No More Learning

” Marx sees this as the capture of human activities in the material life-process through the value creation of capital. The industrial proletariat gives the category of work sans phrase its social shape. But human activity only becomes “work as such” if it belongs to a form of production which in its very essence continually produces further possibilities of production. Marx explains this extraordinary phenomenon by
16 The Modern Age as Mobilization
linking the anthropological motive of self-production both to the economic motive of profit (i. e. investment return) and to the agonal motive of competition. An explosive mixture of motives emerges from the alliance between self-preserving self-sufficiency, pursuit of profit, and competition that lends the modernizing movement its impetus. The decisive mechanism in this new arrangement is indeed the suspected “self-exploitation of value” – that work of alchemy which organizes an activity in such a way that its result consists of the increase in ability to carry out the activity. Wherever the modern “work sans phrase” sets the rhythm, not only is a given form of life reproduced “economically” (in other words, in terms of home or palace economics), but also an increase in productivity becomes part of the primary product of production. This is precisely in accordance with the kinetic formula of mobilization. The self- exploitation of value as production of productivity is one of the many ways in which the modern mobilization loop begins to turn into movement that leads to more movement. Marx was right to describe capital which circulates around its own self-propagation as a demiurgic processing magnitude that forces the concrete lifelines of workers to march to its abstract rhythm for the sake of its self- sustaining self-propagation. But he gives far too little attention to the kinetic foundational process of modernity as the general movement towards more movement. Marx attributes the fact that “in modern times” everything moves further, faster, and more inten- sively to the dynamics of capitalist modes of production and uses confusing schemas of primary and secondary movement (i. e. base and superstructure) to interpret it as a problem that is sui generis. In reality, the capital process would never have begun if it had not been sustained by independent, parallel, and preceding structures of self-actualization and self-intensification. It is no coincidence that Marxist interpreters of early modern emerging movements continue to be perplexed by the riddle of “primitive accumulation. ” This perplexity necessarily remains as long as we insist on under- standing the accumulation process in economic terms. In actual fact, the problem of accumulation leads to the core of modern kinetics, which is in turn – we’ve already said it – inseparable from the secret of subjectivity. We find more promising clues if we reject the question of primitive accumulation of capital and turn our attention to that of primitive accumulation of subjectivity – always provided that we are right to see it as not just a “metaphysical” phenomenon (which it also is in a certain sense) and not address it merely as the seat of intelligible and creative capacity, but above all to recognize the agency of self-movement towards movement in it, which is as puzzling as it is world-shaking. We would then be
The Modern Age as Mobilization 17
dealing with the primitive accumulation of a “kinetic energy” which – always mediated by subjective initiatives – repels itself from the world as first nature, turning it into pure raw material, energy source and substrate, which is then used by the kinetic energy to construct a New World from mobile artifacts on top of it. (In chapter 3, we will identify the nature of this kinetic subjectivity and connect it to the tension between a birth through a mother and a self-birth through one’s own efforts. )
Wherever the modern kinetic model of success (movement towards increased mobility) begins to operate within a sector of activity, wayward contributions to the great dawn of the New World are created; a dawn where Europe is split off from its archaic, antiquated, and pre-modern way of being, followed by vast parts of the rest of the world. It is likely that classical Greece acted as a prelude to it: in sophistry, we can see the first signs of the devel- opment of intelligence into sport and in the Olympic games, a cult-like intensification of physical exercise. After that, the kinetic genie in a bottle seems to have been corked for a millennium and a half; it is only underground that the energies continued to rumble, having been exhausted in tribal feuds, migrations of peoples, Hunnish wars, Saxon slaughters, Germanic missions, politics of the first Reich, agriculture, livestock farming, monastic immersion, hermitage, simple reproduction. Then: the great initial spark. It seems to begin in the monasteries of the high Middle Ages, where the true factories of primitive accumulation of subjectivity are to be found. What is deployed here in the religious exercises of ascetic self-intensification – autogenic movement to increase movement, concentrating on concentration, immersing oneself in immersion, praying for work, working at being able to pray – has its analog in the various sectoral movements towards increasing self-powering mobility; in the accumulation of scientific knowledge which can only retain its status as valid knowledge if it is organized as research, that is, cognitive mobilization; in the self-exaltation of modern territorial states which soon reveal themselves to be transport states and arm themselves as nation states; in the dynamic of military mobilization, which has always been an arms race, that is, a battle for ballistic and kinetic advantages; in the self-dramatization of fit bodies that surrender to the ecstasy of increased movement almost as if entering a cult; in the self-erotization of sexual subjects who practice arousing their ability to be aroused; in the self-deification of the individual as artist, who revolves around the creation of their own creativity in a constant, expressive mobilization. In all of these fields and sectors of human mobility, self-mobilizations are being played out that span over several centuries, and the economic process
18 The Modern Age as Mobilization
is certainly their most willing medium, most unilateral driving force, and most versatile accomplice; in it, movement towards more movement pushes through industrial and monetary processes as well with an irresistibility that is sui generis. But the Marxian “value” that generates additional value per capitalization is in reality more a kinetic than an economic phenomenon; its parameter is the power to move, and its content, in turn, tantamount to being able to move.
A view of mobilization as a fundamental process of modernity has only recently been coming to light, not because anyone claims to be more insightful than the great social theorists of previous centuries but because the “thing itself ” has appeared on the stage of recognizability for the naked eye to behold. It is only for us, in view of the late modern effects of acceleration, that the phenomenon of pure mobility has become real and conceivable. In analogy to Marx’s vision of the Fundamentals, a categorically novel phenomenon seems to appear for the diagnosis of the late twentieth century: “mobility as such,” “self-movement sans phrase. ” This postulates not only a third industrial revolution, with all that has been done to the reality of modern life by electronics, nuclear technology, and computer science, but also modern politics with its arms races, mass movements, and initiatives from above and below; it also assumes modern tourism and its conception of the world as service counter and landing strip; the cable-equipped screens, too, and the new disarray of love with its urban theater of separation, night clubs, computer games, and consoles in children’s rooms; jogging in the park and athletic cults in the stadiums, disposable bottles, Andy Warhol’s Factory, and the Captured Music. . . It is only once the self-movement sans phrase has directly forced its way into everyone’s reality of life as a real category that the dynamic motif of a society made up of self-mobilizing subjects can be designated as such in the tone of calm critique without the diagnostician having to rise to the status of a prophet. And it is only recently that we have been forced to perceive in philosophical hindsight as well that Marx and Nietzsche said the same thing – the will to self-appropriating self-production and the will to power (as an initiative to enforce an interpretation of the world) are two alternate formulations of the same creative large-scale attack of the acting spirit on “matter,” of the same kinetic nihilism that apprehends what exists as source of energy and construction site, nothing else.
