According
to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in telligibilis.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
The proper ground of this hvt
that all change to be perceived as change prc-supposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition to be found. Lastly, the objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in tpnee. For how ca. i we conceive the possibility of coramu
? ? ? is
is,
? ON THE 8TSTEM OF. PRINCIl'IJtB.
177
nity, that when several substances exist, that surne cfiFect on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that, because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone For this the very essence of community -- which incon ceivable as property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the substances of the world --as cogitated the understanding alone -- community, re quired the mediating aid of divinity for, from their ex istence, such property seemed to him with justice incon ceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility of community (of substances as phsenomena) we represent them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intui tion. For external intuition contains in itself priori formal external relations, as the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the pos sibility of comnmnity. With the same ease can be demon strated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and conse quently the objective reality of the category of quantity, cau be grounded only in external intuition, and that its means alone the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal
sense. But must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of lustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection.
The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more, when the subject of self-cognition mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own na ture without the aid of external empirical intuitions under discussion, for the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such cognition.
The result of the whole of this part of the Analytic of Principles is, therefore --All principles of the pure understand ing are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibi lity of experience, and to experience alone do all priori syn thetical propositions apply and relate--indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation.
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TKAN8CENDENTAL DOCTRINB.
178
01? THE GBOUND OF THE DIVISION OF ALL OBJECTS INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.
We have now not only traversed the region of the pure un
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,
ob Analytic of Princifles.
CHAPTER III.
? and carefully surveyed every part of but we have also measured and assigned to everything therein its
But this land an island, and enclosed
proper place.
nature herself within unchangeable limits.
truth (an attractive word), surrounded
ocean, the region of illusion, where many
an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery,
new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which lie never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to ter mination. But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore its whole extent, and to arrive at certainty whether anything to be discovered there, will not be with out advantage we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what con tains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented with
we can find nowhere else solid foundation to build upon and, secondly, what title we possess this land itself, and how we hold secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these questions, yet summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction,
uniting in one poi. it the momenta of the arguments.
We have seen that everything which the understanding
draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, never theless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether constitu tive priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regu lative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema,
? h
ww, of uossible experience. For experience possesses
the land of wide and stormy fog-bank, many
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? OF PHJEKOMENA AND NOUMEXA.
17V
. ts unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the ima gination in relation to apperception, and in d priori relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a pos sible cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding are not only & priori true, but the very source of all truth, that of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis of the
possibility of experience, as the ensemble* of all cognition, seems to us not enough to propound what true -- we desire also to be told what we want to know. If, then, we leari> nothing more this critical examination, than what we shoult. have practised in the merely empirical use of the understand ing, without any such subtle enquiry, the presumption is, that the advantage we reap from not worth the labour be stowed upon it. It may certainly be answered, that no rash curiosity more prejudicial to the enlargement of our know ledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though were placed before our eyes. But there one advantage in such transcendental enquiries which can he made comprehen sible to the dullest and most reluctant learner --this, namely, that the understanding which occupied merely with empiri cal exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very suc
cessfully, but quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted. But cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when transgresses, as unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.
? * Inbegriff. The word continent, in the sense of tt at which oonUini the content (inkalt), might be allowed to use an old word in new
? ease, would exactly hit the meaning. -- TV.
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? 18C TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTB1XE.
That Ine understanding, therefore, cannot make of its & priori principles, or even of its conceptions other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most impor tant results. A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves ; an empirical use, when it is referred merely to phenomena, that to objects of possible experience. That the latter use of conception the only admissible one, evident from the reasons followiug. For every conception are requisite,
firstly, the logical form of conception (of thought) in general and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to which may apply. Failing this latter, has no sense, and
utterly void of content, although may contain the logical function for constructing conception from certain data. Now object cannot be given to conception otherwise than by in tuition, and, even pure intuition antecedent to the object
? priori possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objec tive validity only from empirical intuition, of which itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their a priori possibi lity, relate to empirical intuitions, that to data towards possible experience. Withr,ut this they possess no objective validity, but are mere play of imagination or of understand ing with images or notions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure intuitions.
" Space has three dimensions" -- " Between two points there can be only one straight line," &c. Although all these prin ciples, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself are generated the mind entirely priori, they would nevertheless have no significance, we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and means of pbsenomena (empirical objects). Hence requi site that an abstract conception be made sensuous, that that an object corresponding to in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, that without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this require ment by the construction of the figure, which phenome- non evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance in number this in its turn finds in the finger* or in counters, or in lines and points. The conception
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? OF PHANOUEKA. anb KOTTMEKA. 181
itself is always produced ct priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions ; but the proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain i priori.
That this is also the case with all of the categories and the
principles based upon them, is evident from the fact, that we
cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corre sponding to them, without having recourse to the conditions ot
sensibility, consequently, to the form of phsenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their use must therefore be con fined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all signifi cance, that is, all relation to an object disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.
