No More Learning

A fresh illustration had been afforded of the truth, that
supported Sinope,
408
THE EASTERN STATES AND book iii
of all haphazards none is more hazardous than an ab solute hereditary monarchy. Philip was not the man whom Macedonia at that time required ; yet his gifts were far from insignificant He was a genuine king, in the best and worst sense of the term. A strong desire to rule in person and unaided was the fundamental trait of his character; he was proud of his purple, but he was no less proud of other gifts, and he had reason to be so. He not only showed the valour of a soldier and the eye of a general, but he displayed a high spirit in the conduct of public affairs, whenever his Macedonian sense of honour was offended. Full of intelligence and wit, he won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain, especially of the men who were ablest and most refined, such as Flamininus and Scipio; he was a pleasant boon companion and, not by virtue of his rank alone, a dangerous wooer. But he was at the same time one of the most arrogant and flagitious characters, which that shameless age produced. He was in the habit of saying that he feared none save the gods ; but it seemed almost as if his gods were those to whom his admiral Dicaearchus regularly offered sacrifice —Godless- ness (Asebcia) and Lawlessness (Paranomia). The lives of his advisers and of the promoters of his schemes possessed no sacredness in his eyes, nor did he disdain to pacify his indignation against the Athenians and Attalus by the de struction of venerable monuments and illustrious works of art; it is quoted as one of his maxims of state, that "whoever causes the father to be put to death must also kill the sons. " It may be that to him cruelty was not, strictly, a delight ; but he was indifferent to the lives and sufferings of others, and relenting, which alone renders men tolerable, found no place in his hard and stubborn heart. So abruptly and harshly did he proclaim the principle that no promise and no moral law are binding on an absolute king, that he thereby interposed the most serious obstacles
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
409
to the success of his plans. No one can deny that he possessed sagacity and resolution, but these were, in a singular manner, combined with procrastination and supine- ness ; which is perhaps partly to be explained by the fact, that he was called in his eighteenth year to the position of an absolute sovereign, and that his ungovernable against every one who disturbed his autocratic course by counter-argument or counter-advice scared away from him all independent counsellors. What various causes co operated to produce the weak and disgraceful management which he showed in the first Macedonian war, we cannot tell; it may have been due perhaps to that indolent arrogance which only puts forth its full energies against danger when it becomes imminent, or perhaps to his in difference towards a plan which was not of his own devising and his jealousy of the greatness of Hannibal which put him to shame. It is certain that his subsequent conduct betrayed no further trace of the Philip, through whose negligence the plan of Hannibal suffered shipwreck.
When Philip concluded his treaty with the Aetolians Macedonia and Romans in 548-9, he seriously intended to make a [206-205. ]
lasting peace with Rome, and to devote himself exclusively ^a-jr'11 in future to the affairs of the east. It admits of no doubt Egypt
that he saw with regret the rapid subjugation of Carthage ;
and it may be, that Hannibal hoped for a second declara
tion of war from Macedonia, and that Philip secretly rein forced the last Carthaginian army with mercenaries (p. 351).
But the tedious affairs in which he had meanwhile involved himself in the east, as well as the nature of the alleged support, and especially the total silence of the Romans as
to such a breach of the peace while they were searching
for grounds of war, place it beyond doubt, that Philip was
by no means disposed in 551 to make up for what he ought 203. to have done ten years before.
He had turned his eyes to an entirely different quarter.
fury
410
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
206. Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt had died in 549. Philip and Antiochus, the kings of Macedonia and Asia, had combined against his successor Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child of five years old, in order completely to gratify the ancient grudge which the monarchies of the mainland entertained towards the maritime state. The Egyptian state was to be broken up ; Egypt and Cyprus were to fall to Antiochus ; Cyrene, Ionia, and the Cyclades to Philip. Thoroughly after the manner of Philip, who ridiculed such considera tions, the kings began the war not merely without cause, but even without pretext, "just as the large fishes devour the small. " The allies, moreover, had made their calcula tions correctly, especially Philip. Egypt had enough to do in defending herself against the nearer enemy in Syria, and was obliged to leave her possessions in Asia Minor and the Cyclades undefended when Philip threw himself upon these as his share of the spoil. In the year in which
201. Carthage concluded peace with Rome (553), Philip ordered a fleet equipped by the towns subject to him to take on board troops, and to sail along the coast of Thrace. There
was taken from the Aetolian garrison, and Perinthus, which stood in the relation of clientship to
was likewise occupied. Thus the peace was broken as respected the Byzantines ; and as respected the Aetolians, who had just made peace with Philip, the good understanding was at least disturbed. The crossing to Asia was attended with no difficulties, for Prusias king of Bithynia was in alliance with Macedonia. By way of recompense, Philip helped him to subdue the Greek mercantile cities in his territory. Chalcedon submitted. Cius, which resisted, was taken by storm and levelled with the ground, and its inhabitants were reduced to slavery— a meaningless barbarity, which annoyed Prusias himself who wished to get possession of the town uninjured, and which excited profound indignation throughout the
Lysimachia
Byzantium,
CHAP, vm THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
411
Hellenic world. The Aetolians, whose strategus had com manded in Cius, and the Rhodians, whose attempts at mediation had been contemptuously and craftily frustrated by the king, were especially offended.
But even had this not been so, the interests of all Greek The commercial cities were at stake. They could not possibly Hansa*and allow the mild and almost purely nominal Egyptian rule to Pergamus be supplanted by the Macedonian despotism, with which phiUjT urban self-government and freedom of commercial inter
course were not at all compatible ; and the fearful treat
ment of the Cians showed that the matter at stake was not
the right of confirming the charters of the towns, but the
life or death of one and all. Lampsacus had already fallen,
and Thasos had been treated like Cius ; no time was to be
lost Theophiliscus, the vigilant strategus of Rhodes,
exhorted his citizens to meet the common danger by common
resistance, and not to suffer the towns and islands to become
one by one a prey to the enemy. Rhodes resolved on its
course, and declared war against Philip. Byzantium joined
it ; as did also the aged Attalus king of Pergamus, per
sonally and politically the enemy of Philip. While the
fleet of the allies was mustering on the Aeolian coast,
Philip directed a portion of his fleet to take Chios and
Samos. With the other portion he appeared in person
before Pergamus, which however he invested in vain; he
had to content himself with traversing the level country
and leaving the traces of Macedonian valour on the temples
which he destroyed far and wide. Suddenly he departed
and re-embarked, to unite with his squadron which was at
Samos. But the Rhodo-Pergamene fleet followed him,
and forced him to accept battle in the straits of Chios.