We can differentiate three basic tendencies or categories of the modern fundamental process of mobilization, which has in the meantime absorbed the entire way of the world. The great self- movement towards more movement takes place first as a tendency towards motorization, installation of autonomous process units,
The Modern Age as Mobilization 19
and continuous acceleration of them (“tachocracy”); second, as a tendency to relieve, numb, and disable the functions of a subject that are too sensitive, slow, and oriented towards truth (automation through desensitization or elimination of context); third, through progressive eradication of distances and imponderables in coinci- dence with strategic appropriation of the other (logistics). In these three executing aggregates, the world as a hitherto inert resource for automobile system-subjects becomes processed, codified, made ready-to-use, and de-realized. De-realization is the psycho-social result of a systemic “self-realization” where the outdated term “reality” logically shrinks to the residual function of the not-yet- mobilized. For a few years now, American “deconstructionists” have been whispering the new message to each other: there is nothing outside the text;9 only the naïve still cling to the antiquated fiction of the “external referent. ” Even epistemology shows glimpses of the impending short-circuit between kinetics and semiotics – the world is logically ripe for evaporation.
Only on the horizon of an omnipresent mobilization do we see that there can only be one kind of appropriate critique for such a reality that works towards a pervasive awareness of movement. Yet this is again formulated to be misunderstood, because this work towards awareness must not move forward but take a step back in order to gain distance and disconnect from the process of acceleration. Only hesitantly do we call the critical aspect of this mobilization theory after a classical model: the critique of political kinetics.
This critique claims the ugly and seemingly merely physical and subhuman concept of movement for the humanities, social sciences, and history in basic conceptual terms. We can only imagine what kind of reception the critique of political kinetics will receive when we recall what kinds of arguments and faces were made by the beautiful souls of the nineteenth century in response to the Marxist impertinence of accepting the term “work” as a funda- mental category of historical anthropology. All we know is that this time the Marxists have joined the beautiful souls and bourgeois pragmatists as part of the great coalition of mobilizers: the Marxists because they are the first to understand that the critique of kinetics is only possible from a post-Marxist position that views “dialectical materialism” as just a particularly faded form of modern mobili- zation folklore; the beautiful souls because they are at least not inspired by such an ugly theory while they engage in their favorite occupation, the dawn of a New Age and the Human Potential Movement; the pragmatists because they in any case suppress any thought that could even remotely question their axiom of economic growth at a rate of 3% per annum.
20 The Modern Age as Mobilization
Now, no one can be under the illusion that anything more can be called into question through a critique of political kinetics than just the growth rate of an industrial civilization that is racing – with the force of a train that’s been accelerating for centuries – into the unknown. Whoever raises the question of kinetics does no less than to call into play the problem of whether and how this train can be brought to a halt, or at least diverted somehow. And it is a matter not of whether individuals can get off the train (of course they can, provided they are the right kind of individuals), but of whether modernity as a whole can free itself from a way of being that is ontologically determined by the formula “being-towards-movement. ”
These questions are too fundamental to be left to fundamen- talists. Therefore, the critique of political kinetics exposes a working framework that can potentially be joined by every thinking and praxis that contributes in some way to the study of movement and to the exercise of the right kind of mobility. The critique of political kinetics will be a working title for the studies of a trans-disciplinary post-university “college. ” It can begin its exercises wherever the correctness of human and systemic movements needs to be examined. Like all other university-like entities, the trans-discipline for the awareness of movement requires power-neutral terrains to which the executives and stakeholders of the mobilizers have no access – it is the best tradition for the protection of theory since the European high Middle Ages. But since the operation of almost all currently active universities in this world has evolved into pre-schools of mobilization and cognitive subcontracting companies for the “attack of the present on the rest of all time,” the critique of political kinetics has to look for other spaces in order to hold its studies. Whether this will take place in the New Social Movements, the centers for alternative culture, para-academic start-ups – that is not a pressing matter for the time being, and besides, these are also not the only possible alternatives. It is pressing, however, that the trans-discipline of the critique of movement cultivate polyvalent new brains of the societies in which the knowledge of demobilization from a variety of fields is instantiated. For all of us who come from the mobilization process, this knowledge will seem difficult to handle, implausible, and frustrating because the critique of political kinetics can under no circumstance be the theoretical conscience of a “praxis. ” Some will say that its bizarre and absurd result is to describe real processes in such a way that initially there is “nothing to do” – inasmuch as all those who are eager for action will make fools of themselves before doing what is to be done first, before hesitating, before stepping back to perceive more precisely, before ceasing with what has always been
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done, before imperceptibly becoming open to the correct movement. We can guarantee that anything else will once again yield blind mobilization, however magnificent the slogans of action may sound.
Though critique of political kinetics has its basic starting point in post-Marxism, we may not extrapolate that it relates to the insights of the socialist tradition in a destructive way. What carries weight compared to that tradition is the expansion of the conceptual field from production to mobilization, on the one hand, and the amendment of the prognostic symptoms of kinetics, on the other. One has to make the effort to once again study The Communist Manifesto in the way the text has for a long time now deserved to be studied: as the Magna Carta of aggressive kinetic nihilism, in which modernity declared for the first time what it is and what it wants. But a critique of kinetics will no longer be able to participate in Marx’s euphoria in the face of the observation that in a world through which capital pulsates “all that is solid melts into air. ”10 In this phrase, we can completely hear Marx as a thinker of mobili- zation – it is not for nothing that he has provided half the world with rationalizations for making history. But he is also a thinker of mobilization because his great terminology machine – especially the dialectic of productive forces and relations of production – is only built for the purpose of demonstrating the blastability of the inert conditions that still offer oppositions to the unleashing of effective production and the ultimate evaporation of assets. Marx’s work- messianic vision is directed at a state of society where the activity of productive selves only has its own issues to deal with – removal of real resistance, total appropriation of the other, self-appropriating self-creation twenty-four hours a day. In its own way, a critique of political kinetics will indeed also know a “dialectic,” namely that of the forces and conditions of movement; only it will not lament the fact that the conditions “still” inhibit the full use of the forces but rather dryly note, if need be, that the forces of movement are in any case not too far from “evaporating” all conditions in which conven- tional movements on our part have been possible. The critique of kinetics, too, will point out – in accordance with its derivation of post-modernism from the effects of a second passivity – that there is a growing organic compound of the masses of self-movement and therefore also a tendentious decline of the advantages of movement, but it would never occur to it to prognose a “revolutionary situation” from these observations; similarly, catastrophe-loving speculations about the connection between total system collapse and the rising up of the masses are foreign to it. What this critique does emphasize is nothing more or less than a crisis-induced opportunity for an evolutionary recall of the false mobilization forays. 11
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Just as the percentage of fixed capital permanently proportionally increases in the capital process, so too the dead automated centrifugal masses continuously swell in the world-wide mobilization of systems and increase their dominance over the gestures of living mobility to the point of oppression. Moreover, the same is true of the independent scientific research companies where the self-movement of theoretical apparatuses ensures that the act of thinking plays as good as no role in relation to what is thought. These extraordinarily uncanny operations are expressed by the concept of automation as inadequately as by the term “alienation” – our classical vocabulary is of no help to us whatsoever in the face of such new process-related realities. Movement is the great unthinkable in our languages.
