No More Learning

That said, let us not forget Schleiermacher's own intimation - in the second Speech, the speech on which Hegel focuses his attention - that "we must learn to read between the lines. " Hegel's criticisms, like Jacobi's, are primarily concerned with what was going on between the
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lines or behind the veil of Schleiermacher's prose. With this in mind, I think that Hegel's criticism is as far-reaching as it is terse.
Hegel implicitly associates Schleiermacher with Jacobi insofar as Schleiermacher is associated with the fundamental principles of Protestantism: But is the truly Absolute, in Schleiermacher, as in Jacobi, an absolute Beyond in faith and in feeling? Is it nothing for cognitive reason? Is Schleiermacher all tangled up, along with Jacobi, in finitude? Did Schleiermacher, in the Speeches, like Jacobi, understand the eternal to be above or beyond the sphere of opposition, beyond the concept and the empirical (Hegel 1802b: 63)? Did Schleiermacher, in 1799, misled by his reading of Jacobi's misreading of Spinoza, and as part of an over-reaction to the Aufkla? rung, unjustly and paternalistically restrict the reach of reason [Vernunft] to the domain or dominions of the understanding [Verstand]? And is Schleiermacher, like Jacobi and Kant and Fichte, as alleged by Hegel, committed to an absolute antithesis between the finite and the infinite (1802b: 147)? Hegel takes the more obvious points of agreement between Schleiermacher and Jacobi for granted - namely, that nihilism is the admonitory lesson of idealism and that feeling is the highest form of interiority. 2
Hegel explicitly associates Schleiermacher with Jacobi in the following manner: First, because Jacobi's radical subjectivity is easily polluted with reflectivity and thus collapses in on itself, abandoning the beyond for the things of this world, Schleiermacher's more moderate subjectivity (a subjectivity tempered by intersubjectivity) achieves a higher pitch of intensity. Second, in Schleiermacher, much more than in Jacobi, the "deification of the subject [is] made into a more elevated object" (1802b: 149). Third, the "intuition of oneself and of the world [are] grasped in a more ideal [idealisch] way" in Schleiermacher than in Jacobi - i. e. , even
2 According to Jacobi, the honest transcendental idealist is forced to admit that "our senses teach us nothing of the qualities of things, nothing of their mutual relations and connections, they do not even teach us that, in a transcendental sense, things are actually there. This would be a sensibility that represented nothing at all of the things themselves, a sensibility that is decidedly empty of objective reference. Our intellect is supposed to connect with this sensibility in order to give radically subjective forms to radically subjective intuitions according to radically subjective rules. [. . . ] In that case I am everything and, properly speaking, nothing exists outside me. I, and everything of mine, am in the end also nothing but a mere delusion of something or other, the form of a form, [. . . ] a ghost" (1812-1825: II. 214-17).
? The Hegel-Schleiermacher Conflict 95
the highest intuition is turned into something subjective, something that remains private and personal. 3 Fourth, the quest of Protestantism for reconciliation in the here and now is achieved - in Schleiermacher - without stepping out of its character of subjectivity. Fifth, and last, that "even when the individual casts away his [or her] subjectivity, and the dogmatism of yearning dissolves its antithesis in idealism, still this Subject-Objectivity in the intuition of the universe [remains] something particular and subjective" in Schleiermacher (1802b: 150). Do these explicit associations have any basis in fact? One's answer to this question turns on what one means by "fact. " Hegel's association of Schleiermacher with Jacobi is part of a larger association; the reflective philosophies of subjectivity include not only Jacobi and Schleiermacher, of course, but Kant and Fichte as well.
4. 3 Schleiermacher at the Periphery
To what extent did Hegel misread or otherwise misrepresent Schleiermacher? That depends on how one reads Schleiermacher and, I think, equally, how one reads Hegel. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Hegel, at least to this point in his career, in 1802, actively ignored or otherwise evaded the speculative significance of the Speeches. But because Hegel, at least at this stage of his career, was often viewed as a mere apprentice to Schelling's genius, Hegel's alleged misunderstanding of his precursors - in this case, Schleiermacher and Jacobi - is itself something to be understood. In short, Hegel's alleged misreading is a philosophical interpretation; rather than a history of philosophy, Hegel is committed to a philosophy of history. Rather than merely rehearsing the thought of his precursors, Hegel intended to transform and complete them - and indeed, this is philosophical criticism as described in the programmatic introduction to the Critical Journal of which this 1802 essay is a part. Whether the association Hegel draws between Schleiermacher and Jacobi has any basis in fact, then, depends on whether Hegel's interpretation of the "reflective philosophies of subjectivity" has
3 Schleiermacher's philosophy, says Hegel, begins to compensate nature for the mishandling it received at the hands of the Critical philosophy: "Nature, as a collection of finite facts, is extinguished and acknowledged as the Universe" [i. e. , the identity of the jenseits and the diesseits]; because of this, "the yearning is brought back from its escape out of actuality into an eternal beyond, the partition between the cognitive subject and the absolutely unattainable object is torn down, grief is assuaged in joy, and the endless striving is satisfied in intuition" (Hegel 1802b: 150).