The number of the Macedonian decked vessels was smaller,
but the multitude of their open boats made up for this inequality, and the soldiers of Philip fought with great
courage. But he was at length defeated. Almost half of
412
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
his decked vessels, 24 sail, were sunk or taken ; 6000 Macedonian sailors and 3000 soldiers perished, amongst whom was the admiral Democrates; 2000 were taken prisoners. The victory cost the allies no more than 800 men and six vessels. But, of the leaders of the allies, Attalus had been cut off from his fleet and compelled to let his own vessel run aground at Erythrae; and Theo- philiscus of Rhodes, whose public spirit had decided the question of war and whose valour had decided the battle, died on the day after it of his wounds. Thus while the fleet of Attalus went home and the Rhodian fleet remained temporarily at Chios, Philip, who falsely ascribed the victory to himself, was able to continue his voyage and to turn towards Samos, in order to occupy the Carian towns. On the Carian coast the Rhodians, not on this occasion supported by Attalus, gave battle for the second time to the Macedonian fleet under Heraclides, near the little island of Lade in front of the port of Miletus. The victory, claimed again by both sides, appears to have been this time gained by the Macedonians ; for while the Rhodians retreated to Myndus and thence to Cos, the Macedonians occupied Miletus, and a squadron under Dicaearchus the Aetolian occupied the Cyclades. Philip meanwhile prose cuted the conquest of the Rhodian possessions on the Carian mainland, and of the Greek cities : had he been dis posed to attack Ptolemy in person, and had he not pre ferred to confine himself to the acquisition of his own share in the spoil, he would now have been able to think even of an expedition to Egypt In Caria no army confronted the Macedonians, and Philip traversed without hindrance the country from Magnesia to Mylasa ; but every town in that country was a fortress, and the siege-warfare was protracted without yielding or promising any considerable results. Zeuxis the satrap of Lydia supported the ally of his master with the same lukewarmness as Philip had
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
413
manifested in promoting the interests of the Syrian king, and the Greek cities gave their support only under the pressure of fear or force. The provisioning of the army became daily more difficult ; Philip was obliged to-day to plunder those who but yesterday had voluntarily supplied his wants, and then he had reluctantly to submit to beg afresh. Thus the good season of the year gradually drew to an end, and in the interval the Rhodians had reinforced their fleet and had also been rejoined by thatof Attalus, so that they were decidedly superior at sea. It seemed almost as if they might cut off the retreat of the king and compel him to take up winter quarters in Caria, while the state of affairs at home, particularly the threatened inter vention of the Aetolians and Romans, urgently demanded his return. Philip saw the danger; he left garrisons amounting together to 3000 men, partly in Myrina to keep Pergamus in check, partly in the petty towns round Mylasa — Iassus, Bargylia, Euromus and Pedasa — to secure for him the excellent harbour and a landing place in Caria ; and, owing to the negligence with which the allies guarded the sea, he succeeded in safely reaching the Thracian coast with his fleet and arriving at home before the winter of
which did not permit him to continue the plundering of mtelTJn' defenceless Egypt. The Romans, who had at length in Rome, this year concluded peace on their own terms with Carthage,
began to give serious attention to these complications in
the east It has often been affirmed, that after the con quest of the west they forthwith proceeded to the subjugation of the east ; a serious consideration will lead to a juster judgment It is only dull prejudice which fails to see that Rome at this period by no means grasped at the sovereignty of the Mediterranean states, but, on the contrary, desired nothing further than to have neighbours that should not
553-4-
201-200. In fact a storm was gathering against Philip in the west, Diplomatic
414
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
be dangerous in Africa and in Greece ; and Macedonia was not really dangerous to Rome. Its power certainly was far from small, and it is evident that the Roman senate only consented with reluctance to the peace of
206-205. 548-9, which left it in all its integrity; but how little any serious apprehensions of Macedonia were or could be entertained in Rome, is best shown by the small number of troops—who yet were never compelled to fight against a superior force — with which Rome carried on the next war. The senate doubtless would have gladly seen Macedonia humbled ; but that humiliation would be too (iearly purchased at the cost of a land war carried on in Mace donia with Roman troops ; and accordingly, after the with drawal of the Aetolians, the senate voluntarily concluded peace at once on the basis of the status quo. It is therefore far from made out, that the Roman government concluded this peace with the definite design of beginning the war at a more convenient season ; and it is very certain that, at the moment, from the thorough exhaustion of the state and the extreme unwillingness of the citizens to enter into a second transmarine struggle, the Macedonian war was in a high degree unwelcome to the Romans. But now it was inevitable. They might have acquiesced in the Macedonian
205. state as a neighbour, such as it stood in 549 ; but it was impossible that they could permit it to acquire the best part of Asiatic Greece and the important Cyrene, to crush the neutral commercial states, and thereby to double its
Further, the fall of Egypt and the humiliation, perhaps the subjugation, of Rhodes would have inflicted deep wounds on the trade of Sicily and Italy ; and could Rome remain a quiet spectator, while Italian commerce with the east was made dependent on the two great continental powers ? Rome had, moreover, an obligation of honour to fulfil towards Attalus her faithful ally since *be first Macedonian war, and had to prevent Philip, who
power.
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
415.
had already besieged him in his capital, from expelling him from his dominions. Lastly, the claim of Rome to extend her protecting arm over all the Hellenes was by no means an empty phrase : the citizens of Neapolis, Rhegium, Massilia, and Emporiae could testify that that protection was meant in earnest, and there is no question at all that at this time the Romans stood in a closer relation to the Greeks than any other nation—one little more remote than that of the Hellenized Macedonians. It is strange that any should dispute the right of the Romans to feel their human, as well as their Hellenic, sympathies revolted at the outrageous treatment of the Cians and Thasians.
Thus in reality all political, commercial, and moral Prepara- motives concurred in inducing Rome to undertake the 1^^ second war against Philip —one of the most righteous, for second which the city ever waged. It greatly redounds to donian the honour of the senate, that it immediately resolved war.
on its course and did not allow itself to be deterred
from making the necessary preparations either by the exhaustion of the state or by the unpopularity of such
a declaration of war. The propraetor Marcus Valerius
Laevinus made his appearance as early as 553 with the 201. Sicilian fleet of 38 sail in the eastern waters. The government, however, were at a loss to discover an ostensible pretext for the war ; a pretext which they needed
in order to satisfy the people, even although they had not
been far too sagacious to undervalue, as was the manner
of Philip, the importance of assigning a legitimate ground
for hostilities. The support, which Philip was alleged to
have granted to the Carthaginians after the peace with
Rome, manifestly could not be proved. The Roman
subjects, indeed, in the province of Illyria had for a con
siderable time complained of the Macedonian encroach
ments. In 551 a Roman envoy at the head of the Illyrian sot.
levy had driven Philip's troops from the Illyrian territory ;
4t6
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
and the senate had accordingly declared to the king's 202. envoys in 552, that if he sought war, he would find it
sooner than was agreeable to him. But these encroach ments were simply the ordinary outrages which Philip practised towards his neighbours; a negotiation regarding them at the present moment would have led to his humbling himself and offering satisfaction, but not to war. With all the belligerent powers in the east the Roman community was nominally in friendly relations, and might have granted them aid in repelling Philip's attack. But Rhodes and Pergamus, which naturally did not fail to request Roman aid, were formally the aggressors ; and although Alexandrian ambassadors besought the Roman senate to undertake the guardianship of the boy king, Egypt appears to have been by no means eager to invoke the direct intervention of the Romans, which would put an end to her difficulties for the moment, but would at the same time open up the eastern sea to the great western power. Aid to Egypt, moreover, must have been in the first instance rendered in Syria, and would have entangled Rome simultaneously in a war with Asia and with Macedonia ; which the Romans were natur ally the more desirous to avoid, as they were firmly resolved not to intermeddle at least in Asiatic affairs. No course was left but to despatch in the meantime an embassy to the east for the purpose, first, of obtaining —what was not in the circumstances difficult —the sanction of Egypt to the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Greece ; secondly, of pacifying king Antiochus by abandoning Syria to him ; and, lastly, of accelerating as much as possible a breach with Philip and promoting a coalition of the minor
201. Graeco- Asiatic states against him (end of 553). At Alex andria they had no difficulty in accomplishing their object ; the court had no choice, and was obliged gratefully to receive Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, whom the senate had despatched as "guardian of the king" to uphold his
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
417
interests, so far as that could be done without an actual intervention. Antiochus did not break off his alliance with Philip, nor did he give to the Romans the definite explanations which they desired ; in other respects, however —whether from remissness, or influenced by the declara tions of the Romans that they did not wish to interfere in Syria — he pursued his schemes in that direction and left things in Greece and Asia Minor to take their course.
Meanwhile, the spring of 554 had arrived, and the war 200. had recommenced. Philip first threw himself once more ^JT? ^1 upon Thrace, where he occupied all the places on the
coast, in particular Maronea, Aenus, Elaeus, and Sestus ;
he wished to have his European possessions secured against
the risk of a Roman landing. He then attacked Abydus
on the Asiatic coast, the acquisition of which could not
but be an object of importance to him, for the possession
of Sestus and Abydus would bring him into closer connec
tion with his ally Antiochus, and he would no longer need
to be apprehensive lest the fleet of the allies might intercept
him in crossing to or from Asia Minor. That fleet com
manded the Aegean Sea after the withdrawal of the weaker Macedonian squadron : Philip confined his operations by
sea to maintaining garrisons on three of the Cyclades,
Andros, Cythnos, and Paros, and fitting out privateers.
The Rhodians proceeded to Chios, and thence to Tenedos,
where Attalus, who had passed the winter at Aegina and
had spent his time in listening to the declamations of the Athenians, joined them with his squadron. The allies
might probably have arrived in time to help the Abydenes,
who heroically defended themselves ; but they stirred not,
and so at length the city surrendered, after almost all who
were capable of bearing arms had fallen in the struggle
before the walls. After the capitulation a large portion of
the inhabitants fell by their own hand—the mercy of the
victor consisted in allowing the Abydenes a term of three
VOL, II
SQ
418
THE EASTERN STATES AND book III
days to die voluntarily. Here, in the camp before Abydus, the Roman embassy, which after the termination of its business in Syria and Egypt had visited and dealt with the minor Greek states, met with the king, and submitted the
which it had been charged to make by the senate, viz. that the king should wage no aggressive war against any Greek state, should restore the possessions which he had wrested from Ptolemy, and should consent to an arbitration regarding the injury inflicted on the Pergamenes and Rhodians. The object of the senate, which sought to provoke the king to a formal declaration of war, was not gained; the Roman ambassador, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, obtained from the king nothing but the polite reply that he would excuse what the envoy had said because he was young, handsome, and a Roman.
