It is probably, on the other hand, reasonable to
think that this unconscious movement was not always suffi-
cient to accommodate itself to such a development of civilisa-
tion as took place in the centuries from the eleventh to the
thirteenth.
think that this unconscious movement was not always suffi-
cient to accommodate itself to such a development of civilisa-
tion as took place in the centuries from the eleventh to the
thirteenth.
Thomas Carlyle
iii.
pp.
41, 42.
* Cf.
vol.
ii.
p.
98.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 47
actions of men which constitute custom can change or estab-
lish or interpret law. 1
He goes on to contend that, as human laws may not cover
all cases, it may be right sometimes to take action which is
outside of the law, and when such cases are multiplied owing
to some change in men, custom shows that the law is
no longer useful. And he even adds that, while normally,
if the conditions remain the same, the law founded upon
these conditions will prevail over custom, there may be
cases where the law is useless, simply because it is contrary
to the custom of the country, for this is one of the conditions
of law--it is difficult to change the custom of the multitude. 3
It is clear that while St Thomas recognises other forms
of law besides the custom of the people, he does substantially
represent the conception of custom as a main source of
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 1. 2, 97, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit in Epistola
ad Casulanum : ' mos populi Dei et
instituta ma jorum pro lege sunt
tenenda ; et siout prevaricatores legum
divinarum. ita et contemptores con-
suetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi
sunt. ' Respondeo dioendum, quod
omnia lex proficiscitur a rations, et
voluntate legislatoris: lex quidem
divina, et naturalis, a rationabili Dei
voluntate, lex autem humana a volun-
tate hominis ratione regulata: sicut
autem ratio et voluntas hominis mani-
festantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita
etiam manifestantur facto : hoc enim
unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum,
quod ope re implet. Manifest :t est
autem, quod verbo humano potest et
mut&ri lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum
manifestat interiorem motum, et con-
ceptum rationis humanse ; unde etiam
ct per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui
consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest
lex, et exponi et etiam, aliquid causari,
quod legis virtu tem obtineat; inquan-
tum scilicet per exteriores actus multi-
plicatas interior voluntatis motus, et
rationis conceptus efficacissimo decla-
ratur: quum enim aliquid multoties
fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis
judicio proveniri: et secundum hoc
consuetudo et habet vim legis, et
legem abolet, et est legum inter-
pretatrix. "
Cf. Julianus in * Dig. ,' i. 3, 32, and
vol. i. p. 64.
2 Id. id. id. : " Ad secundum di-
cendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est,
leges human se in aliquibus casibus
deficiunt; unde possibile est quando-
que prater legem agere, in casu scilicet
in quo deficit lex; et tamen actus
non erit malus : et cum tales casus
multiplicantur propter aliquam muta-
tionem hominum, tunc manifestatur
per consuetudinem, quod lex ulterius
non est utilis ; sicut etiam manifesta-
retur, si lex contraria verbo promul-
garetur. Si autem adhuc maneat
ratio eadem, propter quam prima lex
utilis erat, non consuetudo legem sed
? ? lex consuetudinem vincit: nisi forte
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? 48
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
law. It is, however, clear that St Thomas Aquinas implies
that there were other forms of law besides custom, and we
shall presently deal with these. The important point of the
passages which we have just considered is that, whatever
other forms of law there might be, he was clear that custom
lay behind them, and was still paramount over them.
This is also the position of some other very important
writers of the later thirteenth century. Vincent of Beauvais,
in his ' Speculum,' cites the significant words of Gratian, in
which he laid down the principle that even when laws were
instituted by a competent authority, they needed to be con-
firmed by the custom of those who were concerned. 1 Albert
the Great seems also to refer to the same doctrine when he
says that the edict of the Prince which is maintained by
custom has the force of written law. 2 What is, however,
much more significant is the treatment of the authority of
custom by the most important Canonist, and the most authori-
tative Civilian of the second half of the century.
Hostiensis, in his ' Commentary on the Decretals,' describes
the nature and the authority of custom, and clearly accepts
the judgment of Gregory IX. that custom if it is " rationabilis
et legitime prsescripta," prevails over other forms of positive
law. 3 Odofridus, in his ' Commentary on the Digest,' draws
attention to the divergence between this judgment of Gregory
and the passage in the ' Code ' (viii. 52 (53)), in which Con-
stantine had apparently maintained that custom could not
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
it 7. 35. Cf. vol. ii. pp. 155, 166,
186.
2 Albert the Great, ' Ethica,' x. iii.
2: " Sin autem illse (leges) scriptse
aint vel non scriptse, nihil videtur
differre ad prsesens: edictum enim
principia consuetudine servatum script:! !
legis habet vigorem. "
* Hostiensis, ' In Primum Librum
Decretalium Commentaria,' i. * De
Consuetudine,' 8, 9: " Ad quod
sciendum quod quatuor sunt species
consuetudinis, scilicet generalissima, ut
est consuetudo inter omnes Catholicos,
versus orientem orare. . . . "
Id. id. , 10 : " Item est consuetudo
genoralis, quando scilicet nedum civitas
sed tota provincia ita generaliter
servat. "
Id. id. , 8, 11 : " Et hae duo species
derogant juri, sive in provincia, sive
in loco in quo obtinct hoc, si post
legem introducta sit consuetudo. "
Id. id. , 10, 9: " Quid est consue-
tudo. . . . TJsus rationabilis competente
tempore confirmatus. . . . "
Id. id. , 11: " TJtrum autem ait
rationabilis vel non, relinquo judici,
cum non regula posset tradi. "
Cf. ' Decretals,' i. 4, 11. Cf. vol. ii.
