influence and forced pragmatists such as
Rafsanjani
to revert to more hard-line posi- tions.
Revolution and War_nodrm
" Ibid.
, 185.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S. citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
? ? [226]
? The Iranian Revolution
The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment . . . on a case-i? y-case basis. " The texts of these memoranda are printed in the Report of the President's Special Review Board ("Tower Commission" ), February 26, 1987, B-6:7; B-7:8; and the Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Se- cret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 1ooth Congress, 1st sess. (Wash- ington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988), vol. 100-10:512-18.
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and another in July 1986, they replaced them by kidnapping two more U. S. citizens in September 1986. The exposure of the secret arms shipments em- barrassed the Reagan administration and alarmed its Arab allies, who saw the initiative as a hypocritical departure that undercut efforts to contain Iran. Moreover, the revelation that Iranian government officials had held secret ne- gotiations with the "Great Satan" revived Iranian fears about U. S.
influence and forced pragmatists such as Rafsanjani to revert to more hard-line posi- tions. In sum, the "arms for hostages" scheme was a fiasco from start to finish.
Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to the United States early in 1987, but relations between the two countries deteriorated after the "arms for hostages" scheme unraveled. 55 In an attempt to cut Iraq's oil revenues and reduce Arab support for Baghdad, Iran had begun laying mines in the Persian Gulf and threatening to attack oil shipments from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To restore its credibility with the gulf Arabs and bring additional pressure to bear on Iran, the U. S. eventually agreed to place Kuwaiti tankers under U. S. registry and provide a naval escort for tankers using Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. This decision led to repeated confrontations between the U. S. and Iranian forces: a U. S. fighter fired on an Iranian F-14 in August, and U. S. naval units sank an Iranian ship laying mines in the gulf the following month. In October, U. S. naval forces sank three Iranian gunboats after they fired on a U. S. helicopter and destroyed several Iranian oil platforms in re- taliation for missile attacks on two U. S. tankers. The Senate banned oil im- ports from Iran in September, and President Reagan announced a complete ban on Iranian imports and an embargo on "militarily useful" exports in October, while minor clashes between U. S. and Iranian forces continued into the following year. Finally, the U. S. destroyer Vincennes mistakenly shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner on July 2, killing all 290 people aboard.
The tragedy brought defiant protests from Tehran, but it also seems to have convinced Khomeini to end the war. Rafsanjani announced that con- cluding the war would allow Iran to follow a more "open" foreign policy, but in fact it did not lead to a significant improvement in U. S. -Iranian rela- tions. The hostages in Lebanon remained a sore point and U. S. officials were no longer willing to make concessions to hasten their release. The United States rejected an Iranian offer to mediate in exchange for the release of ad- ditional Iranian assets in August, and the Iranian government denounced a conciliatory letter from former president Carter to Khomeini and Rafsanjani as a "new trick. " Although Iran's deputy foreign minister hinted that rela- tions with the United States might be restored, Rafsanjani declared that
55 In April, Rafsanjani declared that normal relations with the United States would be pos- sible once it stopped threatening Iran. He later stated that Iran would help obtain the release of U. S. hostages in Lebanon if the Americans showed goodwill by releasing frozen Iranian as- sets, adding that relations need not remain poor "until doomsday. " "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o1.
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? The Iranian Revolution
public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
? ? ? Revolution and War
the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages. The Soviets condemned the
U. S. rescue mission in April, agreed that Iran could ship goods across Soviet territory in the event of a U. S. blockade, and issued frequent warnings about America's hostile intentions. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party supported Kho- meini and the radical clergy against both Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, and the Soviets endorsed Iran's request for an investigation of the shah's rule by the UN Security Council. The Islamic Republic also established close ties with Soviet allies such as Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicating that the fall of the shah had brought Moscow and Tehran closer together. 62
But it soon became apparent that the establishment of the Islamic Repub- lic had created as many problems for the Soviet Union as it had solved. To begin with, the revolution introduced an element of instability into a region on the Soviets' southern border, which increased the risk of U. S. military in- volvement and raised concerns about the impact of Islamic fundamentalism
. on the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. Khomeini and his followers saw Soviet Communism as an atheistic ideology that was every bit as objec- tionable as Western capitalism, and Khomeini soon declared, "We are in con-
60 A useful guide to the present state of U. S. -Iranian relations is Geoffrey Kemp, Forever En- emies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic ofIran (Washington, D. C. : Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 1994).
