Morality
as the work of error.
Nietzsche - v14 - Will to Power - a
.
In
the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life ; gradu-
ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life,
etc.
248.
Christian moral quackery. --Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the
sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in
## p. 205 (#229) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
205
the presence of the most despicable crime. Here
error is made a duty—a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption ";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa-
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another
set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system-
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for
holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing—that is to say,
to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing;
redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the
Creator Himself.
Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded
as morbid, and creates suspicion. . .
Proposition II. : The prerequisites of a strong,
exuberant life-strong desires and passions—are
reckoned as objections against strong and ex-
uberant life.
Proposition III. : Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin
him, is evil, must be rejected—and should be torn
root and branch from his soul.
Proposition IV. : Man converted into a weak
creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humility and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness,- in fact, the “sinner," - this is the
-
## p. 206 (#230) ############################################
206
THE WILL TO POWER.
desirable type, and one which one can produce by
means of a little spiritual surgery.
.
249.
What is it I protest against ? That people
should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity,
this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength,
as something high, or possibly as the standard of
all things.
Bacon of Verulam says: Infimarum virtutum
apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supre-
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion,
however, belongs to the vulgus: it has no feeling
for the highest kind of virtus.
250.
Let us see what the "genuine Christian " does
with all the things which his instincts forbid :-he
covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy,
knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud-
in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the
latter of its clean conscience.
251.
The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital
crime against Life, its apologists had a good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth” of
2)
## p. 207 (#231) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
207
Christianity—whether in regard to the existence
of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science
-is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value of Christian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything, or are they a
profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en-
forced ? The question concerning the truth of
the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges ;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end,
avail themselves of the logic used by their
opponents, in order to create a right for their side
to assert that certain things are irrefutable—that
is to say, they transcend the means employed to
refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
called "Kantian Criticism”).
252.
Christianity should never be forgiven for having
ruined such men
This is precisely
what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take
no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed :—the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the
demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and
“Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the
remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern
us; they might be a thousand times more absurd
as Pascal.
## p. 208 (#232) ############################################
208
THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.
But what we do stand up against, is that ideal
which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine
seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous
eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,—and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,-as though all that
which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments—that is to say, confidence, artlessness,
modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation,
submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-
were useful and desirable per se; as though the
puny, modest abortion which in these creatures
takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock—which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence
of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by
virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but
were actually to stand as an ideal for man in
general, as a goal, a measure—the highest de-
sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put
in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases
among men, in which the will to power and to
growth leads the whole species "man" one step
“
farther forward, this type was threatened with
disaster. By means of the values of this ideal,
the growth of such higher men would be checked
at the root. For these men, owing to their
superior demands and duties, readily accept a
## p. 209 (#233) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
209
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is
a case of an increase in the costs of the under-
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it
aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness
and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will
to power, turns inwards, against themselves
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation : that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most
famous example.
VOL. I.
## p. 210 (#234) ############################################
II,
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
253.
This is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by its charm, and not
without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling
beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world
which we can admire, which is in keeping with
our capacity for worship—which is continually
demonstrating itself—in small things or in large :
this is the Christian standpoint which is common
to us all.
But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in
our mistrust, and in our scientific spirit (also
through a more developed instinct for truth, which
again is due to Christian influence), this interpre-
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us.
The craſtiest of subterfuges : Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right to
interpret things in that way, but also to reject the
interpretation once it has been made. People
are satisfied with a greater demand upon their
credulity and faith, with a renunciation of all
## p. 211 (#235) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
211
<
ever
right to reason concerning the proof of their
creed, with an intangible and superior “Ideal”
(God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the
Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: “Spirit" itself is the “ self-
revealing and self-realising ideal”: we believe
that in the “process of development” an
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani-
fested—thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being
worshipped.
In short:
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move-
ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some-
thing evolving, and we are part of it, as our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
It should be observed that criticism is never
levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the
problem which gives rise to a controversy con-
cerning the ideal—that is to say, why it has not
yet been realised, or why it is not demonstrable
in small things as in great.
*
It makes all the difference : whether a man
recognises this state of distress as such owing to
## p. 212 (#236) ############################################
212
THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he
arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost.
Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises
the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does.
(What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present !
The belief in a “Beyond” is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem i whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in
morality ? (It is betrayed by the fact that
even the fundamental conditions of life are
falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our
knowledge of plants and animals.
