No More Learning

By a letter of 15 June, 1758, he recalled Bussy with his
detachment. Salabat Jang felt that this meant his own destruction,
as was indeed the case; but Lally's orders were formal; Bussy obeyed,
like a disciplined soldier, and set out at once to join him. This did not
necessarily signify the ruin of French hopes, even in the Deccan, if
Lally triumphed in the Cårnatic. In 1758 the position of the French
on the coast was as strong as in the best days of Dupleix, and the
Carnatic itself with Trichinopoly might have been secured, had
fortune favoured the new general. But the check before Madras,
then the battle of Wandiwash where Bussy was taken prisoner,
destroyed the work of the previous nine years, and left of the work
of Dupleix and Bussy only memories on the one side, and hopes on
the other. It was by learning from these two great Frenchmen that
Clive was enabled to lay the British Empire in India on secure
foundations. Their success showed him the weakness of the Indian
princes; that the walls of their power would fall at the first push.
Frenchmen will ever regret that Dupleix did not confine his efforts to
the Carnatic; with united forces he might have triumphed over Tri-
chinopoly before the patience of the Company was tired out, and
then, if it was resolved to go farther, the way was open. He lost
everything by wishing to hasten the work of time, and by forgetting
the certainty of English resistance in India and of public disapproval
in France, where men did not know his plans and were alarmed at
the endless wars into which he was leading them.


## p. 141 (#169) ############################################

CHAPTER VII
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
ON 9 April, 1756, died 'Ali Wardi Khan, subahdar of Bengal and
Bihar. He had established himself by force of arms as ruler of those
provinces after a severe struggle with the Marathas; and when his
position was no longer assailable, the Moghul emperor had recognised
him as his lieutenant on condition of his paying fifty-two lakhs nf
rupees a year. Apparently this condition was never fulfilled; but he
went on ruling none the less, and in 1752 designated as his successor
his great-nephew, Siraj-ud-daula, then a young man of twenty-three.
Cf the latter neither his English nor his Indian contemporaries have
the least good to say; and his conduct confirms their words. Having
been proclaimed as nawab at the capital, Murshidabad, he marched
almost at once against his cousin, Shaukat Jang, the governor of
Purnia, whom he suspected rightly of intriguing against him. On
20 May, when he had reached Rajmahal on his march against Purnia,
he suddenly changed his mind, ordered an immediate return to
Murshidabad, and directed the English factory at Kasimbazar to be
seized. This was carried out on 4 June, three days after the nawab's
return to Murshidabad; and on the 5th his army began its march
against Calcutta. On the 20th he captured the place.
This extraordinary series of events took everyone by surprise; and
when they came to offer explanations to their friends and superiors,
personal feeling ran so high, and each member of the Calcutta Council
was so visibly anxious to throw the blame elsewhere than on himself
and his friends, that little weight can be attached to their evidence.
Some declared that Omichand had instigated this attack in revenge
for having been excluded from his former share in the Company's
business; others attributed it to the reception of a fugitive who was
alleged to have eloped with large sums of money, and to the expul-
sion of the messenger whom the nawab had sent to demand him.
Others again asserted that on his deathbed 'Ali Wardi Khan had
solemnly warned Siraj-ud-daula against the dangers of European
aggression. All these are vigorously asserted and as vigorously denied
in the letters describing that eventful twelvemonth which elapsed
between the capture of Calcutta and the battle of Plassey. But there
is reason to think that fear of European aggression was the main
predisposing cause of the attack. Holwell, to whom we owe a detailed
account of 'Ali Wardi's deathbed warning, may have been drawing
on his imagination or may have been indebted to mere rumour; but
1 Holwell to Company, 30 November, 1756; Watts to the same, 30 January,
1757.


## p. 142 (#170) ############################################

142
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
it is certain that those who like Watts, the head of the Kasimbazar
factory, dismissed the story on the ground that orientals were too
incurious and indolent to trouble about what happened in distant
provinces, had chosen to forget at least two incidents which should
have taught them better. We know that when the news of Nasir
Jang's death reached Bengal, 'Ali Wardi Khan had threatened to
seize the goods belonging to the French. We know, too, that a short
time before 'Ali Wardi's death Siraj-ud-daula had accused the English
of preparing to resist the government; the English had been repeatedly
questioned, and though they had convinced 'Ali Wardi of their inno-
cence they had not succeeded in convincing Siraj-ud-daula; he had
ordered his spies to keep a close watch on their doings, and it was
common talk at Murshidabad that the vast wealth of the English
might easily be captured. The day on which Siraj-ud-daula turned
back from his march against Purnia he had received a letter from
Drake, the English governor, explaining recent additions to the
defences of Calcutta as intended to protect the place against a French
attack. That letter has not been preserved in any form, and we
cannot tell whether in any other way it was calculated to irritate the
nawab; but there was certainly an uneasy feeling in his mind that
unless he took precautions the Europeans would turn Bengal upside
down as they had done the Carnatic and the Deccan. It is very
possible that this feeling was accentuated by other imprudences on
the part of Drake, who was at best but a short-sighted mortal. But
the main reason for the nawab's attack was the idea that the English
had taken advantage of 'Ali Wardi's illness to strengthen their mili-
tary position, and that he had better check them before they became
dangerous.
This idea, as the event was to prove, was ludicrously false. Drake
had indeed mounted some guns along the river front, in case French
vessels should sail up the river and attempt a landing when war broke
out again; but that was no protection against any attack which the
nawab might deliver, for that would come from the land, not from
the water. Nor, indeed, was any attack anticipated. The common
view held by Europeans in Bengal was that expressed in a letter of
4 June, 1743, written by Dupleix and his council at Pondichery to
his successor at Chandernagore. The latter, alarmed by the expul-
sion of Schonamille and his Ostenders, had planned a large and
powerful fortress. Dupleix rejoined : "So long as Europeans trade in
Bengal we do not believe that the Moors will directly attack them;
they have surer means of making them pay the unjust contributions
which they exact”. 3 Their river-borne commerce could be stopped at
any point; and no fortifications would enable them to carry on trade
1 Law, Mémoire, p. 52; Cultru, Dupleix, p. 353.
2 Forth to Drake. 16 December, 1756.
8 Correspondance. . . de Pondichéry à Bengale, a, 288.


