No More Learning

In these evil
tendencies they had been encouraged by the lax administration of the
last two reigns. Yet even more were the greater lay magnates, the dukes
and margraves, disposed to regard themselves as hereditary princes. The
dukes, in spite of past efforts to reduce their pretensions, were the recog-
nised chiefs of the separate races which made up the German nation, and,
like Herman of Swabia, were generally too strong, even in defeat, to be
displaced without risk. The margraves, holding an office less venerable, had
also won, by effective service on the frontiers, a firm position in the State.
Though dukes and margraves alike required investiture by the king, it
was rarely that a son was not preferred to his father's place. The control
of men so firmly established in power and dignity could be no easy task;
yet it now depended upon the vindication of the royal authority whether
the nation should preserve its political cohesion, or be split up, like the
adjacent kingdoms on the West, into a loose aggregation of almost in-
dependent principalities under a nominal sovereign.
It was the second Henry who by his energy postponed for two gene-
rations the process of disintegration which set in under Henry IV. To
restore the rule of law was his prime object. In the decay, however,
CH. X.


## p. 230 (#276) ############################################

230
Lessening resources of the Crown
of local justice, the Royal, or Palatine, Court, over which the king
presided in person, was the only tribunal where redress could be sought
against a powerful adversary, or whither appeal could be made from
decisions in the inferior courts. Henry knew, as his biographer tells us,
that the region left unvisited by the king was most often filled with the
complaints and groans of the poor, and he did his utmost, by incessant
journeys through the land, to bring justice within reach of all his subjects.
In many cases he punished with severity high-born disturbers of the
peace. Yet the conditions were now such that the Crown was not
strong enough of itself to compel obedience to the law. To make his
will prevail, alike in judicial administration and in large measures of
policy, he had to secure the co-operation of the magnates assembled in
general or provincial diets. At these meetings, which became more
frequent under him than under his predecessors, he was generally able, by
his fixity of purpose and his skilful address, to win consent to his designs.
Even so, however, he was largely dependent for their accomplishment upon
such material aid as the good will of the nobles might afford him. There
existed no standing army. The national levy could still be summoned by
royal command for the defence of the realm; but the only permanent
force at the disposal of the king consisted of unfree retainers (ministeriales)
drawn from the crown lands or from his patrimonial estates. But they
were insufficient for making expeditions abroad or for preserving order at
home; and it was upon the feudal contingents furnished by the magnates
that the monarch had to rely in the last resort.
Furthermore the royal revenues had for years been in steady decline.
The immense crown estates, the villae on which Charles the Great had
bestowed such care, had been broken up and largely dissipated by the
later Carolingians, partly through the granting of fiefs to reward their
supporters, partly though their lavish endowment of churches and monas-
teries. And in similar fashion the peculiar royal rights of coinage, tolls,
and markets, with others of the same kind, all extremely profitable, had
been also freely alienated to laymen and ecclesiastics. In the hands of
Otto the Great this practice had been turned to account for the strength-
ening of the throne; but under his son and grandson it had rather
served to establish the local powers in their independence. What crown
lands remained to the monarch lay scattered in fragments throughout the
kingdom, and were therefore less profitable and more difficult to ad-
minister. Henry was a wealthy king, but more through his possession of
the great Liudolfing inheritance in Saxony and of the patrimony of his
Bavarian ancestors, than through his command of such resources as were
proper to the Crown.
Faced then by the growing power of the secular magnates, Henry, if
he were to restore the German monarchy, had to seek some surer means
than the bare authority of the Crown. But the task was one beyond the
powers of a single man, and required the steady action of an ordered ad-


## p. 231 (#277) ############################################

The Church as an instrument of order
231
ministration. This was found in the organisation of the Church. Its
dignitaries Henry employed as crown officials, whom he appointed himself.
Though the bishops and greater abbots were spiritual chiefs, they were
called upon to act also as servants of the king, advising him in council,
fulfilling his missions abroad, preserving his peace within their own terri-
tories. Further, they, even more than lay princes, had to provide him with
military contingents of their vassals, often to follow him in person into
the field, sometimes even to conduct his campaigns. And while heavy
calls were continually being made upon their revenues for the public need,
the right to dispose of their vacant fiefs was frequently claimed by the
king for some purpose of his own. More especially did the royal monas-
teries suffer loss at Henry's hand; for the pious king in several cases did
not hesitate at extensive confiscation of monastic lands. Yet these
severe measures were not the outcome of caprice or greed, but of a settled
policy for the kingdom's weal.
In thus employing the Church Henry resumed the policy adopted by
Otto the Great. But while Otto, in using the Church to fortify the
throne, had cared little to interfere in matters purely ecclesiastical,
Henry sought to exercise over the Church an authority no less direct
and searching than over the State. Filled with the ecclesiastical spirit,
he set himself to regulate Church affairs as seemed to him best in
the Church's interest; and the instinct for order which urged him from
the first to promote its efficiency developed at last into a passionate zeal
for its reformation.
To achieve his purpose it was essential for Henry to secure an
effective mastery over the Church. But only through its constitutional
rulers, the bishops, could he, without flagrant illegality, obtain command
of its wealth, engage its political services, and direct its spiritual energies.
In order, however, to be sure of bishops who should be his willing agents,
the decisive word in the appointment to vacant sees must be his. In the
Frankish kingdom the old canonical rule that the choice of a new bishop
rested with the clergy and laity of the diocese had never been quite for-
gotten; but from early times the kings had claimed and been allowed the
right of confirming or disapproving an episcopal election, and this had been
enlarged into the greater right of direct nomination. The claim of the
Crown to intervene in episcopal appointments had been fully revindicated
by Otto the Great. In a few German dioceses the privilege of free elec-
tion had been expressly confirmed or granted afresh by charters, yet Otto
had never allowed the local privilege to hinder the appointment of any
man he desired. The effect of such methods was to fill the bishoprics with
royal nominees. Though the procedure was prejudicial to the indepen-
dence of the Church, yet it freed episcopal elections from those local
influences which would have made the bishops mere creatures of the
secular magnates, or at best their counterparts in an ecclesiastical dis-
guise.
CH. X.


