No More Learning

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Although the texts show a keen interest in the orient, there is not one aspect of Chinese thought that is dealt with exhaustively. even though these texts tell us less about China than about Hegel's philosophy, they nevertheless need to be taken seriously. it would be too easy to conclude that Hegel's account of Chinese thought represents a pure regress com- pared to the Jesuit fathers, and to leibniz, Wolff and goethe. studying the texts leads to a more nuanced conclusion. Yes, there is regress in some respects, but in others, Hegel can be said to have carved out a sui generis position in the receptionhistory, which is worth being studied.
2. orientation
Hegel's study of oriental religion and philosophy (Religion of Ancient China, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. ) only starts in the 1820's. 2 With respect to China, his foremost source is the Jesuit Me? moirs concernant les Chi- nois (1776-1814). For his knowledge of Taoism he is mainly dependent on Abel Re? musat, Me? moire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu (1823). 3 Until 1824, these exploits do not effect his overall classification of religions: The religion of ancient China remains subsumed under the 'nature religions', within which category it represents the rubric of 'the religion of magic'. However, from 1827 on the picture starts to change. As Jaeschke puts it, then Hegel's approach to the pre-Christian religions comes closer to a 'sequence of interpretations' than to the application of a rigid system. Although in 1827 the religion of ancient China is still classified as magical, it now represents a 'developed religion of magic'. eventually, in 1831, all links between China and nature religions are severed. 4
one peculiarity needs to be pointed out at this stage, the lack of a sharp demarcation between religion and philosophy. Where the texts show a preference for 'religion', it is because (as we will see) the category of 'phi- losophy' in a strict sense is not applicable to China and to the (broader) oriental world, since philosophy presupposes a measure of freedom unknown to the orient. This explains why Hegel in his own expositions shows preference for 'religion' as a term with a broader application than
2 Cf. Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, stuttgart: Metzler 2003, p. 461.
3 see Hodgon's editorial introduction to g. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, Peter Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1988, p. 43.
4 Cf. Hodgson, 'editorial introduction' in: Hegel, The Lectures of 1827, pp. 40-46, and Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, pp. 461-2.
? hegel on chinese religion 23
'philosophy'. nevertheless, there is no watertight division between religion and philosophy. The religion of Ancient China is being interpreted and assessed throughout as if it were an aspirant philosophy. Clearly, Hegel's interest is in doctrines, in thought contents, and less in religious rites and customs (although he does deal with these in the pertinent sections of the Lectures on World History). Finally, the texts also use 'philosophy' in a non-emphatic sense. This is true for general references to 'oriental phi- losophy', 'Chinese philosophy', etc. Here Hegel simply follows common designations.
3. Three stages
Hegel's survey of Chinese religion opens with what he calls 'the state reli- gion of the Chinese empire'. it comprises the religious practices and doc- trines as reconstructed on the basis of the (quite heterogeneous) materials collected in the Shujing (the Book of Annals), and includes the teachings of Confucius. only around 1827 does he gain knowledge of Taoism, mainly through Re? musat's study. He then starts to distinguish three stages in the development of Chinese thought. The first stage being the 'state religion', the second one being represented by Taoism, and the third one by Bud- dhism. With respect to the latter, there is no distinction between indian and Chinese Buddhism. in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the survey of Chinese philosophy proper closes with a section on the Yi Jing (Vorl. 6, 371-3). systematically those are at the level of the second stage, and will be included here accordingly.
laozi, whom he regards as an older contemporary of Confucius, is portrayed as a reformer of a much older Taoist 'sect'. This second stage entails a shift from a nature religion to a higher, more speculative form of thought. Thus, it is not Taoism that is classified as a religion of nature, but the state religion. normally the latter is viewed as essentially moral (esp. in its Confucian shape), and the former as focussing on nature rather than on a moral order. The explanation is that Hegel takes Heaven (tian), the central concept of the state religion, to refer mainly to the physical order, rather than to the moral order. Whereas, on the other hand, he holds that Taoism represents a higher, purer level in the development of thinking. Hegel discovers here the beginning of speculative thought. As we will see, his interest is drawn by what he takes to be vestiges of Trinitarian thought in certain texts.