Considering all of this, we can anticipate the contours of what a critique of political kinetics might entail. It does the groundwork for a critical theory of modernity that could use expressions of movement to describe how mobilization problematically sublates all Old World stock through mobilization and to criticize it through exercises in demobilization. There is no indication that something of this sort will be successful – except the success itself, for which it is impossible to decree any indubitable criteria. In any case, the point of departure for this critique is the observation that the departure of modernity towards an independent conscious life for all has largely lost itself in a rather blind kinetic passing on of the sometime initiated process congeries. The cost of the impressive yields of modern possibilities for self-movement and self-actualization in many fields is an incalculable and increasingly unbearable self-surrender to the subsequent automatic, self-lapsing processes. If we are right to imagine the immediate future as a time when the growing risks of disaster rapidly actualize, it is because we can already formulate the basic kinetic scheme of every possible accidental disaster: they will be the hetero-mobile result of countless self-mobilizations. A singular and dark inevitability emerges from the interaction between countless automatizations. And as concerns our much-vaunted future from a systemic point of view, its secret lies entirely in the variations of this great inevitability. Among these variations, we can determine two kinds of extremes: one leads to a relative cessation of mobilization as a whole via the mutual deceler- ation of partial processes (a great commendation to the obstacles? ); the other drifts into the exponentiation of mobilizations through interactions to become an eco-kinetic inferno. And our process- consciousness? What role does it play in this world theater: that of the hero, the fool, or just a powerless audience member? If every- thing is really heading towards a fatal end, then our conscious self can take heart in the fact that it plays all the roles of the endgame
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at the same time so that it can be the audience of its own dramatic morphing from mobilization hero to process fool until the curtain falls. In the relatively benign version, on the other hand, subjects would be faced with a remarkable experience of themselves. In a time when modernity could save itself from itself, subjects, too, would stop moving as ontological agents of movement towards more movement. They would then know from their changed way of being that they are not the agents of mobilization but the “guardians” of real movement.
The Prospect of an Asian Renaissance: Towards a Theory of the Ancient
Wherever [the European] Mind prevails, there we witness the maximum of needs, the maximum of labor, capital and production, the maximum of ambition and power, the maximum transformation of external Nature, the maximum of relations and exchanges.
All these taken together are Europe, or the image of Europe.
Moreover, the source of this development, this astonishing superiority, is obviously the quality of the individual man, the average quality of Homo europeus. It is remarkable that the European is defined not by race, or language, or customs, but by his aims and the amplitude of his will.
Paul Valéry, “The European”12
It is an open secret among experts that for more than a hundred years now a large part of Western intelligence has been “Asianizing,” as they say. Therein, one could perceive an ironic game that an object of cognition plays with its subject. In the world of intelligences, the discoverer is always exposed to a counter-discovery by those who have been discovered. For the bourgeois world between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the interest in the East began under the sign of colonialism, which soon brought about an intel- lectual world trade. It was through the generation of early romantics that Asian imports were first brought to a theoretical level and incorporated into a generous synopsis of world cultures. A world conversation about world literature is what the cheerful mission statement of a romantic ecumenism proclaimed, in which Persian poetry and translations of the Upanishads were passed around as evidence of the actually metaphysical activity of the world soul.
But it did not end with philological flirtation. For the actual East, being discovered by another spirit turned out to be a date
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with destiny. What first began as discovery and then turned into conquest, mission, and instruction of the East soon pulled the old East into the mobilization of the planet along with it. Japan has given the world a model of self-liquidation in its final form, committing a seppuku for the sake of industry and history that will remain forever astonishing. Old Asia probably disappeared from the earth one day in the course of an epochal self-colonization, only surviving in the libraries of Western-inspired Indology, Sinology, Japanology, not unlike the way Old Europe has only survived in classical philology, medieval seminars, and period dramas.
This process must be formulated in an exaggerated way in order to correctly assess the Western Asian cult in all its strangeness. As the real East throws itself into industrial, scientific, political, and military mobilization in order to leave its old ways of thinking and being behind, the West is experiencing a cultural Asianizing for which there is no historical precedent – unless one wanted to accept the pervasion of the Roman Empire by Greco-Hellenic curricula as an analog. In this case, one would have to cite the cynical motif of conquering the conqueror; Horace’s Graecia capta ferocem victorem vincit is still on the tip of the last humanists’ tongues – after all, the verse (“Conquered Greece took prisoner her rough conquerer”13) proves how conspicuous it was even in a Roman setting to have a victor bow to the superiority of the vanquished.
Nevertheless, the topos of conquering the conqueror is not suitable for deciphering the inflation of Asianizing motifs in the current Western cultural scene. If we look through the historical arsenal for a prototype for current events, the only phenomenon that lives up to the occidental enthusiasm for Asia is that of a cultural renaissance. 14 We will argue in a moment that the phenomenon of “our” great Renaissance which occurred at the end of the Middle Ages can probably only be understood in light of today’s Asia cult.
Renaissances are visualizations of old culture in a new context. A Renaissance shows its genius in finding the ability to step into something entirely unprecedented under the cover of its enthusiasm for a prominent antiquity. The unprecedented newness can emerge precisely by drawing inspiration from a great precedent – it seems as if enthusiastic repetitions are the great vehicle of innovation. In this way, Renaissances always owe their prolificacy to a passionate misunderstanding of the old by a newness that does yet not speak its name. Only through an intense misrecognition do antiquities get brought back to a new life – one that is not their own, but rather the fluorescence of the still necessarily self-misrecognizing current life.
