In the thought symphony of those forty years the Kantian doctrine forms the theme, and
idealism
its development.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Cf.
Picavet, Ideologues, 86 ff .
4 It is the more to be lamented that Bentham later in his Deontology at tempted to give a kind of popular catechism of the utilitarian morals, which, in radical one-sidedness, in rancour and lack of understanding for other moral systems, equals the worst products of the time of the Revolution.
• William Godwin (1766-1836) published his Inquiry concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness in 1793. Cf. C. Kegan Paul, W. Godwin, his Friends and Contemporaries, Lond. 1876, and L. Stephen, English Thought, II. 264 ff.
(cf.
Chap. 2, § 37. ] Problem of Civilisation : France. 523
the social storm is beard in the literature of the Revolution, as dull thunder still dying away in the distance. The investigations con cerning the problems of political economy, which in France especially were chiefly promoted by the physiocratic school, became more and more comprehensive, and were grounded with increasing indepen dence upon empirical principles. But while the theory of the state demanded, above all, security of possessions, there rose, from the depth of society, the question as to the right ofpersonal property ; and while the philosophers considered with more and more dissen
sion the problem, how the interests of the community could be reconciled with those of the individual (cf. below), the thought forced its way to the surface that the ground of all evil with the human race lies in the striving after individual possessions, and that a social morality and a moral society will begin with the denun ciation of this original sin, and not till then. Such communistic ideas were thrown to the world by Mably and Morelly, and a Babeuf made the first abortive conspiracy to carry out these ideas, under the Directory.
3. But the socio/ question had already before this cast up its waves from its lowest depth. The contrast between the classes representing luxurious wealth and most wretched poverty, which had so great importance among the causes of the Revolution, might indeed at first be more palpable and effective; but it first acquired its full sharpness by virtue of the antithesis between culture and non-culture, which was linked with it by the whole development of European life, and this separating chasm was deepest and baldest in the age of the Enlightenment The more the age plumed itself upon its "culture," the more evident it became that this was in the main a privilege of the property-owning class. In this point, too, English Deism had led the way with typical frankness. The religion of reason should be reserved for the cultivated man, just as the free, beautiful morality should be : for the ordinary man, on the other hand, Shajiesbury held, the promises and threatenings of positive religion must remain standing as a wheel and gallows.
Tolnnd, too, had presented his cosmopolitan natural worship as an "esoteric" doctrine, and when the later Deists began to carry these ideas among the people in popular writings, iMrd Bolingbroke, him self a free-thinker of the most pronounced kind, declared them to be a pest of society, against which the sharpest means were the best Among the German Deists, also, men like Semler would have a very careful separation made between religion as a private matter and religion as a public order.
The French Enlightenment, as the relation of Voltaire to Boling
524 The Enlightenment: Practical Question*. {Fart V.
broke shows, was from the beginning decidedly more democratic Indeed, it had the agitative tendency to play off the enlighten ment of the masses against the exclusive self-seeking of the upper ten thousand. But with this was completed a revolution, by virtue of which the Enlightenment necessarily turned against itself. . For if in those strata in which it first took hold " culture " or civilisa tion had such consequences as appeared in the luxury of the " higher " classes, if it had been able to do s« little in the way of yielding fruits that could be used for the needs of the masses also, its value must appear all the more doubtful the more philosophy regarded the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the proper standard for the estimation of things and actions.
In this connection the problem of civilisation shaped itself out for modern philosophy : the question whether and how far civilisation, i. e. intellectual improvement (which is a historical fact), and the change in human impulses and in the relations of human life, which has been connected with it — whether and in how far this civilisa tion has served to further the moral order and man's true happiness. The more proudly and self-complacently the average Enlightener praised the progress of the human mind, which had reached in him its summit of a clear and distinct rational life in theory and prac tice, the more burning and — uncomfortable this question became.
It is raised first, though not in a direct and square statement, by Mandeville. In his psychology an extreme adherent of the selfish system, he sought to show, as against Shaftesbury, that the whole life and charm of the social system rests solely upon the struggle which self-seeking individuals carry on in their own interests — a principle which worked also upon Adam Smith in his doctrine of supply and demand. 1 If we should think of man as stripped bare of all egoistic impulses (this is the meaning of the Fable ofthe Bees), and provided only with the "moral" qualities of altruism, the social mechanism would stand still from j^re absence of regard for self. The motive power in civilisation is solely egoism, and, therefore, we must not be surprised if civilisation displays its activity, not by heightening the moral qualities, but only by refining and dis guising egoism. And the individual's happiness is as little enhanced by civilisation as his morality. If it were increased, the egoism, on which the progress of civilisation rests, would be thereby weak ened. In truth, it appears, rather, that every improvement of the material condition, brought about by intellectual advance, calls forth new and stronger wants in the individual, in consequence of which
1 Cf. Lange, Gesch. d. Mater. , I. 285 [Eng. tr. I. 296].
Chap. J, S 37. ] Problem of Civilisation : Mandeville, Rousseau. 525
he becomes more and more discontented ; and so it turns out that the apparently so brilliant development of the whole is accomplished only at the cost of the morality and happiness of the individual.
4. In Mandeville these thoughts appear in a mild suggestion, and at the same time, in the repelling form of a cynical commendation of the egoism, whose " private vices " are " public benefits. " They attained an importance for world-literature through the brilliant turn given them by Rousseau. With him the question concerned nothing more and nothing less than the worth of all human history — its worth for the morality and happiness of individuals. And he cast into the face of the Enlightenment the reproach that all growth in knowledge, and all refinement of life, had but made man more and more untrue to his true vocation and his true nature.
History with its artificial structure of civilised society has deterio rated man : ' he came forth from the hand of Nature good and pure, but bis development has separated him from Nature step by step. The beginning of this "degeneration" Rousseau, in his second Dis course, found in the creation of property, which had for its result the division of labour, and with this the separation of the classes and, ulti mately, the awakening of all evil passions : this it was that enlisted the work of the intellect permanently in the service of self-seeking.
In comparison with this unnatural condition of civilised barbarism the state of Nature appears at first as the lost paradise, and in this sense the sentimental yearning of a time intellectually and morally blaxe" found its nourishment in Rousseau's writings, above all in the New Heloise. The ladies of the salon were carried away with enthu siasm for the Gessnerian pastoral idyl; but on this account they mis-heard the admonition of the great Genevan.
For he did not wish to lead back to that state of Nature which had no society. He was convinced that man is provided by his creator with a capacity for being perfected (perfertibilite) which makes the development of his natural endowment both a duty and a natural necessity. If this development has been guided into wrong paths by the historical process which has hitherto prevailed, and, therefore, has led to demoralisation and wretchedness, history must be begun anew; in onler to find the right way toward his devel opment man must return from the unnatural condition of intellectual pride to the simple natural state of feeling, from the narrowness and falsehood of relations of society to his pure unstunted self. For this end, according to Rousseau, humanity as a whole needs a
' The KnglUh Deinu' conception of the history of religion (cf. | 36, 8) U extended by Kou»»e«u to all niatory.
626 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Pakt V.
jwlttical constitution, which affords the individual full freedom of personal activity in connection with the life of the whole body, and in accordance with the principle of equality of rights ; and as indi viduals, humanity needs an education,1 which allows the natural endowments of the individual to unfold from his own vitality without constraint. The optimism, which Rousseau finds in the constitution of the natural God-descended nature of man, makes him hope that our condition will be better, the more freely and naturally we can develop.
