But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic.
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic.
Summa Theologica
Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts
alone.
Objection 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular
or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man
chooses save what he can do himself. "
I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard
the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end
is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man
produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the
physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the
thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the possession of
money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means
must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some action
intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or
puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as
man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the
intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that
is put in contradistinction to contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or
some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that
post. Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop
or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we
speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in
conjunction with some action of the chooser.
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Whether choice is only of possible things?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice in not only of possible things.
For choice is an act of the will, as stated above [1097](A[1]). Now
there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore
there is also a choice of impossibilities.
Objection 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above
[1098](A[4]). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing
is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or
that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we
are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be
impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
Objection 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But
the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of
the impossible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no
choice of impossibilities. "
I answer that, As stated above [1099](A[4]), our choice is always
concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to
us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an
end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is
that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is
impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the
business.
Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the
reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end,
as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an
impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.
Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now
no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to
the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.
Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The will stands between the intellect and the
external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and
the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the
movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
something under the universal notion of good: but the term or
perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the
action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the
perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one
to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete
act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him
that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the
impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one
would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an
act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And
therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended
good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is
apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something
which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and
yet impossible to him.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for this is that the subject should
not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is
possible; but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
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Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end
stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that
which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man is
moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the
reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises.
Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not
moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two
portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not
moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of
this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if
that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen,
much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible).
Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to
be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others.
Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of
necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that
seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because
that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a
twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act;
again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of
this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend
to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can
apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also
this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act. " Again, in all particular
goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of
some good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect, it can
apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be
avoided. The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be
apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way.
Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to
be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
the means, as stated above [1100](A[3]); it is not of the perfect good,
which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man
chooses not of necessity, but freely.
Reply to Objection 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity
follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true
if the conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always
necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not
always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be
such, they are not always considered in that light.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to
be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such
matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that
are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as,
for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion. "
Reply to Objection 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one
aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some
particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards
that one rather than towards the other.
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OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?
(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?
(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?
(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether counsel is an inquiry?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the
appetite. " But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel
is not an inquiry.
Objection 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for
which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
as we have shown in the [1101]FP, Q[14], A[7]. But counsel is ascribed
to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that "He worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Therefore counsel is not
inquiry.
Objection 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is
given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:25): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I
give counsel. " Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ]
says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a
counsel. "
I answer that, Choice, as stated above ([1102]Q[13], A[1], ad 2; A[3]),
follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there
is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are
concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their
vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore
the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on
the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has
been already counselled. "
Reply to Objection 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one
another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other
power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now
it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the
means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the
reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is
to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the
will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason,
something of the will---both as matter (since counsel is of what man
wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that
man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore,
just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect
influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act
of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is
"appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a
way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the
inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
Reply to Objection 2: The things that we say of God must be understood
without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us
science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects:
but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the
First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe
counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which
certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry
has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to
God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes
not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: It may happen that things which are most
certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not
certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded
men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
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Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but
also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a
doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore
inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can
be of the end.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some
human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can
be of the end.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ] says
that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means. "
I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters: because
the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry.
Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only
of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard
to some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the
principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and
consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may
be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an
object of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already
fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not
looked upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will
be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they
are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it
will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
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Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we
do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for
many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are
not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are
laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who
seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future
events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not
only of things that we do.
Objection 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no
would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ]
says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and
that we are able to do. "
I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between
several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to
confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent
particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is
necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into
consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note
of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal
things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and
simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these
things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly
speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in
such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is
the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as
being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular
and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about
things done by us.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but
about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is
not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs
him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing
something.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also
about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we
speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to
do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Reply to Objection 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in
so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of
affection---thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as
though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for
the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since
one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he
would do through his servant.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether counsel is about all things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
above [1103](A[1]). But choice is about all things that we do.
Therefore counsel is too.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But,
whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything
that we do.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but
if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this. "
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore
counsel takes place in all things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ] says
that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
or art. "
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
[1104](A[1]).
