"150 Soviet Russia was badly in need of peace and
economic
reconstruction after seven years of war and rev- olution, and the Bolsheviks also believed that their capitalist opponents needed Russian markets and raw materials.
Revolution and War_nodrm
On July 16, however, the Soviet Politburo rejected British mediation and ordered the Red Army "to continue and step up the offensive.
" Chicherin offered to begin bilateral talks with the Poles-noting that the Soviet government had already signed peace treaties with several Baltic states "without the participation of other par- ties"-and he also announced that the Soviets would send an "enlarged" delegation to the next round of trade talks in London, in order to reach a "final" peace.
131 More ominously, his response implied that a peace settle- ment would require adjustments in Poland's internal arrangements, and in- deed the Soviets subsequently insisted that the Polish Army be replaced by
a militia "organized among the workers. "132
The Soviet decision to invade Poland is best seen as a calculated risk. 133 Lenin's support for this step is somewhat surprising, as he had opposed
1 30 In April, Lloyd George said the Poles "have gone rather mad" and described them as "a menace to the peace of Europe. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 215; Ullman, Anglo- Soviet Accord, 48, i37-39; and W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History ofAnglo-Soviet Rela- tions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1944), 35?
131 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 194-97; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 148-49, 168-69; and Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover In- stitute Press, 1972), 1:273.
132 As Pyotr Wandycz points out, this condition was "equivalent to a demand for complete surrender. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 245-47; Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:196, 201-202; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:213.
133 The decision to invade Poland remains the object of controversy. The traditional view is that Lenin insisted on an attempt to impose Bolshevism by force, overruling Trotsky, Stalin, and thePolishCommunists;seeCarr,BolshevikRevolution,J:209-10;Ullman, Anglo-SovietAc- cord, 165-70, 184-85; Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98-102, and "Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin," South Atlantic Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1973); Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 213-15; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. For alter- native interpretations, see Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland; and Melograni, Lenin and the Myth ofWorld Revolution, 97-102, 112-13.
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precipitous attempts to export the revolution since the seizure of power in 1917. He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist pressure and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes. Finally, the invasion coincided with the Second Comintern Congress in Petrograd, and a socialist takeover in Poland at that moment would have strengthened Moscow's claims to primacy within the international socialist movement. 134
The Soviets did not expect to conquer Poland solely by force of arms; rather, the invasion would allow the Polish workers and peasants to over- throw the bourgeois government and establish an independent Soviet regime. 135 And Lenin was adamant about what he would do if this assump- tion were incorrect: "If the expected uprising does not occur, . . . would it be fitting to push military operations more thoroughly, risking a dangerous turn of events? Without doubt, no! " Thus, the invasion of Poland was a gamble but a limited one, and Lenin was unwilling to raise the stakes if his hopes turned out to be incorrect. 136
His error was soon apparent: the Polish proletariat did not rise up to wel- come the invading Red Army, and a Polish counterattack at the outskirts of Warsaw split the Soviet forces and sent them scurrying back across the bor- der. Peace negotiations commenced in Riga in November, and a final peace treaty was concluded in March 1918. 137
The Balance of Threats. The war between Russia and Poland supports the general proposition that revolutions alter the balance of threats in ways that make war more likely. By affecting the balance of power, perceptions of in- tent, and assessments of the offense-defense balance, the revolution in Rus-
134 Lenin saw the Poles' actions as intended "to strengthen the barrier and to deepen the gulf which separates us from the proletariat of Germany," and he told a group of European socialists that "if Poland gives itself to Communism, the universal revolution would take a decisive step. . . . [It) would mean Germany shortly falling due, Hungary reconquered, the Balkans in revolt against capitalism, Italy shaken up, it would mean bourgeois Europe crack- ing apart in a formidable hurricane. " Quoted in Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14; and Fid- dick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 122-23. See also Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966), 31:305; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:274-'77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p87-201. .
135 In May 1920, the president of the Soviet Executive Central Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, had predicted, "If we deliver the first blow, the Polish proletariat will deliver the second and final one. . . . The western capitalists . . . will only succeed in founding yet another Soviet state with which we will enjoy close relations with the proletariat of the West. " Quoted . in Davies,
White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14.
136 Quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 123-24; and see also Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 105.
137 The Treaty of Riga was quite favorable to Poland, which received considerable territory in the east and financial compensations as well. See Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 18.
? ? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
sia heightened Soviet-Polish animosity and made the use of force appear espeCially attractive.
First we examine the issue of the balance of power. The underlying cause of the Russo? ? Polish war was each side's sense of insecurity. For the Poles, expansion was seen as essential to ensure their long-term security against Germany and Russia. Pilsudski "described himself as a "realist, without prejudices or theories," and Poland's unhappy past had taught him that
? Poland would either be "a state equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that needed protection of the mighty. " He saw the revolution in Russia and the German defeat in World War I as a once-in-a-lifetime oppor- tunity and believed that the conquest of the borderlands would give Poland the size and strength it needed to survive. Failing to seize this chance, by contrast, would doom Poland to permanent inferiority. 138
Soviet behavior reflected similar concerns. In addition to the ideological commitment to world revolution, Soviet leaders saw the creation of addi- tional Soviet republics as the best way to protect Soviet Russia from outside interference. If Poland remained independent and tied to the West, Russia would be cut off from Europe and the prospects for subsequent revolutions would decrease. Even before the Red Arrriy had crossed the Polish border, in fact, Trotsky had declared that the existence of an independent bourgeois Poland was a threat to Soviet Russia. 139 If the Polish government were over- thrown, however, Russia would be more secure in the short term and better able to support revolutionary efforts elsewhere. Moreover, the restoration of Russian authority in the borderlands would eliminate the threat of further
Polish encroachments or a renewed counterrevolutionary invasion.
By contrast, ideological antipathies played only a secondary role. Al- though Pilsudski declared Bolshevism to be a "purely Russian disease" and sought to push this "foreign way of life" as far from Poland as possible, his main focus was on the balance of power. Poland's leaders were equally hos- tile to the Whites; as Pilsudski put it, "Irrespective of what her government will be Russia is terribly imperialistic. " The head of the Polish Socialist Party opposed Allied proposals for Polish intervention in Russia by saying_ "We want to be neither the advance guard nor the gendarmerie of the East," and the leader of the Populist Party stated, "A struggle against Bolshevism in particular is neither our aim nor our task. " Instead, the Polish Supreme Command emphasized that the main goal was territory, because the "re-
duction of Russia to her historical frontiers is a condition of [Poland's] exis? tence. " Ort the Soviet side, ideology exacerbated Soviet fears and inflated their hopes of spreading the revolution, but as Pyotr Wandycz notes, even
1? 38 Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 159-60; and also see temer, "Poland in 1920," 409?
139 See Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
in their case "ideological motives blended with the requirements of Russian
raison d'etat. "140
In sum, relations between bourgeois Poland and revolutionary Russia displayed the classic symptoms of an intense security dilemma. Both states saw their own expansion as necessary for their security and expansion by the other as a serious threat.
The security dilemma between Russia and Poland was compounded by a second factor, perception of intent. Each side believed that the other was hostile, sentiments that were reinforced by ignorance and ideology, com- bined with the adversary's subsequent behavior. Thus, relations between Soviet Russia and Poland confirm the tendency for revolutionary states to enter a spiral of suspicion with other powers. The shared belief that war was inevitable provided both sides with a powerful incentive to initiate it as soon as circumstances seemed favorable.
Polish behavior gave the Soviet government ample grounds for suspi- cion. The murder of four Russian Red Cross officials by Polish security forces in January 1919 was a clear warning, and Poland's refusal to negoti- ate and its steady movement east convinced Lenin and Trotsky that their ef- forts at accommodation had simply invited further aggression. The Polish invasion in April merely confirmed Soviet perceptions of threat and in- creased their incentive to replace the Polish state with a Soviet regime. 141
These perceptions of Polish hostility were magnified by the belief that Poland was a tool of the Entente. Lenin believed that with the Polish capture of Wilno the Entente "became even more impudent," and he saw the inva- sion as imperialism's latest attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. 142 The Bolsheviks still feared a renewal of Allied support for the Whites, and! Wrangel's spring offensive seemed too well timed to be purely coincidental. This image of implacable imperialist aggression was reinforced when King George of England sent a message congratulating the Poles on the two hun- dredth anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, which the Soviets in- correctly saw as an endorsement of the Polish invasion. 143
141 As one Bolshevik leader declared in July, "With these people [the Poles) there can be no peace. . . . [The] historical strife between Russia and Poland must end by friendship and uni- fication ofthe Russian and Polish Soviet republics. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 174, 221; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 29.