Meanwhile, however, the occasion for declaring war, which Rome desired, had been furnished from another quarter. The Athenians in their silly and cruel vanity had put to death two unfortunate Acarnanians, because these had accidentally strayed into their mysteries. When the Acarnanians, who were naturally indignant, asked Philip to procure them satisfaction, he could not refuse the just request of his most faithful allies, and he allowed them to levy men in Macedonia and, with these and their own troops, to invade Attica without a formal declaration of war. This, it is true, was no war in the proper sense of the term; and, besides, the leader of the Macedonian band, Nicanor, immediately gave orders to his troops to
retreat, when the Roman envoys, who were at Athens at 201. the time, used threatening language (in the end of 553). But it was too late. An Athenian embassy was sent to Rome to report the attack made by Philip on an ancient ally of the Romans ; and, from the way in which the senate
received Philip saw clearly what awaited him so that 200. he at once, the very spring of 554, directed Philocles,
proposals
it, in
;
chap, vin THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
419
his general in Greece, to lay waste the Attic territory and to reduce the city to extremities.
The senate now had what they wanted; and in the Dectaa- summer of 554 they were able to propose to the comitia a "°n E*J^ declaration of war " on account of an attack on a state in Rome, alliance with Rome. " It was rejected on the first occasion
almost unanimously : foolish or evil-disposed tribunes of
the people complained of the senate, which would allow the
citizens no rest ; but the war was necessary and, in strict
ness, was already begun, so that the senate could not
possibly recede. The burgesses were induced to yield by representations and concessions. It is remarkable that
these concessions were made mainly at the expense of the
allies. The garrisons of Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and
Sardinia, amounting in all to 20,000 men, were exclusively
taken from the allied contingents that were in active service
—quite contrary to the former principles of the Romans.
All the burgess troops, on the other hand, that had
continued under arms from the Hannibalic war, were discharged ; volunteers alone, it was alleged, were to be enrolled for the Macedonian war, but they were, as was afterwards found, for the most part forced volunteers — a
fact which in the autumn of 555 called forth a dangerous in. military revolt in the camp of Apollonia. Six legions were formed of the men newly called out ; of these two remained
in Rome and two in Etruria, and only two embarked at Brundisium for Macedonia, led by the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba.
Thus it was once more clearly demonstrated, that the sovereign burgess assemblies, with their shortsighted resolutions dependent often on mere accident, were no longer at all fitted to deal with the complicated and difficult relations into which Rome was drawn by her victories ; and that their mischievous intervention in the working of the state machine led to dangerous modifies-
The Roman
eague.
tions of the measures which in a military point of view were necessary, and to the still more dangerous course of treating the Latin allies as inferiors.
The position of Philip was very disadvantageous. The eastern states, which ought to have acted in unison against all interference of Rome and probably under other circum stances would have so acted, had been mainly by Philip's fault so incensed at each other, that they were not inclined to hinder, or were inclined even to promote, the Roman invasion. Asia, the natural and most important ally of Philip, had been neglected by him, and was moreover prevented at first from active interference by being entangled in the quarrel with Egypt and the Syrian war.
Egypt had an urgent interest in keeping the Roman fleet out of the eastern waters ; even now an Egyptian embassy intimated at Rome very plainly, that the court of Alexandria was ready to relieve the Romans from the trouble of inter vention in Attica. But the treaty for the partition of Egypt concluded between Asia and Macedonia threw that important state thoroughly into the arms of Rome, and compelled the cabinet of Alexandria to declare that it would only intermeddle in the affairs of European Greece with consent of the Romans. The Greek commercial cities, with Rhodes, Pergamus, and Byzantium at their head, were in a position similar, but of still greater perplexity. They would under other circumstances have beyond doubt done what they could to close the eastern seas against the Romans ; but the cruel and destructive policy of conquest pursued by Philip had driven them to an unequal struggle, in which for their self-preservation they were obliged to use every effort to implicate the great Italian power. In Greece proper also the Roman envoys,
who were commissioned to organize a second league against Philip there, found the way already substantially paved (01 them by the enemy. Of the anti-Macedonian party —tb*
420
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
421
Spartans, Eleans, Athenians, and Aetolians —Philip might perhaps have gained the latter, for the peace of 548 had 208. made a deep, and far from healed, breach in their friendly alliance with Rome; but apart from the old differences which subsisted between Aetolia and Macedonia regarding
the Thessalian towns withdrawn by Macedonia from the Aetolian confederacy — Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, Phar- salus, and Thebes in Phthiotis — the expulsion of the Aetolian garrisons from Lysimachia and Cius had produced fresh exasperation against Philip in the minds of the Aetolians. If they delayed to join the league against him,
the chief reason doubtless was the ill-feeling that continued
to prevail between them and the Romans.
It was a circumstance still more ominous, that even among
the Greek states firmly attached to the interests of Macedonia
—the Epirots, Acarnanians, Boeotians, and Achaeans —the Acarnanians and Boeotians alone stood steadfastly by Philip.
With the Epirots the Roman envoys negotiated not without
success ; Amynander, king of the Athamanes, in particular
closely attached himself to Rome. Even among the Achaeans, Philip had offended many by the murder of Aratus; while on the other hand he had thereby paved the
way for a more free development of the confederacy. Under
the leadership of Philopoemen (502-571, for the first time 252-181. strategus in 546) it had reorganized its military system, re- 208. covered confidence in itself by successful conflicts with
Sparta, and no longer blindly followed, as in the time of
Aratus, the policy of Macedonia. The Achaean league,
which had to expect neither profit nor immediate injury from
the thirst of Philip for aggrandizement, alone in all Hellas
looked at this war from an impartial and national-Hellenic
point of view. It perceived —what there was no difficulty
in perceiving —that the Hellenic nation was thereby sur
rendering itself to the Romans even before these wished or desired its surrender, and attempted accordingly to mediate
200. Landing
of the Romans in Mace donia.
between Philip and the Rhodians ; but it was too late. The national patriotism, which had formerly terminated the federal war and had mainly contributed to bring about the first war between Macedonia and Rome, was extinguished ; the Achaean mediation remained fruitless, and in vain Philip visited the cities and islands to rekindle the zeal of the nation —its apathy was the Nemesis for Cius and Abydus. The Achaeans, as they could effect no change and were not disposed to render help to either party, remained neutral.
In the autumn of 554 the consul, Publius Sulpicius Galba, landed with his two legions and 1000 Numidian cavalry accompanied even by elephants derived from the spoils of
Carthage, at Apollonia ; on receiving accounts of which the king returned in haste from the Hellespont to Thessaly. But, owing partly to the far-advanced season, partly to the sickness of the Roman general, nothing was undertaken by
land that year except a reconnaissance in force, in the course of which the townships in the vicinity, and in particular the Macedonian colony Antipatria, were occupied by the Romans. For the next year a joint attack on Macedonia was concerted with the northern barbarians, especially with Pleuratus, the then ruler of Scodra, and Bato, prince of the Dardani, who of course were eager to profit by the favourable opportunity.
More importance attached to the enterprises of the Roman fleet, which numbered 100 decked and 80 light vessels. While the rest of the ships took their station for the winter at Corcyra, a division under Gaius Claudius Cento proceeded to the Piraeeus to render assistance to the hard-pressed Athe nians. But, as Cento found the Attic territory already sufficiently protected against the raids of the Corinthian garrison and the Macedonian corsairs, he sailed on and ap peared suddenly before Chalcis in Euboea, the chief strong hold of Philip in Greece, where his magazines, stores of arms, and prisoners were kept, and where the commandant Sopater was far from expecting a Roman attack. The unite
422
THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
chap, viil THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
4*3
fended walls were scaled, and the garrison was put to death; the prisoners were liberated and the stores were burnt; unfortunately, there was a want of troops to hold the im portant position. On receiving news of this invasion, Philip immediately in vehement indignation started from Demetrias in Thessaly for Chalcis, and when he found no trace of the enemy there save the scene of ruin, he went on to Athens to retaliate. But his attempt to surprise the city was a failure, and even the assault was in vain, greatly as the king exposed his life ; the approach of Gaius Claudius from the Piraeeus, and of Attalus from Aegina, compelled him to depart. Philip still tarried for some time in Greece ; but in a political and in a military point of view his successes were equally insig nificant In vain he tried to induce the Achaeans to take up arms in his behalf; and equally fruitless were his attacks on Eleusis and the Piraeeus, as well as a second attempt on Athens itself. Nothing remained for him but to gratify his natural exasperation in an unworthy manner by laying waste the country and destroying the trees of Academus, and then to return to the north.