5. While we thus find Rousseau in lively opposition to the his torical development, and in the zealous endeavour to put in its stead a new development "according to Nature," the last reconciling synthesis of the ideas of the Enlightenment is the endeavour to understand the previous course of human history itself as the natural development of human nature ; in this thought the phil osophy of the eighteenth century strips off all its one-sided- ness and reaches its highest consummation. The first stirring of this is found in an isolated appearance of Italian literature, with
Vico. * Influenced by the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of the Renais sance, especially by Campanella, and educated by Bodin and Grotius, he had grasped the idea of a general natural law of the development of life, which manifests itself in the history of peoples as well as in that of individuals, and with great learning had sought to prove this principle of the identity of all natural development. But if in such a conception of the naturally necessary correspondences between the different historical systems and the fundamental biological scheme, the thought of a purposeful inter-relation of the destinies of nations had remained foreign to him, this had previously found
1 In its details Rousseau's Smile frequently uses the " Thoughts," which Locke had advanced with a much more limited purpose for the education of a young man of higher station in society : there, too, the complete development of the individuality was the main thing, from which the turning away from learned one-sidedness, the direction of attention to the real and practical, the appeal to perception and the use of individual instead of general truths in instruction and education, followed as a matter of course. These principles, thought out for the Englishman of superior rank, Rousseau adopts as elements in an education which sought to develop in man, not the member of a definite class or of a future profession, but only "the man. " In this spirit his peda gogical doctrines passed over to the school of German philanthropy, which, under the lead of Basedow (1723-1790), combined the principle of natural develop ment with that of utility, and thought out the appropriate forms of an education for a community by which the individual should be trained to become by the natural way a useful member of human society.
2 Giov. Battista VYco (1668-1744) became influential chiefly through his Principj d1 una scienza nuova <f intorno alia commune natura delle nazioni
Of. K. Werner, Giambatlista V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher (Vienna, 1879) ; R. Flint, Vico (Edin. and Lond. 1884); and likewise for the following, Flint, The Philosophy of History in Europe, Vol new ed. , 1893.
(I72u).
I. ,
Chap. 2, § 37. ] Problem of Civilitation: Vico, Herder. 527
all the more forcible support in Boesuet} The French prelate con tinues the patristic philosophy of history , which had pushed the
into the centre of the world's events. He would have the christianising of modern nations through the empire of Charles the Great, regarded as the concluding and decisive epoch of uni versal history, the whole course of which is the work of divine
and the goal of which is the dominance of the one Catholic Church. Such a theological view of the world and of history had now, indeed, been energetically put aside by modern philosophy, but the meagreness of the results yielded for the con sideration of history by the treatment of human society from the point of view of individual psychology is seen in the trivial lucu brations of Iselin,1 in spite of his leaning upon Rousseau.
It was in a mind of Herder's universal receptiveness and fineness of feeling that Rousseau's ideas first found in this respect, also, a fruitful soil. But his optimism, which had matured in the atmos phere of Leibniz and Shaftesbury, did not allow him to believe in the possibility of that aberration which the Genevan would regard as the nature of previous history. He was rather convinced that the natural development of man is just that which has taken place in history. While Rousseau's conception of man's perfectibility was treated by the Genevan's French adherents, such as St. Lambert, and especially Contlorcet, as the voucher for a better future, and as an infinite perspective toward the perfecting of the race, Herder used it — against Rousseau — as a principle of explanation for the past, also, of the human family. History is nothing but the unin terrupted progress of natural development.
This concerned, above all, the beginning of history. The begin ning of the life of society is to be understood, not as an arbitrary act, whether of human reflection or of divine determination, but as a gradually formed result of the natural connection. It has neither been invented nor commanded, but has become. Characteristically enough, these opposing views as to the origin of history, asserted themselves earliest in theories of language. The individualism of associational psychology saw in language, as is manifest jwirticularly in the case of Condillac,* an invention of man, —supra-naturalism, defended in Germany by Suaamilch* saw a divine inspiration; here
1 Jacques Benigne Bottwt (1627-1704), the celebrated eloquent divine, wrote the Ditcourt mr T Hittoire L'nirenelle (l'aris, 1081) originally for the instruc tion of the Dauphin.
* Iaaak heiin of Ba*le (1728-1782) published in 1764 hia Philotophtichtn Mulhmatrungen iiher <lir CrKhichtt dt$ Mciuchheit, 2 vols.
* Istgiqtu and Langue <lr» Calruli.
* BeZoeiM, da$$ der Urtprung dtr menfckliehen Sprache gSttlich $ei (Berlin, 1766).
Redemption
providence,
528 The Enlightenment: Practical Questions. [Part V.
Rousseau had already spoken the word of solution when he saw in language a natural, involuntary unfolding of man's essential nature. 1
Herder not only made this conception his own (cf. above, § 33, 11), but he extended it also consistently to all man's activities in civilisation. He proceeds, therefore, in his philosophy of history from the point of view of man's position in Nature, from that of the conditions of life which the planet affords him, and from that of his peculiar constitution, to understand from these sources the beginnings and the direction of his historical development: and in the progress of his exposition of universal history he makes, like wise, the peculiar character of each people and of its historical sig nificance proceed from its natural endowments and relations. But at the same time the developments of the various nations do not fall apart in his treatment, as was still the case with Vico : on the con trary, they are all arranged organically as a great chain of ascend ing perfection. And they all form in this connected whole the ever-maturer realisation of the general constitution of human nature.
As man himself is the crown of creation, so his history is the unfolding of human nature. The Idea of Humanity explains the complicated movement of national destinies.
In this consideration, the unhistorical mode of thinking which had characterised the Enlightenment was overcome : every form in this great course of development was valued as the natural product of its conditions, and the " voices of the peoples " united to form the harmony of the world's history, of which humanity is the theme. And out of this sprang also the task of the future, — to bring to ever richer and fuller development all the stirrings of human nature, and to realise in living unity the ripe fruits of the historical development. In the consciousness of this task of the " world- literature," far from all the pride of the meaner Enlightenment, full of the presage and anticipation of a new epoch, Schiller could call out, in valedictory to the "philosophical century," the joyful words : —
" Wie schon, o Mensch, mit deinem Palmenzweige Stehst du an des Jahrhunderts Neige
In edler, s toiler Mftnnlichkeit ! " a
1 With his arguments, though in part of another opinion, St. Martin the Mystic attacked the crude presentation of Condillac's doctrine by Garat ; cf. Seances des jScoles Kormales, III. 61 ff.
* In rude paraphrase :
How fair, O man, with victory's palm,
Thou standest at the century's wane In noble pride of manliness.
PART VI.
THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.
F. K. Biedermann, Die deuttche Philotophie von Kant bit auf unttre Leipa. 1842 f.
K. L. Michelet, Entwiekelungtgetchichte der neueeten deuttehen Philotophie. Berlin, 1843.
C. Fortlage, Genetitche Qeschichte der Philotophie teit Kant. Leips. 1862.
O. Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen. Stuttgart, 1886.
Fr. Harms, Die Philotophie teit Kant. Berlin, 1876.
A. S. Willm, Hittoire de la Philotophie Allemande deputt Kant jutqu'i Hegel.
Paris, 1846 ft*.
II. Lotze, Oetchirhu der ^Etthetik in Deuttchland. Munich, 1868.
B. Flint, Philosophy of History in Europe, I. Edin. and Lond. 1874.
B. Fester, Rousseau und die deuttche Oesrhichltphilotophie. Stuttgart, 1800. [J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Boston, 1802. ]
A fortunate union of various intellectual movements produced in Germany, during the close of the preceding and at the beginning of the present century, a bloom of philosophy, which in the history of European thought can be compared only with the great develop ment of Greek philosophy from Socrates to Aristotle. In a devel opment, powerful alike in its intensity and extent, the German mind during the short span of four decades (1780-1820) produced a wealth of systems of philosophical Weltanschauung, grandly pro jected on all sides, such as has at no other time been compressed within so narrow a space ; and in all of these the thoughts of pre ceding philosophy combine to form characteristic and impressive structures. They appear in their totality as the ripe fruit of a long growth, out of which germs of a new development, as yet scarcely recognisable, are to spring.
