No More Learning

9 (#39) ###############################################

532] The Nika Riot 9
two hated ministers, Tribonian and John of Cappadocia. Justinian
gave way, but too late. His apparent weakness only encouraged the
mob, and the revolt became a revolution. The fires kindled by the
rebels raged for three days, and destroyed the finest quarters of the
capital. Justinian, almost destitute of means of defence, shut himself
up in the palace without attempting to do anything, and the obvious
result followed. As might have been expected, the mob proclaimed
emperor Hypatius, the nephew of Anastasius, and, swelled by all
malcontents, the insurrection became a definite political movement.
"The Empire,'" wrote an eye-witness, "seemed on the verge of its fall. '"
Justinian, in despair of curbing the riot which had continued for six
days, lost his head, and thought of saving himself by flight. He had
already ordered to load the imperial treasure in ships. It was then that
Theodora rose in the Council, to recall to their duty the Emperor and
ministers who were abandoning it. She said " When safety only remains
in flight still I will not flee. Those who have worn the crown should
not survive its fall. I will never live to see the day when I shall no
longer be saluted as Empress. Flee if you wish, Caesar; you have
money, the ships await you, the sea is unguarded. As for me, I stay. I
hold with the old proverb which says that the purple is a good winding-
sheet" This display of energy revived the courage of all. As soon as
discord had been sown among the rebels by a lavish distribution of gold,
Belisarius and Mundus with their barbarian mercenaries threw them-
selves on the crowd collected in the hippodrome. They gave no quarter,
but continued their bloody work throughout the night (18 January).
More than 30,000 corpses according to one computation, more than
50,000 according to other witnesses, flooded the arena with blood.
Hypatius and Pompeius were arrested, and both executed the next
morning. Other condemnations followed, and, thanks to the frightful
bloodshed which ended this six days' battle, order was established once
more in the capital, and thenceforth the imperial power became more
absolute than ever.
In spite of every difficulty the imperial diplomacy never lost sight of
any event that might further the accomplishment of Justinian's plans.
Occurrences in the Vandal kingdom in Africa and the Ostrogothic
kingdom in Italy were carefully watched for the profit of the Empire.
In Africa, as in Italy, everything was in favour of the imperial restoration.
The Roman people, governed by barbarian kings, had kept alive the
memory of the Empire, and looked impatiently to Constantinople for
a deliverer. According to Fustel de Coulanges "they persisted in
regarding the Roman Empire as their supreme head; the distant power
seemed to them to be an ancient and sacred authority, a kind of far-off
providence, to be called upon as the last hope and consolation of the
anfortunate. " They felt still more keenly, perhaps, the misery of being
ruled by heretical sovereigns. In Africa, where rigorous persecution of
s


## p. 10 (#40) ##############################################

10 Justinian s Designs in the West [523-533
Catholics had long been carried on, everyone hoped for the end of the
"horrible secular captivity. '" In Italy, Theodoric's prolonged toleration
had reconciled no one to him, and his ultimate severity exasperated his
Roman subjects. A dumb agitation held sway in the West, and the
coming of the Emperor's soldiers was eagerly awaited and desired.
What is more surprising is that the barbarian kings themselves
acknowledged the justice of the imperial claims. They also still
reverenced the Empire whose lands they had divided, they thought of
themselves as vassals of the basilem, received his commands with respect
and bowed before his remonstrance. Hilderic, who had reigned over the
Vandal kingdom since 523, was proud to proclaim himself the personal
friend of Justinian. The two interchanged presents and embassies, and
the Emperor's head replaced that of the king on the Vandal coinage.
Amalasuntha, who had governed Italy since 526 in the name of her son
Athalaric, made it her first care to recommend the youth of the new
prince to Justinian's kindness: and the prince himself begged for the
imperial favour the day after his accession. He recalled with pride the
fact that his father had been adopted by Justin, and that he could
therefore claim kinship with the basileus. So great was the prestige of
the Roman Empire throughout the West that even the opponents of
the imperial policy, such as Witigis or Totila, were willing to acknowledge
themselves the Emperor's vassals.
Justinian realised this: he also realised the essential weakness of the
barbarian kingdoms—their internal dissensions, and inability to make
common cause against a foe. Therefore from the first he took up the
position of their overlord, waiting until circumstances should furnish him
with an opportunity for more active interference. This occurred, as far
as Africa was concerned, in 531. At this time a domestic revolution
substituted Gelimer, another descendant of Gaiseric, for the weakly
Hilderic. Hilderic at once appealed to Byzantium, begging the Emperor
to support the cause of his dethroned vassal. Byzantine diplomacy at
once interfered in the haughtiest manner, demanding the restoration, or
at any rate the liberation of the unhappy king, and evoking the decision
of the dispute to the Emperor's court. Gelimer alone, perhaps, among
the barbarian princes, recognised the fact that concessions, however large,
would only postpone the inevitable struggle. Therefore he flatly refused
the satisfaction required, and replied to the Byzantine demands by
redoubled severity towards his political and religious enemies. The
struggle had begun, and all was ready for the imperial restoration.
III.
Besides holding several trump cards, Justinian possessed another
advantage in the redoubtable war machine constituted by the Byzantine
army with its generals. The imperial army, in Justinian's time, was