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232
Royal nomination of Bishops
Otto's practice was followed by Henry, who insisted on his right to
nominate the bishops. He made no fresh grants of privilege of free elec-
tion; he often qualified it by reserving the right of royal assent as at
Hamburg, Hildesheim, Minden, Halberstadt, and Fulda, and sometimes
he withheld it altogether as at Paderborn. His general practice is fairly
illustrated by the case of Magdeburg, which fell vacant four times in the
course of his reign. This church had not received from its founder,
Otto the Great, the right of choosing its own pastor; and it was by
gift of his son, in terms unusually solemn, that the privilege was conferred
in 979. Yet Otto II made light of his own charter when, on the first
vacancy of the see, he allowed his favourite, the crafty Bishop Gisiler of
Merseburg, to supplant the canonically elected nominee. At Gisiler's
death in January 1004, the clergy of Magdeburg forthwith unanimously
elected their Provost Waltherd. But Henry was resolved that no
Magdeburg cleric should occupy the see; and demanded the election
of his own attached friend, the Bavarian Tagino. Neither the plea of
right nor the humble entreaty of the electors was accepted by the king,
whose insistence at length won the consent of Waltherd and his sup-
porters to Tagino's promotion. Through their presence at his investiture
by Henry they acquiesced in the reversal of their own previous act.
Tagino died in June 1012. Again Henry intervened by sending an envoy,
but this time to ask the electors to submit a candidate for his approval.
The clergy and vassals of the see once more chose the same candidate,
Waltherd, as archbishop. Only with great reluctance did Henry agree,
and that upon condition of a fresh election being held in his presence, at
which he himself proposed, and the electors concurred in, the nomi-
nation of the Provost. Within two months, however, Waltherd was
snatched away by death. Next day, the Magdeburg clergy, still anxious
to preserve their right, elected Thiedric, a youthful cleric, to the vacant
see; and the day following repeated the act. Henry, greatly indignant
at this proceeding, determined to enforce his will on the presumptuous
Church. He made Thiedric a royal chaplain, and then, coming to
Magdeburg, directed another meeting to be held for the election of
Gero, one of his chaplains, whom he had designated for the archbishopric.
The electors, with an express reservation of their right for the future,
obeyed, and Gero was chosen. Yet this reservation appears to have been
no hindrance to Henry when, in the last year of his reign, the see of
Magdeburg was again vacated by the death of Gero, and he secured the
succession of Hunfrid (Humphrey), another royal nominee.
To Henry, therefore, the right of election was useful for giving
canonical sanction to a choice made by himself, and the utmost allowed
to electors was to name a candidate; thus in course of time most of the
German bishoprics were filled by his nominees. Yet Henry's bishops were
men far from unworthy of their office. If few of them were learned, the
lives of few gave occasion for reproach; if capable men of affairs rather


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Aggrandisement of Bishops
233
than sound spiritual guides, they were not generally neglectful of pastoral
duty; some were even distinguished for evangelical zeal. They were chosen
oftenest, it would seem, for their practical capacity, and for a sympathy
with his political and ecclesiastical aims gained by long service in the
royal chapel or chancery; some, like the historian Thietmar, were chosen
for their wealth, part of which they were expected to bestow on their
impoverished sees; not a few were recommended by their Bavarian birth.
Henry was not the man to dishonour the Church by giving it worthless
prelates. Nevertheless, the bishops were his creatures, from whom he
demanded obedience; in a word, the Church had to accept a position of
strict subordination to the State.
It was not all at once that Henry was able to bring this about.
The bishops whom he found in office at his accession owed nothing to
him; and even when of proved loyalty they were not inclined to be sub-
servient. Some indeed were openly disaffected. Of such were the Arch-
bishops Heribert of Cologne and Gisiler of Magdeburg, and among
bishops, the celebrated Bernward of Hildesheim. Whether indifferent or
hostile, however, it was not the spiritual independence of the Church for
which most of them were jealous, but for the temporal power and dignity
of their own sees. Their sense of ecclesiastical unity was faint; nor did
any voice sound from Rome to remind them of their allegiance to the
Church Universal. To many even the welfare of their own national branch
thereof was of small concern beside the interests of their particular
dioceses. Papal impotence left Henry a free hand; and with the rise of
a new episcopate the cohesion of the German Church was strengthened
and its energies were revived, but only at the cost of its independence. For
the bishops learned to acquiesce in Henry's claim to ecclesiastical authority,
and zealous churchmen were not slow to enjoin obedience to the Crown
as a duty of divine ordinance. But with the Church thus submissive, all
fear that the bishops might use their means and their privileges in a
spirit defiant of the secular power was removed. They had become, in
truth, royal officials; and the more, therefore, that their position was
enhanced, the better service could they render to the king. Accordingly,
it was with no sparing hand that Henry, following the example of the
Ottos, bestowed territory and regalities upon the episcopal churches. His
charters reveal also two other special features of his policy. The one is
the frequency with which he annexed royal abbeys of the lesser rank to
bishoprics, to be held by them as part of their endowment; the other is
his extension of the recent practice of giving vacant counties into the
hands of prelates. In the former case, the purpose was achieved of turning
the smaller religious houses to better account for the service of the State
than they could be as isolated corporations; in the latter, advantage was
gained for the Crown by the transfer of local authority from secular to
ecclesiastical hands, since the bishops were now more amenable to royal
control than were the lay counts. Thus the process, by which the bishops
CH. X.