This brilliant phenomenon had its general cause in the incompar able vigour and spirit with whioh the German nation at that time took up again with new strength, and carried to its completion, the movement of civilisation which began in the Renaissance and had
To the literature cited on pp. 348 and 437, we add : —
H. M. Chalybaeus, Hittorische Enttricklung der speculativen
Philosophie eon Kant bit Hegel. Dresden, 1837. [Tr. Edin. and Andover, 1864. ]
Tage.
530 The German Philosophy. [Part VL
been interrupted by external force. Germany attained the summit of its inner development at the same time that its outer history reached its lowest condition, — a process that has no equal in history. When it lay politically powerless, it created its world-conquering thinkers and poets. Its victorious power, however, lay just in the league between philosophy and poetry. The contemperaneousness of Kant and Goethe, and the combination of their ideas by Schiller, — these are the decisive characteristics of the time.
The history of philosophy at this point is most intimately inter woven with that of general literature, and the lines of mutual rela tion and stimulus run continuously back and forth. This appears characteristically in the heightened and finally decisive significance which fell in this connection to the problems and conceptions ozsthetics. Philosophy found thus opened before her a new world, into which she had hitherto had but occasional glimpses, and of which she now took possession as of the Promised Land. In their matter as well as their form, aesthetic principles gained the mastery, and the motives of scientific thought became interwoven with those of artistic vision to produce grand poetical creations in the sphere of abstract thought.
The ensnaring magic which literature thus exercised upon philos ophy rested mainly upon its historical universality. With Herder and Goethe begins what we call, after them, world-literature ; the conscious working out of true culture from the appropriation of all the great thought-creations of all human history. The Ro mantic School appears in Germany as the representative of this work. And, in analogy to this, philosophy also developed out of a wealth of historical suggestions ; it resorted with conscious deep ening of thought to the ideas of antiquity and of the Renaissance, it plunged intelligently into what the Enlightenment had shown, and ended in Hegel by understanding itself as the systematically penetrating and formative comprehension of all that the human mind had hitherto thought.
basis, without which all those suggestions from general literature would have remained without effect. This philosophical power to master
But for this mighty work it needed a new conceptional
the ideal material of history dwelt within the doctrine of Kant, and this is its incomparably high historical importance. Kant, by the newness and the greatness of his points of view, prescribed to the succeeding philosophy not only its problems, but also the means for their solution. His is the mind that determines and controls on all sides. The work of his immediate successors, in which his new principle unfolded itself in all directions and finished its life histor
of
The German Philosophy. 531
ically with an assimilation of earlier systems, is best comprehended in accordance with its most important characteristic, under the name of Idealism.
Hence we treat the history of the German Philosophy in two chapters, of which the first embraces Kant, and the second the de velopment of idealism.
In the thought symphony of those forty years the Kantian doctrine forms the theme, and idealism its development.
CHAPTER I.
THE CRITIQUE OF REASON.
C. L. Reinhold, Briefe iiber die Kantische Philosophic (Deutsch. Merkur, 1786 f. ). Leips. 1790 ff.
V. Cousin, Lecuns stir la Philosophic de Kant. Paris, 1842.
M. Desdouits, La Philosophic de Kant, d'apres les Trois Critiques. Paris, 1876. E. Caird, The Philosophy of Kant. Lond. 1876.
[E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. ,
2 vols. , 1889. ]
C. Cantoni, Em. Kant (3 yols. ). Milan, 1879-1884. \V. Wallace, Kant. Oxford, Edin. , and Lond. 1882. J. B. Meyer, Kant's Psychologic. Berlin, 1870.
The pre-eminent position of the Konigsberg philosopher rests upon the fact that he took up into himself the various motives of thought in the literature of the Enlightenment, and by their recipro cal supplementation matured a completely new conception of the problem and procedure of philosophy. He passed through the school of the Wolffian metaphysics and through an acquaintance with the German popular philosophers; he plunged into Hume's profound statement of problems, and was enthusiastic for Rousseau's gospel of Nature ; the mathematical rigour of the Newtonian natural philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis of the origin of human ideas and volitions found in English literature, Deism from Toland and Shaftesbury to Voltaire, the honourable spirit of freedom with which the French Enlightenment urged the improve ment of political and social conditions, — all these had found iu the young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who with a rich knowledge of the world and admirable sagacity, and also, where it was in place, with taste and wit, though far from all self-compla cency and boasting, united typically within himself the best features of the Enlightenment.
But it was in connection with the difficulties of the problem oj knowledge that he wrought out from all these foundation elements the work which gave him his peculiar significance. The more he
632
Chap. 1. ] The Critique of Reason. 538
had originally prized metaphysics just because it claimed to give scien tific certainty to moral and religious convictions, the more lasting was its working upon him when he was forced to become convinced by his own progressive criticism in his constant search for truth, how little the rationalistic school system satisfied that claim which it made. But the more, also, was his vision sharpened for the limitations of that philosophy which empiricism developed by the aid of psychological method. In studying David Hume this came to his consciousness in such a degree that he grasped eagerly for the aid which the Nouveaux Estate of Leibniz seemed to offer toward making a metaphysical science possible. But the epistemological system, which he erected upon the principle of virtual innateness - extended to mathematics (cf. pp. 465 f. and 485 f. ), very soon proved its untenability, and this led him to the tedious investigations
which occupied him in the period from 1770 to 1780, and which found their conclusion in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The essentially new and decisive in this was that Kant recog nised the inadequacy of the psychological method for the solution of
and completely separated the questions which surround the origin and the actual development of man's rational activities, from those which relate to their mine. He shared with the Enlightenment the tendency to take the starting-point of his investigations, not in our apprehension of things, which is influenced by most various presuppositions, but in considering the reason itself; but he found in this latter
point of view universal judgments which extend beyond all expe rience, whose validity can neither be made dependent upon the exhibition of their actual formation in consciousness, nor grounded upon any form of innateness. It is his task to fix upon these judg ments throughout the entire circuit of human rational activity, in order from their content itself and from their relations to the system of the rational life determined by them, to understand their authority or the limits of their claims.
This task Kant designated as the Critique of Reason, and this method as the critical or transcendental method; the subject-matter to which this method was to be applied he considered to be the investigation as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori. 1
• Cf. the beginning of the transcendental deduction of the pure conceptions of the undemanding In the Critique of Pure Keasnn, II. 118 fl.
* This expression took form gradually in connection with the origination of the Kr. d. r. V. through the importance which the conception of synthesis acquired Cf. } 38. Kant develops the above general formula in his introduc tion to the Critique in the following way : Judgment* are analytical when the relation of the predicate to the tubjvct, which \s therein asserted, ha* its ground
philosophical problems,1 permanently
5*4 The German PkUotvphy. [Pakt VL
This rest* upon the fundamental insight that the validity of the principles of reason is entirely independent of how they rise in the empirical consciousness (whether of the individual or of the race). All philosophy is dogmatic, which seeks to prove or eren merely to judge of this validity by showing the genesis of those principles out of elements of sensation, or by their innateness, whatever the metaphysical assumptions in the case may be. The critical method, or transcendental philosophy, examines the form in which these principles actually make their appearance, in connection with the capacity which they possess of being employed universally and necessarily in experience.
From this there followed for Kant the task of a systematic inves tigation of reason's functions in order to fix upon their principles, and to examine the validity of these ; for the critical method, which was first gained in epistemology, extended its significance of itself to the other spheres of the reason's activity. But here the newly acquired scheme of psychological division (cf. p. 512, note 6) proved authoritative for his analysis and treatment ofphilosophical problems. As thinking, feeling, and Killing were distinguished as the funda mental forms in which reason expresses itself, so the criticism of reason must keep to the division thus given ; it examined separately the principles of knowledge, of morality, and of the working of things upon the reason through the medium of feeling, — a province inde pendent of the other two.