61 Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 283. In 1981, Brezhnev termed the Iranian Rev- olution a "major international event" and said that, "for all its complications and contradic- tions, it is still fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution. " Quoted in Karen Dawisha and Helene Carrerre d'Encausse, "Islam in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: A Double- Edged Sword? " in Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy, 170.
? 62 See Menashri, Iran, 99; Hunter, Iran and the World, 85, and "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Post-Revolution Period," in Iran's Revolution: The Searchfor Consensus, ed. R. K. Ramazani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 86.
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? ? The Iranian Revolution
flict with international communism to the same extent as we are against the Western exploiters. . . . The danger of communist power is not less than that of America. "63 Iran's new leaders were well aware of earlier Soviet attempts to dominate Iran, and the new regime abrogated the 1921 Soviet-Persian friendship treaty in November 1980. Iran accused the Soviet Union of sup- plying arms to the Kurds and other rebellious ethnic minorities, and Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr warned that the Soviet Union "sought to divide Iran" in order to extend its control to theIndian Ocean. 64 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another source of tension, both because Afghanistan was a Muslim country and because the invasion reinforced Iranian fears about So- viet intentions. 65 Iran's fear of Communist subversion was another sore point, and as noted earlier, Iran eventually banned the Tudeh Party and ex- pelled eighteen Soviet diplomats in April 1983. 66 Finally, the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 posed a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union, as Iraq, a long-standing ally, was heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry. The Soviets declared they would remain neutral and offered to sell arms to Iran, but their
support for Iraq would remain a contentious issue for the rest of the decade. 67
By the mid-? . 98os, Soviet relations with Iran were much worse than they had been under the shah. Early hopes that the revolution might take on a "progressive" character had been dashed, and Iran's military successes against Iraq threatened to shift the regional balance of power and boost the ideological appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. 68 Cooperation between
63 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 156. In 1980, then-foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh told So- viet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, "Our Imam has described the United States as a great satan. Unfortunately, you too have proved in practice that you are no less satanic than the United States. " Quoted fu Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 71.
64 See Menashri, Iran, 99; "Chronology," ME/ 34, no. 2 (1980), 171; and Richard K. Herr- mann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 78-8o.
65 Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh called the invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile measure . . . against all Muslims of the world. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 284. Similarly, Khomeini condemned "the savage occupation of Afghanistan by the aggressive plunderers of the East" and hoped that "the noble Muslim people of Afghanistan will achieve victory . . . and be delivered from the clutches of the so-called champions of the working class. " Quoted in Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Dilemmas in Khomeini's Iran," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu- tion, 121.
66 Rafsanjani called the Tudeh Party a "disreputable party with a filthy record" in Novem- ber 1982, and Radio Tehran announced in May 1983 that "the mercenary leaders of that party . . . were laying the foundations of a . . . creeping coup d'etat so that they could . . . drag the country in the direction they wished. " "Chronology," ME] 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 132, 142-44.
67 An Iranian mob attacked the Soviet embassy in Tehran in December 19Bo, and the Sovi- ets suspended arms shipments to Iraq for a year. Shipments resumed after a series of Iranian victories in 1982. See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 287; Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolution- ary Iran, 81, 134-36; Menashri, Iran, 207; "Chronology," ME/ 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and 42, no. 2 (1988), 466.