“ Self-preser-
vation”: the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia-
tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuations and tables of law has absolutely
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though
people persist in believing it has; the two
matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact
that the knowledge of the pudenda origo of a
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre-
pares the way to a critical attitude and spirit
towards it.
## p. 213 (#237) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws ? What is the outcome of their
dominion ? For whom? In relation to what?
answer: for Life. But what is Life? A new and
more definite concept of what “Life” is, becomes
necessary here. My formula of this concept is:
Life is Will to Power.
What is the meaning of the very act of valuing ?
Does it point back to another, metaphysical
world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,
who lived in a period which preceded the great
historical movement. ) In short: what is its
origin? Or had it no human "origin"? -
“
Answer: moral valuations are a sort of explana-
ation, they constitute a method of interpreting.
Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite
physiological conditions, as also of a definite
spiritual level of ruling judgments.
What is it
that interprets ? –Our passions.
255.
All virtues should be looked upon as physio-
logical conditions : the principal organic functions,
more particularly, should be considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions
and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the
developments of sexual relations-justice as the
development of the passion for revenge,—virtue
as the love of resistance, the will to power,
honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of
an equally powerful, force.
## p. 214 (#238) ############################################
214
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under “Morality" I understand a system of
valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
“ Ye shall know them by their fruits. ” I say of
every form of morality: “It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments
as symptoms and a language of signs in which
the processes of physiological prosperity or the
reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions
of preservation and growth, are betrayed—a
mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology,
prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races,
communities, and different stages of existence, as,
for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis-
belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes-
simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral
phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
phenomena. The origin of this interpretation
itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
## p. 215 (#239) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
215
imagined a contradiction in existence? This is
of paramount importance: behind all other
valuations those moral valuations stand com-
mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according
to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc.
etc. ? ? ?
259.
:.
A point of view : in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ-
ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. —Thanks to the fact that
people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of
contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of
animals, in which all the instincts answer certain
definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice—that is to say, to the ascertain-
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil.
The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with
mental antennæ wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men ; and with it all he would have
his great moments, when all the chords in his
being would ring in splendid unison—the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of planetary
movement.
## p. 216 (#240) ############################################
216
THE WILL TO POWER,
260.
“ To will” is to will an object. But “object,”
as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do
valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,
"pleasant or painful,” their basis ?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of all make a thing painful, by investing it
with a valuation.
The compass of moral valuations: they play a
part in almost every mental impression. To us
the world is coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value of
all things: owing to this we possess an enormous
fund of latent power : but the study of compara-
tive values teaches us that values which were
actually opposed to each other have been held in
high esteem, and that there have been many
tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have
been worth anything per se).
The analysis of individual tables of laws re-
vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly) as the conditions of existence for limited
groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are a large number of very different values
to hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power—the fundamental principle: "the
condition of existence" is now quite divorced
from the moral values. It is much more super-
fluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an
arbitrary matter. Chaos.
Who creates the goal which stands above man-
## p. 217 (#241) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
217
kind and above the individual ? Formerly
morality was a preservative measure: but nobody
wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve.
Thus we are reduced to an experi-
mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
himself.
261.
What is the criterion of a moral action ? (1) Its
disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: “This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal
condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly
established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with “Thou shalt not steal. ”
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of
“spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for
their πόλις.
262.
0
The necessity of false values. --A judgment
may be refuted when it is shown that it was
## p. 218 (#242) ############################################
218
THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is
not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more
eradicate false values than they can alter astig-
matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing
to do with reasoning.
263
To see and reveal the problem of morality
seems to me to be the new task and the principal
thing of all. I deny that this has been done by
moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's
mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious-
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that “evil” has really and seriously
been christened “good” and vice versa. I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the
words “ Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " Even conscience
*
The morality of custom.
## p. 219 (#243) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
219
has changed its sphere: formerly there was such
a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
266.
.
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
1. In order that moral values may attain to
supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera-
tions.
B.
Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital—Truthfulness, Doubt, étoxń, Judging.
-The “Immorality” of belief in morality.
The steps:
1. Absolute dominion of morality: all bio-
logical phenomena measured and judged
according to its values.
2. The attempt to identify Life with morality
(symptom of awakened scepticism : mor-
ality must no longer be regarded as
the opposite of Life); many means are
sought-even a transcendental one.
3. The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by
Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous to
Life?
(a) It depreciated the joy of living and the
gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
## p. 220 (#244) ############################################
220
THE WILL TO POWER.
