All
phcenomena
exist in time, wherein alone ns substratum, that as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co existence and succession can "ie represented.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
"
? ? ? a
is,
? TKANSCEWBENTAL DOCTMKE.
Proof.
Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, u con
sciousness, which contains an element of sensation. Phsenomena
as objects of perception are not pure, that merely formal in tuitions, like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves. * They contain, then, over and above the intui tion, the materials for an object (through which represented something existing in space or time), that to say, they con tain the real of sensation, as representation merely subjec tive, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject
affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure con
sciousness possible, inasmuch as the real in this conscious ness entirely evanishes, and there remains merely formal consciousness priori) of the manifold in time and space consequently there possible synthesis also of the production of the quantity of sensation from its commencement, that from the pure intuition = onwards, up to certain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself not an objective
? and in to be found neither the intuition of space nor of time, cannot possess any extensive quantity, and yet there does belong to quantity (and that means of its
apprehension, in which empirical consciousne*is can within certain time rise from nothing = up to its given amount), consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive quantity, that degree of influence on sense to all objects of perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.
All cognition, by means of which am enabled to cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an Anticipation and without doubt this the sense in which Epicurus employed his expression vpoy. ^i;. But as there in phsenomena something which never cog nized priori, which on this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition, that to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), follows, that
sensation just that element in cognition which cannot be at
They can be perceived only as phsenomena, and some part of them
must always belong to the non-ego whereas pure intuitions are entirely the orodncts of the mind itself, and as such arc cognized in thenuehn. -- Tr
representation,
? ? ;
;
a
*
h
is
is
is (a
it
is
by
is
is
I
0
is, a
it a
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0
a
a
is,
;
it
a is
is a
a
is is, is
a is
? disappear.
ANTICIPATIONS OP PKBCEPTIOJT.
127
? 11 anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to Quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent a priori that which may always be given a pos teriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense --special, because it may seem surprising to forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really is the case here.
Apprehension,* by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that do not take into consideration succes sion of many sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which not successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity the want of sensation in moment of time would represent as empty, consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation rea
? lity (real as phenomenon) absence of negation = 0. of diminution, so that
that which corresponds to the
Now every sensation capable can decrease, and thus gradually
Therefore, between reality phenomenon and negation, there exists continuous concatenation of many pos sible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other always smaller than that between the given sen sation and zero, or complete negation. ' That to say, the realiia phenomenon has always quantity, which however not discoverable in Apprehension, inasmuch as Apprehension takes place means of mere sensation in one instant, and not the successive synthesis of many sensations, and there fore does not progress from parts to the whole.
has quantity, but not an extensive quantity.
Now that quantity which apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation
to negation = term intensive quantity. Consequently, rea lity in phenomenon has intensive quantity, that degree,
Apprehension tbs Kantian word for perception, in the largest ? cast in which we employ that term. the genus which includes under
M species, perception proper and sensation proper. -- Tr.
Consequently,
? ? It is
is
it
;
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ii
is
*
a
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a
is
0, I
is,
is, a
is
a
is a
by by
is
it it,
a
a
it ;
in a
is
if 1
? 128 TRANSCENDENTAL iJOCTltlNX.
If we consider tins reality as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, for example, a change) ;
we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momen tum, for example, the momentum of weight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the appre hension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with Causality I have at present nothing to do.
Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quautity, which may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour -- for example, red -- has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight, &c.
This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part simple*), is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given, without enclosing it within bound aries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and moments are only boundaries, that the mere places or positions of their limi tation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to limit or determine them and we cannot conceive either space or time composed of constituent parts which are given
before space or time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in the production of these Quantities progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate the
expression flowing.
All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect
both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with
In the former case they are extensive quanti ties in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the manifold of phenomenon interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not properly phe- nomenon as quantity, which not produced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of certain kind, bul
Simplex. -- 7V.
? reality).
? ? a
a
a
*
is
;
is
a
by
it ;
is a
is,
? AjrTicii'vrioxs or fekception. 129
by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, 1 employ the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver, which to be sure, continuous quantity, in which no part the smallest, but every part might constitute piece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, the words thirteen dollars understand so many coins (be their value in silver what may), would be quite erroneous to use the expression quantity of dollars on the contrary, must call them aggregate, that number of coins. And as in every number we must have unity as the foundation, so phenomenon taken as unity quantity, and as such always
continuous quantity (quantum continuum).
Now, seeing all phsenomena, whether considered as extensive
or intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition, "All change (transition of thing from one >>tate into another) con tinuous," might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were not that the causality of change lies entirely beyond the bounds of transcendental philosophy, and presup
poses empirical principles. For of the possibility of cause which changes the condition of things, that which de termines them to the contrary of certain given state, the under standing gives us priori no knowledge; not merely because has no insight into the possibility of (for such insight ab sent in several priori cognitions), but because the notion of change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that we have
nothing which we could here employ but the pure funda mental conceptions of all possible experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical science, which built upon certain fundamental
experiences.
Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great in
fluence which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw.
all reality in perception has degree, between which ai. d x
? ? ? If
a
is
& it &
a
aa it
a
a
it I
it
a ais,a
is,
is
a
;
a
is
is, by
is
it aI
a
is
? 130 THANSCENDENTAi DOCTIlUiE.
negation there is an endless sequence of ever . smaller degree*, and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations ; no perception, and consequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately
or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon ; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception ; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single . phenomenon, and the difference of the degrees in its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that no part thereof empty, yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon un changed, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which space or time filled, and the intensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the ex tensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered.
We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philo
sophers, remarking great difference in the quantity of the matter of different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously, that this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would sus pect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely on metaphysical hypothesis -- sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space must not here call impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) always iden tical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensivo quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, Air which they can have no ground in experience, and which conse
? quently merely metaphysical, oppose
transcendental de-
* It should be remembered that Kant means by matter, that which in the object corresponds to sensation the subject--the real in pheno menon. -- V.
? ? 2
a
is * is
in
I
a
a
is, if
a
is
it
(I
?
a
is
? ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 1. 31
monstration, which it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned pre supposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space -- for example, caloric, or any other reality in the phsenomenal world -- can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty ; on the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees, as completely as another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard
I wish
ciple of the pure understanding, that the nature of our per
ceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a phsenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori principle of the understanding.
Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an enquirer whom initiation into tran scendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We may natu rally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phsenomena, and consequently--the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself ab straction being made of its empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution : How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and & priori respecting pheno-
mena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is pecu liarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sen
? to their specific gravity ;
only
to
prove,
from a
prin
sation itself?
x2
? ? ? 132 TRANSCENDENTAL TOl. TltlNE.
The quality of sensation is in all cases n. erely empirical, and cannot be represented a priori (for example, colours, taste, &c). But the real -- that which corresponds to sensation -- iu opposition to negation=0, only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical con sciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a sen sation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illumi nated. We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and represent to our selves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum,* a syn thesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such are given only d posteriori, but this property thereof, namely,
that they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only a single quality, namely, continuity ; but in respect to all quality (the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize d priori any thing more than the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to experience.
III.
ANALOGIES OF EXPERLENCB.
The principle of these is : Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of per
? ceptions.
Proof.
Experience is an empirical cognition ; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci-
? The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power oi nlensive quantity in the cauie of a sensation, for example, redness, weight, Ac, is called in the Kantian terminology, Us moment. The term momentum which we employ, must not he confounded with the word com "conly employed ic :atural science. -- Ti.
? ? ? AXALOGIES OP EXPEllIEKCJt. 133
ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog
nition of objects of the senses, that of experience merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension only placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of necessity the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, to be discovered therein. But as experience cognition of objects means of perceptions, follows that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe rience not as put together time, but as objectively
time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place ny means of their connexion in time in general, consequently ouly means of priori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience possible only by means of representation of the necessary connexion of perception.
The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon determined in re-pect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience, and render possible.
The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse quently, as this unity lies priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com plex of all representations), and indeed relates priori to its form, that to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time, --
the a priori transcendental unity of ap perception, to which subjected all that can belong to my
e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become *n object for me. This synthetical and priori determine*?
necessity imposed
(not
? ? ? ii
a
is
(i.
in
by is
is a
a
is
it
il
it
&
by is
by
is a
is it a
in
it
in
a is
is
is,
? 134
7BAKS0IKDETITA1 DOOTBIJ'E.
unity in relntion of perceptions in time is therefore the rule : " All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.
These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, aid the synthesis of the empirical in tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the
mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its
? synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phe nomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determiuately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others.
The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic to phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan tities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose, and give a priori, that is con struct, the degree of our sensations of the "in-light. * We may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive.
The case is very different with those principles whose pro vince it is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con-
? Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads of " Aiioms of Intuition," and " Anticipations of Perception," authorize the application to phamacnena of determinations of size and number, that is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its dif
ferent effects on water, *c, and on mercury in a thermometer. -- 7V.
