of this opinion (drsti), The world is eternal; this is true; any other theory is false,' this is drspiviparydsa (v. 9d), this is kuan-ts'a chien jjjjjjf? , (drspipardmarla, v. p. 778). 'The world is not eternal. . . the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death': this is drspiviparydsa"
89. On the "questions to be rejected," Kosa, v. 22, Nirvana, 1925, p. 108, where we see that Malebranche reasons quite closely to Vasubandhu.
90. We have Divya, 358: bahubollaka idkyaputriya.
91. The present passage of the Ko? a has been pointed out by S. Levi, AIBL. , 1893, 232. Chavannes has translated a very similar recension in Cinq Cents Contes, iii. 120 (according to Nanjio 1329, Ratnakaranda Sutra (? ), Tokyo, xiv. 10, fol. 39), the same recension in Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the Milindapanho," JRAS, 1896, p. 7. See Pelliot, "Les noms propres du Milinda,"JAS, 1914, ii. 380-381. (It appears indeed that the "Milindra" of the Tibetan text of the Avaddnakalpalatd is a rash correction by the editor). Finally, Paul Demieville, in a fine article on the Chinese versions of the Milinda, BEFEO, 1924, p. 64, completes our information.
92. Compare Samyutta, iv. 400. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245? 1: Vatsagotra asks, "Gotama, is there an dtman? " The Bhagavat does not answer. He asks a second, a third time; and the Bhagavat, a second, a third time does not answer . . . And the monk Vatsagotra, in his evil (pdpikd), false view, says, "The Sramana does not know how to answer my question. " The Bhagavat says to Ananda, "If I were to answer him that there is an dtman, then I would increase the false view that he already has; if I were to answer him that there is no dtman, would his first folly-doubt not increase? Infatuated, he would say, 'The dtman, which existed, is now annihilated. ' The opinion that he has of the existence of an dtman is the opinion of permanence; to think that this dtman is annihilated is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathagata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma of the middle: if this is, then that exists . . . if ignorance exists, then the samskdras exist. . . "
93. Missing in Paramartha.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 38al9: In the Brahmajdlasutra, it is said that the 62 drstigatas have
satkdyadrsti for their root; in the Sutra of the Lion's Roar, it is said all the diverse opinions of the Brahmins and monks rest on two opinions, the opinion of existence and the opinion of non-existence (bhavadrsti, vibhavadrsti,yu-chien ^ M and wu-yu-chien $&^|"? ); what is the difference between the declarations of these two Sutras? From the point of view of arising (samutpdda), it is said that all the drstigatas have satkdyadrsti for their root; from the point of view "t'ui-ch'iu ? ? " (to thrust-search out), it is said that the diverse opinions rest on the opinions of existence and non-existence. See above, p. 1336.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 1002b6: Bhavadrsti is sd/vatadrsti, and vibhavadrsti is ucchedadrsti, that is, the view of existence is the view of permanence or eternity, and the view of non-existence is the view of annihilation. Although bad opinions (kudrspigata) are of numerous types, they are all included by these two opinions.
94. Vydkhyd: Bhadantakumdraldbhah. On Kumaralabha, see PeVi, Date de Vasubandhu, p. 22.
95. Vydkhyd: drspir eva damstrd / taydvabhedham apeksya desayanti buddhd dharmam nairatmyarh tatpratipaksena / bhramsam ca karmandm apeksya krtaviprandsam apeksya pudgaldstitvam iva darsayanto'nyathd defayanti / vydghripotdpahdravad iti /yathd vydghri natinisphurena dantagrahanena svapotam apaharati / nayati mdsya damsprayd sarira [ ] krtam bhud iti / ? ? ? ? atisithilena dantagrahanena tarn apaharati / mdsya bhram/ah pdto'smin visaye bhud itiyuktenaiva grahanendpaharatity arthah / tathdrthadarsane kdranam darsayann aha / dtmastitvam iti vistarah /
? 96. For the second stanza, the Vydkhyd is less clear: dtmdstitvam pratipannas cet kascid drspidamsprayd satkdyadrstilaksanayd bhinnah sa vineyajanah sydd aprdpya samvrtiti (? ) (samvrtinitim? ) dharmasamketam ajdndnah kusalapotasya kuialakarmano vydghripotabh- utasya bhramUm kurydn ndsti karmanah phalam iti.
97. Vydkhyd: prdjuaptika iti prdjnaptau bhavah prdjnaptikah samvrtisann api pudgalo ndstiti kascid grhniydd ity ato ndstiti ndvocat.
98. The Vydkhyd has the last pdda: omitted by Hsiian-tsang.
Paramartha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real
emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvana, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.
99. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which dharma are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal. . . that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death? " "By reason of the consciousness of ? ? ? ? , vedand, etc. "
100. Vydkhyd: nirgranthasrdvakacatakavad iti / nirgranthasrdvakena catakam jivantam grhitvd bhagavdn prspah kim ayam catako jivati na veti / tasydyam abhiprdyah /yadi /ramano gautama ddisej jivatiti sa tam nipidanena mdrayitvd darsayet / yadi punar bhagavdn evam ddisen mrta iti sa tam jivantam eva darsayet / katham namdyam ajna iti loko jdniydd iti tasydbhinivesah / bhagavatd tv asydsayam jrtdtvd na vydkrtam / tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj jivati vd na veti. . . ndbhihitam / tadvad etan na vydkrtam. Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, J. As. 1925, i. 38.
101. The catuska (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (anantavdn)? etc. " has the same meaning as the catuska: "Is the world eternal (sdsvata)? . . . "
If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three catuskas and one dvika (Is the vital principle the body? . . . )? To this question the Vydkhyd answers: parydyarupatvavyavasthdne'pi caturdasatvam bhavatity adosah.
102. kun tu rgyu smra byed kyis. Chinese transcription: U-ti-chia ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Stcher- batski: Vatsa. The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.
This is the Paribbajaka Uttiya of the Anguttara, v. 193-195 (perhaps different from the Uttiya of the Samyutta, v. 22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . . "; Uttiya asks, "What do you explain? "; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvana". Thereupon Uttiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvana through this Dhamma? " The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ananda then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvana is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvana: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.
In Samyukta, TD 2, p. 247cl8, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world.
Do all beings attain to Nirvana? Digha, ii. 147 (yes), Mahdvastu, i. 126 (yes), Milinda, 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer.
The redactor of the Brahmajdla understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (Digha, i. 23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point Kosa, iii. 3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.
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103. Uktika asks: kim tu sarvo loko'nena mdrgena nirydsyati / dhosvid ekadeio lokasya.
In the Pali recension: sabbo ca tena (dhammena) loko niyyissati upaddho vd tibhdgo vd.
104. On Maitreya, see Peri,BEFEO; xi. 455, Przyluski,/4*o/k*, 169,171,332. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 510? 9 (66th Sutra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), Dirgha, 6th Sutra, TD 1, p. 4lc29 and Digha, iii. 76, SdlistambasMra (see Koia, iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the Suttanipdta, 1032, 1040. Milinda, 159; Andgatavamsa in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i. 414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?
105. Saeki quotes the Samyukta, TD 2, p. 244al4, "Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that 'Such a one is reborn in such a place .