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any basis in fact. To view Hegel's reading of Schleiermacher as a misreading, therefore, misses the critical point of the Critical Journal and an essential feature of this "many-sided debate. "
But even if Hegel relegates Schleiermacher to the periphery of his analysis of his philosophical contemporaries, mentioning the Speeches en passant, and then only as a slight variation on Jacobi, Hegel must have been familiar with Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion by the time he wrote Glauben und Wissen. Hegel could have easily appropriated Schleiermacher along the lines of those proposed by Fackenheim in his God Within. But if that were the case, Schleiermacher would have been construed not as a variation on Jacobi but rather as a step beyond Fichte; but for Hegel, that honor belongs to Schelling. Following Fackenheim, Fichte represents a "historic breakthrough to God internalized, to the God within" (1996: 58). Though we will discuss Fichte in the following chapter, Fackenheim argues that whereas morality led to religion in Kant, the joy of moral activity constitutes religion in Fichte's system of idealism. For Schelling, at this same time, in 1800, the God within is found within art; and for Schleiermacher, the God within is found in the experience of the religious life. According to Fackenheim, who seems to understand the religious dimension of Hegel's thought as well as anyone, Hegel misunderstood Schleiermacher's assertion that religious experience is captured in the feeling of absolute dependence. "For Schleiermacher," claims Fackenheim, "to have reached this feeling [of absolute dependence] is to have gone beyond Fichte's self-activity: it is to have reached the ultimate" (1996: 59). What Fackenheim is claiming for Schleiermacher, namely, that he transcends Fichte's self-activity and reached the ultimate, is a speculative distinction that the critical journals reserved - as we shall see in the following chapters - for themselves. 4
4 The dialectical somersault from, say, Kant's 'transcendental realism' to Fichte's 'ethical idealism' and then to Schleiermacher's 'higher realism' if not also Schelling's 'realism-idealism' would have fit nicely into the program implemented in Glauben und Wissen. As Fackenheim turns it: "Divinity is present for this feeling, but it is not in it, let alone reducible to it, for the feeling is one of dependence, and this is on an Other. Schleiermacher therefore asserts a new 'realism. ' Rather than a lapse into the old, discredited realism, which is beneath Fichte's idealism, this is a realism beyond it. Divinity, to be sure, is present-as- other, but it is thus disclosed to the feeling of absolute dependence, and to it alone, and manifest as present only once Fichtean moral activity, which projects Divinity into the infinite future, is transcended. Fichtean idealism therefore paves for Schleiermacher the way for something higher still, a 'higher realism'" (1996: 59).
? CHAPTER FIVE
ON FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE IN FICHTE
As for myself qua subject-object, I am incomprehensible. Within experience, I divide myself into a subject and an object, which, to be sure, should [sollte] be thought of as originally one.
--Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, ? 17 (B419-20; D211).
Hegel's 1802 reading of Fichte is based largely on his reading of Die Bestimmung des Menschens [The Vocation of Man], which was published in 1799 as a popular if not polemical presentation of Fichte's 1794 Wissenschaftslehre. And Hegel's reading of Fichte was certainly influenced by Ho? lderlin and Schelling. Hegel appropriates Fichte's solution to the faith and reason debate by situating it within its dialectical if not also historical context: though Fichte is associated with Kant and Jacobi by Hegel as the third stage or Aufhebung within the paradigm of reflective philosophy, Fichte distinguishes himself from his dialectical siblings in terms of his synthesis of the objectivism of Kant and the subjectivism of Jacobi or Schleiermacher. Not altogether unlike Herder, who was caught between Kant and Hamann, Fichte attempts to reconcile the spirit of the Aufklarung with the faith and feeling of the Sturm und Drang.
According to Hegel's reading of the Bestimmung des Menschens (1800), Fichte's compromise - not unlike the solutions posed by Kant and Jacobi - underestimates the scope of reason and misidentifies the source of faith. Although Hegel's reading of the Bestimmung might be viewed as misleading, since the Bestimmung is itself polemical to such a degree that it surely misrepresents Fichte's larger enterprise, as anticipated in the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre but perhaps best articulated in his later manuscripts on Naturrecht, it is - I think - instructive nonetheless: Hegel's (mis-)reading of Fichte teaches us something important about Hegel in terms of his goals as well as his methods. And Hegel's (mis-)reading of Fichte may well have exercised some influence on Fichte's subsequent theory of inter-
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subjectivity and the social origins of consciousness. Hegel may have been right to suggest that Fichte and Jacobi are ultimately preoccupied with the same problem and that they are suggesting a similar solution, something that both Fichte and Jacobi animatedly denied. What Hegel sees as minor differences, Fichte and Jacobi saw as utterly irreconcilable. 1 And while Jacobi complained that Hegel misread or otherwise misrepresented him,2 Fichte never responded to Hegel's criticisms; indeed, claims Wayne Martin, in "In Defense of the Bad Infinite," Fichte "never publicly acknowledged their existence. " Despite Fichte's alleged "speculative failure," and the remaining residue of reflectivity, the Wissenschaftslehre is a triumph when viewed as an attempt to turn systemicity back upon itself and thereby stretch the reach of reason beyond the phenomenal realm. Fichte's deduction is, on this reading, an elaborate attempt "aus Reflektion hinauszureflektieren. "
5. 1 'Egregious Misinterpretations' of Fichte.
In Fichte's Jena Wissenschaftslehre, philosophy is presented as a whole in which the various parts are united by an Act [die Tat], an intellectual intuition which is "the singular or sole secure standpoint for all philosophy" [der einzige festige Standpunkt fu? r alle Philosophie] (Werke: I. 466) and, thinks Fichte, the sort of consciousness underlying the categorical imperative in Kant. The Jena WL was in large part written in response to what Breazeale calls "the egregious misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the aim and the content of the [Foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre]" (1988a: xi). Two of the more prominent of these alleged misunderstandings or misinterpretations were promulgated by or at least associated with Hegel and Jacobi. The fact that Jacobi's misunderstanding was painful to Fichte is all too clear from the sustained cordiality - an anomalous gesture in Fichte's career - that he extended toward Jacobi in his comments in the "Second Introduction"; it is also
1 Freud discusses the "narcissism of minor differences" in "The Taboo of Virginity" (1917), "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1922), and "Civilization and its Discontents" (1929). In the earliest essay Freud observes that "it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them. "
2 Jacobi objected to Hegel's reading in an essay titled "On Faith and Knowledge in Response to Schelling and Hegel" (1803), which was published as an appendix to Friedrich Ko? ppen's Schellings Lehre oder das Ganze der Philosophie des Absoluten Nichts. Nebst drei Briefen verwandten Inhalts von Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (Hamburg, 1803).
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clear from the conciliatory comments at the conclusion of the 'second dialogue,' the transition from 'Wissen' to 'Glauben,' in the Bestimmung des Menschens essay.