Kant's doctrine is accordingly divided into a theoretical, a practi cal, and an cesthetical part, and his main works are the three Critiques, of the Pure Reason, of the Practical Reason, and of the Judgment.
Immanuel Kant, born April 22, 1724, at Konigsberg. Prussia, the son of a saddler, was educated at the Pietistic Collegium Fridericianum, and attended in 1740 the University of his native city to study theology ; but subjects of natural science and philosophy gradually attracted him. After concluding his studies, he was a private teacher in various families in the vicinity of Konigs berg from 1746 to 1755, habilitated in the autumn of 1755 as Privatdocent in
in the concept itself which forms the subject ("explicative judgments"); synthetical, when this is not the case, so that the addition of the predicate to the subject must have its ground in something else which is logically different from both ("ampliative judgments"). This ground is, in the case of syn thetical judgments a posteriori ("judgments of perception. " cf. Prolegom ena, § 18, III. 215 f. ), the act of perception itself; in the case of synthetical judgments a priori, on the contrary, i. e. of the universal principles employed for the interpretation of experience, it is something else ; what it is is just that which is to be sought. A priori is, with Kant, not a psychological, but a purely epistemological mark ; it means not a chronological priority to experience, but a universality and necessity of validity in principles of reason which really tran scends all experience, and is not capable of being proved by any experience [i. e. ■alogical, not a chronological priority]. No one who does not make this clear to himself has any hope of understanding Kant.
Chap, i. j Tfie Critique of Reaton. 585
the philosophical faculty of Konigsberg University, and was made full Professor there in 1770. The cheerful, brilliant animation and versatility of his middle years gave place with time to an earnest, rigorous conception of life and to the control of a strict consciousness of duty, which manifested itself in his unremit ting labour upon bis great philosophical task, In his masterful fulfilment of the duties of his academic profession, and in the inflexible rectitude of his life, which was not without a shade of the pedantic. The uniform course of his solitary and modest scholar's life was not disturbed by the brilliancy of the fame that fell upon his life's evening, and only transiently by the dark shadow, that the hatred of orthodoxy, which had obtained control under Frederick William II. , threatened to cast upon his path by a prohibition upon his philosophy. He died from weakness of old age on the 12th of February, 1804.
Kant's life and personality after his earlier works has been drawn most completely by Kuno Fischer (Gesch. A neueren Philos. , III. and IV. , 4th ed. Heidelb. 181*0) ; E. Arnoldt has treated of his youth and the first part of his activity as a teacher (Konigsberg, 1882); [J. H. W. Stuckenberg, Life of Kant, Lond. 1882].
The change which was taking place in the philosopher toward the end of the seventh decade of the eighteenth century appears especially in his activity as a writer. His earlier "pre-critical" works (of which those most important philosophically have been already cited, p. 446) are distinguished by easy- flowing, graceful presentation, and present themselves as admirable occasional writings of a man of fine thought who is well versed in the world. His later works show the laboriousness of his thought and the pressure of the contending motifs, both in the form of the investigation with its circumstantial heaviness and artificial architectonic structure, and in the formation of his sentences, which are highly involved, and frequently interrupted by restriction. Minerva frightened away the graces ; but instead, the devout tone of a deep thought and an earnest conviction which here and there rises to powerful pathos and weighty expression hovers over his later writings.
For Kant's theoretical development, the antithesis between the Leibnizo- Wolfflan metaphysics and the Newtonian natural philosophy was at the begin ning of decisive importance. The former had been brought to his attention at the University by Knutzen (cf. p. 444), the latter by Teske, and in his growing alienation from the philosophical school-system, his interest for natural science, to which for the time he seemed to desire to devote himself entirely, co-operated strongly. His first treatise, 1747, was entitled Thought* upon the True Estima tion of the Vis Viva, a controverted question between Cartesian and I. eibnizian physicists ; bis great work upon the General Xatural History and Theory of the Hearens was a natural science production of the first rank, and besides
■mall articles, his promotion treatise, De Igne (1766), which propounded a hypothesis as to imponderables, belongs here. His activity as a teacher also showed, even on into his later period, a preference for the subjects of natural sciences, especially for physical geography and anthropology.
In theoretical philosophy Kant passed through many reversals (mancherlei Umkippungen) of his standpoint (cf. §{ 83 and 34). At the beginning (in the Physical Monadology) he had sought to adjust the opposition between Leibniz
and Newton, in their doctrine of space, by the ordinary distinction of thini;s-iii- themaelves (which are to be known metaphysically), and phenomena, or things as they appear (which are to be investigated physically) ; he then (in the writ ings after 1760) attained to the insight that a metaphysics in the sense of rationalism is Impossible, that philosophy and mathematics must have diametri cally opposed methods, and that philosophy as the empirical knowledge of the given cannot step beyond the circle of experience. But while he allowed him self to be comforted by Voltaire and Rousseau for this falling away of meta physical insight, through the instrumentality of the "natural feeling" for the right and holy, he was still working with Lambert at an improvement of the method of metaphysics, and when he found this, as he hoped, by the aid of Leibniz's Xoureaux Kssais, he constructed in bold lines the mystico-dogmatic system of his Inaugural Dissertation.
The progress from there on to the System of Criticism is obscure and contro verted. Cf. concerning this development, in "which the time in which he was influenced by Hume and the direction which that influence took are especially
536 German Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part VL
in question, the following: Fr. Michelis, Kant vor und nach 1770 (Braunsberg, 1871) ; Fr. Paulsen, Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie (Leips. 1875) ; A. Riehl, Geschichte und Methode da phi- losophischen Kriticismus (Leips. ; 15. Erdmann, Kant's Kriticismus
1876) f
(Leips. 1878) ; W. Windelband, Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen
Lehre vom Ding-an-sich ( Vierteljahrschr. wissenseh. Philos. ,
the writings by K. Dieterich on Kant's relation to Newton and Rousseau under the title Die kantisehe Philosophie in ihrtr inneren Entwicklungsgeschichte, Freiburg i. B. 1886.
From the adjustment of the various tendencies of Kant's thought proceeded the " Doomsday-book " of German philosophy, the Critique of Pure Reason (Kiga, 1781). It received a series of changes in the second edition (1787), and these became the object of very vigorous controversies after attention had been
called to them by Schelllng ( W. , V. 196) and Jacobi ( W. , II. 291). Cf. concern ing this, the writings cited above. H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu K. K. d. r. V. (Vol. Stuttgart, 1887 [Vol. II. , 1892]), has diligently collected the literature. Separate editions of the Kritik, by K. Kehrbach, upon the basis of the first edi tion, and by B. Erdmann [and E. Adickes] upon the basis of the second edition. [Eng. tr. of the Critique (2d ed. ), by Meiklejohn, in the Bohn Library, and by Max Mliller (text of 1st ed. with supplements giving changes of 2d ed. ), Lond. 1881 Paraphrase and Commentary by Mahaffy and Bernard, 2d ed. , Lond. and N. Y. 1889 partial translations in J. H. Stirling's Text-book to Kant, and in Watson's Selections, Lond. and N. Y. 1888. This last contains also ex tracts from the ethical writings and from the Critique of Judgment. ]
1876).
Cf. also
The additional main writings of Kant in his critical period are Prolegomena zu einer jeden kUnftigen Metaphysik, 1783 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschafl, 1785 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 Kritik der Vrtheilskraft, 1790 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 Zum ewigen Frie- den, 1796 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechts- und Tugendlehre, 1797 Der Streit der FakultSten, 1798 [Eng. tr. of the Prolegomena, by Mahaffy and Bernard, Lond. and N. Y. 1889; of the Prolegomena and Metaphysical Founda tions of Natural Science, by Bax, Bohn Library of the ethical writings, includ ing the first part of the Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, by T. K Abbott, 4th ed. , Lond. 1889 of the Critique of Judgment, by J. H. Bernard, Lond. and N. Y. 1892; of the Philosophy of Law, by W. Hastie, Edin.