142 In May, Lenin told a group of soldiers that Poland's invasion had been "instigated by the Entente," and he later declared that "international capital . . . was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:431, and Collected Works, Jl:JOl. For Lenin's reaction to the seizure of Wilno, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 128.
143 Some Bolshevik leaders saw the British government as divided between hardline anti- Bolsheviks and moderate advocates of accommodation, but Lenin told Trotsky that the talks in England "have shown withfull clarity that England is helping and will help both the Poles and Wrangel. There is absolutely only one line. " Lenin's appraisal was incorrect, as the British had rejected Polish requests for military ai. d in the fall of 1919 and did little to aid the Poles.
140 See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 107-108, 126-27, 198, 287.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
Polish suspicions of Russia were equally intense. In addition to reacting to a long history of Russian domination, the Poles understandably read the Bolsheviks' early attempts to establish "Soviet" republics in the Baltic states and Byelorussia as evidence of expansionist intentions. Pilsudski was con- vinced that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and he viewed the var- ious Soviet peace offers simply as attempts to buy time. 144
The defensive expansionism that drove subsequent Soviet and Polish policies underscored each state's worst fears. Poland began planning an all- out offensive in December 1919, and Lenin told Trotsky in February to "get ready for war with Poland. " Soviet preparations just strengthened the Poles' desire to strike first. 145
Momentum for war was increased by mutual perceptions. of an offen- sive advantage. In addition to believing that war was inevitable, both sides believed that they would win a swift and decisive victory. The repa- triation of Polish units at the end of World War I had brought the Polish Army up to a strength of 590,000 troops, and an assault on Pinsk in March 1920 had been surprisingly easy. In addition, the Poles were aware that Russia had been weakened by the revolution and distracted by the civil war, an assessment shared by foreign military experts and several Soviet leaders as well. 146
The Poles also recognized that this opportunity was unlikely to last. Vic- tories over Kolchak and Yudenich allowed the Soviets to fo? s more atten- tion on Poland, and Soviet troop strength in the west increased steadily after January 1920. Concerned that the Soviets would draw out the peace talks in order to build up their forces, Pilsudski decided to seize the opportunity be- fore the window closed. Thus, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920 contains elements of preventive and preemptive war: Pilsudski at- tacked while the balance of power still favored Poland and "to forestall by his offensive an attack by Soviet troops/ti47
SeeUllman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 137-47, 163, 173-83; Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 45, 100-101, 168; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 161-62, 211-12; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 92--93, 172-73- 220, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20," 132-% and Marjan Kukiel, "The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920," Slavonic Review 8, no. 1 (1929), 59?
144 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 26-27, 65; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 144-45.
145 Pilsudski told a French journalist in March, "My impression of Bolshevik behavior is that peace is out of the question. I know the Bolsheviks are concentrating large forces on our front. They are making a mistake. . . . Our Army is ready. " See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 88, 98--<)9; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 167, 1 78.
146 Pilsudski referred to White and Red Russia as "cadavers" and tried to get Wrangel to renew the war in southern Russia so as to stretch the Soviet forces even further. See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 83-85; Brinkley, Volunteer Army, 209-10; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Rela- tions, 141, 147-49, 167, 17); and Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 32-34.
147 This assessment was made by a group of Soviet historians. Similarly, French general Maxime Weygand later termed the Polish assault a "preventive offensive. " See Wandycz, So- viet-Polish Relations, 194; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 87-88.
? ? ? Revolution and War
When the tide turned in June, however, the Soviets succumbed to their own optimistic delusions. The march on Warsaw was predicated on the be- lief that the campaign would be over before the Entente could come to Poland's rescue; and by the hope that the Polish proletariat would greet the Red Army as liberators. Despite their awareness of Poland's anti-Russian propensities, their ideological commitment to world revolution left the So- viets vulnerable to this kind of optimism even in the face of considerable contrary evidence. Polish Communists warned Lenin that a revolution in Poland was unlikely, but his normal caution evaporated in the face of the Red Army's successful advance and other apparently encouraging signs. His hopes for a revolution in the West had been renewed by the failure of the right-wing Kapp putsch in Germany in March 1920 (which he saw as analogous to the Kornilov revolt that had preceded the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917). The first signs from Poland seemed favorable as well, and reports from England and France suggested strong public opposition to any attempt to aid the Poles. 148
Uncertainty and misinformation contributed to all these miscalculations.
Soviet Russia and Poland correctly saw each other as hostile, but the level of animosity was blown out of proportion and the benefits of using force ex- aggerated. The Soviets erroneously blamed Polish expansionism on imperi- alist hostility and played up the revolutionary prospects in Poland, while mistakenly viewing working-class opposition to Allied intervention as evi- dence of Europe's own revolutionary potential. 149 For their part, the Poles overstated their own ability to attract popular support in the borderlands and underestimated the Bolsheviks' military capability and political resolve. Thus, not only was each side relatively ignorant about the other's true ca- pabilities, but each misread its own ability to impose a political solution by force.
In sum, the Russo-Polish war presents a vivid illustration of how revolu- tions foster security competition and war. Both Russia and Poland faced se- rious security problems that neither could solve without endangering the
148 Lenin's optimism about revolutionary prospects in Europe was nicely expressed in a message to Stalin in July: "The situation in Comintem is splendid . . . it is time to encourage revolution in Italy. . . . For this to happen, Hungary must be sovietized, and maybe also the Czech Lands and Romania. " He later maintained that attacking Poland would help sovietize Lithuania and Poland and aid the revolution in Germany, and that even failure "will teach us about offensive wiu . . . . We will help Hungary, Italy, and at each step we will remember where to stop. " Quoted in Volkogonov, Lenin, 388; and also see Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 102-103.
149 France supported the Polish initiative, but the Polish government made its decisions in- dependently. See Michael Jabara Carley, "Anti-Bolshevism in French Foreign Policy: The Cri- sis in Poland in 1920," International History Review 2, no. 3 (1980), and "The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: The French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920," Historical ]ourna/ 19, no. 1 (1976).
? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
other. Both sides saw the other as aggressive, and these perceptions of hos- tility grew as each state took steps to protect itself. The revolution in Russia had created a seemingly large window of opportunity, and with Poland and Russia both preparing for a war they regarded as inevitable, it is not sur- prising that the Poles moved first. Ideology reinforced the Soviet belief that Poland was a eat's paw of the Entente and fueled their hopes for an upris- ing there (although Moscow reversed course when the anticipated uprising failed to occur). Thus, by altering each side's evaluation of the balance of threats, the revolution in Russia made war with Poland virtually inevitable.
THE STRATEGY OF "PEACEFUL CoEXISTENCE"
By late 1920, the failure of Con. 1munist revolts in Germany, Hungary, and Austria had cast doubt on Soviet hopes that the revolution would soon spread to the rest of Europe. The abortive invasion of Poland merely rein- forced this trend, and Soviet officials began to abandon the belief that war with the West was inevitable and imminent. Instead, Lenin now foresaw an indefinite period of "peaceful coexistence.
"150 Soviet Russia was badly in need of peace and economic reconstruction after seven years of war and rev- olution, and the Bolsheviks also believed that their capitalist opponents needed Russian markets and raw materials. Western hopes that the White armies would soon eliminate the Soviet regime had proved equally mis-
taken, and leaders on both sides saw the restoration of economic ties as the best way to accelerate recovery and enhance security. This more cooperative approach yield\ed a number of tangible benefits-although Soviet efforts to build more normal relations were repeatedly compromised by lingering suspicions and their continued commitment to world revolution.
The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
As noted earlier, Lloyd George had begun to advocate the restoration of trade with Russia at the end of 1919, and he told the House of Commons in February 1920, "We have failed to restore Russia to sanity by force. I believe we can save her by trade. " A broad spectrum of British business, labor, and political leaders endorsed this policy, arguing that it would help revive Britain's sagging economy. They also pointed out that other countries
150 As Lenin put it in November 1920: "Today we have to speak, not merely of a breathing space, but of there being a serious chance of a new and lengthy period of development. " Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic De- velopment in the 1920s," International History Review 1, no. 1 (1979), 61; and see also Jacobson, When the. Soviet Union Entered, 18-19.