The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. * But this " how many times" is based upon successive repetition, con sequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be ex plained only by cogitating a time which is either filled there with or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in all time), there remains in the concep tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realise by representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make no thing out of the notion, and draw no inference from because no object to which to apply the conception determined, and we consequently do not know whether has any meaning at all. In like manner, leave out the notion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in conformity with rule, can find nothing in the pure category, except that there something of such sort that from con clusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing.
Kant's meaning is, that we cannot have any conception of tha size, quantity, 4c. , of thing, without cogitating or constructing arbitrarily unit, which shall be the standard of measurement. This observable weights, measures, &c. Number the schema of quantity. -- Tr.
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? TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
But in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect, but, as this power to draw con clusions requires conditions of which I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle, Everything that is contingent has a cause, comes with a gravity and sell- nssumed authority that seems to require no support from without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer that the non-existence of which possible. But should like very well to know, by what means this possibility of non-existence to be cognized, we do not represent to ourselves succession in the series of phenomena, and in this Succession an existence which follows non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that the non existence of thing not self-contradictory, lame appeal to logical condition, which no doubt necessary condition of the existence of the conception, but far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence.
? can annihilate in thought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but cannot infer from this their objective contingency existence, that to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards the category of commu nity, may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of snbstance and causality are incapable of definition and ex planation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other (commercium) just as little sus ceptible thereof. Possibility, Existence, and Necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of mani fest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the
logical possibility of the conception --the condition of which that be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental pos sibility of things -- the condition of which that there be an object corresponding to the conception, trick which can only deceive the inexperienced. *
? In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, we take away sensuous intuition --the only intuition which we possess, and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought possible -- which, howe'er, not the question what we want to know being, whether relates to an bject
uid thus Jtossesbes anv meaning.
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? O. 1? PHENOMENA A>>D KOUilENA. Ih3
It follows incontestably, that the purr conception* of the understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always ie of empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general conditions of a pos sible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them.
Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important re mit, to wit, thai the understanding is competent to effect nothing cL priori, except the anticipation of the form of a pos sible experience in general, and, that, as that which is not phe nomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions & priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.
Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is
an object, but merely expresses the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ conception, the function of judgment required, by which au object subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal condition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing this condition of judgment (schema), sub- sumption impossible for there in such case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of the categories therefore, in fact, no use at all, and has no determined, or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence follows, that the pure
? merelytranscendental. and the conception
is employed only transcendentally, that
in the thought of manifold in general. Now pure cate gory, in which all conditions of sensuous intuition --as the only intuition we possess -- are abstracted, does not determine
to establish synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of tcanscendentai use, and that beyond the sphere of -possible experience no synthetical
priori principles are possible.
may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus.
The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sen
category incompetent
of the understanding to produce unity
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? 184 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKINt.
tibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are never- thel ess not of transcendental use, because this is in itself im possible, inasmuch as nll the conditions of any employment of use of them (in judgments) are nbsent, to wit, the formal con ditions of the subsumption of an object under these concep tions. As, therefore, in the character of pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility, that they cannot be applied to an object. They are merely the pure form of the employment of the under standing in respect of objects in general and of thought, with out its being at the same time possible to think or to deter
mine any object by their means.
But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion
which very difficult to avoid. The categories are not
based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms intuition, space and time they seem, therefore, to be capa
ble of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this not the case. They are nothing but mere forms
thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they
have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object at least given, while mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold wanting, has no meaning at all. At the sflme time, when we designate certain objects as phsenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in
themselves, evident that this very distinction we as were place the latter, considered this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated
the understanding alone, and call them intelligible exist
ences (noumena). Now the question arises, whether the pure
conceptions of our understanding do possess significance
respect of these latter, and may possibly be mode of cog
nising them.
But we are met at the very commencement with an am
biguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension.
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The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain rela tion phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence be lieves that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental concep tions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intel ligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sen
sibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which
we can cognize in some way or other by means of the under
standing.
If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as
it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making ab straction of our mode of intuiting this noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But we understand by an object non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion --and this noumenon the positive sense.
? The doctrine of sensibility also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that of things which the under standing obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, cousequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves.
time comprehends that
consideration of things
significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this
unity of time not to be met with, as the case with nou mena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the cate gories entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories, in this case incomprehensible. On this point, need only refer the reader to what have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended
to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of
But the understanding at the same cannot employ its categories for the themselves, because these possess
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? 186 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTUINB.
not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition cor responding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply
the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as pheno* mena, we must have an intuition different fnm the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that an in tellectual intuition, no part of our faculty of cognition, absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any appli cation beyond the limits of experience. may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sen suous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood us as such in negative sense.
