ix, 8, "friendship towards
another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks
on another as on himself.
another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks
on another as on himself.
Summa Theologica
.
.
hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word
was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2).
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals
(Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to
Moses, is sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an
angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the
external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within,
Who supported the effectual power of speaking. " Hence also it is that
the angel spoke as personating the Lord.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is
stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and
shortly afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived
what he saw and he desired what he saw not. " Hence he did not see the
very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him
immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him
face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of
the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to
mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate
creature, i. e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision
"face to face" means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation,
inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by
his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it
through others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He
promulgated it through the angels.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given
to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which
was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2065]AA[2],3). But that
salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations,
according to Is. 49:6: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my
servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of
Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that
thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth. "
Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to
one people only.
Objection 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a
respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and
worketh justice, is acceptable to Him. " Therefore the way of salvation
should not have been opened to one people more than to another.
Objection 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated
above [2066](A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the
angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written
(Ecclus. 17:14): "Over every nation He set a ruler. " Also on all
nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God
than spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to
all peoples.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath
the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God
were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like
manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest
unto them. "
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given
to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone
remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned
away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the
Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to
idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as
is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and
sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But
you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols,
the star of your god, which you made to yourselves. " Moreover it is
stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God
giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for
thou art a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in
the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. "
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16)
that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not,
'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which
is Christ. " And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons
to that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that
Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of
whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special
sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy,
because I . . . am holy. " Nor again was it on account of the merit of
Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ
should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation.
Hence it is written (Is. 41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form
the east, hath called him to follow him? "
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election
that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung
from them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg. :
'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He
loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them. " And if again it
asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be
born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super
Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou
to judge, if thou wish not to err. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through
Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ
should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged
above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews,
"belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the
testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and
of whom is Christ according to the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things
which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things
which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity,
gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of
persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were
not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a
respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the
human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if
He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity;
but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not": for this is
due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first
parent.
Reply to Objection 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on
account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are
the ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures
demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the
intermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not
only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts
Thou wilt preserve, O Lord. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old
Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to
his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the
earth" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were
bound to observe the Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the
Old Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not
in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work. " If
therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old
Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual
and to the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If
any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of
the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he
celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is
born in the land. " But it would have been useless to admit strangers to
the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have
been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be
saved without observing the Law.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the
Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that
the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved
without observing the Law.
I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural
law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those
precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to
observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but
because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts
which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on save the
Jewish people alone.
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above
[2067](A[4]), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a
prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of
that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special
sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics
who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain
obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are
bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which
people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people
was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were
not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): "Thou shalt be perfect
and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they
used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3: "I profess
this day before the Lord thy God," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to
observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders
certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others
are not bound thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his
state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the
worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence
it is written (Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that
hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law? " In like manner,
from this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of
the laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the
world.
Reply to Objection 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly
and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere
natural law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the
laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons
to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at
the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation
which was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2068]AA[2],3). But
man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned.
Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of
those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the
"seed, which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as
related in Gn. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once
at the time of Abraham.
Objection 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended
from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born
of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the
promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was
appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said. "
Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it
was given after Abraham.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set
because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made
the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator":
ordained, i. e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.
Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order
of time.
I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time
of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect
of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is
imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law
restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being
instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do.
Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as
would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was
proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of
his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for
salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome
in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the
help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience that
his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had
fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore,
after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as a
remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of
sin" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his
pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil
what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8:3,4), "what the
Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sent
[Vulg. : 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law
might be fulfilled in us. "
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was
most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be
obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that
this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they
might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming
that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law
of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at
once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident
in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law;
because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by
habitual sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: A law should not be given save to the people,
since it is a general precept, as stated above ([2069]Q[90], AA[2],3);
wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as
it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had
multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from
slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for "slaves
are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the
law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not
only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole
people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the
sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed,
according to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be
given to that people as soon as they were collected together.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are
distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral
precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?
(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept.
Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above
([2070]Q[90], AA[2],3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it
contains but one precept.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): "If there be any
other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself. " But this is only one commandment. Therefore the
Old Law contained but one commandment.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them.