But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic.
ad Trebat. ]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no
doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate
ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts
which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does
not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by
art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done
this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder
but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small
things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we
do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those
which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with
the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine,
commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxiv. ].
Reply to Objection 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its
judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is
evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no
inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel
in all that is done by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means,
but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be
accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not
only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
there is no need of counsel.
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Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of
analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of
our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.
from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always
proceed by way of analysis.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason
proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to
the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present,
and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel
one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is
not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one
of analysis.
Objection 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to
us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a
certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable
to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of
counsel should begin from things present.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who
takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze. "
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And
if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect
is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects.
But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being,
the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with
effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the
principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed
in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of
counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from
that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives
at that which is to be done at once.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take
their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning
about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason begins with that which is first according
to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
Reply to Objection 3: We should not want to know whether something to
be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining
that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the
end, before considering whether it be possible.
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Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.
For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action
is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of
counsel is indefinite.
Objection 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only
what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action
can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.
Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go
on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are
self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is
not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and
uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
On the contrary, "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly
reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the
infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would
begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides,
on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it,
and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this
is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted
as its principle, as stated above [1105](A[2]). The other principle is
taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences
one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring
into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the
inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for
instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements
known either through speculative or through practical science; for
instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live
without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry.
But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For
just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means
are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which
presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate
conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however
prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an
infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only
potentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Although human action can be hindered, the
hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always
necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.
Reply to Objection 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken
for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as
it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a
necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to
sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive
power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul
only?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the
apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12)
ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, consent is "co-sense. " But sense is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive
power.
Objection 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect
to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which
is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an
apprehensive power.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man
judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no
sentence," i. e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power.
Therefore consent does also.
I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now
it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the
absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the
intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend
indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since
the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far
as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense,
since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which
it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is
written (Wis. 1:1): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness. " And on
these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the
reason. " Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
reason as including the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the
apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies
seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud
sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain
distance from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to
consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the
thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect,
whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather
the reverse, as we have stated in the [1106]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [1107]FP,
Q[27], A[4]; [1108]FP, Q[59], A[2], is more properly said to assent:
although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather
than in English. ]. We may also say that the intellect assents, in so
far as it is moved by the will.
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Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational
animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one
thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what
follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act
accomplished; which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do
something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But
irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after
judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
this is called the sentence," i. e. consent. But counsel is not in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational
animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of
the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the
appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject
in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an
action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the
stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But
irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for
this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational
animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not
apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the
irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to
the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement,
and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
Reply to Objection 1: In irrational animals the determination of the
appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent
implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than
merely passive.
Reply to Objection 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is
removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only.
But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by
the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect
of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen
water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not
follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act
follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the
appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to
follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power.
Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because
that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is
on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still
more do we consent to the end.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just
as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
Objection 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above
([1109]Q[13], A[1]). If therefore consent were only directed to the
means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be
false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the
choice. " Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the
"sentence," i. e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and
embraces the judgment of his counsel. " But counsel is only about the
means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to
something that is already in the power of him who causes the
application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the
apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends
to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive
movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of
simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration
after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they
come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as
the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from
counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to
counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes
the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means
presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of
the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly
speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent,
properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the
principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not
science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent
to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not
consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself,
is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he
consents to that act.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice includes something that consent has not,
namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is
preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice.
For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found
conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval,
consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have
given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with
approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in
our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we
approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to
those that do not meet with our approval.
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Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always
belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as
youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent
to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the
higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be
voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts.
Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Objection 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the
contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal,
but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the
soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason
alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible
for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining
them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave. "
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest
place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as
judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision
has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher
reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of
sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge
according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher
reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or
not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be
considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of
what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act
belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason
includes the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to
the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to
delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower
reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far
as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it
belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something
else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is
ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the
master or principal art.
Reply to Objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact
that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of
each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only
because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but
also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
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OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether use is an act of the will?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?
(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
alone.
