For God by producing a
new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in
this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it.
new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in
this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it.
Summa Theologica
Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all
the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now
whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate
its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational
powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore
the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the
Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son.
And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have
assumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to
be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal
Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence,
if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in
this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.
Reply to Objection 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of
natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the
Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the
Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal.
4:6: "God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying,
Abba, Father. " And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we
receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so
likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received
adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural
sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and
Son.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to
eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the
Son of God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as
He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for
the nature of mission.
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Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be
only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one person;
and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed,
which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can
take one human nature.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of
Person, as has been said above [3891](A[2]). But the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot
assume one human nature.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from the Incarnation of God the
Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the
Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one
human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the
three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said
of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what
is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the
man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could
not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume
one human nature.
On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the
three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also
subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be
assumed by the three Persons.
I answer that, As was said above ([3892]Q[2], A[5], ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another
from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person.
Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole reason of the
deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum
cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine
Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature
assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine
Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for
them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the
book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that "several Persons
cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one
human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one
man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say
the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so
it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human
nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human
nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were
one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men,
who are many simply, are in some respect one, e. g. one people, and as
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of
man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results,"
according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. "
Reply to Objection 2: In this supposition the human nature would be
assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of
each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with
each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Person by assumption.
Reply to Objection 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results
a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because
whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person
subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may
apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be
predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the
Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own
Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost
on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the
man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the
Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the
Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy
of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude
that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
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Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two
human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation
has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is
plain from what has been stated above ([3893]Q[2], AA[3],6). Therefore,
if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be
one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to
imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied
by distinct supposita.
Objection 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the
Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one
human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for
several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would
be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is
impossible.
Objection 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole
Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i. e. to every part
of it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and
complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human
natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one
would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would
be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore
it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.
On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do.
But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature
distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the
power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son.
Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume
another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power
limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can
it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a
Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume
another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of
the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be
unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible,
for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is
plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His
power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His
Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the
Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed,
can assume another distinct human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials
by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter.
And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new
suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the
multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the
union of form and matter, i. e. of soul and body, does not constitute a
new suppositum, as was said above [3894](A[6]). Hence there can be a
numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the
division of matter, without distinction of supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a
hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two
natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called
one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A[6],
ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words
according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation
to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's
signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which
are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in
the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two
garments is not said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with
two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the
singular as "such by reason of the two qualities. " Now the assumed
nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit
at all points, as has been said above ([3895]Q[2], A[6], ad 1). And
hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would
be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two
human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they
have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of
suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one
singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated
(A[6], ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have
some one thing in common.
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same
relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related
first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and
afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch
as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the
nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human
nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And
hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine
Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the
whole nature assumed, i. e. in all its parts. Now in the two natures
assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor
would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of
them to be altogether united to the other, i. e. all the parts of one
with all the parts of the other.
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Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other
Divine Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of
God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by
the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of
God, according to Jn. 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I
into the world, to give testimony to the truth. " But by the Person of
the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the
true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the
Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an
inequality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): "The
Father is greater than I. " Now this error would not have arisen if the
Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken
the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the
Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have
become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be,
as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15:
"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature. " But the power of creation is
appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming
to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of
sins, according to Mat. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He
shall save His people from their sins. " Now the remission of sins is
attributed to the Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: "Receive ye the
Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. "
Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person
of the Son to become incarnate.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the mystery
of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the
wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt;
the power, for He made the conquered conquer. " But power and wisdom are
appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the power
of God and the wisdom of God. " Therefore it was fitting that the Person
of the Son should become incarnate.
I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should
become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are
similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the
Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because
the word of the craftsman, i. e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of
whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal
concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as
creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by
the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and
personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the
creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable
perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art,
whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into
ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since
the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom
is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper
perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the
disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is
said (Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of
wisdom. " And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting
that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i. e. of such as are
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on
sons, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also. " Hence it was
fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same
chapter (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be
made conformable to the image of His Son. "
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of
the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it
was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to
God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse,
since it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: "Or
despisest thou the riches of His goodness? " Hence, even if the Person
of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of
finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to
restore human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The first creation of things was made by the
power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation
ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God
the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation
according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is
proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the
Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to
man's justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift
the Holy Ghost is.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of
God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a
threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature;
secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order
of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any
other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature
abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all
its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any
man begotten of the stock of Adam?
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Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of
being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine
says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the
whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. " Now the power of
God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is
not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite.
Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any
other creature.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of
the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated ([3896]Q[3],
A[8]). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so
in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the
irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
Objection 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib. ;
xxxiv in Ev. ), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance. " And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to
Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness. " Therefore the
angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.
Objection 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the
more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole
universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature.
Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than
human nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human
nature.