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would capture the Russian market if Britain failed to act, and that access to Russian grain would improve Europe's food supply. 151
The chief motive behind the trade negotiations, however, was political. 152 The government was worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the British Empire, and Lloyd George saw the restoration of trade as a way to persuade the Soviet government to abandon its subversive activities. 153 Accordingly, tlhe British insisted that any trade agreement include "a mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party and from direct or indirect official propaganda. " The fear of Bolshevik subversion, which had once justified support for the Whites, now became a rationale for accommodation. 154
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations. Despite each side's obvious in- terest in restoring commercial ties, the negotiations faced several impressive obstacles. British conservatives still mistrusted the Bolsheviks, and their suspicions were not allayed by the Soviets' public commitment to exporting their revolution. The British government was facing renewed unrest in Ire- land, several rebellious colonies, a threatened strike by the Miners' Federa- tion, and the formation of a trade union Council of Action to oppose British involvement in the Russo-Polish war. Opponents of the trade talks blamed working-class agitation on the presence of the Soviet delegation, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson began preparations for a military campaign against the Council of Action in August. Sir Basil Thomson, chief of intelli-
151 Lloyd George told Parliament, "The withdrawal of Russia from the supplying markets is contributing to high prices, high cost of living, and to scarcity and hunger. Russia supplied before the war one-fourth of the whole export wheat of the world. . . . The world needs it. " Quoted in Coates and Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 15-16; and see also Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 15-20, 37; Alfred L. P. Dennis, TheForeign Policies ofSoviet Russia (New York: E. P. Dut- ton, 1924), 381-83; Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Rev- olution, I9IJ-I92J (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 328; and Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1 92cr24 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 15-16.
152 According to Thompson and White, Lloyd George "had never abandoned his hopes for some sort of peaceful settlement in Russia," and the trade talks provided a cover for discus- sions whose "real substance had remained pre-eminently political throughout. " See Thomp- son, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 347; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 7?
153 The First Congress of the Communist International in March 1919 had anticipated "open risings and unrest in all colonies" and the liberation of "colonial slaves" by the victo- rious proletariat. Zinoviev called for a "holy war against British imperialism" at a "Congress of Peoples of the East" in September, the Soviet government established a school for training Asian revolutionaries in Tashkent, and fifteen hundred Bolshevik agents were reported to be in India. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:245-{)o; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 349-51, 357-{)7; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 82-<)6, 98-104, 11? r24.
154 They also demanded that the Soviet government undertake "not to join in military ac- tivities or propaganda conducted by the Asiatic peoples against British interests or the British Empire. " Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:192-93.
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gence for the Home Office, told the Cabinet in September, "The Russian Trading Delegation has become a greater menace to the stability of this country than anything that has happened since the Armistice. " And where Lloyd George believed that these dangers could be defused by a combina- tion of an armistice in Poland, a trade agreement with Russia, and the ban on Bolshevik propaganda, to his Conservative opponents the threat of rev- olution was a sufficient reason to abandon the talks forthwith. 155
Soviet officials were equally suspicious, and Lenin warned Krasin that "that swine Lloyd George has no scruples or shame in the way he deceives: don't believe a word he says and gull him three times as much. "156 They also exaggerated the revolutionary potential of the British working class, and their misplaced optimism nearly derailed the negotiations completely. 157 In August, the new Soviet negotiator in London, Lev Kamenev, misled the British government regarding the peace terms the Soviets had offered to Poland in order to buy time for the Red Army to reach Warsaw. 158 Kamenev also held several meetings with members of the Council of Action and other left-wing groups and gave ? 75,000 to the left-wing Daily Herald, thereby vi- olating the pledge not to interfere in British domestic politics. The exposure of these deceptions led conservatives to demand the immediate expulsion of the Soviet trade delegation, and Lloyd George promptly informed Kamenev that he was no longer welcome. 159
155 See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 51-52, 222-24, 265-85. On the Council of Action, see White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 43-51 .
156 Chicherin wired Krasin that the Foreign Office was "playing a mos? perfidious and base double-faced game," and Lenin argued that British proposals for a ceasefire in Poland were intended "to snatch victory out of our hands with the aid of false promises. '' Kamenev's own views were more moderate, and he told Lloyd George in August that he was aware that "nei- ther Poland nor Wrangel had the direct support of the British Government. " See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 116-17, 121-22, 166; and Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, eds. , Documents on1British Foreign Policy, 1 9 1 9-1939, 1st ser. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1958), 8:686.
57 Soviet officials knew that Lloyd George's interest in a trade agreement was based in part on his desire to end Bolshevik propaganda, and Chicherin told Krasin to "make it clear that we are able to cause [England] serious damage in the East if we so wish. " He added: "Picture to them what will happen if we send a Red Army to Persia, Mesopotamia, and Afghanistan. We are awaited and yearned for there, and it is only the moderation of our policy which causes a slow development [of the revolutionary situation] in that country. " Quoted in Ull- man, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 122.
158 Kamenev omitted the Soviet demand that the Polish Army be disarmed and replaced by a "worker's militia" organized under Russian auspices. Ironically, Chicherin had tried to convince Kamenev to make this demand public in order to stimulate revolutionary attitudes among British workers. See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 253-64.
159 After meeting with representatives from the Council of Action on August 7, Kamenev wired Chicherin that "the workers are coming forward on our side, not because we are right or wrong, but because they must be with Russia at all costs; and on any terms. " Similarly, after Soviet hopes for the conquest of Poland had faded, Lenin was still instructing Kamenev to "use all your forces to explain [Lloyd George's treacherous aggression] to the British work- ers. Write articles for them yourself . . . teach them how to agitate among the masses. In this
? [1771
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Lloyd George was still committed to restoring normal relations, however, and he managed to exempt Krasin from the charges leveled at Kamenev. The basic terms for an agreement had been in place since June, but disputes over a final prisoner exchange and several other issues delayed the final sig- nature until March 1921. In addition to the economic arrangements, each party agreed to "refrain from hostile action . . . and from conducting outside its own borders any hostile propaganda. " The Soviets specifically pledged not to interfere in India or Afghanistan; Britain made a similar commitment regarding the territories of the former Russian Empire. 160
The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement illustrates some of the other obstacles that can impede efforts to normalize relations with a revolutionary regime. First, in addition to each side's suspicions and the complications raised by the Russo-Polish war, the negotiations were prolonged by the inherent diffi- culty of measuring the level of threat that a revolutionary power represents. In 1920, the Bolshevik threat to British interests was based not on Russian economic or military power but on the appeal of Bolshevik ideas, yet no one knew how broadly appealing these ideas really were. Men such as Basil Thomson recognized that the Council of Action was primarily an antiwar movement and not a revolutionary organization, but they could not be cer- tain that pro-Bolshevik sentiment was not growing beneath the surface. In- deed, Sir Henry Wilson eventually became convinced that Lloyd George himself was a Bolshevik and tried to organize a campaign to force him from office. 161 In the same way, Kamenev's misconduct while in England followed from the belief that England was ripe for a revolution, even though his ef- forts to encourage one merely hardened Conservative attitudes and jeopar- dized the process of accommodation. Thus, uncertainty about Britain's revolutionary potential made both sides less willing to compromise.
Interestingly, other forms of uncertainty may have facilitated the negotia- tions. Because of their ignorance about economic conditions in Russia, the British may have exaggerated the economic benefits of trade and thereby overstated their own interest in accommodation. Similarly, the claim that a trade agreement would strengthen Russian "moderates" reveals both wish- ful thinking and the British leaders' continued failure to understand the basic nature of the Soviet system. Interest in the trade agreement was also fueled by unwarranted concerns about Communist subversion in the rest of the British empire, which increased the desire to silence Soviet propaganda. 162
? lies your chief task. " Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 224-25, 254, 269. On Kamenev's expulsion, see Butler and Bury, British Documents, 783-91.
160 The text of the agreement is reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 474-78.
161 For the details of this fascinating episode, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 274-81, 307-3o8.
162 Ullman,Anglo-SovietAccord,415-19,438-43.
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Thus, despite enduring suspicions, continued insecurity, deep domestic opposition, and a host of misconceptions, Britain and Russia managed to take the first step toward a more normal relationship. Above all else, their willingness to do so reveals a growing recognition of the postwar balance of threats. Although Churchill and Curzon continued to oppose the trade agreement on the grounds that Soviet Russia "makes no secret of its inten- tions to overthrow our institutions everywhere," the claim that the Soviet
government could be toppled easily was now untenable. Lloyd George drew the obvious conclusion: if Bolshevism could not be eliminated, then Britain should come to terms with it. Similarly, although Soviet leaders had not abandoned their hope for a world revolution, they were begin- ning to realize that it might not be imminent and were becoming increas- ingly aware of their own economic liabilities. 163 Agreeing to mute their propaganda offensive was a small price to pay for recognition and the restoration of trade, which they believed would foster recovery and dis- courage a renewed imperialist offensive. Not surprisingly, similar calcula-
tions were beginning to shape Soviet relations with a number of other countries as well.