? ? ? ANALOGIES OF EXPEBIENCE. 13. 1
st. ucted, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perceptkin is given us, in a certain relation 01 time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can not then say a priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the for mer but only how connected, quoad its existence, in
Analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formule, which enounce
the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always constitutive, so that two terms of the proportion are given, the third also given, that can be constructed the aid of these formule. But in philosophy, analogy not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three given terms, can give a priori and cognize the relation to fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although certainly possess rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience therefore only rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (pheno mena) not as constitutive, but merely as regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought
general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phsenomena), the synthesis of per ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these
? For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con
perceptions).
stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both
Known the two terms and and the relation of to not only the relation of to some other number given, but that number itself, 12, given, that constructed. Therefore 3:6=6: 12. -- TV.
Given known effect, known cause, and another known effect, we reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but ? hose relation to the known effect we know from the comparison of the
Thus, our own known actions our own known motives -= the known actions of others x, that the inotivrs of others
three given terms.
which we cannot immediately cognize. -- TV.
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? lIUNsCKItDKNTAL TWICTRrRK.
possess & priori, but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse quently also in the manner of demonstration.
But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently
the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con cerning them synthetically h priori. But they are nothing but phcenomena ; a complete knowledge of which -- a know ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate --is the only possible experience. It follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of plienomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phsenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the categories in the principles them selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under the title of formulce of the former.
A.
FIRST ANALOOY.
PBIKCIFLX OF THE PEBMAKEXCE OF STTBSTAWCE.
In all changes of phcenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi nished.
Pboof.
All phcenomena exist in time, wherein alone ns substratum, that as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co existence and succession can "ie represented. Consequently
? ? ? is,
? OT TUB PE11MANENCE OT SUBSTAVCE.
137
time, in which all changes of phsenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which buc- cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of per ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that
phsenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre sents time in general, and in which ail change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phsenomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per tains to the existence of things, substance all that per tains to existence enn be cogitated only as determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined,
substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phsenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished.
? Our apprehension of the manifold in
phenomenon always successive, consequently always changing. By
alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani fold, as an object of experience, co-existent or successive, unless had for foundation something that exists always, that something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) that to say, the permanent
the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time possible. Permanence
in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phsenomena time (just as co-existence cannot be regarded as modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive). * If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos sible. only by means of the permanent that existence
The latter part of thii sentence aetma to contradict the former. Th>> sequel will explain. -- TV.
? ? *
is,
is
in
It is
is, it
a
in
is
isis is
;
is it is
is,
a
is
aa
;
? 138 TltANSCEXDENTAL DOCTRINE.
in different pa. ts of the successive aeries of time receives k quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never' has even the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con dition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that of experience and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent the object in itself, that the substance (phenomenon) but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub stances, consequently to its determinations.
? find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as substratum of all change in phenomena indeed, am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself
more precise and definite manner, when he says " In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable. " But of this decidedly synthetical pro
nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof nay, very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as deserves to
do, at the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of na ture. In truth, the statement that substance permanent,
position,
For this very permanence the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenome
non and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable nothing but determination. But because proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that
Not tubt'antia noumenon. -- Tr.
tautological.
cannot be drawn from conceptions,
synthetical proposition priori, and as philosophers never re flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved exeep'. means of deduction of the possibility of experience, no wonder that while has served as the foundation of all ex-
inasmuch as concerns
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;
? OF THE FEBMANENCE 01 SUBSTANCE. li'J
perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it tins never been supported by proof.
A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke? " He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke. " Thus he presumed it to be incon trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like manner was the saying, *' From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- mena. For if that in the phsenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phsenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de nihilo nihil," -- " in nihilum nil posse reverti," are two propo sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even
? in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needier, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their
should arise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This permanence however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe nomenal world.
The determinations of substance, which are only par ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They
are always real, because they concern the existence of sub
substance)
? ? a
is,
? 110 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
stance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe n particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation.
Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical, "Only the permanent
? is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that when certain deter minations cease, others begin. "
Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely determination of the permanent, cannot be possible perception, for this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of transition from one state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which perma nent. Grant that thing absolutely begins to be we must then have point of time in which was not. But how and
what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless that which already exists For void time -- preceding --
(substance)
? ? by by
1
a it
it is
aa a
;
is
a
a
is,
? OF THE BUCCE8&ION OF TIME. 141
is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin ning with objects which existed previously, and which con tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the per manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.
Substances (in the world of phsenomena) are the substratum of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and in that case phsenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as co-existent, but as successive.
Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor tunity to speak in the sequel.
B. SECOND ANALOGY
PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY.
All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.
