No More Learning

262. Hsiian-tsang translates: "This theory is not good, for it is in contradiction with our system. "
Let us add: "So say the Vaibhasikas. " See above note 218.
263. Buddhaghosa attributes to the Pubbaseliyas and to the Sammitiyas the Abhidharma doctrine
that the jivitendriya is a cittacippayutta arupadhamma. See Kathdvatthu, viii. 10, Compendium, p. 156; Vibhariga, p. 123, Dhammasangani, 19,635, Atthasdlim, 644.
264. Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 991b25 (Indriyaskandhaka, 1), Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a23. 265. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 150b9, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 789al, Samyutta, iii. 143 (varients); compare
Majjhima, i. 296. Quoted below ad iv. 73a-b.
266. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 771a7: This Sutra is quoted by the Vibhajyavadins in order to prove that these three dharmas,--life, heat, and consciousness,--are always united and not separated But VasumitraobservesthattheSutrareferstotheseriesofacertaindfraya. . . Life(dyus)formspart
of the samskdraskandha, the dharmadhdtu, and the dharmdyatana; heat, of the rupaskandha and the sprastavydyatana; and consciousness, of the vijndnaskandha, the seven dhdtus and the mandyatana: thus one should not take the Sutra literally. Furthermore, if these three dharmas always go together, there would be heat in Arupyadhatu, life and consciousness among non-living beings, and consciousness in the non-conscious absorption.
267. Hsiian-tsang: "In addition to that we have said. What have you said? In order to avoid this consequence . . . "
268. Vaisesikadarsana, v. 1. 16; H. Ui, Vaisesika philosophy, p. 163. The example of the arrow has no real value for the Vaisesikas who hold that vega is a thing in and of itself. Thus the author here refutes the theory of the Vai&sikas.
269. Hsiian-tsang: "There is a thing in and of itself, the support of heat and consciousness, called dyus: this is the best doctrine. " Note of the Japanese editor: The author adopts the opinion of the Sarvastivadins. But we may suppose that Hsuan-tsang has omited the words ^The Vaibhasikas say:. . . ," for in his Pancaskandhaka, Vasubandhu adopts the Sautrantika thesis.
270. Karmaprajndptisdstra, Chap, xi (Mdo 72, fol. 240b).
271. On the different results of action, iv. 85 and following. On bhoga, Yogasutra, ii. 13.
272. Missing in Paramartha. See above, p. 167. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 103b3.
273. This is an explanation of the Foreigners (Bahirdesaka). The explanation of the Kas'mireans differs only in its words. Or rather these latter understand that the dyus of the first category is "bound to its own series (svasamtatyupanibaddha), but susceptible of being hindered. "
274. According to Kathdvatthu, xvii. 2, the Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas deny the premature death of an Arhat (Kosa, ii. 10). According to Rockhill (Life of Buddha, p. 189) and Wassilieff, p.
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244, the Prajfiaptivadins deny premature death. The Bodhicaryavatdra (ii. 55) admits a "natural" (kola) death and one hundered premature deaths, due to each of the humors (vdta, pitta, salesman) and to the humors joined together, for a total of four hundred and four deaths.
Further (1) samucchedamarana, the death of an Arhat; (2) khantkamarana, the constant disappearance of the dharmas eaten up by Impermanence; (3) sammutimarana, the death that one attributes to a tree, etc The Abhidhamma distinguishes (1) kdlamarana (natural death) (a) by exhaustion of merit (pun~na), (b) by exhaustion of the span of life (dyu), and (c) by exhaustion of the two; (2) akdlamarana (premature death) by reason of an action which cuts off existence (upacchedakakammand), in the case of DusI Mara, Kalabhu, etc. , and in the case of persons assassinated in retribution of a previous action (Visuddhimagga, viii. apud Warren, p. 252; Commentary on the Anguttara, P. T. S. , p. Ill; Nettipakarana, p. 29; Milinda, p. 301. Abhi- dhammasangaha, Compendium, p. 149.
Jain doctrine, Umasvati, Tattvdrthddhigamasutra, ii. 52: dvividhany dyumsi . . .
275. Literally: taking possession of existence, dtmabhdvapratUambha. Majjhima, iii. 53 distin-
guishes two types, savydpajjha and avydpajjha.
276. Digha, iii. 231, Anguttara, ii. 159: atth'dvuso attabhdvapatildbho yasmim attabhdvapatUdbhe attasamcetand yeva kamati no parasamcetand . . . See Kofa, vi. 56. Vydkhyd: dtmasamcetand = dtmand mdranam; parasamcetand - parena mdranam.
211. Digha, i. 19, iii. 31. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 997b9. There is no agreement as to whether this refers to the Four Kings and the heaven of the Thirty-three Gods, or to other categories of gods in Kamadhatu.