The treatment of the Yi Jing resembles the approach to Taoism. Hegel appreciates its speculative interest as to the order of the cosmos, which
24 sander griffioen
he considers as a major progress vis-a`-vis Confucius' moral teachings. However, no matter how speculative its intentions, the outcome is found wanting. Hegel thinks the hexagrams of the Yi Jing are not equipped as a medium of thought and are only able to grasp the external order of things.
it is only in the third stage, represented by Buddhism that oriental reli- gion is thought to reach its apex. Buddhist thought is praised for having developed the concept of the one substance in which all particularities and individualities submerge. Here thinking attains infinity, liberating itself from all attachment to finite life. in this respect Buddhist thought is on a par with spinoza's philosophy. (l2 27, 564/461; 573-574/470-471)
4. state Religion
let us take a closer look at each of the stages. The first stage is most exten- sively dealt with in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Although, as mentioned before, tian (Heaven) is assumed to connote primarily nature, these lectures do stress that ancient teachings are moral and social rather than anything else. This shows that China does not neatly fit Hegel's sys- tematization. 'Magic' is another category that appears strangely out of place in the present context. on first hearing, one is inclined to think it is introduced to account for the fascination China exerted on an impress- ible european public. in fact, the reason for its use is quite different: it is because tian is thought to be entirely indeterminate and therefore for its content dependent on the whims of the rulers. Just as in more primi- tive religions of magic, such as found among the inuit, magicians and conjurers (l2 27, 541/439) play an essential role in finding out the will of Heaven, China developed a system of divinations placed under the supervision of high state officials, the mandarin class. According to Hegel, this state religion lacks any form of rationality. 'The emperor is lord over the visible world of the mandarins just as he is over the invisible shen. ' (l2 27, 555/453)
The descriptions of the shen (spirits) make clear that Hegel focuses on the chthonic aspect of Chinese ancient religion, viz. the local genii (Vorl. 12, 162), at the expense of the ouranic, heavenly aspects. 5 Therefore,
5 Raguin (following the research conducted by Kristoffer schipper) has shown that official religion focused on the Dao of Heaven whereas popular religion was primarily interested in local, terrestrial spirits: cf. Yves Raguin, Lec? ons sur le taoi? sme, Taipei: institut Ricci, 1989, pp. 119-121.
? hegel on chinese religion 25
it is only logical for him to assume that the common people are not able to develop an outlook transcending their own localities and hence can- not but fall prey to all sorts of superstition once the emperor recedes. 'The Chinese are the most superstitious people of the world; they have a ceaseless fear and anxiety of everything, because everything external has a significance for them, is a power over them . . . ' (l2 27, 561/458). in a similar vein the 1831 manuscripts read: 'This power is that of the shen, and with this an enormous realm of superstition comes into play. ' (l2 27, 561/458, note 135)
5. Taoism and the Yi Jing
With respect to Taoism Hegel's attention is drawn to places in the Daode- jing (the book of The Way and the Power, attributed to laozi) that evi- dence triadic cosmological thought, esp. chapter 42: 'Tao gave birth to one, one gave birth to Two, Two gave birth to Three, Three gave birth to all the myriad things. '6 This text was one of the proof texts in Re? musat's effort to show a direct relation between China and the Bible. Whereas schelling in his Philosophy of Mythology (1857) expresses serious doubts about Re? musat's speculations, Hegel reproduces the hypothesis of a his- torical link to the biblical account of the creation of the world. 7 He con- cludes that laozi's text offers Trinitarian thought in a rudimentary form: 'Unless three determinations are recognized in god, "god" is an empty word. Right at the beginning of thinking we find the very simplest and most abstract determinations of thought . . . ' (l2 27, 559/456) However, the 1827 manuscript from which this quote is taken is quick to add: 'but one should not believe that a higher, spiritual religion has established itself in this case. ' (560/457). Hegel argues that the Dao remains abstract, and
6 in the translation of John C. H. Wu, Tao Teh Ching, Boston & london: shambhala, 2005. This cosmology has many parallels in ancient Chinese thought. An illustration which spells out the implications somewhat further is offered by the Suo Wen (a dictionary dat- ing from the 2nd C. ) in its annotation of character for 'one' ( yi): 'le Un est initial; c'est le commencement absolu; une fois la Voie (tao) e? tablie dans et par le Un, Ciel et Terre sont produits et distingue? s, les Dix mille e^tres e? voluent et s'accomplissent. ' (Dictionnaire Ricci de caracte`res chinois, Paris-Taipei: 1999, Vol. 1, p. 814).
