No More Learning

(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);

(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;

(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth. " Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect.
Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the
intellect.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech. )
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn};
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr. ], signifies the contemplative life. " Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the
contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that it belongs
to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action. " Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. " Now desire
and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above
([3715]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3716]FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the
contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now
intention is an act of the will, as stated above ([3717]FS, Q[12],
A[1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will.
Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the
action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of
the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the
other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above
([3718]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3719]FS, Q[9], A[1]).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Mat. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is
thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life
to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are
aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he
obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
result being that love also becomes more intense.

Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and
delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares
and longs to see the face of its Creator. "

Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice
the act of contemplation, as stated above.
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Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with
the whole mind. " Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God
and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law"
(Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to
the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator. " Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. [3720] Q[8], A[7]]. For it is
written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God. " Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful
countenance. " Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues,
especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46).
Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative
life.

On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions.
Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech. ; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external
action. " Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.

I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.

On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative
life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the
passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to
sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues
curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of
outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
contemplative life.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3721](A[1]), the contemplative
life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this
respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the
contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of
a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that
the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.

Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the
virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of
the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he
who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and
disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative
life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above ([3722]Q[145], A[2]),
consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is
found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore
it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a
lover of her beauty. "

On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in
so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it
in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially
darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity
most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures
most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says
(Soliloq. i, 10).
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Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and
"cogitation. " Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to
the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are
transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg. : 'into the same image from
glory to glory. ']. " Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio]
belongs to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first
and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty. " Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.

Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of
St. Victor, Alleg. in N. T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life:
since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk.
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.

On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is
chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
lives.

I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of
a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then,
the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,
namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its
unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some
of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds
to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from
the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the
last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation"
would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of
certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's
discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid.
ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every
operation of the intellect may be called "consideration. " But
"contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of
its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
prone to wander. "

Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of
Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in
a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]. " Now to see a
thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to
meditation.

Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results
from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above
[3723](A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways.
First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as
regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according
to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon
me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
"hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and
"reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ.
Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he
requires "meditation. "
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Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or
also in the consideration of any truth whatever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any
truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my
soul knoweth right well. " Now the knowledge of God's works is effected
by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it
pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine
truth, but also any other.

Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that
"contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly
of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises. "
Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the
other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in
the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.

Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is
in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in
"the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on
things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth
is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine
revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by
the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason";
when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem
contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine
truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine
truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.

Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of
truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we
seek the principle which is God. "

I answer that, As stated above [3724](A[2]), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life
is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is
the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8)
that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all
our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys. " This
contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see
God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas
now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us
imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor.
13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which
begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the
contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.

Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of
God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of God . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it
follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to
the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the
knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in
the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile
curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
unperishable and everlasting. "

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said ([3725]AA[1],2,3) that
four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly,
the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth
itself.

Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so
that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps.
142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of
Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. "

Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided
to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
vouchsafed.

Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by
means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step
consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth
step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation
of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.

Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is
the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
the divine truth.
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Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the
vision of the Divine essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and
my soul has been saved. " Now the vision of God's face is the vision of
the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life
one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative
men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of
seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above
them, they overcome that which they are. " Now man is not hindered from
seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by
the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would
seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and
angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things
by the light of God. " Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life.
Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the
vision of the essence of God.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "As long as we live
in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as
to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible
light. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing
God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play:
and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether
out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not
caught up into that vision. " This has been carefully discussed above
(Q[175], AA[4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the [3726]FP,
Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.

Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the
bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise
attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this
life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the
soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use
neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens
in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can
attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest
degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in
rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and
the life to come.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach. ), "if
anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
something belonging to God. " And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "By
no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of
lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain
to the glory of vision. " Accordingly the words of Jacob, "I saw God
face to face" do not imply that he saw God's essence, but that he saw
some shape [*Cf. [3727]FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 1], imaginary of course,
wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by the
face of God he signified his knowledge of Him," according to a gloss of
Gregory on the same passage.

Reply to Objection 2: In the present state of life human contemplation
is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states
(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the
phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of
the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but
also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under
certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the
single ray of light," i. e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible
truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement of
Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows
of things corporeal," since their contemplation is not fixed on them,
but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.

Reply to Objection 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the
blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes
to show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it
follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment of
the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may see of
the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him. "
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Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold
movement, circular, straight and oblique?

Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," "straight,"
and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to
rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my house, I shall repose
myself with her. " Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the
operations of the contemplative life should not be described as
movements.

Objection 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to
the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in
the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement in
the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the
good. " On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul
to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the soul
into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of
its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward
occupation"; and the third is "union with those things that are above
it. " Again, he describes differently their respective straight
movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that
by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him.
On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as
being twofold: first, "its progress towards things that are near it";
secondly, "its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation. "
Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he
assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that "while
providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to
God": whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact
that "the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and
discoursing. " Therefore it would seem that the operations of
contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned
above.

Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5)
mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the
air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another
swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag
behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;
and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place. " Therefore
it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

I answer that, As stated above ([3728]Q[119], A[1], ad 3), the
operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists,
is called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect
thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however,
it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of
intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place
without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are
described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various
movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most
perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the
foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened
to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the
"circular" movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point
as center, another is the "straight" movement, by which a thing goes
from one point to another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it
were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that
which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the
intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another
is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation
which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is
compared to the oblique movement.

Reply to Objection 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the
quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward
occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the
quiet of contemplation.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically,
but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.
Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in
different ways, according as they are differently related to
uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the
truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
certain discoursing of the reason.

Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of
uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
from external objects. " Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires
to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of
reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the
simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated
by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual powers
must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that discoursing must
be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one
simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as
there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles
which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being
done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is like that of the
angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the
contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being
thus made uniform unitedly," i. e. conformably, "by the union of its
powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful. " The "straight"
movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to
another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence,
namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels
through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he
says: "The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to
the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things
are direct," i. e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order.
Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the soul's
proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible
objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he describes as being
composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care
for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of
God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be
partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes
use of the light received from God.

Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from
the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of
reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from
the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below:
if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from
the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be
about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the
movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to
intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural
reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the
Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as
explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility
belongs to the circular movement.

Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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Whether there is delight in contemplation?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is
no delight in contemplation.

Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to
delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when the soul strives to contemplate
God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because
even while tasting, it fails. " Therefore there is no delight in
contemplation.

Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative
life.

Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight.
Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
(Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face
to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31) . . . because he
touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore
seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable. "

I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in
two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. [3729]FS, Q[3],
A[5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits
him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the
truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the
result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as
bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in
itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the
contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of
which charity is the motive, as stated above ([3730]AA[1],2, ad 1), it
follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by
reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine
love.

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both
because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated
above ([3731]FS, Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions,
and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all
love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is
sweet. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly
in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God.
And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the
term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ) that "when we see one whom we love,
we are so aflame as to love him more. " And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
not only seen but also loved.

Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of
an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights
not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights
yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more
peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph. " But
there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the
truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our
defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to
lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body ss a load
upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things. " Hence it is that when man attains to the
contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more
his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say
with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver
me from the body of this death? " Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ): "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He
withers all carnal pleasure in us. "

Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is
imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like
manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as
compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is
written (Ps. 35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure. " Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i,
5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime
beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly,
nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory
says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "The contemplative life is
sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above
itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes
of the mind. "

Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ). "Thus
when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while
the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on
that foot which is sound. "
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Whether the contemplative life is continuous?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
shall be destroyed. " Therefore the contemplative life is made void.

Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost
soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I
sink down again. " Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15,
"When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does
not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for
it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the
light. " Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.

Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous.