In Kamadhatu, the defilements, with the
exception
of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, consti- tute dsravas;
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v.
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ajlvikas and to reject the Sutras of the Sugata: 'The eye, Oh Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place .
.
.
;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (amurta) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms {aparamanu- samcita), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion.
In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present.
If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal.
Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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108
non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati). If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
*##
Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
***
116
When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
? ^
The Latent Defilements 821
with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
118
Seeing of Arising. He has abandoned the things (vastu) which
are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, but he is not yet disjoined from these things by this: for he continues to be bound to
119
these first things
whose abandoning depends on the Seeing of Arising and which are relative to these first things.
In the Path of Meditation wherein one sucessively expells nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of defilements, when the first category is abandoned and not the others, these other categories of defilements, which bear upon the first category, continue to bind. (vi. 33)
###
How many anusayas attach themselves (anuserate) to each object?
We would never finish were we to examine this problem in detail. The Vaibhasikas (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6) give a summary exposition of this.
In general one can say that there are sixteen types of dharmas, objects to which the anusayas attach themselves: for each sphere there are five categories (categories to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. ); plus the pure dharmas. The conscious- nesses are of the same sixteen types.
When we know which dharmas are the objects of which consciousness, we are then able to calculate how many anusayas
through the universal defilements (v. 12)
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attach themselves to these dharmas.
29. Abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and
Arising, abandoned through Meditation, the dharmas in
Kamadhatu are the sphere of three consciousnesses of this
sphere, of one consciousness of Rupadhatu and the pure
120 consciousness.
In all, these dharmas are the object of five consciousnesses. The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, through the Seeing of Arising, and through Meditation {abhydsa = bhdvand). One consciousness of Rupadhatu is abandoned through Meditation.
30a-b. The same three categories of dharmas in Rupadhatu
are the object of three consciousnesses of Rupadhatu, three
of Kamadhatu, one of Arupyadhatu and the pure con-
121 sciousness.
The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu are the same as above: they are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and its Arsing, and through Meditation. Consciousness in Arupyadhatu is abandoned through Meditation. In all, these dharmas are the objects of eight consciousnesses.
30c-d. The same categories of dharmas in Arupyadhatu are the objects of three consciousnesses of the three spheres and pure conscousness.
The same three consciousnesses. In all, these dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses.
31a-b. The dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of
? Extinction and the Path are all the objects of the same consciousnesses with the addition of the consciousness of their own category.
(a)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction: in all six consciousnesses.
(b)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path: in all six consciousnesses.
(c)The dharmas of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path: they are the objects, respectively, of nine and eleven consciousnesses.
31c-d. The pure dharmas are the object of the last three consciousnesses of the three spheres and of pure conscious- ness.
They are the objects of ten consciousnesses, the conscious- nesses of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, through Meditation, and the pure consciousness.
Here are two summarizing slokas: "The dharmas of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering and through Meditation, are, in the order of the spheres, the domain of five, of eight, of ten consciousnesses. " "To the abandoning through Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path, add the mind of their class. The pure dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses. "
Such are the sixteen types of dharmas, objects of sixteen types of consciousness. We shall now examine what anusaya attaches
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itself to what dharma.
A complete analysis would take us too far afield; we will
content ourselves with studying a typical case.
1. Let us choose, among the objects of attachment, agreeable sensation, and let us see how many anusayas attach themselves to it.
Agreeable sensation is of seven types: (1) belonging to Kamadhatu, to be abandoned through Meditation; (2-6) belonging to Rupadhatu, of five categories; and (7) pure.
When it is pure, the anusayas do not attach themselves to it, as we have shown.
When they belong to Kamadhatu, the anusayas abandoned through Meditation and all the universal anusayas attach them- selves to it.
When they belong to Rupadhatu, all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.
2. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object is of twelve types: (1-4) belong to Kamadhatu, for categories of consciousness (excepting the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering); (5-9) belong to Rupadhatu, five categories; (10-11) belong to Arupyadhatu, the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path and the one abandoned through Meditation; and (12) the pure consciousness.
Attaching themselves to it are, according to their types: 1. four categories of Meditation; anusaya of the sphere of Kamadhatu; 2. the anusayas of the sphere of Rupadhatu which have conditioned things for their object; 3. two categories of anusayas of the sphere of Arupyadhatu; and 4. the universal anusayas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 452c20).
3. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness
? which has for its object the consciousness having an agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has an agreeable sensation for its object, and which is of twelve types, is itself the object of a consciousness which can be of fourteen types, namely the twelve aforementioned types with the addition (13-14) of the conscious- nesses of the sphere of Arupyadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of the Arising of Suffering.
Attaching themselves to this consciousness are, according to their types, the anusayas described above in the first two spheres, plus four categories in Arupyadhatu (by excluding the anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering).