Soviet Diplomacy in Asia
The Soviet government saw the developing world as a natural ally in the struggle against imperialism, and the liberation of the colonial areas re- ceived particular attention at the Second Comintern Congress in July and August of 1920. 164 The Soviets began cultivating close ties with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and China during this period. In each case, the desire to enhance the security of the Soviet state proved stronger than the commit- ment to world revolution.
Before World War I, Persia's position in international politics was defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which gave Russia a sphere of in- fluence in the north of Persia and Britain a sphere of influence in the south. The Soviet government renounced these treaty rights in January 1918, and British forces moved into the vacuum as Russia withdrew. The pro-British Cabinet of Vusuq al-Dawlah signed a new Anglo-Persian treaty on August
163 In November, Lenin admitted, "Though we have not yet won a world victory . . . we have fought our way into a position where we can coexist with the capitalist powers, who now are forced to have trade relations with us. " In December, he acknowledged that "the speed, the tempo, at which revolution is developing in the capitalist countries is far slower than it was in our country. " Quotations from Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 412; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:540.
164 At the congress, Lenin called for "the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the na- tional and colonial liberation movements. " Lenin, Selected Works, 3:434; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:251-59.
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9, 1919; had it been ratified, the agreement would have given Britain de facto control over much of Persia's foreign and domestic policy. 165
Britain's attempt to solidify its influence in Persia sparked a storm of protests, however, and the situation was complicated further when Mirza Kuchik Khan, a dissident nationalist, proclaimed an independent "Republic of Gilan" in northern Persia and began receiving aid and military backing from the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan. The British withdrawal from northern Persia following a Soviet raid on Enzeli shook Persian confidence in British protection, and the Persian government quickly dispatched an envoy to Russia to negotiate the resumption of relations.
British officials responded by arranging for a Persian colonel, Reza Shah, to conduct a coup d'etat in January 1921. 166 This move appeared to backfire when Reza denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and signed a formal treaty of friendship with the Soviet government in February 1921. The Sovi- ets again renounced any special privileges in Persia, but the treaty autho- rized their entry "should a third power intervene with armed force" on Persian territory. 167 Reza Shah carefully maintained his freedom of action, however, suppressing local Communists and refusing to allow the Soviet ambassador to enter Tehran until all Soviet forces had withdrawn from Per- sian soil. The Soviets abandoned KUchik Khan as relations with Tehran im- proved, and the "Republic of Gilan" quickly collapsed. All told, the initial course of Soviet-Persian relations offered an early indication of Moscow's willingness to disregard immediate revolutionary objectives for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 168
Soviet relations with Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. Prior to World War I, Afghanistan lay largely within the British sphere of influence, but the revolution in Russia inspired Emir Amanullah to declare war on
165 The Soviets renounced any "spheres of influence and exclusive interests" in Persia at Brest-Litovsk, and Lenin sent a formal message to the government of Persia "repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. " See R. K. Ra- mazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 150o-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Char- lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), 148-51; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:232 n. 2; George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), 49-50; and Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927 (Geneva: Michael Joseph,
1966), 154?
166 For an account of the coup that stresses the British role, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 355-57, 376-8;8 for a version downplaying it, see Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran, 176-77.
167 The Soviet-Persian treaty was an obvious attempt to balance against Great Britain, but Reza Shah recognized that Russia was a potential threat as well. He therefore tried to main- tain cordial relations with Britain and the United States, a policy consistent with Persia's tra- ditional practice of seeking third powers to balance British and Soviet pressure. See Ramazani, Foreign PolicyofIran, 203-11, 3o8-309.
168 The Soviet ambassador told Khan, "Soviet Russia at this time regards all revolutionary movements as not only fruitless but also harmful. Therefore, Soviet Russia has adopted a new form of policy as evidenced by its new treaty with the government of Iran. " Quoted in R a m a z a n i , F o r e i g n P o l i c y of I r a n , 1 9 1 .
[18o]
? TheRussian Revolution
Britain in April 1919 and request aid from Moscow. The Soviet government was in no position to help, however, and Amanullah's forces were soon de- feated. Britairi acknowledged Afghan independence in August, and Lenin subsequently sent a telegram to the emir proposing a trade agreement and a treaty of friendship directed against "the most rapacious imperialist gov- ernment on Earth-Great Britain. "169
This offer led directly to the Soviet-Afghan treaty of February 1921. Ideo- logical solidarity played no role in this agreement (if anything, Amanullah's pan-Islamic beliefs were a potential threat to Soviet control in Central Asia), and the treaty failed to prevent a number of serious disagreements between Moscow and Kabul. 170 Like the Persians, the Afghanis were primarily inter- ested in balancing between Britain and Russia, and the Soviet-Afghan treaty was followed by a similar agreement with Great Britain in November.
Russia's policy toward Afghanistan offers further evidence of its prag- matic approach to diplomatic relations with the border states, particularly in areas where the threat of imperialist interference was especially acute. E. H. Carr notes, "What was significant in all this was not the extension of propaganda for world revolution but the succession of Soviet Russia to the traditional Russian role as Britain's chief rival in central Asia. "171
Soviet policy toward Turkey also sought to counter Western (especially British) influence. Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been rivals for centuries, but Soviet Russia and the new Turkish state found them- selves united by a number of common interests. Clandestine discussions between Karl Radek and several prominent members of the Young Turk movement had already raised the possibility of a Soviet-Turkish alliance against British imperialism. Chicherin broadcast a radio message warning of the dangers of imperialism and proposing Soviet-Turkish cooperation to "expel the European robbers" in September 1919. Until the summer of
1920, however, Soviet hopes rested primarily on the Turkish Communist movement. 172
As discussed at length below in chapter 6, foreign interference in Turkey eventually caused a nationalist revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a prominent Ottoman general. In April 1920, when the revolt was well un- derway, Kemal sent a formal note to Moscow proposing diplomatic rela-
169 Lenin'smessagecongratulatedtheAfghanpeopleontheirstruggleagainst"foreignop- pressors" and referred to the "wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others. " Quoted in Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 1:285-86.
}29CH)2.
171 BolshevikRevolution,3:292. 172 Ibid. , 3:244-47?
170 The
? [181]
main dispute concerned the emir of Bokhara, who was ousted by a Bolshevik "Young Bokharan" movement in September 1920. The emir fled to Afghanistan while his supporters tried to oust the new government, and this incident delayed the Soviet-Afghan treaty for several months. See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 222-28; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution,
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tions and a joint "struggle against foreign imperialism which threatens both countries. "173
The harsh peace terms imposed at Versailles accelerated the Soviet-Turk- ish rapprochement. Turkey and Russia began direct negotiations in Moscow in July, and a Soviet representative arrived in Ankara in November. A friendship treaty emphasizing "their solidarity in the struggle against im- perialism" was signed in March 1921; six months later, the Treaty of Kars settled the remaining border disputes between the new Turkish state and the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 174
Despite these favorable developments, Russia and Turkey faced several enduring disputes during this period. Both states still coveted parts of Transcaucasia, and Kemal's overt anti-Communism was an obvious irritant as well. Soviet self-interest soon overcame any ideological inclinations, and Russia sent a military delegation to Ankara in November 1921 and agreed to provide a subsidy of 3? 5 million gold rubles and enough arms and amum ni- tion for three divisions. This gesture did little to bind Turkey to Moscow, however, and when the Greeks withdrew following their final defeat in 1922, Kemal moved away from Moscow and suppressed the Turkish Com- munist Party even more vigorously. Turkey also reversed its earlier position
on the Turkish Straits and agreed to negotiate a new arrangement with the . Western powers. The Soviets' response to these setbacks was restrained, a policy that paid off when Turkey insisted that Russia be invited to partici- pate in the negotiations for a new straits regime. 175
On the whole, Soviet relations with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey are best seen as attempts to balance against a common threat. They are thus en- tirely consistent with the dictates of realpolitik. At the same time, Bolshevik ideology clearly affected Moscow's evaluation of alternative partners. The 1921 friendship treaties both stabilized Soviet relations with three of its neighboring countries and presented a worrisome threat to Western influ- ence in the developing world. Although maintaining these connections re- quired Moscow to overlook the persecution of local Communist groups, it was a small price to pay for such obvious diplomatic benefits.