Proof.
(That all phsenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that successive being and non-being of the de terminations of substance, which permanent; consequently that being of substance itself which follows on the non- being thereof, or non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, impossible --all this has been fully es tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin ciple might have been expressed as follows "All alteration (succession) of phenomena merely change for the changes
? ? ? is
;":
a is
is, a
a
is
? 142 TBANSCENDBHTAL DOOTBnrE.
of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with
I perceive that phsenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, whicft determines the in ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the
one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can
not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places one state before, and the other after ; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the
two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof. )
? relation of the successive phsenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is
determined as necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phsenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus ality, that experience itself, that empirical cognition of phte- nomena, becomes possible and consequently, that phsenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only virtue of this law.
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena always successive. The representations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the object also, second point for reflection, which was not contained in the former.
objective
thereby
? ? is
a is
by
;
is,
? OF THE 8UCC3SSSION OF TIME.
113
Now we may certainly give the name of object to every thing, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there of ; but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question re quiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects of con sciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,
that reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we
must therefore say " The manifold of phenomena always
produced successively in the mind. " If phenomena were things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our representations how this manifold con nected in the object for we have to do only with our repre sentations. How things may be themselves, without regard to ths representations through which they affect us, utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now although phenom- ena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phse- nomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold in
apprehension always successive. For example, the apprehen sion of the manifold in the phenomenon of house which stands before me,issuccessive. Now comes the question, whether the manifold of this house in itself also successive --which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon as raise my conception of an object to the transcendental signifi
? cation thereof, find that the house not thing in itself, but only phenomenon, that a representation, the trans cendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am to understand the question, How can the manifold be
connected in the phenomenon itself -- not considered as thing in itself, but merely as phenomenon? Here that which lies in mys'iecessive apprehension regarded as representation,
whilst the phenomenon which given me, notwithstanding that nothing more than complex of these representations, regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception,
drawn from the representations of apprehension, must har monize. very soon seen that, as accordance of the cog nition with its object constitutes truth, the question now beforo na can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth/
? ? It is
is
is
I
is,
it is
a
I
a a
is is,
is
is
in it
by
is a
is
a
;
a I is
;
:
is is
? 144 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKHTE.
and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representation! of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom ns the object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the pheno menon which contains the condition of this necessary rule 01 npprehension, is the object.
That something happens, that is to say, that something or some state exists which be fore was not, cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phe
nomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which fol lows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an oc currence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phsenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is deter mined ; and by this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension of a house, might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice versd ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Ac cordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no de termined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon neeettary.
? ? ? ? or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME.
146
I mast therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjec tive sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter mined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the phsenomenou itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I caunot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.
In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne cessarily ; but 1 cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by npprehension) that which antecedes it.
For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the event.
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc
cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same Ij
? ? ? ? 146 TBAJJSCENDENTAl DOCTR1NE.
tort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phsenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, --not even in the phenomenal world.
Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phsenomena are determined in their sequence, that as they happen, the preceding state, can make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event possible.
No doubt appears as this were in thorough contradic
? tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained
in regard to the procedure rf the human understanding. Ac
cording to these opinions, means of the perception and
comparison of similar consequences following upon certain
antecedent phsenomena, that the understanding led to the
discovery of rule, according to which certain events always
follow certain phsenomena, and only by this process thnt we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such basis,
clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which furnishes us with -- " Everything that happens must have cause" --would be just as contingent as expe rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as would not in this case be priori, but founded on deduction. Bat the same the case with this law as with other pure priori representations g. space and time), which we can
draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experier. ce, only because we had already placed them therein, and thnt
means, nnd by that alone, had rendered
experience possible.
? ? by
(e.
is,
it
a
is
4 it it
is
isait I a itit
d is
by is
it
it if is is
by
? Or THK 8UCCESSIOK OF TIMI.
147
Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori.
It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc cession or effect (of an event--that the happening of some thing that did not exist before), and distinguish from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when rule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed,
this necessity which first renders possible the representation of succession in the object.
We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre sentations are still nothing more than representations, that internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how happens that to these representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to them certain unknown objective reality clear that ob jective significancy cannot consist in relation to nnother re presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again arises " How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi cancy over and above the subjective, which proper to as
? determination of state of mind ? " If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our
and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our
representations in certain manner, and of subjecting them to rule and that conversely, only because certain order
necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significancy ascribed to them.
In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our repre sentations always successive. Now hereby not repre sented an object, for by means of this succession, which
subjective representations,
l2
? ? ii
is
is
it,
a is
it a
isaa a ;a
it is
a
a
is
It is
it,
it is, is
:
a
is,
?