(6) It checked the tendency to beautify and
to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because
it tried to set the highest phenomena
thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality
to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure
for the general whole, it may be a pro-
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production
of the man who is a “ tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure
mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to “mediocre people. ”
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness : it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the
mighty: it is useful to the “lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the
expressions “right" and "wrong” in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance
in the sentence: “Do right and fear no one"
*
*“Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
## p. 221 (#245) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
221
-that is to say, to do one's duty, according to
the rough scheme of life within the limit of which
a community exists. —Let us not think meanly
of what a few thousand years of morality have
inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded :
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient
decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself,
and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran-
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the
sort of " drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and “beautiful feelings” on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of
this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one
glance, as a phenomenon-also as a riddle.
Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply
to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own?
and why is it that my neighbour himself should
value his welfare differently from the way in which
## p. 222 (#246) ############################################
222
THE WILL TO POWER,
a
I value it—that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this “Thou shalt,” which is
regarded as “given” even by philosophers them-
selves ?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should
esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and
that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good
which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
and for his welfare) has its reasons-namely,
as the result of the social instinct which rests
upon the valuation, that single individuals are
of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre-
supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the
whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is
the will to a kind of optics which renders a view
of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be
individuals. We see the general drift: every
individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.
Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-
is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What
is the purpose of it all ?
270.
How is it possible that a man can respect
himself only in regard to moral values, that he
## p. 223 (#247) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
223
subordinates and despises everything in favour
of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. 7 as, for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What
is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy ? -I
mean this both in the psychological and physio-
logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal.
In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen-
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not
and could have . is it not the result of
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real
states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par-
ticular form of sensibility which does not happen
to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable
feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral
hypotheses ? In this way an occasional feeling
of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a “clean conscience," flooded with
light through the proximity of God and the
consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral
idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of
society : "the good fellow," " the upright man”.
a sort of medium state of high respectability :
mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien-
tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira-
tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under-
stand all his states he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. -
Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate
himself:-is it a form of pride?
"
## p. 224 (#248) ############################################
224
THE WILL TO POWER,
271.
The predominance of moral values. —The con-
quence of this predominance : the corruption of
psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this
predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im-
peratives have been used in order to make moral
values appear as if they were for ever fixed :—they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time:
they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost
beyond question. The practice—that is to say,
the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart-
ment :-look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of
those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute "research" in these matters.
272,
My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity
of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ-
entiations but the value of perspective ; to show
that all that which is praised as moral is essentially
the same as that which is immoral, and was only
## p. 225 (#249) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
225
made possible, according to the law of all moral
development—that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends—just as
all that which has been decried as immoral is,
from the standpoint of economics, both superior
and essential; and how development leading to
a greater abundance of life necessarily involves
progress in the realm of immorality. “Truth,"
that is the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.
»
273
But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we
require a great deal of morality, in order to be
immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a
parable :-
A physiologist interested in a certain illness,
and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let
us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,
for morality is an illness, -and that we
Europeans are the invalid : what an amount of
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing
we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned !
Should we under these circumstances earnestly
desire to rid ourselves of morality? Should we
want to? This is of course irrespective of the
question whether we should be able to do so-
whether we can be cured at all ?
P
VOL. 1.
## p. 226 (#250) ############################################
226
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
2. THE HERD,
274.
Whose will to power is morality ? — The common
factor of all European history since the time of
Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life,
but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. "Amelioration” regarded as
the only duty, everything else used as a means
thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and
endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . ). —A similar move-
ment to be observed in China and India.
What is the meaning of this will to power on
the part of moral values, which has played such
a part in the world's prodigious evolutions ?
Answer :-Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(1) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and all abortions opposed to the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the
mediocre opposed to the exceptions. —Enormous
advantage of this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped
it along (for the history of the struggle of morality
with the fundamental instincts of life is in itself
the greatest piece of immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed on earth. . . ).
## p. 227 (#251) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
227
275.
>
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem
behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
to which we have become accustomed throughout
the ages our eye does not seem focussed for
such things : at least, this seems to me to be the
case in so far as our morality is concerned.
“Every man should be the preoccupation of his
fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves
honour: no one ought to think of himself.
“Thou shalt”: an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart
and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are-on the contrary, it is made to be their
standard and their judge !
The problem of “equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction : here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we
demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane; but-it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to
common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered
distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should
be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of
well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the
same sacrifice.