What the Grecomania of the Italian Renaissance and then again of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries meant for the
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self-forming of modern bourgeois society is by now culturo-histor- ically evident. But what it might have to do with the more recent Asiamania is still an unrevealed secret for most contemporaries – many come to take this (certainly conspicuous) phenomenon to be a fashion trend or an episodic exoticism. Thus, it would seem, they make good use of their fundamental right to live in ignorance of the major events of their time. But this does not change the fact that things are being negotiated in the Asiamanic phenomena of the present time which get to the heart of the world process, insofar as we are able to know something about it. When the West imagines itself to be in a sunken East and channels Asian antiquity as a master model of culture for life in the present, it is searching for possibilities of a future for itself within a foreign past. Nothing other than this was precisely the case back in the great European Renaissance, which rarely suspected the profound differences that separated it from its ancient Greek models. Today’s Asianizing Renaissance similarly delves deep into old Eastern worlds of wisdom to create pathways towards the new, the unprecedented, the inacces- sible for late modernity, whose corruption seems threatening, if not entirely incurable. For many, Asia is the cipher that offers shelter to a concept of the inconceivable.
Initially, we can draw four conclusions from this. The first is that a post-Christian era has begun within the Western hemisphere that could not possibly find the terms it would require to under- stand itself within the scriptures of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Following in the footsteps of the Young Hegelian Bruno Bauer, the Young Conservative diagnostician Otto Petras already summarized this situation in 1935 in the form of a still impressive intention “to show that Christianity – the most formidable history-shaping movement of our time – has exhausted its formative power and that we live in a Post-Christianity understood in a deeper sense than the calendar’s AD. ”15
Secondly, modernity, thus left to its own devices – at least according to the conviction of skeptical interpreters – has used up its moral reserves and has no counterforces to deploy that could intercept its own fatal drift. Enlightened secularism, with its dual commitment to self-determination and large-scale technology, is disappearing, it seems, before our very eyes in global neglect – things run as they please and initial intentions are no longer of concern. Thirdly, the attempts of the last Central European generations to invoke livable forms of neopaganism from Germanic, Celtic, Greek, and Latin religious antiquities have proved to be straw fires that sometimes burned off with barbaric fumes and rarely on a level higher than that of spiritual party conversations. Thus, anyone who
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is interested likely knows that under present conditions one might perhaps make a rural commune with that homemade raw substance of Old European and pre-Christian elements, but no longer a terri- torial state. Fourth, a turn to the East (for Americans, it is not a turn anyway, but a continuation on their old Western course, only through water) brings into play no less than a world-cultural alter- native to the Greco-Judeo-Christian path that retains its quality as alternative even when the actual contemporary Eastern hemisphere modernizes itself beyond recognition by adopting Western mobili- zation techniques.
What does it indicate that in the crisis of late modern Western world this phenomenon – here referred to as an Asian renaissance – is interlaced with it? If a logic of the Renaissance really exists, then the new Asiamania should be read as a sign that creative members of post-Christian civilization hope to come to an understanding of themselves by grasping at antiquity once again – but this time not so that it can be appropriated as one’s own antiquity, but as antiquity in a foreign form. This time, the illusion of a “memory” of something that once belonged to us is not being sought. Today, an Asian antiquity rising to the rank of exemplarity has to do not with what is foreign or one’s own, but with the very spirit of the ancient as such. In other words, we have become so uncanny to ourselves through our modernization that the old, strange sounds of the Far East suddenly begin to sound like an old, familiar idiom. And although it is obviously not a native language that touches us so suggestively in this respect, it could – after many twists and turns – become a sister language to the mother tongue. To put it differ- ently, once again: the destruction of our own traditions by way of modern analytics has stripped our lives down to the stumps – that is, all the way down to the anonymous awareness of the fact that we find ourselves in a world that is both foreign and our own at the same time. This design-making awareness that is thrown into being can now learn the language of Buddha as well as that of Plato in order to clarify its strange position to itself insofar as it experiences every language as a foreign one. From now on, it only knows itself as that which cannot know itself and cannot name itself – and if it can, then only in the form of a persistent self-misrecognizing, of an essential theatricality. From the anonymousness of this existence, the path to Lao Tzu or Chuang Tzu is no longer than the path to Parmenides or Augustine, the ascent to Plotin and Hegel no steeper than the one to Nagarjuna and Shankara, the path through Aristotle no drier than the one through Patanjali, the entry into the way of being of Meister Eckhardt no more mysterious than that of Master Dogen. Whether of Eastern or Western origin, the same
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exhausting improbability looms over these old names and doctrines, the same fascinating strangeness. Precisely because modernization has evaporated our Old European traditions and identities by way of progressive mobilization, the most foreign ancient tradition is no longer more foreign than the one that has until recently been our own.
It is in this context that the punchline of the Asian Renaissance in the modern West becomes clear: it makes us so pointedly aware of the question of the ancient preconditions of the modern enter- prise that while we can underestimate, misunderstand, combat, and disregard it, we can in the end no longer shake it off. As long as these times remain modern, they will be haunted by the question of the compatibility of human life processes and modernity itself. Since human culture is demonstrably very old and modernity very new and unsubstantiated, it is not a secondary task to find out if modernity is an outdoing of the ancient by the means of the modern or if its modernity puts a final end to antiquity. This question has become so urgent that the difference between the familiar and the foreign no longer plays any major role in these matters. Since the most foreign traditions are no longer more foreign to us than our own, it becomes clear how much our path towards the unparalleled has put all of the Old World nature and culture reserves up for negotiation. Because it is by now undeniable that a universalizing modernity exists in the form of “mobilization as such,” the question of “antiquity as such” pushes itself to the forefront almost violently. Then what is it that we take with us from antiquity on our trip into the unprecedented? Which dowries from the ancient world still create a link between past and future? What provisions will future generations live on during their continued exodus? How do the vessels in modern outer space stay in contact with the ancient ground controls?
These very questions indicate that the Asianizing Renaissance goes far beyond the events of the Grecizing Renaissance in the early bourgeois mobilization time; it is both more than and different from a mere cultural quote that will unleash something unprecedented in allusion to an authentic antiquity. Because it already emerges after this unleashing and already has an impression of what modernity can be, it poses the question more radically than the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and seeks the ancient as something that is not just as a pretext for the modern. Since the world belongs to the moderns anyway, the moment has come to inquire about the possibility of the ancient as ancient. Modern Asiamania is a Renaissance to the extent that it sides with those antiquities – whether ancient culture or nature – that create conditions for New World adventures. Thus,
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the new Asiamanically encrypted “Renaissance as such” asserts the authority of the ancient in two ways: on the one hand, it stresses that modernity would not exist if it could not – as user and consumer of pre-modern resources – depend on that which it (in an ultimately self-destructive way) exploits without regener- ating; on the other hand, it proves that the New World enterprise fundamentally overwhelms the ancient precepts since modernity follows the drive to carry out an infinite project on a finite basis. It obeys this drive if it has constituted itself metaphysically as being-towards-movement. This is actualized through us in the production of expanded productivity, in the will to a further reaching will, in the imagining of heightened imagination, in the creation of more comprehensive creativity, in short, in the movement towards movement ad inifinitum. As being-towards- movement, modernity is defined as “mobilization as such,” in other words as being-towards-self-annihilation.