## p. 11 (#41) ##############################################

533] The Army 11
formed essentially of mercenaries, recruited from all the barbarians of the
East and West. Huns, Gepids, Heruls, Vandals, Goths and Lombards,
Antae and Slavs, Persians, Armenians, men from the Caucasus, Arabs
from Syria, and Moors from Africa served in it side by side, glad to sell
their services to an Emperor who paid well, or to attach themselves to
the person of a celebrated general, to whom they would form the guard
and staff (inratrrriaTai). The greater number of these soldiers were
mounted. Only the smallest part of the troops consisted of infantry
which, being heavily equipped, was more notable for solidity than
mobility. The cavalry, on the other hand, was excellent. Barbed with
iron, armed with sword and lance, bow and quiver, the heavy regiments
of Byzantine cuirassiers (cataphracti) were equally formed to break the
enemy's ranks from a distance by a flight of arrows, or to carry all before
them by the splendid dash of their charge. This cavalry generally
sufficed to win battles, and the old regiments, proved as they were
by a hundred fights, and matchless in bravery, made incomparable
soldiers.
However, in spite of these qualities, the troops were not lacking in
the faults inseparable from mercenary armies. Convinced that war
should maintain war, and owning no fatherland, they pillaged merci-
lessly wherever they went. With an insatiable greed of gold, wine and
women, and with thoughts always bent on plunder, they easily slipped
the yoke of discipline, and imposed unheard-of conditions on their
generals. Even treason was not below them, and more than one victory
was lost by the defection of the troops on the field of battle, or their
disorganisation in the rush for plunder. After a victory, things were
still worse. Only anxious for leisure in which to enjoy their ill-gotten
gains, they were deaf to entreaty, and the efforts of the generals to
restore discipline frequently led to mutiny in the camp. The officers, of
whom the greater number were barbarians, were not much more to be
trusted than the men. They also were greedy, undisciplined and jealous
of each other, always a willing prey to intrigue and treason.
Certainly the faulty organisation of the army explained some of these
failings. The commissariat was badly arranged, pay generally in arrears,
while the treasury officials and the generals sought, under various
pretexts, to cheat the soldiers. Thus if the army was to be of any use,
everything really depended on the Commander-in-Chief. Justinian had
the good fortune to find excellent generals at the head of his armies;
they were adored by the troops, and able, by a mixture of skilful energy
and firm kindness, to keep them in hand and lead them where they
wished. Such were the patrician Germanus, the Emperor's nephew, who
commanded in turn in Thrace, Africa and Syria; Belisarius, the hero of
the reign, conqueror of the Persians, Vandals and Ostrogoths of Africa
and Italy, and the last resource of the Empire in every peril; and
lastly the eunuch Narses, who concealed under a frail appearance
e


## p. 12 (#42) ##############################################

12 Conquest of Africa [533
indomitable energy, prodigious activity and a strong will. He was a
wonderful general, who completed the ruin of the Goths, and chased the
Alemannic hordes from Italy.
The numerical force of the imperial armies must not be exaggerated.
Belisarius had scarcely 15,000 men with which to destroy the Vandal
kingdom, he had still less in his attack on the Ostrogothic realm, only
10,000 or 11,000; and altogether 25,000 to 30,000 sufficed to break
down the Ostrogothic resistance. The weakness of this force added to
the faulty organisation explains the interminable length of Justinian's
wars, specially during the second half of the reign. It also illustrates
the fundamental vice of the government, which was the perpetual
disproportion between the end aimed at, and the means employed for its
accomplishment. Lack of money always led to reduction of expenses
and curtailment of effort.
However, when in 583 the chance of intervention in Africa presented
itself, Justinian did not hesitate. Grave doubts as to the success of the
distant enterprise were felt at court, and in the Council John of Cappadocia
pointed out its many perils with a somewhat brutal clearness. Before
this opposition, added to the critical condition of the treasury and the
discontent of the soldiers, Justinian himself began to waver. On the
other hand, the African bishops, surrounded as they were with the halo
of martyrdom, revived the prince's nagging zeal and promised him victory.
As soon as it became known that imperial intervention was probable,
risings against the Vandal domination broke out in Tripolitana and
Sardinia. Furthermore, Justinian could not hesitate long, because of
the strength of the motives impelling him forward, his burning desire of
conquest, and his absolute trust in the justice of his claims and in divine
protection. He himself took the initiative in making the final decision,
and events proved that in doing so he was wiser than his more prudent
ministers.
The African campaign was equally rapid and triumphant. On
22 June 533 Belisarius embarked for the West. Ten thousand infantry,
and from five to six thousand cavalry were shipped in five hundred
transport-ships, manned by twenty thousand sailors. A fleet of war-ships
(dromons) manned by two thousand oarsmen convoyed the expedition.
The Vandals could offer little resistance to these forces. During the last
hundred years they had lost in Africa the energy which had once made
them invincible; and in spite of his boasted bravery, their king Gelimer
proved himself, by his indecision, sensitiveness, lack of perseverance and
want of will power, the worst possible leader for a nation in danger.
The neutrality of the Ostrogoths, which Byzantine diplomacy had secured,
gave Belisarius every chance of fair play. Early in September 533 he
was able to disembark unhindered on the desert headland of Caput-Vada.
He was well received by the African people, and marched on Carthage,