Thus the winter passed away. With the spring of 555
the proconsul Publius Sulpicius broke up from his winter
camp, determined to conduct his legions from Apollonia by
the shortest route into Macedonia proper. This principal cedonifc attack from the west was to be supported by three subordi
nate attacks ; on the north by an invasion of the Dardani
and Illyrians ; on the east by an attack on the part of the combined fleet of the Romans and allies, which assembled
at Aegina; while lastly the Athamanes, and the Aetolians
also, if the attempt to induce them to share in the struggle
should prove successful, were to advance from the south.
After Galba had crossed the mountains pierced by the
Apsus (now the Beratind), and had marched through the
fertile plain of Dassaretia, he reached the mountain range
which separates Illyria from Macedonia, and crossing
Attempt of *e C199-
invade Ma-
it,
424
THE EASTERN STATES AND book iil
entered the proper Macedonian territory. Philip had marched to meet him; but in the extensive and thinly- peopled regions of Macedonia the antagonists for a time sought each other in vain ; at length they met in the province of Lyncestis, a fertile but marshy plain not far from the north-western frontier, and encamped not iooo paces apart Philip's army, after he had been joined by the corps de tached to occupy the northern passes, numbered about 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry; the Roman army was nearly as strong. The Macedonians however had the great
that, fighting in their native land and well acquainted with its highways and byways, they had little trouble in procuring supplies of provisions, while they had encamped so close to the Romans that the latter could not venture to disperse for any extensive foraging. The consul repeatedly offered battle, but the king persisted in declining it ; and the combats between the light troops, although the Romans gained some advantages in them, produced no material alteration. Galba was obliged to break up his camp and to pitch another eight miles off at Octolophus, where he conceived that he could more easily procure supplies. But here too the divisions sent out were destroyed by the light troops and cavalry of the Macedonians ; the legions were obliged to come to their help, whereupon the Macedonian vanguard, which had advanced too far, were driven back to their camp with heavy loss ; the king himself lost his horse in the action, and only saved his life through the magnanimous self-devotion of one of his troopers. From this perilous position the Romans were liberated
the better success of the subordinate attacks which Galba had directed the allies to make, or rather through the weak ness of the Macedonian forces. Although Philip had instituted levies as large as possible in his own dominions, and had enlisted Roman deserters and other mercenaries, he had not been able to bring into the field (over and above
advantage,
through
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
435
the garrisons in Asia Minor and Thrace) more than the army, with which in person he confronted the consul; and besides, in order to form even this, he had been obliged to leave the northern passes in the Pelagonian territory unde fended. For the protection of the east coast he relied partly on the orders which he had given for the laying waste of the islands of Sciathus and Peparethus, which might have furnished a station to the enemy's fleet, partly on the garrisoning of Thasos and the coast and on the fleet organ ized at Demetrias under Heraclides. For the south frontier he had been obliged to reckon solely upon the more than doubtful neutrality of the Aetolians. These now suddenly joined the league against Macedonia, and immediately in conjunction with the Athamanes penetrated into Thessaly,
while simultaneously the Dardani and Illyrians overran the northern provinces, and the Roman fleet under Lucius Apustius, departing from Corcyra, appeared in the eastern waters, where the ships of Attalus, the Rhodians, and the Istrians joined it
Philip, on learning this, voluntarily abandoned his position and retreated in an easterly direction : whether he did so in order to repel the probably unexpected invasion of the Aetolians, or to draw the Roman army after him with a view to its destruction, or to take either of these courses according to circumstances, cannot well be determined. He managed his retreat so dexterously that Galba, who adopted the rash resolution of following him, lost his track, and Philip was enabled to reach by a flank movement, and to occupy, the narrow pass which separates the provinces of Lyncestis and Eordaea, with the view of awaiting the Romans and giving them a warm reception there. A battle took place on the spot which he had selected; but the long Macedonian spears proved unserviceable on the wooded and uneven ground. The Macedonians were partly turned, partly broken, and lost many men.
Return Romans,
But, although Philip's army was after this unfortunate action no longer able to prevent the advance of the Romans, the latter were themselves afraid to encounter further un known dangers in an impassable and hostile country ; and returned to Apollonia, after they had laid waste the fertile
of Upper Macedonia — Eordaea, Elymaea, and Orestis. Celetrum, the most considerable town of Orestis (now Kastoria, on a peninsula in the lake of the same name), had surrendered to them : it was the only Macedonian town that opened its gates to the Romans. In the Illyrian land Pelium, the city of the Dassaretae, on the upper confluents of the Apsus, was taken by storm and strongly garrisoned to serve as a future basis for a similar expedition.
Philip did not disturb the Roman main army in its retreat, but turned by forced marches against the Aetolians and Athamanians who, in the belief that the legions were
the attention of the king, were fearlessly and recklessly plundering the rich vale of the Peneius, defeated them completely, and compelled such as did not fall to make their escape singly through the well-known mountain paths. The effective strength of the confederacy was not a little diminished by this defeat, and not less by the numerous enlistments made in Aetolia on Egyptian account The Dardani were chased back over the mountains by Athena- goras, the leader of Philip's light troops, without difficulty and with severe loss. The Roman fleet also did not accomplish much ; it expelled the Macedonian garrison from Andros, punished Euboea and Sciathus, and then made attempts on the Chalcidian peninsula, which were, however, vigorously repulsed by the Macedonian garrison at Mende. The rest of the summer was spent in the capture of Oreus in Euboea, which was long delayed by the resolute defence of the Macedonian garrison. The weak Macedonian fleet
under Heraclides remained inactive at Heraclea, and did not venture to dispute the possession of the sea with die
426
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
provinces
occupying
chap, vni THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
The latter went early to winter quarters, the Romans proceeding to the Piraeeus and Corcyra, the Rhodians and Pergamenes going home.
Philip might on the whole congratulate himself upon the results of this campaign. The Roman troops, after an ex tremely troublesome campaign, stood in autumn precisely on the spot whence they had started in spring ; and, but for the well-timed interposition of the Aetolians and the un expected success of the battle at the pass of Eordaea, perhaps not a man of their entire force would have again seen the Roman territory. The fourfold offensive had every where failed in its object, and not only did Philip in autumn see his whole dominions cleared of the enemy, but he was able to make an attempt — which, however, miscarried — to wrestfrom the Aetolians the strong town of Thaumaci, situated on the Aetolo-Thessalian frontier and commanding the plain of the Peneius. If Antiochus, for whose coming Philip vainly supplicated the gods, should unite with him in the next campaign, he might anticipate great successes. For a moment it seemed as if Antiochus was disposed to do so ; his army appeared in Asia Minor, and occupied some town ships of king Attalus, who requested military protection from the Romans. The latter, however, were not anxious to urge the great-king at this time to a breach : they sent envoys,
who in fact obtained an evacuation of the dominions of Attalus. From that quarter Philip had nothing to hope for.
But the fortunate issue of the last campaign had so Philip raised the courage or the arrogance of Philip, that, after TMc^p" having assured himself afresh of the neutrality of the Aous. Achaeans and the fidelity of the Macedonians by the sacri
fice of some strong places and of the detested admiral Heraclides, he next spring (556) assumed the offensive and 198. advanced into the territory of the Atintanes, with a view to
form a well-entrenched camp in the narrow pass, where the
enemy.