## p. 143 (#171) ############################################

LOSS OF CALCUTTA
143
against the will of the nawab. That was also the view of the English.
At the beginning of the century they had built Fort William; but
they had been at no pains to make it defensible from the land, or to
maintain its original strength. So early as 1725 the timbers of the
bastions had become so rotten that they had had to be shored up. In
1729 the south curtain was rendered defenceless by the building of
outhouses which masked the fịanking fire of the bastions. They had
built a church close at hand which commanded the gorges of all four
bastions. Private persons had been allowed to build solid brick
houses almost adjoining. Then the fort had been found stuffy, and
so great windows had been cut in its walls. No soldier or engineer
who saw it but foretold that it could never be defended against attack.
A captain of artillery in 1755 reported that there was not an embra-
sure fit to hold a gun or a carriage fit to mount one; on which the
council reprimanded him for not sending his letter through the com-
mandant. 1 Nor even was the garrison at its full strength. During
those alarming years when Madras and Pondichery were at unautho-
rised war, many recruits intended for Bengal had been detained at
Madras; and this deficiency had not been made good. Finally the
officers who commanded the garrison were of the same poor quality,
with no more experience of war, and hardly more military spirit,
than had been displayed by their brothers-in-arms at Madras in 1746.
So far from being prepared to disturb the peace of Bengal, the place
was not even capable of defence. Few events have had a more
ironical conclusion than Siraj-ud-daula's attack upon Calcutta.
The short interval between the first warning and the appearance
of Siraj-ud-daula's troops served no better purpose than to display
the lack of military talent in the settlement. All the available Euro-
peans, Eurasians, and Armenians were embodied in the militia; a
body of Indian matchlockmen was taken into pay; and plans were
made for the defence of the town. But there was no leadership. The
projected line of defence was larger than could be held by the num-
bers present; and nothing was done to render the fort itself defensible.
On 16 June, the nawab's troops appeared before the place, and were
repulsed in an attack they made on the northern side of the town;
but on the 17th they entered the town limits from the east; on the
18th they drove the defenders from their outposts; and on the 19th
the fort was deserted by the governor, the commandant, and several
of the members of council, who took refuge with a number of women
on board the ships in the river. When their desertion was known,
the remainder placed the command in the hands of Holwell, the junior
member of council; and the defence was prolonged for one more
day. But the soldiers, exhausted with their efforts, got out of hand,
and broke open the liquor godowns, as had happened at Madras; the
1 Wilson, Old Fort William, 9, 25.
2 Bengal to Madras, 25 May, 1756 (Madras Letters received, 1756, no. 95).


## p. 144 (#172) ############################################

144
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
>
enemy's fire from the church and neighbouring houses rendered the
bastions untenable; and in the afternoon the place surrendered. After
anxious enquiries about the treasure which the fort was thought to
contain, the prisoners were shut up for the night in the military
prison generally known as the Black Hole. This was a room 18 feet
long by 14 feet 10 inches wide, from which only twenty-three survivors
emerged next morning. 1
The news of this disaster arrived piece-meal at Madras. First, on
14 July, came news of the seizure of Kasimbazar. It was decided to
send reinforcements at once; and on the 20th Killpatrick sailed with
230 men. He arrived on 2 August, and found a number of refugees
at Fulta, where he was obliged to encamp amidst the swamps of that
unhealthy place. Not till 16 August did news come of the fate of
Calcutta. At the moment the council was actively preparing an
expedition which was to have joined Salabat Jang in the Deccan and
replaced French influence there by English. Luckily it had not
marched. Admiral Watson, who had come out two years earlier with
a squadron and a King's regiment in case the French could not be
brought to terms, was called into council, and Clive was summoned
up from Fort St David where he was now deputy governor. There
was a strong and natural feeling in the council against the dispatch
of a large force to Bengal, based partly on the local advantage of
expelling the French from the Deccan, partly on the evident approach
of war with France with its consequent dangers to Madras. This was
overcome, mainly owing to the firm and prudent arguments of Robert
Orme, supported by the governor Pigot and by Clive. But there
still remained the problems of who was to command the expedition
and what were to be his powers. The command was claimed by
Colonel Adlercron, the commander of the royal regiment that had
come out with Watson. But he refused to agree to the division of the
prospective plunder in the shares laid down in the Company's in-
structions, or to promise to return on a summons from the Madras
Council; 3 and so the command was finally entrusted to Clive. As
regards his powers, there were obvious objections to entrusting the
direction of the Madras forces to persons who had proved themselves
so wanting in conduct and resolution as the council of Fort William.
At the same time it was contrary to the Company's practice to entrust.
uncontrolled power to a military officer. It was, therefore, first decided
to send two deputies with Clive, who were with him to constitute a
council with power to determine the political management of the
expedition. But then arived a member of the Calcutta Council who
protested so loudly against this supersession of the Calcutta authori-
ties that that plan was laid aside and Clive was invested with complete
1 See note at the end of the chapter.
2 Orme to Payne, 3 November, 1756 (Orme MSS, Various, 28, p. 58).
3 Madras Public Consultations, 21 September, 1756; Adlercron to Fox, 21
November, 1756 (India Office, Home Misc. 94, p. 210).


