ber die
Geschichte
der Philosophie, ii, p.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
however, is that all?
what is the philosophical significance of the fact that the values of chivalry, science, philosophy and art came from the islamic world to europe.
to discover this significance a glance on a remark about islam in the chapter about the Crusades is revealing.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
? 224 gerrit steunebrink
there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s. ) (. . . ), was elevated by religion and then kindled to a noble enthusiasm through contemplating the boundless magnanimity of oriental prowess. for Christianity also contains that element of boundless abstraction and freedom; the oriental chivalric spirit found therefore in occidental hearts a response, which paved the way for their attaining a nobler virtue than they had previously known. "29
therefore, hegel is putting here again, like in the Lectures on the Phi- losophy of Religion, islam and Christianity on the same level. they are both characterized by universality and in that sense by freedom from particularity, called abstraction by hegel. And islam inspires Christians to the realization of their specific, concrete universality. the result was the emergence of new ecclesiastical orders or knighthood. hegel aims at the phenomenon of templar orders that were engaged in works of char- ity. hegel mentions this orders of nobler virtue together with the trans- fer of Arab sciences to europe and calls them, in the next chapter about the disappearance of feudalism in europe: "moral phenomena tending in the direction of a general principle. "30 therefore, the encounter with islam stimulated the direction to generality. in practical-ethical life this tendency to general principles manifest itself in the transition of feudal- istic particularity in monarchical sovereignty, based on a political body, in which all individual interest are governed by law, while in feudalism it still was possible for 'vassals' to maintain their personal interest against the prince. hegel refers clearly to the development of theories of sover- eignty of hobbes and the development of the state of estates. therefore, generality first had to transcend all particularities in which the Christian german peoples were immersed, as hegel said in the beginning of his chapter about islam.
however, this general principle cannot deny particularity. the denial of particularity was the weak spot of the universalism of the islamic empires that could not find a definite political mode of existence. Christianity unites generality with particularity, as the dogma of the trinity shows.
29 idem, p. 412. 30 idem, p. 415.
? a religion after christianity? 225
therefore, hegel relates the general principal of the law to the particu- larity of nations, in which this political constitution is born. so now, the philosophical significance of abstract universalism of islam is to bring the western, Christian german world to the development of the necessary moment of generality in law that at the same time is only concrete in the particularity of the nationalities. in this way, the abstract universality of the islamic world is at service of the development of the concrete universality of Christianity in the form of the modern particular european states.
nevertheless, what is left for the islamic world? does it not exist any- more? : "but the east itself, when by degrees enthusiasm has vanished, sank into the grossest vice, the most hideous passions became dominant, and as sensual enjoyment was sanctioned in the first form which maho- metan doctrine assumed, and was exhibited as a reward of the faithful in paradise, it took the place of fanaticism. "31 According to hegel, religiously legitimized voluptuousness at the end replaces enthusiasm or fanaticism. by that, islam lost its vigour. "At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in one corner of europe through the jealousy of Christian powers, islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into oriental ease and repose. "32
7. evaluation: teleology and a positive Appreciation of islam
of course, hegel's teleological reading of the function of islam in the development of europe is impossible. it actually does not give a solution for the problems that islam causes to the view that Christianity is the absolute, fulfilling religion.
besides this, the positive tone in hegel's description of islam is strik- ing. he admires islamic 'enthusiasm' and 'fanaticism' and praises muslims for their magnanimity. he even dares to say that islam civilized europe! his admiration for islam is caused by influence of romantic thinkers like herder, by the translation work done by the romantics in germany and by goethe's appropriation of islamic poetry in his west-eastern diwan hegel refers to. 33 we will come back on it when we talk about hegel's interpretation of islamic art.
31 idem, p. 374.
32 idem.
33 Johann wolfgang goethe, West-o? stlicher Divan, frankfurt am main: insel Verlag
1974.
? 226 gerrit steunebrink
hegel's formulation that in islam no finite reality can be fixed, but that everything is destined to expand itself in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is can be united, is not a bad interpretation of the islamic worldview. it is confirmed by the famous orientalist louis massignon in his analysis of the 'arabesque', the well-known meandering ornamental pattern in islamic art. he interprets this meandering as an expression of the islamic worldview. it is the negation of all fixed forms, of the permanence of nature; it stresses the fugitive character of everything, which evokes, by its absence the face of the lord, the only permanent thing that keeps all together. 34
rightly, hegel stressed the activist character of islam against the monas- tic tradition of hindus. indeed, although there are mystical fraternities and some mystics were unmarried, the phenomenon of monasticism with the pledge of chastity is unknown even unwanted in official islam. in this sense, islam far more resembles Judaism.
there are some common prejudices in his work too. so the idea that islam converted people by violence. it is a too long story to explain it totally, but first of all, we have to say that the muslims were welcomed as liberators by many Christians that suffered from the violence of their Christian emperor. the spread of islamic rule of law did not imply the conversion by violence of Christians and Jews. they had the right to live according to their own laws, if they recognized islamic rule of law as the general rule of law.
hegel's idea of islamic paradise as a kind of reward for oversexed believers does not understand that the symbolism of women in paradise ('houris') means the restoration of the right sexual relations and behaviour as they were established in paradise. 35 this position is to a certain extent familiar with saint thomas Aquinas' opinion, that in paradise, because of man's purity, sexual pleasures could be more intense than after the fall, in life as we know it. 36
what about his verdict of islam in his time? to a certain extent, it was true. the ottoman empire had lost its vigour and power. therefore, it was called the 'sick man of europe'. nevertheless, what hegel did not know, was that already in his time the first moves toward a reformation in the
34 louis massignon, En Islam Jardins et mosque? es, paris: 1981, pp. 17-18.
35 louis massignon, 'mystique et continence en islam', in: louis massignon, Parole don- ne? e, paris: E? ditions du seuil 1983, pp. 273-280, 275.
36 thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ia 98, 2 ad 3.
? a religion after christianity? 227
empire were started. end eighteenth century, beginning nineteenth cen- tury, the empire started to implement the western educational system. After hegel's death in 1832, with the famous reform decree of 1839, it began to implement even a western law system. the philosopher Auguste Comte congratulated the sultan for his endeavour.
like hegel, the famous muslim reformist Al-Afghani (1838-1897) thought that it was necessary first to realize a religious reformation in order to make a social revolution possible. he is said to have been inspired by the reformation in europe. it is very seductive to look for hegel's influence here, for hegel thought that the protestant reformation of the Christian world was a precondition of the french revolution. but it was the prot- estant french historian and politician guizot (1787-1874) that influenced Al Afghani in this respect. 37
however, hegel certainly influenced the famous indian-pakistani reform thinker, poet and nobel prize winner sir muhammad iqbal (1877-1938). he too was engaged in discussions about the example of luther and the reformation, but scorned reformation for its secularist results. in england, he got his philosophical education first of all in english neo-hegelianism, by mactaggart, and went to germany. 38 in germany, he learned to love the same poet that hegel loved, goethe, because of his adequate, dynamic understanding of islam. iqbal was positively interested in the interaction, in romantic times, between islamic and german literature. he praised hegel for his interpretation of the famous mystic rumi. he quotes hegel and compares his 'spiritual' worldview with islamic worldviews and used hegel's idea of god as an absolute ego to stress the personal character of god and the activist ego character of human beings. 39 essentially he is known for his activist interpretation of islam and his criticism of 'the ease and repose' of the islamic world and therefore of fatalism and pantheism. we met the word 'fatalism' in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and we will meet the word 'pantheism' in the next chapters. however, it is already clear here that those words were fashionable for a long time. moreover, they are criticized by iqbal, not because they were just untrue,
37 nikki r. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani', by nikkie r. Keddie, berkely, los Angels, london: university of California press 1983, pp. 42, 82, 171.