p. 158.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 49
over-ride law. 1 Odofridus says that there had been much
controversy over this question, and cites the opinion of
Placentinus that, while in earlier times the Eoman people
could make law and its custom could abrogate it, nowadays
it was only the Emperor who could make law, and therefore
the custom of the people could no longer annul it. Odofridus
himself, however, emphatically repudiated the opinion of
Placentinus, and maintained that the Eoman people could
still make law, and that, therefore, its custom could still
annul it. 2 Odofridus was, as it is thought, a pupil of Azo,
and represented the tradition of his master. 3
The opinions of these writers are interesting and important,
but, after all, they are of little importance as compared with
the clear and dogmatic statements of the great feudal lawyers
like Bracton and Beaumanoir on the principles of the system
of law which they had to interpret and administer in the
latter part of the thirteenth century. We may add that the
same judgment as to the legal authority of custom is clearly
1 Cf. vol. ii. p. 158.
2 Odofridus, * Commentary on Di-
gest,' i. 3, 32 (fol. 15 r. ): "Dixit
Pla. (Placentinus) Olim consuetudo
vincebat legem, et ita loquitur lex
nostra in fi . . . nam olim populus
Roman us poterat legem condere, vft
lex est quod populus Romanus, etc.
. . . Non est ergo mirum si contraria
ejus consuetudo tollat legem, quia ejus
est tollere cujus est condere. . . . Sed
hodie solus princeps potest legem con-
dere, ut C. de le. et consti. 1. f. (Code
i. 14, 12) unde non debet consuetudo
populi posse leges imperatoris tollere,
et sic loquitur 1. nostra quia hoc esset
inconveniens quod consuetudo populi
tolleret legem principis. Sed, signori,
banc solutionem non approbamus,
quia sicut olim populus poterat legem
condere, sic et hodie potest, vn debet
posse consuetudo populi legem tollere,
nec obstat quod dicitur quod solus
princeps sive imperator potest legem
condere, quia ilia dictio, solus, excludit
singularem personam, non populum,
VOL. V.
nam populus beno potest hodie legem
condere, sicut olim poterat, ut ibi
dixi. S. E. Ti. L. I. (i. e. , his ' Com-
mentary on Digest,' i. iii. 1). Item
non obstat quod alibi dicitur quod
populus omne imporium legis condere
transtulit in principem, ut id. f. p. p. 1.
una, in. pn. ('Digest,' i. 4, 11), quia
intelligo ' transtulit,' i. concessit, non
tamen de se abdicando ut 7. de consti.
principum, 1. 1 (' Digest,' 1, 4, 1). . . .
Sed, signori, spretis omnibus aliis
solutionibus dicendum est, ut dixi
in casu ; duplex est consuetudo, ut
consuetudo generalis que obtinet per
totum imperium Romanum, et ilia
generalis consuetudo 1. contraria, uni-
que vincit legem, ut in ll. contrariis;
est consuetudo specialis alicujus civi-
ta tis, et ilia specialis consuetudo in
illo solummodo loco vincit legem, in
alio non . . . et sic intelligitur lex
nostra. "
? ? s Cf. for a full discussion of the
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? 50
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
laid down in the great law book of Castile, which we know
as the ' Siete Partidas ' of Alfonso X. There are, it says,
only three things which can hinder the force of law: the
first is " uso," the second is " costumbre," and the third is
"fuero. "1 We shall, however, presently return to the con-
ception of law in Spain, and treat it in detail.
Enough, we think, has been said to make it clear that the
first and, as we think, the fundamental principle of the Middle
Ages was that the law was the expression, not so much of the
deliberate and conscious will of any person or persons who
possessed legislative authority, but rather of the habits and
usages of the community. It is not our part here to endeavour
to trace the whole significance of this conception, but we
may be allowed to point out that this does not mean that
law as custom was something unintelligible or irrational. It
does not require any great consideration to enable us to
understand that the custom of a community was deter-
mined by the conditions or environment under which it
lived, and by the moral ideas such as they were, and how-
ever they arose, which possessed the community. We may
be allowed to point out that this is true not only of the cus-
tomary law of a primitive community, but in the long run
of all systems of law.
It is also important to remember that this customary law
was not really unchangeable and fixed. On the contrary, it
is evident that at least in what we call progressive countries
it was continually changing with the change of circumstances
or ideas.
It is probably, on the other hand, reasonable to
think that this unconscious movement was not always suffi-
cient to accommodate itself to such a development of civilisa-
tion as took place in the centuries from the eleventh to the
thirteenth.
1 ' Siete Partidas,' i. 2, Introduction: costumbre, et la tercera fuero : et
" Embargar non puede ninguna cosa estas naxon unas do otras, et han
las leyes que non hayan la fuerza et derecho natural en si, segunt que en
el poder que habemos dicho sinon tree esto libro se muestra. "
cosas: la primera uso, et la segunda
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 51
However this may be, it is clear that in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries we can trace the appearance and develop-
ment of another method of conceiving of the source of law--
that is, the beginning of the conception that law is the ex-
pression of the will of some conscious legislative authority.
We have arrived, that is, at the beginnings, for the modern
world, of the conception of sovereignty--that is, that there
exists in every independent society some power of making
and unmaking laws.
