Cape- sius, Die
Metaphysik
Herbart's (Leips.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
's Leben in Briefen, ed.
by Plitt, Leips.
1869 f. ; Caroline, Britfe, etc. , ed. by G. Waitz, Leips. 1871. Schelling's devel opment as philosopher and author falls into five periods: (1) Philosophy of Nature, ldeen zu einer Philos. der Xatur, 1797 ; Von der Wellseelc, 1798 ;
Setter Kntteurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799; (2) vKsthetic Ideal ism, Der transcendeutale Idealismus, 1800 ; Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophic der Kunst ; (3) Absolute Idealism, Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophic, 1801 ; Bruno, oder Sber das naturliche und gSttliche Prineip der Dinge, 1802 ;
Vorleiungen iiber die Methode des akademischen Studiums, 1803; (4) his Doctrine of Freedom, Philosophic und Beligion, 1804 ; Vntcrsuchungen iiber das Wescn der menschlichen Freiheit, 1809 ; Denkmal der Schrtfl Jacob? s von den gottliehen Dinge*, 1812 ; (6) Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, Lecture* in Part II. of the writings; Collected works, 14 vols. , Stuttg. and Augsb. 1866-1861 ; [J. Watson, Schelling's Transcendental Idealism, Chicago,
Griggs series].
Among the thinkers who stood in close relation to Schelling may be noticed,
of the Romantic School, Fr. Schlegel (m2-1829 ; Characteristics and Criti cisms in the " Athenseum," 1799 f. ; Lurinde, 1799 ; Philosophical Lectures, in the years 1804-6, ed. by Windischmann, 1836 f. ; Complete writings, 16 vols. , Vienna, 1846 [Eng. tr. of the Philosophy of History and of the Philosophy of Life and of Language in Bohn Library]) and Novalia (Fr. v. Hardenberg, 1772-1801), also K. W. F. Bolger (1780-1819; Erwin, 1816; Philosophische Gesprache, 1817 ; Vorlesungen iiber sEsthetik, ed. by Heyse, 1829) ; further, Lor. Oken (1779-1851; Lehrbuch der Xaturphilosophie, Jena, 1809; cf. A. Ecker, L. O. , Stuttgart, 1880) ; U. Bteffens (1773-1846; a Norwegian, Grund- suye der philosophic hen Naturmissenschaft, 1806), U. II. Schubert
(1780- 18«IO; Akndungen einer allg. Oeschichte des Lebens, 1800 f. ), Franz Baader
(17(16-1841; Permenta Cognitionis, 1822 ff. ; Speculative Dogmatik, 1827 ff. Complete writings with a biography ed. by Fr. Hoffmann, Leips. 1861 ff. ) ; and Anally, K. Chr. Fr. Krauae (1781-1832 ; Entaurf des Systems der Philoso
phic, 1804 ; Urbild der Menschheit, 1811 ; Abriss des Systems der Philosophic, 1836 ; Vorlesungen iiber das System der Philosophic, 1828. Some years since an inexhaustible body of material has appeared from his literary remains, ed. by P. Hohlfeld and A. Wlinsche. Cf. R. Eucken, Zur Erinnerung an K. , I^eips.
1881).
Oeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Schelling's older friend, was born, 1770, in Stuttgart, studied in Tubingen, was a private teacher in Berne and Frank fort, and began, in 1801, his activity as a teacher in Jena, where, in 1805, he became Professor Extraordinary. After 1806 he became editor of a review in Bamberg, and in 1808 Gymnasium Director in Nuremberg. In 1810 lie went as Professor to Heidelberg ; in 1818 from there to Berlin, where he worked until his death in 1831 as the head of a school which extended with greater and greater brilliancy. Besides the articles published in the Kritische Journal der Philosophic, which he edited in connection with Schelling, he published Phiino- menologie des tlcistes (1807) [tr. of cha. 1. 2, and 3 in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vol. IL; tr. in prep, by J. Royce, Holt * Co. , N. Y. I; Wissenschaft der l. oyik (1812 ff. ) (tr. of Vol. II. by W. T. Harris, UegeVs Doctrine of Reflection]; Encyclopedic der philosophisc. hen Wisscnschaftcn (1817) [of this the Logic is trans, with Prolegomena by W. Wallace. Clar. Press, 1874, 2d ed. , in 2 vols. , 18W2] ; Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rccht's (1821). After 1827 the Jahr- barker fir urissenschaftliche Kritik was the organ of his school. His works, including his lectures edited by his students, were published in 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832 ff. ) [trans, of the Philosophy of History, by J. Sibree, Bohn Library ; of the Introd. to Phil, of Art, by B. Bosanquet (Lond. 1880) ; of the Phil, of Art, abr. by W. Hastie (Edin. ), and of the second part of the same in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. V. -XII1. ; of the History of Philosophy, by E. S. Haldane, In 3 vols. ,
572 German : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
Vol. I. (Lond. 1892) ; of the Phil, of Religion and of the State, in part in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. XV. -XXI. ]. From the very extensive literature we may name C. Rosenkranz, HSs Leben (Berlin, 1844), and H. als deutseher National-
philosoph (Berlin, 1870) [part, trans. G. S. Hall, St. Louis, 1876] ; R. Hayni,
J. Klaiber, Holderlin, Schelling und Hegel in ihren schwabischen Jugendjahren (Stuttgart,
//. und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857) ; K. Kostlin, H. (Tubingen, 1870) ;
1877) [The Secret of Hegel, by J. H. Stirling (Lond. 1805), 2 vols. ; Hegel, by E. Caird (Edin. and "Lond. 1883) ; Heyelianism and Personality, by Seth (Edin. and Lond. , 2d ed. , 1898) ; Critical Expositions in Griggs series (Chicago) ; of the ^Esthetics, by J. S. Kedney (1885) ; of the Philosophy of the State and of History, by G. S. Morris (1887) ; and of the Logic, by W. T. Harris (1890)'; numerous articles in the Jour. Spec. Phil, cited in last-named work].
Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, born, 1768, in Breslau, educated at the Herrnhuter educational institutions in Niesky and Barby, and at the University of Halle, after private positions took a vicarship in Landsberg, and in 1796 began his duties as preacher at the Berlin Charitfe. In 1802 he went as court preacher to Stolpe ; in 1804 as Professor Extraordinary to Halle ; in 1806 returned to Berlin, where in 1809 he became preacher at the Dreifaltigkeits- kirche ; and in 1810 Professor at the University. He acquitted himself well in both offices, occupying at the time a successful position in the ecclesiastical movement (Union) until his death in 1834. His philosophical writings form the third part of his works collected after his death (Berlin, 1835 ff. ). They contain his lectures on Dialectic, ^Esthetic, etc. ; among his writings are to be mentioned : Beden ube. rdie Religion an die Gfebildeten unter ihren Verdchtern (1799) ; Monologen (1800) ; GrundMnUn einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre
The most important work, the Ethik, is given in the coll. works, in the edition by Al. Schweizer; it is also published in an edition by A. Twesten (Berlin, 1841). — Cf. Aus Sch. 's Leben in Briefen, ed. by L Jonas and W. Dil- they, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1868-1863) ; W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher's, Vol. I.
(1803).
(Berlin, 1870) [art. S. in Enc. Brit. , J. F. Smith].
Johann Friedrich Herbart, born, 1776, at Oldenburg, educated there and at the Jena University, for a time private teacher in Berne and acquainted with Pestalozzi, became in 1802 Privatdocent in Gottingen, was from 1809 to 183:1 Professor in Konigsberg, and then returned to Gottingen as Professor, where he died, 1841. His main writings are: Hauptpunkte der Afetaphysik (1806); Allgemeine praktische Philosophic (1808) ; Einleitnng in die Philosophic (1813) : Lehrbuch ztir Psycholoyie (1816) [Eng. tr. by M. K. Smith, N. Y. 1891] ; Psycho logic als Wissenschaft (1824 f. ). Complete edition by G. Hartenstein, 12 vols. (Leips. 1850 ff. ) ; in process of appearance, ed. by K. Kehrbach, since 1882. The pedagogical writings have been edited by O. Willmann in 2 vols. (Leips. 1873 and 1876). Cf. G. Hartenstein, Die Problems und Grundlehren der allgemeinen Afetaphysik (Leips. 1836) ; J. Kaftan, Sollen und Sein (Leips. 1872) ; J.
Cape- sius, Die Metaphysik Herbart's (Leips. 1878) [Ward, art. Herbart, in Enc
Brit. ].
Arthur Schopenhauer, born 1788 in Danzic, passed over somewhat late to philosophical life, studied in Gottingen and Berlin, received his degree in 1813 at Jena with his treatise on the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficirnt Reason, lived for a time at Weimar and Dresden, habilitated as Privatdocent in Berlin in 1820, but withdrew after he had won no success in a work as teacher which was frequently interrupted by journeys, and spent the rest of his life in private, after 1831, in Frankfort on the Main, where he died In 1880. His main work is Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819 [The World at
Will and as Idea, tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, Lond. and Boston, 3 vols. , 1884-86]. To this were attached Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 1836; Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841 ; finally, Parerga und Paralipomena.
1851. Complete edition in 6 vols. (Leips. 1873 f. ), and since then frequently edited. [Tr. of the Fourfold Root and of On the Will in Nature, by K. Hille- brand, Bohn Library, 2d ed. , 1891 ; of selected essays by Bax, Bohn Library, also by T. B. Saunders, 5 vols. , Lond. and N. Y. , 3d ed. , 1892. ] Cf. W. Gwinner, Sch. 's Leben, 2d ed. (Leips. 1878) ; J. Frauenstadt, Briefe iiber die ScK'scht
Chap. 2, § 41. ] Thing-in-Ittelf : Jacobi. 573
Philosophic (Leips. 1864) ; R. Seydel, Sch. 's System (Leips. 1867) ; A. Haym. A. Seh. (Berlin, 1864) ; G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauungcn Leibniz1 und Schopenhauer's (Leips. 1872) [H. Zimmern, Schopenhauer, His Life and Phil. , Lond. 1876 ;
J. Sully, Pessimism, 2d ed. , Lond. 1801
By the side of the main metaphysical development runs a psychological
aide-line, a series of schools which, in an eclectic way, frequently approached the doctrines of the great systems by the path of the psychological method. Such is the relation to Kant and Jacobi of J. Fr. Fries (1773-1843 ; Beinhold, Fiehte und Schelling, 1803 ; Wissen, Olaube und Ahndung, 1806 ; Neue Kritik der Vernunft, 1807 ; Psychische Anthropologic, 1820 f. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena, Acad. Address, Stuttg. 1862), — to Kant and Fiehte of Willi. Traug. Krug (1770-1842 ; Organon der Philosophic 1801 ;
§ 41. The Thing-in-Itielf.