The alleged Hegelian misunderstanding runs something like this: In the Differenzschrift, which apparently provided the "decisive nudge" for Schelling's split with Fichte, Hegel argues that although Fichte succeeded in purifying further the principle of Kant's deduction of the categories and identify if not remove its "unthinking inconsistency" (Haldane and Simson, III, 481), the Wissenschaftlehre is ultimately a speculative failure; in order to tie up the speculative loose ends, Hegel says that Fichte resorts to a strategy characteristic of the reflective philosophies of subjectivity (or, as he puts it in the Pha? nomenologie, "edifying philosophy") - i. e. , "to introduce the Absolute into philosophy through the backdoor" (1802a: 369). 3 According to Hegel's Glauben und Wissen, "the Third that is truly the First and the Only One is not to be found in the system" (1802b: 170); the task of the third principle "simply cannot be performed" (1802b: 173). Hegel and Schelling agree that Fichte's system "knows only the knowing, but is not the knowing itself"; the speculative task consists in an Ausfu? hrung of Fichtean idealism. Hegel complains that "if we accept the popular conception of philosophy and make explanation our business, the most interesting side of the objective world, the side of its reality, remains [in Fichte] unexplained" (1802b: 154); in short, Hegel argues that "formal idealism does not alter the common and incomprehensible necessity of empirical existence in the slightest. " Adding insult to injury, the Fichtean philosophy is characterized as but a slight dialectical variation on the faith philosophy of Jacobi. Jacobi, on the other hand, is critical of the Wissenschaftslehre because it leads - in short and as is clear from his Jacobi an Fichte (1798) - to nihilism; granted, the charge of "nihilism" was part and parcel of Jacobi's rhetorical arsenal (i. e. , marshaled at various times against Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and - eventually - Hegel), but given Fichte's response, there is good reason to think that it was the charge
3 In the Vocation of Man (hereafter VOM), Fichte seems to concede that the way of knowledge leads to nihilism: "All earnestness and all reality are banished from my life; and life, as well as thought, is transformed into a mere play which proceeds from nothing and tends to nothing" (88). Moreover, "[k]nowledge is not [the means by which to grasp my vocation]; no knowledge can be its own foundation, its own proof; every knowledge presupposes another higher knowledge on which it is founded, and to this ascent there is no end. It is faith, that voluntary acquiescence in the view which is naturally presented to us, because only through this view can we fulfill our vocation" (88-89).
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which Fichte took most to heart. The simple juxtaposition of these two interpretations, i. e. , of Hegel at one extreme and Jacobi at the other, is startling; perhaps Fichte is partially justified in his suspicion that to the best of his knowledge, the Grundlage had been understood by almost no one.
5. 2 Fichte's Varied Deductions
According to Harris, it may well have been Schelling who first suggested to Fichte that the self-positing activity of the Ego displayed the structure of intellectual intuition described by Kant in the Critique of Judgment (see 1977: 4). But it was Fichte who insisted that intellectual intuition was "the only secure foundation or standpoint for all philosophy" ["intellektuelle Anschauung ist das einziges festiges Standpunkt fu? r alle Philosophie"] (W, I: 466). By philosophy, or at least philosophy worthy of the name, Fichte was thinking of a form of philosophy that "could measure itself against mathematics"; to accomplish that, however, meant removing the "unthinking inconsistencies" (e. g. , the dualism between receptivity and spontaneity) from the Kantian system. It is with this in mind that Hegel claimed, in the Differenzschrift, that while "the Kantian philosophy had proved unable to awaken Reason to the lost concept of speculation, Fichte's is the most thorough and profound speculation" (1801: 118). The Wissenschaftslehre constitutes Fichte's attempt to deduce, "out of the activity of this intellect, the manifold of specific presentations: of a world, of a material, spatially located world existing without our aid, et cetera, which notoriously occurs in consciousness" (WL, in Werke: I, 4, 200). Hegel agrees with Fichte that the speculative task consisted in providing a synthesis containing "the ground for the antithesis [i. e. , the sensuous manifold] within itself" (1802b: 130). Or as Pippen turns it, the task consists in showing that "the intellect's synthesizing activity is not, even in some highly complex, indirect way, a result of sensible receptivity" (1989: 45). In this speculative task, however, suggests Hegel, Fichte failed; but Hegel believes that Fichte's failure is instructive, perhaps even necessary.
The Fichtean system, though constantly evolving, with no fewer than sixteen different expositions of the first principles of his system (Breazeale, 1994: ix), strives to deduce the totality of empirical cognition from the activity of intellectual intuition - i. e. , to demonstrate how the Nicht-Ich, or "those representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity," arise from the free acts of the Ich. In his 1794
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Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte extracts - following Kant's transcendental method - three fundamental principles (Grundsa? tze) from the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. In the Foundations, Fichte says that critical philosophy or transcendental idealism - as opposed to dogmatism - "posits everything in the Ich" (I. 2, 279). 4 For Schelling, as well as for Fichte and Hegel, the speculative task consisted in showing how the Ich and the Nicht-Ich, "A and not-A, being and non-being, reality and negation, can be thought together without mutual elimination and destruction" (Schelling, I,, 2, 269). Fichte's answer to this problem is to say that they, the Ich and the Nicht-Ich, will mutually limit one another: "The self posits itself as determined by the not-self, Hence the self is not to determine but be determined, which the not-self is to determine, to set limits to the reality of the self. . . . But to say that the self determines itself as determined obviously amounts to saying that the self determines itself" (I, 2, 287). Elsewhere, Fichte says that to "the Ich, I oppose a divisible Nicht-Ich to a divisible Ich" (I. 110).
Fichte often claimed that his system had not yet been presented to the public in a worthy form. The publication of the New Presentation (1797- 1799), which was to appear in installments in the Philosophisches Journal, was delayed - subsequent to the initial installment - by the Atheismusstreit. The impact of the atheism controversy, which revolved around Jacobi's charge of nihilism in Jacobi on Fichte, changed Fichte's research agenda; according to Breazeale, "almost everything Fichte published during his first year in Berlin [1799], including the Vocation of Man, was designed not only to demonstrate the falsity of the charge of atheism, but also to reveal the deep confusion underlying Jacobi on Fichte" (1988a: xviii). This is important because Hegel treats the Vocation of Man, which offers a practical solution - a retreat to Kant's regulative "sollen" (see 5. 3, below) - to a theoretical or speculative question, as though it "set forth Fichte's philosophy in its totality as a system. " Hegel's reading of Fichte in Glauben und Wissen focuses almost exclusively on Fichte's least technical if not also popular presentations of his system: "On the Foundation of our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe"
4 It is with this in mind that Schelling and Hegel considered it important to "recompense nature for the mishandling it suffered at the hands of Kant and Fichte" (1801: 83). Indeed, Hegel was initially attracted to Schelling's system because, in Schelling's words, "he who has reflected on idealism and realism, the two most opposite theoretical systems, has found by himself that both can come to pass only in the approach to the absolute, yet that both must unite in the absolute, that is, must cease to become opposite systems" (I, 333).