278. For example a certain Suka was sent by the Blessed One to Amrapall; the Licchavis were engaged in military exercises iyogya), and seeing him they covered him with a rain of arrows. But the messanger of the Buddha cannot be killed before he has completed his mission.
279. Perhaps we should understand: "the persons to whom the Buddha gives an order know that they will live yet that much more time. " The notes ofJ. Przyluski on Yasas andJTvaka makethis version plausible enough:
"In Mahdvagga, i. 7, Para. 4 is almost incomprehensible. Yas'as cries out 'What a danger! ' and we do not know to what danger he is alluding. In the corresponding passage of the Vinaya of the Sarvastivadins everything is explained: "Then Yasas, having passed beyond the gate of the village, arrived at the river of Varanasi. Then the Blessed One was walking on the bank of this river. Yasas, seeing the water, gave forth a cry as he had formerly done. The Buddha, hearing this cry, said to the young man: "This place has nothing to cause fear. Cross the current and come'" (Tok. xvii. , 3. 26a).
"The wife of Subhadra (comp. Divyavaddna, 262-270) died before having given birth; the body was cremated but the infant was not burned. The Buddha told Jivaka to go and take the infant from out of the midst of the flames: Jfvaka obeyed and returned without having had any ill effect (xvii. l. 6a). "
280. Tibetan: gan ga len. The Qiinese transcriptions give Gaiijila; see the unsuccessful suicide attempts of Garigika, Avaddnafataka, 98.
281. The fact that the word tadyathd is lacking in the response of the Blessed One does not prove that this response should be understood literally.
282. Paramartha: "Further, there are the laksanas of the samskrtas . . . "
Hsiian-tsang: "The laksanas, are namely the arising, duration, change, and destruction of the
samskrtas. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198a8 and following; Dharmottara's Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p.
? 811bl7.
A provisional definition of samskrta has been given i. 7a-b.
283. But cannot one say that duration is a characteristic of an unconditioned thing? No. Characteristics are things in and of themselves (dravydntararupa) distinct from the dharmas characterized, which causes arising, duration, decline and the perishing of this same dharma. An unconditioned thing lasts but does not possess the characteristic "duration," see below p. 239 line
11.
284. This is Trilaksanasutra (see below p. 242 line 9). Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 85bl0; Anguttaray i. 152: tin'imdni bhikkhave samkhatassa samkhatalakkhandni /katamdni tint / uppddo panndyati vayo panndyati thitassa anndthattam panndyati. The Sanskrit redaction has: sthityanya- thdtva (Madhyamakavrtti, p. 145); Kathdvatthu, trans, p. 55: thitdnam anfldthatta.
On anyathdbhdva, Samyutta, ii. 274. The Abhidhamma only admits three characteristics: certain masters omit even sthiti (Kathdvatthuy trans. , note p. 374).
The four laksanas of the Vijnanavada, Bodhisattvabhumi, I, xvii. Para. 15. {Madhyamakavrtti^ p. 546).
285. The same comparison, with a different moral, Atthasdlini, 655. 286. Compare Burnouf, Introduction, p. 255.
287. The theory of the laksanas and anulaksanas is refuted by Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka, vii. l and following. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 148, on the theory of the Sarhmltiyas who admit seven laksanas and seven anulaksanas: utpdda, utpddotpdda, etc.
288. Space is a pure negative, a pure absence of any matter susceptible of resistance. It cannot be analyzed {vipapyate, vibhidyate).
289. See note 293.
290. See the sources quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 5%.
291. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 73b23. pravdhagatd hi vedands tasya viditd evotpadyante /viditd avatisthante / viditd astam pariksayam parydddnam gacchanti /na ksanagatdh ksanasya durava- dharatvdt (Vydkhyd).
Tibetan: The kulaputra Nanda (Comp. Angutiara, iv. 166).
Compare Samyutta, vi. 180; Majjhima, iii. 25 (where the Blessed One says to Sariputra what he says here to Nanda): dhammd viditd uppajjanti viditd upatthahanti viditdabbhattham gacchanti.
292. Majjhima, iii. 25 contains the formula evam kila me dhammd ahutvd sambhonti which becomes the thesis of the Sautrantikas: abhutvdbhdva utpddah (p. 243 line 17), which we read in Milinda, p. 51: ahutvd sambhoti, and which is contradicted by the Sarvastivadins and by Milinda, p. 52: natthi keci samkhdrdye abhavantd jdyanti. Nagasena is a Vibhajyavadin, p. 50.