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of
being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken
with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to
what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature
with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be
assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness
in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its
dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because
human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for
attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing
and loving Him. According to its need---because it stood in need of
restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things
belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the
fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid
fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was
assumable.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to
their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from
their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not
that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the
proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be
not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God,
but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no
capability for this.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature,
forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its
own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards
only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature,
and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a
likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what
does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body
which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less
fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is
the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And
hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God
by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since
they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their
creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and
corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine
Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit
the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the
creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the
fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed.
For God by producing a
new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in
this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said
above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the
angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is
irremediable, as stated above ([3897]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 4: The perfection of the universe is not the
perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one
by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of
assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature
is capable of being assumed.
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Whether the Son of God assumed a person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed
human nature 'in atomo,'" i. e. in an individual. But an individual in
rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ).
Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the
Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature. " But He sowed our
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent
III [*Paschas. Diac. , De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that
"the Person of God absorbed the person of man. " Therefore it would seem
that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii)
that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man. "
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken
into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now
a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it
is the term of the assumption, as was said ([3898]Q[3], AA[1],2). For
if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted---in which
case it was useless; or it remains after the union---and thus there
would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is
false, as was shown above ([3899]Q[2], A[6]). Hence it follows that the
Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo,"
i. e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum,
the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person
was assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the
nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the
perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something
which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
Reply to Objection 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of
anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have
been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person,
the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is
it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person,"
inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature
from having its personality.
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Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it
is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken
to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De
Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore
things human. "
Objection 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the
Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the
men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any
other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is
quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ,
born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God,
and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another
besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be
another besides Him. "
I answer that, As has been said above [3900](A[2]), what is assumed is
not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption.
Now it was said (Q[3], AA[1],2) that the individual to Whom the human
nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term
of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is
in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11),
this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot
properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in
fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis.
But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son
of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D.
6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was
said above (Q[2], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally,
but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy
doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature
was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this---that the
Son of God is man.
Reply to Objection 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the
concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot
say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed,
but the man whose nature He assumed.
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from
all individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of
human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it
is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men,
especially of the faithful. " But nature as it is in individuals
withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have
assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be
attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best.
Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se]
man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from
its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above
[3901](A[3]). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said [3902](A[3]).
Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word
Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for
this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation. " But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist
in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the
Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from
individuals.
I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond
the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first,
as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held;
secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it
cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of
sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in
the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible
matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it
would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God.
First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is
contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a
person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed
common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits
nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in
order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for
us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but
intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show
Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was
seen upon earth, and conversed with men. "
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God
assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean
nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and
thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false
understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 11).
Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of
all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to
the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause,
whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human
salvation.
Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in
nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists
held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only
in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be
assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the
concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption,
nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as
to be in an individual.
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all
individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by
itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature
belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that
human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine
Love; hence it is written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world as to
give His only-begotten Son. " But love makes us give ourselves to our
friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to
assume several human natures, as was said above ([3903]Q[3], A[7]), and
with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume human nature in all its supposita.
Objection 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the
shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all
men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to
lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb.
2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all
its supposita.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of
God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all
its hypostases. "
I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the
Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of
human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For
since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature,
except the Person assuming, as was said above [3904](A[3]), if there
was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there
was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming.
Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the
incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren,
according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all
creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal
dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum
is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both
sides unity might be found.
Reply to Objection 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of
itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it
belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not,
however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its
essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it
would belong to all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human
nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God commendeth His
charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ
died for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human
nature in all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful
workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence
it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
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Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the
stock of Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God
to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb.
7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . .
separated from sinners. " But He would have been still further separated
from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a
sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature
of the stock of Adam.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what
is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He
ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews,
as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners. " Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from
the stock of Abraham, who was just.
On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to
Adam.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to
assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his
sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to
assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the
enemy of the human race. " And this for three reasons: First, because it
would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends;
and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed
that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature.
Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of
the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly,
because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a
corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such
might and glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as
regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature
which He came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to
be made like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in
this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed
from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came
to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which
Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written
(Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need
cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is
immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself
unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human
nature in Adam himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated
from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it
was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men
should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness
should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was
to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham,
who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision,
as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11).
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OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i. e. one of flesh
and blood?
(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?
(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness
of men. " But what is something in truth is not said to be in the
likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ. ) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption
lessen the higher. " But it pertains to the dignity of God to be
altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the
assumption God was not united to a body.
Objection 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But
the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the
imagination, as is plain from Is. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc.
Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world
was not in a real body, but only in imagination.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of
Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is
not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a
phantom. " Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.
I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not
born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body
was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of
human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore
granted, as already proved ([3905]Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for
the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have
assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in
the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but
imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which
the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only
in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation
of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to
the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person
assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His
work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute
this error (Lk. 24:37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted,
supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He
offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. "
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human
nature in Christ---just as all that truly exist in human nature are
said to be like in species---and not a mere imaginary likeness. In
proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient
unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of
God is nowise lessened.
the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now
whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate
its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational
powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore
the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the
Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son.