“ The value of an action is once
## p. 228 (#252) ############################################
228
THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed : every individual must submit
to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks—who speaks —
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried
to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by
the side of it. Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary as an unconditional sanction
which has no superior, as a “Categorical Imperator":
or, in so far as people believed in the authority
of reason, what was needed was a “unitarian
metaphysics” by means of which this view could
be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith in God is dead : the
question arises once more: "who speaks? " My
answer, which I take from biology and not from
metaphysics, is: “the gregarious instinct speaks. "
This is what desires to be master : hence its “ thou
shalt! ”-it will allow the individual to exist only
as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole,
it hates those who detach themselves from every-
thing—it turns the hatred of all individuals against
him.
276.
The whole of the morality of Europe is based
upon the values which are useful to the herd: the
sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is
explained by the fact that everything which
distinguishes them from others reaches their con-
sciousness in the form of a feeling of their own
smallness and egregiousness. It is the virtues of
modern men which are the causes of pessimistic
## p. 229 (#253) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience
-they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. )
The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
“Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant
signs—otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup-
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is
absolutely the worst thing for the herd.
We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot
identify. -Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed
from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the
possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in-
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon
exacts"truthfulness. "
>
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com-
munity—that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima-
tion of truthfulness is very reasonable.
A man
## p. 230 (#254) ############################################
230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived and con-
sequently he adopts as his own personal morality
that he should deceive no one ! a sort of mutual
obligation among equals! In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand
that he should be on his guard against deception :
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the
source of truthfulness.
279.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd. —Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes
suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates
power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries
to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus
the relationship to the powerful no longer has any-
thing revolting in it. (3) In the sense of truth.
3
What is truth? Truth is that explanation of
things which causes us the smallest amount of
mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely
fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to
know one's self on the same level with all, to feel
as all feel, and to accept a belief which is already
current; it is something passive beside the
activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights of valua-
tion (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In
## p. 231 (#255) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be
detached and “objective. " (6) In uprightness :
6)
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand
rather than to create a new one, rather than to
command themselves and others: the fear of
commanding—it is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration : the fear of exercising
a right or of enforcing a judgment.
280.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu
and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to
be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of all order of rank;
it regards a climb from the level to the heights
in the same light as a descent from the majority
to the minority. The herd regards the exception,
whether it be above or beneath its general level,
as something which is antagonistic and dangerous
to itself. Their trick in dealing with the ex-
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to be-
come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen-in fact,
to become their head-servants : thus they convert
a danger into a thing which is useful. In the
middle, fear ceases : here a man is alone with
nothing; here there is not much room even for
misunderstandings; here there is equality; here
a man's individual existence is not felt as
reproach, but as the right existence; here con-
a
## p. 232 (#256) ############################################
232
THE WILL TO POWER.
tentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only
towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to
be a sinner.
281.
If, in compliance with our communal instincts,
we make certain regulations for ourselves and
forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in
common reason, forbid a certain kind of “exist-
ence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a
particular application and development of this
“ existence" and "attitude of mind. ” But then
the idealist of virtue, the moralist, comes along and
says: “ God sees into the human heart! What
matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye
are not any better on that account ! " Answer:
Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not
want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied
with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not
harm one another—and that is why we forbid
certain actions when they take a particular direction
- that is to say, when they are against our own
interests: but that does not alter the fact that
when these same actions are directed against the
enemies of our community — against you, for
instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay
them sufficient honour. We educate our children
up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent.
Did we share that " god-fearing" radicalism which
your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-
rns enough to condemn the source of those for-
bidden “acts” by condemning the “heart” and
the "attitude of mind " which recommends them,
## p. 233 (#257) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
233
.
that would mean condemning our very existence,
and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with
all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this
attitude of mind from breaking out and venting
itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we
prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also
moral in so doing. . . . Have you no idea-how-
ever vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how
much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it
has compelled us to exercise ? We are vehement
in our desires; there are times when we even feel
as if we could devour each other. . . But the
“communal spirit” is master of us: have you
observed that this is almost a definition of
morality?
282.
The weakness of the gregarious animal gives
rise to a morality which is precisely similar to
that resulting from the weakness of the decadent
man: they understand each other; they associate
with each other (the great decadent religions
always rely upon the support of the herd). The
gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid
characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature;
but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it
must have a "leader”-the priests understand
this. . . The state is not subtle, not secret
enough; the art of " directing consciences” slips
“
its grasp
How is the gregarious animal infected
with illness by the priest?