## p. 13 (#43) ##############################################

533-546] Conquest of Africa 13
while the imperial fleet turned back, skirting the coast in a northerly
direction. On September 13 the battle of Decimum was fought, and
shattered Gelimer's hopes by a single blow, while Carthage, the chief
town and only fortress in Africa, fell into the conqueror's hands un-
defended. In vain the Vandal king recalled the forces which he had
detached for service in Sardinia, and endeavoured to regain his capital.
He was forced to raise the blockade, and on the day of Tricamarum
(mid-Dec. 533) the Byzantine cavalry again overcame the impetuosity of
the barbarians. This was the final and decisive defeat. All Gelimer's
towns, his treasures and family fell in turn into Belisarius1 hands. He
himself, hemmed in in his retreat on Mt Pappua, was forced to surrender,
on receiving a promise that his life should be spared, and that he should
be honourably treated (March 534). In a few months, contrary to all
expectations, a few cavalry regiments had destroyed Gaiseric's kingdom.
Justinian, always optimistic, considered the war at an end. He
recalled Belisarius, who was decreed the honours of a triumph; while he
himself, somewhat arrogantly, assumed the titles of Vandalicus and
Africanus. Furthermore he adorned the walls of the imperial palace
with mosaics representing the events of the African war, and Gelimer
paying homage to the Emperor and Theodora. He hastened to restore
Roman institutions in the conquered province, but at this very moment
the war broke out afresh. The Berber tribes had passively allowed the
Vandals to be crushed; now it was their turn to rise against the imperial
authority. The patrician Solomon, who had succeeded Belisarius,
energetically put down the revolt in Byzacena (534) but he was unable
to break through the group of Aures in Numidia (535): and soon the
discontented troops, dissatisfied with a general who was strict and
demanded too much from them, broke into a serious mutiny (536).
Belisarius was obliged to leave Sicily for Africa at once, and arrived just
in time to save Carthage, and defeat the rebels in the plains of
Membressa. To complete the pacification it was found necessary to
appoint the Emperor's own nephew Germanus governor of Africa.
After performing prodigies of courage, skill and energy, he succeeded at
last in crushing out the insurrection (538). But four years had been
lost in useless and exhausting struggles. Only then was the patrician
Solomon, invested a second time with the rank of Governor-General,
able to complete the pacification of the country (539). By a bold march
he forced Iabdas, the strongest of the Berber princes and the great chief
of the Aures, into submission. He overran Zab, Hodna and Mauretania
Sitifensis, forcing the petty kings to acknowledge the imperial suzerainty.
Under his beneficent rule (539-544) Africa once more experienced peace
and security. His death occasioned another crisis. The revolted Berbers
made common cause with the mutinous soldiers. A usurper Guntharic
murdered Areobindus, the Governor-General, and proclaimed his own
independence (546). Africa seemed on the point of slipping from the


## p. 14 (#44) ##############################################

14 Invasion of Italy [533-548
Empire, and the fruits of Belisarius1 victories were, to quote Procopius'
phrase, "as completely annihilated as though they had never existed. 11
This time again, the energy of a general, John Troglita, overcame
the danger. After two years of warfare (546-548) he beat down the
Berber resistance, and restored, permanently at last, the imperial
authority.
After fifteen years of war and strife Africa once more took her place
in the Roman Empire. Doubtless it was not the Africa that Rome had
once possessed, and of which Justinian dreamed. It included Tripolitana,
Byzacena, Proconsularis, Numidia, and Mauretania Sitifensis. The Byzan-
tines also occupied Sardinia, Corsica and the Balearic Isles, all dependencies
of the African government. But with the exception of several scattered
places on the coast, of which the most important was the citadel of
Septem (Ceuta) at the Pillars of Hercules, the whole of West Africa
broke away from Justinian. Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania
Tingitana always remained independent, joined to the Empire only by
the loosest bond of vassalage. However, within these limited boundaries
the work of the imperial restoration was not in vain. It is clear that
Justinian's reign left a lasting impress on the lands drawn once more
into the bosom of the monarchy.
The conquest of Africa by Belisarius furnished Justinian with a
splendid base for operations in Italy, where he hoped to carry out his
ambitious projects. As had been the case in Africa, circumstances
provided him, in the nick of time, with a pretext for interference in the
peninsula.
Amalasuntha, daughter of Theodoric, and regent for her young son
Athalaric, had soon succeeded in arousing the discontent of her barbarian
subjects by her Roman sympathies. Made uneasy by the growing
opposition, she put herself into communication with the Court at
Constantinople, begging of the imperial benevolence an asylum in the
East should she need it. In return she offered all facilities for therfleet
of Belisarius to revictual in Sicily in 533, and finally allowed herself to
be persuaded to propose to Justinian the conquest of Italy (534). The
death of the young Athalaric (October 534) further complicated the
princess's position. In order to strengthen it, she made her cousin
Theodahad her partner; but a few months later a national revolution,
like that which had hurled Hilderic from the throne in Africa, deposed
Theodoric's daughter. Amalasuntha was imprisoned by order of her
royal husband, and soon afterwards assassinated (April 535). As had
been the case in Africa, but even with increased imperiousness, the
Byzantine diplomacy demanded satisfaction for the arrest of a princess
allied to and protected by Justinian. Her death proved to be the
wished-for casus belli.
As if to complete the remarkable parallelism presented by Italian