And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have
assumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply to Objection 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to
be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal
Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence,
if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in
this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.
Reply to Objection 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of
natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the
Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the
Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal.
4:6: "God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying,
Abba, Father. " And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we
receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so
likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received
adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural
sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and
Son.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to
eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the
Son of God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as
He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for
the nature of mission.
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Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be
only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one person;
and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed,
which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can
take one human nature.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of
Person, as has been said above [3891](A[2]). But the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot
assume one human nature.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from the Incarnation of God the
Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the
Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one
human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the
three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said
of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what
is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the
man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could
not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume
one human nature.
On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the
three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also
subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be
assumed by the three Persons.
I answer that, As was said above ([3892]Q[2], A[5], ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another
from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person.
Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole reason of the
deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum
cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine
Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature
assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine
Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for
them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the
book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that "several Persons
cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one
human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one
man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say
the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so
it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human
nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human
nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were
one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men,
who are many simply, are in some respect one, e. g. one people, and as
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of
man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results,"
according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. "
Reply to Objection 2: In this supposition the human nature would be
assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of
each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with
each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Person by assumption.
Reply to Objection 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results
a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because
whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person
subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may
apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be
predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the
Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own
Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost
on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the
man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the
Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the
Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy
of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude
that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
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Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two
human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation
has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is
plain from what has been stated above ([3893]Q[2], AA[3],6). Therefore,
if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be
one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to
imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied
by distinct supposita.
Objection 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the
Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one
human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for
several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would
be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is
impossible.
Objection 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole
Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i. e. to every part
of it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and
complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human
natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one
would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would
be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore
it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.
On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do.
But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature
distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the
power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son.
Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume
another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power
limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can
it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a
Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume
another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of
the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be
unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible,
for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is
plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His
power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His
Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the
Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed,
can assume another distinct human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials
by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter.
And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new
suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the
multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the
union of form and matter, i. e. of soul and body, does not constitute a
new suppositum, as was said above [3894](A[6]). Hence there can be a
numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the
division of matter, without distinction of supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a
hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two
natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called
one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A[6],
ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words
according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation
to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's
signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which
are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in
the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two
garments is not said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with
two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the
singular as "such by reason of the two qualities. " Now the assumed
nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit
at all points, as has been said above ([3895]Q[2], A[6], ad 1). And
hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would
be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two
human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they
have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of
suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one
singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated
(A[6], ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have
some one thing in common.
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same
relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related
first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and
afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch
as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the
nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human
nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And
hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine
Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the
whole nature assumed, i. e. in all its parts. Now in the two natures
assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor
would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of
them to be altogether united to the other, i. e. all the parts of one
with all the parts of the other.
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Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other
Divine Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of
God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by
the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of
God, according to Jn. 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I
into the world, to give testimony to the truth. " But by the Person of
the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the
true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the
Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an
inequality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): "The
Father is greater than I. " Now this error would not have arisen if the
Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken
the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the
Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have
become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be,
as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15:
"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature. " But the power of creation is
appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming
to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of
sins, according to Mat. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He
shall save His people from their sins. " Now the remission of sins is
attributed to the Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: "Receive ye the
Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. "
Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person
of the Son to become incarnate.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the mystery
of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the
wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt;
the power, for He made the conquered conquer. " But power and wisdom are
appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the power
of God and the wisdom of God. " Therefore it was fitting that the Person
of the Son should become incarnate.
I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should
become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are
similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the
Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because
the word of the craftsman, i. e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of
whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal
concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as
creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by
the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and
personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the
creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable
perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art,
whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into
ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since
the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom
is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper
perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the
disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is
said (Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of
wisdom. " And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting
that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i. e. of such as are
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on
sons, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also. " Hence it was
fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same
chapter (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be
made conformable to the image of His Son. "
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of
the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it
was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to
God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse,
since it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: "Or
despisest thou the riches of His goodness? " Hence, even if the Person
of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of
finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to
restore human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The first creation of things was made by the
power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation
ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God
the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation
according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is
proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the
Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to
man's justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift
the Holy Ghost is.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of
God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a
threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature;
secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order
of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any
other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature
abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all
its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any
man begotten of the stock of Adam?
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Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other
nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of
being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine
says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the
whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. " Now the power of
God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is
not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite.
Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any
other creature.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of
the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated ([3896]Q[3],
A[8]). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so
in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the
irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
Objection 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib. ;
xxxiv in Ev. ), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of
resemblance. " And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to
Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness. " Therefore the
angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.
Objection 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the
more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole
universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature.
Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than
human nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human
nature.