68 See Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 90. [231]
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Moscow and Tehran was confined to economic affairs, as the Soviet Union had become an increasingly important avenue for Iranian foreign trade once Iran's major ports were damaged in the war with Iraq. The two states even- tually signed a major economic agreement, in February 1982, and subse- quent trade deals helped compensate for the loss of trade between Iran and the West. 69 Rafsanjani described relations as "somewhat improved" in 1985; Prime Minister Musavi called the Soviet approach to the Iran-Iraq war
"more realistic. " Tensions reemerged after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein visited Moscow in December and got a renewed pledge of Soviet arms. Musavi now accused the Soviets of having "long desired access to southern waters through Iran," while Foreign Minister Velayati declared that "Iran will never accept Soviet domination. "70
Both Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq and the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan remained major sources of strain, and talks be- tween Velayati and Soviet president Andrei Gromyko in February 1987 were described as "businesslike. " Khomeini repeated his condemnation of Soviet support for Iraq; President Khamenei called Soviet policy in the gulf a "grave enor" in April, and Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet tanker in May. The U. S. reflagging operation and the resulting confrontation between
the U. S. and Iran brought Moscow and Tehran closer together in the sum- mer, however, and Rafsanjani accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at some point in the future. The Soviets also persuaded the UN Secu- rity Council to delay imposition of an arms embargo against Iran in the fall, but Iran's continued suspicions and the Soviets' reluctance to jeopardize their opening to the West kept the emerging detente from developing fur- ther. 71
Relations improved sharply following the Iranian ceasefire with Iraq and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets offered to aid Iran's postwar reconstruction, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov admitted that "mistakes had been made" in Moscow's earlier dealings with Iran. n An- other series of economic agreements was completed in the fall of 1988, and Khomeini called for improved relations between the two countries in a per- sonal message to Gorbachev in January 1989. Soviet foreign minister Eduard ? Shevardnadze met with Khomeini during a visit to Iran in February, when
69 There were also reports that Soviet intelligence officials were advising the Revolutionary Guards and that the Soviet Union and Iran had signed a secret military agreement in May 1982, but these stories were probably fabrications by exile groups hoping to obtain more sup- port from the West. See Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 98--99, 101, 132; and Menashri, Iran, 249.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S. citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
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The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment . . . on a case-i? y-case basis. " The texts of these memoranda are printed in the Report of the President's Special Review Board ("Tower Commission" ), February 26, 1987, B-6:7; B-7:8; and the Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Se- cret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 1ooth Congress, 1st sess. (Wash- ington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988), vol. 100-10:512-18.
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and another in July 1986, they replaced them by kidnapping two more U. S. citizens in September 1986. The exposure of the secret arms shipments em- barrassed the Reagan administration and alarmed its Arab allies, who saw the initiative as a hypocritical departure that undercut efforts to contain Iran. Moreover, the revelation that Iranian government officials had held secret ne- gotiations with the "Great Satan" revived Iranian fears about U. S.
influence and forced pragmatists such as Rafsanjani to revert to more hard-line posi- tions. In sum, the "arms for hostages" scheme was a fiasco from start to finish.
Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to the United States early in 1987, but relations between the two countries deteriorated after the "arms for hostages" scheme unraveled. 55 In an attempt to cut Iraq's oil revenues and reduce Arab support for Baghdad, Iran had begun laying mines in the Persian Gulf and threatening to attack oil shipments from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To restore its credibility with the gulf Arabs and bring additional pressure to bear on Iran, the U. S. eventually agreed to place Kuwaiti tankers under U. S. registry and provide a naval escort for tankers using Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. This decision led to repeated confrontations between the U. S. and Iranian forces: a U. S. fighter fired on an Iranian F-14 in August, and U. S. naval units sank an Iranian ship laying mines in the gulf the following month. In October, U. S. naval forces sank three Iranian gunboats after they fired on a U. S. helicopter and destroyed several Iranian oil platforms in re- taliation for missile attacks on two U. S. tankers. The Senate banned oil im- ports from Iran in September, and President Reagan announced a complete ban on Iranian imports and an embargo on "militarily useful" exports in October, while minor clashes between U. S. and Iranian forces continued into the following year. Finally, the U. S. destroyer Vincennes mistakenly shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner on July 2, killing all 290 people aboard.