We have, a few pages back, referred to the statement of
Bracton that England was governed by custom and not by
written law ; but the same passage which contains these
words contains also words which express a different con-
ception of the nature of the authority on which law is founded.
Other countries, he says, are governed by written laws, Eng-
land by unwritten law and custom; but these English laws
may properly be called " leges," for that has the force of
law which has been justly determined and approved with
the counsel and consent of the great men, the approval of
the whole commonwealth, and the authority of the King. 1
Such laws, he adds in another place, when they have been
approved by the consent of those who are concerned (utantium)
and have been confirmed by the oath of the King, cannot be
changed or annulled without the counsel and consent of those
by whose counsel or consent they were promulgated. 2
Here we have a clear statement of the conception that
there is a definite legislative authority which enacts and
1 Bracton, ' Do Legibus,' i. 1, 2:
" Cum autem fere in omnibus regionibus
utatur legibus et jure non scripto, sola
Anglia usa est in suis finibus jure non
scripto et consuetudine. In ea quidem
ex non scripto jus venit, quod usus
comprobavit. Sed absurdum non erit
leges Anglicanas, licet non scriptas,
leges appellare, cum legis vigorem
habeat, quicquid de consilio et con-
sensu magnatum et reipublicss com-
muni sponsione, authoritate regis, sive
principis precedente, juste fuerit de-
finition et approbatum. "
2 Id. id. , i. 2, 6 : " Hujusmodi vero
leges Anglicanse et consuetudines, re gum
auctoritate jubent quandoque, quan-
doque vetant, et quandoque judicant,
et puniunt transgressores ; quse qui-
dem, cum fuerint approbate consensu
utentium, et sacramento re gum con-
firmatse, mutari non poterunt, nec
destrui sine communi consensu eorum
omnium, quorum consilio et consensu
fuerunt promulgatse. In melius tamen
converti possunt, etiam sine eorum
consensu, quia non dcstruitur quod iu
melius oonvertatur. "
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? 52
[PAKT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
promulgates laws. What was, then, the nature of this
authority ? We have in the third volume set out our con-
clusion that the feudal and national jurists of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries clearly held that the legislative
authority resided not in any one person, but belonged to the
whole community, acting through all its parts, the King, the
great men, and the whole body of the people;1 and in the
first volume we have endeavoured to show that this principle
was already firmly established in the ninth century. 2
The words of Bracton which we have just quoted are only
one expression of a general principle. Lest, however, it
should be thought that this was only an abstract or specu-
lative principle of the jurists, we will briefly examine the
legislative forms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in
the various European countries, and we shall see that nowhere
in the constitutional methods of the great European countries
is there any sign that the legislative power belonged to the
king alone, but always that the king acted with the advice
and consent of the great men, and behind them we see from
time to time the whole community. We must bear in mind
that it is impossible in the Middle Ages to draw a sharp line
between what we should call legislative and administrative
action.
If we go through the constitutions of the Empire, we shall
find that they are issued not by the emperors alone, but
with the advice and consent of the princes. This is obvious
even of the great Frederick II. He renewed in 1213 the
promises made by Otho IV. to Innocent HI. with respect
to the territories claimed by the Papacy, and did this with
the counsel and consent of the princes of the Empire. 3 It
is with the same counsel that in 1226 he annulled the com-
munal privileges of the citizens of Cambrai. * He proclaimed
the ban against various Lombard towns in the same year
with the deliberation and judgment of the princes and other
chief men of the Eoman Empire. 8
1 Ci. vol. iii. part i. chap. 3.
>> Cf. vol. i. chap. 19.
? M. G. H. . ' Const. ,' vol. ii. 48.
<< Id. id. , 106.
1 Id. id. , 107.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOUECE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 53
The most noticeable phrase is, however, that which is
prefixed to the constitution of 1235, which created an im-
portant new official, the " Justitiarius," who was to act in
judicial matters during the absence of the emperor. Frederick
begins by saying that ancient custom and unwritten law had
not provided for some important matters which concerned
the tranquillity of the empire, and therefore it was that
with the counsel and assent of the princes and other
faithful men of the empire assembled in a solemn council
(curia) held at Maintz he had promulgated certain con-
stitutions. 1
It would seem that there is implied a contrast between
the tradition and the custom of the empire, and the new
constitution, which is issued by the emperor not alone, but
with the authority of the Council of the Empire.
If we turn from the Empire to the kingdom of France, we
find that the same principle is illustrated in the " Ordon-
nances " of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is im-
portant to observe this, because there has been a tendency
in some works on French history to speak of the mediseval
French king as exercising some isolated legislative authority.
This view is not consistent with the fact that the formulas
of legislation which we find in the ordinances are of almost
exactly the same nature as those which we find in the other
European countries at that time, and which, as we have
shown in our first volume, were already used in the ninth
century. 2
Louis the Fat in 1118 issued a regulation about the privi-
leges of the serfs of St Maur des Fosses with the common
1 M. G. H. , ' Const. ,' vol. ii. 190 :
" Licet per totam Germani&m consti-
tuti vivant in causis et negociis priva-
torum consuetudinibus antiquitua tra-
ditis et jure non scripto, quia tamen
ardua quedam, quse generalem statum
et tranquillitatem imperii reformabant
nondum fuerant specialiter introducta,
quorum partem aliquam, si quando
casus trahebat in causam, Beta magis
opinio quam statuti juris aut optente
contradictorio judicio consuetudinis
sentencia terminabat--De consilio et
assensu dilectorum principum eccle-
siasticorum et socularium in sollempni
curia celebrata Moguncio constitu-
ciones quasdam certis capitulis com-
prehensas, presentibus eisdem princi-
pibus, nobilibus plurimis, et aliis
ndelibus imperii fecimus promul-
gari. "
* Vol. i. chap. 19.