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(1798) and the Vocation of Man. That said, Fichte's alleged "speculative failure" might have resulted, ultimately, from intrinsic rather than extrinsic - e. g. , the Atheismusstreit - difficulties. And it is also true that Fichte stressed - as early as the Foundations (1794/95) - the importance of examining the practical implications as well as presuppositions of criticism vis-a`-vis dogmatism as a means of resolving theoretical metaphysical disputes.
By the end of 1800, Fichte abandoned his hope of completing the New Presentation. Breazeale claims that "Fichte was beginning to have serious second thoughts about several features of his earlier presentation and was finding it increasingly difficult to assimilate to the form of the latter some of the new results he had arrived at working on The Vocation of Man" (1988a: xviii-xix). The desideratum of the "common ground," where the Ich and the Nicht-Ich can be thought together without annihilating one another, is considered to be - not unlike in Kant - "incomprehensible" [unbegreifliche]. Fichte ultimately concedes that "such a ground is incomprehensible, since it is not included under the basic principle thereof - namely, that the self posits itself as determined by the not-self; on the contrary, it is presupposed by that principle" (I, 2, 328). In his Neue Bearbeitung der Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte claims that from the idealistic starting point "there is no way of unifying the not-I and the I" (GA II, 5: 532).
By the time that Hegel and Schelling began work on the Critical Journal, Schelling and Fichte were corresponding only intermittently. In a letter addressed to Schelling in August of 1801, Fichte complained that Schelling still failed to "penetrate completely" the Wissenschaftslehre. In his earlier Letters, Schelling suggests:
By itself the Critique of Pure Reason is or contains the genuine theory of science or Wissenschaftslehre, for it is valid for all science. Nevertheless, science may lift itself to an absolute principle; indeed, it must do this if it is to become a system. But it is impossible for the Wissenschaftslehre to establish an absolute principle and thereby to become a system (in the narrow sense of the word), because it is supposed to contain within itself, not an absolute principle nor a determinate, completed system, but rather, the canon of all principles and systems (Werke, I, 304-305).
For Schelling, the task of delineating the "canon of all principles and systems" belongs to criticism, which investigates the nature of philosophy itself, as opposed to metaphysics, which provides a transcendental
On Faith and Knowledge in Fichte 103
explanation of the possibility of ordinary knowledge and experience (see Breazeale, 1988a: xx). As Hegel turns it, Fichtean philosophy "knows only the knowing, but is not the knowing itself" (1802b: 157). In his correspondence with Fichte, Schelling suggests that it is impossible for a science of all sciences to extend beyond those principles to the ground of those self-same principles; he also denies - even in the case of intellectual intuition - that the epistemological principles inherent in transcendental idealism can be transformed into a metaphysical system. Schelling agrees with Fichte, however, that intellectual intuition is the key to the development of a genuine philosophical system. But like Hegel, Schelling thought that Fichte's account of intellectual intuition was "a merely formal affair" (1802b: 154). In its popular formulation, in the Vocation of Man, the unity of the Ich and the Nicht-Ich is established in terms of religious faith; like Kant, Fichte acknowledged the limits of knowledge and the need for faith (see VOM: 88).
5. 2 Fichte and the Limits of Knowledge.
It is sometimes suggested that while morality merely leads to religion in Kant, "morality is religion" for Fichte. More precisely, writes Fackenheim,
. . . it is the 'joy' inherent in the moral agents' experience itself, produced by their awareness of having a share in the moral conquest of the world. The conquest is the "moral order of the world," and that order is God. The joy that is in moral activity is therefore nothing less than a share in God (1996: 57).
It was this interpretation of Fichte's philosophy of religion that led to the Atheismusstreit. But Fichte insisted that his philosophy aimed instead at retrieving God from the transcendent beyond [jenseits] to the God within [diesseits]. In this, at least, Hegel sees Fichte's "breakthrough" as genuinely speculative rather than merely reflective. But while we encounter glimpses of the speculative Idea in Fichte, whether in the Wissenschaftslehre or the Vocation of Man, it is not as something that exists, but rather as "something which we ought [sollen] to, but yet cannot achieve" (Werke, I: 100). Hegel had already dealt with the Wissenschaftslehre in the Differenzschrift, but the emphasis in the earlier essay was placed on Fichte's refinement of the transcendental unity of apperception; though Hegel treats Fichte as an improvement on Kant's deduction of the categories, Fichte is compared unfavorably to Schelling's emerging system. By the time that he was working on Faith and Knowledge, Hegel was able to point to the Vocation of Man as a slight variation on the
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Kantian reconciliation of faith and knowledge. Hegel claims that "Fichte acknowledges that the sole truth and certainty, that is, pure self- consciousness and pure knowing, are incomplete, are conditioned by something else; or in other words, that the Absolute of the system is not absolute, and that for this reason we must go on to something else" (1802b: 157). This "something else" is the manifold of the determinate Nicht-Ich, that is, the counterpart of the indeterminate Ich, which allegedly exists "outside of me, something which does not owe its existence to me. "
In the second part of the Vocation of Man, i. e. , the stage of doubt and self-knowledge, the philosophical protagonist claims to have achieved what he set out to accomplish - namely, freedom from his bondage in the chains of empirical necessity; he achieves this in the recognition that - in words reminiscent of the Wissenschaftslehre - "the self posits itself as determined by the not-self. " Elated, the protagonist reiterates that "the consciousness of any thing outside us is absolutely nothing more than the product of our own representative faculty [and] the Spirit declares 'I' to be free and delivered forever from the fear that humiliated and tortured him, free from a necessity which exists only in his thought and from the reality of things existing outside him" (Werke, II, 341); in response to this popular presentation of transcendental idealism, Hegel quips: "As if here were not in one and the same prison of his own condition, subject to the same necessity as before. " Apparently conceding Jacobi's charge of nihilism, though defending himself against the implication of atheism, Fichte concludes the second section of the Bestimmung des Menschens with the dialogical protagonist's forlorn complaint that "nothing now exists, nothing but representations, that is, determinations of a consciousness as mere consciousness. " In a comment aimed more at Jacobi than Fichte, Hegel glosses on this passage in the Vocation of Man by saying that it "is not for what it took away, but for the whole range of finitude which it left him that Fichte's 'I' could fairly call the Spirit profligate" (1802b: 164).