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234
Dual position of the Bishops
became territorial princes, went rapidly forward; although the Crown
was strengthened rather than weakened by their exaltation.
It is indisputable that the alliance between the Church and the
Monarchy brought immense advantages to both. The former, favoured by
the Crown, still further improved its high position. The king, on his
side, obtained the services of men highly educated and familiar with
business; who could form a counterpoise to the hereditary nobility, and
yet could never establish themselves as an hereditary caste; who set an
example within their dioceses of upright and humane administration;
and who shewed themselves prudent managers of their estates. Besides
all which, the revenues of their churches and the military aid of their
vassals were at his command. Their corporate feeling as members of a
national church had revived; and their general employment in the service
of the Crown, which claimed the headship of that church, made them the
representatives of national unity on the secular no less than on the
ecclesiastical side.
Yet the coalition of the two powers contained the seeds of future
calamity to the Church. It was inevitable that bishops so chosen and so
employed could not rise to their spiritual vocation. Even within their
own dioceses they were as much occupied by secular as by pastoral work.
Insensibly they became secularised; and the Church ceased to be either
a school of theologians or a nursery of missionaries. At such a price were
its temporal advantages secured. Nor was the gain to the Crown without
its alloy. For the royal supremacy over the Church depended on the
monarch keeping a firm hold on episcopal appointment. That prerogative
might become nominal; and during a minority it might disappear. The
result in either case would be the political independence of the bishops,
whose power would then be all the greater through the favours now
lavished upon their churches. This was the latent political peril; and
beside it lurked an ecclesiastical danger yet more formidable. Henry had
mastered the German Church; and, so long as it remained the national
institution he had made it, the tie of interest which bound it to the
throne would hold. Yet it was but part of a larger ecclesiastical whole,
whose acknowledged head was the Pope. The present thraldom of the
Papacy to a local despot made its claim to the obedience of distant
churches a shadowy prerogative which could be safely disregarded; but
with a future recovery of freedom and of moral influence the pretension
of the Roman See to apostolic authority over the Western Church would
revive; and the German prelates would have to choose between King
and Pope. Within sixty years of Henry's death that question presented
itself.
In his government of the Church Henry was accustomed to act both
on his own sole authority and in co-operation with the bishops in synod.
No sharp distinction is apparent between the matters he decided himself
and those he referred to the synods; in general, however, breaches of


## p. 235 (#281) ############################################

Protectorship of the Church
235
external order the king dealt with alone, while strictly ecclesiastical
questions were more often disposed of in synod.
How vigorously Henry meant to assert his right to regulate Church
affairs was seen soon after his accession in his revival of the see of Merse-
burg. That bishopric, established in 968 by Otto the Great as part of
his scheme for evangelising the Wends, had been held by Gisiler for ten
years before his elevation to Magdeburg. Such a translation was liable
to be impugned as invalid, and the astute prelate therefore induced his
patron Otto II and Pope Benedict VII to decree the abolition of Merse-
burg as superfluous, and to distribute its territory among the neighbouring
dioceses, including Magdeburg. Under Otto III Gisiler managed by skilful
procrastination to maintain his ill-won position. Henry however made
peremptory demand upon Gisiler to vacate the archbishopric and return
to Merseburg. The prelate's death before he complied, enabled Henry by
the appointment of Tagino to Magdeburg, to bring back the old position.
Tagino's first episcopal act was to consecrate Wigbert to the revived
Merseburg bishopric, of which the king by his sole act, without reference
to synod or to Pope, had thus become the second founder. No less inde-
pendent was Henry's procedure in settling the ignoble quarrel between
two of Germany's noblest prelates over the monastery of Gandersheim.
From its foundation by Henry's ancestor Duke Liudolf of Saxony in 842,
and after an early subjection to Mayence, this religious house for women
had been without question for nearly a century and a half under the
spiritual authority of the bishops of Hildesheim. In an unhappy hour
Archbishop Willigis claimed jurisdiction over it for Mayence; and the
dispute so begun with one bishop was continued later with his successor
Bernward, and by him referred for decision to Pope Sylvester II. The
papal edict in favour of Hildesheim, when promulgated in Germany, was
treated with open disrespect by Willigis. To end the scandal, Henry won
the promise of both bishops to abide by his ruling, and then, at a diet in
1006, gave judgment for Hildesheim. The result was loyally accepted by
Willigis and his next successor.
This protectorship of the Church led Henry, whom Thietmar calls
the Vicar of God on earth, to undertake on its behalf tasks of the most
diverse kind. Thus he asserted his right, both to order the due regis-
tration of monastic lands, and to require strict observance of German
customs in public worship; he took it upon him, not only to enforce eccle-
siastical discipline, but to prevent heresy from raising its head. In such
matters the synods had a right to speak, although they did so rather as
organs of the royal will than as independent church assemblies. For they
met upon Henry's summons; he presided over, and took active part in,
their discussions; he published their resolutions as edicts of his own.
But he called them to account in the tone of a master, and at the very
first
synod of his reign he rebuked them severely for slackness in their discipline.
In pressing for the removal of irregularities Henry certainly shewed
a
CH. X.