The Far East did not at first appear to be an area of great revolutionary potential. The "Congress of Peoples of the East" held in Baku in 1920 fo- cused primarily on the Near East and South Asia, and the first "Congress of Toilers of the Far East" did not meet until January 1922. The Soviet govern- ment played a only minor role in the founding of the Chinese and Japanese
173 Quoted in ibid. , 248; and also see Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif.
a militia "organized among the workers. "132
The Soviet decision to invade Poland is best seen as a calculated risk. 133 Lenin's support for this step is somewhat surprising, as he had opposed
1 30 In April, Lloyd George said the Poles "have gone rather mad" and described them as "a menace to the peace of Europe. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 215; Ullman, Anglo- Soviet Accord, 48, i37-39; and W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History ofAnglo-Soviet Rela- tions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1944), 35?
131 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 194-97; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 148-49, 168-69; and Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover In- stitute Press, 1972), 1:273.
132 As Pyotr Wandycz points out, this condition was "equivalent to a demand for complete surrender. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 245-47; Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:196, 201-202; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:213.
133 The decision to invade Poland remains the object of controversy. The traditional view is that Lenin insisted on an attempt to impose Bolshevism by force, overruling Trotsky, Stalin, and thePolishCommunists;seeCarr,BolshevikRevolution,J:209-10;Ullman, Anglo-SovietAc- cord, 165-70, 184-85; Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98-102, and "Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin," South Atlantic Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1973); Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 213-15; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. For alter- native interpretations, see Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland; and Melograni, Lenin and the Myth ofWorld Revolution, 97-102, 112-13.
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precipitous attempts to export the revolution since the seizure of power in 1917. He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist pressure and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes. Finally, the invasion coincided with the Second Comintern Congress in Petrograd, and a socialist takeover in Poland at that moment would have strengthened Moscow's claims to primacy within the international socialist movement. 134
The Soviets did not expect to conquer Poland solely by force of arms; rather, the invasion would allow the Polish workers and peasants to over- throw the bourgeois government and establish an independent Soviet regime. 135 And Lenin was adamant about what he would do if this assump- tion were incorrect: "If the expected uprising does not occur, . . . would it be fitting to push military operations more thoroughly, risking a dangerous turn of events? Without doubt, no! " Thus, the invasion of Poland was a gamble but a limited one, and Lenin was unwilling to raise the stakes if his hopes turned out to be incorrect. 136
His error was soon apparent: the Polish proletariat did not rise up to wel- come the invading Red Army, and a Polish counterattack at the outskirts of Warsaw split the Soviet forces and sent them scurrying back across the bor- der. Peace negotiations commenced in Riga in November, and a final peace treaty was concluded in March 1918. 137
The Balance of Threats. The war between Russia and Poland supports the general proposition that revolutions alter the balance of threats in ways that make war more likely. By affecting the balance of power, perceptions of in- tent, and assessments of the offense-defense balance, the revolution in Rus-
134 Lenin saw the Poles' actions as intended "to strengthen the barrier and to deepen the gulf which separates us from the proletariat of Germany," and he told a group of European socialists that "if Poland gives itself to Communism, the universal revolution would take a decisive step. . . . [It) would mean Germany shortly falling due, Hungary reconquered, the Balkans in revolt against capitalism, Italy shaken up, it would mean bourgeois Europe crack- ing apart in a formidable hurricane. " Quoted in Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14; and Fid- dick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 122-23. See also Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966), 31:305; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:274-'77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p87-201. .
135 In May 1920, the president of the Soviet Executive Central Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, had predicted, "If we deliver the first blow, the Polish proletariat will deliver the second and final one. . . . The western capitalists . . . will only succeed in founding yet another Soviet state with which we will enjoy close relations with the proletariat of the West. " Quoted . in Davies,
White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14.
136 Quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 123-24; and see also Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 105.
137 The Treaty of Riga was quite favorable to Poland, which received considerable territory in the east and financial compensations as well. See Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 18.
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sia heightened Soviet-Polish animosity and made the use of force appear espeCially attractive.
First we examine the issue of the balance of power. The underlying cause of the Russo? ? Polish war was each side's sense of insecurity. For the Poles, expansion was seen as essential to ensure their long-term security against Germany and Russia. Pilsudski "described himself as a "realist, without prejudices or theories," and Poland's unhappy past had taught him that
? Poland would either be "a state equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that needed protection of the mighty. " He saw the revolution in Russia and the German defeat in World War I as a once-in-a-lifetime oppor- tunity and believed that the conquest of the borderlands would give Poland the size and strength it needed to survive. Failing to seize this chance, by contrast, would doom Poland to permanent inferiority. 138
Soviet behavior reflected similar concerns. In addition to the ideological commitment to world revolution, Soviet leaders saw the creation of addi- tional Soviet republics as the best way to protect Soviet Russia from outside interference. If Poland remained independent and tied to the West, Russia would be cut off from Europe and the prospects for subsequent revolutions would decrease. Even before the Red Arrriy had crossed the Polish border, in fact, Trotsky had declared that the existence of an independent bourgeois Poland was a threat to Soviet Russia. 139 If the Polish government were over- thrown, however, Russia would be more secure in the short term and better able to support revolutionary efforts elsewhere. Moreover, the restoration of Russian authority in the borderlands would eliminate the threat of further
Polish encroachments or a renewed counterrevolutionary invasion.
By contrast, ideological antipathies played only a secondary role. Al- though Pilsudski declared Bolshevism to be a "purely Russian disease" and sought to push this "foreign way of life" as far from Poland as possible, his main focus was on the balance of power. Poland's leaders were equally hos- tile to the Whites; as Pilsudski put it, "Irrespective of what her government will be Russia is terribly imperialistic. " The head of the Polish Socialist Party opposed Allied proposals for Polish intervention in Russia by saying_ "We want to be neither the advance guard nor the gendarmerie of the East," and the leader of the Populist Party stated, "A struggle against Bolshevism in particular is neither our aim nor our task. " Instead, the Polish Supreme Command emphasized that the main goal was territory, because the "re-
duction of Russia to her historical frontiers is a condition of [Poland's] exis? tence. " Ort the Soviet side, ideology exacerbated Soviet fears and inflated their hopes of spreading the revolution, but as Pyotr Wandycz notes, even
1? 38 Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 159-60; and also see temer, "Poland in 1920," 409?
139 See Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98.
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in their case "ideological motives blended with the requirements of Russian
raison d'etat. "140
In sum, relations between bourgeois Poland and revolutionary Russia displayed the classic symptoms of an intense security dilemma. Both states saw their own expansion as necessary for their security and expansion by the other as a serious threat.
The security dilemma between Russia and Poland was compounded by a second factor, perception of intent. Each side believed that the other was hostile, sentiments that were reinforced by ignorance and ideology, com- bined with the adversary's subsequent behavior. Thus, relations between Soviet Russia and Poland confirm the tendency for revolutionary states to enter a spiral of suspicion with other powers. The shared belief that war was inevitable provided both sides with a powerful incentive to initiate it as soon as circumstances seemed favorable.
Polish behavior gave the Soviet government ample grounds for suspi- cion. The murder of four Russian Red Cross officials by Polish security forces in January 1919 was a clear warning, and Poland's refusal to negoti- ate and its steady movement east convinced Lenin and Trotsky that their ef- forts at accommodation had simply invited further aggression. The Polish invasion in April merely confirmed Soviet perceptions of threat and in- creased their incentive to replace the Polish state with a Soviet regime. 141
These perceptions of Polish hostility were magnified by the belief that Poland was a tool of the Entente. Lenin believed that with the Polish capture of Wilno the Entente "became even more impudent," and he saw the inva- sion as imperialism's latest attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. 142 The Bolsheviks still feared a renewal of Allied support for the Whites, and! Wrangel's spring offensive seemed too well timed to be purely coincidental. This image of implacable imperialist aggression was reinforced when King George of England sent a message congratulating the Poles on the two hun- dredth anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, which the Soviets in- correctly saw as an endorsement of the Polish invasion. 143
141 As one Bolshevik leader declared in July, "With these people [the Poles) there can be no peace. . . . [The] historical strife between Russia and Poland must end by friendship and uni- fication ofthe Russian and Polish Soviet republics. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 174, 221; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 29.
142 In May, Lenin told a group of soldiers that Poland's invasion had been "instigated by the Entente," and he later declared that "international capital . . . was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:431, and Collected Works, Jl:JOl. For Lenin's reaction to the seizure of Wilno, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 128.