For this is the Law and the prophets. " But the whole of the Old Law is
comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old
Law contains but one commandment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of
commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old
Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law
comprises many commandments.
I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something
which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the
necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in
its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as
being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to
be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be
given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently
we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of
their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the
diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained
to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the
diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art
of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims
at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules,
according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing
friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God.
Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," as expressing the end of all
commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when
we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this
commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of
one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two
commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic.
ix, 8, "friendship towards
another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks
on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an
explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an
explanation of this commandment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts.
For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above
([2071]Q[91], AA[4],5;[2072] Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts
belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old
Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's
assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to
things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason
seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts
do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that
killeth" (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken,
according to Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for
by them Thou hast given me life. " Therefore the moral precepts do not
belong to the Old Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them
discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an
inheritance. " Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb.
12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc. , says: "Discipline is
an exercise in morals by means of difficulties. " Therefore the Law
which was given by God comprised moral precepts.
I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident
fromEx. 20:13, 15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal. " This
was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law
is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of
the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since
likeness is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every
beast loveth its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man
to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is
written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy. " But the
goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii,
6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts
about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not
as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto.
For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to
man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is
insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen
to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as
to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being
habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done
in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like
conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the
reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful,
things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the
authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus
among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to
which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also
those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the
Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is
liable.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv),
even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to
the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good,
without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise
ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man
is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are
called moral, as stated above ([2073]Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems
that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral
precepts.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to
refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue,
viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and
ceremony to the Godhead. " Since, then, the moral precepts are about
acts of virtue, as stated above [2074](A[2]), it seems that the
ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which
signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first
place. " Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial
precepts about certain figurative actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote
in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should
teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do. " But the ten
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
I answer that, As stated above [2075](A[2]), the Divine law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another.
Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of
anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good
of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions
relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the
formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles.
On the other hand the Divine law directed men to one another according
to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which
order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not
only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love,
but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his
subjection to God: and it is these works that are said to belong to the
Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i. e.
gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because,
at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as
Valerius Maximus states [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word
"ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine
worship, being derived from a town near Rome called "Caere": since,
when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans
were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those
precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially
called ceremonial.
Reply to Objection 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and
therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these
matters also.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2076]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts
of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they
are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these
very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of
natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the
moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship
God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the
determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by
such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the
ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct
from the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of
God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible
similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not
only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the
things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes
expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but
also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to
the ceremonial precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial
precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in
addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For
Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are
"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
the life that is foreshadowed. " Now the precepts of the life we have to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is
foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from
Thy judgments," says, i. e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for
me. " But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the
judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according
to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment. " But acts of
justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and
consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral
precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts
besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the
Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these
belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which
dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to
be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known
principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters.
Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about
Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the
determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be
observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying
that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy,
and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with
regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word
"sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is consecrated to God);
and "good," i. e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at
the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised
under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts
of the life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an
application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.
Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral
precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both
judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the
ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial
precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall
observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while
"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the
moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act
belongs to the judicial precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the
ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is
worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz.
temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above
([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old
Law should comprise others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God,
and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and
commandments. " Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above
[2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial
precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments. "
[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this
article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the
ordinary acceptance of the word. ]
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of
the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have
[Vulg. : 'He hath'] commanded thee. " Therefore in addition to the above,
the Law comprises "testimonies. "
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications
(i. e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget. " Therefore
in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial
precepts, but also others, called "justifications. "
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. "
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all
the precepts of the Law are included under them.
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or
virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was
necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to
indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e. g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies. "
Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be
appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who
transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice
of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations," etc. : and these are called "justifications," according as God
punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a
law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of
the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts. "
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but
as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments";
because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an
example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in
other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc. )
says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments. "
Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards
human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those
things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those
things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as
the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in
so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part,
as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
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Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men
to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and
threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by
fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what
doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? " But the desire for temporal
goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity. " Therefore temporal
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a
lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher
declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law
employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of
guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But
as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the
just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if
you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour
you. "
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent
to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments
and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered
becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
generally known.
hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word
was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2).