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236
Reform of monasteries
himself a conscientious ruler of the Church, but gave no proof of a desire
to initiate any far-reaching ecclesiastical reform. His views at this time
were bounded by the needs of the German Church; and so strictly national
were the synods he convoked that they cared but little whether the
measures they agreed upon were in consonance with general church law.
With reform, however, in one wide sphere of organised religion
Henry had long shewn his active sympathy. For already, as Duke
of Bavaria, he had used his authority to impose a stricter life upon the
monasteries of that land. He had thus helped forward the monastic
reformation which, beginning in Lorraine in the early decades of the
tenth century, had spread eastwards into Germany, and had won a footing
in Bavaria through the energy of the former monk, Wolfgang, Bishop
of Ratisbon. In his early years Henry had seen the beneficent change
wrought in Bavaria, and exemplified at St Emmeram's in Ratisbon.
After becoming duke, he had forced reform upon the reluctant monks of
Altaich and Tegernsee through the agency of Godehard, a passionate
ascetic, whom, in defiance of their privilege, he had made abbot of both
those houses. In the same spirit and with like purpose Henry treated
the royal monasteries after his accession. They became the instruments
of his strenuous monastic policy; while he also, as in the case of the
bishoprics, insisted on the right of the Crown to appoint their heads,
notwithstanding the privilege of free election which many of them
possessed. By this time, however, some of the greater monasteries had
acquired immense landed wealth, and their abbots held a princely position.
The communities they ruled for the most part led an easy existence.
Not a few houses, it is true, did admirable work in art and learning, in
husbandry, and in care for the poor. Much of the land, specially reserved
to the abbot, was granted out in fief to vassals, in order to acquit his
military service to the Crown; but these might also be used against the
Crown, if the abbot were not loyal.
Henry's monastic policy was revealed in 1005 by his treatment of
the wealthy abbey of Hersfeld. Complaints made to him by the brethren
gave him the opportunity for replacing the abbot by the ascetic Gode-
hard of Altaich, who offered the monks a choice between strict observance
of the Rule and expulsion. The departure of all but two or three enabled
Godehard to dispose of their superfluous luxuries for pious uses, while
Henry seized on the corporate lands reserved for the brethren, and added
them to the abbot's special estate, which thus became liable to the Crown
for greater feudal services. In the end Hersfeld, under Godehard, became
again an active religious community. Between 1006 and 1015 Reichenau,
Fulda and Corvey were likewise dealt with and with like results. Further,
the Crown, by placing several abbeys under one head, was able, out of
land hitherto required for the upkeep of abbatial households, to make
grants to vassals. In these measures the king was supported by the
bishops, some of whom followed his example in monasteries under their
a


## p. 237 (#283) ############################################

Foundation of the see of Bamberg
237
control. The result was a general revival of monastic discipline, and a
serious curtailment of the resources of the greater abbeys.
The lesser royal monasteries, from whose lands new fiefs could not be
granted, needed the king's special protection to keep their independence.
Henry had no use for feeble institutions, and subjected seventeen of
them to various sees or greater abbeys. If they were not abolished
altogether, they were generally transformed into small canonries, while
part of their property fell to the bishop.
Henry proclaimed his belief in the episcopal system by the foundation
of the see of Bamberg. Near the eastern border of Franconia dwelt a
population almost entirely Wendish. Left behind in the general retreat
of their kinsfolk before the Franks, these Slavonic tribesmen still kept
their own language and customs, and much of their original paganism.
Baptised by compulsion, they neglected all Christian observances, while
the bishops of Würzburg, to whose diocese they belonged, paid little heed
to them. Close by them was the little town of Bamberg, dear to Henry
from his boyhood. It was a favourite home with him and his wife, and
he resolved to make it the seat of a bishopric. The scheme required
the assent of the Bishops of Würzburg and Eichstedt. But Megingaud
(Meingaud) of Eichstedt flatly refused to agree, and Henry of Würzburg,
though a devoted subject, was an ambitious man, and demanded, in
addition to territorial compensation, the elevation of Würzburg to
metropolitan rank. After a synod at Mayence (May 1007), at which
Bishop Henry was present, had given its solemn approval, envoys were
sent to the Pope to secure ratification. By bull issued in June John XVIII
confirmed the erection of the see of Bamberg, which was to be subject
only to the authority of the Papacy. Würzburg, however, was not made an
archbishopric, and Bishop Henry thought himself betrayed. At a synod
at Frankfort (1 November 1007) there assembled five German arch-
bishops with twenty-two suffragans, five Burgundian prelates including
two archbishops, two Italian bishops, and, lastly, the primate of Hungary.
Willigis of Mayence presided, but Henry of Würzburg held aloof. The
king, prostrating himself before the bishops, set forth his high purpose
for the Church, reminding them of the consent already given by the
Bishop of Würzburg. Bishop Henry's chaplain replied that his master
could not allow any injury to his church. But the absence of the bishop
had displeased many of his colleagues, while the agreement he had made
was on record. Thus, finally, the foundation of the see of Bamberg was
unanimously confirmed, and the king nominated as its first bishop his
kinsman the Chancellor Everard, who received consecration the same day.
Henry's intention to make God his heir was amply fulfilled; he had
already endowed Bamberg with his lands in the Radenzgau and the
Volkfeld, and he lavished wealth on the new see. Thus Bamberg was
among the best endowed of German bishoprics, and the comital juris-
diction, given by Henry to some other sees, can hardly have been with-
CH. X.


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238
War with the Luxemburgers
H
1
held here. Yet Everard was for some time a bishop without a diocese.
Only in May 1008 did Henry of Würzburg transfer to Bamberg almost
all the Radenzgau and part of the Volkfeld. From this moment the new
see grew. Just four years later, in May 1012, the now finished cathedral
was dedicated in the presence of the king and a great assembly, six
archbishops and the patriarch of Aquileia, besides many bishops, taking
part in the ceremony with Bishop Everard. Less than a year afterwards,
the episcopal rights of Bamberg received the papal confirmation; and the
last stage was reached in 1015, when, after the death of Megingaud
of Eichstedt, the king was able by an exchange of territory with
Megingaud's successor to enlarge the Bamberg diocese to the limit originally
planned.
It was to be the fortune of the first bishop of Bamberg to receive a
Pope within his own city, and of the second himself to become Pope.
Yet even these unusual honours shed no such real glory over the bishopric
as did the successful achievement of the purpose for which it was founded.
For from Bamberg Christianity spread over a region hitherto sunk in
heathenism, and the social arts made way among an uncultured people.
A secondary result of its activities, whether intended or not, was the
fusion of an alien race with the German population. For a far wider
sphere than its actual diocese Bamberg was a wellspring of intellectual
energy. Its library grew to be a great storehouse of learning; its schools
helped to diffuse knowledge over all Germany. This may have been
beyond Henry's aim; yet it was through the Bamberg which he created
that the sluggish life of the district around was drawn into the general
stream of European civilisation.
The action of dynastic and local politics upon the Church was notably
shewn in the queen's own family. Her eldest brother Henry of
Luxemburg had been made Duke of Bavaria: a younger brother Dietrich
contrived to gain the see of Metz (1005) against Henry's nominee.
On
the death (1008) of Liudolf, Archbishop of Trèves, a third brother
Adalbero, still a youth, was elected successor there. Henry refused his
consent and nominated Megingaud; civil war arose and the king's
nominee, although approved by the Pope, was kept out of his own city.
In Lorraine there were other malcontents to be dealt with, and thence
the discontented family of Luxemburg carried the revolt into Bavaria,
where Henry had with the consent of the magnates deprived Duke
Henry and taken the duchy into his own hands. Dietrich, the Bishop
of Metz, supported his brothers, and all Lorraine was plunged into
misery. Dietrich of Metz did not return to allegiance until 1012, and
even then his brothers Henry and Adalbero kept hold of Trèves. Lor-
raine was in smouldering strife.
In East Saxony, in the North Mark, and in Meissen the story was the
same. Lawless vassals wrought misdeeds, and attempts at punishment
brought on rebellion. And behind Saxony lay Boleslav of Poland always