The other dharmas (the twenty-two indriyas, i. 48c-d, etc. ) will 122
be examined on the basis of this example.
***
The mind is termed sanusaya, "havinganusaya" from the fact of the anusayas. Should we think that, necessarily, the anusayas
125
nourish themselves, and lodge in (anuserate) the sanusaya
mind?
Those which lodge in it are the non-abandoned anusayas, whose object is not abandoned (v. 61c-d), and which are associated with the mind in question.
Those which do not lodge in it are the abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind in question.
32a-b. The defiled mind is sanusaya in two ways; the non-defiled mind solely from the fact of the anusayas which
124 lodge therein.
The defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas
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? 826 Chapter Five
which lodge therein: the anusayas with which it is associated, whose object is not abandoned, which takes an object; and (2) from the fact of the anuiayas which are not therein: the abandoned anuiayas and that to which it is associated: for this mind continues to have them as companions.
The non-defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein: the non-abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind.
##*
In what order are the ten anusayas produced (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 245b28 and following)?
Any one can arise after any one: there is thus no rule which applies to all of them. Nevertheless, for the order of their production:
32c. From moha9 there is doubt.
At first, bound by ignorance (moha=avidya)> a person is in confusion with respect to the Truths: he does not take pleasure in the Truth of Suffering; he does not admit it.
From this state of confusion, there arises doubt; he undertands the two thesis; he doubts whether suffering is true, or if non-suffering is true.
32d. From whence false views;
From doubt there arises false views: by reason of false teaching and false reflection, he comes to the judgement "This is not suffering. "
32e. From whence a belief in a self;
? From false view there arises the view of personality; for, not recognizing the skandhas as suffering, he considers these skandhas as constituting a "self. "
33a. From whence a belief in the extremes;
From whence there is the view of the two extremes, for a person, believing in a self, becomes attached to the idea of the eternity or the annihilation of the self.
33b. From whence the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices;
From this there is an esteeming of morality and practices considered to be a means of purification.
33c. From whence the esteeming of bad views;
From this, there is an esteeming of that which is inferior, the esteeming of what he considers as a means of purification.
33d. From whence lust and pride relative to one's own views;
From this there is attachment to one's own views, and pride and pleasure in these views.
33e. And hatred with respect to another:
From this there is dislike: for, quite full of his own views, he detests the views of others which are contrary to his own.
? 828 Chapter Five
According to other masters, there is hatred for one's own opinions when . one changes them; for lust and the other anusayas which are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths are those which have for their object the person himself and his own views.
33f. Such is the order.
This is the order of the arising of the ten klesas, ***
How many causes give rise to the klesas?
34. Klesas [with complete causes] arise from the non-aban- doning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object,
125
For example, lust arises (1) when the anus aya of lust is non-abandoned--not-completely-known {aparijnata)--its opposi- tion not having arisen (v. 64); (2) when the dharmas which provoke the manifestation of lust, namely visible things, etc. , are found in the field of experience {abhasagata~visayarupata-apanna)\ and (3) when there is erroneous judgment.
T h e anus ay a is cause; t h e dharmas a r e its object; and incorrect judgment is its immediate preparation: three distinct forces.
The same holds for the other klesas
34a. With complete causes.
This is the case for the klesas which proceed from all causes. For, according to the School, a klesa can arise through the mere force of its object; as in the case of the Arhat who is subject to
and from erroneous judgment.
? falling away (vi. 58b).
In a Sutra, the Blessed One said that the ninety-eight anusayas, with the ten wrappings of attachment (the paryavasthanas), are made up of three cankerous influences (dsravas), the cankerous influence of objects of pleasure (kdmasrava), the cankerous influence of existence (bhavdsrava), and the cankerous influence of ignorance (avidydsrava); four floods (oghas), the flood of the objects of pleasure (kdmaugha), the flood of existence (bha- vaugha), the flood of views (drstyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidhaugha); four yokes (yogas), the yoke of the objects of pleasure (kdmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (drstiyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidydyoga); and four clingings (updddnas), clinging to the objects of pleasure (kdmopdddna), the clinging to views (drsfyupdddna), the clinging to morality and ascetic practices (stlavratopadana), and the clinging to a belief in a self (atmavddopdddna).
***
What is the definition of the cankerous influences (dsravas)?
35a.
In Kamadhatu, the defilements, with the exception of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, consti- tute dsravas;
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v. 47) make up forty-one things: this is the cankerous influence of the objects of pleasure.
35b. In Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, only the anus ayas themselves constitute the cankerous influence of existen-
126 ce.