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals
(Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to
Moses, is sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an
angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the
external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within,
Who supported the effectual power of speaking. " Hence also it is that
the angel spoke as personating the Lord.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is
stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and
shortly afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived
what he saw and he desired what he saw not. " Hence he did not see the
very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him
immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him
face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of
the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to
mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate
creature, i. e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision
"face to face" means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation,
inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by
his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it
through others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He
promulgated it through the angels.
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Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given
to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which
was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2065]AA[2],3). But that
salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations,
according to Is. 49:6: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my
servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of
Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that
thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth. "
Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to
one people only.
Objection 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, "God is not a
respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and
worketh justice, is acceptable to Him. " Therefore the way of salvation
should not have been opened to one people more than to another.
Objection 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated
above [2066](A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the
angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written
(Ecclus. 17:14): "Over every nation He set a ruler. " Also on all
nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God
than spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to
all peoples.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): "What advantage then hath
the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God
were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in like
manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest
unto them. "
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given
to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone
remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned
away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the
Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to
idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as
is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: "Did you offer victims and
sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But
you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols,
the star of your god, which you made to yourselves. " Moreover it is
stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God
giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for
thou art a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in
the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He
promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. "
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16)
that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not,
'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy seed,' which
is Christ. " And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons
to that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that
Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of
whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special
sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be ye holy,
because I . . . am holy. " Nor again was it on account of the merit of
Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ
should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation.
Hence it is written (Is. 41:2): "Who hath raised up the just one form
the east, hath called him to follow him? "
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election
that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung
from them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: "Ye did [Vulg. :
'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He
loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them. " And if again it
asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be
born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super
Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou
to judge, if thou wish not to err. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through
Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ
should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged
above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom," namely the Jews,
"belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the
testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and
of whom is Christ according to the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things
which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things
which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity,
gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of
persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were
not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a
respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the
human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if
He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity;
but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not": for this is
due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first
parent.
Reply to Objection 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on
account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are
the ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures
demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the
intermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not
only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts
Thou wilt preserve, O Lord. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old
Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to
his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the
earth" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were
bound to observe the Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the
Old Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not
in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work. " If
therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old
Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.
Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual
and to the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If
any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of
the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he
celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is
born in the land. " But it would have been useless to admit strangers to
the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have
been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be
saved without observing the Law.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the
Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that
the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved
without observing the Law.
I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural
law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those
precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to
observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but
because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts
which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on save the
Jewish people alone.
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above
[2067](A[4]), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a
prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of
that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special
sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics
who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain
obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are
bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which
people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people
was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were
not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): "Thou shalt be perfect
and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they
used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3: "I profess
this day before the Lord thy God," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to
observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders
certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others
are not bound thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his
state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the
worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence
it is written (Dt. 4:8): "What other nation is there so renowned that
hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law? " In like manner,
from this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of
the laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the
world.
Reply to Objection 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly
and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere
natural law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the
laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons
to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at
the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation
which was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2068]AA[2],3). But
man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned.
Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of
those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the
"seed, which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as
related in Gn. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once
at the time of Abraham.
Objection 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended
from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born
of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the
promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was
appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said. "
Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it
was given after Abraham.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set
because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made
the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator":
ordained, i. e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains.
Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order
of time.
I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time
of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect
of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is
imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law
restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being
instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do.
Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as
would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was
proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of
his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for
salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome
in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the
help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience that
his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had
fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore,
after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as a
remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of
sin" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his
pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil
what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8:3,4), "what the
Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sent
[Vulg. : 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law
might be fulfilled in us. "
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was
most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be
obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that
this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they
might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming
that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law
of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at
once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident
in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law;
because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by
habitual sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: A law should not be given save to the people,
since it is a general precept, as stated above ([2069]Q[90], AA[2],3);
wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as
it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had
multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from
slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for "slaves
are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the
law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not
only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole
people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the
sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed,
according to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be
given to that people as soon as they were collected together.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are
distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?
(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?
(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral
precepts?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?
(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept.
Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above
([2070]Q[90], AA[2],3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it
contains but one precept.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): "If there be any
other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself. " But this is only one commandment. Therefore the
Old Law contained but one commandment.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them.