The compelling power which Kant's philosophy gained over the minds and hearts of men was due chiefly to the earnestness and greatness of its ethical conception of the world ; ' the progress of thought, however, attached itself primarily to the new form which had been given to the principles of the theory of knowledge in the Critique of the Pure Reason. Kant took the antithesis of phenom ena and uoumena from earlier philosophy ; but by his transcen
dental analytic he widened the realm of phenomena to include the whole compass of human knowledge, and the thing-in-itself survived only as a problematical conception, like a rudimentary organ, which might be indeed characteristic for the historical genesis of this theory of knowledge, but which performed no living function in it.
1. This was first seen by Jacobi, when he confessed that without the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian system, and with the same could not remain in it ; * for the concep tion of the sensibility introduced at the beginning involves the causal relation of being affected by things-in-themselves, —a rela tion which, according to the doctrine of the analytic that categories must not be applied to things-in-themselves, it is forbidden to think. In this contradiction of professing to think things-in-themselves
and yet of not being jwrmitted to think thein, the whole critique of the reason moves ; and at the same time this contradictory assump tion does not at all help to guarantee to our knowledge of phe nomena even the slightest relation to truth. For, according to Kant, the mind presents to itself in thought " neither itself nor
1 This is especially to be recognised from Reinhold's Bnefen Uber die kant. Ph.
Handworterbufh der philos. Wisscnschaftcn, 1827 ff. ), — to Fiehte and Schelling of Fried. Bouterwek (1766-1828; Apodiktik, 1790; uEsthetik, 1806), —and Anally, to Herbart of Fr. Beneke (1708-1864; Psychologische Skitxen, 1826 and 1827 ; Lehrbueh der Psychologie, als Xatuncissenschaft, 1832 ; Metaphysik und Beligionsphilosophie, 1840 ; Die neue Psychologie, 1846).
;
Adamson in Mind,
1876].
» JacoW, W. , II. 304.
574 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
other things, but solely and alone that which is neither what the mind is itself, nor what other things are. " * The faculty of cogni tion hovers between a problematical X of the subject and an equally problematical X of the object. The sensibility has nothing behind
and the understanding nothing before it; "in a twofold en chanter's smoke, called space and time, rise the ghostly forms of phenomena or appearances in which nothing appears. " If we assume things, Kant teaches that knowledge has not the least to do with them. The critical reason reason busy about pure noth ing, i. e. only about itself. If, therefore, criticism will not fall into nihilism or absolute scepticism, the transcendental idealist must have the courage to assert the " strongest " idealism he must declare that only phenomena are.
^— In the claim that what Kant calls the object of knowledge in truth " nothing," inheres as presupposition the same naive realism, the destruction of which was the great service of the transcendental analytic and the same realism determines also the episteinology of Faith, which Jacobi opposes to "the transcendental
uncertainty," not without being entirely dependent upon All truth knowl edge of the actual but the actual asserts itself in human con
sciousness not through thought, but through feeling; just Kant's experiment proves that thought alone moves in circle out of which there no access to actuality, in an endless series of the condi tioned in which no unconditioned to be found. The fundamental law of causality may indeed be formulated in exactly this manner, viz. there nothing unconditioned. Knowledge, therefore, or thought that can be demonstrated, in its very nature, as Jacobi says, Spinozism, — doctrine of the mechanical necessity of all that finite: and the interest of science that there be no God, — indeed, God who could be known would be no God. * Even he who in his heart a Christian must be in his head heathen he who will bring into his intellect the light which in his heart quenches it. 4 But this knowledge only mediate knowing the true, immediate knowing feeling; in this we are truly one with the object," and possess as we possess ourselves in the certainty of a faith that has no proof. 7 This feeling, however, as regards its objects, of twofold kind: the reality of the sensuous reveals itself to us in perception, that of the supersensuous in the " reason. "
Allwill, XV. W. , II. 310. To Hamann,
W. , 121.
W. , in. Ill W. , III. 384. W. , II. 175.
367.
Hume's conception of belief and his distinction of impressions and ideas
(here called Vorstellungen) experience in this a noteworthy transformation.
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For this supra-natural sensualism. , therefore, " reason " signifies the immediate feeling of the reality of the supersensuous, of God, free dom, morality, and immortality. In this limitation Kant's dualism of theoretical and practical reason and of the primacy of the latter return in Jacobi,1 to be placed in the service of mystical extrava gance of feeling, which manifests itself also in the character of a style which warm and full of spirit, but rhapsodical and more given to assertion than to proof.
This same fundamental conception, brought somewhat nearer to Kant, appears with Fries. In demanding that the knowledge of the a priori forms to which the critical philosophy aspired must itself arise a posteriori, through inner experience, and therefore that Kant's
"
results must be established or set right by an " anthropological critique, he rested upon the conviction that the immediate, proper cognitions of the reason are given originally in an obscure form through the feeling,' and transformed into intellectual knowledge only by means of reflection. This Leibnizian body ends, however, in the critical tail, since the perceptional and conceptional Forms of this reflection are regarded as only an expression of the phenomenal mode in which the above original truth [as experienced in feeling] appears on the other hand, the body received a Kant-Jacobi head, when the limitation of knowledge to these phenomenal Forms had set over against the immediate relation of moral faith to things- in-themselves, while at the same time — with a decided attachment to the Critique of Judgment — the aesthetic and religious feelings had ascribed to them the significance of presage (Ahndung) that the Being which lies at the basis of phenomena just that to which the practical reason relates.