The tragedy brought defiant protests from Tehran, but it also seems to have convinced Khomeini to end the war. Rafsanjani announced that con- cluding the war would allow Iran to follow a more "open" foreign policy, but in fact it did not lead to a significant improvement in U. S. -Iranian rela- tions. The hostages in Lebanon remained a sore point and U. S. officials were no longer willing to make concessions to hasten their release. The United States rejected an Iranian offer to mediate in exchange for the release of ad- ditional Iranian assets in August, and the Iranian government denounced a conciliatory letter from former president Carter to Khomeini and Rafsanjani as a "new trick. " Although Iran's deputy foreign minister hinted that rela- tions with the United States might be restored, Rafsanjani declared that
55 In April, Rafsanjani declared that normal relations with the United States would be pos- sible once it stopped threatening Iran. He later stated that Iran would help obtain the release of U. S. hostages in Lebanon if the Americans showed goodwill by releasing frozen Iranian as- sets, adding that relations need not remain poor "until doomsday. " "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o1.
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public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
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the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages. The Soviets condemned the
U. S. rescue mission in April, agreed that Iran could ship goods across Soviet territory in the event of a U. S. blockade, and issued frequent warnings about America's hostile intentions. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party supported Kho- meini and the radical clergy against both Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, and the Soviets endorsed Iran's request for an investigation of the shah's rule by the UN Security Council. The Islamic Republic also established close ties with Soviet allies such as Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicating that the fall of the shah had brought Moscow and Tehran closer together. 62
But it soon became apparent that the establishment of the Islamic Repub- lic had created as many problems for the Soviet Union as it had solved. To begin with, the revolution introduced an element of instability into a region on the Soviets' southern border, which increased the risk of U. S. military in- volvement and raised concerns about the impact of Islamic fundamentalism
. on the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. Khomeini and his followers saw Soviet Communism as an atheistic ideology that was every bit as objec- tionable as Western capitalism, and Khomeini soon declared, "We are in con-
60 A useful guide to the present state of U. S. -Iranian relations is Geoffrey Kemp, Forever En- emies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic ofIran (Washington, D. C. : Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 1994).
61 Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 283. In 1981, Brezhnev termed the Iranian Rev- olution a "major international event" and said that, "for all its complications and contradic- tions, it is still fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution. " Quoted in Karen Dawisha and Helene Carrerre d'Encausse, "Islam in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: A Double- Edged Sword? " in Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy, 170.
? 62 See Menashri, Iran, 99; Hunter, Iran and the World, 85, and "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Post-Revolution Period," in Iran's Revolution: The Searchfor Consensus, ed. R. K. Ramazani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 86.
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flict with international communism to the same extent as we are against the Western exploiters. . . . The danger of communist power is not less than that of America. "63 Iran's new leaders were well aware of earlier Soviet attempts to dominate Iran, and the new regime abrogated the 1921 Soviet-Persian friendship treaty in November 1980. Iran accused the Soviet Union of sup- plying arms to the Kurds and other rebellious ethnic minorities, and Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr warned that the Soviet Union "sought to divide Iran" in order to extend its control to theIndian Ocean. 64 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another source of tension, both because Afghanistan was a Muslim country and because the invasion reinforced Iranian fears about So- viet intentions. 65 Iran's fear of Communist subversion was another sore point, and as noted earlier, Iran eventually banned the Tudeh Party and ex- pelled eighteen Soviet diplomats in April 1983. 66 Finally, the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 posed a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union, as Iraq, a long-standing ally, was heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry. The Soviets declared they would remain neutral and offered to sell arms to Iran, but their
support for Iraq would remain a contentious issue for the rest of the decade. 67
By the mid-? . 98os, Soviet relations with Iran were much worse than they had been under the shah. Early hopes that the revolution might take on a "progressive" character had been dashed, and Iran's military successes against Iraq threatened to shift the regional balance of power and boost the ideological appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. 68 Cooperation between
63 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 156. In 1980, then-foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh told So- viet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, "Our Imam has described the United States as a great satan. Unfortunately, you too have proved in practice that you are no less satanic than the United States. " Quoted fu Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 71.