293. If one says, "It is by reason of its duration (sthitisadbhdvdt) that a dharma^ once arisen, does not perish for a moment; lacking duration, even this moment itself would not exist," such'isnot the case, for the moment exists by reason of the cause which produces it.
If one says, "It is duration which causes, which embraces (upagrhndti) a dharma engendered
by causes," we would ask, "If duration does not accomplish this task, what will happen? " "The
1 dharmawouldnotexist(dtmasattddharmasyanabhavet)! "Thensaythatdurationengenders,
not that it cause something to endure. "
If one says, "Duration causes the series to continue (avastbdpayati)" then the name of
duration should be reserved for its causes.
294. Smoke is momentary; when it "reproduces itself in a place higher than that which it first
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occupied, persons say that it rises (urdhvagamandkhydm labhate) and they conceive of the rising (urdhvagamanatvam) as distinct from the smoke (see iv. 2b).
295. If, grasping the unique self nature of a visible thing, I were to grasp it as being conditioned (samskrtam its) before knowing of its former non-existence, one could say that "conditioned" is a mark of a conditioned thing, that a conditioned thing is characterized by a conditioned thing {tenaive tal laksitam sydt). But such is not the case.
296. The Vaibhasikas are "followers of momentariness" (ksanikavddin): dharmas last only a moment and perish of themselves. See iv. 2b; Wassilief, p. 325. But the difficulty is: what does ksana mean?
297. Some other definitions, iii. 86a.
298. The Sarhmitlyas (see iv. 2c).
299. In the Introduction we have studied the different theories relative to impermanence
(anityatva) and momentariness (ksanikatva).
300. See above p. 245. A conditioned dharma is engenderd by its characteristic "arising. " "Arising" arises at the same time as the dharma which it engenders; being "future" it engenders it before arising itself.
301. Causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) are defined ii. 49,61c.
302. The Vydkhyd quotes the response made by the Bhadanta Anantavarman to this objection: "The eye does not produce the visible consciousness without the coming together of clearness, etc. ; it is no less a cause of the visual consciousness. " Response: "We state that the blind do not see, that the non-blind do see: thus we state the efficacy of the eye. The same does not hold for arising. "
Anantavarman is quoted in the Vydkhyd ad ii. 71b-72, iii. 35d and vii. 32.
303. The nature of the mental states, sparsa, etc. is subtle and difficult to distinguish. Without doubt, reply the Sautrantikas, but the Blessed One explained the efficacy of spar/a, etc. : "All that which is vedand, samjnd, and samskdras, exists by reason of sparsa . . . ;" but he did not explain the efficacy of "arising. "
304. The idea of "color" has for its object specific characteristics (svalaksana) of the "color. " But the idea of "arisen," as "the color has arisen," does not bear on the color, since I have the same idea of arising when it refers to sensation: "sensation has arisen. " Thus the idea of "arisen" bears on the action produced by a certain dharma, independent of its color, its sensation, and its "arising. "
305. The Buddhists (baudhasiddhdnta) believe that sandalwood is only a certain collection of odors, etc. {gandhddisamuha). The Vaibhasikas believe that sandalwood exists in and of itself; this is why the author gives the example of the bust, an example admitted by the Vaibhasikas. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 66; Sdmkhyapravacanabhdsya, p. 84, 148, etc.
306. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198al5: Some maintain that the samsknalaksanas are not real things, namely the Darstantikas who say: "The samsknalaksanas are included within the viprayuk- tasamskdraskandha; the viprayuktasamskdraskandha is not real; thus the samsknalaksanas are not real. " In order to refute their" opinion . . .
307. Hsiian-tsang: "This theory is best. Why? "
308. Namely the Abhidharmasastras.
309. We have four proverbs which have the same meaning, that is, one should not renounce a
? thing in and of itself because of the defects that it presents, or because of the risks that it entails. a. Na hi bhiksukdh santiti sthdlyo nddhisriyante.
b. Na ca mfgdh santiti yavd (var. sdlayo) nopyante.
These two proverbs, which often go together, have been studies by Col. Jacob, in his Second
Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay, Nirnayasagar, 1909, p. 42, index sub voc. na hi bhiksikdh), with the references which follow: Mahdbhdsya, i. 99, ii. 194, iii. 23 (Kielhorn), in the same context (nahidosdhsantitipraibhdsanakartavydlaksanamvdnapraneyam/ nahibhiksukdh. . . ); Vdcasapatimisra, Nydyavdrtikatdtparyatikd, pp. 62,441; BhamatI, p. 54; Sarvadarsanasamgraha, p. 3 of Cowell's translation. We should add the Kdmasutra (see Cat. Oxford, 216b), where the two proverbs are attributed to Vatsyayana (mentioned by Weber, Indische Studien, XIII, p. 326).
c. Ato'jirnabhaydn ndhdraparitydgo bhiksukabhaydn na sthMyd anadhisrayanam dosesu prativsdhdtavyam iti nydyah.