143 Some Bolshevik leaders saw the British government as divided between hardline anti- Bolsheviks and moderate advocates of accommodation, but Lenin told Trotsky that the talks in England "have shown withfull clarity that England is helping and will help both the Poles and Wrangel. There is absolutely only one line. " Lenin's appraisal was incorrect, as the British had rejected Polish requests for military ai. d in the fall of 1919 and did little to aid the Poles.
140 See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 107-108, 126-27, 198, 287.
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Polish suspicions of Russia were equally intense. In addition to reacting to a long history of Russian domination, the Poles understandably read the Bolsheviks' early attempts to establish "Soviet" republics in the Baltic states and Byelorussia as evidence of expansionist intentions. Pilsudski was con- vinced that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and he viewed the var- ious Soviet peace offers simply as attempts to buy time. 144
The defensive expansionism that drove subsequent Soviet and Polish policies underscored each state's worst fears. Poland began planning an all- out offensive in December 1919, and Lenin told Trotsky in February to "get ready for war with Poland. " Soviet preparations just strengthened the Poles' desire to strike first. 145
Momentum for war was increased by mutual perceptions. of an offen- sive advantage. In addition to believing that war was inevitable, both sides believed that they would win a swift and decisive victory. The repa- triation of Polish units at the end of World War I had brought the Polish Army up to a strength of 590,000 troops, and an assault on Pinsk in March 1920 had been surprisingly easy. In addition, the Poles were aware that Russia had been weakened by the revolution and distracted by the civil war, an assessment shared by foreign military experts and several Soviet leaders as well. 146
The Poles also recognized that this opportunity was unlikely to last. Vic- tories over Kolchak and Yudenich allowed the Soviets to fo? s more atten- tion on Poland, and Soviet troop strength in the west increased steadily after January 1920. Concerned that the Soviets would draw out the peace talks in order to build up their forces, Pilsudski decided to seize the opportunity be- fore the window closed. Thus, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920 contains elements of preventive and preemptive war: Pilsudski at- tacked while the balance of power still favored Poland and "to forestall by his offensive an attack by Soviet troops/ti47
SeeUllman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 137-47, 163, 173-83; Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 45, 100-101, 168; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 161-62, 211-12; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 92--93, 172-73- 220, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20," 132-% and Marjan Kukiel, "The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920," Slavonic Review 8, no. 1 (1929), 59?
144 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 26-27, 65; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 144-45.
145 Pilsudski told a French journalist in March, "My impression of Bolshevik behavior is that peace is out of the question. I know the Bolsheviks are concentrating large forces on our front. They are making a mistake. . . . Our Army is ready. " See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 88, 98--<)9; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 167, 1 78.
146 Pilsudski referred to White and Red Russia as "cadavers" and tried to get Wrangel to renew the war in southern Russia so as to stretch the Soviet forces even further. See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 83-85; Brinkley, Volunteer Army, 209-10; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Rela- tions, 141, 147-49, 167, 17); and Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 32-34.
147 This assessment was made by a group of Soviet historians. Similarly, French general Maxime Weygand later termed the Polish assault a "preventive offensive. " See Wandycz, So- viet-Polish Relations, 194; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 87-88.
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When the tide turned in June, however, the Soviets succumbed to their own optimistic delusions. The march on Warsaw was predicated on the be- lief that the campaign would be over before the Entente could come to Poland's rescue; and by the hope that the Polish proletariat would greet the Red Army as liberators. Despite their awareness of Poland's anti-Russian propensities, their ideological commitment to world revolution left the So- viets vulnerable to this kind of optimism even in the face of considerable contrary evidence. Polish Communists warned Lenin that a revolution in Poland was unlikely, but his normal caution evaporated in the face of the Red Army's successful advance and other apparently encouraging signs. His hopes for a revolution in the West had been renewed by the failure of the right-wing Kapp putsch in Germany in March 1920 (which he saw as analogous to the Kornilov revolt that had preceded the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917). The first signs from Poland seemed favorable as well, and reports from England and France suggested strong public opposition to any attempt to aid the Poles. 148
Uncertainty and misinformation contributed to all these miscalculations.
Soviet Russia and Poland correctly saw each other as hostile, but the level of animosity was blown out of proportion and the benefits of using force ex- aggerated. The Soviets erroneously blamed Polish expansionism on imperi- alist hostility and played up the revolutionary prospects in Poland, while mistakenly viewing working-class opposition to Allied intervention as evi- dence of Europe's own revolutionary potential. 149 For their part, the Poles overstated their own ability to attract popular support in the borderlands and underestimated the Bolsheviks' military capability and political resolve. Thus, not only was each side relatively ignorant about the other's true ca- pabilities, but each misread its own ability to impose a political solution by force.
In sum, the Russo-Polish war presents a vivid illustration of how revolu- tions foster security competition and war. Both Russia and Poland faced se- rious security problems that neither could solve without endangering the
148 Lenin's optimism about revolutionary prospects in Europe was nicely expressed in a message to Stalin in July: "The situation in Comintem is splendid . . . it is time to encourage revolution in Italy. . . . For this to happen, Hungary must be sovietized, and maybe also the Czech Lands and Romania. " He later maintained that attacking Poland would help sovietize Lithuania and Poland and aid the revolution in Germany, and that even failure "will teach us about offensive wiu . . . . We will help Hungary, Italy, and at each step we will remember where to stop. " Quoted in Volkogonov, Lenin, 388; and also see Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 102-103.
149 France supported the Polish initiative, but the Polish government made its decisions in- dependently. See Michael Jabara Carley, "Anti-Bolshevism in French Foreign Policy: The Cri- sis in Poland in 1920," International History Review 2, no. 3 (1980), and "The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: The French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920," Historical ]ourna/ 19, no. 1 (1976).
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other. Both sides saw the other as aggressive, and these perceptions of hos- tility grew as each state took steps to protect itself. The revolution in Russia had created a seemingly large window of opportunity, and with Poland and Russia both preparing for a war they regarded as inevitable, it is not sur- prising that the Poles moved first. Ideology reinforced the Soviet belief that Poland was a eat's paw of the Entente and fueled their hopes for an upris- ing there (although Moscow reversed course when the anticipated uprising failed to occur). Thus, by altering each side's evaluation of the balance of threats, the revolution in Russia made war with Poland virtually inevitable.
THE STRATEGY OF "PEACEFUL CoEXISTENCE"
By late 1920, the failure of Con. 1munist revolts in Germany, Hungary, and Austria had cast doubt on Soviet hopes that the revolution would soon spread to the rest of Europe. The abortive invasion of Poland merely rein- forced this trend, and Soviet officials began to abandon the belief that war with the West was inevitable and imminent. Instead, Lenin now foresaw an indefinite period of "peaceful coexistence.
"150 Soviet Russia was badly in need of peace and economic reconstruction after seven years of war and rev- olution, and the Bolsheviks also believed that their capitalist opponents needed Russian markets and raw materials. Western hopes that the White armies would soon eliminate the Soviet regime had proved equally mis-
taken, and leaders on both sides saw the restoration of economic ties as the best way to accelerate recovery and enhance security. This more cooperative approach yield\ed a number of tangible benefits-although Soviet efforts to build more normal relations were repeatedly compromised by lingering suspicions and their continued commitment to world revolution.
The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
As noted earlier, Lloyd George had begun to advocate the restoration of trade with Russia at the end of 1919, and he told the House of Commons in February 1920, "We have failed to restore Russia to sanity by force. I believe we can save her by trade. " A broad spectrum of British business, labor, and political leaders endorsed this policy, arguing that it would help revive Britain's sagging economy. They also pointed out that other countries
150 As Lenin put it in November 1920: "Today we have to speak, not merely of a breathing space, but of there being a serious chance of a new and lengthy period of development. " Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic De- velopment in the 1920s," International History Review 1, no. 1 (1979), 61; and see also Jacobson, When the. Soviet Union Entered, 18-19.