? 148 TRAKSCENDENTAL D0CTK1JCB.
common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another.
? ? ? a
is,
? TKANSCEWBENTAL DOCTMKE.
Proof.
Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, u con
sciousness, which contains an element of sensation. Phsenomena
as objects of perception are not pure, that merely formal in tuitions, like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves. * They contain, then, over and above the intui tion, the materials for an object (through which represented something existing in space or time), that to say, they con tain the real of sensation, as representation merely subjec tive, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject
affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure con
sciousness possible, inasmuch as the real in this conscious ness entirely evanishes, and there remains merely formal consciousness priori) of the manifold in time and space consequently there possible synthesis also of the production of the quantity of sensation from its commencement, that from the pure intuition = onwards, up to certain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself not an objective
? and in to be found neither the intuition of space nor of time, cannot possess any extensive quantity, and yet there does belong to quantity (and that means of its
apprehension, in which empirical consciousne*is can within certain time rise from nothing = up to its given amount), consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive quantity, that degree of influence on sense to all objects of perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.
All cognition, by means of which am enabled to cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an Anticipation and without doubt this the sense in which Epicurus employed his expression vpoy. ^i;. But as there in phsenomena something which never cog nized priori, which on this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition, that to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), follows, that
sensation just that element in cognition which cannot be at
They can be perceived only as phsenomena, and some part of them
must always belong to the non-ego whereas pure intuitions are entirely the orodncts of the mind itself, and as such arc cognized in thenuehn. -- Tr
representation,
? ? ;
;
a
*
h
is
is
is (a
it
is
by
is
is
I
0
is, a
it a
it is
0
a
a
is,
;
it
a is
is a
a
is is, is
a is
? disappear.
ANTICIPATIONS OP PKBCEPTIOJT.
127
? 11 anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to Quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent a priori that which may always be given a pos teriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense --special, because it may seem surprising to forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really is the case here.
Apprehension,* by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that do not take into consideration succes sion of many sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which not successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity the want of sensation in moment of time would represent as empty, consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation rea
? lity (real as phenomenon) absence of negation = 0. of diminution, so that
that which corresponds to the
Now every sensation capable can decrease, and thus gradually
Therefore, between reality phenomenon and negation, there exists continuous concatenation of many pos sible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other always smaller than that between the given sen sation and zero, or complete negation. ' That to say, the realiia phenomenon has always quantity, which however not discoverable in Apprehension, inasmuch as Apprehension takes place means of mere sensation in one instant, and not the successive synthesis of many sensations, and there fore does not progress from parts to the whole.
has quantity, but not an extensive quantity.
Now that quantity which apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation
to negation = term intensive quantity. Consequently, rea lity in phenomenon has intensive quantity, that degree,
Apprehension tbs Kantian word for perception, in the largest ? cast in which we employ that term. the genus which includes under
M species, perception proper and sensation proper. -- Tr.
Consequently,
? ? It is
is
it
;
is a
ii
is
*
a
it a
a
is
0, I
is,
is, a
is
a
is a
by by
is
it it,
a
a
it ;
in a
is
if 1
? 128 TRANSCENDENTAL iJOCTltlNX.
If we consider tins reality as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, for example, a change) ;
we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momen tum, for example, the momentum of weight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the appre hension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with Causality I have at present nothing to do.
Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quautity, which may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour -- for example, red -- has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight, &c.
This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part simple*), is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given, without enclosing it within bound aries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and moments are only boundaries, that the mere places or positions of their limi tation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to limit or determine them and we cannot conceive either space or time composed of constituent parts which are given
before space or time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in the production of these Quantities progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate the
expression flowing.
All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect
both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with
In the former case they are extensive quanti ties in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the manifold of phenomenon interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not properly phe- nomenon as quantity, which not produced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of certain kind, bul
Simplex. -- 7V.
? reality).
? ? a
a
a
*
is
;
is
a
by
it ;
is a
is,
? AjrTicii'vrioxs or fekception. 129
by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, 1 employ the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver, which to be sure, continuous quantity, in which no part the smallest, but every part might constitute piece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, the words thirteen dollars understand so many coins (be their value in silver what may), would be quite erroneous to use the expression quantity of dollars on the contrary, must call them aggregate, that number of coins. And as in every number we must have unity as the foundation, so phenomenon taken as unity quantity, and as such always
continuous quantity (quantum continuum).