38 Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing. A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muham- mad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 37.
39 sir muhammad iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, lahore: Kashmiri bazar 1962, p. 71.
? 228 gerrit steunebrink
but because they represented too a kind of self (mis)understanding of islam that should be criticized. like all reform thinkers of the nineteenth century, muslims and non-muslims alike, iqbal defends activism. in addi- tion, this defence resembles very much hegel's stress on islamic activism and dynamic presence in the world. in how far he was influenced directly of indirectly by hegel's description of islam in the Philosophy of History as activism, so perfectly fitting in iqbals worldview is difficult to trace. A source tells us that he wrote an examination paper in germany on the topic of world history. 40 later iqbal left hegel and looked for support for his activism to vitalism and nietzsche.
8. islam in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy
hegel told us that the development of the sciences and of philosophy in the islamic world was finally meant to stimulate their development in the Christian-germanic world. however, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, hegel does not analyze that movement. therefore, we do not find an extensive presentation of the influential philosophies of, for exam- ple, Avicenna and Averroes. why? first of all we have to say, that hegel does not possess knowledge about islamic philosophy out of the original sources. he is relying heavily on tennemann and buhle. nevertheless, this explanation does not satisfy. for tenneman (1761-1819) gives a far more extensive description of islamic philosophy as hegel does. At the end he mentions an interesting description by Averroes and by the Jewish philosopher maimonides of the theological school of the 'speakers', the 'mutakallimun' (Arabic) or the medabberim (hebraic) or the 'loquentes' (latin). that islamic school had its origin in early Christian theological discussions with philosophy and defends the unsustainability of nature and the non-fixed, fugitive character of things and their laws with respect to gods omnipotence. 41
hegel does the other way around. he mentions that school immedi- ately in the introduction, after some positive remarks about the rapid development of Arabic sciences. After concluding with praising Arabic philosophy for free, brilliant and deep imagination, without specifying to
40 schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, p. 37.
41 wilhelm gotlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, leipzig: barth 1789-1819, bd. 8, p. 441.
? a religion after christianity? 229
what he refers to, he continues in part A with an elaborate exposition of the medabberim.
in b of the section about Arabic philosophy he describes what is tra- ditionally called islamic philosophy under the title 'commentators of Aristotle'. 42 but here, contrary to tennemann, he gives only short list of the well know names from Al Kindi and Al farabi to Avicenna and Averroes, including the famous critic of islamic philosophy and theology al ghazali, whom he calls a witty sceptic. he mentions their dates and works, tells an anecdote and that is it. he concludes with saying that their function was to make the west acquainted with Aristotle. that is all, for that was all they had to do! the section ends with a paragraph (C) about the Jewish philosophers of the middle Ages. indeed Jewish philosophy of the middle Ages functioned in the context of the revival of philosophy in the Arabic world. Just like the Christians of the middle east, they knew Arabic and wrote in Arabic language. As a thinker, hegel only mentions maimonides.
hegel's general judgment about Arabic philosophy is that it did not contribute something specifically to the development of the principle of philosophy. therefore, he tells nothing about the real contribution they made to the development of western medieval philosophy. to a certain extent hegel is excused, for this contribution was not the focus of the sources like tenneman he used. you can find far more islamic philosophy in tennemann than hegel gives. nevertheless, tennemann judges that it is Aristotelism corrupted by neo-platonism and that there is nothing original in Arabic philosophy. hegel just adopts this judgment. At last, mediaeval philosophy as such, whether islamic or Christian, has no spe- cific relevance for the development of philosophy according to hegel. for him it is philosophy in service of theology and it had as its only principle the principle of revelation.
probably because he wants to find something special and different in the islamic worldview, he pays ample attention to the passage from maimonides about the muslim theologians, the mutakallimun or medab- berim, that defend the omnipotence of god against all (semi)autonomy of finite things. but by going back to maimonides' story about them, hegel present this school that criticized philosophy and even, by the mouth of al-ghazali, dealt a blow to islamic philosophy, as the characteristic islamic
42 g. w. f. hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1971, ii, pp. 515, 517, 522.
? 230 gerrit steunebrink
philosophy. that of course, is impossible. still, amazingly perhaps, hegel has a point by paying attention to that school. we come back on this issue in the evaluation at the end of this section.
like tennemann, hegel's quotes extensively maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, in which he mentions a discussion in early islamic theology, caused by the influence of greek philosophy, about the unity of god. maimonides refers to the position of the rationalists, the school of the mutazila (the mutazila? in hegel's quotation), this school denied the pos- sibility of all plurality, that means of a plurality of attributes of god, at the same time it severely criticizes all anthropomorphism and tried to interpret the anthropomorphisms of the Koran allegorically. he mentions their opponents the Asharites (in hegel's text 'Assaria'). they defended a literal interpretation of the Koran. All their problems were already pres- ent in Christian times, among the greeks and the syrians, who tried to defend their Christian truth against the philosophers. when islam arose, they took over that style of thinking from the greek and syriac-Aramaic thinkers. what hegel fascinates in the philosophy of the medabberim, is exactly the denial of the substantial character of the finite world. here he finds the theological-philosophical position of islam that justified him to interpret the islam as a religion of the sublime, that is a religion in which the Absolute as 'the one' is absolutely dominating , either giving a shadow of autonomy to the finite world, nor to mans' reason and actions.
it belonged to the repertoire of early islamic theologians, so hegel quotes maimonides again, to deny the possibility of certain knowledge of things, because one could always think the opposite. they interpreted the world as a collection of atoms without any relation, so that all conjunc- tions are something accidental. it does not belong to the nature of things to have this or that accidentent. the accidents itself are just coming up and passing away, all dependent of the creative force of god. it is just a matter of habit that fire moves upward, that the earth is moving around a centre. god could have arranged it otherwise. hegel is naming the clas- sical topics of that theological discussion. 43 because in this position only god himself is a 'substantial being' hegel's association with pantheism is understandable: "this pantheism, if you want spinozism, is the position, the general point of view of oriental poets, historians and philosophers. "44
43 for an up to date exposition of these discussions see: william montgomery watt and michel marmura, Der Islam I, II, III, stuttgart-berlin: Kohlhammer 1985, bd. ii in: 'die religionen der menschheit' bd. 25, pp. 368 ff.