## p. 15 (#45) ##############################################

536-639] Conquest of Italy 15
and African affairs, Theodahad the Gothic king was, like Gelimer,
impressionable, changeable, unsteady, unreliable, and, in addition, a
coward. After the first military demonstrations he offered to Justinian's
ambassador to cede Sicily to the Empire, to acknowledge himself as a
vassal of Byzantium, and, soon afterwards, he proposed to abandon the
whole of Italy in return for a title and a money settlement. Against
such a foe Belisarius had no formidable task, specially as in view of the
Ostrogothic war, Byzantine diplomacy had secured the Frankish alliance,
just as in the African war it had secured that of the Ostrogoths. From
the end of 535, while a Byzantine army was concentrated in Dalmatia,
Belisarius landed in Sicily, and occupied it, hardly needing to strike a blow.
Theodahad was terrified, and "already feeling the fate of Gelimer about
to descend on him11 offered any concessions. Then, on hearing that
Belisarius had been obliged to return to Africa, he once more plucked
up courage, imprisoned the imperial ambassadors, and flung himself
desperately into the struggle. Little good it did him. While one of
Justinian's generals conquered Dalmatia, Belisarius crossed the Strait
of Messina (May 536) and, greeted by the Italian people as a liberator,
in turn seized Naples and occupied Rome unopposed (10 December 536).
However, the Ostrogoths still possessed more energy than the Vandals.
On the news of the first disasters, even before the fall of Rome, they
dethroned the incapable Theodahad, and elected as king Witigis, one of
the bravest of their warriors. With considerable skill the new king
checked the march of the Franks by the cession of Provence; then,
having united all his forces, he proceeded with 150,000 men to-besiege
Belisarius in Rome. For a whole year (March 537—March 538) he
exhausted himself in vain efforts to take the Eternal City. Everything
miscarried before the splendid energy of Belisarius. Meanwhile, another
Roman army, which had landed at the beginning of 538 on the Adriatic
coast, was occupying Picenum. Greek troops, at the request of the
Archbishop of Milan, had made a descent on Liguria, and seized the
great town of northern Italy. Witigis, in despair, decided to abandon
Rome. The triumph of the imperialists seemed assured, and to finish it
Justinian despatched another army under Narses into Italy. Unfor-
tunately, Narses' instructions were not only to reinforce Belisarius, but
also to spy upon him; and the misunderstanding between the two
generals soon paralysed all operations. They confined themselves to
saving Rimini, which was attacked by Witigis; but allowed the Goths
to reconquer Milan, and Theudibert's Franks to pillage the valley of the
Po on their own account. At last in 539 Justinian decided to recall
Narses, and to leave to Belisarius alone the task of conducting the war.
It was brought rapidly to a successful end. Pressed on every side,
Witigis threw himself into Ravenna, and the imperialists besieged it
(end of 539). For six months the Ostrogoths held out, counting on a
diversion to be caused by the Persians in the East, the intervention of the


## p. 16 (#46) ##############################################

16 Mismanagement in Italy [540-544
Lombards, and the defection of the Franks. When they saw themselves
abandoned by all, they determined to negotiate with Justinian (May 540).
The Emperor leaned towards conciliation and shewed himself inclined to
allow Witigis to keep possession of Italy north of the Po. But for the
first time in his life Belisarius refused to obey, and declared that he
would never ratify the convention. He wished for complete victory,
and hoped to destroy the Ostrogothic kingdom as completely as the
Vandal. Then occurred a strange episode. The Goths suggested that
the Byzantine general, whose valour they had proved, and whose
independence they had just ascertained, should be their king, Witigis
himself consenting to abdicate in his favour. Belisarius pretended to
fall in with their plans in order to obtain the capitulation of Ravenna;
then he threw off all disguise and declared that he had never worked for
anyone but the Emperor.
Once more, as he had done in Africa, Justinian in his optimistic
mind considered the war at an end. Proudly he assumed the title of
Gothicus, recalled Belisarius, reduced the troops in occupation; and in
the Ostrogothic kingdom, now transformed into a Roman province, he
organised a system of purely civil administration. Once more the issue
disappointed his anticipations. The Goths indeed soon recovered them-
selves. Scarcely had Belisarius gone, before they organised resistance to
the north of the Po, and instead of Witigis (a prisoner of the Greeks)
they chose Hildibad for king. The tactlessness of the Byzantine adminis-
tration, which was both harsh and vexatious, still further aggravated the
situation; and when, at the end of 541, the accession of the young and
brilliant Totila gave the barbarians a prince equally remarkable for his
chivalrous courage and unusual attractiveness, the work of the imperial
restoration was undone in a few months. For eleven years Totila was
able to hold at bay the whole force of the Empire, to reconquer the
whole of Italy, and to ruin the reputation of Belisarius.
He passed the Po with only five thousand men. Central Italy was
soon opened to him by the victories of Faenza and Mugillo. Then,
while the disabled Byzantine generals shut themselves up in forts,
without attempting any joint action, Totila skilfully moved towards the
Campania and southern Italy, where the provinces had suffered less from
the war, and would consequently yield him supplies. Naples fell to him
(543), and Otranto, where the imperialists revictualled, was besieged.
At the same time Totila conciliated the Roman population by his
political skill; he made war without pillaging the country, and his
justice was proverbial. Justinian felt sure that no one except Belisarius
was capable of dealing with this formidable foe. Therefore he was
ordered back to Italy (544). Unfortunately there were just then so
many calls on the Empire, from Africa, on the Danube, and from the
Persian frontier, that the great effort needed in the peninsula was not
forthcoming. The imperial general, bereft of money, and almost


