No More Learning

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For
it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are
virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while
they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.
For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel. " But this is not
common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not
obey the gospel. " Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said
to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book
that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in
regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law
belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in
this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on
the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human
actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in
the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative
matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of
the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason,
neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all
to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored
to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend
further into detail, e. g. if one were to say that goods held in trust
should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such
a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater
the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions,
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the
majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since
in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly
contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the
Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that
whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural
law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
by. "

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as
conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases,
but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other
powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers
must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally
right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed
according to reason.
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Whether the natural law can be changed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because
on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the
gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to
correct the law of nature. " But that which is corrected is changed.
Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft
are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God:
as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and
when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a
wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be
changed.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of
all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural
law. " But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore
it seems that the natural law is subject to change.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural
law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable. "

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate
conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not
changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it
may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through
some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above [2021](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was
wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in
the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
need of correction.

Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the
death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth
and maketh alive. " Consequently, by the command of God, death can be
inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently
intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery
nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of
another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to
Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural
things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in
the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in
two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e. g. that one should
not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the
contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the
distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature,
but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
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Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from
the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not
the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin
had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
grace. " But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore
the law of nature can be blotted out.

Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law
of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more
therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.

Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just.
But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of
nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of
man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in
the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not. " But the law
which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the
natural law cannot be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above ([2023]AA[4],5), there belong to the
natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to
all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which
are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can
nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the
case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from
applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77],
A[2]). But as to the other, i. e. the secondary precepts, the natural
law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil
persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of
necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states
(Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular
cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary
precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature,
yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts
of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain
enactments which are unjust.
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OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself;
(2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Its utility.

(2) Its origin.

(3) Its quality.

(4) Its division.
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Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed
by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.

Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice. " But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to
the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90],
AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are
infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions
cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. " But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human
laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]),
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue
must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we
observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for
instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full
complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency
of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by
their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of
God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil
by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it
was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in
virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable
to do.

Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to
virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is
better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by
taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one
solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of
future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered
by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal
just is that which originally was a matter of indifference. " But those
things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law
does not belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere. " If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:
which is clearly false.

Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which
are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat. ].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has
been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature,
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general
principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e. g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way
of determination; e. g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a
determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from
the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments
which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of
the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are
derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot
be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety
of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.

Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as
to their demonstrations. "
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Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed
for no private benefit, but for the common good.
" Because he had
previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying
that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster
religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. "
Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.

Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De
Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add
"just. "

Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according
to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country. "

Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore
human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing
may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful. "

On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.

I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it
is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2];
Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff. , tit. iii; De Leg. et
Senat. ]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down,
at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as
it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to
discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the utility of mankind.

All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first
on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly,
it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account
the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since
man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it
depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
to place and time. " The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean
that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to
the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good;
"clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing
from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]),
law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part
of the description.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes
or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq. ). For under this law he includes the
"law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations
use it. " But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all
nations. " Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.

Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to
differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym.
v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except
materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may
go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not
appropriate.

Objection 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests
and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems
that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law,"
referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other
laws pertaining to other offices of the state.

Objection 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed
over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that
man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names
of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the
"Falcidian" law, etc.

On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.

I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something
contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or
irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal
is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or
irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law,
many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be
divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to
the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as
explained above [2032](A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided
into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in
which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above
[2033](A[2]). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which
are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e. g.
just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature
a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which
are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination,
belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is
best for itself.

Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the
common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided
according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for
the common good: e. g. priests, by praying to God for the people;
princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety
of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to
these men.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that
one who governs the community of the state, as shown above
([2034]Q[90], A[3]). In this respect, there are various human laws
according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to
the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i. e. when the state
is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances. " Another form
is "aristocracy," i. e. government by the best men or men of highest
rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa
Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus consulta]. Another form
is "oligarchy," i. e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and
then we have "Praetorian," also called "Honorary," law. Another form of
government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and
there we have "Decrees of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also
tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore,
has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made
up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law
sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v,
4, seqq. ).

Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human
actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the
law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named
after their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the
"Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this
way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to
which they refer.

Reply to Objection 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way,
natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is
derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very
remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto.
Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is
distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.

The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been
said.
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OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?

(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?

(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?

(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?

(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?

(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of
the law?
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Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the
individual?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the
community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts
of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of
decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed
about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the
community, but also for the individual.

Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated
above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual
matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community,
but rather for the individual.

Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as
stated above ([2036]Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most
certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no
general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual
cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for
individual cases.

On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii,
art. ii; De legibus, etc. ) that "laws should be made to suit the
majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may
possibly happen in an individual case. "

I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit,
but for the common good of all the citizens. " Hence human laws should
be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many
things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to
persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the
state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many
actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to
last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal
just, i. e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid
down simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these
he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter of
indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing
of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community in one
respect, and individuals in another. These are called "privileges,"
i. e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons,
although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these,
he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation. " Other
matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being
applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees
which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds "all
matters subject to decrees. "

Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to
many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all
things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the
principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as
there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use,
since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law
would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single
act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of
prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions;
whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ([2037]Q[92], A[2],
OBJ[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in
all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less
frequently it fail.
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Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all
vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order
that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check. " But it
would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were
repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.

Objection 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the
citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from
all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all
vices.

Objection 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above ([2038]Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law
of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.

On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the
law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits
these things, and that Divine providence punishes them. " But Divine
providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly
allows some vices, by not repressing them.

I answer that, As stated above ([2039]Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as
a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous
with that which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since
different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws
imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as
Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to
nature, and according to the customs of the country. " Now possibility
or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since
the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as
is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as
to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the
same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which
in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In
like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue,
which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.

Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and
chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition
of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law
prohibits murder, theft and such like.

Reply to Objection 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of
others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's
neighbor is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as
stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to
virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the
multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already
virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these
imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out
into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that
violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Mat. 9:17) that
if "new wine," i. e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old
bottles," i. e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine
runneth out," i. e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from
contempt, break into evils worse still.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the
eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.