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? 54
[PABT I,
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
counsel and assent of the bishops and great men. 1 Philip
Augustus in 1209 issued an ordinance concerning feudal
tenures, but the formula of legislation is one which hardly
distinguishes between the royal authority and that of the
great princes and barons. 2 In one ordinance of St Louis of
1246 we have a careful statement of procedure. He first
called together at Orleans the barons and magnates of that
province, and learned from them the custom of the province,
and then, with their counsel and assent, commanded it to be
firmly observed in the future. 3
It is true that in the reign of Philip III. we find in a number
of cases, in place of the formula of the counsel and assent of
the barons, the phrase "in Parliamento " or "in pleno Par-
liamento," 4 while in other cases we find such phrases as
" ordinatum fuit per Dominum regem et ejus consilium. " s
In the reign of Philip IV. we find an ordinance issued " par
la cour de nostre seigneur le Eey," 6 and another " in Parlia-
mento. " 7 In the first case these formulas are apparently
taken to be equivalent. 8
In other cases, however, in the reign of Philip 17. , we have
the traditional form, including the reference to the barons
and the prelates. This is especially noticeable in the demand
1 * Ordonnances des rois de France
de la troisieme Race,' 1118 a. d. :
" Ludovicus Dei clementia Francorum
rex, communi quidem episcoporum et
procerum nostrum consilio et assensu,
regis e auctoritatis dccreto, instituo et
decerno ut servi etc. "
2 Id. , 1209 : " Philippus Dei gratia
Francorum Rex, O. Dux Burgundiss ;
Her. Comes Nivernensis, R. Comes
Bolonuc, G. Comes Sancti Pauli, G.
Damma Petra, et plures alii magnates
de regno Francise unanimiter con-
venerunt, et assensu publico firmave-
runt ut a primo die maii in posterum
ita sit de feodibus tenementis. "
3 Id. , 1246: "Nos volentes super
hoc cognoscere veritatem et quod erat
dubium declarare, vocatis ad nos apud
Aurel. baronibus et magnatibus earun-
dem terrarum, habito cum cis tractatu
et consilio diligenti, communi asser-
tione eorum, didicimus de consuetudine
terrarum illarum, quse tabs est. . . .
Haec autem omnia, prout superius
continentur, de communi consilio et
assensu dictorum baronum et militum
volumus et prsecipimus de ccetero in
perpetuum firmiter obser\rari. "
* E. g. , 'Ordonnances,' 1272, 1274,
1275.
6 Id. , 1277, 1278.
s Id. , 1287.
7 Id. , 1291.
8 Id. , 1287 : " C'est l'ordonnance
faite par la cour de nostre Seigneur le
Roi, et de son commandement, seur
la maniere de faire et tenir les bour-
geoisies de son reaume . . . cette orde-
nance fut faite au Parlement de la
? ? Pentecoste 1'an 1287. "
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 55
for the surrender of at least half of the silver plate belonging
to the clergy and laity of the kingdom in August 1302,1 and
in the general ordinance for the levy of money for the war
in Flanders in the same year. 2 The most significant of all
these phrases, however, are those of the letter of 1303 to the
Bishop of Paris, which communicates the ordinance made for
the levy of soldiers for the war in Flanders. The ordinance
was made with the deliberation and counsel of those prelates
and barons who could be got together ; but Philip obviously
is aware that all the prelates and barons of the kingdom
ought to have been summoned to consider this, and makes
the excuse that time had not permitted it. 3
It would seem clear that, while it may be right to make
some distinction between the authority of the king in the
royal domain and that which he exercised in France as a
whole, the formulas of legislation show that there was no
substantial distinction between the constitutional principles
of legislation as they obtained in France and in other countries.