427
FUmi-
Aous (Viosa) winds its way between the mountains Aeropus and Asnaus. Opposite to him encamped the Roman army reinforced by new arrivals of troops, and commanded first by the consul of the previous year, Publius Villius, and
198. then from the summer of 556 by that year's consul, Titui Quinctius Flamininus. Flamininus, a talented man just thirty years of age, belonged to the younger generation, who began to lay aside the patriotism as well as the habits of their forefathers and, though not unmindful of their father land, were still more mindful of themselves and of Hellenism. A skilful officer and a better diplomatist, he was in many respects admirably adapted for the management of the troubled affairs of Greece. Yet it would perhaps have been better both for Rome and for Greece, if the choice had fallen on one less full of Hellenic sympathies, and if the general despatched thither had been a man, who would neither have been bribed by delicate flattery nor stung by pungent sarcasm ; who would not amidst literary and artistic
reminiscences have overlooked the pitiful condition of the constitutions of the Hellenic states ; and who, while treating Hellas according to its deserts, would have spared the Romans the trouble of striving after unattainable ideals.
The new commander-in-chief immediately had a con ference with the king, while the two armies lay face to face inactive. Philip made proposals of peace; he offered to restore all his own conquests, and to submit to an equitable arbitration regarding the damage inflicted on the Greek cities; but the negotiations broke down, when he was asked to give up ancient possessions of Macedonia and
428
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
For forty days the two armies lay in the narrow pass of the Aous ; Philip would not retire, and Flamininus could not make up his mind whether he should order an assault, or leave the king alone and reattempt the expedition of the previous year. At length the Roman general was helped out of his perplexity by the
particularly Thessaly.
chap, nil THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
429
treachery of some men of rank among the Epirots — who
were otherwise well disposed to Macedonia —and especially
of Charops. They conducted a Roman corps of 4000
infantry and 300 cavalry by mountain paths to the heights
above the Macedonian camp ; and, when the consul
attacked the enemy's army in front, the advance of that
Roman division, unexpectedly descending from the moun
tains commanding the position, decided the battle. Philip
lost his camp and entrenchments and nearly 2000 men,
and hastily retreated to the pass of Tempe, the gate of Macedonia proper. He gave up everything which he had Greece la held except the fortresses ; the Thessalian towns, which he ofj^*** could not defend, he himself destroyed; Pherae alone Romani. closed its gates against him and thereby escaped destruction.
The Epirots, induced partly by these successes of the Roman arms, partly by the judicious moderation of Flami- ninus, were the first to secede from the Macedonian alliance. On the first accounts of the Roman victory the Athamanes and Aetolians immediately invaded Thessaly, and the Romans soon followed; the open country was easily overrun, but the strong towns, which were friendly to Macedonia and received support from Philip, fell only after a brave resistance or withstood even the superior foe— especially Atrax on the left bank of the Peneius, where the phalanx stood in the breach as a substitute for the wall.
Except these Thessalian fortresses and the territory of the faithful Acarnanians, all northern Greece was thus in the hands of the coalition.
The south, on the other hand, was still in the main retained under the power of Macedonia by the fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth, which maintained communication with each other through the territory of the Boeotians who were friendly to the Macedonians, and by the Achaean neutrality ; and as it was too late to advance into Macedonia this year, Flamininus resolved to direct his land army and
Philip
SfJ0 Tempe.
The
fleet in the first place against Corinth and the Achaeans. The fleet, which had again been joined by the Rhodian and Pergamene ships, had hitherto been employed in the capture and pillage of two of the smaller towns in Euboea, Eretria and Carystus ; both however, as well as Oreus, were thereafter abandoned, and reoccupied by Philocles the Macedonian commandant of Chalcis. The united fleet proceeded thence to Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, to threaten that strong fortress. On the other side Flami- ninus advanced into Phocis and occupied the country, in which Elatea alone sustained a somewhat protracted siege : this district, and Anticyra in particular on the Corinthian gulf, were chosen as winter quarters. The Achaeans, who thus saw on the one hand the Roman legions approaching and on the other the Roman fleet already on their own coast, abandoned their morally honourable, but politically untenable, neutrality. After the deputies from the towns most closely attached to Macedonia—Dyme, Megalopolis, and Argos —had left the diet, it resolved to join the coali tion against Philip. Cycliades and other leaders of the Macedonian party went into exile; the troops of the Achaeans immediately united with the Roman fleet and hastened to invest Corinth by land, which city — the strong hold of Philip against the Achaeans —had been guaranteed to them on the part of Rome in return for their joining the coalition. Not only, however, did the Macedonian garrison, which was 1300 strong and consisted chiefly of Italian deserters, defend with determination the almost impregnable
city, but Philocles also arrived from Chalcis with a division of 1500 men, which not only relieved Corinth but also invaded the territory of the Achaeans and, in concert with the citizens who were favourable to Macedonia, wrested from them Argos. But the recompense of such devotedness was, that the king delivered over the faithful Argives to the reign of terror of Nabis of Sparta. Philip hoped, after the
enter into alliance
Rome.
43©
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
CHAP, viil THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
431
accession of the Achaeans to the Roman coalition, to gain over Nabis who had hitherto been the ally of the Romans;
for his chief reason for joining the Roman alliance had been that he was opposed to the Achaeans and since 550 204. was even at open war with them. But the affairs of Philip were in too desperate a condition for any one to feel satisfaction in joining his side now. Nabis indeed accepted Argos from Philip, but he betrayed the traitor and remained
in alliance with Flamininus, who, in his perplexity at being now allied with two powers that were at war with each other, had in the meantime arranged an armistice of four months between the Spartans and Achaeans.
Thus winter came on ; and Philip once more availed Vain himself of it to obtain if possible an equitable peace. At a^J£j,,t° a conference held at Nicaea on the Maliac gulf the king peace, appeared in person, and endeavoured to come to an under
standing with Flamininus. With haughty politeness he
repelled the forward insolence of the petty chiefs, and by
marked deference to the Romans, as the only antagonists
on an equality with him, he sought to obtain from them
tolerable terms. Flamininus was sufficiently refined to feel
himself flattered by the urbanity of the vanquished prince
towards himself and his arrogance towards the allies, whom
the Roman as well as the king had learned to despise;
but his powers were not ample enough to meet the king's
wishes. He granted him a two months' armistice in return
for the evacuation of Phocis and Locris, and referred him,
as to the main matter, to his government. The Roman
senate had long been at one in the opinion that Macedonia
must give up all her possessions abroad ; accordingly, when
the ambassadors of Philip appeared in Rome, they were
simply asked whether they had full powers to renounce all
Greece and in particular Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias,
and when they said that they had not, the negotiations were immediately broken off, and it was resolved that the war
Thessaiy.
who were besieged in Leucas ; in Greece proper he became by stratagem master of Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, in consequence of which the Boeotians were compelled to join at least nominally the alliance against Macedonia. Content with having thus interrupted the communication between Corinth and Chalcis, he proceeded to the north, where alone a decisive blow could be struck. The great difficulties of provisioning the army in a hostile and for the most part desolate country, which had often hampered its operations, were now to be obviated by the fleet accompany ing the army along the coast and carrying after it supplies sent from Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. The decisive blow came, however, earlier than Flamininus had hoped. Philip, impatient and confident as he was, could not endure to await the enemy on the Macedonian frontier : after assem bling his army at Dium, he advanced through the pass of Tempe into Thessaly, and encountered the army of the enemy advancing to meet him in the district of Scotussa.
197.
432
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
should be prosecuted with vigour. With the help of the tribunes of the people, the senate succeeded in preventing
a change in the chief command —which had often
so injurious —and in prolonging the command of Flami- ninus ; he obtained considerable reinforcements, and the two former commanders-in-chief, Publius Galba and Publius Villius, were instructed to place themselves at his disposal. Philip resolved once more to risk a pitched battle. To secure Greece, where all the states except the Acarnanians and Boeotians were now in arms against him, the garrison of Corinth was augmented to 6000 men, while he himself, straining the last energies of exhausted Macedonia and enrolling children and old men in the ranks of the phalanx, brought into the field an army of about 26,000 men, of whom 16,000 were Macedonian phalangitae.