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would capture the Russian market if Britain failed to act, and that access to Russian grain would improve Europe's food supply. 151
The chief motive behind the trade negotiations, however, was political. 152 The government was worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the British Empire, and Lloyd George saw the restoration of trade as a way to persuade the Soviet government to abandon its subversive activities. 153 Accordingly, tlhe British insisted that any trade agreement include "a mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party and from direct or indirect official propaganda. " The fear of Bolshevik subversion, which had once justified support for the Whites, now became a rationale for accommodation. 154
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations. Despite each side's obvious in- terest in restoring commercial ties, the negotiations faced several impressive obstacles. British conservatives still mistrusted the Bolsheviks, and their suspicions were not allayed by the Soviets' public commitment to exporting their revolution. The British government was facing renewed unrest in Ire- land, several rebellious colonies, a threatened strike by the Miners' Federa- tion, and the formation of a trade union Council of Action to oppose British involvement in the Russo-Polish war. Opponents of the trade talks blamed working-class agitation on the presence of the Soviet delegation, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson began preparations for a military campaign against the Council of Action in August. Sir Basil Thomson, chief of intelli-
151 Lloyd George told Parliament, "The withdrawal of Russia from the supplying markets is contributing to high prices, high cost of living, and to scarcity and hunger. Russia supplied before the war one-fourth of the whole export wheat of the world. . . . The world needs it. " Quoted in Coates and Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 15-16; and see also Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 15-20, 37; Alfred L. P. Dennis, TheForeign Policies ofSoviet Russia (New York: E. P. Dut- ton, 1924), 381-83; Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Rev- olution, I9IJ-I92J (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 328; and Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1 92cr24 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 15-16.
152 According to Thompson and White, Lloyd George "had never abandoned his hopes for some sort of peaceful settlement in Russia," and the trade talks provided a cover for discus- sions whose "real substance had remained pre-eminently political throughout. " See Thomp- son, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 347; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 7?
153 The First Congress of the Communist International in March 1919 had anticipated "open risings and unrest in all colonies" and the liberation of "colonial slaves" by the victo- rious proletariat. Zinoviev called for a "holy war against British imperialism" at a "Congress of Peoples of the East" in September, the Soviet government established a school for training Asian revolutionaries in Tashkent, and fifteen hundred Bolshevik agents were reported to be in India. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:245-{)o; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 349-51, 357-{)7; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 82-<)6, 98-104, 11? r24.
154 They also demanded that the Soviet government undertake "not to join in military ac- tivities or propaganda conducted by the Asiatic peoples against British interests or the British Empire. " Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:192-93.
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gence for the Home Office, told the Cabinet in September, "The Russian Trading Delegation has become a greater menace to the stability of this country than anything that has happened since the Armistice. " And where Lloyd George believed that these dangers could be defused by a combina- tion of an armistice in Poland, a trade agreement with Russia, and the ban on Bolshevik propaganda, to his Conservative opponents the threat of rev- olution was a sufficient reason to abandon the talks forthwith. 155
Soviet officials were equally suspicious, and Lenin warned Krasin that "that swine Lloyd George has no scruples or shame in the way he deceives: don't believe a word he says and gull him three times as much. "156 They also exaggerated the revolutionary potential of the British working class, and their misplaced optimism nearly derailed the negotiations completely. 157 In August, the new Soviet negotiator in London, Lev Kamenev, misled the British government regarding the peace terms the Soviets had offered to Poland in order to buy time for the Red Army to reach Warsaw. 158 Kamenev also held several meetings with members of the Council of Action and other left-wing groups and gave ? 75,000 to the left-wing Daily Herald, thereby vi- olating the pledge not to interfere in British domestic politics. The exposure of these deceptions led conservatives to demand the immediate expulsion of the Soviet trade delegation, and Lloyd George promptly informed Kamenev that he was no longer welcome. 159
155 See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 51-52, 222-24, 265-85. On the Council of Action, see White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 43-51 .
156 Chicherin wired Krasin that the Foreign Office was "playing a mos? perfidious and base double-faced game," and Lenin argued that British proposals for a ceasefire in Poland were intended "to snatch victory out of our hands with the aid of false promises. '' Kamenev's own views were more moderate, and he told Lloyd George in August that he was aware that "nei- ther Poland nor Wrangel had the direct support of the British Government. " See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 116-17, 121-22, 166; and Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, eds. , Documents on1British Foreign Policy, 1 9 1 9-1939, 1st ser. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1958), 8:686.
57 Soviet officials knew that Lloyd George's interest in a trade agreement was based in part on his desire to end Bolshevik propaganda, and Chicherin told Krasin to "make it clear that we are able to cause [England] serious damage in the East if we so wish. " He added: "Picture to them what will happen if we send a Red Army to Persia, Mesopotamia, and Afghanistan. We are awaited and yearned for there, and it is only the moderation of our policy which causes a slow development [of the revolutionary situation] in that country. " Quoted in Ull- man, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 122.
158 Kamenev omitted the Soviet demand that the Polish Army be disarmed and replaced by a "worker's militia" organized under Russian auspices. Ironically, Chicherin had tried to convince Kamenev to make this demand public in order to stimulate revolutionary attitudes among British workers. See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 253-64.
159 After meeting with representatives from the Council of Action on August 7, Kamenev wired Chicherin that "the workers are coming forward on our side, not because we are right or wrong, but because they must be with Russia at all costs; and on any terms. " Similarly, after Soviet hopes for the conquest of Poland had faded, Lenin was still instructing Kamenev to "use all your forces to explain [Lloyd George's treacherous aggression] to the British work- ers. Write articles for them yourself . . . teach them how to agitate among the masses. In this
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Lloyd George was still committed to restoring normal relations, however, and he managed to exempt Krasin from the charges leveled at Kamenev. The basic terms for an agreement had been in place since June, but disputes over a final prisoner exchange and several other issues delayed the final sig- nature until March 1921. In addition to the economic arrangements, each party agreed to "refrain from hostile action . . . and from conducting outside its own borders any hostile propaganda. " The Soviets specifically pledged not to interfere in India or Afghanistan; Britain made a similar commitment regarding the territories of the former Russian Empire. 160
The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement illustrates some of the other obstacles that can impede efforts to normalize relations with a revolutionary regime. First, in addition to each side's suspicions and the complications raised by the Russo-Polish war, the negotiations were prolonged by the inherent diffi- culty of measuring the level of threat that a revolutionary power represents. In 1920, the Bolshevik threat to British interests was based not on Russian economic or military power but on the appeal of Bolshevik ideas, yet no one knew how broadly appealing these ideas really were. Men such as Basil Thomson recognized that the Council of Action was primarily an antiwar movement and not a revolutionary organization, but they could not be cer- tain that pro-Bolshevik sentiment was not growing beneath the surface. In- deed, Sir Henry Wilson eventually became convinced that Lloyd George himself was a Bolshevik and tried to organize a campaign to force him from office. 161 In the same way, Kamenev's misconduct while in England followed from the belief that England was ripe for a revolution, even though his ef- forts to encourage one merely hardened Conservative attitudes and jeopar- dized the process of accommodation. Thus, uncertainty about Britain's revolutionary potential made both sides less willing to compromise.
Interestingly, other forms of uncertainty may have facilitated the negotia- tions. Because of their ignorance about economic conditions in Russia, the British may have exaggerated the economic benefits of trade and thereby overstated their own interest in accommodation. Similarly, the claim that a trade agreement would strengthen Russian "moderates" reveals both wish- ful thinking and the British leaders' continued failure to understand the basic nature of the Soviet system. Interest in the trade agreement was also fueled by unwarranted concerns about Communist subversion in the rest of the British empire, which increased the desire to silence Soviet propaganda. 162
? lies your chief task. " Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 224-25, 254, 269. On Kamenev's expulsion, see Butler and Bury, British Documents, 783-91.
160 The text of the agreement is reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 474-78.
161 For the details of this fascinating episode, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 274-81, 307-3o8.
162 Ullman,Anglo-SovietAccord,415-19,438-43.
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Thus, despite enduring suspicions, continued insecurity, deep domestic opposition, and a host of misconceptions, Britain and Russia managed to take the first step toward a more normal relationship. Above all else, their willingness to do so reveals a growing recognition of the postwar balance of threats. Although Churchill and Curzon continued to oppose the trade agreement on the grounds that Soviet Russia "makes no secret of its inten- tions to overthrow our institutions everywhere," the claim that the Soviet
government could be toppled easily was now untenable. Lloyd George drew the obvious conclusion: if Bolshevism could not be eliminated, then Britain should come to terms with it. Similarly, although Soviet leaders had not abandoned their hope for a world revolution, they were begin- ning to realize that it might not be imminent and were becoming increas- ingly aware of their own economic liabilities. 163 Agreeing to mute their propaganda offensive was a small price to pay for recognition and the restoration of trade, which they believed would foster recovery and dis- courage a renewed imperialist offensive. Not surprisingly, similar calcula-
tions were beginning to shape Soviet relations with a number of other countries as well.