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of
being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken
with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to
what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature
with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be
assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness
in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its
dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because
human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for
attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing
and loving Him. According to its need---because it stood in need of
restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things
belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the
fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid
fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was
assumable.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to
their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from
their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not
that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the
proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be
not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God,
but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no
capability for this.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature,
forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its
own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards
only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature,
and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a
likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what
does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body
which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less
fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is
the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And
hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God
by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since
they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their
creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and
corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine
Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit
the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the
creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the
fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed.
For God by producing a
new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in
this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said
above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the
angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is
irremediable, as stated above ([3897]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 4: The perfection of the universe is not the
perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one
by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of
assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature
is capable of being assumed.
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Whether the Son of God assumed a person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed
human nature 'in atomo,'" i. e. in an individual. But an individual in
rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ).
Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the
Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature. " But He sowed our
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent
III [*Paschas. Diac. , De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that
"the Person of God absorbed the person of man. " Therefore it would seem
that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii)
that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man. "
I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken
into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now
a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it
is the term of the assumption, as was said ([3898]Q[3], AA[1],2). For
if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted---in which
case it was useless; or it remains after the union---and thus there
would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is
false, as was shown above ([3899]Q[2], A[6]). Hence it follows that the
Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo,"
i. e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum,
the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person
was assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the
nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the
perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something
which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
Reply to Objection 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of
anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have
been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person,
the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is
it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person,"
inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature
from having its personality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it
is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken
to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De
Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore
things human. "
Objection 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the
Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the
men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any
other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is
quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ,
born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God,
and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another
besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be
another besides Him. "
I answer that, As has been said above [3900](A[2]), what is assumed is
not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption.
Now it was said (Q[3], AA[1],2) that the individual to Whom the human
nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term
of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is
in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11),
this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot
properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in
fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis.
But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son
of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D.
6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was
said above (Q[2], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally,
but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy
doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature
was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this---that the
Son of God is man.
Reply to Objection 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the
concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot
say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed,
but the man whose nature He assumed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from
all individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of
human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it
is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men,
especially of the faithful. " But nature as it is in individuals
withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have
assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be
attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best.
Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se]
man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from
its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above
[3901](A[3]). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said [3902](A[3]).
Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word
Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for
this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation. " But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist
in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the
Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from
individuals.
I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond
the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first,
as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held;
secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it
cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of
sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in
the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible
matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it
would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God.
First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is
contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a
person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed
common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits
nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in
order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for
us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but
intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show
Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was
seen upon earth, and conversed with men. "
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God
assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean
nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and
thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false
understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 11).
Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of
all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to
the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause,
whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human
salvation.
Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in
nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists
held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only
in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be
assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the
concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption,
nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as
to be in an individual.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all
individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by
itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature
belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that
human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine
Love; hence it is written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world as to
give His only-begotten Son. " But love makes us give ourselves to our
friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to
assume several human natures, as was said above ([3903]Q[3], A[7]), and
with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume human nature in all its supposita.
Objection 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the
shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all
men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to
lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb.
2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all
its supposita.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of
God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all
its hypostases. "
I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the
Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of
human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For
since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature,
except the Person assuming, as was said above [3904](A[3]), if there
was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there
was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming.
Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the
incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren,
according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all
creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal
dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum
is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both
sides unity might be found.
Reply to Objection 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of
itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it
belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not,
however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its
essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it
would belong to all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human
nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God commendeth His
charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ
died for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human
nature in all its supposita.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful
workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence
it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the
stock of Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God
to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb.
7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . .
separated from sinners. " But He would have been still further separated
from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a
sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature
of the stock of Adam.
Objection 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what
is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He
ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews,
as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners. " Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from
the stock of Abraham, who was just.
On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to
Adam.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to
assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his
sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to
assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the
enemy of the human race. " And this for three reasons: First, because it
would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends;
and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed
that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature.
Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of
the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly,
because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a
corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such
might and glory.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as
regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature
which He came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to
be made like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in
this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed
from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came
to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which
Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written
(Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need
cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is
immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself
unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human
nature in Adam himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated
from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it
was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men
should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness
should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was
to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham,
who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision,
as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i. e. one of flesh
and blood?
(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?
(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness
of men. " But what is something in truth is not said to be in the
likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.
Objection 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ. ) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption
lessen the higher. " But it pertains to the dignity of God to be
altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the
assumption God was not united to a body.
Objection 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But
the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the
imagination, as is plain from Is. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc.
Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world
was not in a real body, but only in imagination.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of
Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is
not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a
phantom. " Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.
I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not
born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body
was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of
human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore
granted, as already proved ([3905]Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for
the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have
assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in
the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but
imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which
the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only
in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation
of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to
the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person
assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His
work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute
this error (Lk. 24:37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted,
supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He
offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. "
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human
nature in Christ---just as all that truly exist in human nature are
said to be like in species---and not a mere imaginary likeness. In
proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient
unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of
God is nowise lessened.