4 It is the more to be lamented that Bentham later in his Deontology at tempted to give a kind of popular catechism of the utilitarian morals, which, in radical one-sidedness, in rancour and lack of understanding for other moral systems, equals the worst products of the time of the Revolution.
• William Godwin (1766-1836) published his Inquiry concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness in 1793. Cf. C. Kegan Paul, W. Godwin, his Friends and Contemporaries, Lond. 1876, and L. Stephen, English Thought, II. 264 ff.
(cf.
Chap. 2, § 37. ] Problem of Civilisation : France. 523
the social storm is beard in the literature of the Revolution, as dull thunder still dying away in the distance. The investigations con cerning the problems of political economy, which in France especially were chiefly promoted by the physiocratic school, became more and more comprehensive, and were grounded with increasing indepen dence upon empirical principles. But while the theory of the state demanded, above all, security of possessions, there rose, from the depth of society, the question as to the right ofpersonal property ; and while the philosophers considered with more and more dissen
sion the problem, how the interests of the community could be reconciled with those of the individual (cf. below), the thought forced its way to the surface that the ground of all evil with the human race lies in the striving after individual possessions, and that a social morality and a moral society will begin with the denun ciation of this original sin, and not till then. Such communistic ideas were thrown to the world by Mably and Morelly, and a Babeuf made the first abortive conspiracy to carry out these ideas, under the Directory.
3. But the socio/ question had already before this cast up its waves from its lowest depth. The contrast between the classes representing luxurious wealth and most wretched poverty, which had so great importance among the causes of the Revolution, might indeed at first be more palpable and effective; but it first acquired its full sharpness by virtue of the antithesis between culture and non-culture, which was linked with it by the whole development of European life, and this separating chasm was deepest and baldest in the age of the Enlightenment The more the age plumed itself upon its "culture," the more evident it became that this was in the main a privilege of the property-owning class. In this point, too, English Deism had led the way with typical frankness. The religion of reason should be reserved for the cultivated man, just as the free, beautiful morality should be : for the ordinary man, on the other hand, Shajiesbury held, the promises and threatenings of positive religion must remain standing as a wheel and gallows.
Tolnnd, too, had presented his cosmopolitan natural worship as an "esoteric" doctrine, and when the later Deists began to carry these ideas among the people in popular writings, iMrd Bolingbroke, him self a free-thinker of the most pronounced kind, declared them to be a pest of society, against which the sharpest means were the best Among the German Deists, also, men like Semler would have a very careful separation made between religion as a private matter and religion as a public order.
The French Enlightenment, as the relation of Voltaire to Boling
524 The Enlightenment: Practical Question*. {Fart V.
broke shows, was from the beginning decidedly more democratic Indeed, it had the agitative tendency to play off the enlighten ment of the masses against the exclusive self-seeking of the upper ten thousand. But with this was completed a revolution, by virtue of which the Enlightenment necessarily turned against itself. . For if in those strata in which it first took hold " culture " or civilisa tion had such consequences as appeared in the luxury of the " higher " classes, if it had been able to do s« little in the way of yielding fruits that could be used for the needs of the masses also, its value must appear all the more doubtful the more philosophy regarded the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the proper standard for the estimation of things and actions.
In this connection the problem of civilisation shaped itself out for modern philosophy : the question whether and how far civilisation, i. e. intellectual improvement (which is a historical fact), and the change in human impulses and in the relations of human life, which has been connected with it — whether and in how far this civilisa tion has served to further the moral order and man's true happiness. The more proudly and self-complacently the average Enlightener praised the progress of the human mind, which had reached in him its summit of a clear and distinct rational life in theory and prac tice, the more burning and — uncomfortable this question became.
It is raised first, though not in a direct and square statement, by Mandeville. In his psychology an extreme adherent of the selfish system, he sought to show, as against Shaftesbury, that the whole life and charm of the social system rests solely upon the struggle which self-seeking individuals carry on in their own interests — a principle which worked also upon Adam Smith in his doctrine of supply and demand. 1 If we should think of man as stripped bare of all egoistic impulses (this is the meaning of the Fable ofthe Bees), and provided only with the "moral" qualities of altruism, the social mechanism would stand still from j^re absence of regard for self. The motive power in civilisation is solely egoism, and, therefore, we must not be surprised if civilisation displays its activity, not by heightening the moral qualities, but only by refining and dis guising egoism. And the individual's happiness is as little enhanced by civilisation as his morality. If it were increased, the egoism, on which the progress of civilisation rests, would be thereby weak ened. In truth, it appears, rather, that every improvement of the material condition, brought about by intellectual advance, calls forth new and stronger wants in the individual, in consequence of which
1 Cf. Lange, Gesch. d. Mater. , I. 285 [Eng. tr. I. 296].
Chap. J, S 37. ] Problem of Civilisation : Mandeville, Rousseau. 525
he becomes more and more discontented ; and so it turns out that the apparently so brilliant development of the whole is accomplished only at the cost of the morality and happiness of the individual.
4. In Mandeville these thoughts appear in a mild suggestion, and at the same time, in the repelling form of a cynical commendation of the egoism, whose " private vices " are " public benefits. " They attained an importance for world-literature through the brilliant turn given them by Rousseau. With him the question concerned nothing more and nothing less than the worth of all human history — its worth for the morality and happiness of individuals. And he cast into the face of the Enlightenment the reproach that all growth in knowledge, and all refinement of life, had but made man more and more untrue to his true vocation and his true nature.
History with its artificial structure of civilised society has deterio rated man : ' he came forth from the hand of Nature good and pure, but bis development has separated him from Nature step by step. The beginning of this "degeneration" Rousseau, in his second Dis course, found in the creation of property, which had for its result the division of labour, and with this the separation of the classes and, ulti mately, the awakening of all evil passions : this it was that enlisted the work of the intellect permanently in the service of self-seeking.
In comparison with this unnatural condition of civilised barbarism the state of Nature appears at first as the lost paradise, and in this sense the sentimental yearning of a time intellectually and morally blaxe" found its nourishment in Rousseau's writings, above all in the New Heloise. The ladies of the salon were carried away with enthu siasm for the Gessnerian pastoral idyl; but on this account they mis-heard the admonition of the great Genevan.
For he did not wish to lead back to that state of Nature which had no society. He was convinced that man is provided by his creator with a capacity for being perfected (perfertibilite) which makes the development of his natural endowment both a duty and a natural necessity. If this development has been guided into wrong paths by the historical process which has hitherto prevailed, and, therefore, has led to demoralisation and wretchedness, history must be begun anew; in onler to find the right way toward his devel opment man must return from the unnatural condition of intellectual pride to the simple natural state of feeling, from the narrowness and falsehood of relations of society to his pure unstunted self. For this end, according to Rousseau, humanity as a whole needs a
' The KnglUh Deinu' conception of the history of religion (cf. | 36, 8) U extended by Kou»»e«u to all niatory.
626 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Pakt V.
jwlttical constitution, which affords the individual full freedom of personal activity in connection with the life of the whole body, and in accordance with the principle of equality of rights ; and as indi viduals, humanity needs an education,1 which allows the natural endowments of the individual to unfold from his own vitality without constraint. The optimism, which Rousseau finds in the constitution of the natural God-descended nature of man, makes him hope that our condition will be better, the more freely and naturally we can develop.