44 hegel, Vorlesungen u?
ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 519.
? a religion after christianity? 231
hegel characterizes the islamic worldview in general with this word. for him, this 'spinozistic' worldview represents the idea of the sublime. god as the only, the persistent one is, in its abstract negativity, the basic con- cept of the oriental world of representations.
for the qualification of the islamic world as pantheism hegel relies on f. A. g. tholuck who published in 1821 one of the first books on islamic mysticism in europe called Sufism or the Pantheistic Theosophy of the Per- sians (sufismus sive theosophia persarum pantheistica). 45 Another book he wrote, quoted by hegel, was Anthology of Oriental Mysticism (blu? ten- sammlung aus der morgenla? ndischen mystik). we put aside now the topic of pantheism. it is an essential issue in the next and last part of this essay. first, we have to ask: is hegel's lecture of the history of Arabic philosophy adequate? in addition, if the answer is 'no', as the reader may presume, how is it the possible that hegel still hits an essential mark in his concep- tion of the islamic worldview?
9. evaluation: philosophy and religion of the sublime
what is true and what is false in this representation of islamic philosophy? As we already said, hegel underestimates the classical islamic philoso- phy of the middle Ages, by saying that they were only commentators of Aristotle. Avicenna, for example, contributed to western thinking by the unaristotelian distinctions between essence and existence and his ideas of contingency. of course, hegel's presentation of a theological school as 'the islamic philosophy' is wrong.
but at the other hand, this theological position became influential through the work of al-ghazali, a very important thinker in the world of islam, sometimes called a 'church father' or 'the thomas Aquinas of islam'. 46 hegel just mentions the name of al-ghazali among the commentators of Aristotle, as if he was just another philosopher. this was normal for a long time. As the first part of his The incoherence of the Philosophers (some- times translated as the Refutation of the Philosophers or The destruction of the Philosophers), al-ghazali wrote a book on 'The goals of philosophy', in
45 for tholuck and the reception of islamic mysticism in the west, especially of rumi, see franklin d. lewis, Rumi, Past and Present, East and West, oxford: one world 2000, pp. 506 ff.
46 see for criticism of this epitheta too: montgomery watt and marmura, Der Islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
? 232 gerrit steunebrink
which he summarized the philosophical positions he wanted to attack. it was translated in latin separately in the twelfth century, without the prologue in which al-ghazali exposed his goals, and for a long time this was the only book that was known. therefore he was regarded, for exam- ple by thomas of Aquinas, as a philosopher and an Aristotelian. 47 in the fourteenth century, the second part seemed to be translated and edited together with Averroes' critical commentary called The Incoherence of the Incoherence (sometimes translated as the Refutation of the Refutation or The Destruction of the Destruction). nevertheless, for a long time al ghaza- lis criticism of the philosophers was only known by the criticism of this criticism by Averroes. 48
tenneman too interprets him as a philosopher and as a sceptic very near to greek scepticism. however, he tells us too that al-ghazali was a sceptic not just because he wanted to be a sceptic, but because of theo- logical motives. he wanted to defend the possibility of miracles. never- theless, tennemans complains about the fact that he did not have at his disposal the original sources. he knows al-ghazali only from the refuta- tion of his thoughts by Averroes in his 'incoherence'. 49 but tenneman was right about the theological motives of al-ghazali. According to the modern point of view, al ghazali was not just another islamic Aristoteliz- ing philosopher, but a mystical theologian who criticized philosophy and theology using philosophy to combat philosophy with its own arms. 50 the inspiration for this criticism was the position described by maimonides as the position of the Asharites against the mutazila. so he mobilized the criticism of the mutakallimun against philosophy and especially against rational theology. his target was the philosophy of Avicenna. he is indeed famous for a criticism of causality that resembles very much that of david hume. therefore, he was called in old times, as hegel does a sceptic. how- ever, the aim and the source of his criticism of causality was not scep- ticism, but to prove the absolute omnipotence of god as first cause in
47 louis gardet, L'islam, religion et communaute? , paris: descle? e de brouwer 1967.
48 Charles burnett, 'Arabic into latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into western europe', in: peter Adamson and richard taylor (eds. ) The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2005, pp. 370-405, p. 396. beatrice h. Zedler, 'introduction' in: Averroes' Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin version of Calo Calonymos, edited by beatrice Zedler, milwaukee: the marquette university press 1961, pp. 1-65.
49 tenneman, Geschichte der Philosophie, bd. 8, p. 404. 50 montgomery watt and marmura, der islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
? a religion after christianity? 233
all causal relations in our finite world. therefore, he denied the reality, the (semi) autonomy of secondary causes. Al ghazali's position became dominant, 'orthodox' so to speak, in islamic thinking at the costs of the Aristotelians. After al ghazali came Averroes who attacked him again. he was the last great representative of the Aristotelian mediaeval tradition. As a special, isolated thinker, not known by hegel and tennemann, one has to mention ibn Khaldum 1332-1406, a social philosopher and philoso- pher of history.
often it is said that al ghazali dealt a definite blow to the development of islamic philosophy, that because of him islamic philosophy did not survive the middle Ages. to say that after al ghazali islamic philosophy ended, is exaggerated. but it is true that, because it lost its Aristotelian combination with the sciences, it could not make the transition to the modern sciences and continued its existence in combination with the- ology and especially mysticism. not Aristotelism, but neo-platonism in combination with mysticism became dominant, which provokes some- times the question of it being still philosophy.
therefore, hegel had a point, in as far as al ghazali's position, stress- ing the omnipotence of god at the cost of the (semi) autonomy of the world, became dominant in islam,51 hegel rightly highlighted the posi- tion of the mutakallimun and described islam properly as a religion of the sublime. Combining these ideas with persian mysticism as he knew it from tholucks' work, was not wrong either. there is indeed familiarity between them. 52
however, this stressing of the omnipotence was not the point of the philosophers, so much as of theologians in discussion with the philoso- phers. this islamic view on the unsustainability of all natural laws is a well-known topic in catholic circles that always opposed it to Aquinas' idea of the semi-autonomous reality of secondary causes. this 'rational- ism' of catholicism was the background of the famous or notorious speech of pope benedict XVi in regensburg in 2006, in which he criticized this islamic worldview because of its irrationality.
51 And one should not exaggerate al--ghazali's voluntarism. generally, in his thought gods wisdom prevails over his omnipotency. see william J. Courtnay, 'the Critique on natural Causality in the mutakallimun and nominalism' in william J. Cournay, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought, london: Variorum reprints 1984, pp. 77-94.
52 therefore a special chapter about persian poets in his book about al ghazali in: ber- nard Carra de Vaux, Ghazali A. H. 450505/1058-1111 (Algazel) Amsterdam: philo press 1974 (first edition 1902) p. 273.