If take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any
for means of mere intuition nothing cogitated, and from the existence of such or such an affection of sensi bility in me, does not follow that this affection or repre sentation has any relation to an object without me. But takeaway all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that the mode of determining an object for the manifold of possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some mea sure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode 'of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sen suous mode of intuition, supposition we are not justified in making.
call conception problematical which contains itself no contradiction, and which connected with other cogni tions as limitation of given conceptions, but whose ob jective reality cannot be cognised in any manner. The con ception of noumenon, that is, of thing which must be co gitated not as an object of sense, but as thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) not self-contra dictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility the only possible mode of intuit'on. Nay, further, this con
? object
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? OF PHENOMENA iND SOUMKNA.
187
jeptioE. is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the
bounds of phsenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition ; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are calleu noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its applica tion to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void ; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even th<< conception of a possi ble intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The concep tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and
of the world into a mundus sensibilis aud intelligibilis is there
fore quite inadmissible in a positive' sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division ; for the class of nou mena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the catego ries (which are the only conceptions that could serve as concep tions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, <is requisite for their application to an object. The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, however, not only admissible, but, as limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, noumenon not
? particular intelligible object for our understanding on the contrary, the kind of under
standing to which could belong itself problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discur sively by means of categories, but intuitively in non-sensuooa intuition. Our understanding attains in this way sort of negative extension. That to say, not limited by, but mtber limits, sensibility, giving the name of noumena to
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DOCTXOf*.
things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in them selves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, foi it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely aa an unknown something.
I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an en. tirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis* which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients --an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling.
According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in telligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent the former ; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena ; but the question whether these can be ap plied, when the object not phenomenon --and in this sense we regard cogitated as given to the under standing alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore
whether over and above the empirical use of the under standing, transcendental use possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered
the negative.
When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they
appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood in transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that as they must be represented in the complete connexion of phenomena, and not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to possible expe
rience, consequently not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, also quite unknown to us, whether any such transcendental or extraordi-
We mu>>t not translate this expression by intellectual, as com. monly done in German works; for cognition* alone that are intel- ectual or sensuous. Objects of the one or the other mode of intuition ought
he called, however harshly may sound intelligible or untitle. --
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? OF PHENOMENA AND KOUMENA. 189
nary cognition is possible under any circumstances, at leant, whether it is possible by means of our categories. Under standing and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without
or conceptions without intuitions ; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object.
If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the cate gories, let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of course, be unnecessary for this pur pose to construct an analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought--complete
abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given : in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the under standing to know what lies in the conception --to what it ap plies, is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for example, Everything that exists, exists as substance, or, Every thing that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing, viz. , of its cause. Now I ask, whence can the understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves (noumena) ? Where is to be found the third term, which is always requisite in a synthetical propo sition, which may connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical (analytical) connection with each other ? The preposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of the under standing, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgment. Thus the conception of pure and merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles
of its application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them serves enly, like a void
space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without con taining at the same time any other object of cognitioi beyond their sphere.
conceptions,
? ? ? ? 190 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
APPENDIX.
OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OB AMPHIBOLY OF THE CON CEPTIONS OF REFLECTION FROM THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDER STANDING.
Reflection (reflcxio) is not occupied about objects them selves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given
? to the different sources or faculties of cogni tion, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly
determined. The first question which occurs in considering our representations to what faculty of cognition do they belong To the understanding or to the senses Many judgments are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclina tion but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, held to be judgment that has its origin in the understand ing. All judgments do not require examination, that investi gation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain (for example, Between two points there can be only one straight line), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all judgment, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that distinction of the faculty of cog nition to which the given conceptions belong. The act where by compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, term transcendental re flection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the deter minable and the determining (matter and form). The proper determination of these relations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensi bility or understanding For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must
cojj'tate thc*o relations.
representations
? ? 1
is, a
1
I
I
;
?
is,
?
a
it is
is,
? OF THE EQUTVOCAL NATUBE OV THE OOKCEPTIOKB. 191
Before constructing ar. y objective judgment, we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgment, and observe whether there exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general judgment is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular ; whether there is agreement when affirmative, and opposition when negative judgments are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (concept us com-
paralionis). But m, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental reflection, that the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or opposi tion, &c. , from the mere conception of the things means of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that logical reflection mere comparison, for in no ac count taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as re gards their origin, to be treated as homogeneous while tran- icendental reflection (which applies to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other, and therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendenta. reflection duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an priori judgment upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not little light on the question as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding. --
? When an object presented to
. Identity and Difference.
us several times, but always with the same internal determin ations (quulitas et quantitas), an object of pure under standing, always the same, not several things, but only one
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is aa
it, if
1
is
a
is
;
is
is
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by
is,
? 192 TBABSCENDENTAL DOCTBIKE.
thing (numrrica identilas) ; but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical
difference of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different places, is suf- ficent to justify us in holding them to be numerically different.
Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in themselves, conse quently as intelligibilia, that objects of pure understand ing, (although, on account of the confused nature of their
representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case his principle of the indiscernible (principium iden-
tatis indiscernibilium) not to be impugned. But, as pheno mena are objects of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in re spect of them, must be employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of external phenomena. For one part of space, although may be perfectly similar and equal to another part, still without and for this reason alone different from the latter, which added to in order to make up greater space. It follows that this must hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another. --
menon (realitas phenomenon) may very well be in mutual oppo sition, and, when united in the same subject, the one niny
completely or part annihilate the effect or consequence
the other as the case of two moving forces in the same
? 2. Agreen. int and Opposition.
by the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition be tween realities incogitable -- such relation, that is, thai when these realities are connected in one subject, they anni hilate the effects of each other, and may be represented in the formula --3=0. On the other hand, the real in pheno
straight line drawing or impelling point in opposite direc tions, or in the case of pleasure counterbalaucing certain amount of pain.
3, The Internal and External. -- In an object of the pur*
When reality represented
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a
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is a
;
oj
is
a
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is
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? OF THE EQUIYOCAL NATURE OF THE COKCEPTIOKB. 193
understanding only that is internal which has no relation (an regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative in either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe netrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal determina tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object can think than those which my internal sense presents to me --That, to wit, which either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation, and therefore also composition or combina tion, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen tation, in one word, monads.
4. Matter and Form. -- These two conceptions lie at the
foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con
nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its determination, both in transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in that which given, and of the mode in which determined. Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In judgment one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter the mode in which they
are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the conception), in order to b<< able to determine in a. certain manner. Hence, con-
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is
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is
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? 194 TBANSCENDENTAIi DOOTBINE.
ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the
form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence
of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation iu them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the community of their state (that of their representa tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible --the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and effects. And so would really be, the pure un derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob
jects, and space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the form of intuition (as subjective property of sensibility) must ante- cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena aud all data of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility an ob
jection perfectly correct, we assume that we iutuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is peculiar subjective condition, which
priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, given formal intuition (space and time).
Rguabe on the Amfhiboly of the Conceftions of Reflection.
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap pointment of the position which must be taken each concep tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be transcendental topic, doctrine which would tho
roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as would always distinguish to what faculty cf cognition each concert
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? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OT BEFLECTIOJT. 195
tion properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would
best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them
selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing
more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison
and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect,
that they do not represent the object according to that which
constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth
merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our
conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which
the representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by sensibility.
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phenomena to sensi bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that
upon substitution of an object of pure understanding for phenomenon.
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual
the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things, comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peo-iliar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but
? tystem
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by
of
a is, a
? 198 TRAKSCENDE5TAL DOCTHIKS.
misconception. He compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distin guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of
representation, and not any particular source of representa tions. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form --the former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep
tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectva- lised phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us with objective judgments of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one
of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib nitz as things in general merely in the understanding.
1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif ference --as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions --whether, that their object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things themselves, was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle
of indiscernibles, which valid solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth,
cognize in all ita inner determinations drop of water a*
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in
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? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OF BETLECTIOS. 197
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different . ham another, if the conception of the one is completely iden tical with that of the othe. \ But if it is a phenomenon in fcpace, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), hut also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, lust as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
? 2nd. The principle, " Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have
not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -- B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other -- fact which constantly brought before our eyes the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- litates pheenomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an priori rule, as directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces -- condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of new principle, he yet employed for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers introduced into their Leib- nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings, that negations, because these are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of
thing in general this really the case, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system deem not only possible, but natural also, to connect and
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is,
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it is,
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? 1M TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.
3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, consequently from that of composition also. The simple-- that which can be represented by a unit -- is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that with its own representations, the state of the representations of one sub stance could not stand active and living connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states corre spond with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- tentiee), bi't through the unity of the idea of cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.
4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine spare and time, in which he iutellertualized these forms of sensibility, ori
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? Or THE COKCCTTIOnS OF KUFLECTIOW.
199
ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do bo only by employing the con
ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in telligible substances (substantia: noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of phsenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former.
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under
standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to pheno mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in ternal, and which itself consist* of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an
? I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other
conceptions
?
that all change to be perceived as change prc-supposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition to be found. Lastly, the objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in tpnee. For how ca. i we conceive the possibility of coramu
? ? ? is
is,
? ON THE 8TSTEM OF. PRINCIl'IJtB.
177
nity, that when several substances exist, that surne cfiFect on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that, because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone For this the very essence of community -- which incon ceivable as property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the substances of the world --as cogitated the understanding alone -- community, re quired the mediating aid of divinity for, from their ex istence, such property seemed to him with justice incon ceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility of community (of substances as phsenomena) we represent them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intui tion. For external intuition contains in itself priori formal external relations, as the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the pos sibility of comnmnity. With the same ease can be demon strated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and conse quently the objective reality of the category of quantity, cau be grounded only in external intuition, and that its means alone the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal
sense. But must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of lustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection.