Thus the fourth campaign, that of 557, began. Flamini-
anjo^dsto nus despatched a part of the fleet against the Acarnanians,
proved
chap, via THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
433
The Macedonian and Roman armies — the latter of Battle of which had been reinforced by contingents of the Apolloni- SjjJT*" ates and the Athamanes, by the Cretans sent by Nabis, and especially by a strong band of Aetolians —contained nearly
equal numbers of combatants, each about 26,000 men ;
the Romans, however, had the superiority in cavalry. In
front of Scotussa, on the plateau of the Karadagh, during
a gloomy day of rain, the Roman vanguard unexpectedly encountered that of the enemy, which occupied a high and
steep hill named Cynoscephalae, that lay between the two
camps. Driven back into the plain, the Romans were reinforced from the camp by the light troops and the excellent corps of Aetolian cavalry, and now in turn forced
the Macedonian vanguard back upon and over the height
But here the Macedonians again found support in their
whole cavalry and the larger portion of their light infantry ;
the Romans, who had ventured forward imprudently, were pursued with great loss almost to their camp, and would
have wholly taken to flight, had not the Aetolian horsemen prolonged the combat in the plain until Flamininus brought
up his rapidly -arranged legions. The king yielded to the impetuous cry of his victorious troops demanding the continuance of the conflict, and hastily drew up his heavy-
armed soldiers for the battle, which neither general nor
soldiers had expected on that day. It was important to
occupy the hill, which for the moment was quite denuded
of troops. The right wing of the phalanx, led by the king
in person, arrived early enough to form without trouble in
battle order on the height ; the left had not yet come up,
when the light troops of the Macedonians, put to flight by
the legions, rushed up the hill. Philip quickly pushed the
crowd of fugitives past the phalanx into the middle division,
and, without waiting till Nicanor had arrived on the left
wing with the other half of the phalanx which followed
more slowly, he ordered the right phalanx to couch their
vol. 11 60
434
THE EASTERN STATES AND book III
spears and to charge down the hill on the legions, and the rearranged light infantry simultaneously to turn them and fall upon them in flank. The attack of the phalanx, irresistible on so favourable ground, shattered the Roman infantry, and the left wing of the Romans was completely beaten. Nicanor on the other wing, when he saw the king give the attack, ordered the other half of the phalanx to advance in all haste ; by this movement it was thrown into confusion, and while the first ranks were already rapidly following the victorious right wing down the hill, and were still more thrown into disorder by the inequality of the ground, the last files were just gaining the height The right wing of the Romans under these circumstances soon overcame the enemy's left ; the elephants alone, stationed upon this wing, annihilated the broken Macedonian ranks. While a fearful slaughter was taking place at this point, a resolute Roman officer collected twenty companies, and with these threw himself on the victorious Macedonian wing, which had advanced so far in pursuit of the Roman left that the Roman right came to be in its rear. Against an attack from behind the phalanx was defenceless, and this movement ended the battle. From the complete breaking up of the two phalanxes we may well believe that the Macedonian loss amounted to 13,000, partly prisoners,
partly fallen — but chiefly the latter, because the Roman soldiers were not acquainted with the Macedonian sign of surrender, the raising of the sarissae. The loss of the victors was slight Philip escaped to Larissa, and, after burning all his papers that nobody might be compromised, evacuated Thessaly and returned home.
Simultaneously with this great defeat, the Macedonians suffered other discomfitures at all the points which they still occupied ; in Caria the Rhodian mercenaries defeated the Macedonian corps stationed there and compelled it to shut
itself up in Stratonicea; the Corinthian garrison was
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
435
defeated by Nicostratus and his Achaeans with severe loss, and Leucas in Acarnania was taken by assault after a heroic resistance. Philip was completely vanquished ; his last allies, the Acarnanians, yielded on the news of the battle of Cynoscephalae.
It was completely in the power of the Romans to dictate Preiiml- peace ; they used their power without abusing The em- nanes °* pire of Alexander might be annihilated at conference of
the allies this desire was expressly put forward by the Aetolians. But what else would this mean, than to demolish the rampart protecting Hellenic culture from the Thracians and Celts Already during the war just ended
the flourishing Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese had
been totally destroyed by the Thracians— serious warning
for the future. Flamininus, who had clearly perceived the
bitter animosities subsisting among the Greek states, could
never consent that the great Roman power should be the executioner for the grudges of the Aetolian confederacy,
even his Hellenic sympathies had not been as much won
the polished and chivalrous king as his Roman national feeling was offended by the boastings of the Aetolians, the "victors of Cynoscephalae," as they called themselves. He replied to the Aetolians that was not the custom of Rome to annihilate the vanquished, and that, besides, they were their own masters and were at liberty to put an end to Macedonia, they could. The king was treated with all possible deference, and, on his declaring himself ready now to entertain the demands formerly made, an armistice for considerable term was agreed to Flamininus in return for the payment of sum of money and the furnishing of host ages, among whom was the king's son Demetrius, —an armistice which Philip greatly needed in order to expel the Dardani out of Macedonia.
The final regulation of the complicated affairs of Greece Peace with was entrusted the senate to commission of ten persons, TMIacc"
by
if a
a
by
it
a
by
if
a
a
it.
?
;
Greece free.
the head and soul of which was Flamininus. Philip obtained from it terms similar to those laid down for Carthage. He lost all his foreign possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and in the islands of the Aegean Sea ; while he re tained Macedonia proper undiminished, with the exception of some unimportant tracts on the frontier and the province of Orestis, which was declared free—a stipulation which Philip felt very keenly, but which the Romans could not avoid prescribing, for with his character it was impossible to leave him free to dispose of subjects who had once revolted from their allegiance. Macedonia was further bound not to conclude any foreign alliances without the previous knowledge of Rome, and not to send garrisons abroad ; she was bound, moreover, not to make war out of Macedonia against civilized states or against any allies of Rome at all ; and she was not to maintain any army exceed ing 5000 men, any elephants, or more than five decked ships — the rest were to be given up to the Romans. Lastly, Philip entered into symmachy with the Romans, which obliged him to send a contingent when requested ; indeed, Macedonian troops immediately afterwards fought side by side with the legions. Moreover, he paid a contribution of
1000 talents (,£244,000).
After Macedonia had thus been reduced to complete
political nullity and was left in possession of only as much power as was needful to guard the frontier of Hellas against the barbarians, steps were taken to dispose of the possessions ceded by the king. The Romans, who just at that time
were learning by experience in Spain that transmarine provinces were a very dubious gain, and who had by no means begun the war with a view to the acquisition of territory, took none of the spoil for themselves, and thus compelled their allies also to moderation. They resolved to Jeclare all the states of Greece, which had previously been under fnli^ free : and Flamininus was commissioned
436
THE EASTERN STATES AND book III
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
437
to read the decree to that effect to the Greeks assembled
at the Isthmian games (558). Thoughtful men doubtless 191 might ask whether freedom was a blessing capable of being
thus bestowed, and what was the value of freedom to a nation apart from union and unity ; but the rejoicing was great and sincere, as the intention of the senate was sincere
in conferring the freedom. 1
The only exceptions to this general rule were, the Illyrian Scodra. provinces eastward of Epidamnus, which fell to Pleuratus
the ruler of Scodra, and rendered that state of robbers and pirates, which a century before had been humbled by the Romans 218), once more one of the most powerful of
the petty principalities in those regions some townships in western Thessaly, which Amynander had occupied and was allowed to retain and the three islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, which were presented to Athens in return for her many hardships and her still more numerous addresses of thanks and courtesies of all sorts. The Rhodians, of course, retained their Carian possessions, and the Pergamenes retained Aegina. The remaining allies were only indirectly rewarded by the accession of the
cities to the several confederacies. The The Achaeans were the best treated, although they were the \aigail.
latest joining the coalition against Philip apparently enlarged, for the honourable reason, that this federation was the best
newly-liberated
and most respectable of all the Greek states.
All the possessions of Philip in the Peloponnesus and on
the Isthmus, and consequently Corinth in particular, were incorporated with their league. With the Aetolians on the The
rt
organized
other hand the Romans used little ceremony they were allowed to receive the towns of Phocis and Locris into their symmachy, but their attempts to extend also to
There are still extant gold staters, with the head of Flamininus and the inscription " T. Quincti(us)," struck in Greece under the government of the liberator of the Hellenes. The use of the Latin language signifi cant compliment.
is a
it
1
;
;
in
;
;
(p.
War
Acarnania and Thessaly were in part decidedly rejected, in part postponed, and the Thessalian cities were organized into four small independent confederacies. The Rhodian city-league reaped the benefit of the liberation of Thasos, Lemnos, and the towns of Thrace and Asia Minor.
The regulation of the affairs of the Greek states, as respected both their mutual relations and their internal condition, was attended with difficulty. The most urgent matter was the war which had been carried on between
ffb"5' f Sparta.