The counsel and consent of the great men of the kingdom
is no doubt what Beaumanoir meant when he said that the
king had the right and authority to make " establissemens "
for the whole kingdom for a reasonable cause, for the common
good, and " par grant conseil. " *
It is hardly necessary to argue that the same principles
1 Id. , August 1302 : " Pour la
ne? cessite? apparissant, et pour le profit
commun de notre royaume, il soit
accorde? assembliement de plusieurs de
nos amez et feaux prelaz et barons,
avec notre conseil, que il et toute
autre personne d'e? glise, re? ligion, ou
de siecle queles que elles soient, baillent
et delivre en present, la moitie? de tout
leur vesselement blanc. **
2 Id. , March 1302(3) : " De fidelium
prelatorum baronum et aliorum con-
siliariorum nostrorum ad hoc presen-
tium concilio et assensu duximus
ordinandum. **
' Id. , October 1303 : " Euz sur ce
deliberation et consueil, avuecques nos
prelaz et nos barons, que nous poons
avoir eu presentement, pourceque nous
ne poons pas avoir a` cette deliberation
tous nos prelaz et barons du royaume,
sitost comme la necessite? du royaume
le requiert. . . . Nous avecques nos diz
prelaz, barons, e autres feaux presenz,
avons accorde? et ordene? la voie qui
s'ensuit, pour la plus profitable et
convenable a` la besoigne et qui peut
estre au moins du grief des soujies
et du peuple. **
4 Beaumanoir, ' Les Contumes du
Beauvoisis,* 49, 6 : " Tout soit il ainsi
que li rois puist fere nouveaus cstab-
lissemens, il doit mout prendre garde
qu'il les face par resnable cause, et
pour le commun pourfit, et par grant
conseil. "
Cf. vol. iii. pp. 48-51.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 47
actions of men which constitute custom can change or estab-
lish or interpret law. 1
He goes on to contend that, as human laws may not cover
all cases, it may be right sometimes to take action which is
outside of the law, and when such cases are multiplied owing
to some change in men, custom shows that the law is
no longer useful. And he even adds that, while normally,
if the conditions remain the same, the law founded upon
these conditions will prevail over custom, there may be
cases where the law is useless, simply because it is contrary
to the custom of the country, for this is one of the conditions
of law--it is difficult to change the custom of the multitude. 3
It is clear that while St Thomas recognises other forms
of law besides the custom of the people, he does substantially
represent the conception of custom as a main source of
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 1. 2, 97, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit in Epistola
ad Casulanum : ' mos populi Dei et
instituta ma jorum pro lege sunt
tenenda ; et siout prevaricatores legum
divinarum. ita et contemptores con-
suetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi
sunt. ' Respondeo dioendum, quod
omnia lex proficiscitur a rations, et
voluntate legislatoris: lex quidem
divina, et naturalis, a rationabili Dei
voluntate, lex autem humana a volun-
tate hominis ratione regulata: sicut
autem ratio et voluntas hominis mani-
festantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita
etiam manifestantur facto : hoc enim
unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum,
quod ope re implet. Manifest :t est
autem, quod verbo humano potest et
mut&ri lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum
manifestat interiorem motum, et con-
ceptum rationis humanse ; unde etiam
ct per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui
consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest
lex, et exponi et etiam, aliquid causari,
quod legis virtu tem obtineat; inquan-
tum scilicet per exteriores actus multi-
plicatas interior voluntatis motus, et
rationis conceptus efficacissimo decla-
ratur: quum enim aliquid multoties
fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis
judicio proveniri: et secundum hoc
consuetudo et habet vim legis, et
legem abolet, et est legum inter-
pretatrix. "
Cf. Julianus in * Dig. ,' i. 3, 32, and
vol. i. p. 64.
2 Id. id. id. : " Ad secundum di-
cendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est,
leges human se in aliquibus casibus
deficiunt; unde possibile est quando-
que prater legem agere, in casu scilicet
in quo deficit lex; et tamen actus
non erit malus : et cum tales casus
multiplicantur propter aliquam muta-
tionem hominum, tunc manifestatur
per consuetudinem, quod lex ulterius
non est utilis ; sicut etiam manifesta-
retur, si lex contraria verbo promul-
garetur. Si autem adhuc maneat
ratio eadem, propter quam prima lex
utilis erat, non consuetudo legem sed
? ? lex consuetudinem vincit: nisi forte
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? 48
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
law. It is, however, clear that St Thomas Aquinas implies
that there were other forms of law besides custom, and we
shall presently deal with these. The important point of the
passages which we have just considered is that, whatever
other forms of law there might be, he was clear that custom
lay behind them, and was still paramount over them.
This is also the position of some other very important
writers of the later thirteenth century. Vincent of Beauvais,
in his ' Speculum,' cites the significant words of Gratian, in
which he laid down the principle that even when laws were
instituted by a competent authority, they needed to be con-
firmed by the custom of those who were concerned. 1 Albert
the Great seems also to refer to the same doctrine when he
says that the edict of the Prince which is maintained by
custom has the force of written law. 2 What is, however,
much more significant is the treatment of the authority of
custom by the most important Canonist, and the most authori-
tative Civilian of the second half of the century.
Hostiensis, in his ' Commentary on the Decretals,' describes
the nature and the authority of custom, and clearly accepts
the judgment of Gregory IX. that custom if it is " rationabilis
et legitime prsescripta," prevails over other forms of positive
law. 3 Odofridus, in his ' Commentary on the Digest,' draws
attention to the divergence between this judgment of Gregory
and the passage in the ' Code ' (viii. 52 (53)), in which Con-
stantine had apparently maintained that custom could not
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
it 7. 35. Cf. vol. ii. pp. 155, 166,
186.
2 Albert the Great, ' Ethica,' x. iii.
2: " Sin autem illse (leges) scriptse
aint vel non scriptse, nihil videtur
differre ad prsesens: edictum enim
principia consuetudine servatum script:! !
legis habet vigorem. "
* Hostiensis, ' In Primum Librum
Decretalium Commentaria,' i. * De
Consuetudine,' 8, 9: " Ad quod
sciendum quod quatuor sunt species
consuetudinis, scilicet generalissima, ut
est consuetudo inter omnes Catholicos,
versus orientem orare. . . . "
Id. id. , 10 : " Item est consuetudo
genoralis, quando scilicet nedum civitas
sed tota provincia ita generaliter
servat. "
Id. id. , 8, 11 : " Et hae duo species
derogant juri, sive in provincia, sive
in loco in quo obtinct hoc, si post
legem introducta sit consuetudo. "
Id. id. , 10, 9: " Quid est consue-
tudo. . . . TJsus rationabilis competente
tempore confirmatus. . . . "
Id. id. , 11: " TJtrum autem ait
rationabilis vel non, relinquo judici,
cum non regula posset tradi. "
Cf. ' Decretals,' i. 4, 11. Cf. vol. ii.