Fichte's idealism represents, for Hegel, a sustained and systematic but ultimately flawed attempt to demonstrate how specific presentations (e. g. , "of a world, of material, spatially located, existing without our aid, et cetera") emerge from the primordial, absolutely unconditioned self- positing act of the Self. The task, thinks Hegel, is genuinely speculative; the solution, however, is decidedly non-speculative (i. e. , it resorts to Reflexionsphilosophie and the backdoor of a Glaubensphilosophie).
Setting out from the intuiting subject, and the identity principle, Fichte
On Faith and Knowledge in Fichte 105
attempted to discover - borrowing Kant's phrase - "a common, but to us unknown, root" (KRV, A15/B29), whence springs the delimiting object as well as the self-positing subject. But in Fichte, this common source or ground is "incomprehensible, since it is not included under the basic principle thereof, viz. , that the self posits itself as determined by the not- self"5 and thus "a ground of that kind, if it is to be identified at all, would have to lie outside the boundaries of the theoretical Doctrine of Knowledge" (Werke, I,2: 328). This "absolute confluence," as Schelling called it in the Deduction of the Universal Organ of Philosophy (1800: 207), extends beyond the scope of the Wissenschaftslehre; and within the confines of Fichte's speculative system, thinks Hegel, the theoretical deduction "simply cannot be performed" (1802b: 173). This common ground, i. e. , "the Third that is truly the First and the Only One is not to be found in [Fichte's] system" (1802b: 170), is incompletely comprehended by acquiescence only by means of faith. But if the system cannot perform the task for which it was designed, thinks Hegel, "the whole apparatus of this theoretical idealism is nothing but a construct of logical forms, in abstraction from all content" (1802b: 170) or "nothing but the transformation of signs, of the minus sign into a plus sign" (1802b: 157). In short, "formal idealism does not alter the common and incomprehensible necessity of empirical existence in the slightest" (1802b: 156).
5. 4 Faith in the Bestimmung des Menschens
Whereas the Wissenschaftslehre concludes with a candid admission the roots from which our knowledge springs are theoretically incomprehensible, the Bestimmung des Menschens - published while he was in the throes of the Atheismusstreit and presented as a popular exposition of Fichte's system - provides an extra-theoretical solution to the "incomprehensibility problem. " Written as a dialogue, the first conversation presents the thesis of the dogmatist, or materialist, the second expresses the antithesis, i. e. , idealism, and the last conversation - or Third - aims at a synthesis or practical solution; the third phase of the dialogue, titled "Faith," is animated by an apparently unsettling consequence of the adopted idealist
5 In ? 17, which is prefaced with the gentle warning that "hier mangelt die Sprache", Fichte writes: "This act of self-determining [of apprehending oneself] is the absolute beginning of all life and of all consciousness (and all activity), and - for just this reason - it is incomprehensible, for our consciousness always presupposes something. As we saw above, our consciousness cannot grasp its own beginning; instead it always discovers itself in the midst [of its own conscious activity], where the beginning must be presupposed" (B414; D208).
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system, namely, that the world in which we live is "absolutely nothing but presentations - modes of consciousness, and of consciousness only . . . the shadow of a reality; in itself it cannot satisfy me and has not the smallest worth" (VOM: 76). This passage echoes Jacobi's charge - in his Open Letter to Fichte - that thoroughgoing idealism constitutes of form of nihilism. To this complaint, the Spirit replies "all knowledge is only pictures, representations; and there is always something wanting in it - that which corresponds to the representation. This want cannot be supplied by knowledge; a system of knowledge is necessarily a system of mere pictures, wholly without reality, significance, or aim. Did you expect anything else? " (VOM: 81-82). This concession, that there is always something wanting in our knowledge, is at the heart of Hegel's critique of Fichte's system:
Because of its absolute deficiency the completely empty principle from which he begins has the advantage of carrying the immediate necessity of self-fulfilment immanently within itself. . . The necessity rests upon the principle's being nothing but a part and upon its infinite poverty being the infinite possibility of wealth (1802b: 157).
As an exercise in what Hegel elsewhere calls "edifying philosophy," Fichte is able to console the dissatisfied idealist by assuring him or her that our vocation is not merely to know but also to act. "When I act," the Spirit claims, "I doubtless know that I act, and how I act; nevertheless this knowledge is not the act itself, but only the observation of it" (VOM: 84). For Fichte, not unlike Kant, the solution is more a matter of 'will' than 'cognition': "This voice thus announces to me precisely that which I sought - something lying beyond mere knowledge and, in its nature, wholly independent of knowledge" (ibid. ). The ethical ideal or "law of holiness" consists in achieving a confluence of will or desire and duty; the speculative ideal consists in thinking the absolute confluence of the subject and the object. 6 Although these ideals are "unattainable by any creature,"
6 In ? 18 (B430; D217), Fichte tells us that "[t]here is here a conflict between, on the one hand, the expressions we employ and the way we necessarily have to view [what we are describing] and, on the other, the topic we want to think about. . . . Try as we might, we can never exhaust our investigation of the primary synthesis. Consequently, we could never intuit what is determinate and the determining subject as one and the same, for they are separate within this synthesis. . . . For us, therefore, they will always remain discrete and separate. . . . To think of them as one and the same is no more than a task. . . . Thus when we say here that what is determinate and the act of determining are one and the same, this simply means that we are able to think of the rule (or the task) in accordance with which we
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writes Kant, "it is yet an archetype which we should strive to approach and to imitate in an uninterrupted progress" (Grundlage: 86). Following Kant, Fichte claims that acting is distinct from knowing: whereas the former is performed according to conceptions of design or purpose (i. e. , "as types of something yet to be"),7 the latter is preoccupied with representing that which already exists.
For Fichte, similar to Kant, or at least for the progenitor of the dialogue, "practical reason is the root of all reason" (VOM: 99) and "through the edict of conscience alone, truth and reality are introduced into my conceptions" (VOM: 94). Unless our moral conscience is for naught, in which case the summons is merely an exercise of our faculties within an empty system of pictures, then the purpose to which we are summoned "shall, must be realized. " In a world of mechanistic necessity, or dogmatism, suggests Fichte, "the whole of human existence is nothing but an idle game without significance and without end" (VOM: 106). It is in view of our moral calling that human understanding finds its true dignity, one might say, and it is with these moral purposes in mind that knowledge finds its complement in faith. This "practical turn" has consequences also for one's conception of nature, which is construed in terms of our moral vocation, which consists less in knowing than in acting, nature is construed as "that on which I have to act" (VOM: 93). Nature, one might suppose, at this stage in the argument, is nothing but a requisite obstacle to one's moral purposes; "[m]y world is the object and sphere of my duties, and absolutely nothing more" (VOM: 96). According to Hegel, Fichte's conception of nature is "in theory just a non-ego, something merely negative, defined as the opposite in general. " As if by impulse, or a "gift of insight," our human vocation - and there are at least six formulations of the vocation, the most general of which summons us to listen to the voice within - is disclosed to us; but because this summons is incomprehensible
would have to proceed if we were able to think them as one. The case is the same with the original I = the subject-object. This is incomprehensible to me, and the reason for this lies within my own finitude. The only way I can think of this I = X is to think of the task of obtaining a concept of this X--a task that can be stated as follows: 'Think of the rule in accordance with which you would have to proceed if it were possible to think of X. ' . . . Therefore, once again, all we can do is simply propose this as a task. Everything else is obtainable [within consciousness], because everything else is accomplished within experience. "
7 "The conception of a purpose," writes Fichte, "a particular determination of events in me, appears in a double shape: partly as subjective, a thought, and partly as objective, an action" (VOM: 87).
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to human understanding, "faith lends sanction to knowledge. " Because the moral law within must be obeyed, writes Fichte, but following Kant, "we are compelled to assume a certain sphere for this action" (VOM: 98). On the basis of practical or moral reasoning, there is indeed "something beyond mere presentations. " Whereas idealism concedes that things-in- themselves are incomprehensible,8 the moral idealist says: "Whatever these beings may be in and for themselves, you shall [sollen] act toward them as self-existent, free, substantive beings, wholly independent of yourself. Thus I ought to act; by this course of action all my thought ought to be guided" (VOM: 95). When asked whether the world exists as I represent it to myself, one ought to respond by saying:
Our consciousness of a reality external to ourselves is not rooted in the operation of supposed external objects, which indeed exist for us, and we for them, insofar as we already know of them; nor is it an empty vision evoked by our imagination and thought, the products of which must, like itself, be mere empty pictures; it is rather the necessary faith in our freedom and power, in our own real activity, and in the definite laws of human action, which lies at the root of all our consciousness of a reality beyond ourselves (VOM: 98).
Compelled by conscience, and adopted as a regulative principle, we are obliged - writes Fichte - to believe in a "real, actual present world" in which "[others are], and that you are, that there is a medium through which you can influence [one another]. " The kingdom of ends formulation of the categorical imperative in Kant, or the vocation of persons in Fichte, entails an infinite if asymptotic striving toward a convergence of ideality and reality or the actualization of what ought to be the case. 9 This conviction or non-speculative knowledge of the actual world emerges from the necessity of action; and action, which is carried out according to design and purpose, is animated by inner convictions that are
8 In one of his most telling of his reflections on comprehending the incomprehensible, Fichte claims - in WL ? 17 (B419-20; D211) - that "[t]he entire structure of the I is based on the act of determining and what is determined. I-hood consists in the division of the I into a subjective and an objective [I]. This is the fundamental law. When I become conscious of I-hood, a split occurs between the ideal and the real, which are originally one. What is real or objective is, in turn, both a determining agency and something determinate. "
9 In the Phenomenology, Hegel suggests that "what only ought to be without [actually] being has no truth. The instinct of reason . . . refuses to be led astray by figments of thoughts which only ought to be and, as oughts, are credited with truth, although they are nowhere met within experience" (151).
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incomprehensible to theoretical reason. And, alas, Fichte says: "I will not suffer myself to entertain the desire of pressing this conviction on others by reasoning, and I will not be surprised if such an undertaking should fail. I have adopted my mode of thinking first of all for myself, not for others, and before myself only will I justify it. He who possesses the honest, upright purpose of which I am conscious will also attain similar conviction; without the purpose, the conviction can in no way be attained" (VOM: 98).
Fichte's speculative project of constructing "a scientific philosophy, one which can measure itself against mathematics" and whose success seemed "already good as assured" in 1794 had been altered considerably, drastically even, by the time that Fichte published his popular account - which was "not intended for professional philosophers" - in the Bestimmung des Menschens; but from another perspective, it seems accurate to say, as Fichte does in the Foreword, that one "will find nothing [in the Vocation of Man] that has not been already set forth in other writings of the same author. " As early as the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte thought that "the opposites must be united, so long as opposition remains, until absolute unity is effected: a thing, indeed - as will appear in due course - which could be brought about only by a completed approximation to infinity which itself is impossible" (I. 116). And indeed, Fichte's strategy in "ber der Grund unsers Glaubens an eine Go? ttliche Weltregierung" (1798) is perfectly consistent with what he re-enacts in the Vocation of Man essay. The difficulties of dogmatism, writes Fichte, "vanish if we adopt the transcendental standpoint. There is then no longer an independent world: everything is now simply a reflection of our inner activity" (1798: 21). Elsewhere: "Our moral vocation is therefore itself the outcome of a moral attitude and it is identical with our faith; one is thus quite right in maintaining that faith is the basis of all certainty" (1798: 22). This faith, claims Fichte, is intrinsically true and evident - "it is not based on or conditioned by any other truth, but on the contrary all other truths are conditioned by it. " Though Fichte says that "this logical order is frequently overlooked," Hegel makes it the crux of his critique: philosophy is surrendered - in Fichte as in Kant and Jacobi - to faith. Granted, Fichte is concerned here with the "true religion of joyful morality" rather than the exposition of his system, with certainty rather than knowledge, per se, but he does seem to suggest - as Hegel interprets him to say - that "transcendental theory teaches that the world is nothing but the sensuous appearance, given according to intelligible rational laws, of our own inner activity, our own intelligence operating with boundaries
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that must remain incomprehensible [as far as their origin is concerned]" (1798: 24).