5. While we thus find Rousseau in lively opposition to the his torical development, and in the zealous endeavour to put in its stead a new development "according to Nature," the last reconciling synthesis of the ideas of the Enlightenment is the endeavour to understand the previous course of human history itself as the natural development of human nature ; in this thought the phil osophy of the eighteenth century strips off all its one-sided- ness and reaches its highest consummation. The first stirring of this is found in an isolated appearance of Italian literature, with
Vico. * Influenced by the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of the Renais sance, especially by Campanella, and educated by Bodin and Grotius, he had grasped the idea of a general natural law of the development of life, which manifests itself in the history of peoples as well as in that of individuals, and with great learning had sought to prove this principle of the identity of all natural development. But if in such a conception of the naturally necessary correspondences between the different historical systems and the fundamental biological scheme, the thought of a purposeful inter-relation of the destinies of nations had remained foreign to him, this had previously found
1 In its details Rousseau's Smile frequently uses the " Thoughts," which Locke had advanced with a much more limited purpose for the education of a young man of higher station in society : there, too, the complete development of the individuality was the main thing, from which the turning away from learned one-sidedness, the direction of attention to the real and practical, the appeal to perception and the use of individual instead of general truths in instruction and education, followed as a matter of course. These principles, thought out for the Englishman of superior rank, Rousseau adopts as elements in an education which sought to develop in man, not the member of a definite class or of a future profession, but only "the man. " In this spirit his peda gogical doctrines passed over to the school of German philanthropy, which, under the lead of Basedow (1723-1790), combined the principle of natural develop ment with that of utility, and thought out the appropriate forms of an education for a community by which the individual should be trained to become by the natural way a useful member of human society.
2 Giov. Battista VYco (1668-1744) became influential chiefly through his Principj d1 una scienza nuova <f intorno alia commune natura delle nazioni
Of. K. Werner, Giambatlista V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher (Vienna, 1879) ; R. Flint, Vico (Edin. and Lond. 1884); and likewise for the following, Flint, The Philosophy of History in Europe, Vol new ed. , 1893.
(I72u).
I. ,
Chap. 2, § 37. ] Problem of Civilitation: Vico, Herder. 527
all the more forcible support in Boesuet} The French prelate con tinues the patristic philosophy of history , which had pushed the
into the centre of the world's events. He would have the christianising of modern nations through the empire of Charles the Great, regarded as the concluding and decisive epoch of uni versal history, the whole course of which is the work of divine
and the goal of which is the dominance of the one Catholic Church. Such a theological view of the world and of history had now, indeed, been energetically put aside by modern philosophy, but the meagreness of the results yielded for the con sideration of history by the treatment of human society from the point of view of individual psychology is seen in the trivial lucu brations of Iselin,1 in spite of his leaning upon Rousseau.
It was in a mind of Herder's universal receptiveness and fineness of feeling that Rousseau's ideas first found in this respect, also, a fruitful soil. But his optimism, which had matured in the atmos phere of Leibniz and Shaftesbury, did not allow him to believe in the possibility of that aberration which the Genevan would regard as the nature of previous history. He was rather convinced that the natural development of man is just that which has taken place in history. While Rousseau's conception of man's perfectibility was treated by the Genevan's French adherents, such as St. Lambert, and especially Contlorcet, as the voucher for a better future, and as an infinite perspective toward the perfecting of the race, Herder used it — against Rousseau — as a principle of explanation for the past, also, of the human family. History is nothing but the unin terrupted progress of natural development.
This concerned, above all, the beginning of history. The begin ning of the life of society is to be understood, not as an arbitrary act, whether of human reflection or of divine determination, but as a gradually formed result of the natural connection. It has neither been invented nor commanded, but has become. Characteristically enough, these opposing views as to the origin of history, asserted themselves earliest in theories of language. The individualism of associational psychology saw in language, as is manifest jwirticularly in the case of Condillac,* an invention of man, —supra-naturalism, defended in Germany by Suaamilch* saw a divine inspiration; here
1 Jacques Benigne Bottwt (1627-1704), the celebrated eloquent divine, wrote the Ditcourt mr T Hittoire L'nirenelle (l'aris, 1081) originally for the instruc tion of the Dauphin.
* Iaaak heiin of Ba*le (1728-1782) published in 1764 hia Philotophtichtn Mulhmatrungen iiher <lir CrKhichtt dt$ Mciuchheit, 2 vols.
* Istgiqtu and Langue <lr» Calruli.
* BeZoeiM, da$$ der Urtprung dtr menfckliehen Sprache gSttlich $ei (Berlin, 1766).
Redemption
providence,
528 The Enlightenment: Practical Questions. [Part V.
Rousseau had already spoken the word of solution when he saw in language a natural, involuntary unfolding of man's essential nature. 1
Herder not only made this conception his own (cf. above, § 33, 11), but he extended it also consistently to all man's activities in civilisation. He proceeds, therefore, in his philosophy of history from the point of view of man's position in Nature, from that of the conditions of life which the planet affords him, and from that of his peculiar constitution, to understand from these sources the beginnings and the direction of his historical development: and in the progress of his exposition of universal history he makes, like wise, the peculiar character of each people and of its historical sig nificance proceed from its natural endowments and relations. But at the same time the developments of the various nations do not fall apart in his treatment, as was still the case with Vico : on the con trary, they are all arranged organically as a great chain of ascend ing perfection. And they all form in this connected whole the ever-maturer realisation of the general constitution of human nature.
As man himself is the crown of creation, so his history is the unfolding of human nature. The Idea of Humanity explains the complicated movement of national destinies.
In this consideration, the unhistorical mode of thinking which had characterised the Enlightenment was overcome : every form in this great course of development was valued as the natural product of its conditions, and the " voices of the peoples " united to form the harmony of the world's history, of which humanity is the theme. And out of this sprang also the task of the future, — to bring to ever richer and fuller development all the stirrings of human nature, and to realise in living unity the ripe fruits of the historical development. In the consciousness of this task of the " world- literature," far from all the pride of the meaner Enlightenment, full of the presage and anticipation of a new epoch, Schiller could call out, in valedictory to the "philosophical century," the joyful words : —
" Wie schon, o Mensch, mit deinem Palmenzweige Stehst du an des Jahrhunderts Neige
In edler, s toiler Mftnnlichkeit ! " a
1 With his arguments, though in part of another opinion, St. Martin the Mystic attacked the crude presentation of Condillac's doctrine by Garat ; cf. Seances des jScoles Kormales, III. 61 ff.
* In rude paraphrase :
How fair, O man, with victory's palm,
Thou standest at the century's wane In noble pride of manliness.
PART VI.
THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.
F. K. Biedermann, Die deuttche Philotophie von Kant bit auf unttre Leipa. 1842 f.
K. L. Michelet, Entwiekelungtgetchichte der neueeten deuttehen Philotophie. Berlin, 1843.
C. Fortlage, Genetitche Qeschichte der Philotophie teit Kant. Leips. 1862.
O. Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen. Stuttgart, 1886.
Fr. Harms, Die Philotophie teit Kant. Berlin, 1876.
A. S. Willm, Hittoire de la Philotophie Allemande deputt Kant jutqu'i Hegel.
Paris, 1846 ft*.
II. Lotze, Oetchirhu der ^Etthetik in Deuttchland. Munich, 1868.
B. Flint, Philosophy of History in Europe, I. Edin. and Lond. 1874.
B. Fester, Rousseau und die deuttche Oesrhichltphilotophie. Stuttgart, 1800. [J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Boston, 1802. ]
A fortunate union of various intellectual movements produced in Germany, during the close of the preceding and at the beginning of the present century, a bloom of philosophy, which in the history of European thought can be compared only with the great develop ment of Greek philosophy from Socrates to Aristotle. In a devel opment, powerful alike in its intensity and extent, the German mind during the short span of four decades (1780-1820) produced a wealth of systems of philosophical Weltanschauung, grandly pro jected on all sides, such as has at no other time been compressed within so narrow a space ; and in all of these the thoughts of pre ceding philosophy combine to form characteristic and impressive structures. They appear in their totality as the ripe fruit of a long growth, out of which germs of a new development, as yet scarcely recognisable, are to spring.