p. 158.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 49
over-ride law. 1 Odofridus says that there had been much
controversy over this question, and cites the opinion of
Placentinus that, while in earlier times the Eoman people
could make law and its custom could abrogate it, nowadays
it was only the Emperor who could make law, and therefore
the custom of the people could no longer annul it. Odofridus
himself, however, emphatically repudiated the opinion of
Placentinus, and maintained that the Eoman people could
still make law, and that, therefore, its custom could still
annul it. 2 Odofridus was, as it is thought, a pupil of Azo,
and represented the tradition of his master. 3
The opinions of these writers are interesting and important,
but, after all, they are of little importance as compared with
the clear and dogmatic statements of the great feudal lawyers
like Bracton and Beaumanoir on the principles of the system
of law which they had to interpret and administer in the
latter part of the thirteenth century. We may add that the
same judgment as to the legal authority of custom is clearly
1 Cf. vol. ii. p. 158.
2 Odofridus, * Commentary on Di-
gest,' i. 3, 32 (fol. 15 r. ): "Dixit
Pla. (Placentinus) Olim consuetudo
vincebat legem, et ita loquitur lex
nostra in fi . . . nam olim populus
Roman us poterat legem condere, vft
lex est quod populus Romanus, etc.
. . . Non est ergo mirum si contraria
ejus consuetudo tollat legem, quia ejus
est tollere cujus est condere. . . . Sed
hodie solus princeps potest legem con-
dere, ut C. de le. et consti. 1. f. (Code
i. 14, 12) unde non debet consuetudo
populi posse leges imperatoris tollere,
et sic loquitur 1. nostra quia hoc esset
inconveniens quod consuetudo populi
tolleret legem principis. Sed, signori,
banc solutionem non approbamus,
quia sicut olim populus poterat legem
condere, sic et hodie potest, vn debet
posse consuetudo populi legem tollere,
nec obstat quod dicitur quod solus
princeps sive imperator potest legem
condere, quia ilia dictio, solus, excludit
singularem personam, non populum,
VOL. V.
nam populus beno potest hodie legem
condere, sicut olim poterat, ut ibi
dixi. S. E. Ti. L. I. (i. e. , his ' Com-
mentary on Digest,' i. iii. 1). Item
non obstat quod alibi dicitur quod
populus omne imporium legis condere
transtulit in principem, ut id. f. p. p. 1.
una, in. pn. ('Digest,' i. 4, 11), quia
intelligo ' transtulit,' i. concessit, non
tamen de se abdicando ut 7. de consti.
principum, 1. 1 (' Digest,' 1, 4, 1). . . .
Sed, signori, spretis omnibus aliis
solutionibus dicendum est, ut dixi
in casu ; duplex est consuetudo, ut
consuetudo generalis que obtinet per
totum imperium Romanum, et ilia
generalis consuetudo 1. contraria, uni-
que vincit legem, ut in ll. contrariis;
est consuetudo specialis alicujus civi-
ta tis, et ilia specialis consuetudo in
illo solummodo loco vincit legem, in
alio non . . . et sic intelligitur lex
nostra. "
? ? s Cf. for a full discussion of the
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? 50
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
laid down in the great law book of Castile, which we know
as the ' Siete Partidas ' of Alfonso X. There are, it says,
only three things which can hinder the force of law: the
first is " uso," the second is " costumbre," and the third is
"fuero. "1 We shall, however, presently return to the con-
ception of law in Spain, and treat it in detail.
Enough, we think, has been said to make it clear that the
first and, as we think, the fundamental principle of the Middle
Ages was that the law was the expression, not so much of the
deliberate and conscious will of any person or persons who
possessed legislative authority, but rather of the habits and
usages of the community. It is not our part here to endeavour
to trace the whole significance of this conception, but we
may be allowed to point out that this does not mean that
law as custom was something unintelligible or irrational. It
does not require any great consideration to enable us to
understand that the custom of a community was deter-
mined by the conditions or environment under which it
lived, and by the moral ideas such as they were, and how-
ever they arose, which possessed the community. We may
be allowed to point out that this is true not only of the cus-
tomary law of a primitive community, but in the long run
of all systems of law.
It is also important to remember that this customary law
was not really unchangeable and fixed. On the contrary, it
is evident that at least in what we call progressive countries
it was continually changing with the change of circumstances
or ideas.
It is probably, on the other hand, reasonable to
think that this unconscious movement was not always suffi-
cient to accommodate itself to such a development of civilisa-
tion as took place in the centuries from the eleventh to the
thirteenth.
1 ' Siete Partidas,' i. 2, Introduction: costumbre, et la tercera fuero : et
" Embargar non puede ninguna cosa estas naxon unas do otras, et han
las leyes que non hayan la fuerza et derecho natural en si, segunt que en
el poder que habemos dicho sinon tree esto libro se muestra. "
cosas: la primera uso, et la segunda
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 51
However this may be, it is clear that in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries we can trace the appearance and develop-
ment of another method of conceiving of the source of law--
that is, the beginning of the conception that law is the ex-
pression of the will of some conscious legislative authority.
We have arrived, that is, at the beginnings, for the modern
world, of the conception of sovereignty--that is, that there
exists in every independent society some power of making
and unmaking laws.
We have, a few pages back, referred to the statement of
Bracton that England was governed by custom and not by
written law ; but the same passage which contains these
words contains also words which express a different con-
ception of the nature of the authority on which law is founded.