.
## p.
the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life ; gradu-
ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life,
etc.
248.
Christian moral quackery. --Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the
sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in
## p. 205 (#229) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
205
the presence of the most despicable crime. Here
error is made a duty—a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption ";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa-
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another
set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system-
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for
holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing—that is to say,
to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing;
redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the
Creator Himself.
Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded
as morbid, and creates suspicion. . .
Proposition II. : The prerequisites of a strong,
exuberant life-strong desires and passions—are
reckoned as objections against strong and ex-
uberant life.
Proposition III. : Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin
him, is evil, must be rejected—and should be torn
root and branch from his soul.
Proposition IV. : Man converted into a weak
creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humility and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness,- in fact, the “sinner," - this is the
-
## p. 206 (#230) ############################################
206
THE WILL TO POWER.
desirable type, and one which one can produce by
means of a little spiritual surgery.
.
249.
What is it I protest against ? That people
should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity,
this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength,
as something high, or possibly as the standard of
all things.
Bacon of Verulam says: Infimarum virtutum
apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supre-
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion,
however, belongs to the vulgus: it has no feeling
for the highest kind of virtus.
250.
Let us see what the "genuine Christian " does
with all the things which his instincts forbid :-he
covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy,
knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud-
in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the
latter of its clean conscience.
251.
The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital
crime against Life, its apologists had a good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth” of
2)
## p. 207 (#231) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
207
Christianity—whether in regard to the existence
of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science
-is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value of Christian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything, or are they a
profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en-
forced ? The question concerning the truth of
the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges ;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end,
avail themselves of the logic used by their
opponents, in order to create a right for their side
to assert that certain things are irrefutable—that
is to say, they transcend the means employed to
refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
called "Kantian Criticism”).
252.
Christianity should never be forgiven for having
ruined such men
This is precisely
what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take
no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed :—the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the
demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and
“Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the
remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern
us; they might be a thousand times more absurd
as Pascal.
## p. 208 (#232) ############################################
208
THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.
But what we do stand up against, is that ideal
which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine
seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous
eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,—and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,-as though all that
which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments—that is to say, confidence, artlessness,
modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation,
submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-
were useful and desirable per se; as though the
puny, modest abortion which in these creatures
takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock—which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence
of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by
virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but
were actually to stand as an ideal for man in
general, as a goal, a measure—the highest de-
sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put
in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases
among men, in which the will to power and to
growth leads the whole species "man" one step
“
farther forward, this type was threatened with
disaster. By means of the values of this ideal,
the growth of such higher men would be checked
at the root. For these men, owing to their
superior demands and duties, readily accept a
## p. 209 (#233) ############################################
CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
209
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is
a case of an increase in the costs of the under-
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it
aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness
and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will
to power, turns inwards, against themselves
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation : that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most
famous example.
VOL. I.
## p. 210 (#234) ############################################
II,
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
253.
This is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by its charm, and not
without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling
beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world
which we can admire, which is in keeping with
our capacity for worship—which is continually
demonstrating itself—in small things or in large :
this is the Christian standpoint which is common
to us all.
But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in
our mistrust, and in our scientific spirit (also
through a more developed instinct for truth, which
again is due to Christian influence), this interpre-
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us.
The craſtiest of subterfuges : Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right to
interpret things in that way, but also to reject the
interpretation once it has been made. People
are satisfied with a greater demand upon their
credulity and faith, with a renunciation of all
## p. 211 (#235) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
211
<
ever
right to reason concerning the proof of their
creed, with an intangible and superior “Ideal”
(God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the
Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: “Spirit" itself is the “ self-
revealing and self-realising ideal”: we believe
that in the “process of development” an
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani-
fested—thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being
worshipped.
In short:
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move-
ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some-
thing evolving, and we are part of it, as our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
It should be observed that criticism is never
levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the
problem which gives rise to a controversy con-
cerning the ideal—that is to say, why it has not
yet been realised, or why it is not demonstrable
in small things as in great.
*
It makes all the difference : whether a man
recognises this state of distress as such owing to
## p. 212 (#236) ############################################
212
THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he
arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost.
Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises
the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does.
(What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present !
The belief in a “Beyond” is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem i whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in
morality ? (It is betrayed by the fact that
even the fundamental conditions of life are
falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our
knowledge of plants and animals.