For this is the Law and the prophets. " But the whole of the Old Law is
comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old
Law contains but one commandment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law of
commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old
Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law
comprises many commandments.
I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something
which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the
necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in
its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as
being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to
be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be
given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently
we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of
their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the
diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained
to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the
diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art
of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims
at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules,
according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing
friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God.
Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," as expressing the end of all
commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when
we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this
commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of
one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two
commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic.
ix, 8, "friendship towards
another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks
on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever
you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an
explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an
explanation of this commandment.
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Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts.
For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above
([2071]Q[91], AA[4],5;[2072] Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts
belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old
Law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's
assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to
things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason
seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts
do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
Objection 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that
killeth" (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken,
according to Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for
by them Thou hast given me life. " Therefore the moral precepts do not
belong to the Old Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them
discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an
inheritance. " Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb.
12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc. , says: "Discipline is
an exercise in morals by means of difficulties. " Therefore the Law
which was given by God comprised moral precepts.
I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident
fromEx. 20:13, 15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal. " This
was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law
is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of
the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since
likeness is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every
beast loveth its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man
to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is
written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy. " But the
goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii,
6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts
about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not
as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto.
For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to
man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is
insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen
to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as
to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being
habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done
in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like
conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the
reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful,
things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the
authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus
among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to
which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also
those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the
Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is
liable.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv),
even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to
the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good,
without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
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Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise
ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man
is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are
called moral, as stated above ([2073]Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems
that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral
precepts.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to
refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue,
viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and
ceremony to the Godhead. " Since, then, the moral precepts are about
acts of virtue, as stated above [2074](A[2]), it seems that the
ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which
signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first
place. " Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial
precepts about certain figurative actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): "Ten words . . . He wrote
in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should
teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do. " But the ten
commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
I answer that, As stated above [2075](A[2]), the Divine law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another.
Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of
anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good
of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions
relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the
formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles.
On the other hand the Divine law directed men to one another according
to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which
order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not
only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love,
but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his
subjection to God: and it is these works that are said to belong to the
Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i. e.
gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because,
at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as
Valerius Maximus states [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word
"ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine
worship, being derived from a town near Rome called "Caere": since,
when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans
were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those
precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially
called ceremonial.
Reply to Objection 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and
therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these
matters also.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2076]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts
of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they
are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these
very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of
natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the
moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship
God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the
determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by
such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the
ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct
from the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of
God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible
similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not
only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the
things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes
expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but
also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to
the ceremonial precepts.
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Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial
precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in
addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For
Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are
"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
the life that is foreshadowed. " Now the precepts of the life we have to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is
foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from
Thy judgments," says, i. e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for
me. " But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the
judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according
to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment. " But acts of
justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and
consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral
precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts
besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the
Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these
belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which
dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to
be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known
principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters.
Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about
Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the
determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be
observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying
that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy,
and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with
regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word
"sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is consecrated to God);
and "good," i. e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at
the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised
under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts
of the life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an
application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.
Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral
precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both
judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the
ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial
precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall
observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while
"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the
moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act
belongs to the judicial precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the
ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is
worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz.
temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above
([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old
Law should comprise others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God,
and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and
commandments. " Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above
[2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial
precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments. "
[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this
article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the
ordinary acceptance of the word. ]
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of
the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have
[Vulg. : 'He hath'] commanded thee. " Therefore in addition to the above,
the Law comprises "testimonies. "
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications
(i. e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget. " Therefore
in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial
precepts, but also others, called "justifications. "
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. "
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all
the precepts of the Law are included under them.
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or
virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was
necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to
indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e. g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies. "
Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be
appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who
transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice
of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations," etc. : and these are called "justifications," according as God
punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a
law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of
the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts. "
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but
as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments";
because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an
example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in
other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc. )
says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments. "
Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards
human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those
things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those
things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as
the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in
so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part,
as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
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Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men
to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and
threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by
fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what
doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? " But the desire for temporal
goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity. " Therefore temporal
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a
lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher
declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law
employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of
guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But
as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the
just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if
you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour
you. "
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent
to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments
and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered
becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
generally known.