Now, seeing all phsenomena, whether considered as extensive
or intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition, "All change (transition of thing from one >>tate into another) con tinuous," might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were not that the causality of change lies entirely beyond the bounds of transcendental philosophy, and presup
poses empirical principles. For of the possibility of cause which changes the condition of things, that which de termines them to the contrary of certain given state, the under standing gives us priori no knowledge; not merely because has no insight into the possibility of (for such insight ab sent in several priori cognitions), but because the notion of change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that we have
nothing which we could here employ but the pure funda mental conceptions of all possible experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical science, which built upon certain fundamental
experiences.
Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great in
fluence which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw.
all reality in perception has degree, between which ai. d x
? ? ? If
a
is
& it &
a
aa it
a
a
it I
it
a ais,a
is,
is
a
;
a
is
is, by
is
it aI
a
is
? 130 THANSCENDENTAi DOCTIlUiE.
negation there is an endless sequence of ever . smaller degree*, and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations ; no perception, and consequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately
or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon ; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception ; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single . phenomenon, and the difference of the degrees in its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that no part thereof empty, yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon un changed, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which space or time filled, and the intensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the ex tensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered.
We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philo
sophers, remarking great difference in the quantity of the matter of different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously, that this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would sus pect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely on metaphysical hypothesis -- sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space must not here call impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) always iden tical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensivo quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, Air which they can have no ground in experience, and which conse
? quently merely metaphysical, oppose
transcendental de-
* It should be remembered that Kant means by matter, that which in the object corresponds to sensation the subject--the real in pheno menon. -- V.
? ? 2
a
is * is
in
I
a
a
is, if
a
is
it
(I
?
a
is
? ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 1. 31
monstration, which it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned pre supposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space -- for example, caloric, or any other reality in the phsenomenal world -- can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty ; on the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees, as completely as another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard
I wish
ciple of the pure understanding, that the nature of our per
ceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a phsenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori principle of the understanding.
Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an enquirer whom initiation into tran scendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We may natu rally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phsenomena, and consequently--the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself ab straction being made of its empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution : How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and & priori respecting pheno-
mena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is pecu liarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sen
? to their specific gravity ;
only
to
prove,
from a
prin
sation itself?
x2
? ? ? 132 TRANSCENDENTAL TOl. TltlNE.
The quality of sensation is in all cases n. erely empirical, and cannot be represented a priori (for example, colours, taste, &c). But the real -- that which corresponds to sensation -- iu opposition to negation=0, only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical con sciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a sen sation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illumi nated. We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and represent to our selves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum,* a syn thesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such are given only d posteriori, but this property thereof, namely,
that they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only a single quality, namely, continuity ; but in respect to all quality (the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize d priori any thing more than the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to experience.
III.
ANALOGIES OF EXPERLENCB.
The principle of these is : Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of per
? ceptions.
Proof.
Experience is an empirical cognition ; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci-
? The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power oi nlensive quantity in the cauie of a sensation, for example, redness, weight, Ac, is called in the Kantian terminology, Us moment. The term momentum which we employ, must not he confounded with the word com "conly employed ic :atural science. -- Ti.
? ? ? AXALOGIES OP EXPEllIEKCJt. 133
ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog
nition of objects of the senses, that of experience merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension only placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of necessity the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, to be discovered therein. But as experience cognition of objects means of perceptions, follows that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe rience not as put together time, but as objectively
time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place ny means of their connexion in time in general, consequently ouly means of priori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience possible only by means of representation of the necessary connexion of perception.
The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon determined in re-pect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience, and render possible.
The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse quently, as this unity lies priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com plex of all representations), and indeed relates priori to its form, that to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time, --
the a priori transcendental unity of ap perception, to which subjected all that can belong to my
e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become *n object for me. This synthetical and priori determine*?
necessity imposed
(not
? ? ? ii
a
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is a
a
is
it
il
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&
by is
by
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is it a
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it
in
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is
is,
? 134
7BAKS0IKDETITA1 DOOTBIJ'E.
unity in relntion of perceptions in time is therefore the rule : " All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.
These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, aid the synthesis of the empirical in tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the
mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its
? synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phe nomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determiuately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others.
The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic to phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan tities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose, and give a priori, that is con struct, the degree of our sensations of the "in-light. * We may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive.
The case is very different with those principles whose pro vince it is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con-
? Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads of " Aiioms of Intuition," and " Anticipations of Perception," authorize the application to phamacnena of determinations of size and number, that is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its dif
ferent effects on water, *c, and on mercury in a thermometer. -- 7V.