Objection 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular
or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man
chooses save what he can do himself. "
I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard
the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end
is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man
produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the
physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the
thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the possession of
money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means
must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some action
intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or
puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as
man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the
intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that
is put in contradistinction to contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or
some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that
post. Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop
or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we
speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in
conjunction with some action of the chooser.
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Whether choice is only of possible things?
Objection 1: It would seem that choice in not only of possible things.
For choice is an act of the will, as stated above [1097](A[1]). Now
there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore
there is also a choice of impossibilities.
Objection 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above
[1098](A[4]). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing
is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or
that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we
are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be
impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
Objection 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But
the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of
the impossible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no
choice of impossibilities. "
I answer that, As stated above [1099](A[4]), our choice is always
concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to
us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an
end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is
that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is
impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the
business.
Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the
reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end,
as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an
impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.
Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now
no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to
the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.
Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The will stands between the intellect and the
external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and
the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the
movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
something under the universal notion of good: but the term or
perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the
action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the
perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one
to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete
act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him
that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the
impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one
would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an
act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And
therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended
good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is
apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something
which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and
yet impossible to him.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for this is that the subject should
not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is
possible; but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
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Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end
stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that
which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man is
moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the
reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises.
Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not
moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two
portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not
moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of
this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if
that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen,
much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible).
Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to
be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others.
Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of
necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that
seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because
that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a
twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act;
again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of
this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend
to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can
apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also
this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act. " Again, in all particular
goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of
some good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect, it can
apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be
avoided. The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be
apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way.
Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to
be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
the means, as stated above [1100](A[3]); it is not of the perfect good,
which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man
chooses not of necessity, but freely.
Reply to Objection 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity
follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true
if the conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always
necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not
always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be
such, they are not always considered in that light.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to
be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such
matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that
are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as,
for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion. "
Reply to Objection 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one
aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some
particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards
that one rather than towards the other.
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OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?
(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?
(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?
(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
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Whether counsel is an inquiry?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the
appetite. " But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel
is not an inquiry.
Objection 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for
which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
as we have shown in the [1101]FP, Q[14], A[7]. But counsel is ascribed
to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that "He worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will. " Therefore counsel is not
inquiry.
Objection 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is
given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:25): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I
give counsel. " Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ]
says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a
counsel. "
I answer that, Choice, as stated above ([1102]Q[13], A[1], ad 2; A[3]),
follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there
is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are
concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their
vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore
the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on
the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has
been already counselled. "
Reply to Objection 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one
another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other
power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now
it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the
means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the
reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is
to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the
will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason,
something of the will---both as matter (since counsel is of what man
wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that
man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore,
just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect
influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act
of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is
"appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a
way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the
inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
Reply to Objection 2: The things that we say of God must be understood
without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us
science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects:
but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the
First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe
counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which
certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry
has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to
God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes
not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: It may happen that things which are most
certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not
certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded
men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
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Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but
also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a
doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore
inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can
be of the end.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some
human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can
be of the end.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ] says
that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means. "
I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters: because
the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry.
Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only
of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard
to some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the
principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and
consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may
be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an
object of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already
fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not
looked upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will
be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they
are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it
will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
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Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we
do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for
many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are
not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are
laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who
seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Objection 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future
events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not
only of things that we do.
Objection 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no
would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ]
says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and
that we are able to do. "
I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between
several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to
confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent
particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is
necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into
consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note
of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal
things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and
simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these
things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly
speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in
such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is
the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as
being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular
and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about
things done by us.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but
about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is
not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs
him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing
something.
Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also
about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we
speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to
do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Reply to Objection 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in
so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of
affection---thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as
though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for
the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since
one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he
would do through his servant.
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Whether counsel is about all things that we do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
above [1103](A[1]). But choice is about all things that we do.
Therefore counsel is too.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But,
whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything
that we do.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but
if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this. "
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore
counsel takes place in all things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv. ] says
that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
or art. "
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
[1104](A[1]).