The “Renaissance as such” that we see at work in the Asianizing activity of the more sensible West equals nothing less than an ontological sign change.
For if there is a common denominator for the currents of ancient Asian thought, it is that they grasp the meaning of being as a being-towards-stillness-within-movement. Even where, as in yoga, one works with the highest mobilizations of forces in the sense of a mystical physiology, the focus of consciousness is always on the advancement towards stillness within strength. The Asianizing tendencies in the West are perhaps only awkward tentative attempts in this direction – they express the intuition that nothing less than an ontological sign change will suffice to take the fatal thrust out of the “processes of modernization. ” Nowadays, whoever looks for a language of demobilization will most likely find it in the ancient Eastern realm, where different dramaturgies have been developed for the kinetics of the will to live than in the Western mobilization civilization. And it is only by borrowing from such languages, which irritate us with their frustrating wisdom, that it is possible to point, however awkwardly, to what needs to be said in the midst of the worldwide movement towards movement. The unthinkable impertinence that is heard by modern ears in old Asian “quietist” keys is aimed at the kinetic demission of mobilizing systems and subjects. But can we seriously imagine our de-automobilization? Can we conceive of a way of being where the system-subjects would no longer be driven forward by their self-advancement propellers? Does a prospect even exist for us where the powers of the subject generate something other than otherworldly acceleration, enrichment, research, and empowerment?
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These questions do not comprise disclaimers for modernity after-the-fact owing to bad experiences with it. They are as old as modernity itself; indeed they are inseparable from the superb upswing of early Romanticism, in which an offensive modernism, sustained by the élan of self-outdoing, inquired beyond itself in its best philosophical moments. Novalis’ phrase – “One is greatly in error if one believes that antiquities exist. Antiquity is only now coming into being”16 – already holds the key to the post-modern Renaissances. What emerges out of the new antiquities are shadows that belong to the light of modernity. The more modern, the more post-modern – there is no way around this formula. Aside from an imperceptible boundary, nothing can survive the impulse of modern self-mobilization ad infinitum unchanged unless it be through the boundless generosity of post-modern patronage for the benefit of “Renaissances” as such.
2
THE OTHER CHANGE: ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL SITUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENTS
. . . one man is a fool – two are a new humanity!
Robert Musil, The Enthusiasts1
Every age has its own style of being dissatisfied with the world. And every dissatisfaction that becomes self-conscious contains within itself the seeds of a culture.
Today’s dissatisfaction with the world shows unmistakable traits of panic. Those who do not sense the panic are not up to speed – presumably they live off-site, in an asynchronous cave, having been spared, sparing themselves any exertion, living on a private income, perhaps happy as well, transported into a province out of reach from the news. To avoid panic, one would have to trust one’s small good fortune. One would have to have the old psycho- logical immune system that uses immediate worries to protect itself from big questions. But immunity to panic is rare nowadays, as is any believable unworldliness. Whoever reads the newspaper and eats mushrooms is already contaminated. Even those who are constructive-minded can get no further than a little bit of positivity against a panicked background. Goodwill no longer has a common denominator with the course of the world.
All of this says that panic is not a symptom of mass hysteria, nor does it present a personal case of the nerves. Speaking in classical terms, it is a constitution of the objective spirit, articulating an adequate relationship of the intellect to the matters at hand, and should the spirit lose its composure at what it discovers, it is right
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in this matter.
It is the same with the panicked spirit as it is with Lessing’s Father Galotti: if you don’t lose your mind over some things, you have no mind to lose. Panic proves to be the obligatory way of being of a consciousness that delves into its time – into our time. And that is why panic cannot be adopted or discarded like an external code, the possibility of inciting or appeasing it being illusory; its very nature is to be beyond manipulation because it is older than all calculation – ultimately, panic is not born of scare- mongering but the other way around.
In panic, we discover a fundamental feature of the truth about the present historical moment, and even more so an aspect of the truth about the brittle historicity of contemporary existence. If we are gripped by panic, then it has become clear to us that historical time dies with us – in such a way that at its end, barely anything will have happened. Our history – all that we are and have – will one not too distant day not have anyone for whom it is something that has happened. That is why panic arises – and insofar as it arises, it is the intelligent tinge of the moment in which we realize how time trickles away for us into the realm of might-as-well-never-have- been. Something would only have happened to us if a future exists that retains its past – our present – as its origin. Such retention has been the great work of the civilizational imagination which ensured that what has been “remain as happened. ” To remain as having happened means to enter into memories. But since we cannot rule out the absence of a future that remembers us, panic seeps into the signature of the present time as an inevitable feature of it. Before the panicked world-view, the entire historical context disintegrates and the usual impermanence of things suddenly turns into a panicked impermanence. It is as if a black hole appeared in time into which all that has happened within time disappears. Vertigo in the background, a tear in the film of representations, a flavor of unreality and emptiness – and panic is the form in which the end-times are “there” for the insightful zeitgeist from now on. Put simply, panic is the post-Christian, neo-pagan version of the apoca- lypse; it arrives at the same time as the re-actualization of Greek motifs from the ancient fund and occupies the space left open by the receding Judeo-Christian interpretations of the last things. Ever since time has run out for historical messianism, the bell of panicked worldly experience has tolled once more.
This explains why today’s style of dissatisfaction with the world can be nothing other than a panicked one. What is not explained, however, is whether a panicked consciousness that pushed through to self-affirmation could be the stylistic principle of a post-Christian culture. Even less is said about the question of whether the
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movements that present themselves as alternatives contain enough mental substance and lifestyle to bring about an alternative culture from their new attitude to the world in which the attitudes to life and interpretations of being human would take shape for the coming millennium. Only one thing is certain: the macabre undertone in the phrase “panicked culture” is not without reason. 2
This undertone not only insinuates the shift from religious apoca- lypse to post-religious panic, but it also foreshadows with an uncomfortable realism the coming era as a kind of earthly purgatory where sinners who can still be rescued must undergo dire courses of treatment. For one can only describe the due learning processes of the kind found at the level of great social and political systems in terms of a diabolical autodidacticism. In this view, the histori- cally moved planet appears to be something between hell and adult education, where the poor souls have to memorize the conditions for their own survival through a disastrous self-study.