## p. 145 (#173) ############################################

RECOVERY OF CALCUTTA
145
military independence, while the funds—four lakhs of rupees-sent
with the expedition were consigned to him personally. In fine the
Madras council came to the best conclusion possible. In part this
was due to luck. It was a miracle of fortune that Colonel Adlercron
was so unaccommodating. But the decision to dispatch a large expe-
dition instead of a small one showed high qualities of courage and
insight.
These discussions took up a long time. The expedition did not
actually sail till 16 October, after the north-east monsoon had set
in. Their passage was therefore long and stormy. One of the vessels
was driven into Vizagapatam, whence she put back to Madras; so
that when Clive reached the Hugli a few days before Christmas and
was joined by Killpatrick and the remains of his detachment, he had
only about the same number of troops as he had 'set out with—800
Europeans and 1000 sepoys. He marched up the eastern bank of the
river, occupied Baj-baj, recovered Calcutta (2 January, 1757), and
plundered Hugli
. This brought Siraj-ud-daula. once more upon
Calcutta. He refused to listen to the embassy which Clive sent to
him; but a night attack, though far from a complete success, so
disquieted him that he retired and sent offers of terms. Within a
week the treaty had been completed and signed. It confirmed the
English privileges, promised the restoration of the Calcutta plunder
in the nawab's hands, and granted the power of fortifying Calcutta
and coining rupees.
This treaty came at a timely moment. News of the outbreak of
the Seven Years' War had arrived at almost the same time as Clive
had reached Calcutta, and the English were not strong enough to
fight the nawab and the French together. Indeed had the French
followed the English example, and thrown every available man into
Bengal, the immediate course of events must have been very diffe-
rent. But they were entangled in the Deccan. They had already sent
all the forces they could spare to assist Bussy in his crisis at the
Chahar Mahal; and now had no one to send for the crisis in Bengal.
Just as in 1751 the dispatch of Bussy to the Deccan had disabled
Dupleix from completing his designs in the Carnatic, so now in 1757
the need of maintaining Bussy's position prevented them from inter-
fering with effect in Bengal. Law, the French chief at Kasimbazar,
and the author of an illuminating memoir on the events of 1756-7,
had urged the directeur, Renault de St Germain, either to agree with
the English for a neutrality or at once to join Siraj-ud-daula. "If he
makes peace without having received any help from you, you cannot
expect help from him should you be attacked. " 2 Renault tried to
adopt the first alternative. On Watson's arrival he had sent deputies
to propose a neutrality; but Watson had replied that he would accept
1 Treaty of February, 1757.
2 Law, Mémoire (ed. Martineau), p. 93.
10


## p. 146 (#174) ############################################

146
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
nothing short of an alliance against the nawab. Then when the nawab
was marching on Calcutta, the English offered to relax this stipulation.
and Clive fully expected them to accede to his proposals, unless
indeed they "should not be vested with powers to enter into engage-
ments of such a nature, which I somewhat suspect”. 1 But. no answer
was returned to this offer until 21 February, when peace had been
made with Siraj-ud-daula. Then they sent deputies again, and a draft
treaty was drawn up. But when the question of their powers was
raised, it proved that they could bind neither the Pondichery council
nor any royal officers who might come out to India. Thus negotiations
were broken off on 4 March.
Meanwhile Watts, that "helpless, poor, and innocent man” as
Siraj-ud-daula had called him, had been sent up to Murshidabad
to act as English resident there and watch over the execution of the
treaty. There ensued a duel between him and Law, in which the latter
had the advantage of the nawab's sympathy. He was by no means
disposed to acquiesce in his defeat, and could not speak of the English
without blazing eyes. But the durbar was on the whole inclined to the
English and against the French. Then too came news that the Durani
Afghans, who had invaded Northern India, were likely to advance
on Bengal. Under the alarm caused by this, Siraj-ud-daula wrote to
offer the English a lakh a month if they would aid him against the
Afghans. This was on 4 March, the day on which the Anglo-French
negotiations were broken off and on which also Watson had written
to the nawab a very angry letter, demanding the complete execution
of the treaty within ten days, or else "I will kindle such a flame in
your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to
extinguish". In these circumstances, on the 10th, a letter was written
by the nawab's secretary, bearing the nawab's seal, permitting the
attack on Chandernagore. Law asserts that this letter was not written
by the order of the nawab. However, it was enough to authorise
Watson to move. On the 14th Chandernagore was attacked, though
not closely, from the land; on the 23rd the ships appeared off the
place and after a day's severe fighting it surrendered.
This deprived the nawab of his natural allies against the English;
and nothing can extenuate his folly in allowing their destruction.
Indeed, after his reluctant consent had been given, he seems to have
changed his mind, and ordered Rai Durlabh to march with a con-
siderable force to relieve the town. But then, on hearing from
Nandakumar, the faujdar of Hugli, that the French would not be
able to resist the English, the nawab changed his mind again, and in
the end did nothing. No conduct could have been feebler or more
3
1 Clive to Secret Committee, 1 February, 1757.
2 Siraj-ud-daula to Pigot, 30 June, 1756.
8 Watson to the nawab, 4 March, 1757.
4 Law, op. cit. pp. 121-2.