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Fresh war with Poland
239
ready to make use of local disloyalty. Against him in August 1010
Henry assembled an army of Saxons and of Bohemians under Jaromir.
The sickness of the king and many of his troops made this campaign
fruitless, and others were as futile. The Saxons were slow to aid; Henry
was often busied elsewhere; and when Jaromir was driven from Bohemia
his help was lost. Henry, anxious for peace towards the East, recognised
the new Duke Udalrich, and Jaromir remained an exile. Thus Bohemia
was an ally and the Lyutitzi had long been such. Peace with Poland
was therefore easier. And on Whitsunday 1012 Boleslav did homage
to Henry at Merseburg, carried the sword before his lord in the pro-
cession, and then received the Lausitz as a fief. Boleslav promised help
to Henry in Italy whither the king had long been looking: Henry pro-
mised a German contingent to Boleslav against the Russians. Henry
had gained peace, but Boleslav had won the land he had fought for.
Within the realm Henry's firmness was forming order : he was able
to rule through the dukes. In Saxony a faithful vassal, Bernard I, had
died (1011) and was succeeded by his son Bernard II. When in Carinthia
Conrad (1004-11), Otto's son, died, Henry passed over his heir and
nominated Adalbero of Eppenstein, already Margrave there. The next
year, with the boy Herman III, Duke of Swabia, died out a branch of the
Conradins, and perhaps with Duke Otto of Lower Lorraine, a branch of
the Carolingians. To Swabia Henry appointed Ernest of Babenberg, an
old rebel (1004) but brother-in-law of Herman, and to Lower Lorraine
Count Godfrey of the Ardennes, sprung from a family marked by loyalty
and zeal in monastic reform. The duchy of Bavaria he kept in his own
hands, and thus all the duchies were safe under rulers either proved or
chosen by himself. Upon Godfrey of Lower Lorraine a special burden lay,
for Trèves was disaffected and the Archbishop of Cologne was hostile. In
the other arch-see of Mayence Willigis died (1011) after thirty-six years
of faithful rule. As his successor Henry chose Erkambald, Abbot of
Fulda, an old friend in affairs of state and a worthy ecclesiastic. Next
year Henry had twice to fill the see of Magdeburg, naming Waltherd
and then Gero. Early in 1013, too, died Lievizo (Libentius) of Hamburg,
where Henry put aside the elected candidate and forced on the chapter a
royal chaplain, Unwan. When (1013) all these appointments had been
made, Henry could feel he was master in his own house, and able to
turn towards Italy. For a year at least he had felt the call. The years
between 1004 and 1014 were in Lombardy a time of confusion. Ardoin
had broken out from his castle of Sparone (1005), only to find his authority
gone ; in the west he had vassals and adherents; some greater nobles,
bishops, and scattered citizens wished him well. But he was only the
king over the middle and lower classes, and even that only for a small
part of the realm.
Yet even so, Henry was only nominally Italian king. Real power
rested with the ecclesiastical and secular magnates; and though it might
CB. X.


## p. 240 (#286) ############################################

240
Civil wars in Lombardy
suit prelates and nobles alike to profess to Henry a formal allegiance,
few of either order desired his presence among them. To be independent
within their own territories was the chief aim of both. The bishops by
tradition inclined to the German side. Some few, like Leo of Vercelli,
remained steadfast for the German cause from political convictions ;
while the holders of the metropolitan sees of Milan and Ravenna stood
haughtily indifferent to the claims of either king. But if the bishops
generally might be counted as in some sort Henry's partisans, this was
not true of the great noble families with which they were perennially at
strife. Of these, the house of Canossa alone was firmly attached to the
German interest; its chief, the Marquess Tedald, and after him his son
Boniface, continuing faithful. The rest, the most powerful of whom were
those other marquesses who had sprung up in Lombardy half a century
before, by accumulating counties and lordships in their own hands, had
formed a new order in the State especially inimical to the bishops,
although equally ready with them to make outward acknowledgment of
Henry. But no class could be less desirous of the reappearance of a
sovereign who would be sure to curtail their independence, and, in
particular, to check their encroachment on ecclesiastical lands. On the
other hand, they had little mind to help Ardoin in regaining an authority
which would be exercised over themselves for the benefit of their humbler
fellow-subjects. So far as can be discerned, the Aleramids, the progenitors
of the house of Montferrat, whose power was concentrated about Savona
and Acqui, appear to have played a waiting game; while the Marquesses
of Turin, represented by Manfred II, inclined first to the German, and
then to the Italian side. Only in the Otbertines, the great Lombard
house which held the comital authority in Genoa and Milan, in Tortona,
Luni, and Bobbio, whose present head was the Marquess Otbert II, and
from which sprang the later dukes of Modena and of Brunswick, can be
found some signs of genuine patriotism. But in general, these powerful
dynasts, and the lay nobles as a class, had little sense of national duty,
and were selfishly content to pursue the old evil policy of having two
kings, so that the one might be restrained by fear of the other.
Year after year Ardoin sallied forth from his subalpine fastnesses to
attack his enemies and especially the bishops. Leo of Vercelli was forth-
with driven out of his city, to become for years an exile. The Bishops of
Bergamo and Modena also felt the weight of Ardoin's revenge, and even
the Archbishop of Milan, by whom Henry had been crowned, was forced
to a temporary recognition of his rival. The Marquess Tedald himself was
threatened, while Bishop Peter of Novara only escaped capture by fleeing
across the Alps. Yet Ardoin was no nearer being in truth a king. The
Apennines he never crossed; the Romagna remained in turmoil. Tuscany
obeyed its powerful Marquess.
Henry had never dropped his claim to Italian sovereignty. Royal missi
were sent at irregular intervals into Lombardy ; Italian bishops took