“ Self-preser-
vation”: the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia-
tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuations and tables of law has absolutely
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though
people persist in believing it has; the two
matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact
that the knowledge of the pudenda origo of a
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre-
pares the way to a critical attitude and spirit
towards it.
## p. 213 (#237) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws ? What is the outcome of their
dominion ? For whom? In relation to what?
answer: for Life. But what is Life? A new and
more definite concept of what “Life” is, becomes
necessary here. My formula of this concept is:
Life is Will to Power.
What is the meaning of the very act of valuing ?
Does it point back to another, metaphysical
world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,
who lived in a period which preceded the great
historical movement. ) In short: what is its
origin? Or had it no human "origin"? -
“
Answer: moral valuations are a sort of explana-
ation, they constitute a method of interpreting.
Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite
physiological conditions, as also of a definite
spiritual level of ruling judgments.
What is it
that interprets ? –Our passions.
255.
All virtues should be looked upon as physio-
logical conditions : the principal organic functions,
more particularly, should be considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions
and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the
developments of sexual relations-justice as the
development of the passion for revenge,—virtue
as the love of resistance, the will to power,
honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of
an equally powerful, force.
## p. 214 (#238) ############################################
214
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under “Morality" I understand a system of
valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
“ Ye shall know them by their fruits. ” I say of
every form of morality: “It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments
as symptoms and a language of signs in which
the processes of physiological prosperity or the
reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions
of preservation and growth, are betrayed—a
mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology,
prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races,
communities, and different stages of existence, as,
for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis-
belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes-
simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral
phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
phenomena. The origin of this interpretation
itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
## p. 215 (#239) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
215
imagined a contradiction in existence? This is
of paramount importance: behind all other
valuations those moral valuations stand com-
mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according
to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc.
etc. ? ? ?
259.
:.
A point of view : in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ-
ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. —Thanks to the fact that
people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of
contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of
animals, in which all the instincts answer certain
definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice—that is to say, to the ascertain-
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil.
The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with
mental antennæ wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men ; and with it all he would have
his great moments, when all the chords in his
being would ring in splendid unison—the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of planetary
movement.
## p. 216 (#240) ############################################
216
THE WILL TO POWER,
260.
“ To will” is to will an object. But “object,”
as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do
valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,
"pleasant or painful,” their basis ?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of all make a thing painful, by investing it
with a valuation.
The compass of moral valuations: they play a
part in almost every mental impression. To us
the world is coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value of
all things: owing to this we possess an enormous
fund of latent power : but the study of compara-
tive values teaches us that values which were
actually opposed to each other have been held in
high esteem, and that there have been many
tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have
been worth anything per se).
The analysis of individual tables of laws re-
vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly) as the conditions of existence for limited
groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are a large number of very different values
to hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power—the fundamental principle: "the
condition of existence" is now quite divorced
from the moral values. It is much more super-
fluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an
arbitrary matter. Chaos.
Who creates the goal which stands above man-
## p. 217 (#241) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
217
kind and above the individual ? Formerly
morality was a preservative measure: but nobody
wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve.
Thus we are reduced to an experi-
mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
himself.
261.
What is the criterion of a moral action ? (1) Its
disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: “This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal
condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly
established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with “Thou shalt not steal. ”
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of
“spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for
their πόλις.
262.
0
The necessity of false values. --A judgment
may be refuted when it is shown that it was
## p. 218 (#242) ############################################
218
THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is
not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more
eradicate false values than they can alter astig-
matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing
to do with reasoning.
263
To see and reveal the problem of morality
seems to me to be the new task and the principal
thing of all. I deny that this has been done by
moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's
mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious-
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that “evil” has really and seriously
been christened “good” and vice versa. I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the
words “ Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " Even conscience
*
The morality of custom.
## p. 219 (#243) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
219
has changed its sphere: formerly there was such
a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
266.
.
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
1. In order that moral values may attain to
supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera-
tions.
B.
Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital—Truthfulness, Doubt, étoxń, Judging.
-The “Immorality” of belief in morality.
The steps:
1. Absolute dominion of morality: all bio-
logical phenomena measured and judged
according to its values.
2. The attempt to identify Life with morality
(symptom of awakened scepticism : mor-
ality must no longer be regarded as
the opposite of Life); many means are
sought-even a transcendental one.
3. The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by
Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous to
Life?
(a) It depreciated the joy of living and the
gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
## p. 220 (#244) ############################################
220
THE WILL TO POWER.