Other countries, he says, are governed by written laws, Eng-
land by unwritten law and custom; but these English laws
may properly be called " leges," for that has the force of
law which has been justly determined and approved with
the counsel and consent of the great men, the approval of
the whole commonwealth, and the authority of the King. 1
Such laws, he adds in another place, when they have been
approved by the consent of those who are concerned (utantium)
and have been confirmed by the oath of the King, cannot be
changed or annulled without the counsel and consent of those
by whose counsel or consent they were promulgated. 2
Here we have a clear statement of the conception that
there is a definite legislative authority which enacts and
1 Bracton, ' Do Legibus,' i. 1, 2:
" Cum autem fere in omnibus regionibus
utatur legibus et jure non scripto, sola
Anglia usa est in suis finibus jure non
scripto et consuetudine. In ea quidem
ex non scripto jus venit, quod usus
comprobavit. Sed absurdum non erit
leges Anglicanas, licet non scriptas,
leges appellare, cum legis vigorem
habeat, quicquid de consilio et con-
sensu magnatum et reipublicss com-
muni sponsione, authoritate regis, sive
principis precedente, juste fuerit de-
finition et approbatum. "
2 Id. id. , i. 2, 6 : " Hujusmodi vero
leges Anglicanse et consuetudines, re gum
auctoritate jubent quandoque, quan-
doque vetant, et quandoque judicant,
et puniunt transgressores ; quse qui-
dem, cum fuerint approbate consensu
utentium, et sacramento re gum con-
firmatse, mutari non poterunt, nec
destrui sine communi consensu eorum
omnium, quorum consilio et consensu
fuerunt promulgatse. In melius tamen
converti possunt, etiam sine eorum
consensu, quia non dcstruitur quod iu
melius oonvertatur. "
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? 52
[PAKT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
promulgates laws. What was, then, the nature of this
authority ? We have in the third volume set out our con-
clusion that the feudal and national jurists of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries clearly held that the legislative
authority resided not in any one person, but belonged to the
whole community, acting through all its parts, the King, the
great men, and the whole body of the people;1 and in the
first volume we have endeavoured to show that this principle
was already firmly established in the ninth century. 2
The words of Bracton which we have just quoted are only
one expression of a general principle. Lest, however, it
should be thought that this was only an abstract or specu-
lative principle of the jurists, we will briefly examine the
legislative forms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in
the various European countries, and we shall see that nowhere
in the constitutional methods of the great European countries
is there any sign that the legislative power belonged to the
king alone, but always that the king acted with the advice
and consent of the great men, and behind them we see from
time to time the whole community. We must bear in mind
that it is impossible in the Middle Ages to draw a sharp line
between what we should call legislative and administrative
action.
If we go through the constitutions of the Empire, we shall
find that they are issued not by the emperors alone, but
with the advice and consent of the princes. This is obvious
even of the great Frederick II. He renewed in 1213 the
promises made by Otho IV. to Innocent HI. with respect
to the territories claimed by the Papacy, and did this with
the counsel and consent of the princes of the Empire. 3 It
is with the same counsel that in 1226 he annulled the com-
munal privileges of the citizens of Cambrai. * He proclaimed
the ban against various Lombard towns in the same year
with the deliberation and judgment of the princes and other
chief men of the Eoman Empire. 8
1 Ci. vol. iii. part i. chap. 3.
>> Cf. vol. i. chap. 19.
? M. G. H. . ' Const. ,' vol. ii. 48.
<< Id. id. , 106.
1 Id. id. , 107.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOUECE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 53
The most noticeable phrase is, however, that which is
prefixed to the constitution of 1235, which created an im-
portant new official, the " Justitiarius," who was to act in
judicial matters during the absence of the emperor. Frederick
begins by saying that ancient custom and unwritten law had
not provided for some important matters which concerned
the tranquillity of the empire, and therefore it was that
with the counsel and assent of the princes and other
faithful men of the empire assembled in a solemn council
(curia) held at Maintz he had promulgated certain con-
stitutions. 1
It would seem that there is implied a contrast between
the tradition and the custom of the empire, and the new
constitution, which is issued by the emperor not alone, but
with the authority of the Council of the Empire.
If we turn from the Empire to the kingdom of France, we
find that the same principle is illustrated in the " Ordon-
nances " of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is im-
portant to observe this, because there has been a tendency
in some works on French history to speak of the mediseval
French king as exercising some isolated legislative authority.
This view is not consistent with the fact that the formulas
of legislation which we find in the ordinances are of almost
exactly the same nature as those which we find in the other
European countries at that time, and which, as we have
shown in our first volume, were already used in the ninth
century. 2
Louis the Fat in 1118 issued a regulation about the privi-
leges of the serfs of St Maur des Fosses with the common
1 M. G. H. , ' Const. ,' vol. ii. 190 :
" Licet per totam Germani&m consti-
tuti vivant in causis et negociis priva-
torum consuetudinibus antiquitua tra-
ditis et jure non scripto, quia tamen
ardua quedam, quse generalem statum
et tranquillitatem imperii reformabant
nondum fuerant specialiter introducta,
quorum partem aliquam, si quando
casus trahebat in causam, Beta magis
opinio quam statuti juris aut optente
contradictorio judicio consuetudinis
sentencia terminabat--De consilio et
assensu dilectorum principum eccle-
siasticorum et socularium in sollempni
curia celebrata Moguncio constitu-
ciones quasdam certis capitulis com-
prehensas, presentibus eisdem princi-
pibus, nobilibus plurimis, et aliis
ndelibus imperii fecimus promul-
gari. "
* Vol. i. chap. 19.