## p. 241 (#287) ############################################

Roman affairs
241
their place in German synods; from Italy came also abbots and canons
to seek redress at the German throne for injuries done by their bishops.
Thus Henry kept alive his pretension to rule in Italy. But he was bound
sooner or later again to attempt the recovery of the Lombard crown.
Yet after all it was Rome that now drew Henry once more into
Italy. Before the death of Otto III the Romans had repudiated German
domination; and soon after that event they had allowed John Crescentius,
son of the Patricius slaughtered in 998, to assume the chief authority over
the city and its territory, which he ruled thenceforth for ten years. But
his power was finally established by the death in May 1003 of Sylvester II,
which removed the last champion of the German cause in Rome, and laid
the Papacy as well as the city at the feet of the Patricius: he raised three
of his nominees in turn to the papal throne. Nevertheless, Crescentius lived
in dread of the German king, and spared no pains, therefore, to conciliate
him. John died about the beginning of 1012, and with the death a
few months later of Sergius IV, his last nominee, there began a struggle
between the Crescentian family and the house of the counts of Tusculum,
like themselves connected with the infamous Marozia. In the contention
that arose for the Papacy, Gregory, the Crescentian candidate, at first
prevailed, but had to yield in the end to Theophylact of Tusculum, who
became Pope as Benedict VIII. Driven out of Rome, Gregory fled to
Germany, and at Christmas 1012 presented himself in pontifical array
before Henry at Pöhlde. But the king was not likely to help a
Crescentian Pope, and he had already obtained from Benedict a bull of
confirmation for the privileges of Bamberg. He now met Gregory's
request for help by directing him to lay aside the pontifical dress until he
himself should come to Rome.
Honour and interest alike urged Henry to seize the occasion for
decisive intervention in Italy. If his promises to return were to remain
unfulfilled, the German cause in Lombardy would be lost. So, too, would
be his hope of winning the imperial crown, which was to him the symbol
of an enhanced authority both abroad and at home. As Emperor he
would have a further, though indefinite, claim upon the obedience of his
subjects on both sides of the Alps, and would regain for Germany her
former primacy in Western Europe. Moreover, through a good under-
standing with the Papacy, if not by entire mastery over it, he would
secure finally his hold upon the German Church and so be able to frus-
trate the intrigues of Duke Boleslav at the Papal court for recognition
as king. During the earlier half of 1013 Henry had therefore sought an
agreement with Pope Benedict. Through the agency of Bishop Walter
of Spires, a compact, the terms of which are unrecorded, was ratified by
mutual oath.
Later in 1013 Henry, accompanied by Queen Kunigunda and many
bishops, marched to Italy. Boleslav sent not aid but envoys who intrigued
against his lord.
a
C. MED. H. VOL. III. OH. X.
16


## p. 242 (#288) ############################################

242
Henry's second expedition to Italy
a
The king reached Pavia before Christmas, while Ardoin withdrew to
his fortresses, thus yielding up to Henry nearly the whole of Lombardy
without a blow. Then he sent to Pavia offering to resign the crown if
he were put in possession of some county, apparently his own march of
Ivrea. But Henry rejected the proposal and Ardoin was left in helpless
isolation. At Pavia, meanwhile, a throng of bishops and abbots, including
the two great champions of monastic reform, Odilo of Cluny and Hugh
of Farfa, surrounded Henry, while many lay nobles, even the Otber-
tines, and others friendly to Ardoin, also came to make submission.
In January 1014 Henry passed on to Ravenna. At Ravenna there
reappeared, after ten years of obscurity, Bishop Leo of Vercelli. But
beside him stood Abbot Hugh of Farfa, the man who had so firmly
upheld in Italy the ideals of monasticism, resolved as ever both to
combat vigorously the nobles, especially the Crescentian family who had
annexed the possessions of his house, and to make his community a
pattern of monastic discipline. Like many others, he had acquired his
abbacy by unworthy means : partly in expiation of this offence, partly
to get Henry's help against his enemies, he had resigned his office,
though still deeply concerned for the prosperity of Farfa. His strenuous
character, the moral dignity which placed him at the head of the abbots
of Italy, and the identity of his aims for monasticism with those of the
king, made Hugh an ally too important to be left aside. In Italy the
monasteries supported Henry, and there he shewed them favour,
especially Farfa with its command of the road to the south, without
any of the reserve he had shewn in Germany.
At Ravenna a synod was convoked, the first business of which was
to settle the disputed right to the archbishopric of Ravenna. Adalbert,
its actual holder for the last ten years, was generally recognised in the
Romagna ; but Henry in 1013 had treated the see as vacant, and had
nominated thereto his own natural half-brother, Arnold. The intruder,
however, failed to establish himself in possession, and now came back to
be declared, with the authority of the Pope and the advice of the synod,
the rightful archbishop. Thereupon followed the issue in Henry's name
of decrees for the suppression of certain ecclesiastical abuses then preva-
lent in Italy: the simoniacal conferment of Holy Orders, the ordination
of priests and deacons below the canonical age, the taking of money for
the consecration of churches, and the acceptance by way of gift or
pledge of any articles dedicated to sacred use. Of no less serious import
for the Church and for the nation at large was the further decree that
all bishops and abbots should make returns of the property alienated
from their churches and abbeys, of the time and manner of the aliena-
tion, and of the names of the present holders. Such a record was a
preliminary to any measure of restitution; but this could not fail to
arouse the anger of the territorial lords, against whom chiefly it would
be directed.