## p. 17 (#47) ##############################################

544-552] Totila 17
without an army, was practically powerless. Content with having
thrown supplies into Otranto, he fortified himself in Ravenna and stayed
there (545). Totila seized the posts by which communications were
maintained between Ravenna and Rome, and finally invested the Eternal
City, which Belisarius was unable to save when he finally roused himself
from his inaction (17 December 546). Totila then tried to make
peace with the Emperor, but Justinian obstinately refused to negotiate
with a sovereign whom he held to be nothing but an usurper. Therefore
the war went on. Belisarius did manage to recover Rome, evacuated
by the Gothic king and emptied of its inhabitants, and clung to it
successfully in spite of all Totila's hostile attacks (547). But the
imperial army was scattered over the whole of Italy, and quite powerless;
and reinforcements, when they did arrive from the East, could not
prevent Totila from taking Perusia in the north and Rossano in
the south. Belisarius, badly supported by his lieutenants, and driven
to desperation, demanded to be recalled (548). When his request
was granted he left Italy, where his glory had been so sadly tarnished.
"God himself,'" wrote a contemporary, "fought for Totila and the
Goths. "
In fact, no resistance to them remained.
Belisarius had been gone
for less than a year when the imperialists were left with only four towns
in the peninsula: Ravenna, Ancona, Otranto and Crotona. Soon after-
wards the fleet which Totila had created conquered Sicily (550), Corsica,
Sardinia (551), and ravaged Dalmatia, Corfu and Epirus (551). Mean-
while the fast ageing Justinian was absorbed in useless theological
discussions, and forgot his province of Italy. "The whole West was in
the hands of the barbarians,'" wrote Procopius. However, moved by
the entreaties of the emigrant Italians who flocked to Byzantium, the
Emperor recovered himself. He despatched a fleet to the West which
forced Totila to evacuate Sicily, while a great army was mobilised under
the direction of Germanus to reconquer Italy (550). The sudden death
of the general hindered the operations, but Narses, appointed as his
successor, canned them on with a long forgotten energy and decision.
He boldly stated his conditions to the Emperor, and succeeded in
wringing from him those supplies that had been doled out so meagrely
to his predecessors. He obtained money, arms and soldiers, and soon
commanded the largest army ever entrusted by Justinian to any of his
generals, numbering probably from thirty to thirty-five thousand men.
In the spring of 552 he attacked Italy from the north, moved on
Ravenna, and from there made a bold push for the south in order to
force Totila to a decisive engagement. He encountered the Goths in
the Apennines at Taginae (May or June 552), not far from the site
of Busta Gallorum where, Procopius tells us, Camillus repulsed the
Gauls in ancient days. The Ostrogothic army was stricken with panic,
and broke and fled as soon as the battle was joined; Totila was borne
C. SI ED. H. VOL. II. I'll. I. 2


## p. 18 (#48) ##############################################

18 End of the Gothic Kingdom [552-563
away in the rout, and perished in it. The Gothic State had received its
death-blow.
The Byzantines could hardly believe that their formidable enemy was
really overcome. They wanted to disinter his body to assure themselves
of their good fortune; "and having gazed at it for a long time," wrote
Procopius,"they felt satisfied that Italy was really conquered. " It was in
vain that the unhappy remnant of the Gothic people rallied under a new
king, Teias, for a last desperate struggle. By degrees the whole of
central Italy, including Rome itself, again passed into the hands of the
Greeks. Finally Narses fought the last barbarian muster in Campania
near the foot of Mt Vesuvius on the slopes of Monte I^ettere (Mons
Lactarius) early in 558. The battle lasted for two whole days, "a
giants' combat" according to Procopius, desperate, implacable, epic.
The flower of the Gothic army fell round their king, the remainder
received honourable treatment from Narses, and permission to seek land
amongst the other barbarians, where they would no longer be subjects
of Justinian.
Italy had still to be cleared of the Franks. They had profited by
what was happening, and had occupied part of Liguria, and almost the
whole of the Venetian territory, had repulsed the imperialists of Verona
after Taginae, and now claimed to inherit all the possessions of the
Goths. In the middle of the year 553 two Alemannic chieftains,
Leutharis and Bucelin, rushed on Italy, with seventy-five thousand
barbarians, marking a trail from the north to the centre with blood and
fire. Fortunately for Narses the remnant of the Ostrogoths thought
submission to the Emperor better than submission to the Franks.
Thanks to their help, the Greek general was able to crush the hordes of
Bucelin near Capua (autumn of 554), while those of Leutharis, decimated
by sickness, perished miserably on their retreat. In the following year
peace was restored to Italy by the capitulation of Compsae, which had
been the centre of Ostrogothic resistance in<the south (555). Thus,
after twenty years of warfare, Italy was once more drawn into the
Roman Empire. Like Africa, her extent was not so great as it had
been formerly, as the Italian praefecture. Without mentioning places
like Brescia and Verona, where a handful of Goths held out till 563,
neither Pannonia nor Rhaetia nor Noricum ever came under Justinian's
rule again. The imperial province of Italy did not extend beyond the
line of the Alps, but Justinian was none the less proud of having rescued
it from "tyranny," and flattered himself on having restored to it
"perfect peace," likely to prove durable.
It might easily be imagined that Spain, conquered by the Visigoths,
would be added to the Empire, after the reconquest of Africa and Italy.
Here also, just at the right moment, circumstances arose which gave
a pretext for Greek intervention. King Agila was a persecutor of