The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more, when the subject of self-cognition mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own na ture without the aid of external empirical intuitions under discussion, for the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such cognition.
The result of the whole of this part of the Analytic of Principles is, therefore --All principles of the pure understand ing are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibi lity of experience, and to experience alone do all priori syn thetical propositions apply and relate--indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation.
Ill II "gt
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TKAN8CENDENTAL DOCTRINB.
178
01? THE GBOUND OF THE DIVISION OF ALL OBJECTS INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.
We have now not only traversed the region of the pure un
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,
ob Analytic of Princifles.
CHAPTER III.
? and carefully surveyed every part of but we have also measured and assigned to everything therein its
But this land an island, and enclosed
proper place.
nature herself within unchangeable limits.
truth (an attractive word), surrounded
ocean, the region of illusion, where many
an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery,
new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which lie never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to ter mination. But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore its whole extent, and to arrive at certainty whether anything to be discovered there, will not be with out advantage we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what con tains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented with
we can find nowhere else solid foundation to build upon and, secondly, what title we possess this land itself, and how we hold secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these questions, yet summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction,
uniting in one poi. it the momenta of the arguments.
We have seen that everything which the understanding
draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, never theless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether constitu tive priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regu lative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema,
? h
ww, of uossible experience. For experience possesses
the land of wide and stormy fog-bank, many
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? OF PHJEKOMENA AND NOUMEXA.
17V
. ts unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the ima gination in relation to apperception, and in d priori relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a pos sible cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding are not only & priori true, but the very source of all truth, that of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis of the
possibility of experience, as the ensemble* of all cognition, seems to us not enough to propound what true -- we desire also to be told what we want to know. If, then, we leari> nothing more this critical examination, than what we shoult. have practised in the merely empirical use of the understand ing, without any such subtle enquiry, the presumption is, that the advantage we reap from not worth the labour be stowed upon it. It may certainly be answered, that no rash curiosity more prejudicial to the enlargement of our know ledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though were placed before our eyes. But there one advantage in such transcendental enquiries which can he made comprehen sible to the dullest and most reluctant learner --this, namely, that the understanding which occupied merely with empiri cal exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very suc
cessfully, but quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted. But cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when transgresses, as unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.
? * Inbegriff. The word continent, in the sense of tt at which oonUini the content (inkalt), might be allowed to use an old word in new
? ease, would exactly hit the meaning. -- TV.
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? 18C TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTB1XE.
That Ine understanding, therefore, cannot make of its & priori principles, or even of its conceptions other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most impor tant results. A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves ; an empirical use, when it is referred merely to phenomena, that to objects of possible experience. That the latter use of conception the only admissible one, evident from the reasons followiug. For every conception are requisite,
firstly, the logical form of conception (of thought) in general and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to which may apply. Failing this latter, has no sense, and
utterly void of content, although may contain the logical function for constructing conception from certain data. Now object cannot be given to conception otherwise than by in tuition, and, even pure intuition antecedent to the object
? priori possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objec tive validity only from empirical intuition, of which itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their a priori possibi lity, relate to empirical intuitions, that to data towards possible experience. Withr,ut this they possess no objective validity, but are mere play of imagination or of understand ing with images or notions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure intuitions.
" Space has three dimensions" -- " Between two points there can be only one straight line," &c. Although all these prin ciples, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself are generated the mind entirely priori, they would nevertheless have no significance, we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and means of pbsenomena (empirical objects). Hence requi site that an abstract conception be made sensuous, that that an object corresponding to in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, that without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this require ment by the construction of the figure, which phenome- non evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance in number this in its turn finds in the finger* or in counters, or in lines and points. The conception
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? OF PHANOUEKA. anb KOTTMEKA. 181
itself is always produced ct priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions ; but the proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain i priori.
That this is also the case with all of the categories and the
principles based upon them, is evident from the fact, that we
cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corre sponding to them, without having recourse to the conditions ot
sensibility, consequently, to the form of phsenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their use must therefore be con fined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all signifi cance, that is, all relation to an object disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.
The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. * But this " how many times" is based upon successive repetition, con sequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be ex plained only by cogitating a time which is either filled there with or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in all time), there remains in the concep tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realise by representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make no thing out of the notion, and draw no inference from because no object to which to apply the conception determined, and we consequently do not know whether has any meaning at all. In like manner, leave out the notion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in conformity with rule, can find nothing in the pure category, except that there something of such sort that from con clusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing.
Kant's meaning is, that we cannot have any conception of tha size, quantity, 4c. , of thing, without cogitating or constructing arbitrarily unit, which shall be the standard of measurement. This observable weights, measures, &c. Number the schema of quantity. -- Tr.