? ? ? ANALOGIES OF EXPEBIENCE. 13. 1
st. ucted, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perceptkin is given us, in a certain relation 01 time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can not then say a priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the for mer but only how connected, quoad its existence, in
Analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formule, which enounce
the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always constitutive, so that two terms of the proportion are given, the third also given, that can be constructed the aid of these formule. But in philosophy, analogy not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three given terms, can give a priori and cognize the relation to fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although certainly possess rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience therefore only rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (pheno mena) not as constitutive, but merely as regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought
general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phsenomena), the synthesis of per ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these
? For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con
perceptions).
stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both
Known the two terms and and the relation of to not only the relation of to some other number given, but that number itself, 12, given, that constructed. Therefore 3:6=6: 12. -- TV.
Given known effect, known cause, and another known effect, we reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but ? hose relation to the known effect we know from the comparison of the
Thus, our own known actions our own known motives -= the known actions of others x, that the inotivrs of others
three given terms.
which we cannot immediately cognize. -- TV.
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? lIUNsCKItDKNTAL TWICTRrRK.
possess & priori, but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse quently also in the manner of demonstration.
But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently
the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con cerning them synthetically h priori. But they are nothing but phcenomena ; a complete knowledge of which -- a know ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate --is the only possible experience. It follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of plienomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phsenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the categories in the principles them selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under the title of formulce of the former.
A.
FIRST ANALOOY.
PBIKCIFLX OF THE PEBMAKEXCE OF STTBSTAWCE.
In all changes of phcenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi nished.
Pboof.
All phcenomena exist in time, wherein alone ns substratum, that as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co existence and succession can "ie represented. Consequently
? ? ? is,
? OT TUB PE11MANENCE OT SUBSTAVCE.
137
time, in which all changes of phsenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which buc- cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of per ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that
phsenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre sents time in general, and in which ail change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phsenomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per tains to the existence of things, substance all that per tains to existence enn be cogitated only as determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined,
substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phsenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished.
? Our apprehension of the manifold in
phenomenon always successive, consequently always changing. By
alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani fold, as an object of experience, co-existent or successive, unless had for foundation something that exists always, that something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) that to say, the permanent
the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time possible. Permanence
in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phsenomena time (just as co-existence cannot be regarded as modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive). * If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos sible. only by means of the permanent that existence
The latter part of thii sentence aetma to contradict the former. Th>> sequel will explain. -- TV.
? ? *
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is
in
It is
is, it
a
in
is
isis is
;
is it is
is,
a
is
aa
;
? 138 TltANSCEXDENTAL DOCTRINE.
in different pa. ts of the successive aeries of time receives k quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never' has even the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con dition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that of experience and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent the object in itself, that the substance (phenomenon) but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub stances, consequently to its determinations.
? find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as substratum of all change in phenomena indeed, am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself
more precise and definite manner, when he says " In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable. " But of this decidedly synthetical pro
nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof nay, very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as deserves to
do, at the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of na ture. In truth, the statement that substance permanent,
position,
For this very permanence the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenome
non and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable nothing but determination. But because proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that
Not tubt'antia noumenon. -- Tr.
tautological.
cannot be drawn from conceptions,
synthetical proposition priori, and as philosophers never re flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved exeep'. means of deduction of the possibility of experience, no wonder that while has served as the foundation of all ex-
inasmuch as concerns
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? OF THE FEBMANENCE 01 SUBSTANCE. li'J
perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it tins never been supported by proof.
A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke? " He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke. " Thus he presumed it to be incon trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like manner was the saying, *' From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- mena. For if that in the phsenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phsenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de nihilo nihil," -- " in nihilum nil posse reverti," are two propo sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even
? in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needier, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their
should arise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This permanence however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe nomenal world.
The determinations of substance, which are only par ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They
are always real, because they concern the existence of sub
substance)
? ? a
is,
? 110 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
stance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe n particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation.
Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical, "Only the permanent
? is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that when certain deter minations cease, others begin. "
Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely determination of the permanent, cannot be possible perception, for this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of transition from one state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which perma nent. Grant that thing absolutely begins to be we must then have point of time in which was not. But how and
what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless that which already exists For void time -- preceding --
(substance)
? ? by by
1
a it
it is
aa a
;
is
a
a
is,
? OF THE BUCCE8&ION OF TIME. 141
is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin ning with objects which existed previously, and which con tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the per manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.
Substances (in the world of phsenomena) are the substratum of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and in that case phsenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as co-existent, but as successive.
Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor tunity to speak in the sequel.
B. SECOND ANALOGY
PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY.