The untenability of the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself, so keenly recognised by Jacobi, became palpable to a certain extent when Reinhold in his Elementary Philosophy made the attempt to present the critical doctrine in a systematic unity. He admired Kant and adopted entirely his solutions of the individual problems, but missed in him the formulation of a simple, fundamental princi ple from which all particular insights might be deduced. Through the fulfilment of this (Cartesian) demand,' opposing private opinions would be at last replaced sby the philosophy, — Philosophy without any surname. He himself believed that he had found this principle in the principle which he supposed to be quite free from presuppo sitions, — that in consciousness every idea distinguished by the
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576 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Paht Vi.
consciousness of subject and object, and is related to both (Principle
Hence there inheres in every idea something that belongs to the subject and something that belongs to the object. From the object comes the manifold of the material, from the subject the synthetic unity of the Form. From this it follows
that neither the object in itself, nor the subject in itself, is know- able, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the two ; from this results further the opposition of the (sensuous) material impulse and of the (ethical) Form impulse; in the former the heteronomy of the dependence of the will upon things may be recognised ; in the latter the autonomy of the will directed toward the formal conformity to law.
In this crude form the Kantian School propagated the doctrine of the master ; all the fineness and profound meaning of the analytic of the "object " had become lost, and the only substitute was Rein- hold's effort to find in the " ideational faculty " ( Vorstellungsver- mbgen), or "consciousness,'* the deeper unity of all the different cognitive powers which Kant had separated from each other as Sensibility, Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. In so far the " fundamental philosophy " opposed with a positive hypothesis the objections which the sharp separation of the sensibility and the under standing in the Kantian doctrine encountered with many contempora ries. This separation presented itself in the exposition determined by the after-working of the Inaugural Dissertation (cf. p. 538, note 4), still more strongly than the spirit of the Critique of Reason required, and became at the same time still more palpable by the dualism of the practical philosophy. So the tendency was awak ened to replace the sensibility again in its rights as against Kant, and the Leibnizian doctrine of the gradual transition from the func tions of sense to those of reason proved the source of a powerful counter-current against Kant's " dissection " of the soul, — a dissec tion more apparent than serious. Hamann in his review, and ih conjunction with him, Herder in his Metakritik, urged this against the Critique of Pure Reason. Both lay chief emphasis upon lan guage as the fundamental, unitary, sensuous-intellectual work of
the reason, and seek to show how from the first " splitting apart " of sensibility and understanding all the other chasms and dualisms of the critical philosophy necessarily followed. 2
» Herder, Metakritik, 14, 1 1 1 . Works in 40 vols. , XXX VII. 333 ft. Moreover, this thought as Herder presented it in the Metakritik, a silly composition of personal irritation, was for a long time a positively impelling moment in the development. Cf . § 42.
of Consciousness). 1
1 Neue Theorie des Vorst. , pp. 201 ff.
Chap. 2, S 41. ] Thing-in-It»elf : Schulze. 577
3. The weak points in Keinhold's system could not escape the sceptics, but their attacks applied at the same time to Kant himself. They were united most effectively in Schulze's sEnesidemus. He shows that the critical method ensnares itself by setting for itself a task, the solution of which is according to its own results im possible. For if the Critique seeks the conditions which lie at the liasis of experience, these conditions are yet not themselves objects of experience (a conception which certainly corresponded better with Kant's meaning than did Fries' attempt at a psychological discovery of the a priori) : the critical method demands, therefore, that philosophical knowledge, at all events a thinking in categories, shall go beyond experience; and just this the Analytic declares impermissible. In fact, the "reason" and each of the knowing faculties, as sensibility, understanding, etc. , is a thing-in-itself, an
imperceptible ground of the empirical activities of the kind of cognition in question; and of all these things-in-theinselves and their relations to each other and to experience, the critical philoso phy — the metaphysics of knowledge — offers a very circumstantial body of information. To be sure, this information is, if closely examined, very slight ; for such a " faculty " is ultimately thought only as an unknown common cause of empirical functions, and is to be characterised only through these its workings.
" ifinesidemus " develops this criticism in connection with Rein- hold's conception of the "ideational faculty";1 he shows that we explain nothing at all, when we postulate over again the content of that which is to be explained, provided with the problematical mark "power" or "faculty. " Schulze thus turned against the " faculty theory," which was employed by the empirical psycholo gists of the Enlightenment in rather a thoughtless manner. It is only descriptively that there is any sense in comprehending like phenomena of the psychical life under one generic conception ; but to hypostatise this conception to a metaphysical power — this is a mythological treatment of psychology. With this watch-word
Herbart* extended the criticism of Schulze to the whole earlier psychological theory, and Beneke also saw in the bringing into prominence of this conception the essential progress towards a natural science of the soul ; i. e. the associational psychology. *
For Schulze, this is only one of the elements in a proof that the critical philosophy, while aiming to prove the authority of the causal conception as against Hume, professes to limit the same
1 sEnrrid. , p. 06.
'» HerbaArt, Uhrb. 13; W. , V. 8 and elaewbere. Uhrb. . z. Ptych. ,
• Beneke, . Vent rtycA. , pp. MB
578 Germany : Development of Idealism. [1*a*t VI.
to experience, and yet everywhere makes the assumption of a causal relation between experience and that which "lies at its basis. " Here, too, belongs of course the contradiction, already exhibited by Jacobi, in the conception of the thing-in-itself by which the "sensibility" is said to be affected. Every attempt of the Critique of Pare Reason to go beyond the circuit of experience,
even merely problematically, is judged in advance by itself. 1
4. The first attempt to transform the conception of the thing-u> itself, untenable in its Kantian shape, proceeded from Salomon
Maimon. He saw that the assumption of a reality to be placed outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. What is thought is in consciousness ; to think of a something outside of consciousness is as imaginary as it would be mathematics to regard the require ment V— a as a real quantity.