Soviet Diplomacy in Asia
The Soviet government saw the developing world as a natural ally in the struggle against imperialism, and the liberation of the colonial areas re- ceived particular attention at the Second Comintern Congress in July and August of 1920. 164 The Soviets began cultivating close ties with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and China during this period. In each case, the desire to enhance the security of the Soviet state proved stronger than the commit- ment to world revolution.
Before World War I, Persia's position in international politics was defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which gave Russia a sphere of in- fluence in the north of Persia and Britain a sphere of influence in the south. The Soviet government renounced these treaty rights in January 1918, and British forces moved into the vacuum as Russia withdrew. The pro-British Cabinet of Vusuq al-Dawlah signed a new Anglo-Persian treaty on August
163 In November, Lenin admitted, "Though we have not yet won a world victory . . . we have fought our way into a position where we can coexist with the capitalist powers, who now are forced to have trade relations with us. " In December, he acknowledged that "the speed, the tempo, at which revolution is developing in the capitalist countries is far slower than it was in our country. " Quotations from Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 412; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:540.
164 At the congress, Lenin called for "the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the na- tional and colonial liberation movements. " Lenin, Selected Works, 3:434; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:251-59.
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9, 1919; had it been ratified, the agreement would have given Britain de facto control over much of Persia's foreign and domestic policy. 165
Britain's attempt to solidify its influence in Persia sparked a storm of protests, however, and the situation was complicated further when Mirza Kuchik Khan, a dissident nationalist, proclaimed an independent "Republic of Gilan" in northern Persia and began receiving aid and military backing from the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan. The British withdrawal from northern Persia following a Soviet raid on Enzeli shook Persian confidence in British protection, and the Persian government quickly dispatched an envoy to Russia to negotiate the resumption of relations.
British officials responded by arranging for a Persian colonel, Reza Shah, to conduct a coup d'etat in January 1921. 166 This move appeared to backfire when Reza denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and signed a formal treaty of friendship with the Soviet government in February 1921. The Sovi- ets again renounced any special privileges in Persia, but the treaty autho- rized their entry "should a third power intervene with armed force" on Persian territory. 167 Reza Shah carefully maintained his freedom of action, however, suppressing local Communists and refusing to allow the Soviet ambassador to enter Tehran until all Soviet forces had withdrawn from Per- sian soil. The Soviets abandoned KUchik Khan as relations with Tehran im- proved, and the "Republic of Gilan" quickly collapsed. All told, the initial course of Soviet-Persian relations offered an early indication of Moscow's willingness to disregard immediate revolutionary objectives for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 168
Soviet relations with Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. Prior to World War I, Afghanistan lay largely within the British sphere of influence, but the revolution in Russia inspired Emir Amanullah to declare war on
165 The Soviets renounced any "spheres of influence and exclusive interests" in Persia at Brest-Litovsk, and Lenin sent a formal message to the government of Persia "repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. " See R. K. Ra- mazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 150o-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Char- lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), 148-51; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:232 n. 2; George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), 49-50; and Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927 (Geneva: Michael Joseph,
1966), 154?
166 For an account of the coup that stresses the British role, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 355-57, 376-8;8 for a version downplaying it, see Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran, 176-77.
167 The Soviet-Persian treaty was an obvious attempt to balance against Great Britain, but Reza Shah recognized that Russia was a potential threat as well. He therefore tried to main- tain cordial relations with Britain and the United States, a policy consistent with Persia's tra- ditional practice of seeking third powers to balance British and Soviet pressure. See Ramazani, Foreign PolicyofIran, 203-11, 3o8-309.
168 The Soviet ambassador told Khan, "Soviet Russia at this time regards all revolutionary movements as not only fruitless but also harmful. Therefore, Soviet Russia has adopted a new form of policy as evidenced by its new treaty with the government of Iran. " Quoted in R a m a z a n i , F o r e i g n P o l i c y of I r a n , 1 9 1 .
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Britain in April 1919 and request aid from Moscow. The Soviet government was in no position to help, however, and Amanullah's forces were soon de- feated. Britairi acknowledged Afghan independence in August, and Lenin subsequently sent a telegram to the emir proposing a trade agreement and a treaty of friendship directed against "the most rapacious imperialist gov- ernment on Earth-Great Britain. "169
This offer led directly to the Soviet-Afghan treaty of February 1921. Ideo- logical solidarity played no role in this agreement (if anything, Amanullah's pan-Islamic beliefs were a potential threat to Soviet control in Central Asia), and the treaty failed to prevent a number of serious disagreements between Moscow and Kabul. 170 Like the Persians, the Afghanis were primarily inter- ested in balancing between Britain and Russia, and the Soviet-Afghan treaty was followed by a similar agreement with Great Britain in November.
Russia's policy toward Afghanistan offers further evidence of its prag- matic approach to diplomatic relations with the border states, particularly in areas where the threat of imperialist interference was especially acute. E. H. Carr notes, "What was significant in all this was not the extension of propaganda for world revolution but the succession of Soviet Russia to the traditional Russian role as Britain's chief rival in central Asia. "171
Soviet policy toward Turkey also sought to counter Western (especially British) influence. Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been rivals for centuries, but Soviet Russia and the new Turkish state found them- selves united by a number of common interests. Clandestine discussions between Karl Radek and several prominent members of the Young Turk movement had already raised the possibility of a Soviet-Turkish alliance against British imperialism. Chicherin broadcast a radio message warning of the dangers of imperialism and proposing Soviet-Turkish cooperation to "expel the European robbers" in September 1919. Until the summer of
1920, however, Soviet hopes rested primarily on the Turkish Communist movement. 172
As discussed at length below in chapter 6, foreign interference in Turkey eventually caused a nationalist revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a prominent Ottoman general. In April 1920, when the revolt was well un- derway, Kemal sent a formal note to Moscow proposing diplomatic rela-
169 Lenin'smessagecongratulatedtheAfghanpeopleontheirstruggleagainst"foreignop- pressors" and referred to the "wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others. " Quoted in Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 1:285-86.
}29CH)2.
171 BolshevikRevolution,3:292. 172 Ibid. , 3:244-47?
170 The
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main dispute concerned the emir of Bokhara, who was ousted by a Bolshevik "Young Bokharan" movement in September 1920. The emir fled to Afghanistan while his supporters tried to oust the new government, and this incident delayed the Soviet-Afghan treaty for several months. See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 222-28; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution,
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tions and a joint "struggle against foreign imperialism which threatens both countries. "173
The harsh peace terms imposed at Versailles accelerated the Soviet-Turk- ish rapprochement. Turkey and Russia began direct negotiations in Moscow in July, and a Soviet representative arrived in Ankara in November. A friendship treaty emphasizing "their solidarity in the struggle against im- perialism" was signed in March 1921; six months later, the Treaty of Kars settled the remaining border disputes between the new Turkish state and the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 174
Despite these favorable developments, Russia and Turkey faced several enduring disputes during this period. Both states still coveted parts of Transcaucasia, and Kemal's overt anti-Communism was an obvious irritant as well. Soviet self-interest soon overcame any ideological inclinations, and Russia sent a military delegation to Ankara in November 1921 and agreed to provide a subsidy of 3? 5 million gold rubles and enough arms and amum ni- tion for three divisions. This gesture did little to bind Turkey to Moscow, however, and when the Greeks withdrew following their final defeat in 1922, Kemal moved away from Moscow and suppressed the Turkish Com- munist Party even more vigorously. Turkey also reversed its earlier position
on the Turkish Straits and agreed to negotiate a new arrangement with the . Western powers. The Soviets' response to these setbacks was restrained, a policy that paid off when Turkey insisted that Russia be invited to partici- pate in the negotiations for a new straits regime. 175
On the whole, Soviet relations with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey are best seen as attempts to balance against a common threat. They are thus en- tirely consistent with the dictates of realpolitik. At the same time, Bolshevik ideology clearly affected Moscow's evaluation of alternative partners. The 1921 friendship treaties both stabilized Soviet relations with three of its neighboring countries and presented a worrisome threat to Western influ- ence in the developing world. Although maintaining these connections re- quired Moscow to overlook the persecution of local Communist groups, it was a small price to pay for such obvious diplomatic benefits.
The Far East did not at first appear to be an area of great revolutionary potential. The "Congress of Peoples of the East" held in Baku in 1920 fo- cused primarily on the Near East and South Asia, and the first "Congress of Toilers of the Far East" did not meet until January 1922. The Soviet govern- ment played a only minor role in the founding of the Chinese and Japanese
173 Quoted in ibid. , 248; and also see Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif.