## p. 147 (#175) ############################################

DISCONTENT IN BENGAL
147
1
unwise. He gave open display to his hostile feelings against the
English while allowing them unmolested to destroy the French. And
then as if to emphasise his errors he proceeded to protect Law at
Murshidabad together with the fugitives who joined him from
Chandernagore, and to write to Bussy to come to his help from the
Deccan. These facts are established by the evidence of Law as
well as by the assertions of the English.
Although then the English had recovered Calcutta, although they
had secured from the nawab promises of privileges which they had
long desired, and although they had succeeded in depriving the French
of their principal stronghold: in Bengal, they were still far from a
position of safety. At any time might come news that the French had
arrived in strength upon the coast, and then Clive would be obliged
to abandon either Madras to the French or Calcutta to the nawab.
It was also becoming apparent that many persons besides the English
had cause to fear Siraj-ud-daula, and desired a revolution in the
government. The chief people in this movement were Hindus. 'Ali
Wardi Khan had favoured them, and had promoted many of them
to high places in his administration. Siraj-ud-daula did not share his
predecessor's feelings, and he succeeded in alienating all the principal
men of the durbar. The great Hindu bankers, the Seths, who had
contributed largely to the establishment of 'Ali Wardi Khan, had
been threatened with circumcision; Rai Durlabh, who had held the
office of diwan, had been placed under the orders of a favourite called
Mohan La'l; Mir Ja'far, who had held the office of bakshi, had been
dismissed with insult, and cannon had been planted against his
palace. The first hint of intrigues against the nawab had come to the
English through Omichand, when they were still lying at Fulta
waiting the arrival of help from Madras. Warren Hastings, who was
employed in this first affair, thought poorly of it; and for the moment
it came to nothing, partly, it seems, because the English lacked forces
and a leader, partly because the Hindus had no suitable candidate
to propose. But after the fall of Chandernagore the idea was again
brought forward. . The nawab, having defeated and slain his only
dynastic rival, Shaukat Jang, in the previous October, had lost at
once all stimulus to self-restraint in his government and the pro-
tection afforded by the hope that he would be overthrown without
the trouble and danger of private action. The Seths were at once
the persons specially concerned and specially active. Law, who was
well placed to view the position with considerable accuracy, says
that without them the revolution of 1757 would never have been
accomplished. That view is probably correct. The English policy
had never been adventurous. They had rather supported existing
.
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 112, 131.
Iden, pp. 108 sqq. ; Gleig, Warren Hasiings, 1, 41; Elliott and Dowson,
VIA, 426.


## p. 148 (#176) ############################################

148
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
princes than replaced them by new. In Bengal they would not have
attempted a revolution without the certainty of a large Indian
backing; and the Seths' intrigues created the situation, bringing the
discontent to a head and the discontented into active contact with
one another, without which the English would never have stirred at
a time when a French war was visibly impending. The Select Com-
mittee declared no more than the truth when it recorded among its
other reasons for participating in the plot that
The Nabob is so universally hated by all sorts and degrees of men; the affection
of the army is so much alienated from him by his ill-usage of the officers; and
a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable that the step will be
aitempted (and successfully too) whether we give our assistance or not. In
this case we think it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and
unconcerned spectators of an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the per-
són designed to be set up we may benefit our employers and the community very
considerably, do à general good, and effectually traverse the designs of the
French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions.
This matter first came to a definite form when on 20 April Scrafton
wrote to Clive that the Seths through Omichand had proposed to set
up Yar Lutf Khan as nawab. This man was a protégé of the Seths
who had employed him in command of a body of troops to protect
them against attacks from the nawab or anyone else. On the 23rd
Scrafton's letter was read in committee and Clive was authorised to
sound the principal people in Murshidabad about their willingness
to co-operate. On the 26th Watts wrote that Mir Ja'far had informed
him through Khwaja Petrus, an Armenian, that he and other im-
portant persons were willing to assist the English in overthrowing
the nawab. This proposal was obviously much more attractive than
engaging to support an unknown man such as Yar Lutf Khan. The
question was considered in committee on 1 May and at once accepted
on the following conditions : an alliance offensive and defensive; the
surrender of all French fugitives and factories; restitution of all
English losses, public and private, caused by the capture of Calcutta;
the admission of all farman rights; liberty to fortify Kasimbazar and
Dacca; no fortifications to be erected on the river below Hugli; the
recognition of English sovereignty within the bounds of Calcutta; the
grant of territories for the maintenance of a proper military force;
extraordinary expenses while the troops were on campaign for the
nawab to be paid by him; and the residence at the nawab's durbar
of one of the Company's servants. Four days later to these terms was
added the additional stipulation that "Omychund in consideration of
his services should have all his losses made good by an express article
in the treaty". But by the time that these proposals had reached
Murshidabad, Omichand had fallen into disfavour with the other
conspirators.
Watts might write on 6 May, "I will conclude nothing
without consulting Omichand”, but on the 14th he had learnt that
1 Benga! Select Committee, 1 May, 1757.