## p. 19 (#49) ##############################################

539-554] Imperial Position of Justinian 19
Catholics, and against him uprose an usurper Athanagild, who naturally
sought help from the greatest orthodox ruler of the time. A Byzantine
army and fleet were despatched to Spain, Agila was defeated, and in a
few weeks the imperialists were in possession of the chief towns in the
south-east of the peninsula, Carthagena, Malaga and Corduba. As soon
as the Visigoths realised the danger in which they stood, they put an
end to their domestic disagreements, and all parties joined in offering
the crown to Athanagild (554). The new prince soon returned to face his
former allies, and managed to prevent them from making much progress.
However, the Byzantines were able to keep what they had already won,
and the Empire congratulated itself on the acquisition of a Spanish
province.
The imperial diplomacy was able to add successes of its own to the
triumphs won by force of arms. The Frankish kings of Gaul had gladly
received subsidies from Justinian, and had entered into an alliance with
him, calling him Lord and Father, in token of their position as vassals.
They proved themselves fickle and treacherous allies, and after Theudibert,
King of Austrasia, had in 539 worked for himself in Italy, he formed the
plan of overwhelming the Eastern Empire by a concerted attack of all the
barbarian peoples. In spite of such occasional lapses, the prestige of
Rome was undiminished in Gaul: Constantinople was regarded as the
capital of the whole world, and in the distant Frankish churches, by the
Pope's request, prayers were said by the clergy for the safety of the
Roman Emperor. To his titles of Vandalicus and Gothicus Justinian
now added those of Francicus, Alemannicus and Germanicus. He
treated Theudibert as though he were the most submissive of lieutenants,
and confided to him the work of converting the pagans ruled by
him in Germany. It was the same with the Lombards. In 547 the
Emperor gave them permission to settle in Pannonia and Noricum,
and furnished them with subsidies in return for recruits. They were
rewarded by receiving imperial support against their enemies the
Gepidae; and Greek diplomacy was successful in keeping them
faithful.
On the whole, in spite of certain sacrifices which had been wrung
from the pride of the basileus, Justinian had realised his dream. It was
thanks to his splendid and persistent ambition that the Empire could
now boast the acquisition of Dalmatia, Italy, the whole of eastern
Africa, south-east Spain, the islands of the western basin of the
Mediterranean, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles, which
almost doubled its extent. The occupation of Septem carried the
Emperor's authority to the Pillars of Hercules, and with the exception
of those parts of the coast held by the Visigoths in Spain and Septimania
and the Franks in Provence, the Mediterranean was once more a Roman
lake. We have seen by what efforts these triumphs were bought, we
shall see at what cost of suffering they were held. We must however
ch. i. 2—2


## p. 20 (#50) ##############################################

20 Administration in Africa and Italy
maintain that by them Justinian had won for the Empire a great and
incontestable increase of prestige and honour. In some respects it may
have proved a misfortune that he had taken upon him the splendid but
crushing heritage of Roman traditions and memories with the crown of
the Caesars: none the less, none of his contemporaries realised that he
had repudiated the obligations they entailed. His most savage detractors
saw in his vast ambitions the real glory of his reign. Procopius wrote
"The natural course for a high-souled Emperor to pursue, is to seek to
enlarge the Empire, and make it more glorious. "
IV.
Justinian's great object in accomplishing the imperial restoration in
the West was to restore the exact counterpart of the ancient Roman
Empire, by means of the revival of Roman institutions. The aim of the
two great ordinances of April 534 was the restoration in Africa of that
"perfect order" which seemed to the Emperor to be the index of true
civilisation in any State. The Pragmatic Sanction of 554, while it
completed the measures taken in 538 and 540, had the same object in
Italy—to "give back to Rome Rome's privileges," according to the
expression of a contemporary. By what appears at first sight to be a
surprising anomaly, remarkably well illustrating however Justinian's
disinclination to change any condition of the past he endeavoured to
restore, the Emperor did not extend to the West any of the administrative
reforms which he was compassing in the East at the same time.
In Africa, as in Italy, the principle on which the administrative re-
organisation was carried out was that of maintaining the ancient separation
between civil and military authority. At the head of the civil government
of Africa was placed a praetorian praefect, having seven governors below
him, bearing the titles of consvlares or prewsides, who administered the
restored circumscriptions which had been established by the Roman
Empire. The numerous offices in which Justinian, with his usual care
for detail, minutely regulated the details of staff and salaries, helped the
officials and assured the predominance of civil rule in the praefecture of
Africa. It was the same in the reconstructed praefecture of Italy.
From 535 a praetor was at the head of reconquered Sicily, after 538 a
praetorian praefect was appointed in Italy, and the regime of civil
administration was established the day after the capitulation of Ravenna.
The reorganisation was carried out by the Pragmatic of 554. Under the
praefect's high authority, assisted, as formerly, by the two vicarii of
Rome and Italy, the civil officials governed the thirteen provinces into
which the peninsula was still divided. Occasionally in practice political
or military exigencies led to the concentration of all the authority in the
same hands. In Africa Solomon and Germanus combined the functions and