? ? ? is
is
hi a
?
a
a a
is I
a
it a
it,
if I
it
is
? TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
But in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect, but, as this power to draw con clusions requires conditions of which I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle, Everything that is contingent has a cause, comes with a gravity and sell- nssumed authority that seems to require no support from without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer that the non-existence of which possible. But should like very well to know, by what means this possibility of non-existence to be cognized, we do not represent to ourselves succession in the series of phenomena, and in this Succession an existence which follows non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that the non existence of thing not self-contradictory, lame appeal to logical condition, which no doubt necessary condition of the existence of the conception, but far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence.
? can annihilate in thought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but cannot infer from this their objective contingency existence, that to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards the category of commu nity, may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of snbstance and causality are incapable of definition and ex planation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other (commercium) just as little sus ceptible thereof. Possibility, Existence, and Necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of mani fest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the
logical possibility of the conception --the condition of which that be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental pos sibility of things -- the condition of which that there be an object corresponding to the conception, trick which can only deceive the inexperienced. *
? In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, we take away sensuous intuition --the only intuition which we possess, and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought possible -- which, howe'er, not the question what we want to know being, whether relates to an bject
uid thus Jtossesbes anv meaning.
? ? if ;
a
is
it
it
in
it is isa aa a is, is
is
is ?
is aa
is
is II
I
is
is is
a a
is,
if
? O. 1? PHENOMENA A>>D KOUilENA. Ih3
It follows incontestably, that the purr conception* of the understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always ie of empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general conditions of a pos sible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them.
Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important re mit, to wit, thai the understanding is competent to effect nothing cL priori, except the anticipation of the form of a pos sible experience in general, and, that, as that which is not phe nomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions & priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.
Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is
an object, but merely expresses the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ conception, the function of judgment required, by which au object subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal condition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing this condition of judgment (schema), sub- sumption impossible for there in such case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of the categories therefore, in fact, no use at all, and has no determined, or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence follows, that the pure
? merelytranscendental. and the conception
is employed only transcendentally, that
in the thought of manifold in general. Now pure cate gory, in which all conditions of sensuous intuition --as the only intuition we possess -- are abstracted, does not determine
to establish synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of tcanscendentai use, and that beyond the sphere of -possible experience no synthetical
priori principles are possible.
may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus.
The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sen
category incompetent
of the understanding to produce unity
? ? & It
is
is is
a it
is
is
is
;
a
is, a
a
a
? 184 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKINt.
tibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are never- thel ess not of transcendental use, because this is in itself im possible, inasmuch as nll the conditions of any employment of use of them (in judgments) are nbsent, to wit, the formal con ditions of the subsumption of an object under these concep tions. As, therefore, in the character of pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility, that they cannot be applied to an object. They are merely the pure form of the employment of the under standing in respect of objects in general and of thought, with out its being at the same time possible to think or to deter
mine any object by their means.
But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion
which very difficult to avoid. The categories are not
based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms intuition, space and time they seem, therefore, to be capa
ble of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this not the case. They are nothing but mere forms
thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they
have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object at least given, while mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold wanting, has no meaning at all. At the sflme time, when we designate certain objects as phsenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in
themselves, evident that this very distinction we as were place the latter, considered this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated
the understanding alone, and call them intelligible exist
ences (noumena). Now the question arises, whether the pure
conceptions of our understanding do possess significance
respect of these latter, and may possibly be mode of cog
nising them.
But we are met at the very commencement with an am
biguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension.
? ? ? a
by
a it
of
by in
is
is
it is
is,
in it of
is
it is
;
? 0? PHENOMENA AKD KOUMEHA
The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain rela tion phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence be lieves that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental concep tions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intel ligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sen
sibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which
we can cognize in some way or other by means of the under
standing.
If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as
it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making ab straction of our mode of intuiting this noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But we understand by an object non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion --and this noumenon the positive sense.
? The doctrine of sensibility also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that of things which the under standing obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, cousequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves.
time comprehends that
consideration of things
significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this
unity of time not to be met with, as the case with nou mena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the cate gories entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories, in this case incomprehensible. On this point, need only refer the reader to what have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended
to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of
But the understanding at the same cannot employ its categories for the themselves, because these possess
? ? it is
a
I
in
a it
I
is
is, is
is
is
is
of a
is
is a
it, if
<)
in it
is a
? 186 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTUINB.
not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition cor responding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply
the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as pheno* mena, we must have an intuition different fnm the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that an in tellectual intuition, no part of our faculty of cognition, absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any appli cation beyond the limits of experience. may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sen suous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood us as such in negative sense.