## p. 149 (#177) ############################################

THE CONSPIRACY
149
the latter had procured from the nawab orders for the restoration of
his property, and, when he was shown the proposed articles, he not
only insisted on his receiving 5 per cent. on the nawab's treasure, but
also demanded many other alterations, "in which his own ambition,
cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives". 1 In conse-
quence of these intrigues both the English and Mir Ja'far resolved to
have nothing more to do with the greedy Sikh; but the matter was
not so simple as that. Omichand had unwisely been let into the
secret and the immediate problem was to keep his mouth shut until
the preparations were more complete. For this purpose the Calcutta
council decided on the expedient of a double treaty, in one copy of
which Omichand's claims were to be inserted, but which was not
to be regarded as the valid copy. In order to make the trick pass,
Watson's signature was added by some person, probably Lushington,
to the false copy. .
Meanwhile, the final terms had been concerted with Mir Ja'far.
They were rather more favourable to the English than had been at
first put forward; and on 5 June, Watts visited Mir Ja'far in secret
and obtained his oath to the treaty. But already doubts had arisen
regarding the amount of assistance that might be expected from him
and his friends. In words which proved true in the event, Watts
wrote:
We can expect no more assistance than that they will stand neuter and wait the
event of a battle. If we are successful they will reap the benefit, if otherwise
they will continue as they were without appearing to have been concerned
with us. 2
Nevertheless, the march of events was not suffered to pause. On
11 June the treaty was delivered to the Select Committee; on the
12th Watts and his companions fled from Murshidabad; and the day
after Clive began to march towards the nawab's capital.
The matter had not been kept so secret as it should have been.
We shall never know whether Omichand revealed the plot to Siraj-
ud-daula, or who broke silence at Calcutta; but it was openly dis-
cussed at the English capital on 5 June; two days later it was known
at Murshidabad; and on the 8th the Frenchman, Sinfray, warned
the nawab of what was impending. . But he was too irresolute hy
nature to take advantage of his knowledge. He seems also to have
so distrusted his army that he would not venture on the decisive step
of seizing Mir Ja'far. Instead of that he visited the latter in person,
and accepted, though presumably he did not place much trust in,
the conspirator's protestations of fidelity. Meanwhile Clive set out
with 3000 men. Of these 2200 were sepoys and topasses; 800 European
infantry and artillerymen. The sepoys were men whom he had
brought up with him to Bengal; they had been raised and trained
1 Watts to Clive, 14 May, 1757.
2 Watts to Clive, 3 June, 1757.


## p. 150 (#178) ############################################

150
ČLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
under Lawrence in the south and had served well against the French.
After a momentary hesitation he reached Plassey at midnight 22-23
June, and found himself within striking distance of Siraj-ud-daula's
army, consisting of some 50,000 men.
His knowledge of the situation was slight and disquieting. He
had received letters from Mir Ja'far promising co-operation; but he
was by no means certain how far the latter would keep his word. In
the first draft of Orme's famous history we find a passage which was
afterwards omitted, probably in deference to the susceptibilities of
his hero:
Colonel Clive . . . saw the morning break with increasing anxiety; at sunrise he
went with another person upon the terras of the hunting-house, from whence
having contemplated the enemy's array, he was surprised at their numerous,
splendid and martial appearance. His companion asked him what he thought
would be the event; to which he replied, “We must make the best fight we can
during the day, and at night sling our muskets over our shoulders and march
back to Calcutta". Most of the officers were as doubtful of success as himself;
but the common soldiery, being mostly tried men, who had served under Major
Lawrence on the plains of Trichinopoly, maintained the blunt spirit of genuine
Englishmen, and saw nothing in the pomp or multitude of the Nabob's army.
either to admire or to fear. . . . 1
In view of the spirit of his men Clive seems to have resolved to remain
on the defensive during the day, but when night fell to try the effect
of a surprise attack upon the nawab's camp. Accordingly, till 2 o'clock
in the afternoon nothing was done but reply to the cannonade opened
by the enemy. But when the latter ceased fire and began to fall back
on their own camp, Killpatrick on his own responsibility ordered an
advance. The enemy were soon driven from the mound near the
British camp which they had occupied; the next point of attack was
another mound close to the nawab's entrenchments. Apparently at
about the time when Clive ordered his men to advance to storm this
post, the nawab sent word to the small party of Frenchmen with him
that he was betrayed, that the battle was lost, and that they should
save themselves; immediately after this he fled on a swift camel, and
himself brought to Murshidabad the news of his overthrow. All this
time Rai Durlabh and Mir Ja'far had been as inactive as the Pathan
nawabs with whom Dupleix had concerted the destruction of Nasir
Jang. They had hung on the right flank of the English forces, without
attacking, but also without giving any sign of their holding other
intentions. Not till the next morning did Mir Ja'far venture into the
English camp, and even then he was apparently very uncertain of
his reception. Scrafton noted that he started when the guard turned
out to receive him, and his face did not brighten till the colonel came
out and embraced him. That day the new nawab hastened to
Murshidabad, of which he took possession; on the 28th Clive entered
1 Orme MSS, Various, 164 A, p. 115.
2 Scrafton, Reflections, p. 90.