? 234 gerrit steunebrink
in modern times, however, the dominant position of al ghazali is dis- cussed again. modern thinkers try to open the course of the history of islamic philosophy again by re-opening the debate between Avicenna, al-ghazali and Averroes, especially regarding problems of nature, natural sciences and with regard to natural law as the source of human rights. 53 so islamic philosophy is certainly not at its end. Just like it tried to cope with greek thought in the past, it tries now to digest modern western thinking.
10. islam in the lectures on fine Art
islamic art is dealt with in the part about oriental art. this type of art is called symbolic art. islamic art belongs to the 'symbolism of the sublime', which is the title of chapter ii. in the first part of that chapter, section A is dedicated to the 'pantheism of art', the second part is entitled: Art of the sublime. both parts belong to the 'symbolism of the sublime'. in part A, indian, islamic and Christian mystical poetry are ranked together. part b is as such dedicated to Judaism, to the Creator god, the world of the old testament and the psalms. hegel separates Judaism from pantheism. pantheism is the affirmative mode of the religion of the sublime. we find it in india, in mysticism of the mohammedan persian poets and again also in the deeper inwardness of thought and sentiment in the Christian west. 54 however, both islamic and Judaic art belong to the 'symbolism of the sub- lime'. because the sublime transcends all sensual possibilities, hegel con- cludes that pictorial art cannot exist in Judaism and islam. so the art of the sublime is essentially literature. here we see the grave consequences of Kant's dictum that 'thou shalt make no images' was the most 'sublime' word of the old testament. nevertheless, islamic pictural art exists in fact, non-figurative and figurative. the prohibition does not mean that man should not try to paint an image of god, but first of all that man should not try to imitate god as a creator. it focuses essentially on sculptures
53 see: Al-djabiri (Al-Jabri, Al-gabiri), muhammad 'Abid, Arab-islamic philosophy, A Contemporary Critique, Austin texas: middle east monograph series no. 12 1999. see also: hendrich, geert, Islam und Aufkla? rung, Der Modernediskurs in der arabischen Philoso- phie, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft 2004. Ku? gelgen, Anke von, Averroes und die arabische Moderne; Ansa? tze zu einer Neubegru? ndung des Rationalismus im Islam, leiden 1994.
54 g. w. f. hegel, Hegel's Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art, i, ii translated by t. m. Knox, oxford: Clarendon press 1998, Vol. i, p. 364.
? a religion after christianity? 235
of human beings and animals that because of their three-dimensionality resemble mostly normal creatures. 55 in paintings of humans and animals therefore, all plastical perspective has to be avoided.
the pantheistic mood of a human being is characterized as 'enlarge- ment of the mind' and the Jewish sublime mood gives an 'elevation of the mind'. in hebrew poetry, we encounter in the negative praise of god sublimity in the strict sense of the word. hegel is criticizing this negativity that reduces the creation to an ornament. 56 but at the same time, hegel highlights as special Jewish the fact that nature and the human being are for the first time just what they are, just nature and man as such bereft of god.
what hegel is praising in islamic pantheism is, to the contrary, the presence of god in the finite. so here, Judaism and islam are separated, while both were intimately linked together in hegel's description of the islamic mind in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. moreover, in his History of Philosophy he blamed islamic 'pantheistic' philosophy for the same thing he blames Judaism for in his Aesthetics.
nevertheless, in the lectures on Aesthetics, the tone towards islam is totally different. the positive attitude to islam of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History comes back. the perspective on pantheism is in general positive. moreover, this cannot be understood as just a matter of hotho's way of text edition, for the position he defends here is identical with the position at the end of the encyclopaedia. there too hegel quotes indian and islamic mystical poetry together. both are dealt with together positively within the context of a discussion about pantheism and the true (Christian) god. spinoza's idea of god is the background of the discussion about pantheism. therefore, islam as a religion of 'substance' is distin- guished from Christianity as a religion of 'subjectivity'. Judaism does not play any role there. 57
let us look first to hegel's interpretation of pantheism and then to his specific estimation of islamic 'pantheistic' poetry. for hegel the word pan- theism is, in essence, an impossible word. by the part 'pan', meaning 'all'
55 doris behrens-Abousef, Beauty in Arabic Culture, princeton: markus wiener publish- ers 1999, pp. 109, 135. see also: ettinghausen, richard, 'the man-made setting, islamic art and architecture', in: bernard lewis, The world of Islam, london: thames and hudson 1992, pp. 57-89, 62.
56 hegel, Aesthetics, p. 375.
57 g. w. f. hegel, Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1970, iii, ? 572, pp. 378-393.
? 236 gerrit steunebrink
or 'everything', it suggests that 'everything is god', so, that 'this house', 'that book' and so on 'is god'. that is utterly nonsense. no philosopher and especially spinoza ever represented that position.
however, when you take the 'pan' as the 'totality' or the one substance in all individuals, it makes sense, but then there is nothing wrong with it. it says just that god is the perfection of everything in everything, the abso- lute being the truth, the goodness itself in all finite good individual things. so it says nothing more than that the finite is the finite from the infinite and vice versa. 58 As hegel says in the encyclopaedia, this pantheism is in fact monotheism. 59 nevertheless, the difference is this that pantheism abstracts from particularity and individuality. All individual finite things are passing away for the absolute. indian pantheism expresses this iden- tity of the one and general substance, according to hegel, in the words of Krishna in the bhagavad--gita, when Krishna is saying that among all existents he is always the most excellent: "Among the stars i am the shin- ing sun (. . . ), among the letters i am the vowel A, amongst seasons of the year the blossoming spring. " etc. however, for hegel's taste this kind of litany becomes monotonous and boring. 60 nevertheless, in islamic poetry pantheism has developed in a higher a more free subjective way. hegel focuses especially on the work of the persian poets rumi (1207-1273) and hafiz (hafis) (1320-1389), indeed until now two very famous muslim mys- tics, early translated and very influential in the west. moreover, especially in this muslim pantheism is an estimation of the finite world possible that is not possible in the art of the sublime in the strict sense. for art of the sublime, Judaism, the finite world is only an ornament of god.
specifically in islamic pantheistic poetry, the presence of god in the finite world is at the service of that world. hegel's characterization of the pantheism of islamic mysticism resembles surprisingly very much what he expects from Christianity: "in pantheism, on the other hand, the immanence of the divine in objects exalts mundane, natural and human existence itself into a more independent glory of its own. "61 hegel men- tions in this respect especially the poetry of hafiz. rumi is praised for the freedom of his feeling, transcending all petty interests, in which he still retains his substantial freedom and wins his self-identification with god. hafiz is praised because he was able to ensoul objects like the rose, the
58 hegel, Aesthetics, p. 271. 59 idem, p. 385.
60 idem, p. 367.
61 idem, p. 368.