But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic.
ad Trebat. ]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no
doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate
ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts
which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does
not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by
art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done
this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder
but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small
things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we
do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those
which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with
the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine,
commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxiv. ].
Reply to Objection 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its
judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is
evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no
inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel
in all that is done by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means,
but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be
accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not
only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
there is no need of counsel.
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Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of
analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of
our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.
from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always
proceed by way of analysis.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason
proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to
the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present,
and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel
one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is
not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one
of analysis.
Objection 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to
us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a
certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable
to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of
counsel should begin from things present.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who
takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze. "
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And
if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect
is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects.
But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being,
the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with
effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the
principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed
in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of
counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from
that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives
at that which is to be done at once.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take
their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning
about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason begins with that which is first according
to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
Reply to Objection 3: We should not want to know whether something to
be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining
that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the
end, before considering whether it be possible.
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Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.
For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action
is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of
counsel is indefinite.
Objection 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only
what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action
can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.
Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go
on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are
self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is
not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and
uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
On the contrary, "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly
reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the
infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would
begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides,
on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it,
and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this
is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted
as its principle, as stated above [1105](A[2]). The other principle is
taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences
one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring
into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the
inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for
instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements
known either through speculative or through practical science; for
instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live
without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry.
But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For
just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means
are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which
presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate
conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however
prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an
infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only
potentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Although human action can be hindered, the
hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always
necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.
Reply to Objection 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken
for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as
it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a
necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to
sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
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OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive
power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul
only?
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Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the
apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12)
ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, consent is "co-sense. " But sense is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive
power.
Objection 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect
to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which
is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an
apprehensive power.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man
judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no
sentence," i. e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power.
Therefore consent does also.
I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now
it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the
absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the
intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend
indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since
the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far
as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense,
since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which
it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is
written (Wis. 1:1): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness. " And on
these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the
reason. " Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
reason as including the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the
apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies
seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud
sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain
distance from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to
consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the
thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect,
whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather
the reverse, as we have stated in the [1106]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [1107]FP,
Q[27], A[4]; [1108]FP, Q[59], A[2], is more properly said to assent:
although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather
than in English. ]. We may also say that the intellect assents, in so
far as it is moved by the will.
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Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational
animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one
thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what
follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act
accomplished; which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do
something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But
irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after
judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
this is called the sentence," i. e. consent. But counsel is not in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational
animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of
the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the
appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject
in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an
action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the
stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But
irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for
this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational
animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not
apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the
irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to
the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement,
and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
Reply to Objection 1: In irrational animals the determination of the
appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent
implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than
merely passive.
Reply to Objection 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is
removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only.
But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by
the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect
of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen
water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not
follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act
follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the
appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to
follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power.
Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because
that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is
on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still
more do we consent to the end.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just
as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
Objection 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above
([1109]Q[13], A[1]). If therefore consent were only directed to the
means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be
false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the
choice. " Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the
"sentence," i. e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and
embraces the judgment of his counsel. " But counsel is only about the
means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to
something that is already in the power of him who causes the
application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the
apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends
to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive
movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of
simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration
after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they
come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as
the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from
counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to
counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes
the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means
presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of
the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly
speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent,
properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the
principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not
science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent
to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not
consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself,
is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he
consents to that act.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice includes something that consent has not,
namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is
preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice.
For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found
conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval,
consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have
given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with
approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in
our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we
approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to
those that do not meet with our approval.
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Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always
belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as
youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent
to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the
higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be
voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts.
Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Objection 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the
contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal,
but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the
soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason
alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible
for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining
them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave. "
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest
place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as
judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision
has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher
reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of
sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge
according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher
reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or
not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be
considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of
what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act
belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason
includes the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to
the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to
delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower
reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far
as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it
belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something
else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is
ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the
master or principal art.
Reply to Objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact
that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of
each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only
because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but
also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
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OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether use is an act of the will?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?
(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