## p. 21 (#51) ##############################################

Administration in Africa and Italy 21
even the titles of praetorian praefect and magister militum. In Italy
Narses was a real viceroy. These, however, were only exceptional
deviations from the established principle, and only concerned the supreme
government of the province. At the same time Justinian introduced
the legislation that he had promulgated into the reconquered West.
The financial administration was co-ordinated with the territorial. The
ancient system of taxation, slightly modified elsewhere by the barbarians,
was completely restored, and the supplies so raised were divided, as had
formerly been the case, between the praefect's area and the coffer of the
largitiones. A comes sacri patrimonii per Italiam was appointed, and
the imperial hgothetae exacted with great harshness arrears of taxation,
dating back to the time of the Gothic kings, from the country already
ruined by warfare.
Thus Justinian meant to efface, with one stroke of the pen, anything
that might recall the barbarian "tyranny. '1 Contracts signed in the
time of Totila, donations made by the barbarian kings, economic
measures passed by them in favour of settlers and slaves, were all
pronounced void, and the Pragmatic restored to the Roman proprietors
all lands that they had held before the time of Totila. However, though
he might shape the future, the Emperor was obliged to accept many
existing facts. The newly-created praefecture of Africa corresponded to
the Vandal kingdom, and included, as the Vandal kingdom had done,
along with Africa, Sardinia and Corsica which the barbarians had torn
from Italy. The Italian praefecture, already reduced by this arrange-
ment, was further diminished by the loss of Dalmatia and Sicily, which
formed a province by themselves. The Italian peninsula alone concerned
the praefect of Italy. \ t^l"\ r t
The military administration was on the siml lints Us the civil, but
very strictly separated from it. Responsible ror J|k* defence of the
country, it was reconstructed on the Roman I modelTaccording to the
minute instructions of the Emperor. Belisarias in Africa and Narses in
Italy organised the frontier defence. Each province formed a great
command, with a magister militum at its head ;\ Africa, Italy and Spain
comprised one each. Under the supreme command of these generals,
who were Commanders-in-Chief of all the troops stationed in the
province, dukes governed the military districts {limites) created along
the whole length of the frontier. In Africa there were originally four,
soon afterwards five (Tripolitana, Byzacena, Numidia and Mauretania),
four also in Italy, along the Alpine frontier. Dukes were also installed
in Sardinia and Sicily. In this group of military districts, troops of a
special nature were stationed, the HmUanei (borderers) formed on the
model formerly invented in the Roman Empire, and partly restored by
Anastasius. Recruited from the provincial population, specially on the
frontier, these soldiers received concessions of land, and pay as well. In
time of peace their duty was to cultivate the land they occupied, and to
"P


## p. 22 (#52) ##############################################

22 Admimstration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the limes; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of danger. ^ A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annorut). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. '"
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters"
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated


## p. 23 (#53) ##############################################

Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. 1" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logothetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
CH. I.


## p. 24 (#54) ##############################################

24 Results of Justinia? is Reign
works were supported or repaired in the interior of the land, and new
cities were founded in the wilds of the high Numidian plateau. Carthage
itself, newly adorned with a palace, churches, splendid baths and
fashionable squares, shewed the interest taken by the prince in his new
provinces. The result of all this was a real prosperity. Similar measures
were taken in Italy, either to tide over the crisis resulting from the mass
of debts and give time to the debtors, or to alleviate in some degree
the crushing burden of the taxes. At the same time the Emperor
busied himself in the restoration of the great aristocracy which had
been broken down by Totila, but to which he looked for the chief
support of the new regime. For a similar reason he protected and
enriched the Church, and set himself as' in Africa by means of the
development of public works to repair the evils of the war. Ravenna
was beautified by such buildings as San Vitale and San Apollinare in
Classe, and became a capital; Milan was raised from her ruins, Rome
was put in possession of privileges likely to lead to an economic revival,
and Naples became a great commercial port.
Unfortunately, in spite of Justinian's good intentions, the financial
burden weighed too heavily upon a depopulated Italy to allow of any
real revival. In the greater number of towns industry and commerce
disappeared; lack of implements hindered the improvement of the land,
and large uncultivated and desert tracts remained in the country. The
middle classes tended more and more to disappear, at the same time
that the aristocracy either became impoverished or left the country.
Justinian exerted himself in vain to restore order and prosperity by
promising to protect his new subjects from the well-known greed of his
officials: the imperial restoration marked, at any rate in Italy, the
beginning of a decadence which long darkened her history.



## p. 25 (#55) ##############################################

25
CHAPTER II.
JUSTINIAN'S GOVERNMENT IN THE EAST.
I.
At the time when Justinian was only heir-presumptive of the
Empire, probably in the year 520, he met the lady who was to become
the Empress Theodora. Daughter of one of the bear-keepers of the
hippodrome, brought up by an indulgent mother amongst the society
which frequented the purlieus of the circus, this young girl, beautiful,
intelligent and witty—if we may believe the gossip of the Secret History
—soon succeeded in charming and scandalising the capital. At the
theatre where she appeared in tableaux vivants and pantomimes she
ventured on the most audacious representations: in town she became
famous for the follies of her entertainments, the boldness of her manners
and the multitude of her lovers. Next she disappeared, and after a
somewhat unlovely adventure she travelled through the East in a
wretched manner for some time—according to contemporary gossip.
She was seen at Alexandria, where she became known to several of the
leaders of the Monophysite party, and returned—perhaps under their
influence—to a more Christian and purer mode of life. She was again
seen at Antioch, and then returned to Constantinople, matured and wiser.
Then it was that she made a conquest of Justinian. She soon wielded
the strongest influence over her lover: desperately in love, the prince
could refuse nothing that his mistress requested. He heaped riches
upon her, obtained for her the title of patrician, and became the humble
minister of her hatred or her affection. Finally he wished to marry her
legally, and was able to do so in 523, thanks to the complaisance of
Justin". When, in April 527, Justinian was associated in the Empire,
Thcothira shared the elevation and the triumph of her husband. She
ascenden the throne with him in August 527, and for twenty years the
adventuress-Empress exercised a sovereign influence on the course of
politics.
Theodora's name may still be read with that of the Emperor on the
walls of churches and over the doors of castles of that date. Her
picture makes a fellow to that of her imperial husband in the church of