1869 f. ; Caroline, Britfe, etc. , ed. by G. Waitz, Leips. 1871. Schelling's devel opment as philosopher and author falls into five periods: (1) Philosophy of Nature, ldeen zu einer Philos. der Xatur, 1797 ; Von der Wellseelc, 1798 ;
Setter Kntteurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799; (2) vKsthetic Ideal ism, Der transcendeutale Idealismus, 1800 ; Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophic der Kunst ; (3) Absolute Idealism, Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophic, 1801 ; Bruno, oder Sber das naturliche und gSttliche Prineip der Dinge, 1802 ;
Vorleiungen iiber die Methode des akademischen Studiums, 1803; (4) his Doctrine of Freedom, Philosophic und Beligion, 1804 ; Vntcrsuchungen iiber das Wescn der menschlichen Freiheit, 1809 ; Denkmal der Schrtfl Jacob? s von den gottliehen Dinge*, 1812 ; (6) Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, Lecture* in Part II. of the writings; Collected works, 14 vols. , Stuttg. and Augsb. 1866-1861 ; [J. Watson, Schelling's Transcendental Idealism, Chicago,
Griggs series].
Among the thinkers who stood in close relation to Schelling may be noticed,
of the Romantic School, Fr. Schlegel (m2-1829 ; Characteristics and Criti cisms in the " Athenseum," 1799 f. ; Lurinde, 1799 ; Philosophical Lectures, in the years 1804-6, ed. by Windischmann, 1836 f. ; Complete writings, 16 vols. , Vienna, 1846 [Eng. tr. of the Philosophy of History and of the Philosophy of Life and of Language in Bohn Library]) and Novalia (Fr. v. Hardenberg, 1772-1801), also K. W. F. Bolger (1780-1819; Erwin, 1816; Philosophische Gesprache, 1817 ; Vorlesungen iiber sEsthetik, ed. by Heyse, 1829) ; further, Lor. Oken (1779-1851; Lehrbuch der Xaturphilosophie, Jena, 1809; cf. A. Ecker, L. O. , Stuttgart, 1880) ; U. Bteffens (1773-1846; a Norwegian, Grund- suye der philosophic hen Naturmissenschaft, 1806), U. II. Schubert
(1780- 18«IO; Akndungen einer allg. Oeschichte des Lebens, 1800 f. ), Franz Baader
(17(16-1841; Permenta Cognitionis, 1822 ff. ; Speculative Dogmatik, 1827 ff. Complete writings with a biography ed. by Fr. Hoffmann, Leips. 1861 ff. ) ; and Anally, K. Chr. Fr. Krauae (1781-1832 ; Entaurf des Systems der Philoso
phic, 1804 ; Urbild der Menschheit, 1811 ; Abriss des Systems der Philosophic, 1836 ; Vorlesungen iiber das System der Philosophic, 1828. Some years since an inexhaustible body of material has appeared from his literary remains, ed. by P. Hohlfeld and A. Wlinsche. Cf. R. Eucken, Zur Erinnerung an K. , I^eips.
1881).
Oeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Schelling's older friend, was born, 1770, in Stuttgart, studied in Tubingen, was a private teacher in Berne and Frank fort, and began, in 1801, his activity as a teacher in Jena, where, in 1805, he became Professor Extraordinary. After 1806 he became editor of a review in Bamberg, and in 1808 Gymnasium Director in Nuremberg. In 1810 lie went as Professor to Heidelberg ; in 1818 from there to Berlin, where he worked until his death in 1831 as the head of a school which extended with greater and greater brilliancy. Besides the articles published in the Kritische Journal der Philosophic, which he edited in connection with Schelling, he published Phiino- menologie des tlcistes (1807) [tr. of cha. 1. 2, and 3 in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vol. IL; tr. in prep, by J. Royce, Holt * Co. , N. Y. I; Wissenschaft der l. oyik (1812 ff. ) (tr. of Vol. II. by W. T. Harris, UegeVs Doctrine of Reflection]; Encyclopedic der philosophisc. hen Wisscnschaftcn (1817) [of this the Logic is trans, with Prolegomena by W. Wallace. Clar. Press, 1874, 2d ed. , in 2 vols. , 18W2] ; Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rccht's (1821). After 1827 the Jahr- barker fir urissenschaftliche Kritik was the organ of his school. His works, including his lectures edited by his students, were published in 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832 ff. ) [trans, of the Philosophy of History, by J. Sibree, Bohn Library ; of the Introd. to Phil, of Art, by B. Bosanquet (Lond. 1880) ; of the Phil, of Art, abr. by W. Hastie (Edin. ), and of the second part of the same in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. V. -XII1. ; of the History of Philosophy, by E. S. Haldane, In 3 vols. ,
572 German : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
Vol. I. (Lond. 1892) ; of the Phil, of Religion and of the State, in part in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. XV. -XXI. ]. From the very extensive literature we may name C. Rosenkranz, HSs Leben (Berlin, 1844), and H. als deutseher National-
philosoph (Berlin, 1870) [part, trans. G. S. Hall, St. Louis, 1876] ; R. Hayni,
J. Klaiber, Holderlin, Schelling und Hegel in ihren schwabischen Jugendjahren (Stuttgart,
//. und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857) ; K. Kostlin, H. (Tubingen, 1870) ;
1877) [The Secret of Hegel, by J. H. Stirling (Lond. 1805), 2 vols. ; Hegel, by E. Caird (Edin. and "Lond. 1883) ; Heyelianism and Personality, by Seth (Edin. and Lond. , 2d ed. , 1898) ; Critical Expositions in Griggs series (Chicago) ; of the ^Esthetics, by J. S. Kedney (1885) ; of the Philosophy of the State and of History, by G. S. Morris (1887) ; and of the Logic, by W. T. Harris (1890)'; numerous articles in the Jour. Spec. Phil, cited in last-named work].
Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, born, 1768, in Breslau, educated at the Herrnhuter educational institutions in Niesky and Barby, and at the University of Halle, after private positions took a vicarship in Landsberg, and in 1796 began his duties as preacher at the Berlin Charitfe. In 1802 he went as court preacher to Stolpe ; in 1804 as Professor Extraordinary to Halle ; in 1806 returned to Berlin, where in 1809 he became preacher at the Dreifaltigkeits- kirche ; and in 1810 Professor at the University. He acquitted himself well in both offices, occupying at the time a successful position in the ecclesiastical movement (Union) until his death in 1834. His philosophical writings form the third part of his works collected after his death (Berlin, 1835 ff. ). They contain his lectures on Dialectic, ^Esthetic, etc. ; among his writings are to be mentioned : Beden ube. rdie Religion an die Gfebildeten unter ihren Verdchtern (1799) ; Monologen (1800) ; GrundMnUn einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre
The most important work, the Ethik, is given in the coll. works, in the edition by Al. Schweizer; it is also published in an edition by A. Twesten (Berlin, 1841). — Cf. Aus Sch. 's Leben in Briefen, ed. by L Jonas and W. Dil- they, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1868-1863) ; W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher's, Vol. I.
(1803).
(Berlin, 1870) [art. S. in Enc. Brit. , J. F. Smith].
Johann Friedrich Herbart, born, 1776, at Oldenburg, educated there and at the Jena University, for a time private teacher in Berne and acquainted with Pestalozzi, became in 1802 Privatdocent in Gottingen, was from 1809 to 183:1 Professor in Konigsberg, and then returned to Gottingen as Professor, where he died, 1841. His main writings are: Hauptpunkte der Afetaphysik (1806); Allgemeine praktische Philosophic (1808) ; Einleitnng in die Philosophic (1813) : Lehrbuch ztir Psycholoyie (1816) [Eng. tr. by M. K. Smith, N. Y. 1891] ; Psycho logic als Wissenschaft (1824 f. ). Complete edition by G. Hartenstein, 12 vols. (Leips. 1850 ff. ) ; in process of appearance, ed. by K. Kehrbach, since 1882. The pedagogical writings have been edited by O. Willmann in 2 vols. (Leips. 1873 and 1876). Cf. G. Hartenstein, Die Problems und Grundlehren der allgemeinen Afetaphysik (Leips. 1836) ; J. Kaftan, Sollen und Sein (Leips. 1872) ; J.
Cape- sius, Die Metaphysik Herbart's (Leips. 1878) [Ward, art. Herbart, in Enc
Brit. ].
Arthur Schopenhauer, born 1788 in Danzic, passed over somewhat late to philosophical life, studied in Gottingen and Berlin, received his degree in 1813 at Jena with his treatise on the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficirnt Reason, lived for a time at Weimar and Dresden, habilitated as Privatdocent in Berlin in 1820, but withdrew after he had won no success in a work as teacher which was frequently interrupted by journeys, and spent the rest of his life in private, after 1831, in Frankfort on the Main, where he died In 1880. His main work is Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819 [The World at
Will and as Idea, tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, Lond. and Boston, 3 vols. , 1884-86]. To this were attached Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 1836; Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841 ; finally, Parerga und Paralipomena.
1851. Complete edition in 6 vols. (Leips. 1873 f. ), and since then frequently edited. [Tr. of the Fourfold Root and of On the Will in Nature, by K. Hille- brand, Bohn Library, 2d ed. , 1891 ; of selected essays by Bax, Bohn Library, also by T. B. Saunders, 5 vols. , Lond. and N. Y. , 3d ed. , 1892. ] Cf. W. Gwinner, Sch. 's Leben, 2d ed. (Leips. 1878) ; J. Frauenstadt, Briefe iiber die ScK'scht
Chap. 2, § 41. ] Thing-in-Ittelf : Jacobi. 573
Philosophic (Leips. 1864) ; R. Seydel, Sch. 's System (Leips. 1867) ; A. Haym. A. Seh. (Berlin, 1864) ; G. Jellinek, Die Weltanschauungcn Leibniz1 und Schopenhauer's (Leips. 1872) [H. Zimmern, Schopenhauer, His Life and Phil. , Lond. 1876 ;
J. Sully, Pessimism, 2d ed. , Lond. 1801
By the side of the main metaphysical development runs a psychological
aide-line, a series of schools which, in an eclectic way, frequently approached the doctrines of the great systems by the path of the psychological method. Such is the relation to Kant and Jacobi of J. Fr. Fries (1773-1843 ; Beinhold, Fiehte und Schelling, 1803 ; Wissen, Olaube und Ahndung, 1806 ; Neue Kritik der Vernunft, 1807 ; Psychische Anthropologic, 1820 f. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena, Acad. Address, Stuttg. 1862), — to Kant and Fiehte of Willi. Traug. Krug (1770-1842 ; Organon der Philosophic 1801 ;
§ 41. The Thing-in-Itielf.