7 Cf. Knut Walf, 'Christian Theologoumena in Western translations of the Daoists', in: Bible in Modern China, red. irene eber e. a. , Monumenta serica Xlii, sankt Augustin (Dld) [not dated], p. 128, note 21; gu? nter Wohlfahrt, Hegel und China. Philosophische Bemerkun- gen zum Chinabild Hegels mit besonderer Beru? cksichtigung des Laozi, in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel- forschung, 3/1997, pp. 144-5.
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that whatever concretization Taoism brings only accrued to the person of laozi instead of to the Tao (560/457). Hegel is referring to the cult of laozi in popular Taoism--which in fact is of later date than the Daodejing. This unhistorical interpretation finds reaffirmation in the 1831 manuscripts.
it is interesting to dwell a moment on Hegel's critique of the Yi Jing. (Vorl. 6, 371-373)8 His main point is that the sixty-four hexagrams only represent the order of the cosmos in an external and static fashion. The reason why leibniz had a much keener eye for the inner connectedness of the hexagrams9 and their ability to express transformations may well be because Hegel was led by an assumed relationship between the hexa- grams and the inflexible character of Chinese, a topic brought up in the same context (Vorl. 12, 152-153). He considers, with some justice, Chinese characters as less flexible than a phonetic system. 10 Furthermore, he holds the non-inflecting character of Chinese language responsible for a ten- dency for representations to be juxtaposed rather than connected. in his mind to miss inflection makes a language a poor medium to articulate dynamic relationships--a view for which nowadays it will be hard to find support among linguists. 11
6. Buddhism and spinozism
'The religion of Fo' (Buddhism) represents the third and final stage. in all lectures the space reserved for this stage is large (relatively speaking) compared to the previous stages. However, the reason is not that extra space is needed for a widening of the textual basis, for in this case Hegel also wholly depends on secondary sources. in fact, the basis is now nar- rower than before. Peter Hodgson in his introduction to the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion only lists certain reports by travellers and a general history of China. (De Mailla's Histoire ge? ne? rale de la Chine, Paris, 1777-1785). Apparently, on approaching the top Hegel prefers to travel light. evidently, he is not interested in the history of Buddhism's indian origins and its later career in China, Japan and Korea. His interest is rather
8 Young Kun Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2, sinological Torque (1978), pp. 174-176.
9 see esp. Karel l. van der leeuw, Leibniz. Over de natuurlijke theologie van de Chinezen, Budel: Damon 2006, pp. 57-63; 130-136.
10 'Was die schriftsprache selbst betrifft, so ist dies herauszuheben, dass sie das gro? sste Hindernis der Befo? rderung der Wissenschaft ist. ' (Vorl. 12, 153)
11 The inflexibility of (spoken) Chinese is one of the myths debunked by John DeFrancis: The Chinese Language. Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984.
? hegel on chinese religion 27
to highlight what he thinks is its central concept: Substance, or rather: the notion of the one substance.