Col. Jacob quotes, for this third proverb, Pancapddikd, p. 63 (of which the final dosesu pratividhdtavyam is found in Vasubandhu), Jivanmuktiviveka, p. 8 (which attributes the proverb to Anandabodhacarya), and Hitopadesa, ii. 50, dosabhiter andrambhah . . .
d Na maksikdh patantiti modakd na bhaksyante.
A proverb for which we do not have any other references than Vasubandhu. It appears that the Buddhists, being bhiksus, have substituted mendicant (bhiksuka) and sthdli in the proverb, making it a proverb less biting than one containing flies and cakes.
310. Surendranath Dasgupta, in his Study ofPatanjali (Calcutta, 1920), give in brief (p. 192-201) the various theories concerning sphota.
311. The word Mmjfidkarana belongs to popular language (lokabhdsd); it is the equivalent of ndmadheya, name or appellation, for one says " 'Devadatta' is a samjfidkarana sound. " But here it means "That which makes an idea arise. " In fact samjnd is a mental dharma, "idea," "notion," or "concept" (i. l4c-d); ndman is what "creates" or engenders this dharma.
312. This does not refer to pada as a declined or conjugated form (Panini, i. 4. 14).
313. One should consider the entire stanza as a pada:
anityd vata samskdrd utpddavyayadharminah / utpadya hi nirudhyante tesdm vyupas'amah sukhah //
that can be explained in different ways:
a. Thesis {pratijnd): "The samskdras are impermanent. " Argument (hetu): "because their
nature is to arise and to perish. " Example (drspdnta): "those things which, born, then die, are impermanent. "
b. The argument: "Their nature is to arise and to perish," is proven by the remark: "In fact, being born, they die. "
c. "The samskdras are impermanent, in other words, their nature is to be born and to perish;" "because, being born, they perish'" "being impermanent, they are suffering, thus the arresting of them is happiness:" this is what the Buddha intended to teach to his followers.
This is the stanza that Sakra uttered at the death of the Blessed One, Digha, TD 1, p. 26c21; Samyutta, i. 158; Dialogues, ii. 176; Jdtaka, 94; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 39; Manuscript Dutreuil de Rhins, /. As. 1898, ii. 300 (quoted in part, p. 108); Uddnavarga, 11; Mdo, 26, Anityatdsutra;]. Przyluski, Funerailles, p. 9.
314. A type of "nominal phrase. "
315. Ndman manifests (dyotaka) unique self characteristics (svalaksana)\ pada manifests the diverse relationships in which the thing whose self characteristic is known is to be found.
316. Compare Amarasirhha, iii. Nandrthavarga, 25.
317. That is to say: "given a voice, a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises" (vdci
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satydm sa cittaviprayukta utpadyate).
318. This means that "a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises with its vocal sound in the process of arising: the vocal sound manifests it with a view to designating an object" (ghosenotpadyamdnena sa cittaviprayukto dharma utpadyate / sa tarn prakdiayaty arthadyo- tanaya).
319. Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 266b9. Samyutta, i. 38: ndmasamni/ritd gdthd. Gdthd is a "phrase" (vdkya); it depends on words, since it exists when sounds have arisen. Consequently, wprd and phrase exist in and of themselves.
320. Mahavyutpatti, 245. 319, has the word krtdvadhi.
321. Panktivat, "like a line of ants;" but the different ants which form the line exist at the same
time; we shall give a new example, cittanupurvyavat, "like a succession of thoughts. "
322. The dharmas which are of the sphere of consciousness of the Tathagatas (tathdgata-
jfidnagocarapatita) are tarkagamya.
323. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 71c25-72a29.
324. Phonemes, etc. are not "voice" by their nature. Nothing prevents their existing in Arupyadhatu, but, as the voice is missing in this sphere of existence, they cannot be pronounced there. The Vaibhasikas: But how can you say that they exist where they are not pronounced?
325. The words that designate good dharmas are not themselves good, for when a person who has cut off the roots of good speaks of the good dharmas, he then possesses (prdpti) the words which designate these dharmas.
326. Hsiian-tsang corrects: The prdptis are of three types, ksanika (i. 38), outflowing, and retribution.
327. The Vydkhyd makes the following remarks: a. There is no difference between hetu and pratyaya- for the Blessed One said: dvau hetu dvau pratyayau samyagdrster utpdddya / katamau dvau / paratas ca ghoso'dhydtamam cayoniio manasikdrah. (Anguttara, i. 87: dve'me bhikkhave paccayd sammdditthiya uppdddya . .