? a religion after christianity? 237
nightingale, the wine, the candle , the flame, which western poets handle in a more prosaic and ornamental way. hegel opposes this 'objectivity' of feeling of the persian poetry to western poetry as more shut in upon itself and therefore subjective. however, he praises goethe, for goethe appropri- ated this islamic attitude of feeling free in objectivity in his famous book the West-Oestlicher Diwan, in which he constructed an encounter between european and islamic poetry by writing himself oriental poetry.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
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there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s. ) (. . . ), was elevated by religion and then kindled to a noble enthusiasm through contemplating the boundless magnanimity of oriental prowess. for Christianity also contains that element of boundless abstraction and freedom; the oriental chivalric spirit found therefore in occidental hearts a response, which paved the way for their attaining a nobler virtue than they had previously known. "29
therefore, hegel is putting here again, like in the Lectures on the Phi- losophy of Religion, islam and Christianity on the same level. they are both characterized by universality and in that sense by freedom from particularity, called abstraction by hegel. And islam inspires Christians to the realization of their specific, concrete universality. the result was the emergence of new ecclesiastical orders or knighthood. hegel aims at the phenomenon of templar orders that were engaged in works of char- ity. hegel mentions this orders of nobler virtue together with the trans- fer of Arab sciences to europe and calls them, in the next chapter about the disappearance of feudalism in europe: "moral phenomena tending in the direction of a general principle. "30 therefore, the encounter with islam stimulated the direction to generality. in practical-ethical life this tendency to general principles manifest itself in the transition of feudal- istic particularity in monarchical sovereignty, based on a political body, in which all individual interest are governed by law, while in feudalism it still was possible for 'vassals' to maintain their personal interest against the prince. hegel refers clearly to the development of theories of sover- eignty of hobbes and the development of the state of estates. therefore, generality first had to transcend all particularities in which the Christian german peoples were immersed, as hegel said in the beginning of his chapter about islam.
however, this general principle cannot deny particularity. the denial of particularity was the weak spot of the universalism of the islamic empires that could not find a definite political mode of existence. Christianity unites generality with particularity, as the dogma of the trinity shows.
29 idem, p. 412. 30 idem, p. 415.
? a religion after christianity? 225
therefore, hegel relates the general principal of the law to the particu- larity of nations, in which this political constitution is born. so now, the philosophical significance of abstract universalism of islam is to bring the western, Christian german world to the development of the necessary moment of generality in law that at the same time is only concrete in the particularity of the nationalities. in this way, the abstract universality of the islamic world is at service of the development of the concrete universality of Christianity in the form of the modern particular european states.
nevertheless, what is left for the islamic world? does it not exist any- more? : "but the east itself, when by degrees enthusiasm has vanished, sank into the grossest vice, the most hideous passions became dominant, and as sensual enjoyment was sanctioned in the first form which maho- metan doctrine assumed, and was exhibited as a reward of the faithful in paradise, it took the place of fanaticism. "31 According to hegel, religiously legitimized voluptuousness at the end replaces enthusiasm or fanaticism. by that, islam lost its vigour. "At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in one corner of europe through the jealousy of Christian powers, islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into oriental ease and repose. "32
7. evaluation: teleology and a positive Appreciation of islam
of course, hegel's teleological reading of the function of islam in the development of europe is impossible. it actually does not give a solution for the problems that islam causes to the view that Christianity is the absolute, fulfilling religion.
besides this, the positive tone in hegel's description of islam is strik- ing. he admires islamic 'enthusiasm' and 'fanaticism' and praises muslims for their magnanimity. he even dares to say that islam civilized europe! his admiration for islam is caused by influence of romantic thinkers like herder, by the translation work done by the romantics in germany and by goethe's appropriation of islamic poetry in his west-eastern diwan hegel refers to. 33 we will come back on it when we talk about hegel's interpretation of islamic art.
31 idem, p. 374.
32 idem.
33 Johann wolfgang goethe, West-o? stlicher Divan, frankfurt am main: insel Verlag
1974.
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hegel's formulation that in islam no finite reality can be fixed, but that everything is destined to expand itself in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is can be united, is not a bad interpretation of the islamic worldview. it is confirmed by the famous orientalist louis massignon in his analysis of the 'arabesque', the well-known meandering ornamental pattern in islamic art. he interprets this meandering as an expression of the islamic worldview. it is the negation of all fixed forms, of the permanence of nature; it stresses the fugitive character of everything, which evokes, by its absence the face of the lord, the only permanent thing that keeps all together. 34
rightly, hegel stressed the activist character of islam against the monas- tic tradition of hindus. indeed, although there are mystical fraternities and some mystics were unmarried, the phenomenon of monasticism with the pledge of chastity is unknown even unwanted in official islam. in this sense, islam far more resembles Judaism.
there are some common prejudices in his work too. so the idea that islam converted people by violence. it is a too long story to explain it totally, but first of all, we have to say that the muslims were welcomed as liberators by many Christians that suffered from the violence of their Christian emperor. the spread of islamic rule of law did not imply the conversion by violence of Christians and Jews. they had the right to live according to their own laws, if they recognized islamic rule of law as the general rule of law.
hegel's idea of islamic paradise as a kind of reward for oversexed believers does not understand that the symbolism of women in paradise ('houris') means the restoration of the right sexual relations and behaviour as they were established in paradise. 35 this position is to a certain extent familiar with saint thomas Aquinas' opinion, that in paradise, because of man's purity, sexual pleasures could be more intense than after the fall, in life as we know it. 36
what about his verdict of islam in his time? to a certain extent, it was true. the ottoman empire had lost its vigour and power. therefore, it was called the 'sick man of europe'. nevertheless, what hegel did not know, was that already in his time the first moves toward a reformation in the
34 louis massignon, En Islam Jardins et mosque? es, paris: 1981, pp. 17-18.
35 louis massignon, 'mystique et continence en islam', in: louis massignon, Parole don- ne? e, paris: E? ditions du seuil 1983, pp. 273-280, 275.
36 thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ia 98, 2 ad 3.
? a religion after christianity? 227
empire were started. end eighteenth century, beginning nineteenth cen- tury, the empire started to implement the western educational system. After hegel's death in 1832, with the famous reform decree of 1839, it began to implement even a western law system. the philosopher Auguste Comte congratulated the sultan for his endeavour.
like hegel, the famous muslim reformist Al-Afghani (1838-1897) thought that it was necessary first to realize a religious reformation in order to make a social revolution possible. he is said to have been inspired by the reformation in europe. it is very seductive to look for hegel's influence here, for hegel thought that the protestant reformation of the Christian world was a precondition of the french revolution. but it was the prot- estant french historian and politician guizot (1787-1874) that influenced Al Afghani in this respect. 37
however, hegel certainly influenced the famous indian-pakistani reform thinker, poet and nobel prize winner sir muhammad iqbal (1877-1938). he too was engaged in discussions about the example of luther and the reformation, but scorned reformation for its secularist results. in england, he got his philosophical education first of all in english neo-hegelianism, by mactaggart, and went to germany. 38 in germany, he learned to love the same poet that hegel loved, goethe, because of his adequate, dynamic understanding of islam. iqbal was positively interested in the interaction, in romantic times, between islamic and german literature. he praised hegel for his interpretation of the famous mystic rumi. he quotes hegel and compares his 'spiritual' worldview with islamic worldviews and used hegel's idea of god as an absolute ego to stress the personal character of god and the activist ego character of human beings. 39 essentially he is known for his activist interpretation of islam and his criticism of 'the ease and repose' of the islamic world and therefore of fatalism and pantheism. we met the word 'fatalism' in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and we will meet the word 'pantheism' in the next chapters. however, it is already clear here that those words were fashionable for a long time. moreover, they are criticized by iqbal, not because they were just untrue,
37 nikki r. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani', by nikkie r. Keddie, berkely, los Angels, london: university of California press 1983, pp. 42, 82, 171.