If take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any
for means of mere intuition nothing cogitated, and from the existence of such or such an affection of sensi bility in me, does not follow that this affection or repre sentation has any relation to an object without me. But takeaway all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that the mode of determining an object for the manifold of possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some mea sure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode 'of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sen suous mode of intuition, supposition we are not justified in making.
call conception problematical which contains itself no contradiction, and which connected with other cogni tions as limitation of given conceptions, but whose ob jective reality cannot be cognised in any manner. The con ception of noumenon, that is, of thing which must be co gitated not as an object of sense, but as thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) not self-contra dictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility the only possible mode of intuit'on. Nay, further, this con
? object
? ? is a
a
It
a a
is a
a
I
a
I
a
in
is,
a
by
is I is
is,
;
if
it
it
by
is
is
? OF PHENOMENA iND SOUMKNA.
187
jeptioE. is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the
bounds of phsenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition ; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are calleu noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its applica tion to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void ; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even th<< conception of a possi ble intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The concep tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and
of the world into a mundus sensibilis aud intelligibilis is there
fore quite inadmissible in a positive' sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division ; for the class of nou mena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the catego ries (which are the only conceptions that could serve as concep tions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, <is requisite for their application to an object. The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, however, not only admissible, but, as limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, noumenon not
? particular intelligible object for our understanding on the contrary, the kind of under
standing to which could belong itself problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discur sively by means of categories, but intuitively in non-sensuooa intuition. Our understanding attains in this way sort of negative extension. That to say, not limited by, but mtber limits, sensibility, giving the name of noumena to
? ? Ity is
;
is
is it
is
a
a a
a
is, it
a
a
? TllAKSClSirDENTAI,
DOCTXOf*.
things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in them selves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, foi it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely aa an unknown something.
I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an en. tirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis* which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients --an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling.
According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in telligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent the former ; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena ; but the question whether these can be ap plied, when the object not phenomenon --and in this sense we regard cogitated as given to the under standing alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore
whether over and above the empirical use of the under standing, transcendental use possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered
the negative.
When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they
appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood in transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that as they must be represented in the complete connexion of phenomena, and not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to possible expe
rience, consequently not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, also quite unknown to us, whether any such transcendental or extraordi-
We mu>>t not translate this expression by intellectual, as com. monly done in German works; for cognition* alone that are intel- ectual or sensuous. Objects of the one or the other mode of intuition ought
he called, however harshly may sound intelligible or untitle. --
? ? ? o
<<
in is,
it
it is is
it is
is, a
is
it is
a
is
a
is,
it if
? OF PHENOMENA AND KOUMENA. 189
nary cognition is possible under any circumstances, at leant, whether it is possible by means of our categories. Under standing and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without
or conceptions without intuitions ; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object.
If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the cate gories, let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of course, be unnecessary for this pur pose to construct an analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought--complete
abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given : in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the under standing to know what lies in the conception --to what it ap plies, is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for example, Everything that exists, exists as substance, or, Every thing that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing, viz. , of its cause. Now I ask, whence can the understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves (noumena) ? Where is to be found the third term, which is always requisite in a synthetical propo sition, which may connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical (analytical) connection with each other ? The preposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of the under standing, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgment. Thus the conception of pure and merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles
of its application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them serves enly, like a void
space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without con taining at the same time any other object of cognitioi beyond their sphere.
conceptions,
? ? ? ? 190 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
APPENDIX.
OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OB AMPHIBOLY OF THE CON CEPTIONS OF REFLECTION FROM THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDER STANDING.
Reflection (reflcxio) is not occupied about objects them selves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given
? to the different sources or faculties of cogni tion, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly
determined. The first question which occurs in considering our representations to what faculty of cognition do they belong To the understanding or to the senses Many judgments are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclina tion but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, held to be judgment that has its origin in the understand ing. All judgments do not require examination, that investi gation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain (for example, Between two points there can be only one straight line), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all judgment, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that distinction of the faculty of cog nition to which the given conceptions belong. The act where by compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, term transcendental re flection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the deter minable and the determining (matter and form). The proper determination of these relations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensi bility or understanding For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must
cojj'tate thc*o relations.
representations
? ? 1
is, a
1
I
I
;
?
is,
?
a
it is
is,
? OF THE EQUTVOCAL NATUBE OV THE OOKCEPTIOKB. 191
Before constructing ar. y objective judgment, we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgment, and observe whether there exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general judgment is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular ; whether there is agreement when affirmative, and opposition when negative judgments are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (concept us com-
paralionis). But m, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental reflection, that the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or opposi tion, &c. , from the mere conception of the things means of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that logical reflection mere comparison, for in no ac count taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as re gards their origin, to be treated as homogeneous while tran- icendental reflection (which applies to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other, and therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendenta. reflection duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an priori judgment upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not little light on the question as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding. --
? When an object presented to
. Identity and Difference.
us several times, but always with the same internal determin ations (quulitas et quantitas), an object of pure under standing, always the same, not several things, but only one
? ? is
is aa
it, if
1
is
a
is
;
is
is
it
by
is,
? 192 TBABSCENDENTAL DOCTBIKE.
thing (numrrica identilas) ; but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical
difference of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different places, is suf- ficent to justify us in holding them to be numerically different.
Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in themselves, conse quently as intelligibilia, that objects of pure understand ing, (although, on account of the confused nature of their
representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case his principle of the indiscernible (principium iden-
tatis indiscernibilium) not to be impugned. But, as pheno mena are objects of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in re spect of them, must be employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of external phenomena. For one part of space, although may be perfectly similar and equal to another part, still without and for this reason alone different from the latter, which added to in order to make up greater space. It follows that this must hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another. --
menon (realitas phenomenon) may very well be in mutual oppo sition, and, when united in the same subject, the one niny
completely or part annihilate the effect or consequence
the other as the case of two moving forces in the same
? 2. Agreen. int and Opposition.
by the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition be tween realities incogitable -- such relation, that is, thai when these realities are connected in one subject, they anni hilate the effects of each other, and may be represented in the formula --3=0. On the other hand, the real in pheno
straight line drawing or impelling point in opposite direc tions, or in the case of pleasure counterbalaucing certain amount of pain.
3, The Internal and External. -- In an object of the pur*
When reality represented
? ? a
a
a
is
it
a
3 in in
is a
;
oj
is
a
is it,
is
it
is
is,
? OF THE EQUIYOCAL NATURE OF THE COKCEPTIOKB. 193
understanding only that is internal which has no relation (an regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative in either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe netrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal determina tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object can think than those which my internal sense presents to me --That, to wit, which either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation, and therefore also composition or combina tion, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen tation, in one word, monads.
4. Matter and Form. -- These two conceptions lie at the
foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con
nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its determination, both in transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in that which given, and of the mode in which determined. Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In judgment one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter the mode in which they
are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the conception), in order to b<< able to determine in a. certain manner. Hence, con-
? ? ? ? in a
it
is
;
a
is
is
it
is a
? I
it,
? 194 TBANSCENDENTAIi DOOTBINE.
ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the
form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence
of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation iu them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the community of their state (that of their representa tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible --the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and effects. And so would really be, the pure un derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob
jects, and space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the form of intuition (as subjective property of sensibility) must ante- cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena aud all data of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility an ob
jection perfectly correct, we assume that we iutuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is peculiar subjective condition, which
priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, given formal intuition (space and time).
Rguabe on the Amfhiboly of the Conceftions of Reflection.
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap pointment of the position which must be taken each concep tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be transcendental topic, doctrine which would tho
roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as would always distinguish to what faculty cf cognition each concert
? ? ? it
if
is
;
a
if a
a
it
is,
by
if
a
a
a
is
a
if
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OT BEFLECTIOJT. 195
tion properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would
best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them
selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing
more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison
and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect,
that they do not represent the object according to that which
constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth
merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our
conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which
the representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by sensibility.
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phenomena to sensi bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that
upon substitution of an object of pure understanding for phenomenon.
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual
the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things, comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peo-iliar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but
? tystem
? ? a
by
of
a is, a
? 198 TRAKSCENDE5TAL DOCTHIKS.
misconception. He compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distin guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of
representation, and not any particular source of representa tions. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form --the former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep
tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectva- lised phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us with objective judgments of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one
of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib nitz as things in general merely in the understanding.
1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif ference --as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions --whether, that their object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things themselves, was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle
of indiscernibles, which valid solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth,
cognize in all ita inner determinations drop of water a*
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it
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OF BETLECTIOS. 197
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different . ham another, if the conception of the one is completely iden tical with that of the othe. \ But if it is a phenomenon in fcpace, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), hut also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, lust as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
? 2nd. The principle, " Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have
not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -- B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other -- fact which constantly brought before our eyes the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- litates pheenomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an priori rule, as directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces -- condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of new principle, he yet employed for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers introduced into their Leib- nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings, that negations, because these are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of
thing in general this really the case, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system deem not only possible, but natural also, to connect and
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is
is
is,
a
it is,
it
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? 1M TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.
3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, consequently from that of composition also. The simple-- that which can be represented by a unit -- is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that with its own representations, the state of the representations of one sub stance could not stand active and living connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states corre spond with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- tentiee), bi't through the unity of the idea of cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.
4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine spare and time, in which he iutellertualized these forms of sensibility, ori
? ? ? of
a
in
is,
? Or THE COKCCTTIOnS OF KUFLECTIOW.
199
ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do bo only by employing the con
ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in telligible substances (substantia: noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of phsenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former.
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under
standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to pheno mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in ternal, and which itself consist* of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an
? I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other
conceptions
?