5. 5 Hegel's (Mis-)Reading of Fichte
One of the things that "everyone should be learning" about recent Fichte scholarship, writes Breazeale, is that many of the deeply entrenched "truisms" that have guided and continued to guide the scholarship are egregiously misleading (1996; also, Seidel 1998). The textbook version of Fichte's wild exaggeration of Kant's principle of the "primacy of practical reason" and reliance on a Sollen, or the task of striving toward an unattainable ideal, to solve otherwise "theoretically insurmountable problems" constitutes - suggest Breazeale and Seidel - an egregious misreading of Fichte; at least in part, the alleged misreading constitutes the backbone of Hegel's interpretation of Fichte in Glauben und Wissen. 10 And while Hegel's reading of Fichte merits more scholarly attention, and while it may be true that Hegel misread or otherwise misunderstood Fichte, Hegel's reading in Glauben und Wissen should be explored within the context of the central interpretative thesis: "The fundamental principle common to the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte," writes Hegel, "is the absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antithesis of finitude and infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and the supersensuous, and the beyondness of what is truly real and absolute. " From a religious point of view, these philosophers embody "the principle of Protestantism" (1802b: 57). These reflective philosophies of subjectivity form a dialectical triad, more or less, which exhausts the inherent principle entirely: Kant illustrates the objective standpoint, Jacobi represents the subjective antithesis, and Fichte posits a synthesis of both (1802b: 62). Fichte serves as a case in point, an exemplar of the species and an admonitory lesson apropos the reflective philosophy of subjectivity.
10 Hegel's early critique of Fichte's system, or at least the system sketched in the Bestimmung des Menschens, focuses on the architectonics of the system, which Hegel considered to be artificially formal and ultimately empty, the remaining reflective dualisms, the suspension of which is the sole purpose of reason (1801: 90), his maltreatment of Nature (i. e. , his "physiotheology" as opposed, say, Schelling's philosophy of nature under the auspices of the an Identita? tsphilosophie) and, most importantly, Fichte's cowardly retreat into Glaubensphilosophie if not also Schwa? rmerei.
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Hegel claims that Fichte's treatment of intellectual intuition was "merely a formal affair" (1802b: 154) and thus "the Absolute of the system is not absolute at all" (1802b: 157). Hegel's critique of Fichte may well have been designed to make room for his own system. And in this respect, suggest his critics, Hegel provides us with little more than a caricature of Fichte's system, which is unfair to Fichte; at his worst, Hegel, following Schlegel, went so far as to describe Fichte as a Pharisee. But Hegel's appropriation of this strain in Fichte serves as a case in point within a larger philosophical thesis. The general drift of Hegel's critique probably served as a corrective to an emerging philosophical tendency in post-Kantian philosophy. As part of an overarching thesis of Glauben und Wissen, Hegel exploits the vulgar or popular formulations and represses the philosophically sophisticated insights - especially those, one might suppose, that were most influential to Hegel's own fledgling philosophical system. It is conspicuous that Hegel limits his reading to the most popular if not romantic formulation of the "summons to moral autonomy," or the "solicitation [Aufforderung] to freedom," inherent in our sacred "vocation as persons," i. e. , listening and obeying the inner voice of conscience, to the comparatively brilliant and subtle formulations provided within Fichte's earlier formulations of his system; Hegel was certainly aware of Fichte's formulation of Anerkennung [recognition] in the Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (1796; SW, III, 51). (In this regard, one could say the same thing of Hegel's reading of Jacobi. ) According to Pinkard, "[t]he solicitation to effective freedom of which Fichte speaks - the ability both to form normative commitments and to perform the appropriate actions in light of those commitments - is thus, as Fichte explains, "what one calls education [Erzeihung], that is, a social activity in which other agents 'solicit' an agent to such freedom" (2002: 121). The Bestimmung des Menschens entails, ultimately, the Erzeihung des Menschens. 11
The decisive speculative synthesis, the Hauptsynthesis, writes Hegel, cannot be performed or otherwise enacted according to empty Fichtean formulae; still worse, Hegel treats these formulae as though it were "nothing but the transformation of signs" (1802b: 157). Although Fichte takes us some distance in the direction of a genuinely speculative
11 This theme of Erzeihung and Bildung was certainly in the air, so to speak, during the Jenaer Zeit from Fichte through Hegel: the answers varied from Goethe's Bildungsromaene to Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and also Rousseau, who was especially influential on Hegel during the years leading to Jena from Tu? bingen and Berne (see Pinkard: 89 ff. ).
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confluence, which takes the form of a divisible Ich and a divisible not-Ich that mutually limit one other, the speculative task collapses into a superficially pious confession of incomprehensibility: the "Third that is truly the First and the Only One" is an impenetrable secret. For Hegel, however, the absolute confluence of the real and the ideal is comprehensible, to greater or lesser degrees, by means of a speculative appropriation of reflective understanding. Taken together, Hegel argues that "Fichte's theoretical philosophy consists in the cognition of the lack and of the manifold which is lacking" (1802b: 162). For Hegel, it seems, the recognition of "deficiency" or "that which is lacking" is itself only possible by means of the idea of totality; Hegel also seems puzzled that this implicit "totality," the measure against which our knowledge is demonstrated to be incomplete or otherwise lacking, does not itself step forth as the Absolute of the system (1802b: 159).
Although Fichte is depicted as "merely highlighting Kant's critical idealism" (1802b: 154) throughout much of Hegel's early critique in Glauben und Wissen, Fichte is also criticized for positing an absolutely hollow and lifeless as well as an "utterly vulgar" conception of nature. Nature is reduced, writes Hegel, to little or nothing more than "the sensation of the empirical subject" in Fichte since it is only by an act of the will that the empirical world receives it veracity:
Because the idealistic side decrees itself to be absolute, what it nullifies must re-emerge as absolute. If empirical reality, the sense world, did not have the whole strength of its being the opposite, Ego would not be Ego; it could not act, its high vocation would be gone (1802b: 175).