(6) It checked the tendency to beautify and
to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because
it tried to set the highest phenomena
thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality
to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure
for the general whole, it may be a pro-
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production
of the man who is a “ tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure
mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to “mediocre people. ”
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness : it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the
mighty: it is useful to the “lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the
expressions “right" and "wrong” in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance
in the sentence: “Do right and fear no one"
*
*“Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
## p. 221 (#245) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
221
-that is to say, to do one's duty, according to
the rough scheme of life within the limit of which
a community exists. —Let us not think meanly
of what a few thousand years of morality have
inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded :
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient
decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself,
and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran-
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the
sort of " drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and “beautiful feelings” on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of
this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one
glance, as a phenomenon-also as a riddle.
Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply
to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own?
and why is it that my neighbour himself should
value his welfare differently from the way in which
## p. 222 (#246) ############################################
222
THE WILL TO POWER,
a
I value it—that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this “Thou shalt,” which is
regarded as “given” even by philosophers them-
selves ?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should
esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and
that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good
which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
and for his welfare) has its reasons-namely,
as the result of the social instinct which rests
upon the valuation, that single individuals are
of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre-
supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the
whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is
the will to a kind of optics which renders a view
of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be
individuals. We see the general drift: every
individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.
Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-
is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What
is the purpose of it all ?
270.
How is it possible that a man can respect
himself only in regard to moral values, that he
## p. 223 (#247) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
223
subordinates and despises everything in favour
of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. 7 as, for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What
is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy ? -I
mean this both in the psychological and physio-
logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal.
In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen-
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not
and could have . is it not the result of
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real
states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par-
ticular form of sensibility which does not happen
to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable
feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral
hypotheses ? In this way an occasional feeling
of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a “clean conscience," flooded with
light through the proximity of God and the
consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral
idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of
society : "the good fellow," " the upright man”.
a sort of medium state of high respectability :
mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien-
tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira-
tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under-
stand all his states he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. -
Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate
himself:-is it a form of pride?
"
## p. 224 (#248) ############################################
224
THE WILL TO POWER,
271.
The predominance of moral values. —The con-
quence of this predominance : the corruption of
psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this
predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im-
peratives have been used in order to make moral
values appear as if they were for ever fixed :—they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time:
they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost
beyond question. The practice—that is to say,
the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart-
ment :-look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of
those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute "research" in these matters.
272,
My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity
of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ-
entiations but the value of perspective ; to show
that all that which is praised as moral is essentially
the same as that which is immoral, and was only
## p. 225 (#249) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
225
made possible, according to the law of all moral
development—that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends—just as
all that which has been decried as immoral is,
from the standpoint of economics, both superior
and essential; and how development leading to
a greater abundance of life necessarily involves
progress in the realm of immorality. “Truth,"
that is the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.
»
273
But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we
require a great deal of morality, in order to be
immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a
parable :-
A physiologist interested in a certain illness,
and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let
us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,
for morality is an illness, -and that we
Europeans are the invalid : what an amount of
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing
we Europeans were, at once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned !
Should we under these circumstances earnestly
desire to rid ourselves of morality? Should we
want to? This is of course irrespective of the
question whether we should be able to do so-
whether we can be cured at all ?
P
VOL. 1.
## p. 226 (#250) ############################################
226
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
2. THE HERD,
274.
Whose will to power is morality ? — The common
factor of all European history since the time of
Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life,
but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. "Amelioration” regarded as
the only duty, everything else used as a means
thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and
endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . ). —A similar move-
ment to be observed in China and India.
What is the meaning of this will to power on
the part of moral values, which has played such
a part in the world's prodigious evolutions ?
Answer :-Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(1) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and all abortions opposed to the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the
mediocre opposed to the exceptions. —Enormous
advantage of this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped
it along (for the history of the struggle of morality
with the fundamental instincts of life is in itself
the greatest piece of immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed on earth. . . ).
## p. 227 (#251) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
227
275.
>
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem
behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
to which we have become accustomed throughout
the ages our eye does not seem focussed for
such things : at least, this seems to me to be the
case in so far as our morality is concerned.
“Every man should be the preoccupation of his
fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves
honour: no one ought to think of himself.
“Thou shalt”: an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart
and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are-on the contrary, it is made to be their
standard and their judge !
The problem of “equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction : here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we
demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane; but-it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to
common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered
distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should
be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of
well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the
same sacrifice.