## p. 243 (#289) ############################################

Henry crowned as Emperor
243
After Ravenna came Rome. On Sunday, 14 February 1014, he
made his entry into the city amid applause. Twelve senators escorted
the king and queen to the door of St Peter's, where the Pope and
his clergy awaited them.
The two chiefs of Western Christendom, whose fortunes were to be
closely linked together for the rest of their joint lives, now met for the
first time. Benedict VIII was a man of vigorous, though not exalted,
character; belonging to the turbulent Roman nobility, raised to the
papal throne while yet a layman and after a faction contest, he was not
likely to shew any real religious zeal. Though his life was free from
scandal, Benedict shone, not as a churchman but as a man of action,
whose principal aim was to recover for the Papacy its external dignity
and its material power. Already he had repelled the Crescentians from
Rome, and taken many of their castles in the Sabina. He had even
wrested the duchy of Spoleto out of the hands of John, the elder
nephew of the late Patricius. But these enemies, nevertheless, were still
formidable, and it was not a mere formality when the Pope demanded
of the king, before they entered the basilica, whether he would be a
faithful patron and defender of the Roman Church, and be true in all
points to himself and his successors. The pledge was heartily given, and
then, within the church, Henry offered at the high altar the crown he
had worn hitherto as king, and received unction and coronation as
Roman Emperor at the hands of Benedict. Queen Kunigunda at the
same time was crowned Empress. Soon afterwards the Pope confirmed
Henry's acts and canons passed at Ravenna, Adalbert was deposed, and
Arnold recognised as Archbishop of Ravenna.
Henry was on the point of starting for the south to force the
Crescentii to disgorge the remnant still held of Farfa's lands, most of
which Benedict had already regained for the monastery, when a sudden
tumult broke out in Rome. After two days' rio
the Germans were
victorious but, nevertheless, Henry did not venture to remain longer in
Rome. Only a week had passed since his coronation and already he had
to make sure of his retreat. After another fruitless effort, therefore,
to bring the case between the Crescentian brothers and the Abbot of
Farfa to legal decision, the Emperor, with the concurrence of the Pope
and the judges, as his last act invested Hugh with the possessions
claimed from the Crescentii. Having charged Benedict to give actual
effect to this decision, the Emperor left Rome.
Nearly two months Henry spent in securing his hold upon Tuscany,
the fidelity of which province, as commanding the route between Lom-
bardy and Rome, was of prime importance for him. Since the death in
1012 of the Marquess Boniface, an ineffective ruler and a dissolute man,
the March had remained vacant; and Henry now gave it to Rainier, a
Tuscan, who had lately, through the influence of the Pope, replaced the
Crescentian John as Duke of Spoleto. Since the Marquess of Tuscany
CH. X.
16-2


## p. 244 (#290) ############################################

244
Henry's rule in Italy
enjoyed an authority superior to that of any other lay subject of the
Italian crown, the union in a single hand of these two provinces, which
had not been held together since the time of the Duke-marquess Hugh
“the Great,” gave special significance to the choice of Rainier. In the
new marquess Henry must have expected to find a stout upholder of
the imperial cause. The fact that like Henry he was a generous and
enlightened patron of monasticism, probably recommended him to the
Emperor. The monastic question was acute in Tuscany as elsewhere and
families like the Otbertines, who there held wide territories, had incessant
quarrels over property with the ecclesiastical foundations. At Easter 1014
Henry was again in Pavia. In Lombardy, although his authority was not
openly disputed, and most of the prelates were on his side, and the secular
lords paid outward obedience, disaffection permeated all classes. The
Archbishop of Milan held aloof, some of the great families still refused
submission, and the hatred of the common people was shewn by their
reluctance to furnish supplies. Renouncing therefore any attempt to
crush Ardoin by force, Henry sought to strengthen himself by adminis-
trative measures. He renewed an institution of Otto the Great by
appointing two permanent missi for the counties of Pavia, Milan, and
Seprio. He thus secured for royal officials the exercise of supreme judicial
authority where disaffection was rife, and, significantly enough, Henry
now gave an Italian city its first measure of municipal freedom. The
Aleramids, who were lords of Savona, had not shewn themselves especially
hostile to Henry, and were even now taking some share in the public
administration. Yet just at this time the men of Savona obtained through
their bishop a royal charter which curtailed the feudal rights of the
marquesses over their city, and relieved its inhabitants of many burden-
some imposts. But Henry could not stay in Italy to secure the success
of his administrative acts; after a month's stay in Pavia he passed on to
Verona, and thence to Germany.
Henry's second expedition to Italy, though it fell far short of complete
success, ensured the continuance of the Western Empire. It renewed the
alliance between the Empire and the Papacy, and it vindicated afresh the
pre-eminence of the German monarchy in Western Europe.
But in Lombardy Henry had left his work half done. A hostile
population, an alienated nobility, and an uncrushed rival remained as
proofs of his failure. And hardly had he recrossed the Alps in June 1014
when a fresh outburst of nationalist fury threatened to overwhelm his
adherents. Ardoin at once issued from Ivrea, and attacked Vercelli with
such suddenness that the Bishop Leo scarcely avoided capture. The whole
of that diocese fell into Ardoin's hands. Thence he went on to besiege
Novara, to overrun the diocese of Como, and to bring ruin upon many
other hostile places. Though more of a punitive foray than regular
warfare, this campaign against the imperialists had yet some of the
dignity of a national uprising. For besides the vavassors and small