38 Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing. A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muham- mad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 37.
39 sir muhammad iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, lahore: Kashmiri bazar 1962, p. 71.
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but because they represented too a kind of self (mis)understanding of islam that should be criticized. like all reform thinkers of the nineteenth century, muslims and non-muslims alike, iqbal defends activism. in addi- tion, this defence resembles very much hegel's stress on islamic activism and dynamic presence in the world. in how far he was influenced directly of indirectly by hegel's description of islam in the Philosophy of History as activism, so perfectly fitting in iqbals worldview is difficult to trace. A source tells us that he wrote an examination paper in germany on the topic of world history. 40 later iqbal left hegel and looked for support for his activism to vitalism and nietzsche.
8. islam in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy
hegel told us that the development of the sciences and of philosophy in the islamic world was finally meant to stimulate their development in the Christian-germanic world. however, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, hegel does not analyze that movement. therefore, we do not find an extensive presentation of the influential philosophies of, for exam- ple, Avicenna and Averroes. why? first of all we have to say, that hegel does not possess knowledge about islamic philosophy out of the original sources. he is relying heavily on tennemann and buhle. nevertheless, this explanation does not satisfy. for tenneman (1761-1819) gives a far more extensive description of islamic philosophy as hegel does. At the end he mentions an interesting description by Averroes and by the Jewish philosopher maimonides of the theological school of the 'speakers', the 'mutakallimun' (Arabic) or the medabberim (hebraic) or the 'loquentes' (latin). that islamic school had its origin in early Christian theological discussions with philosophy and defends the unsustainability of nature and the non-fixed, fugitive character of things and their laws with respect to gods omnipotence. 41
hegel does the other way around. he mentions that school immedi- ately in the introduction, after some positive remarks about the rapid development of Arabic sciences. After concluding with praising Arabic philosophy for free, brilliant and deep imagination, without specifying to
40 schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, p. 37.
41 wilhelm gotlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, leipzig: barth 1789-1819, bd. 8, p. 441.
? a religion after christianity? 229
what he refers to, he continues in part A with an elaborate exposition of the medabberim.
in b of the section about Arabic philosophy he describes what is tra- ditionally called islamic philosophy under the title 'commentators of Aristotle'. 42 but here, contrary to tennemann, he gives only short list of the well know names from Al Kindi and Al farabi to Avicenna and Averroes, including the famous critic of islamic philosophy and theology al ghazali, whom he calls a witty sceptic. he mentions their dates and works, tells an anecdote and that is it. he concludes with saying that their function was to make the west acquainted with Aristotle. that is all, for that was all they had to do! the section ends with a paragraph (C) about the Jewish philosophers of the middle Ages. indeed Jewish philosophy of the middle Ages functioned in the context of the revival of philosophy in the Arabic world. Just like the Christians of the middle east, they knew Arabic and wrote in Arabic language. As a thinker, hegel only mentions maimonides.
hegel's general judgment about Arabic philosophy is that it did not contribute something specifically to the development of the principle of philosophy. therefore, he tells nothing about the real contribution they made to the development of western medieval philosophy. to a certain extent hegel is excused, for this contribution was not the focus of the sources like tenneman he used. you can find far more islamic philosophy in tennemann than hegel gives. nevertheless, tennemann judges that it is Aristotelism corrupted by neo-platonism and that there is nothing original in Arabic philosophy. hegel just adopts this judgment. At last, mediaeval philosophy as such, whether islamic or Christian, has no spe- cific relevance for the development of philosophy according to hegel. for him it is philosophy in service of theology and it had as its only principle the principle of revelation.
probably because he wants to find something special and different in the islamic worldview, he pays ample attention to the passage from maimonides about the muslim theologians, the mutakallimun or medab- berim, that defend the omnipotence of god against all (semi)autonomy of finite things. but by going back to maimonides' story about them, hegel present this school that criticized philosophy and even, by the mouth of al-ghazali, dealt a blow to islamic philosophy, as the characteristic islamic
42 g. w. f. hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1971, ii, pp. 515, 517, 522.
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philosophy. that of course, is impossible. still, amazingly perhaps, hegel has a point by paying attention to that school. we come back on this issue in the evaluation at the end of this section.
like tennemann, hegel's quotes extensively maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, in which he mentions a discussion in early islamic theology, caused by the influence of greek philosophy, about the unity of god. maimonides refers to the position of the rationalists, the school of the mutazila (the mutazila? in hegel's quotation), this school denied the pos- sibility of all plurality, that means of a plurality of attributes of god, at the same time it severely criticizes all anthropomorphism and tried to interpret the anthropomorphisms of the Koran allegorically. he mentions their opponents the Asharites (in hegel's text 'Assaria'). they defended a literal interpretation of the Koran. All their problems were already pres- ent in Christian times, among the greeks and the syrians, who tried to defend their Christian truth against the philosophers. when islam arose, they took over that style of thinking from the greek and syriac-Aramaic thinkers. what hegel fascinates in the philosophy of the medabberim, is exactly the denial of the substantial character of the finite world. here he finds the theological-philosophical position of islam that justified him to interpret the islam as a religion of the sublime, that is a religion in which the Absolute as 'the one' is absolutely dominating , either giving a shadow of autonomy to the finite world, nor to mans' reason and actions.
it belonged to the repertoire of early islamic theologians, so hegel quotes maimonides again, to deny the possibility of certain knowledge of things, because one could always think the opposite. they interpreted the world as a collection of atoms without any relation, so that all conjunc- tions are something accidental. it does not belong to the nature of things to have this or that accidentent. the accidents itself are just coming up and passing away, all dependent of the creative force of god. it is just a matter of habit that fire moves upward, that the earth is moving around a centre. god could have arranged it otherwise. hegel is naming the clas- sical topics of that theological discussion. 43 because in this position only god himself is a 'substantial being' hegel's association with pantheism is understandable: "this pantheism, if you want spinozism, is the position, the general point of view of oriental poets, historians and philosophers. "44
43 for an up to date exposition of these discussions see: william montgomery watt and michel marmura, Der Islam I, II, III, stuttgart-berlin: Kohlhammer 1985, bd. ii in: 'die religionen der menschheit' bd. 25, pp. 368 ff.