## p. 151 (#179) ############################################

MIR JA'FAR NAWAB
161
.
and conducted him to the masnad on which he had not yet ventured
to seat himself; and on 2 July Siraj-ud-daula was brought back by
Mir Ja'far's son Miran, and put to death that same night. So this
revolution was completed. Clive wrote of it to Orme, “I am possessed
of volumes of materials for the continuation of your history, in which
will appear fighting, tricks, chicanery, intrigues, politics, and the
Lord knows what”. " It offers a strange mingling of the admirable
and the mean. No series of events could have thrown into stronger
relief Clive's insight and the way in which he saw "things and their
consequences in an instant"; nothing could have afforded a better
illustration of his resolute conduct as soon as his swift mind had been
made up; nothing cculd have better displayed his extraordinary gift
of leadership. If once or twice he hesitated in the course of affairs, he
was after all but man; and his hesitation took place when there was
no immediate call for action. In attacking Siraj-ud-daula he was
amply justified not only by the standards of his own time but also by
those of our own. But the deception of Omichand has thrown an
ugly air over the business. As has been well said, had Omichand
sought it he could not have devised a more bitter revenge than the
stain which he brought upon the name of Clive. And the large
presents with which Mir Ja'far rewarded those who had given him
Bengal add the touch of sordidness. It is true that in this Clive and
his companions were only following the example of Dupleix and
Bussy; that their motives were not corrupt; that they might have had
more for the asking; that they were only doing what any of their
contemporaries would have done in their place. Here our judgment
must fall upon the age rather than upon the individuals; but none
the less the acceptance of the presents was of. evil example; and could
Clive have locked on to 1765 perhaps he would have refrained from
laying up for himself untold bitterness.
Clive now found himself installed in the same position and
exposed to the same dangers as Bussy in the Deccan. In character
Mir Ja'far was much like Salabat Jang-weak and irresolute. The
principal people of his durbar were as likely to be jealous of the
English as the nobles of the Deccan had proved themselves to be of
the French. Intrigue and hostility were certain. In these circumstances,
though without any formally declared intention, we find Clive adopt-
ing as a definite policy the protection of those prominent Hindus who
had assisted in bringing about the revolution, and whom Mir Ja'far
wished to despoil as soon as it was accomplished. The two chief
persons concerned were Rai Durlabh, who had been diwan and had
received repeated promises of being continued in that office, and
Ramnarayan, the deputy of Bihar, who was thought unlikely to sup-
port the new régime. Before the end of 1757 the nawab was already
1 Clive to Orme, 1 August, 1757.
Hill, Bengal in 1756-57, 1, p. clxxxix.
2


## p. 152 (#180) ############################################

152
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
.
accusing Rai Durlabh of intending to set up a new nawab. On this
pretext the unfortunate brother of Siraj-ud-daula was put to death;
and Rai Durlabh was on the verge of being attacked. Watts, who
was still resident at the durbar, interfered and brought about a re-
conciliation for the time being, which was the more necessary because
Ramnarayan was reported to be allying himself with the wazir of
Oudh against Mir Ja'far. However, when the nawab took the field to
march against Bihar, Rai Durlabh refused to march with him, on the
pretext of ill-health, but really because he was afraid to trust himself
in the nawab's camp. Clive, who had decided to accompany Mir Ja'far
to Patna, visited the diwan at Murshidabad in connection with the
Company's claims for payment which were overdue. At first he
secured nothing but promises. But when the diwan was warned that
he was risking the loss of English protection, an agreement was
reached under which the Company was to receive orders on the
collectors of the various districts (30 December). Clive and Mir
Ja'far now moved towards Patna. At first Clive had been decidedly
hostile towards Ramnarayan. Immediately after the battle of Plassey
he had sent Coote up with a detachment in order to seize Law and
any other Frenchmen whom he could find; and he also issued orders
to dispossess Ramnarayan of Bihar. These orders were never carried
out, because Coote was dissuaded by Mir Ja'far's friends, who prc-
bably thought that the plunder of the deputy had better be left
for their own hands. Six months later Clive's attitude had changed.
In December he had received protestations of the deputy's fidelity;
and on 1 January he had with the approval of the nawab written
giving that guarantee of personal safety without which Ramnarayan
refused to trust himself within the nawab's reach. Relying on this,
Ramnarayan at once came down the river to meet the nawab; and
then ensued a pretty trial of strength between the nawab and Clive,
the first bent on the spoliation of the deputy, the second on the main-
tenance of his promise. Clive won, although at one time after his
arrival at Patna he had certainly speculated on the possibility of
being attacked by the nawab's forces, as Bussy had been at the
Chahar Mahal. Ramnarayan received investiture of his office, for
which he paid nine lakhs of rupees; and he received a definite promise
that so long as he did not intrigue with foreign powers and provided
his due share of the revenues, he should not be dismissed. The net
result was that the two principal servants of the state depended for
their personal security not upon their ostensible master but upon the
influence of Clive.
Down to this time Clive had no definite position among the
1 Clive to Secret Committee, 23 December, 1757.
2 Clive to Secret Committee, 18, February, 1758.
3 See Coote's correspondence and journal up. Orme MSS, India, VII, pp.
1608-50, and 1673-91.
+ Clive to Select Committee, 7 February, 1758.