Contemporary european issues at least as much prompted the choice of this concept, as a reconstruction of the inner development of Chinese religion. The most obvious relation is with the controversies surrounding spinozism. The parallel with spinoza is present right from the outset. Just as the latter attempted to overcome Cartesian dualism by positing one substance, so Hegel places a Buddhist concept of one substance at the apex of oriental thought. Consecutively Hegel contrasts this notion with the concept of pantheism employed by the critics of spinozism. His point is that those critics have a poor understanding of the spinozist notion of the All and could learn a lot from the orient. The great achievement of the latter is to have understood the power of negation. Hegel uses the term 'idealism' as a contrast to the vulgar realism of the critics of spinozism who falsely attribute to spinoza a notion of the Divine as an Allesheit, i. e. a container in which all things of this world are dumped. To do justice to spinoza a more appropriate term than pantheism would be acosmism, since in the latter case Divine omnipotence would rightly be understood as a negation of the world. (l2 27, 574/470, note 172)
For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All character- istics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. (l2 27, 565/462)
7. subjectivism, subjectivity and Philosophy
oriental idealism is not only contrasted to the hypostatization of finite things of which Hegel accused the opponents of spinozism, but is also pitted against Romanticist subjectivism. lecturing in 1825/26 on oriental thought Hegel uses the opportunity for a side-attack on Friedrich schlegel's subjec- tivism. The orient is praised for having discovered the self-sufficiency of pure thinking ('thought for itself '), and for having turned this into the foundation of truth. on the other hand, Romanticists indulge in a 'subjec- tive vanity' that dissolves all objectivity. The advantage of the orient is to have developed 'an intellectual substantiality' in which all 'subjective van- ity is drowned'. 12 However, as Hegel contends, the disadvantage is that the
12 'jene subjective eitelkeit darin zu ersa? ufen' Cf. Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, p. 485.
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orient only has a dim awareness of god as subject, and as a consequence fails to give the human person its due. (l2 27, 576/472)13 This is also why oriental thought could not evolve into a genuine philosophy.
so while opposing both objectivism and subjectivism, Hegel is at the same time concerned that objectivity and subjectivity receive their due. He also makes clear that the acknowledgment of free subjectivity is the 'to be or not to be' of philosophy. since he finds this lacking in the ori- ent, the conclusion cannot but be that we are looking here in vain for genuine philosophy. especially within the Confucian pale there is little to find. even as a moral teacher Confucius cannot measure up to Cicero. Cicero's De Officiis, Hegel suggests, is more valuable than all the works of Confucius; to which he sarcastically adds that it would have been better for the sage's reputation if these had not been translated. 14
Conclusion: Hegel's Place in the Reception History
After this survey of relevant texts, a certain disappointment is hard to avoid. The texts are not many, and nowhere witness of any mastery. inter- preters before us, of course, reached a similar conclusion. one of them, Young Kun Kim, nevertheless derives consolation by supposing that Hegel at least has left us with hard but stimulating questions: 'neverthe- less, Hegel has contributed to the study of Chinese philosophy by posing tough questions, which i am afraid, have not yet been answered. '15 Unfor- tunately, Kim does not tell us what these questions were.
is this to say that 'Hegel and China' is a subject that could just as well be passed over? This would be the case if Hegel would represent a sheer regress compared to the Jesuit fathers, leibniz, Wolff, goethe, and schelling. in fact, his position has something of a sui generis character. in order to understand his position we need to take a number of points into account.
Ex oriente lux. Hegel follows Voltaire in placing China at the beginning of history: his lectures on world history, religion and philosophy all start with China. so the Far east and no longer Asia Minor is honoured as the
13 idem, p. 484.
14 'Ciceros 'De officiis' ist vielleicht besser fu? r uns als alle Werke des Konfuzius. U? ber die U? bersetzungen urteilen die kompetenten Richter, man ha? tte fu? r Konfuzius' Ruhm besser gesorgt, ihn nicht zu u? bersetzen; es sei ganz gewo? hnliche, weitschweifige Moral. ' (Vorl. 6, 371)
15 Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', p. 179.
? hegel on chinese religion 29
cradle of humanity. Herein he follows Voltaire who was the first historian to break with the older tradition of starting in one way or another with the biblical account of israel and the surrounding nations. Whereas Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681) still followed the old model, Vol- taire started a revolution by letting his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), of work of comparable ambition, open with China! 16 Hegel is a child of this revolution.
Historicism. Although the sun rises in the east, it sets in the west. With Hegel, the Western sunset is more important than the eastern sunrise. Both the east's fascination with substantiality and Western reflexivity are placed in a developmental perspective:
This oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the occident: just as the sun sets in the West, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. (l2 27, 572/469)
Therefore, in Hegel the Voltairean revolution does not give the orient a central place. With Buddhism China and india have run their historical course. The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time. For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once. 17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt. Erla? uterungen zu Hegel, Frankfurt: suhrkamp 1962, p. 366.