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? 54
[PABT I,
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
counsel and assent of the bishops and great men. 1 Philip
Augustus in 1209 issued an ordinance concerning feudal
tenures, but the formula of legislation is one which hardly
distinguishes between the royal authority and that of the
great princes and barons. 2 In one ordinance of St Louis of
1246 we have a careful statement of procedure. He first
called together at Orleans the barons and magnates of that
province, and learned from them the custom of the province,
and then, with their counsel and assent, commanded it to be
firmly observed in the future. 3
It is true that in the reign of Philip III. we find in a number
of cases, in place of the formula of the counsel and assent of
the barons, the phrase "in Parliamento " or "in pleno Par-
liamento," 4 while in other cases we find such phrases as
" ordinatum fuit per Dominum regem et ejus consilium. " s
In the reign of Philip IV. we find an ordinance issued " par
la cour de nostre seigneur le Eey," 6 and another " in Parlia-
mento. " 7 In the first case these formulas are apparently
taken to be equivalent. 8
In other cases, however, in the reign of Philip 17. , we have
the traditional form, including the reference to the barons
and the prelates. This is especially noticeable in the demand
1 * Ordonnances des rois de France
de la troisieme Race,' 1118 a. d. :
" Ludovicus Dei clementia Francorum
rex, communi quidem episcoporum et
procerum nostrum consilio et assensu,
regis e auctoritatis dccreto, instituo et
decerno ut servi etc. "
2 Id. , 1209 : " Philippus Dei gratia
Francorum Rex, O. Dux Burgundiss ;
Her. Comes Nivernensis, R. Comes
Bolonuc, G. Comes Sancti Pauli, G.
Damma Petra, et plures alii magnates
de regno Francise unanimiter con-
venerunt, et assensu publico firmave-
runt ut a primo die maii in posterum
ita sit de feodibus tenementis. "
3 Id. , 1246: "Nos volentes super
hoc cognoscere veritatem et quod erat
dubium declarare, vocatis ad nos apud
Aurel. baronibus et magnatibus earun-
dem terrarum, habito cum cis tractatu
et consilio diligenti, communi asser-
tione eorum, didicimus de consuetudine
terrarum illarum, quse tabs est. . . .
Haec autem omnia, prout superius
continentur, de communi consilio et
assensu dictorum baronum et militum
volumus et prsecipimus de ccetero in
perpetuum firmiter obser\rari. "
* E. g. , 'Ordonnances,' 1272, 1274,
1275.
6 Id. , 1277, 1278.
s Id. , 1287.
7 Id. , 1291.
8 Id. , 1287 : " C'est l'ordonnance
faite par la cour de nostre Seigneur le
Roi, et de son commandement, seur
la maniere de faire et tenir les bour-
geoisies de son reaume . . . cette orde-
nance fut faite au Parlement de la
? ? Pentecoste 1'an 1287. "
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 55
for the surrender of at least half of the silver plate belonging
to the clergy and laity of the kingdom in August 1302,1 and
in the general ordinance for the levy of money for the war
in Flanders in the same year. 2 The most significant of all
these phrases, however, are those of the letter of 1303 to the
Bishop of Paris, which communicates the ordinance made for
the levy of soldiers for the war in Flanders. The ordinance
was made with the deliberation and counsel of those prelates
and barons who could be got together ; but Philip obviously
is aware that all the prelates and barons of the kingdom
ought to have been summoned to consider this, and makes
the excuse that time had not permitted it. 3
It would seem clear that, while it may be right to make
some distinction between the authority of the king in the
royal domain and that which he exercised in France as a
whole, the formulas of legislation show that there was no
substantial distinction between the constitutional principles
of legislation as they obtained in France and in other countries.
The counsel and consent of the great men of the kingdom
is no doubt what Beaumanoir meant when he said that the
king had the right and authority to make " establissemens "
for the whole kingdom for a reasonable cause, for the common
good, and " par grant conseil. " *
It is hardly necessary to argue that the same principles
1 Id. , August 1302 : " Pour la
ne? cessite? apparissant, et pour le profit
commun de notre royaume, il soit
accorde? assembliement de plusieurs de
nos amez et feaux prelaz et barons,
avec notre conseil, que il et toute
autre personne d'e? glise, re? ligion, ou
de siecle queles que elles soient, baillent
et delivre en present, la moitie? de tout
leur vesselement blanc. **
2 Id. , March 1302(3) : " De fidelium
prelatorum baronum et aliorum con-
siliariorum nostrorum ad hoc presen-
tium concilio et assensu duximus
ordinandum. **
' Id. , October 1303 : " Euz sur ce
deliberation et consueil, avuecques nos
prelaz et nos barons, que nous poons
avoir eu presentement, pourceque nous
ne poons pas avoir a` cette deliberation
tous nos prelaz et barons du royaume,
sitost comme la necessite? du royaume
le requiert. . . . Nous avecques nos diz
prelaz, barons, e autres feaux presenz,
avons accorde? et ordene? la voie qui
s'ensuit, pour la plus profitable et
convenable a` la besoigne et qui peut
estre au moins du grief des soujies
et du peuple. **
4 Beaumanoir, ' Les Contumes du
Beauvoisis,* 49, 6 : " Tout soit il ainsi
que li rois puist fere nouveaus cstab-
lissemens, il doit mout prendre garde
qu'il les face par resnable cause, et
pour le commun pourfit, et par grant
conseil. "
Cf. vol. iii. pp. 48-51.
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