“ The value of an action is once
## p. 228 (#252) ############################################
228
THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed : every individual must submit
to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks—who speaks —
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried
to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by
the side of it. Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary as an unconditional sanction
which has no superior, as a “Categorical Imperator":
or, in so far as people believed in the authority
of reason, what was needed was a “unitarian
metaphysics” by means of which this view could
be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith in God is dead : the
question arises once more: "who speaks? " My
answer, which I take from biology and not from
metaphysics, is: “the gregarious instinct speaks. "
This is what desires to be master : hence its “ thou
shalt! ”-it will allow the individual to exist only
as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole,
it hates those who detach themselves from every-
thing—it turns the hatred of all individuals against
him.
276.
The whole of the morality of Europe is based
upon the values which are useful to the herd: the
sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is
explained by the fact that everything which
distinguishes them from others reaches their con-
sciousness in the form of a feeling of their own
smallness and egregiousness. It is the virtues of
modern men which are the causes of pessimistic
## p. 229 (#253) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience
-they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. )
The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
“Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant
signs—otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup-
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is
absolutely the worst thing for the herd.
We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot
identify. -Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed
from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the
possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in-
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon
exacts"truthfulness. "
>
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com-
munity—that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima-
tion of truthfulness is very reasonable.
A man
## p. 230 (#254) ############################################
230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived and con-
sequently he adopts as his own personal morality
that he should deceive no one ! a sort of mutual
obligation among equals! In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand
that he should be on his guard against deception :
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the
source of truthfulness.
279.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd. —Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes
suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates
power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries
to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus
the relationship to the powerful no longer has any-
thing revolting in it. (3) In the sense of truth.
3
What is truth? Truth is that explanation of
things which causes us the smallest amount of
mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely
fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to
know one's self on the same level with all, to feel
as all feel, and to accept a belief which is already
current; it is something passive beside the
activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights of valua-
tion (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In
## p. 231 (#255) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be
detached and “objective. " (6) In uprightness :
6)
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand
rather than to create a new one, rather than to
command themselves and others: the fear of
commanding—it is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration : the fear of exercising
a right or of enforcing a judgment.
280.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu
and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to
be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of all order of rank;
it regards a climb from the level to the heights
in the same light as a descent from the majority
to the minority. The herd regards the exception,
whether it be above or beneath its general level,
as something which is antagonistic and dangerous
to itself. Their trick in dealing with the ex-
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to be-
come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen-in fact,
to become their head-servants : thus they convert
a danger into a thing which is useful. In the
middle, fear ceases : here a man is alone with
nothing; here there is not much room even for
misunderstandings; here there is equality; here
a man's individual existence is not felt as
reproach, but as the right existence; here con-
a
## p. 232 (#256) ############################################
232
THE WILL TO POWER.
tentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only
towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to
be a sinner.
281.
If, in compliance with our communal instincts,
we make certain regulations for ourselves and
forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in
common reason, forbid a certain kind of “exist-
ence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a
particular application and development of this
“ existence" and "attitude of mind. ” But then
the idealist of virtue, the moralist, comes along and
says: “ God sees into the human heart! What
matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye
are not any better on that account ! " Answer:
Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not
want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied
with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not
harm one another—and that is why we forbid
certain actions when they take a particular direction
- that is to say, when they are against our own
interests: but that does not alter the fact that
when these same actions are directed against the
enemies of our community — against you, for
instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay
them sufficient honour. We educate our children
up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent.
Did we share that " god-fearing" radicalism which
your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-
rns enough to condemn the source of those for-
bidden “acts” by condemning the “heart” and
the "attitude of mind " which recommends them,
## p. 233 (#257) ############################################
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
233
.
that would mean condemning our very existence,
and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with
all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this
attitude of mind from breaking out and venting
itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we
prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also
moral in so doing. . . . Have you no idea-how-
ever vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how
much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it
has compelled us to exercise ? We are vehement
in our desires; there are times when we even feel
as if we could devour each other. . . But the
“communal spirit” is master of us: have you
observed that this is almost a definition of
morality?
282.
The weakness of the gregarious animal gives
rise to a morality which is precisely similar to
that resulting from the weakness of the decadent
man: they understand each other; they associate
with each other (the great decadent religions
always rely upon the support of the herd). The
gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid
characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature;
but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it
must have a "leader”-the priests understand
this. . . The state is not subtle, not secret
enough; the art of " directing consciences” slips
“
its grasp
How is the gregarious animal infected
with illness by the priest?
.
## p.