44 hegel, Vorlesungen u?
ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 519.
? a religion after christianity? 231
hegel characterizes the islamic worldview in general with this word. for him, this 'spinozistic' worldview represents the idea of the sublime. god as the only, the persistent one is, in its abstract negativity, the basic con- cept of the oriental world of representations.
for the qualification of the islamic world as pantheism hegel relies on f. A. g. tholuck who published in 1821 one of the first books on islamic mysticism in europe called Sufism or the Pantheistic Theosophy of the Per- sians (sufismus sive theosophia persarum pantheistica). 45 Another book he wrote, quoted by hegel, was Anthology of Oriental Mysticism (blu? ten- sammlung aus der morgenla? ndischen mystik). we put aside now the topic of pantheism. it is an essential issue in the next and last part of this essay. first, we have to ask: is hegel's lecture of the history of Arabic philosophy adequate? in addition, if the answer is 'no', as the reader may presume, how is it the possible that hegel still hits an essential mark in his concep- tion of the islamic worldview?
9. evaluation: philosophy and religion of the sublime
what is true and what is false in this representation of islamic philosophy? As we already said, hegel underestimates the classical islamic philoso- phy of the middle Ages, by saying that they were only commentators of Aristotle. Avicenna, for example, contributed to western thinking by the unaristotelian distinctions between essence and existence and his ideas of contingency. of course, hegel's presentation of a theological school as 'the islamic philosophy' is wrong.
but at the other hand, this theological position became influential through the work of al-ghazali, a very important thinker in the world of islam, sometimes called a 'church father' or 'the thomas Aquinas of islam'. 46 hegel just mentions the name of al-ghazali among the commentators of Aristotle, as if he was just another philosopher. this was normal for a long time. As the first part of his The incoherence of the Philosophers (some- times translated as the Refutation of the Philosophers or The destruction of the Philosophers), al-ghazali wrote a book on 'The goals of philosophy', in
45 for tholuck and the reception of islamic mysticism in the west, especially of rumi, see franklin d. lewis, Rumi, Past and Present, East and West, oxford: one world 2000, pp. 506 ff.
46 see for criticism of this epitheta too: montgomery watt and marmura, Der Islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
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which he summarized the philosophical positions he wanted to attack. it was translated in latin separately in the twelfth century, without the prologue in which al-ghazali exposed his goals, and for a long time this was the only book that was known. therefore he was regarded, for exam- ple by thomas of Aquinas, as a philosopher and an Aristotelian. 47 in the fourteenth century, the second part seemed to be translated and edited together with Averroes' critical commentary called The Incoherence of the Incoherence (sometimes translated as the Refutation of the Refutation or The Destruction of the Destruction). nevertheless, for a long time al ghaza- lis criticism of the philosophers was only known by the criticism of this criticism by Averroes. 48
tenneman too interprets him as a philosopher and as a sceptic very near to greek scepticism. however, he tells us too that al-ghazali was a sceptic not just because he wanted to be a sceptic, but because of theo- logical motives. he wanted to defend the possibility of miracles. never- theless, tennemans complains about the fact that he did not have at his disposal the original sources. he knows al-ghazali only from the refuta- tion of his thoughts by Averroes in his 'incoherence'. 49 but tenneman was right about the theological motives of al-ghazali. According to the modern point of view, al ghazali was not just another islamic Aristoteliz- ing philosopher, but a mystical theologian who criticized philosophy and theology using philosophy to combat philosophy with its own arms. 50 the inspiration for this criticism was the position described by maimonides as the position of the Asharites against the mutazila. so he mobilized the criticism of the mutakallimun against philosophy and especially against rational theology. his target was the philosophy of Avicenna. he is indeed famous for a criticism of causality that resembles very much that of david hume. therefore, he was called in old times, as hegel does a sceptic. how- ever, the aim and the source of his criticism of causality was not scep- ticism, but to prove the absolute omnipotence of god as first cause in
47 louis gardet, L'islam, religion et communaute? , paris: descle? e de brouwer 1967.
48 Charles burnett, 'Arabic into latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into western europe', in: peter Adamson and richard taylor (eds. ) The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2005, pp. 370-405, p. 396. beatrice h. Zedler, 'introduction' in: Averroes' Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin version of Calo Calonymos, edited by beatrice Zedler, milwaukee: the marquette university press 1961, pp. 1-65.
49 tenneman, Geschichte der Philosophie, bd. 8, p. 404. 50 montgomery watt and marmura, der islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
? a religion after christianity? 233
all causal relations in our finite world. therefore, he denied the reality, the (semi) autonomy of secondary causes. Al ghazali's position became dominant, 'orthodox' so to speak, in islamic thinking at the costs of the Aristotelians. After al ghazali came Averroes who attacked him again. he was the last great representative of the Aristotelian mediaeval tradition. As a special, isolated thinker, not known by hegel and tennemann, one has to mention ibn Khaldum 1332-1406, a social philosopher and philoso- pher of history.
often it is said that al ghazali dealt a definite blow to the development of islamic philosophy, that because of him islamic philosophy did not survive the middle Ages. to say that after al ghazali islamic philosophy ended, is exaggerated. but it is true that, because it lost its Aristotelian combination with the sciences, it could not make the transition to the modern sciences and continued its existence in combination with the- ology and especially mysticism. not Aristotelism, but neo-platonism in combination with mysticism became dominant, which provokes some- times the question of it being still philosophy.
therefore, hegel had a point, in as far as al ghazali's position, stress- ing the omnipotence of god at the cost of the (semi) autonomy of the world, became dominant in islam,51 hegel rightly highlighted the posi- tion of the mutakallimun and described islam properly as a religion of the sublime. Combining these ideas with persian mysticism as he knew it from tholucks' work, was not wrong either. there is indeed familiarity between them. 52
however, this stressing of the omnipotence was not the point of the philosophers, so much as of theologians in discussion with the philoso- phers. this islamic view on the unsustainability of all natural laws is a well-known topic in catholic circles that always opposed it to Aquinas' idea of the semi-autonomous reality of secondary causes. this 'rational- ism' of catholicism was the background of the famous or notorious speech of pope benedict XVi in regensburg in 2006, in which he criticized this islamic worldview because of its irrationality.
51 And one should not exaggerate al--ghazali's voluntarism. generally, in his thought gods wisdom prevails over his omnipotency. see william J. Courtnay, 'the Critique on natural Causality in the mutakallimun and nominalism' in william J. Cournay, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought, london: Variorum reprints 1984, pp. 77-94.
52 therefore a special chapter about persian poets in his book about al ghazali in: ber- nard Carra de Vaux, Ghazali A. H. 450505/1058-1111 (Algazel) Amsterdam: philo press 1974 (first edition 1902) p. 273.
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in modern times, however, the dominant position of al ghazali is dis- cussed again. modern thinkers try to open the course of the history of islamic philosophy again by re-opening the debate between Avicenna, al-ghazali and Averroes, especially regarding problems of nature, natural sciences and with regard to natural law as the source of human rights. 53 so islamic philosophy is certainly not at its end. Just like it tried to cope with greek thought in the past, it tries now to digest modern western thinking.