## p. 245 (#291) ############################################

Disaffection in Lombardy
245
proprietors of his own neighbourhood, not a few nobles in all parts of
Lombardy took up arms on Ardoin's behalf. The four sons of the aged
Marquess Otbert II, Count Hubert “the Red," a man powerful in the
West, with several other counts, and even the Bishop of distant Vicenza,
were of the number. These men, assuredly, were not inspired by pure
patriotism. But their association for a common purpose with other
classes of their fellow-countrymen, under their native king, affords some
proof that they had also in view the higher purpose of throwing off an
alien yoke.
The fury of the nationalists found vent in ruthless devastation of the
episcopal territories, and made them for a few weeks masters of Lombardy.
But sudden dismay fell upon them through the unexpected capture of all
four sons of the Marquess Otbert, the chief pillar of their cause. Though
two soon escaped, the others were sent as prisoners to Germany, whither
Leo of Vercelli also now went to arouse the Emperor's vengeance
against the insurgent Lombards. At his instigation, Henry struck, and
struck hard, at his opponents. At a judicial inquiry held in Westphalia
during the autumn, the Lombard law of treason was invoked against the
captive Otbertines and their associates still in arms. For having waged
war upon their sovereign, they were declared liable to forfeiture. There-
upon, a series of confiscatory charters, mostly drafted by Leo himself,
was issued. Though the full penalty was not exacted of the chief
offenders, the Otbertine family was mulcted of 500 jugera of land, and
Count Hubert the Red of 3000, for the benefit of the see of Pavia; the
Church of Como was compensated out of the private inheritance of Bishop
Jerome of Vicenza; and to that of Novara was awarded a possession of the
archbishopric of Milan. Far more heavily, however, fell the Emperor's
hand upon the lesser men. “They had above all grievously afflicted the
church of Vercelli,” and Bishop Leo was only satisfied with their total
forfeiture. To his see, accordingly, were transferred at a stroke the lands
of some six score proprietors in the neighbourhood of Ivrea, nearly all
men of middle rank.
The recovery of Vercelli itself about this time was an important
success, chiefly because it led to Ardoin's death. The spirit which had
borne him up through so many vicissitudes sank under this blow; and
he withdrew to the monastery of Fruttuaria, where he laid aside his
crown to assume the cowl of a monk. There, fifteen months later, on
14 December 1015, he died.
So passed away the last monarch to whom the title of King of the
Lombards could be fitly applied. Yet for many months after his abdi-
cation the insurgents kept the mastery in Western Lombardy. This
struggle is revealed in a series of letters addressed by Leo to the Em-
peror. They shew Leo, early in 1016, amid serious difficulties. He is
backed, indeed, by some of his fellow bishops, as well as by a few power-
ful nobles; and he can count now upon Archbishop Arnulf and the men
a
;
CH. X.


## p. 246 (#292) ############################################

246
Pacification of Lombardy
a
of Milan, who are kept true by the presbyter Aribert. But he can hardly
maintain himself in his own city; and he appeals to Henry for a German
army. He has against him the brother and the sons of Ardoin, the
astute Marquess Manfred of Turin with his brother, Alric, Bishop of Asti,
and, most dangerous of all, the mighty Count Hubert. These men are
intriguing for the support of King Rodolph of Burgundy, and are even
negotiating for reconciliation with the Emperor through their friends
Heribert of Cologne and Henry of Würzburg. Not only, however, did
Leo repel their attack on Vercelli, but, by a successful offensive, he re-
covered the whole territory of his diocese. Yet the siege of the castle of
Orba, which was undertaken at the Emperor's command by Leo with
other bishops and some lay magnates, including the young Marquess
Boniface of Canossa, ended in an accommodation. At the suggestion of
Manfred of Turin, who was anxious for peace, the rebel garrison was
allowed to withdraw and the castle itself was burnt.
This agreement was the starting point of serious negotiations. On
the one side, the Marquess Manfred and his brother sought the Emperor's
favour, while Count Hubert sent his son to Germany as a hostage ; on
the other, Pilgrim, a Bavarian cleric lately made chancellor for Italy,
was sent by Henry into Lombardy to bring about a complete pacifica-
tion. Pilgrim's success was soon seen in the arrival of Italian envoys at
Allstedt in January 1017 to offer greetings to the Emperor. On re-
turning to Germany in the autumn of 1017 Pilgrim left Upper Italy
at peace, and the release (January 1018) of the surviving captive
Otbertine marked the Emperor's reconciliation with the Lombards.
Leo of Vercelli, indeed, was dissatisfied because no penalty was laid
on Count Hubert, and although he secured a grant to his church of the
lands of thirty unfortunate vavassors, the vindictive prelate was not ap-
peased until, by a sentence of excommunication issued many months
later, he had brought the Count and his family to ruin. Leo's personal
victory indicated the political advantage that had been gained by his
order over the secular magnates. For the Emperor was bent on forcing
the lay nobles into the background by an alliance with the bishops.
Hence the great office of Count Palatine, the chief judicial authority of
the realm, hitherto always held by a layman, now practically ceased to
exist. The granting of palatine rights to bishops, already begun by the
Ottos, was continued ; similar rights were conferred upon missi; while
the presidency of the Palatine Court itself was annexed to the royal
chancery, and thus invariably fell to a cleric.
In Italy not only did Leo of Vercelli regain his lost influence, but
the bishops generally won a new predominance. Yet this predominance
was bound up with control from Germany, whence the Emperor directed
affairs in Church and State, thus working against Italian independence.
The imperial crown enhanced Henry's position in Europe but it added
little to his power in Germany; for seven years after his return from


## p. 247 (#293) ############################################

Peace with Poland; Burgundy
247
Italy he had to face foreign warfare and domestic strife. Polish affairs
claimed him first. Boleslav had not sent his promised help to Italy: he
had tried to win over Udalrich of Bohemia. Henry tried diplomacy and
on its failure set out on a Polish campaign (July 1015). An elaborate
plan of an invasion by three armies did not succeed, and Henry himself
had a troubled retreat.
During 1016 Henry was busied in Burgundy, and Boleslav was en-
tangled with Russia, where Vladímir the Great was consolidating a
principality.