438
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
804. the Spartans and Achaeans since 550, in which the duty of mediating necessarily fell to the Romans. But after various attempts to induce Nabis to yield, and particularly to give up the city of Argos belonging to the Achaean league, which Philip had surrendered to him, no course at last was left to Flamininus but to have war declared against the obstinate
petty robber-chieftain, who reckoned on the well-known grudge of the Aetolians against the Romans and on the
advance of Antiochus into Europe, and
refused to restore Argos. War was declared, accordingly, by all the Hellenes at a great diet in Corinth, and Flami ninus advanced into the Peloponnesus accompanied by the fleet and the Romano-allied army, which included a con tingent sent by Philip and a division of Lacedaemonian emigrants under Agesipolis, the legitimate king of Sparta
195. (559). In order to crush his antagonist immediately by an overwhelming superiority of force, no less than 50,000 men were brought into the field, and, the other towns being disregarded, the capital itself was at once invested ; but the desired result was not attained. Nabis had sent into the field a considerable army amounting to 15,000 men, of whom 5000 were mercenaries, and he had confirmed his rule afresh by a complete reign of terror—by the execution en masse of the officers and inhabitants of the country whom he suspected. Even when he himself after the first successes of the Roman army and fleet resolved to yield
pertinaciously
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
439
and to accept the comparatively favourable terms of peace proposed by Flamininus, " the people," that is to say the gang of robbers whom Nabis had domiciled in Sparta, not without reason apprehensive of a reckoning after the victory, and deceived by an accompaniment of lies as to the nature of the terms of peace and as to the advance of the Aetoli- ans and Asiatics, rejected the peace offered by the Roman general, so that the struggle began anew. A battle took place in front of the walls and an assault was made upon them ; they were already scaled by the Romans, when the setting on fire of the captured streets compelled the assail ants to retire.
At last the obstinate resistance came to an end. Sparta Settlement
retained its independence and was neither compelled to receive back the emigrants nor to join the Achaean league ; even the existing monarchical constitution, and Nabis himself, were left intact On the other hand Nabis had to cede his foreign possessions, Argos, Messene, the Cretan cities, and the whole coast besides; to bind himself neither to conclude foreign alliances, nor to wage war, nor to keep any other vessels than two open boats ; and lastly to disgorge all his plunder, to give to the Romans hostages, and to pay to them a war-contribution. The towns on the Laconian coast were given to the Spartan emigrants, and this new community, who named themselves the "free Laconians" in contrast to the monarchically governed Spartans, were directed to enter the Achaean league. The emigrants did not receive back their property, as the district assigned to them was regarded as a compensation for it ; it was stipulated, on the other hand, that their wives and children should not be detained in Sparta against their will. The Achaeans, although by this arrangement they gained the accession of the free Laconians as well as Argos, were yet far from content; they had expected that the dreaded and hated Nabis would be superseded, that the
jjajnTM^
Final oKJrrec"
440
THE EASTERN STATES AND book iii
emigrants would be brought back, and that the Achaean symmachy would be extended to the whole Peloponnesus. Unprejudiced persons, however, will not fail to see that Flamininus managed these difficult affairs as fairly and justly as it was possible to manage them where two political parties, both chargeable with unfairness and injustice, stood opposed to each other. With the old and deep
between the Spartans and Achaeans, the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean league would
have been equivalent to subjecting Sparta to the Achaeans, a course no less contrary to equity than to prudence. The restitution of the emigrants, and the complete restora tion of a government that had been set aside for twenty years, would only have substituted one reign of terror for another; the expedient adopted by Flamininus was the right one, just because it failed to satisfy either of the extreme parties. At length thorough provision appeared to be made that the Spartan system of robbery by sea and land should cease, and that the government there, such as it was, should prove troublesome only to its own subjects.
It is possible that Flamininus, who knew Nabis and could
not but be aware how desirable it was that he should
personally be superseded, omitted to take such a step from the mere desire to have done with the matter and not to mar the clear impression of his successes by complications that might be prolonged beyond all calculation; it is possible, moreover, that he sought to preserve Sparta as a counterpoise to the power of the Achaean confederacy in the Peloponnesus. But the former objection relates to a point of secondary importance ; and as to the latter view, it is far from probable that the Romans condescended to fear the Achaeans.
Peace was thus established, externally at least, among the Pettv Greek states. But the internal condition of the several communities also furnished employment to the
hostility subsisting
chap, via THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
441
Roman arbiter. The Boeotians openly displayed their Macedonian tendencies, even after the expulsion of the Macedonians from Greece ; after Flamininus had at their request allowed their countrymen who were in the service of Philip to return home, Brachyllas, the most decided partisan of Macedonia, was elected to the presidency of the Boeotian confederacy, and Flamininus was otherwise irritated in every way. He bore it with unparalleled patience ; but the Boeotians friendly to Rome, who knew what awaited them after the departure of the Romans, determined to put Brachyllas to death, and Flamininus, whose permission they deemed it necessary to ask, at least did not forbid them. Brachyllas was accordingly killed ;
which the Boeotians were not only content with prosecuting the murderers, but lay in wait for the Roman soldiers passing singly or in small parties through their territories, and killed about 500 of them. This was too much to be endured ; Flamininus imposed on them a fine of a talent for every soldier ; and when they did not pay
he collected the nearest troops and besieged Coronea
Now they betook themselves to entreaty; Flamini- It* nus reality desisted on the intercession of the Achaeans
and Athenians, exacting but very moderate fine from those who were guilty and although the Macedonian party remained continuously at the helm in the petty province, the Romans met their puerile opposition simply
with the forbearance of superior power. In the rest of Greece Flamininus contented himself with exerting his influence, so far as he could do so without violence, over
the internal affairs especially of the newly-freed com munities with placing the council and the courts the hands of the more wealthy and bringing the anti- Macedonian party to the helm and with attaching as
much as possible the civic commonwealths to the Roman interest, by adding everything, which in each community
upon
(558).
;
;
in
;
a
in
it,
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should have fallen by martial law to the Romans, to the common property of the city concerned. The work was finished in the spring of 560; Flamininus once more assembled the deputies of all the Greek communities at Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use ot the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only return for the kindness of the Romans, that they would within thirty days send to him the Italian captives who had been sold into Greece during the Hannibalic war. Then he evacuated the last fortresses in which Roman
were still stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along with the smaller forts dependent upon it in Euboea, and Acrocorinthus — thus practically giving the lie to the assertion of the Aetolians that Rome had inherited from Philip the "fetters" of Greece —and departed homeward with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.
It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly sentimentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans were entirely in earnest with the liberation of Greece ; and the reason why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so sorry a structure, is to be sought only in the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic nation. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and as the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons and the unlimited right of self- government ; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation made the liberation of Greece a possibility for the Romans ; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus himself. If the Romans are liable
44*
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
garrisons
Results.
chap, vill THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
443
to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular Flamininus who overcame the well-founded scruples of the senate, were hindered by the magic charm of the Hellenic name from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character of the Greek states of that period, and so allowed yet further freedom for the doings of communities which, owing to the impotent antipathies that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations, knew neither how to act nor how to keep quiet As things stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if
not to instigate, at least to permit, a political murder, because the Romans had resolved to withdraw their troops from Greece and, consequently, could not prevent the Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their remedy in the usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with Antiochus would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but tor the military blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin — for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious
generosity.