10. islam in the lectures on fine Art
islamic art is dealt with in the part about oriental art. this type of art is called symbolic art. islamic art belongs to the 'symbolism of the sublime', which is the title of chapter ii. in the first part of that chapter, section A is dedicated to the 'pantheism of art', the second part is entitled: Art of the sublime. both parts belong to the 'symbolism of the sublime'. in part A, indian, islamic and Christian mystical poetry are ranked together. part b is as such dedicated to Judaism, to the Creator god, the world of the old testament and the psalms. hegel separates Judaism from pantheism. pantheism is the affirmative mode of the religion of the sublime. we find it in india, in mysticism of the mohammedan persian poets and again also in the deeper inwardness of thought and sentiment in the Christian west. 54 however, both islamic and Judaic art belong to the 'symbolism of the sub- lime'. because the sublime transcends all sensual possibilities, hegel con- cludes that pictorial art cannot exist in Judaism and islam. so the art of the sublime is essentially literature. here we see the grave consequences of Kant's dictum that 'thou shalt make no images' was the most 'sublime' word of the old testament. nevertheless, islamic pictural art exists in fact, non-figurative and figurative. the prohibition does not mean that man should not try to paint an image of god, but first of all that man should not try to imitate god as a creator. it focuses essentially on sculptures
53 see: Al-djabiri (Al-Jabri, Al-gabiri), muhammad 'Abid, Arab-islamic philosophy, A Contemporary Critique, Austin texas: middle east monograph series no. 12 1999. see also: hendrich, geert, Islam und Aufkla? rung, Der Modernediskurs in der arabischen Philoso- phie, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft 2004. Ku? gelgen, Anke von, Averroes und die arabische Moderne; Ansa? tze zu einer Neubegru? ndung des Rationalismus im Islam, leiden 1994.
54 g. w. f. hegel, Hegel's Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art, i, ii translated by t. m. Knox, oxford: Clarendon press 1998, Vol. i, p. 364.
? a religion after christianity? 235
of human beings and animals that because of their three-dimensionality resemble mostly normal creatures. 55 in paintings of humans and animals therefore, all plastical perspective has to be avoided.
the pantheistic mood of a human being is characterized as 'enlarge- ment of the mind' and the Jewish sublime mood gives an 'elevation of the mind'. in hebrew poetry, we encounter in the negative praise of god sublimity in the strict sense of the word. hegel is criticizing this negativity that reduces the creation to an ornament. 56 but at the same time, hegel highlights as special Jewish the fact that nature and the human being are for the first time just what they are, just nature and man as such bereft of god.
what hegel is praising in islamic pantheism is, to the contrary, the presence of god in the finite. so here, Judaism and islam are separated, while both were intimately linked together in hegel's description of the islamic mind in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. moreover, in his History of Philosophy he blamed islamic 'pantheistic' philosophy for the same thing he blames Judaism for in his Aesthetics.
nevertheless, in the lectures on Aesthetics, the tone towards islam is totally different. the positive attitude to islam of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History comes back. the perspective on pantheism is in general positive. moreover, this cannot be understood as just a matter of hotho's way of text edition, for the position he defends here is identical with the position at the end of the encyclopaedia. there too hegel quotes indian and islamic mystical poetry together. both are dealt with together positively within the context of a discussion about pantheism and the true (Christian) god. spinoza's idea of god is the background of the discussion about pantheism. therefore, islam as a religion of 'substance' is distin- guished from Christianity as a religion of 'subjectivity'. Judaism does not play any role there. 57
let us look first to hegel's interpretation of pantheism and then to his specific estimation of islamic 'pantheistic' poetry. for hegel the word pan- theism is, in essence, an impossible word. by the part 'pan', meaning 'all'
55 doris behrens-Abousef, Beauty in Arabic Culture, princeton: markus wiener publish- ers 1999, pp. 109, 135. see also: ettinghausen, richard, 'the man-made setting, islamic art and architecture', in: bernard lewis, The world of Islam, london: thames and hudson 1992, pp. 57-89, 62.
56 hegel, Aesthetics, p. 375.
57 g. w. f. hegel, Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1970, iii, ? 572, pp. 378-393.
? 236 gerrit steunebrink
or 'everything', it suggests that 'everything is god', so, that 'this house', 'that book' and so on 'is god'. that is utterly nonsense. no philosopher and especially spinoza ever represented that position.
however, when you take the 'pan' as the 'totality' or the one substance in all individuals, it makes sense, but then there is nothing wrong with it. it says just that god is the perfection of everything in everything, the abso- lute being the truth, the goodness itself in all finite good individual things. so it says nothing more than that the finite is the finite from the infinite and vice versa. 58 As hegel says in the encyclopaedia, this pantheism is in fact monotheism. 59 nevertheless, the difference is this that pantheism abstracts from particularity and individuality. All individual finite things are passing away for the absolute. indian pantheism expresses this iden- tity of the one and general substance, according to hegel, in the words of Krishna in the bhagavad--gita, when Krishna is saying that among all existents he is always the most excellent: "Among the stars i am the shin- ing sun (. . . ), among the letters i am the vowel A, amongst seasons of the year the blossoming spring. " etc. however, for hegel's taste this kind of litany becomes monotonous and boring. 60 nevertheless, in islamic poetry pantheism has developed in a higher a more free subjective way. hegel focuses especially on the work of the persian poets rumi (1207-1273) and hafiz (hafis) (1320-1389), indeed until now two very famous muslim mys- tics, early translated and very influential in the west. moreover, especially in this muslim pantheism is an estimation of the finite world possible that is not possible in the art of the sublime in the strict sense. for art of the sublime, Judaism, the finite world is only an ornament of god.
specifically in islamic pantheistic poetry, the presence of god in the finite world is at the service of that world. hegel's characterization of the pantheism of islamic mysticism resembles surprisingly very much what he expects from Christianity: "in pantheism, on the other hand, the immanence of the divine in objects exalts mundane, natural and human existence itself into a more independent glory of its own. "61 hegel men- tions in this respect especially the poetry of hafiz. rumi is praised for the freedom of his feeling, transcending all petty interests, in which he still retains his substantial freedom and wins his self-identification with god. hafiz is praised because he was able to ensoul objects like the rose, the
58 hegel, Aesthetics, p. 271. 59 idem, p. 385.
60 idem, p. 367.
61 idem, p. 368.
? a religion after christianity? 237
nightingale, the wine, the candle , the flame, which western poets handle in a more prosaic and ornamental way. hegel opposes this 'objectivity' of feeling of the persian poetry to western poetry as more shut in upon itself and therefore subjective. however, he praises goethe, for goethe appropri- ated this islamic attitude of feeling free in objectivity in his famous book the West-Oestlicher Diwan, in which he constructed an encounter between european and islamic poetry by writing himself oriental poetry.