18 see Van der leeuw, Leibniz, pp. 43-47; Daniel J. Cook & Henry Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Writings on China, Chicago: open Court 1994, pp. 5-10.
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atheistic but adequately articulates Divine omnipotence. 19 Thus he would agree with the gist of leibniz' defence of the Riccians.
In line with the anti-Riccians. A great difference vis-a`-vis leibniz is that natural theology for Hegel has to be (negated and) further developed in order to lead to true knowledge. leibniz' rather eclectic method of looking for strong points in both cultures is anathema to Hegel. Therefore, with Hegel the distance to China vastly increases. leibniz envisaged a fruitful exchange based on a win-win situation. He argued that they are stronger in perceiving, we in thinking. 20 We may conclude that such an exchange between equals would be incongruent with Hegelian historicism. This same historicism also explains why the Voltairean revolution fails to gain momentum. Although following Voltaire in granting China a primal posi- tion in the history of civilization, he also makes clear that it represents a stage to be overcome.
? 19 Cf. Vorl. 12, 160, where Hegel deals with the state religion: 'Die gelehrten Chinesen, welche die Missionare Atheisten in der staatsreligion nennen, nehmen dieses Abstrakte Wesen als . . . . das innerste Wesen der Welt . . . '
20 From a letter to Father grimaldi, 1692, cf. Van der leeuw, Leibniz, p. 51. similar: Cook & Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, p. 46 (Preface to the novissima sinica).
Hinduism:
a Religion of fantasy
Paul Cruysberghs
1. introduction
at the end of the 18th century, eastern religions became quite popular in the Western world. Romanticism was in search of alternatives for the typi- cally rationalistic approach of both dogmatic and natural theology by the enlightenment philosophers and theologians. in Hinduism in particular, it discovered a religion that seemed to be free from both rigid dogmatism and abstract rationalism. the very fact that this religion was older than Christianity gave it an aura of originality that made it the more attrac- tive. the sacred texts were initially translated into english and later on into other languages as well. in germany august schlegel published an Indische Bibliothek series. 1 His brother friedrich, who had learned sanskrit during his stay in Paris, wrote a book on The Language and Wisdom of the Indians to which he added a nice selection of indian texts that he had translated on his own. 2 in his most important writings Herder showed an everlasting love for what he called "dieses land der sehnsucht". georg forster translated William Jones's translation of Kalidasa's sakuntula and Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced and translated the Bhagavad-gi^ta^, a crucial episode from the maha^-Bha^rata. 3
Hegel paid close attention to the Hindu religion as well; more than to Buddhism as a matter of fact. in our survey we will refer to the four ver- sions of the lectures on the philosophy of determinate religion as they have been edited by Walter Jaeschke: the manuscript, being the basis of the 1821 lectures (l2 m), the lectures of 1824 (l2 24), those of 1827 (l2 27),
1 see in particular a. W. schlegel (ed. ), Indische Bibliothek, Bd. 2, H. 4, Bonn: 1827.
2 f. schlegel, ? ueber die sprache und Weisheit der inder. ein Beitrag zur Begru? ndung der althertumskunde. nebst metrischen uebersetzungen indischer gedichte? , Heidelberg: 1808. --Kritische friedrich schlegel-ausgabe, ed. by e. Behler, 1. abt. Bd. 8, 1975.
3 W. von Humboldt, ? U? ber die unter dem namen Bhagavad-gi^ta^ bekannte episode des maha^-Bha^rata. gelesen in der akademie der Wissenschaften am 30. Juni 1825 und am 15. Juni 1826, Berlin, 1826? . --W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, abt. 1: Werke, Bd. 5, Berlin: 1906.