## p. 153 (#181) ############################################

INVASION OF BIHAR
163
a
English at Bengal, and still remained a servant of the governor and
council of Madras. On the receipt of the news of the fall of Calcutta,
after some deliberation the Company had resorted to that absurd plan,
which had been attempted before in the period of confusion at the
beginning of the century, of establishing a rotation government. On
this occasion there were to be four governors, who were to have suc-
ceeded to the chair in successive periods of a month. But the Calcutta
Council refused to put this plan into operation; Clive was invited to
act as governor till orders should arrive subsequent to the news of
the revolution. This sensible decision was taken in June, 1758; and
later in the year a dispatch arrived by which the Company appointed
Clive to the position which he was already occupying.
Meanwhile the policy of protecting the Hindu servants of the
nawab was further developed by the attack made by Miran upon Rai
Durlabh. The resident had once more to intervene in order to prevent
his use being plundered; and then an intrigue was started with a
view to ruining him with the English by accusing him of a conspiracy
against the nawab. Clive with great probability on his side refused
to credit the accusation, and the minister was allowed to retire to
Calcutta. The support of persons whom he wished to plunder must
have done much to alienate the nawab; but almost immediately
afterwards came a reminder that he depended upon the English for
military support. In 1759 appeared on the borders of Bihar 'Ali
Gauhar, better known under his later title of Shah 'Alam II, who,
flying from the confusion of Delhi, had found a refuge in Oudh and
was now hoping to strengthen his position by the occupation of Bihar
and Bengal. He laid siege to Patna, but Ramnarayan proved staunch;
after temporising as long as he could, he defended the place until
succour arrived, on which the wandering prince withdrew into Oudh.
This support was the occasion of that great gift of the jagir, which
involved Clive in such animated disputes with the Company at a later
time. It consisted of the quit-rent which the nawab had withheld
when he granted the 24-Parganas to the Company, and which was
till Clive's death and later paid to him instead of to the nawab,
though he had much ado to secure his rights from the Company when
control of the direction passed for the time being out of his hands.
The last striking incident of his first government in Bengal was
the attempt of the Dutch to supplant English influence with the nawab
Although the centre of Dutch power and wealth lay not in India but
in the islands to the eastward, they had watched with growing dis-
favour first the French and then the English establishing themselves
in a position of political predominance. When Masulipatam had been
granted to the French in 1751, the Dutch, who had long had a factory
there, made several attempts to assert their independence. On more
than one occasion they attempted to hoist their flag-a thing which
the French would in no wise permit; and they constantly scrupled to
pay the duties which the French imposed on the trade within their


## p. 154 (#182) ############################################

157
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
grants. But Dutch interests in the Northern Sarkars were trivial
compared with their interests in Bengal. Not only were the piece-
goods of Bengal exported in great quantities to Batavia on the
account of the Dutch Company, but the Dutch servants enjoyed a
most lucrative though secret monopoly of the export of opium ti
Batavia; and though this never appeared in the forefront of their
disputes with the English, we may be sure that it was never far from
their minds. On the establishment of Mir Ja'far they had attempted
to obtain a price for recognising him as nawab; and as a penalty had
seen their trade stopped and their agent seized. ? Then when Pocock
left the Hugli for the Coromandel Coast, the Dutch had been invited
to concert measures to prevent French vessels from entering the river;
they had not been able to concur; and so the English took their own
measures, which consisted in subjecting ali foreign vessels coming up
the river to a strict search 3 Then too, Clive had obtained for the
English Company a monopoly of the saltpetre produced in Bengal,
with a view to preventing that article from reaching the French, and
the Dutch protested against this measure, although they had them-
selves applied for a similar privilege to Siraj-ud-daula. The duties on
the export of opium were also raised and workmen were said to have
been prevented from working for the Dutch Company. The Dutch
were in fact in the same position as the English would have occupied
on the Coromandel Coast had Saunders done nothing to counteract
the schemes of Dupleix. Bisdom and Vernet, the Dutch leaders, have
therefore the same moral justification for attempting to overthrow the
English supremacy as Saunders and Clive have for overthrowing that
of the French in the south. They committed, however, so many errors
of conduct as entirely to destroy any chances that they may ever
have had against so wary and resolute a leader as Clive.
The Dutch authorities at Batavia had already resolved to increase
their Indian garrisons by some 2000 men, but, before they had put
this design into execution, they received news from Chinsura that
Vernet had entered inio relations with Miran, taking advantage of
the disputes over Rai Durlabh, with a view to the introduction of a
large force into Bengal; and early in 1759 Vernet had interviews with
Mir Ja'far, in which he expressed hatred of the English and a desire
to be done with them. In the following June the Dutch governor-
general dispatched a small fleet of seven vessels with 300 Europeans
and 600 Malay troops, with orders to proceed to Negapatam and
follow such orders as they should receive there. The Dutch evidently
felt that they could not take decisive action from so remote a station
as Batavia; but it was the first of many gross mistakes. The ships lay
1 Pondichery to Negapatam, 5 August, and 11 and 27 September, 1750,
Pondichery Records, No. 15, pp. 424, 442, 143.
2 Klerk de Reuss, De expeditie naar Bengale, p. 6.
8 Bengal Select Committee, 2 March, 1758.