The compelling power which Kant's philosophy gained over the minds and hearts of men was due chiefly to the earnestness and greatness of its ethical conception of the world ; ' the progress of thought, however, attached itself primarily to the new form which had been given to the principles of the theory of knowledge in the Critique of the Pure Reason. Kant took the antithesis of phenom ena and uoumena from earlier philosophy ; but by his transcen
dental analytic he widened the realm of phenomena to include the whole compass of human knowledge, and the thing-in-itself survived only as a problematical conception, like a rudimentary organ, which might be indeed characteristic for the historical genesis of this theory of knowledge, but which performed no living function in it.
1. This was first seen by Jacobi, when he confessed that without the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian system, and with the same could not remain in it ; * for the concep tion of the sensibility introduced at the beginning involves the causal relation of being affected by things-in-themselves, —a rela tion which, according to the doctrine of the analytic that categories must not be applied to things-in-themselves, it is forbidden to think. In this contradiction of professing to think things-in-themselves
and yet of not being jwrmitted to think thein, the whole critique of the reason moves ; and at the same time this contradictory assump tion does not at all help to guarantee to our knowledge of phe nomena even the slightest relation to truth. For, according to Kant, the mind presents to itself in thought " neither itself nor
1 This is especially to be recognised from Reinhold's Bnefen Uber die kant. Ph.
Handworterbufh der philos. Wisscnschaftcn, 1827 ff. ), — to Fiehte and Schelling of Fried. Bouterwek (1766-1828; Apodiktik, 1790; uEsthetik, 1806), —and Anally, to Herbart of Fr. Beneke (1708-1864; Psychologische Skitxen, 1826 and 1827 ; Lehrbueh der Psychologie, als Xatuncissenschaft, 1832 ; Metaphysik und Beligionsphilosophie, 1840 ; Die neue Psychologie, 1846).
;
Adamson in Mind,
1876].
» JacoW, W. , II. 304.
574 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
other things, but solely and alone that which is neither what the mind is itself, nor what other things are. " * The faculty of cogni tion hovers between a problematical X of the subject and an equally problematical X of the object. The sensibility has nothing behind
and the understanding nothing before it; "in a twofold en chanter's smoke, called space and time, rise the ghostly forms of phenomena or appearances in which nothing appears. " If we assume things, Kant teaches that knowledge has not the least to do with them. The critical reason reason busy about pure noth ing, i. e. only about itself. If, therefore, criticism will not fall into nihilism or absolute scepticism, the transcendental idealist must have the courage to assert the " strongest " idealism he must declare that only phenomena are.
^— In the claim that what Kant calls the object of knowledge in truth " nothing," inheres as presupposition the same naive realism, the destruction of which was the great service of the transcendental analytic and the same realism determines also the episteinology of Faith, which Jacobi opposes to "the transcendental
uncertainty," not without being entirely dependent upon All truth knowl edge of the actual but the actual asserts itself in human con
sciousness not through thought, but through feeling; just Kant's experiment proves that thought alone moves in circle out of which there no access to actuality, in an endless series of the condi tioned in which no unconditioned to be found. The fundamental law of causality may indeed be formulated in exactly this manner, viz. there nothing unconditioned. Knowledge, therefore, or thought that can be demonstrated, in its very nature, as Jacobi says, Spinozism, — doctrine of the mechanical necessity of all that finite: and the interest of science that there be no God, — indeed, God who could be known would be no God. * Even he who in his heart a Christian must be in his head heathen he who will bring into his intellect the light which in his heart quenches it. 4 But this knowledge only mediate knowing the true, immediate knowing feeling; in this we are truly one with the object," and possess as we possess ourselves in the certainty of a faith that has no proof. 7 This feeling, however, as regards its objects, of twofold kind: the reality of the sensuous reveals itself to us in perception, that of the supersensuous in the " reason. "
Allwill, XV. W. , II. 310. To Hamann,
W. , 121.
W. , in. Ill W. , III. 384. W. , II. 175.
367.
Hume's conception of belief and his distinction of impressions and ideas
(here called Vorstellungen) experience in this a noteworthy transformation.
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For this supra-natural sensualism. , therefore, " reason " signifies the immediate feeling of the reality of the supersensuous, of God, free dom, morality, and immortality. In this limitation Kant's dualism of theoretical and practical reason and of the primacy of the latter return in Jacobi,1 to be placed in the service of mystical extrava gance of feeling, which manifests itself also in the character of a style which warm and full of spirit, but rhapsodical and more given to assertion than to proof.
This same fundamental conception, brought somewhat nearer to Kant, appears with Fries. In demanding that the knowledge of the a priori forms to which the critical philosophy aspired must itself arise a posteriori, through inner experience, and therefore that Kant's
"
results must be established or set right by an " anthropological critique, he rested upon the conviction that the immediate, proper cognitions of the reason are given originally in an obscure form through the feeling,' and transformed into intellectual knowledge only by means of reflection. This Leibnizian body ends, however, in the critical tail, since the perceptional and conceptional Forms of this reflection are regarded as only an expression of the phenomenal mode in which the above original truth [as experienced in feeling] appears on the other hand, the body received a Kant-Jacobi head, when the limitation of knowledge to these phenomenal Forms had set over against the immediate relation of moral faith to things- in-themselves, while at the same time — with a decided attachment to the Critique of Judgment — the aesthetic and religious feelings had ascribed to them the significance of presage (Ahndung) that the Being which lies at the basis of phenomena just that to which the practical reason relates.