In connection with these scandalous reflections, we engage those employed at the alternative front in a historical conversation. Why? Because it must be shown how the most militant dissatisfactions with the actual have a share in a very old history of dissatisfaction with the state of earthly affairs. The current alternatives are to some extent the partners and to some extent the heirs of epochal alternative movements whose beginnings date back to the “rise” of advanced civilizations. Consequently, today we are dealing not only with trivial efforts to reform bad global conditions such as fill the history books, but also with a completely newly constructed and organized alternative to a previous alternative movement. Ecologists, autonomists, fundamentalists, the neo-religious, Green pacifists – all of them get caught up in a very distant history of revolts and revolutions, where an older dissatisfaction with the world has already created its classical expression of it. To positively define the philosophical locus of today’s alternatives, we must distin- guish between two kinds of alternativity: the first (or metaphysical) type of disagreement with the world, which aims for transcendent beyond-worlds or utopian counter-worlds; and the second (or poetic) type of disagreement with the world, which sees the track that shows the way out in reality itself.
Panicked Culture – or: How Much Catastrophe Does a Person Need?
Let us begin with a succinct thesis: today’s alternatives are already the children of catastrophe. What differentiates them from earlier
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generations and makes them the most likely candidates for a panicked culture is their expert-like approach to the potential disasters that surround them. From a historical perspective, the alternatives are likely the first humans to cultivate a non-hysterical relationship to a possible apocalypse. For the first time ever, we do not have to imagine doomsday scenarios to see the writing on the wall. The current situation takes care of that sufficiently. Nowadays, the apocalypse calls attention to itself as if its name were in lights on Broadway. With dry professionalism, it writes its own letter of announcement. Apocalyptic alarm no longer presupposes religious uproar; warnings of the end-times do not imply that prophetic individuals have declared themselves to be the mouthpiece of transcendent revelations. The current alternative consciousness is characterized by what we might call a pragmatic attitude towards catastrophe. The catastrophic is now a category that no longer belongs to visions but to perception. Nowadays, anyone can be a prophet if they dare to say anything at all. In any case, catastrophe needs less an announcement than a transcript – linguistically, its place is not among apocalyptic promises but among the daily news and committee reports. The writing on the wall appears in ordinary language and the only thing that belongs to modern doomsday prophesies (aside from a spray can) is empirical data, such as that pertaining to the events of the year 1986, which has already attained symbolic features with its series of fatal accidents.
What can the expression “panicked culture” mean? Does panicked experience even allow for culture? To the extent that culture must be built upon expectations, repetitions, certainties, and institu- tions, does it not presume the lack, indeed the exclusion, of the element of panic? We vote for the opposite to be the case. It is only through proximity to panicked experiences that living cultures are possible – it is only the occasional experience of the extreme that exposes the temperate human region where we can cultivate what we are competent to do. One of the attributes of the Greek Pan was to be the god of the midday hour when the shadows are at their shortest and the world is dashed to the ground by light, holding its breath in his presence. The modern term “panic” forgets this connection between presence, revelation, and fright – the only thing it remembers is the kinetic motif of directionless escape. Above all, it no longer knows what is most important: bearable human life is always an island within the unbearable, and the existence of islanders is only ensured through the discretion of a subtly present ocean. The world that we are assured of is thus always placed against an either (Judeo-Christian) apocalyptic or (pagan) panicked background. But modernity wants presence without tears. It sees
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culture only as a state of being where the existence of faucets answers the question about the origin of water, just as the problem of the origin of “truth” is taken care of through the dealings of scholars. A panicked culture would be immediately recognized by its respect for faucets; after all, it is possible that when you turn one on, the ocean comes out. It would be no different with the sciences, especially since they have been generating things for a long time now under which the world has the same right to cower as humans and animals once did under the panicked Greek light of midday.
A few questions are now inevitable. Does alternative culture then need catastrophe? Does it secretly approve of disasters, as people sometimes fear to be the case? Does it have to be addicted to calamity because only this creates a climate where alternative ideas gain popularity? Is catastrophe essential for the introduction of a new movement, like a teacher who eventually convinces even the most stubborn minds of his or her lessons? Do humans need catas- trophe because they must be educated and can only be educated by the school of worst possible scenarios? Consequently, are the real hopes of alternative movements not linked to disaster-didactic calculations – provided it is true that only a visual instruction of the worst can usher in a turn for the better?
It was in the days of the Harrisburg nuclear accident on Three Mile Island in 1979 that I really understood what disaster didactics meant for the first time. As the out-of-control reactor boiled and everyone held their breath to see if this infernal machine would explode, I noticed an uncanny phenomenon in myself and in others. Of course, no one could have any doubt about the devastation that an explosion of the nuclear reactor could cause, nor could anyone guarantee that what seemed to be a safe distance from accidents of this kind was actually safe. And yet at the time of Harrisburg, there was an option in the air in favor of the catastrophe; one could sense a sly sympathy with the explosive substances in the reactor casing. It was as if the deadly radioactive substances not only represented a physical quantity, but also contained a culturally critical message that deserved to be released. The small, immoralist neurosis in the face of the defective nuclear reactor was therefore not just a milieu-specific perversity, not just a sign of pyromania or evidence of an inclination towards the macabre within the human nervous system that is characterized by ever stronger stimuli to gain arousal. In it, a whole way of thinking came to light together with its dubiousness. Within its own logic, the option for the explosion was nothing more than an educational hypothesis about the didactic and mind-changing energies that radiate from actually occurring disasters.