This brilliant phenomenon had its general cause in the incompar able vigour and spirit with whioh the German nation at that time took up again with new strength, and carried to its completion, the movement of civilisation which began in the Renaissance and had
To the literature cited on pp. 348 and 437, we add : —
H. M. Chalybaeus, Hittorische Enttricklung der speculativen
Philosophie eon Kant bit Hegel. Dresden, 1837. [Tr. Edin. and Andover, 1864. ]
Tage.
530 The German Philosophy. [Part VL
been interrupted by external force. Germany attained the summit of its inner development at the same time that its outer history reached its lowest condition, — a process that has no equal in history. When it lay politically powerless, it created its world-conquering thinkers and poets. Its victorious power, however, lay just in the league between philosophy and poetry. The contemperaneousness of Kant and Goethe, and the combination of their ideas by Schiller, — these are the decisive characteristics of the time.
The history of philosophy at this point is most intimately inter woven with that of general literature, and the lines of mutual rela tion and stimulus run continuously back and forth. This appears characteristically in the heightened and finally decisive significance which fell in this connection to the problems and conceptions ozsthetics. Philosophy found thus opened before her a new world, into which she had hitherto had but occasional glimpses, and of which she now took possession as of the Promised Land. In their matter as well as their form, aesthetic principles gained the mastery, and the motives of scientific thought became interwoven with those of artistic vision to produce grand poetical creations in the sphere of abstract thought.
The ensnaring magic which literature thus exercised upon philos ophy rested mainly upon its historical universality. With Herder and Goethe begins what we call, after them, world-literature ; the conscious working out of true culture from the appropriation of all the great thought-creations of all human history. The Ro mantic School appears in Germany as the representative of this work. And, in analogy to this, philosophy also developed out of a wealth of historical suggestions ; it resorted with conscious deep ening of thought to the ideas of antiquity and of the Renaissance, it plunged intelligently into what the Enlightenment had shown, and ended in Hegel by understanding itself as the systematically penetrating and formative comprehension of all that the human mind had hitherto thought.
basis, without which all those suggestions from general literature would have remained without effect. This philosophical power to master
But for this mighty work it needed a new conceptional
the ideal material of history dwelt within the doctrine of Kant, and this is its incomparably high historical importance. Kant, by the newness and the greatness of his points of view, prescribed to the succeeding philosophy not only its problems, but also the means for their solution. His is the mind that determines and controls on all sides. The work of his immediate successors, in which his new principle unfolded itself in all directions and finished its life histor
of
The German Philosophy. 531
ically with an assimilation of earlier systems, is best comprehended in accordance with its most important characteristic, under the name of Idealism.
Hence we treat the history of the German Philosophy in two chapters, of which the first embraces Kant, and the second the de velopment of idealism.
In the thought symphony of those forty years the Kantian doctrine forms the theme, and idealism its development.
CHAPTER I.
THE CRITIQUE OF REASON.
C. L. Reinhold, Briefe iiber die Kantische Philosophic (Deutsch. Merkur, 1786 f. ). Leips. 1790 ff.
V. Cousin, Lecuns stir la Philosophic de Kant. Paris, 1842.
M. Desdouits, La Philosophic de Kant, d'apres les Trois Critiques. Paris, 1876. E. Caird, The Philosophy of Kant. Lond. 1876.
[E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. ,
2 vols. , 1889. ]
C. Cantoni, Em. Kant (3 yols. ). Milan, 1879-1884. \V. Wallace, Kant. Oxford, Edin. , and Lond. 1882. J. B. Meyer, Kant's Psychologic. Berlin, 1870.
The pre-eminent position of the Konigsberg philosopher rests upon the fact that he took up into himself the various motives of thought in the literature of the Enlightenment, and by their recipro cal supplementation matured a completely new conception of the problem and procedure of philosophy. He passed through the school of the Wolffian metaphysics and through an acquaintance with the German popular philosophers; he plunged into Hume's profound statement of problems, and was enthusiastic for Rousseau's gospel of Nature ; the mathematical rigour of the Newtonian natural philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis of the origin of human ideas and volitions found in English literature, Deism from Toland and Shaftesbury to Voltaire, the honourable spirit of freedom with which the French Enlightenment urged the improve ment of political and social conditions, — all these had found iu the young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who with a rich knowledge of the world and admirable sagacity, and also, where it was in place, with taste and wit, though far from all self-compla cency and boasting, united typically within himself the best features of the Enlightenment.
But it was in connection with the difficulties of the problem oj knowledge that he wrought out from all these foundation elements the work which gave him his peculiar significance. The more he
632
Chap. 1. ] The Critique of Reason. 538
had originally prized metaphysics just because it claimed to give scien tific certainty to moral and religious convictions, the more lasting was its working upon him when he was forced to become convinced by his own progressive criticism in his constant search for truth, how little the rationalistic school system satisfied that claim which it made. But the more, also, was his vision sharpened for the limitations of that philosophy which empiricism developed by the aid of psychological method. In studying David Hume this came to his consciousness in such a degree that he grasped eagerly for the aid which the Nouveaux Estate of Leibniz seemed to offer toward making a metaphysical science possible. But the epistemological system, which he erected upon the principle of virtual innateness - extended to mathematics (cf. pp. 465 f. and 485 f. ), very soon proved its untenability, and this led him to the tedious investigations
which occupied him in the period from 1770 to 1780, and which found their conclusion in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The essentially new and decisive in this was that Kant recog nised the inadequacy of the psychological method for the solution of
and completely separated the questions which surround the origin and the actual development of man's rational activities, from those which relate to their mine. He shared with the Enlightenment the tendency to take the starting-point of his investigations, not in our apprehension of things, which is influenced by most various presuppositions, but in considering the reason itself; but he found in this latter
point of view universal judgments which extend beyond all expe rience, whose validity can neither be made dependent upon the exhibition of their actual formation in consciousness, nor grounded upon any form of innateness. It is his task to fix upon these judg ments throughout the entire circuit of human rational activity, in order from their content itself and from their relations to the system of the rational life determined by them, to understand their authority or the limits of their claims.
This task Kant designated as the Critique of Reason, and this method as the critical or transcendental method; the subject-matter to which this method was to be applied he considered to be the investigation as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori. 1
• Cf. the beginning of the transcendental deduction of the pure conceptions of the undemanding In the Critique of Pure Keasnn, II. 118 fl.
* This expression took form gradually in connection with the origination of the Kr. d. r. V. through the importance which the conception of synthesis acquired Cf. } 38. Kant develops the above general formula in his introduc tion to the Critique in the following way : Judgment* are analytical when the relation of the predicate to the tubjvct, which \s therein asserted, ha* its ground
philosophical problems,1 permanently
5*4 The German PkUotvphy. [Pakt VL
This rest* upon the fundamental insight that the validity of the principles of reason is entirely independent of how they rise in the empirical consciousness (whether of the individual or of the race). All philosophy is dogmatic, which seeks to prove or eren merely to judge of this validity by showing the genesis of those principles out of elements of sensation, or by their innateness, whatever the metaphysical assumptions in the case may be. The critical method, or transcendental philosophy, examines the form in which these principles actually make their appearance, in connection with the capacity which they possess of being employed universally and necessarily in experience.
From this there followed for Kant the task of a systematic inves tigation of reason's functions in order to fix upon their principles, and to examine the validity of these ; for the critical method, which was first gained in epistemology, extended its significance of itself to the other spheres of the reason's activity. But here the newly acquired scheme of psychological division (cf. p. 512, note 6) proved authoritative for his analysis and treatment ofphilosophical problems. As thinking, feeling, and Killing were distinguished as the funda mental forms in which reason expresses itself, so the criticism of reason must keep to the division thus given ; it examined separately the principles of knowledge, of morality, and of the working of things upon the reason through the medium of feeling, — a province inde pendent of the other two.
Kant's doctrine is accordingly divided into a theoretical, a practi cal, and an cesthetical part, and his main works are the three Critiques, of the Pure Reason, of the Practical Reason, and of the Judgment.