All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.
Proof.
(That all phsenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that successive being and non-being of the de terminations of substance, which permanent; consequently that being of substance itself which follows on the non- being thereof, or non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, impossible --all this has been fully es tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin ciple might have been expressed as follows "All alteration (succession) of phenomena merely change for the changes
? ? ? is
;":
a is
is, a
a
is
? 142 TBANSCENDBHTAL DOOTBnrE.
of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with
I perceive that phsenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, whicft determines the in ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the
one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can
not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places one state before, and the other after ; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the
two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof. )
? relation of the successive phsenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is
determined as necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phsenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus ality, that experience itself, that empirical cognition of phte- nomena, becomes possible and consequently, that phsenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only virtue of this law.
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena always successive. The representations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the object also, second point for reflection, which was not contained in the former.
objective
thereby
? ? is
a is
by
;
is,
? OF THE 8UCC3SSSION OF TIME.
113
Now we may certainly give the name of object to every thing, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there of ; but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question re quiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects of con sciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,
that reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we
must therefore say " The manifold of phenomena always
produced successively in the mind. " If phenomena were things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our representations how this manifold con nected in the object for we have to do only with our repre sentations. How things may be themselves, without regard to ths representations through which they affect us, utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now although phenom- ena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phse- nomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold in
apprehension always successive. For example, the apprehen sion of the manifold in the phenomenon of house which stands before me,issuccessive. Now comes the question, whether the manifold of this house in itself also successive --which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon as raise my conception of an object to the transcendental signifi
? cation thereof, find that the house not thing in itself, but only phenomenon, that a representation, the trans cendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am to understand the question, How can the manifold be
connected in the phenomenon itself -- not considered as thing in itself, but merely as phenomenon? Here that which lies in mys'iecessive apprehension regarded as representation,
whilst the phenomenon which given me, notwithstanding that nothing more than complex of these representations, regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception,
drawn from the representations of apprehension, must har monize. very soon seen that, as accordance of the cog nition with its object constitutes truth, the question now beforo na can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth/
? ? It is
is
is
I
is,
it is
a
I
a a
is is,
is
is
in it
by
is a
is
a
;
a I is
;
:
is is
? 144 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKHTE.
and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representation! of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom ns the object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the pheno menon which contains the condition of this necessary rule 01 npprehension, is the object.
That something happens, that is to say, that something or some state exists which be fore was not, cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phe
nomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which fol lows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an oc currence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phsenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is deter mined ; and by this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension of a house, might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice versd ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Ac cordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no de termined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon neeettary.
? ? ? ? or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME.
146
I mast therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjec tive sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter mined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the phsenomenou itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I caunot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.
In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne cessarily ; but 1 cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by npprehension) that which antecedes it.
For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the event.
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc
cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same Ij
? ? ? ? 146 TBAJJSCENDENTAl DOCTR1NE.
tort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phsenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, --not even in the phenomenal world.
Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phsenomena are determined in their sequence, that as they happen, the preceding state, can make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event possible.
No doubt appears as this were in thorough contradic
? tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained
in regard to the procedure rf the human understanding. Ac
cording to these opinions, means of the perception and
comparison of similar consequences following upon certain
antecedent phsenomena, that the understanding led to the
discovery of rule, according to which certain events always
follow certain phsenomena, and only by this process thnt we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such basis,
clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which furnishes us with -- " Everything that happens must have cause" --would be just as contingent as expe rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as would not in this case be priori, but founded on deduction. Bat the same the case with this law as with other pure priori representations g. space and time), which we can
draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experier. ce, only because we had already placed them therein, and thnt
means, nnd by that alone, had rendered
experience possible.
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4 it it
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? Or THK 8UCCESSIOK OF TIMI.
147
Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori.
It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc cession or effect (of an event--that the happening of some thing that did not exist before), and distinguish from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when rule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed,
this necessity which first renders possible the representation of succession in the object.
We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre sentations are still nothing more than representations, that internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how happens that to these representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to them certain unknown objective reality clear that ob jective significancy cannot consist in relation to nnother re presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again arises " How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi cancy over and above the subjective, which proper to as
? determination of state of mind ? " If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our
and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our
representations in certain manner, and of subjecting them to rule and that conversely, only because certain order
necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significancy ascribed to them.
In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our repre sentations always successive. Now hereby not repre sented an object, for by means of this succession, which
subjective representations,
l2
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it a
isaa a ;a
it is
a
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It is
it,
it is, is
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? 148 TRAKSCENDENTAL D0CTK1JCB.
common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another.