The untenability of the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself, so keenly recognised by Jacobi, became palpable to a certain extent when Reinhold in his Elementary Philosophy made the attempt to present the critical doctrine in a systematic unity. He admired Kant and adopted entirely his solutions of the individual problems, but missed in him the formulation of a simple, fundamental princi ple from which all particular insights might be deduced. Through the fulfilment of this (Cartesian) demand,' opposing private opinions would be at last replaced sby the philosophy, — Philosophy without any surname. He himself believed that he had found this principle in the principle which he supposed to be quite free from presuppo sitions, — that in consciousness every idea distinguished by the
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576 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Paht Vi.
consciousness of subject and object, and is related to both (Principle
Hence there inheres in every idea something that belongs to the subject and something that belongs to the object. From the object comes the manifold of the material, from the subject the synthetic unity of the Form. From this it follows
that neither the object in itself, nor the subject in itself, is know- able, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the two ; from this results further the opposition of the (sensuous) material impulse and of the (ethical) Form impulse; in the former the heteronomy of the dependence of the will upon things may be recognised ; in the latter the autonomy of the will directed toward the formal conformity to law.
In this crude form the Kantian School propagated the doctrine of the master ; all the fineness and profound meaning of the analytic of the "object " had become lost, and the only substitute was Rein- hold's effort to find in the " ideational faculty " ( Vorstellungsver- mbgen), or "consciousness,'* the deeper unity of all the different cognitive powers which Kant had separated from each other as Sensibility, Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. In so far the " fundamental philosophy " opposed with a positive hypothesis the objections which the sharp separation of the sensibility and the under standing in the Kantian doctrine encountered with many contempora ries. This separation presented itself in the exposition determined by the after-working of the Inaugural Dissertation (cf. p. 538, note 4), still more strongly than the spirit of the Critique of Reason required, and became at the same time still more palpable by the dualism of the practical philosophy. So the tendency was awak ened to replace the sensibility again in its rights as against Kant, and the Leibnizian doctrine of the gradual transition from the func tions of sense to those of reason proved the source of a powerful counter-current against Kant's " dissection " of the soul, — a dissec tion more apparent than serious. Hamann in his review, and ih conjunction with him, Herder in his Metakritik, urged this against the Critique of Pure Reason. Both lay chief emphasis upon lan guage as the fundamental, unitary, sensuous-intellectual work of
the reason, and seek to show how from the first " splitting apart " of sensibility and understanding all the other chasms and dualisms of the critical philosophy necessarily followed. 2
» Herder, Metakritik, 14, 1 1 1 . Works in 40 vols. , XXX VII. 333 ft. Moreover, this thought as Herder presented it in the Metakritik, a silly composition of personal irritation, was for a long time a positively impelling moment in the development. Cf . § 42.
of Consciousness). 1
1 Neue Theorie des Vorst. , pp. 201 ff.
Chap. 2, S 41. ] Thing-in-It»elf : Schulze. 577
3. The weak points in Keinhold's system could not escape the sceptics, but their attacks applied at the same time to Kant himself. They were united most effectively in Schulze's sEnesidemus. He shows that the critical method ensnares itself by setting for itself a task, the solution of which is according to its own results im possible. For if the Critique seeks the conditions which lie at the liasis of experience, these conditions are yet not themselves objects of experience (a conception which certainly corresponded better with Kant's meaning than did Fries' attempt at a psychological discovery of the a priori) : the critical method demands, therefore, that philosophical knowledge, at all events a thinking in categories, shall go beyond experience; and just this the Analytic declares impermissible. In fact, the "reason" and each of the knowing faculties, as sensibility, understanding, etc. , is a thing-in-itself, an
imperceptible ground of the empirical activities of the kind of cognition in question; and of all these things-in-theinselves and their relations to each other and to experience, the critical philoso phy — the metaphysics of knowledge — offers a very circumstantial body of information. To be sure, this information is, if closely examined, very slight ; for such a " faculty " is ultimately thought only as an unknown common cause of empirical functions, and is to be characterised only through these its workings.
" ifinesidemus " develops this criticism in connection with Rein- hold's conception of the "ideational faculty";1 he shows that we explain nothing at all, when we postulate over again the content of that which is to be explained, provided with the problematical mark "power" or "faculty. " Schulze thus turned against the " faculty theory," which was employed by the empirical psycholo gists of the Enlightenment in rather a thoughtless manner. It is only descriptively that there is any sense in comprehending like phenomena of the psychical life under one generic conception ; but to hypostatise this conception to a metaphysical power — this is a mythological treatment of psychology. With this watch-word
Herbart* extended the criticism of Schulze to the whole earlier psychological theory, and Beneke also saw in the bringing into prominence of this conception the essential progress towards a natural science of the soul ; i. e. the associational psychology. *
For Schulze, this is only one of the elements in a proof that the critical philosophy, while aiming to prove the authority of the causal conception as against Hume, professes to limit the same
1 sEnrrid. , p. 06.
'» HerbaArt, Uhrb. 13; W. , V. 8 and elaewbere. Uhrb. . z. Ptych. ,
• Beneke, . Vent rtycA. , pp. MB
578 Germany : Development of Idealism. [1*a*t VI.
to experience, and yet everywhere makes the assumption of a causal relation between experience and that which "lies at its basis. " Here, too, belongs of course the contradiction, already exhibited by Jacobi, in the conception of the thing-in-itself by which the "sensibility" is said to be affected. Every attempt of the Critique of Pare Reason to go beyond the circuit of experience,
even merely problematically, is judged in advance by itself. 1
4. The first attempt to transform the conception of the thing-u> itself, untenable in its Kantian shape, proceeded from Salomon
Maimon. He saw that the assumption of a reality to be placed outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. What is thought is in consciousness ; to think of a something outside of consciousness is as imaginary as it would be mathematics to regard the require ment V— a as a real quantity.