Immanuel Kant, born April 22, 1724, at Konigsberg. Prussia, the son of a saddler, was educated at the Pietistic Collegium Fridericianum, and attended in 1740 the University of his native city to study theology ; but subjects of natural science and philosophy gradually attracted him. After concluding his studies, he was a private teacher in various families in the vicinity of Konigs berg from 1746 to 1755, habilitated in the autumn of 1755 as Privatdocent in
in the concept itself which forms the subject ("explicative judgments"); synthetical, when this is not the case, so that the addition of the predicate to the subject must have its ground in something else which is logically different from both ("ampliative judgments"). This ground is, in the case of syn thetical judgments a posteriori ("judgments of perception. " cf. Prolegom ena, § 18, III. 215 f. ), the act of perception itself; in the case of synthetical judgments a priori, on the contrary, i. e. of the universal principles employed for the interpretation of experience, it is something else ; what it is is just that which is to be sought. A priori is, with Kant, not a psychological, but a purely epistemological mark ; it means not a chronological priority to experience, but a universality and necessity of validity in principles of reason which really tran scends all experience, and is not capable of being proved by any experience [i. e. ■alogical, not a chronological priority]. No one who does not make this clear to himself has any hope of understanding Kant.
Chap, i. j Tfie Critique of Reaton. 585
the philosophical faculty of Konigsberg University, and was made full Professor there in 1770. The cheerful, brilliant animation and versatility of his middle years gave place with time to an earnest, rigorous conception of life and to the control of a strict consciousness of duty, which manifested itself in his unremit ting labour upon bis great philosophical task, In his masterful fulfilment of the duties of his academic profession, and in the inflexible rectitude of his life, which was not without a shade of the pedantic. The uniform course of his solitary and modest scholar's life was not disturbed by the brilliancy of the fame that fell upon his life's evening, and only transiently by the dark shadow, that the hatred of orthodoxy, which had obtained control under Frederick William II. , threatened to cast upon his path by a prohibition upon his philosophy. He died from weakness of old age on the 12th of February, 1804.
Kant's life and personality after his earlier works has been drawn most completely by Kuno Fischer (Gesch. A neueren Philos. , III. and IV. , 4th ed. Heidelb. 181*0) ; E. Arnoldt has treated of his youth and the first part of his activity as a teacher (Konigsberg, 1882); [J. H. W. Stuckenberg, Life of Kant, Lond. 1882].
The change which was taking place in the philosopher toward the end of the seventh decade of the eighteenth century appears especially in his activity as a writer. His earlier "pre-critical" works (of which those most important philosophically have been already cited, p. 446) are distinguished by easy- flowing, graceful presentation, and present themselves as admirable occasional writings of a man of fine thought who is well versed in the world. His later works show the laboriousness of his thought and the pressure of the contending motifs, both in the form of the investigation with its circumstantial heaviness and artificial architectonic structure, and in the formation of his sentences, which are highly involved, and frequently interrupted by restriction. Minerva frightened away the graces ; but instead, the devout tone of a deep thought and an earnest conviction which here and there rises to powerful pathos and weighty expression hovers over his later writings.
For Kant's theoretical development, the antithesis between the Leibnizo- Wolfflan metaphysics and the Newtonian natural philosophy was at the begin ning of decisive importance. The former had been brought to his attention at the University by Knutzen (cf. p. 444), the latter by Teske, and in his growing alienation from the philosophical school-system, his interest for natural science, to which for the time he seemed to desire to devote himself entirely, co-operated strongly. His first treatise, 1747, was entitled Thought* upon the True Estima tion of the Vis Viva, a controverted question between Cartesian and I. eibnizian physicists ; bis great work upon the General Xatural History and Theory of the Hearens was a natural science production of the first rank, and besides
■mall articles, his promotion treatise, De Igne (1766), which propounded a hypothesis as to imponderables, belongs here. His activity as a teacher also showed, even on into his later period, a preference for the subjects of natural sciences, especially for physical geography and anthropology.
In theoretical philosophy Kant passed through many reversals (mancherlei Umkippungen) of his standpoint (cf. §{ 83 and 34). At the beginning (in the Physical Monadology) he had sought to adjust the opposition between Leibniz
and Newton, in their doctrine of space, by the ordinary distinction of thini;s-iii- themaelves (which are to be known metaphysically), and phenomena, or things as they appear (which are to be investigated physically) ; he then (in the writ ings after 1760) attained to the insight that a metaphysics in the sense of rationalism is Impossible, that philosophy and mathematics must have diametri cally opposed methods, and that philosophy as the empirical knowledge of the given cannot step beyond the circle of experience. But while he allowed him self to be comforted by Voltaire and Rousseau for this falling away of meta physical insight, through the instrumentality of the "natural feeling" for the right and holy, he was still working with Lambert at an improvement of the method of metaphysics, and when he found this, as he hoped, by the aid of Leibniz's Xoureaux Kssais, he constructed in bold lines the mystico-dogmatic system of his Inaugural Dissertation.
The progress from there on to the System of Criticism is obscure and contro verted. Cf. concerning this development, in "which the time in which he was influenced by Hume and the direction which that influence took are especially
536 German Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part VL
in question, the following: Fr. Michelis, Kant vor und nach 1770 (Braunsberg, 1871) ; Fr. Paulsen, Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie (Leips. 1875) ; A. Riehl, Geschichte und Methode da phi- losophischen Kriticismus (Leips. ; 15. Erdmann, Kant's Kriticismus
1876) f
(Leips. 1878) ; W. Windelband, Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen
Lehre vom Ding-an-sich ( Vierteljahrschr. wissenseh. Philos. ,
the writings by K. Dieterich on Kant's relation to Newton and Rousseau under the title Die kantisehe Philosophie in ihrtr inneren Entwicklungsgeschichte, Freiburg i. B. 1886.
From the adjustment of the various tendencies of Kant's thought proceeded the " Doomsday-book " of German philosophy, the Critique of Pure Reason (Kiga, 1781). It received a series of changes in the second edition (1787), and these became the object of very vigorous controversies after attention had been
called to them by Schelllng ( W. , V. 196) and Jacobi ( W. , II. 291). Cf. concern ing this, the writings cited above. H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu K. K. d. r. V. (Vol. Stuttgart, 1887 [Vol. II. , 1892]), has diligently collected the literature. Separate editions of the Kritik, by K. Kehrbach, upon the basis of the first edi tion, and by B. Erdmann [and E. Adickes] upon the basis of the second edition. [Eng. tr. of the Critique (2d ed. ), by Meiklejohn, in the Bohn Library, and by Max Mliller (text of 1st ed. with supplements giving changes of 2d ed. ), Lond. 1881 Paraphrase and Commentary by Mahaffy and Bernard, 2d ed. , Lond. and N. Y. 1889 partial translations in J. H. Stirling's Text-book to Kant, and in Watson's Selections, Lond. and N. Y. 1888. This last contains also ex tracts from the ethical writings and from the Critique of Judgment. ]
1876).
Cf. also
The additional main writings of Kant in his critical period are Prolegomena zu einer jeden kUnftigen Metaphysik, 1783 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschafl, 1785 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 Kritik der Vrtheilskraft, 1790 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 Zum ewigen Frie- den, 1796 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechts- und Tugendlehre, 1797 Der Streit der FakultSten, 1798 [Eng. tr. of the Prolegomena, by Mahaffy and Bernard, Lond. and N. Y. 1889; of the Prolegomena and Metaphysical Founda tions of Natural Science, by Bax, Bohn Library of the ethical writings, includ ing the first part of the Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, by T. K Abbott, 4th ed. , Lond. 1889 of the Critique of Judgment, by J. H. Bernard, Lond. and N. Y. 1892; of the Philosophy of Law, by W. Hastie, Edin.