? 32 paul cruysberghs
and those of 1831 (l2 31). 4 the manuscript is rather restricted as far as Hin- duism is concerned, but the student notes of the 1824 and 1827 lectures are quite extensive. the 1824 lectures are the most elaborate, stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hinduism; but they are, alas, less clear than the 1827 lectures. the 1827 lectures, while being shorter, are indeed more perspicuous and concrete. of the 1831 lectures, no complete transcript seems to be extant anymore, but we have at our disposal some excerpts passed down to us by david strauss. Considering the dominant role of cat- egories and thought determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen) in Hegel's philosophy in general and in the philosophy of religion in particular, we will focus mainly on what he called the metaphysical dimension of Hindu religion (l2 m, 100/5) and to a lesser extent on the concrete representa- tion of the gods and the cultic aspects of Hinduism.
in addition to the lectures, we must also take into consideration Hegel's extensive review of Humboldt's book about the Bhagavad-gi^ta^ (H, 19ff ). 5 in this review, published in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik, Hegel does not just refer to Humboldt, but also to august schlegel's Indian Library and to some important english sources as well. it focuses more on the (subjective) cultic and ethical aspects than on the (objec- tive) metaphysical ones and, accordingly, it shows how eager Hegel was to improve his acquaintance with the Hindu religion, wrestling with its complexities and incoherencies, and comparing it with the Christian reli- gion and, quite remarkably, with recent, romantic, tendencies in philoso- phy as well. Hegel's interpretation of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them. However, one important modification that Hegel carries out, will require our atten- tion: the treatment of Buddhism which preceded Hinduism in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, was moved in the 1831 lectures to a position following Hinduism. However, as for the internal treatment of Hinduism, Hegel's interpretations do not seem to have changed that much.
4 the english translations of the german text of the lectures are mine (PC); except for those of 1827, that refer to the translation in the Hodgson edition of Hegel's Lectures. in either case, also where my translation diverts from that of the Hodgson edition, a reference to this (standard) edition is added to the text.
5 g. W. f. Hegel, ? Humboldt-Rezension. ueber die unter den nahmen Baghavad-gita bekannte episode des mahabharata; von Wilhelm von Humboldt? , Berlin 1826. --Gesam- melte Werke, Bd. 16, Schriften und Entwu? rfe II (1826-1831), frankfurt am main: meiner, 2001, pp. 19-75 (H).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 33
in what follows i will first introduce the general context in which Hegel dealt with the Hindu religion, then i will discuss Hegel's endeavour to interpret its basic content with the help of typically logical categories; and finally i will focus on the cultic aspects of the Hindu religion.
2. the general Context: nature Religion
in the manuscript and in the 1824 and 1827 lectures Hegel deals with Hin- duism in the context of what he terms 'immediate', or 'natural', or 'nature religion' (unmittelbare Religion, natu? rliche Religion, Naturreligion). 6 these terms refer to african and eskimo religions, but also, and even primarily to oriental religions such as the traditional Chinese, mongolian, indian, and Persian religions. all these religions, Hegel claims, present a 'natu- ral unity of the spiritual and the natural' (l2 24, 233-234/139-140). in the nature religions, indeed spirit has not yet separated itself from nature, and is still identical with it. Consequently, natural and spiritual elements are mixed up with each other. the situation can be compared to what Hegel terms the natural soul in his anthropology:7 on an elementary pre-conscious level the soul, though possessing already a certain level of ideality, is still permeated of nature, without taking a distance from it.
the basic notion in nature religion is that of (immediate) being or of substantiality (l2 m, 95/2). natural objects like the sun do not function as symbolic representations (presupposing a distinction between meaning and immediate existence) of the god; they are themselves the "immedi- ately present god" (l2 m, 106/13). in that sense, we can consider nature religions as being pantheistic: god is all things in them: ? `? ? ? ? ` ? ? ? ? . Heaven, stars, earth, plants, animals, and the human being constitute "one King- dom of Heaven". in so far as these objects merely are, they are immediate manifestations of "one single divine life" (l2 m, 100/5). of course, people do not adore finite natural things as they are as such, in the prosaic sense, but only in so far as they are the expressions of a universal power imma- nent in the things themselves, in the same sense as spinoza considered
6 strictly speaking, Hegel distinguishes 'natu? rliche Religion' and 'naturreligion', the first being identical to the latter, but only in so far as in it 'thought (der Gedanke) is brought to the fore' (144). 'natu? rliche Religion' thus refers primarily to the way religion is considered by authors like david Hume (cf. his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). together with the english translators of the 27 lectures, we translate 'naturreligion' as 'nature religion'.
7 g. W. f. Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 20, ?