64 See Menashri, Iran, 99; "Chronology," ME/ 34, no. 2 (1980), 171; and Richard K. Herr- mann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 78-8o.
65 Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh called the invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile measure . . . against all Muslims of the world. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 284. Similarly, Khomeini condemned "the savage occupation of Afghanistan by the aggressive plunderers of the East" and hoped that "the noble Muslim people of Afghanistan will achieve victory . . . and be delivered from the clutches of the so-called champions of the working class. " Quoted in Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Dilemmas in Khomeini's Iran," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu- tion, 121.
66 Rafsanjani called the Tudeh Party a "disreputable party with a filthy record" in Novem- ber 1982, and Radio Tehran announced in May 1983 that "the mercenary leaders of that party . . . were laying the foundations of a . . . creeping coup d'etat so that they could . . . drag the country in the direction they wished. " "Chronology," ME] 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 132, 142-44.
67 An Iranian mob attacked the Soviet embassy in Tehran in December 19Bo, and the Sovi- ets suspended arms shipments to Iraq for a year. Shipments resumed after a series of Iranian victories in 1982. See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 287; Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolution- ary Iran, 81, 134-36; Menashri, Iran, 207; "Chronology," ME/ 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and 42, no. 2 (1988), 466.
68 See Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 90. [231]
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Moscow and Tehran was confined to economic affairs, as the Soviet Union had become an increasingly important avenue for Iranian foreign trade once Iran's major ports were damaged in the war with Iraq. The two states even- tually signed a major economic agreement, in February 1982, and subse- quent trade deals helped compensate for the loss of trade between Iran and the West. 69 Rafsanjani described relations as "somewhat improved" in 1985; Prime Minister Musavi called the Soviet approach to the Iran-Iraq war
"more realistic. " Tensions reemerged after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein visited Moscow in December and got a renewed pledge of Soviet arms. Musavi now accused the Soviets of having "long desired access to southern waters through Iran," while Foreign Minister Velayati declared that "Iran will never accept Soviet domination. "70
Both Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq and the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan remained major sources of strain, and talks be- tween Velayati and Soviet president Andrei Gromyko in February 1987 were described as "businesslike. " Khomeini repeated his condemnation of Soviet support for Iraq; President Khamenei called Soviet policy in the gulf a "grave enor" in April, and Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet tanker in May. The U. S. reflagging operation and the resulting confrontation between
the U. S. and Iran brought Moscow and Tehran closer together in the sum- mer, however, and Rafsanjani accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at some point in the future. The Soviets also persuaded the UN Secu- rity Council to delay imposition of an arms embargo against Iran in the fall, but Iran's continued suspicions and the Soviets' reluctance to jeopardize their opening to the West kept the emerging detente from developing fur- ther. 71
Relations improved sharply following the Iranian ceasefire with Iraq and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets offered to aid Iran's postwar reconstruction, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov admitted that "mistakes had been made" in Moscow's earlier dealings with Iran. n An- other series of economic agreements was completed in the fall of 1988, and Khomeini called for improved relations between the two countries in a per- sonal message to Gorbachev in January 1989. Soviet foreign minister Eduard ? Shevardnadze met with Khomeini during a visit to Iran in February, when
69 There were also reports that Soviet intelligence officials were advising the Revolutionary Guards and that the Soviet Union and Iran had signed a secret military agreement in May 1982, but these stories were probably fabrications by exile groups hoping to obtain more sup- port from the West. See Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 98--99, 101, 132; and Menashri, Iran, 249.