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
CHAPTER DC
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
Antlochtn In the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidae had *TM been worn since 531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great- great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He had, like
Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years of age, and had dis played sufficient energy and enterprise, especially in his first campaigns in the east, to warrant his being without too ludi crous impropriety addressed in courtly style as " the Great" He had succeeded—more, however, through the negligence of his opponents and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular, than through any ability of his own — in restoring in some degree the integrity of the monarchy, and in reuniting with his crown first the eastern satrapies of Media and Parthyene, and then the separate state which Achaeus had founded on this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to wrest from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of which he sorely felt, had, in the year of the battle of the Trasimene lake, met with a bloody repulse from Philopator at Raphia; and Antiochus had taken good care not to resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man—even though he were but an indolent one—occupied the Egyptian
105. throne. But, after Philopator's death (549), the right moment for crushing Egypt appeared to have arrived ; with that view Antiochus entered into concert with Philip, and had thrown himself upon Coele-Syria, while Philip attacked
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
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the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed in
that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would make common cause with Philip against them — the course suggested by the position of affairs, as well as by the treaty
of alliance. But, not far-seeing enough to repel at once with all his energy any interference whatever by the Romans
in the affairs of the east, Antiochus thought that his best course was to take advantage of the subjugation of Philip by
the Romans (which might easily be foreseen), in order to secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwith standing the close relations of Rome with the court of Alexandria and her royal ward, the senate by no means intended to be in reality, what it was in name, his
" protector ; " firmly resolved to give itself no concern about Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of Hercules and the Hellespont, it allowed the great-king to take his course. He himself was not probably in earnest
with the conquest of Egypt proper—which was more easily talked of than achieved—but he contemplated the sub jugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another,
and at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and Palestine. The great victory, which he gained in 556 over 198. the Egyptian general Scopas at Mount Panium near the sources of the Jordan, not only gave him complete posses
sion of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt proper, but so alarmed the Egyptian guardians of the young king that, to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they sub mitted to a peace and sealed it by the betrothal of their ward to Cleopatra the daughter of Antiochus. When he had thus achieved his first object, he proceeded in the fol lowing year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalae, with a strong fleet of 100 decked and 100 open vessels to Asia Minor, to take possession of the districts that formerly
Difficulties Rome.
belonged to Egypt on the south and west coasts of Asia Minor—probably the Egyptian government had ceded these districts, which were de facto in the hands of Philip, to Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced all their foreign possessions in his favour — and to recover the Greeks of Asia Minor generally for his empire. At the same time a strong Syrian land-army assembled in Sardes.
This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans, w^o from the first ^ad ^d it down as a condition for Philip that he should withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and should leave to the Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory and to the free cities their former constitution unimpaired, and who had now to look on while Antiochus took posses sion of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the Rhodians found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus with precisely the same danger as had driven them a few years before into the war with Philip ; and they naturally sought to involve the Romans in this war as well as in that
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THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
199-198. which had just terminated. Already in 555—6 Attalus had requested from the Romans military aid against Antiochus, who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic Rhodians even declared to king Antiochus, when in the
197. spring of 557 his fleet appeared off the coast of Asia Minor, that they would regard its passing beyond the Chelidonian islands (off the Lycian coast) as a declaration of war ; and, when Antiochus did not regard the threat, they, emboldened
by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle at Cynoscephalae, had immediately begun the war and had
actually protected from the king the most important of the Carian cities, Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the island of Samos. Most of the half-free cities had submitted to Antiochus, but some of them, more especially the important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and Lamp- sacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
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taken courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent entreaties were combined with those of the Rhodians.
It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was at all capable of forming a resolution and adhering to had already made up his mind not only to attach to his empire the Egyptian possessions Asia, but also to make conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, not to seek on that account war with Rome, at any rate to risk The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that request of their allies, and to interfere directly Asia; but they showed little inclination to do so. They not only delayed as long as the Macedonian war lasted, and gave to Attalus nothing but the protection of diplomatic inter cession, which, we may add, proved in the first instance effective; but even after the victory, while they doubtless spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of Ptolemy and Philip ought not to be taken possession of Antiochus, and while the freedom of the Asiatic cities, Myrina, Abydus, Lampsacus,1 and Cius, figured in Roman documents, they took not the smallest step to give effect to
and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable
According to a recently discovered decree of the town of Lampsacus (Mitth. dts arch. Inst, in Athen, vi. 95) the Lampsacenes after the defeat of Philip sent envoys to the Roman senate with the request that the town might be embraced in the treaty concluded between Rome and (Philip) the king (Sirtot cvimptXriQBwim [tr reuf avrOJKOti] raft ytvotUrais 'Pwfialott rpis ti)c [fkuriXia]), which the senate, at least according to the view of the petitioners, granted to them and referred them, as regarded other matters, to Flamininus and the ten envoys. From the latter they then obtain in Corinth a guarantee of their constitution and letters to the kings. " Flamininus also gives to them similar letters of their contents we learn nothing more particular, than that in the decree the embassy is described as successful. But the senate and Flamininus had formally and positively guaranteed the autonomy and democracy of the Lampsacenes, the decree would hardly dwell so much at length on the courteous answers, which the Roman commanders, who had been appealed to on the way for their intercession with the senate, gave to the envoys. " "
Other remarkable points in this document are the brotherhood of the Lampsacenes and the Romans, certainly going back to the Trojan legend, and the mediation, invoked by the former with success, of the allies and friends of Rome, the Massiliots, who were connected with the Lampsacenes through their common mother-city Phocaea.
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;
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THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons to introduce his own. In fact, they even went so far as to submit to his landing in Europe in the spring
196. of 558 and invading the Thracian Chersonese, where he occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a considerable time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had selected as his chief place of arms and as the capital of the newly-instituted satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who was entrusted with the conduct of these affairs, sent to the king at Lysimachia envoys, who talked of the integrity of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom of all the Hellenes ; but nothing came out of it The king talked in turn of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom of Lysimachus conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, ex plained that he was employed not in making territorial acquisitions but only in preserving the integrity of his hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention of the Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in Asia Minor. With justice he could add that peace had already been concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans were thus far deprived of any formal pretext for interfering. 1 The sudden return of the king to Asia occasioned by a false report of the death of the young king of Egypt, and the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the confer ences without coming to any conclusion, still less producing
195. any result. In the following year, 559, Antiochus returned to Lysimachia with his fleet and army reinforced, and employed himself in organizing the new satrapy which he
1 The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of the 198. Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in con
nection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. Syr. 3, and with the 193. actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond a doubt that the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt was in this case
formally uncalled for.
chap, xi THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
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destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had been obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus;
and the singularly honourable reception accorded to the exile was virtually a declaration of war against Rome. Nevertheless Flamininus in the spring of 560 withdrew all 194. the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was under the existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not a criminal acting in opposition to his own better knowledge ;
for we cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to carry home with him the undiminished glory of having wholly terminated the war and liberated Hellas, contented himself with superficially covering up for the moment the smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced any attempt to bring Greece directly under the dominion of the Romans, and any intervention of the Romans in Asiatic affairs, to be a political blunder ; but the opposition fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance of the Asiatic king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of the bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the west in arms against Rome —all these were clear signs of
the approach of a fresh rising in arms on the part of the Hellenic east, which could not but have for its aim at least to transfer Greece from the clientship of Rome to that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if this object should be attained, would immediately extend the circle of its operations. It is plain that Rome could not allow this to take place. When Flamininus, ignoring all these sure indications of war, withdrew the garrisons from Greece,
and yet at the same time made demands on the king of Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to support, he overdid his part in words as much as *»» fell short in action, and forgot his duty as a general and aa a citizen in the indulgence of his personal vanity — a
vanity, which wished to confer, and imagined that it had vol. 11 61
Prepara tions of Antiochos for war with Rome.
198.
conferred, peace on Rome and freedom on the Greeks of both continents.
Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strength ening his position at home and his relations with his neighbours before beginning the war, on which for his part he was resolved, and became all the more so, the more the enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now (561) gave his daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage to the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time promised to restore the provinces wrested from his son-in- law, was afterwards affirmed on the part of Egypt, but probably without warrant ; at any rate the land remained actually attached to the Syrian kingdom. 1 He offered to
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THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
197. restore to Eumenes, who had in 557 succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from him, and to give him also one of his daughters in marriage, if he would abandon the Roman alliance. In like manner he bestowed a daughter on Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gained the Galatians by presents, while he reduced by arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt, and other small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king declared that he would permit the independence of the old free cities such as Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would be content in the case of the others with a mere formal recognition of his sovereignty ; he even gave them to under stand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on the Aetolians, and he hoped to induce Philip again to take
1 For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. 1), which the sequel of the history of Judaea completely confirms ; Eusebius (p. 117, Mai) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly find
187. that about 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at Alex andria (Joseph, xii. 4, 7) ; but this doubtless took place without detriment to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of Cleopatra con stituted a charge on those revenues ; and from this very circumstance presumably arose the subsequent dispute.
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
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up arms. In fact, a plan of Hannibal obtained the royal approval, according to which he was to receive from Antiochus a fleet of 100 sail and a land army of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was to employ them in kindling first a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a second Hannibalic war in Italy ; Tyrian emissaries pro ceeded to Carthage to pave the way for a rising in arms there 380). Finally, good results were anticipated from the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal left Carthage, was at its height (p.