The Ich and the Nicht-Ich, in Fichte if not also in Kant, represent - argues Hegel - the antipodes of reflective philosophy; linguistically, they function as polar concepts (i. e. , each is defined in terms of its opposite). At least within the Bestimmung des Menschens, where the Ich is constituted in terms of free and active opposition to the impact [Anstoss] of the Nicht- Ich, claims Hegel, the Nicht-Ich takes on the hue of something "devoid of all truth, bearing the law of ugliness and irrationality in it" - that is, as something merely "to be nullified. " Although he does seem to concede that Fichte has a more vibrant formulation of nature - "an earlier teleology" in which nature served "as an expression of eternal truth" - elsewhere, Hegel is nevertheless willing to say that Fichte's "view is one which is denuded of all Reason, for the absolute identity of subject and object is entirely alien to it, and its principle is their absolute non-identity" (1802b: 176).
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The critical journalists thought that genuine philosophy, i. e. , speculative philosophy and criticism,12 deals with the actual presence of the Absolute - i. e. , the Idee, not merely as a regulative ideal, as an ought, as something that should obtain, but rather as "concrete[ly] and strictly present. " Rather than the non-identity of the subject and object, or the Ich and the Nicht- Ich, or the infinite and finite, or the supersensible and the sensible, Hegel is seeking an identity within which the antithesis "vanishes altogether" (1802b: 112). But if the real and true resides beyond [jenseits] the sphere of knowledge, as it does for Fichte as well as Kant and Jacobi, where absolute identity is "transferred to the future, a temporal beyond that we do not inhabit," then the truths of reason and the truths of faith are theoretically irreconcilable; rather than a reconciliation between faith and reason, the reflective philosophers of subjectivity settled, each on their own terms but amounting to the same thing, for a practical truce and a temporarily edifying outcome. As an exercise in "edifying philosophy," Fichte offers a practical solution to this otherwise insoluble theoretical problem (i. e. , the non-identity of the subject and object). In each of the reflective philosophers of subjectivity, however, Kant and Fichte as well as Jacobi and Schleiermacher, knowledge or finite cognition is only explicable - ultimately, immediately in Jacobi and remotely in Kant - in terms of faith. In spirit, if not also in letter, Hegel reads Fichte as but a slight dialectical variation on the Glaubensphilosophie inherent in both Kant and - especially - Jacobi:
Jacobi opposes Fichte's philosophy on the grounds that 'what I [Jacobi] understand by the true is something prior to and outside of knowledge. ' But on this point Fichte's philosophy is in full agreement with Jacobi's. The Absolute exists for it in faith alone, not in cognition, Fichte is very far from sinning, as Jacobi claims [in the Preface to his Letter, viii], against 'the majesty of the place' where the true resides outside the range of knowledge, nor does he want to 'include it within the sphere of science. ' On the contrary, absolute identity is, for him, quite outside the sphere of knowledge (1802b: 167-168).
For Kant as well as Jacobi and Fichte, though Hegel thinks that Jacobi misreads Fichte on this point, the absolute identity "exists in faith alone. "
12 Genuine philosophy, writes Hegel, in retrospect, but still brooding on Fichte, "does not waste time with such empty and otherworldly stuff. What philosophy deals with is always something concrete and strictly present" (EL, 149-150). Making a similar point in the Phenomenology, Hegel claims that genuine philosophy "refuses to be led astray by figments of thought which only ought to be and, as 'oughts,' are credited with truth" (1806: 151).
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For Fichte, says Hegel, it is only through our moral vocation that the true or real "steps forth out of the abstraction of knowledge and into the . . . glory of its full vitality" (1802b: 171). At his best, Fichte acknowledges a practical summons toward an absolute identity that ought [sollen] to occur: "but this ought," suggests Hegel, "always implies impotence. " Hegel claims that Fichte's retreat from the sphere of knowledge entails the "absolute finitude of the subject and action, with a sense-world over against it that is devoid of Reason and must be nullified; and finally a super-sensuous world absolutely opposed to the sense-world and dispersed into an infinity of intellectual elements" (1802b: 187).
CHAPTER SIX
RESUSCITATING THE CORPSE OF FAITH AND REASON
Fackenheim was certainly not far off the mark when he suggested, in The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought, that 'theologians have never taken Hegel seriously" (1967: 119). The exception to this rule, more often than not, at least in America, comes from those theologians who treat Hegel as posing a threat to what they consider to be most sacred. And yet Hegel's entire philosophical system could - and perhaps should - be read as fundamentally theological in its orientation, since it is preoccupied to the extreme with God construed as 'the Absolute. ' Indeed, the inspirational economy behind the aphorism for which Hegel is best known, i. e. , that 'the truth is the whole,' was at least initially a theological ideal in which God was conceived of as 'an eternal desire for self- revelation' [eine ewige Begierde sich zu offenbaren]. 1
According to Oetinger, '[t]he Ancients saw God as an eternal process in which He emerges from Himself and returns to Himself; this is the true conception of God and of His Glory; it is the true conception of His infinite life and power which issues in the Blessed Trinity. '2 The spirit of the absolute, or the absolute spirit, is what Oetinger called an Intensum: 'a complex whole that dissolves when it is divided into its constituent elements. ' The problem of how to understand the whole without dissecting it, and thus changing its nature from organic to inorganic, from something alive to something distorted if not dead, was the task of Hegel's system and method. For Oetinger, the Zentrallerkenntnis consists in 'an unmediated, synoptic vision in which the mind momentarily sees existence
1 Oetinger, Biblisches und emblematishces Wo? rterbuch (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1969), as quoted in Magee, 65
2 Quoted in Hanratty, 'Hegel and the Gnostic Tradition,' II, 314; see Chapter 1. 7, above.
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through the eyes of God. '3 The relation of the finite to the infinite, in Oetinger as well as in Hamann and Boehme, is explicable in terms of the 'ewige Selbstbewegung' of God. 4 This principle of an all-embracing and eternally self-animating 'Absolute' is central to Hegel's own - largely still unarticulated or merely implicit in 1802 - speculative reconciliation of faith and knowledge.
6. 1 "Das Wahre ist das Ganze"
Bergson occasionally suggested, as did Heidegger, that strong philosophers are preoccupied to the extreme with a singular yet inexhaustible thought, an ide? e fixe, and the accompanying ideal of expressing or otherwise presenting that idea consistently, completely and coherently. Perhaps the idea in service of which Hegel worked so diligently to express, the string upon which he strummed, time and again, with cadenced pathos, is captured best in his preface to the Phenomenology (1807):5
The true is the whole [Das Wahre ist das Ganze]. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result that only in the end is it what it truly is .