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Only through Chernobyl did the underlying disaster-pedagogical implications of Harrisburg come to light. Indeed, if the worst has to occur before relearning can begin, then, from this perspective, the Harrisburg incident was “not bad enough. ” Because the big explosion failed to materialize, the Harrisburg disaster could not reach the level where disaster didactics develops its grim calcula- tions. It is the level where one believes that compelling connections between misfortune and insight can be formed. According to this dicey logic, such connections arise through an absurdly magnified application of the basic idea that those who do not listen will have to learn the hard way. In fact, disaster-pedagogical thinking promises that even the greatest calamity can be referred to a human scale – that is, into the field of sensible measures for preventing its repetition – through subsequent learning. Consequently, after Harrisburg, the term “warning disaster” made a career for itself in the vocabulary of alternative movements – a term that encapsulates the hope that disasters might penetrate our otherwise unteachable minds like probes and ignite new insights within them. 3
This desperate theory of learning shines a light on the state of the enterprise that has been calling itself Enlightenment since the eight- eenth century. It began as a utopia of an unforced guidance towards better understanding. By using the soft logic of an autonomous thinking that listens to the “voice of reason,” it wanted to eliminate the violence that cuts deep when it comes to learning the hard way. In the meantime, however, even the well-meaning old Enlighteners are not very far from adding disaster to the curriculum of humanity as the last pedagogical tool, if it is really the only way that something can still be learned. Thus, we can see how classical Enlightenment, with its concept of truth based on argumentation, has been pitifully put on the defensive. No one seriously believes that something essential can still be reached on the path of listening. “Let learning the hard way be welcome; for listening has failed. ”4 There are more than a few tireless members of the old Enlightenment troop who are already at the point of being glad if at least one treatment of learning the hard way in the face of disasters that cut deep could contribute a little bit to the establishment of truth in the “civilizing process” at the very last moment (oh, this word that burns the tongue! ). And thus emerges the strange affective pull towards actually occurring doom. The catastrophe will show them! The real present calamity apparently closes the gap between argument and disclosure, bridging the distance between the appeal to the imagi- native consciousness and its overpowering with existing evidence. The catastrophe is thus the apt reversal of a miracle – no wonder, and why is it not one? Because it is a direct consequence of what the
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deluded activists are up to. The real present catastrophe thus attains a formidable truth-theoretical function: it complements the mere argument and brings massively into presence what can otherwise only be imagined. By bridging the evidence gap between listening and learning the hard way, the didactic catastrophe places the epiphanic truth of an event above the discursive truth of the imagi- nation. And thus the problem of learning from disasters leads to the logical center of enlightenment and modernity. Modernity is, after all, the enterprise where human intelligence is not content with just giving voice to right pronouncements about the world; it can only be satisfied if it has actively ensured that the right things happen to the world as a whole. But this active concern for what is right is in the most radical crisis. For if now even human-made catastrophe ought to impose a tax on learning how to do things right, then it is a fatal testament to the way that modernity has strayed from its conception of learnable right action under the guidance of success and truth. 5
The hope for a way to learn from the worst thing at the very last minute is difficult to distinguish from despair about the possibility of learning at all.
Four brief comments will illustrate the risks and limitations of disaster-didactic thinking below. It is only from the failure of this desperate learning theory that the reason why alternative cultures will only be possible as a panicked culture becomes plausible. These observations are commentary on the question that is on the lips of every contemporary: what more needs to happen before something happens? Practically oriented, it could also say: how big would a catastrophe need to get before it radiates the universal flash of insight that we are waiting for? From what point on would disasters be the self-evident grounds for radical mentality-changing insights? How bad does it have to get before it can get any better? Does it have to get bad at all? Does the underlying link between misfortune and insight have validity?
It is clear from the very first remark how problematic an answer to these questions would be, indeed how problematic the questions themselves are already. Clearly, there is no quantitative measure that could be adopted as the “didactically” sufficient size of the disaster. In various ways, the conscious minds of humans have the ability to stay immune to disastrous evidence. Presumably, the silent majority always stays outside the possible radius of damage of great disasters. Additionally, the citizens of the modern epoch have long experienced their era as a fateful event that cannot be mapped onto any reasonable will. The second fatalism that is dawning on all sides belongs to an awareness that realizes the extent to which things already occur differently than one might think. Moreover,
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the most powerful groups of modern societies have politically, ideologically, entrepreneurially, and vitally invested so much in the most dangerous mobilization techniques that even accidents on the largest scale must not cause any doubts on grounds of principle about the course and speed of the civilizing process. In these circles, mentalities exist that are irreversibly, extremely set on mobilization; in the bunker of their automatic responses, they can hold their own against any agitation. Even evidence of actual disaster ricochets off such structures. For them, revelation does not take place. In the end, minds are tougher than facts, and those who did not want to listen when it was still possible will also make themselves immune to learning the hard way, too.
If these considerations are true, then the insinuation that Harrisburg was not yet bad enough to learn anything decisive from becomes doubly transparent in its questionability. Obviously, catastrophe is conceived here as a quantum which, according to allopathic principles, produces stronger effects at higher dosages. With this logic, we immediately get into the most uncomfortable escalation. The victims of Chernobyl will have been lying in terrible agonies for a long time when a zealous didactics announces itself and says: Chernobyl was not terrible enough either, because, after all, the International Organization of Soldiering On is holding it together more determinedly than ever. The relentless consequence of this can only be that more has to happen – but to what extent?
The pedagogization of disaster eventually also fails because of an aesthetic subversion. Since metaphysical or moral meanings for major accidents are no longer available to us in the modern age, images of disaster can no longer be easily provided with a moral key. To the extent that the “readability” of catastrophes ends, their phenomenal and aesthetic visibility is revealed. On the day after the Challenger disaster in 1986, I was giving a lecture on the criteria of post-modern aesthetics at the Academy of Art in Karlsruhe which was followed by a discussion with the audience. There, a not so young student in a black shirt and grey hat spoke up and declared almost triumphantly that he had enjoyed the televised images of the exploding rocket. Hearing that confession, I stood there for a moment, speechless – you are suddenly in the eye of the storm, knowing that this was said from within the core of modern kines- thetics where the world is spun into a series of “images. ” With such memories, you remain skeptical towards the prospect of epiphany through disaster evidence. In the best-case scenario, a demonic Kantianism would emerge, which would transfer the concept of the sublime from The Critique of Judgment to reactor explosions and the view of biologically dead oceans.
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The second remark on disaster didactics connects to the topos of “learning through mistakes,” wherein humanity’s oldest theory of learning is stored. It contains the insight that only a child who has had a burn can understand fire. Because intelligence is not a theoretical quantity but represents a behavioral quality of creatures in an open environment, it must go through the school of fire. Without experiencing burns, you have no idea how to cope with life. The world is not always good and does not tolerate all kinds of behavior. A warning pain must be engraved in the nervous system in order to reliably embody the selectivity predetermined by the world. Human wisdom has been bound to the engrams of suffering from time immemorial. Thereby, disaster-didactic thinking seems initially justified, because it is based on the assumption that humanity make sense of nuclear damage in an epoch-spanning learning process. This sense-making would be identical to the act we are facing in the “drama of the history of species. ” Because humanity enters its path into the unprecedented as a student without a teacher, it would have to teach itself what it cannot learn from anyone else. It must endure being fated to an auto-didactics as a matter of life and death. Its goal of study sounds like a fairytale: it is supposed to transform itself through its own power from a coercive community of deadly stupidity into an ecumenism of intelligences. Evidently, outrageous demands are being made of its auto-didactic genius. In a study of itself that involves many victims, we will see if humanity can teach itself about itself and its planetary situation, or if it still proves to be a learning-impaired subject.