## p. 26 (#56) ##############################################

26 The Empress Theodora [527-548
San Vitale in Ravenna, and also in the mosaics which decorated the
rooms of the Sacred Palace, for it was Justinian's wish to associate her
with the military triumphs and the splendours of the reign. The
grateful people raised statues to her as to Justinian, the officials also
swore fidelity to her, for she was the Emperor's equal throughout her
life, while ambassadors and foreign kings hastened to her to pay their
respects and to gain her good will as well as that of the basUeus. In
deliberating on the most important occasions Justinian always took
council of "the most honoured wife which God had given him," whom
he loved to call "his sweetest charm," and contemporaries agree in
declaring that she did not scruple to use the boundless influence which
she possessed, and that her authority was equal to, if not greater than,
that of her husband. Certainly this ambitious lady possessed many
eminent qualities to justify the supreme authority which she wielded.
She was a woman of unshaken courage, as she proved in the troublous
time of the Nika rising, proud energy, masculine resolution, a determined
and a clear mind, and a strong will by which she frequently overruled the
vacillating Justinian. She undoubtedly combined defects and even vices
with these qualities. She was domineering and harsh, she loved money
and power. To keep the throne to which she had risen she would stoop
to deceit, violence and cruelty; she was implacable in her dislikes, and
inflexible towards those whom she hated. By means of a disgraceful
intrigue she pitilessly destroyed the fortunes of John of Cappadocia, the
all-powerful praetorian praefect, who dared for one moment to dispute
her supremacy (541). She made Belisarius bitterly expiate his rare
lapses into independence, and by the ascendancy which she gained over
Antonina, the patrician's wife, she made him her humble and obedient
servant. As passionate in her loves as in her hates, she advanced
her favourites without scruple. Peter Barsymes was made praetorian
praefect, Narses a general, Vigilius a pope, while she turned the
imperial palace into a hotbed of incessant intrigues. Her influence was
not always good—though the loungers of Constantinople have strangely
lengthened the list of her cruelties and increased the number of her
victims—but it was always powerful. Even when she was forced
temporarily to give way before circumstances, her audacious and supple
wit was always able to devise some startling retaliation. Wily and
ambitious, she always aspired to have the last word—and she got it.
In the twenty years during which Theodora reigned she had a hand
in everything; in politics, and in the Church; in the administration,
she advised the reforms, and filled it with her proteges; in diplomacy,
concerning which the Emperor never decided anything without her
advice. She made and unmade popes and patriarchs, ministers and
generals at her pleasure, not even fearing, when she considered it
necessary, openly to thwart Justinian's wishes. She was the active help-
mate to her husband in all important matters. In the legislative reform


## p. 27 (#57) ##############################################

627-548] The Empress Theodora 27
her feminism inspired the measures which dealt with divorce, adultery,
the sanctity of the marriage-tie, and those meant to assist actresses and
fallen women. In the government of the East her lucid and keen
intelligence discovered-and advised, a policy more suited to the true
interests of the State than that actually pursued, and if it had been
carried out, it might have changed the course of history itself by
making the Byzantine Empire stronger and more durable.
While Justinian, carried away by the grandeur of Roman traditions,
rose to conceptions in turn magnificent and impossible, and dreamed of
restoring the Empire of the Caesars and of inaugurating the reign of
orthodoxy by reunion with Rome, Theodora, by birth an Oriental,
and in other respects more far-seeing and acute than her husband,
immediately turned her attention to the East, She had always
sympathised with the Monophysites; even before she had become
Empress she had willingly received them at the palace, and allowed
them to draw on her credit. She admired their teachers, and loved the
unpolished candour of their monks. She was not actuated by piety
alone, for she had too much political instinct not to realise the im-
portance of religious questions in a Christian State, and the peril
attending indifference to them. But while Justinian, with the mind of
a theologian, occupied himself with religious questions primarily for the
empty pleasure of being able to dogmatise, Theodora, like all the great
Byzantine Emperors, recognised the main features of political problems
under the fleeting form of theological disagreements. ( She realised that
the rich and flourishing provinces of Asia, Syria and Egypt really formed
the mainstay of the Empire; and she felt that the religious differences
by which the Oriental nations manifested their separatist tendencies
threatened danger to the monarchy/ Furthermore ihe saw the necessity
for pacifying the growing discontent by means ofyopportune concessions
and a wide toleration, and she forced the imperial policy to shape itself
to this end; and carried with her the ever worried and vacillating
Justinian, even so far as to brave the Papacy and protect the heretics.
It is only fair to say that she foresaw the future more clearly and
grasped the situation more accurately than did her imperial associate, |,
Before the advent of Justin's dynasty Anastasius' dreams of an ideal
monarchy may have taken this form or something approaching it. He
may have imagined an essentially Oriental Empire, having well-defended
frontiers, a wise administration, sound finances and blessed with religious
unity. To realise this last he would not have hesitated at a breach
with Rome if it had become necessary. In spite of his efforts and good
intentions Anastasius had not succeeded in realising his ideal. But it
was right in principle and, thanks to Theodora, it inspired the policy of
Justinian in the East. In this way the Empress made a great impression
on her husband's government, and as soon as she died a decay set in
which brought the glorious reign to a sad close.