## p. 155 (#183) ############################################

DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH
155
at Negapatam for a month, during which the English had time to
assemble their men to repulse the threatened invasion. Even when
at the beginning of October the Dutch reached the entrance to the
river, they still had not made up their minds what they would do.
They were confronted with a prohibition, in the name of the nawab,
of introducing troops into Bengal. They were simple enough to
attempt to induce the nawab to withdraw his orders, which were,
indeed, the orders of Clive. They evidently did not understand that,
as in the days before Plassey, Mir Ja'far could not be expected to
show his hand till he saw how things were going. More than a month
was thus wasted; and then the Dutch resolved to force their way in.
They seized various small English craft near the mouth of the river,
thus giving their enemies a better casus belli than they could have
hoped for; and finally made their attempt, landing the troops on the
night of 21-22 November. But they met with complete failure. On
the 24th their vessels were all captured by three Company's ships
that Clive had equipped for the purpose of defending the river. On
the same day Forde, who had returned from Masulipatam in the nick
of time, but who, had the Dutch been less supine, would have been
too late, routed a party of 400 men marching from Chinsura to meet
the new troops; and on the next day he met and completely overthrew
the latter body. It is curious to note that the Malay troops were
armed with the old plug-bayonets which had been disused in Europe
for some sixty years. "
These repeated disasters brought the Dutch to their knees. Indeed
they had no choice. Their garrison had been destroyed, and now that
the issue had been decided Miran had suddenly appeared before
Chinsura with a large body of horse, eager to punish them for having
lured him on with the hope of changing one master for another. The
Dutch acknowledged that they had begun the hostilities, submitted
to a demand that the forces they maintained in Bengal should be
limited, and promised to pay ten lakhs damages. Thus Clive, taking
warning by the events of the Carnatic, had a second 'ime, by his
prompt action, crushed the danger of war in Bengal with another
European power. The province was not to be fought over, and its
revenues destroyed, as had happened in the Carnatic.
He had thus been singularly successful in establishing the English
in a position of predominance and had skilfully avoided for three
years the various dangers that arose to threaten their position. But
he had only done so by virtue of his astounding mastery over weaker
minds and his promptitude in crushing each enemy as he arose. But
the general position was still uncertain. The English had no moral
position in the province. Their power was a matter of personal
influence and military force. Clive's dexterity might maintain the
1 Klerk de Reuss, op. cit. ; Malcolm, Clive, a, 74-90; Price to Pocock, 25
December, 1759 (P. R. O. Adm. I-161).


## p. 156 (#184) ############################################

156
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
balance; had he continued governor of Fort William, he might have
continued to maintain it; but it was unlikely that any lesser man
would succeed in doing so. Leaving matters in this uncertain position,
though no external danger was at the moment to be feared, Clive
delivered over the chair to Holwell, and embarked for England on
25 February, 1760.
NOTE ON THE BLACK HOLE. In Bengal Past and Present, July, 1915, and
January, 1916, will be found an attempt to discredit the accepted version of the
Black Hole tragedy by Mr. J. H. Little. His principal arguments are (1) that
Holwell's narrative contains numerous demonstrable errors; (2) that it lacks
contemporary corroboration. He concludes that Holwell, Cooke, and the other
persons who vouch for the event concocted the story, and that those who are
supposed to have perished in the Black Hole really were killed in the storm of
the place. At a later stage in the controversy he even asserted that there was
no evidence for the existence of the monument in memory of the Black Hole
which Holwell erected. Everyone who has studied the records of the time must
have come to the conclusion that Holwell was not a virtuous man; it is even
likely that he touched up his story so as to make the part he played as conspi-
cuous as possible. But even when we have made all allowance for this sort of
thing, the main outlines of the story still remain. The small divergences which
distinguish the story of Cooke from that of Holwell, for instance, are such as
constantly occur in the independent accounts of contemporary witnesses; and,
so far from throwing suspicion on the whole story, suggest that Cooke and
Holwell did not combine to foist a false version of events on the public. Mr.
Little labours to prove that there could not have been so many survivors in the
fort as Holwell says were shut up in the Black Hole; but the truth is that we
have not the material to decide what may have been the exact number of
persons remaining after the capitulation. His first argument thus casts doubt
over certain details only. As regards the silence of contemporaries, he is in
more than one respect entirely mistaken. It was natural that the Calcutta
Council should avoid mention of the Black Hole which threw such a lurid light
over the circumstances of their desertion of the place. It is not the fact that
neither Clive, nor Watson, nor Pigot, refers to the Black Hole. Clive does so
in some of his published correspondence; Watson does in his declaration of
war; Pigot does so in a letter dated 18 September following. But, says Mr.
Little, the acceptance of the story by uncritical contemporaries proves nothing.
However, Holwell's contemporaries were exceedingly critical. Watts, for
instance, who disliked Holwell so much, and criticised his assertions so sharply,
makes no attack upon this. Drake and the other fugitive councillors could
have cast off a load of obloquy had they proved Holwell's story of the Black
Hole to be the imposture Mr. Little supposes it to have been. Altogether the
controversy seems to have arisen from the perplexities of a student unaccus-
tomed to the conflicts of evidence which the historian has perpetually to
encounter; and his negative arguments do not seem to me capable of bearing
the weight he would lay upon them.


## p. 157 (#185) ############################################

CHAPTER VIII
THE SEVEN YEARS WAR
DURING the negotiations in Europe which finally resulted in
the conclusion of Godeheu's provisional treaty with Saunders, Admiral
Watson had been sent out to the Coromandel Coast with a smail
squadron and Adlercron's regiment of foot, in case the French should
refuse to come to terms; and in the next year, 1755, Clive returned
to India, after a two years' rest at home, with additional troops and
rank as lieutenant-colonel in the king's service. His dispatch was
connected with a project that had been formed in London in case, as
was shrewdly suspected, the French refused to evacuate the Deccan.