The question of the learning ability of our species touches on a critical point: humanity is a priori learning impaired because it is not a subject, but an aggregate. When we speak of humanity, we are creating a general term that can only haunt speculative sentences in the form of an allegorical subject – sentences that the Age of Enlightenment made carefree use of. What appears to be a crisis of enlightenment universalism today is in fact a transition from the study of humanistic allegories of the species to that of a hard ecology of local intelligences. This ecology begins only after the completed insight that humanity has no self, no intellectual coherence, no reliable organ of wakefulness, no self-reflection capable of learning, no identity-building common memory. 6
That is why humanity cannot be wiser than a single human being – indeed, even as a whole it cannot become as wise as an individual who has learned the hard way. The aggregate we call humanity has no body of its own with which to learn the hard way – no hand by which to learn first-hand – but rather a foreign body, its place of residence, the earth, which does not become wise, but transforms
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into a desert. The classic model of learning from harm collapses before this fact. All future learning processes at the level of the species will be fraught with an almost intractable problem of trans- mission: the question of how acquired and embodied intelligence can be transferred from one who has become wise to the unwise; more generally speaking, how individual insights can be incorpo- rated into social institutions and technical systems. Only individuals can be wise; institutions are well designed, at best.
The third remark concerns itself not with the subjectlessness of “humanity,” but the subjectlessness of disaster – if I may use this manner of speaking. Our everyday understanding shows an inkling of this when it follows its usual habit of interpreting great disasters in a fatalistic way. We think of fatality under the schema of the anonymous event. In contrast, it is crucial for disaster didactics to view even the most massive disaster under the schema of personal action. Disaster as event does not have the same grammar as disaster as action. Of the first, we say: it happened, it fell upon us. Of the second: someone did it, someone let it get to this point. It is only when the disaster has a subject – you could also say a culprit – that it makes sense to interpret it as a stimulus for self-critical relearning. In order for learning to become possible after disasters, a subject must be assumed that sees the disaster as their own and refers to it as their own deed.
Only disasters that are “committed” by someone can form this arc of reflection which confronts the perpetrator with themselves while bypassing the event. It is only disaster as action that creates this recourse which presents the seemingly impersonal calamity to a particular subject as their previously hidden “true reality. ” Understanding the disaster therefore means setting in motion a kind of oedipal investigation: only insofar as the disaster that happened is an indirect crime does the investigation expect metanoia, rethinking, and repentance from an unconscious or hybrid perpetrator. Thus, here, as in any thinking that judges morally, both the interpre- tation of the event as deed and the identifying of a culprit are indispensable.
It remains questionable, however, if an accident like that of Chernobyl can be attributed to an offender. Aside from the opera- tional aspects and general breakdown risks, isn’t Chernobyl also a result of epistemological and socio-cultural developments in an anonymous and unattributable way, which build upon premises that are thousands of years old and lead to nuclear technology? Is it still possible to seek culprits and assign responsibility in processes of this scale? It would be justified if it could be shown that this entire development is an occurrence where the occidental type of human
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theoretically works out their unmistakably peculiar will, realizes it technocratically, and enforces it in the form of a planetary politics that enslaves nature. The perpetrator could then be identified as the subject of a Western culture of will and understanding, and traced back to every single citizen of modernity, provided that each of us is made up of an objective complicity with this imperialist, nature- consuming ego. All those who participate in modernity would thus be members of its primordial horde that is bound together by the collective crime of matricide.
Let us assume for a moment that it could act the way that this speculation presumes. Don’t we have to break off the investigation and follow the modern culprit-self into the fate of its self-becoming? What has awakened the will to dominate nature in this culprit? Who or what gave the culprit the weapons to do their deed? What history could in the end turn this dominant subject into a master of nuclear fire as well? How was the will for domination positioned within it, and what instances of takeover provided access to exactly this desire and this ability? Is a compulsion to desire perhaps prior to this will to power? Is a certain formation of a self by its very nature as disastrous as a nuclear reactor explosion? Does this self that has attained the power to destroy nature not also happen to “itself” like an anonymous disaster? And is this why the potent agency and ability of modernity relates to itself as suffering and powerlessness?
These questions are being asked to show that even disasters that have been “committed” can ultimately never fit into the context of deed and doer. In them, the boundary that separates the logic of responsible action from the logic of the tragic act is crossed. In the tragic deed, not only is the offense the product of the perpetrator, but the perpetrator themselves is the result of what happened. The dramatic-tragic consciousness crystallizes only at the event itself and no “learning process” follows because the tragic deed makes it clear that the disaster and its perpetrator are made of the same substance. Thus, Chernobyl could belong to the tragedy of ability and desire, where the doers and their disaster emerge from the same happening – from the history of cognitive mobilization of the subject and the planet.
The fourth remark pertains to the relationship between truth and disaster itself. If disaster didactics sheds a light on the agony of the Enlightenment, then an agony of truth is simultaneously at play. In fact, the idea that disaster “reveals something” is only so suggestive to us because we have always associated revelation – in Greek, apocalypse – with truth. Truth – insofar as it “appears” – has ever been presented as a coming-to-light or being evident. In this respect, every kind of enlightenment contains a drama of light
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or illumination – without this photological element, we would not know what knowledge means at all and why it is always the bright side of things that faces in the direction of knowledge. If, for us, the possibility of a realization of “truth” is tied to the coming to light of previously dark things, then the younger Enlightenment as light- emitting process has also made extensive investments in this lighting model of truth.
But we are witnessing the death throes of truth. The old alliance between light and truth – the photological pact of occidental ration- ality – has been torn ever since we have been able to use what gives light to bring death. Nuclear weapons also make philosophical history. From a photological point of view, truth takes place as an event of exposure on a three-step scale: it increases from a natural or artificial lighting of dense bodies that become visible through their self-sufficient reflection to an active and invasive fluoroscopy of the bodies until the bodies are finally transformed entirely into light. The photological Enlightenment encompasses all and any objects from the point of view of their luminosity, transparency, trans- formability into light. If Enlightenment has a dramatic finality in itself, it is located in the eradication of the initial difference between light and matter as it appears in ordinary lighting via a terminal transformation of all matter into light.