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But there are, in the two higher spheres, two wrappings,
127 namely torpor and dissipation (ii. 26a-c, v. 47). The Prakarana
says, "What is the cankerous influence of existence? With the exception of ignorance, it is the other connections (samyojanas), bonds (bandhanas), anusayas, upaklesas and wrappings (paryavas- thanas) of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. "
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmlr say that the wrappings of attach- ment are not mentioned as forming part of the cankerous influence of existence because, in the two higher spheres, they are
128 not independent.
##*
Why are the anusayas of the two higher spheres placed together in order to make one single cankerous influence of existence?
36a-b. They are morally neutral, proceed inwards, and belong to the stage of absorption: this is why they are put together.
They both present the threefold common characteristics of being morally neutral, of being turned inward (that is, of not depending on objects), and of belonging to the spheres of absorption: they are thus united into a single cankerous influence.
And again they are called the cankerous influence of existence for the same reason that one distinguishes the cankerous influence of existence (v. 2).
From the above, it results that the avidyds, "the ignorances," of the three spheres,--in all fifteen things,--(v. 4) constitute the cankerous influence of ignorance.
Why do the ignorances constitute a separate cankerous influence?
? 36c d. Ignorance is the root: it is thus said to constitute a
129 separate cankerous influence.
In the manner in which the cankerous influences are explained,
37a-b. So too for the floods and the yokes. But views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke by reason of their acuteness.
The "floods" and the "yokes" are explained in the same manner. The cankerous influence of the objects of sensual pleasure (kdma-ogha) without views, is both the flood of the objects of sensual pleasure and the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure; so too the cankerous influence of existence, without views, is both the flood of existence and the yoke of existence.
130
According to the School,
tic of sharpness that views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke.
[Why are they not a separate cankerous influence? ]
37c-d. They are not a separate cankerous influence, because, without companions, they are not favorable to installation.
[We shall explain below, v. 40, the etymology of the word dsrava or cankerous influence. ]The dsravas are so called because they seat themselves (asayantUy dsravandm nirvacanam). Isolated (asahdya) views are not favorable to installation (dsana), being acute. Thus one does not make a separate place among the dsravas or cankerous influences for them; they figure in the category of the cankerous influences, but are not mixed with the other anusayas.
Therefore we have:
a. The flood of the objects of sensual pleasure is made up of five
The Latent Defilements 831
it is by reason of their characteris-
? 832 Chapter Five
lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all twenty-nine things.
b. The flood of existence is made up of ten lusts, ten egotisms, eight doubts: in all twenty-eight things.
c. The flood of views is made up of the twelve views of the three Dhatus: in all thirty-six things.
d. The flood of ignorance is made up of the five ignorances of the three Dhatus: in all fifteen things.
The same for the yokes.
38a-c. So too the upadanas (the clingings), by placing ignorance [with the first two] and by dividing the fastis into two.
We have five clingings:
a. Clinging to the objects of sensual pleasure (kdmayoga) is made up of the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure plus the ignorances of Kamadhatu, that is, five lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, five ignorances, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all thirty-four things.
151
b. Clinging to the belief in a soul (atmavadopadana) is made
up of the yoke of existence plus the ignorances of the two higher spheres, that is, ten lusts, ten egotisms, ten ignorances, and eight doubts: in all thirty-eight things.
c. The clinging to views is made up of the yoke of views without the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices: in all thirty things.
d. Clinging to morality and ascetic practices is made up of the six remaining things.
Why distinguish "the presumption of morality and of ascetic practices" from the other views and make it a separate clinging?
? Because it is in opposition to the Path and deludes the two classes of devotees: holding as path that which is not Path, the laity are deluded with expectations of obtaining heaven through
132
abstinence, etc. ,
and clerics are deluded with expectations of
133
38c-d. Ignorance is not the grasper; like clinging, it is mixed 135
Ignorance has non-intellection for its characteristic; it is not at all sharp; thus it does not grasp; therefore, say the School, it is only mixed with the other defilements as is clinging.
136
But, we would say, the Blessed One said in the Sutra, "What
is the yoke of the object of sensual pleasure (kdmayoga)? With
regard to the objects of pleasure (kdmas), within the person who
does not know the origin of the object of pleasure, it is kdmardga,
kdmaprema, kdmecchd, kdmamurchd, kdmagrddha, kdmaparigard-
dha, kdmanandt, kdmaniyanti, and kdmddhyavasdna which
overpowers the mind: these are the yokes of the objects of sensual
137
pleasure. " The Blessed One defines the other yokes in the same
138 Thus chandardga with respect to the objects of pleasure, views,
139 ddna), etc.
***
What is the meaning of the words anus ay a (latent defilement), dsrava (cankerous influence), ogha (flood),yoga (yoke) and upddana (clinging)?
obtaining purity through the renouncing of agreeable things. 134
(Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 284a4).
But why doesn't ignorance constitute a separate clinging?
with the other anusayas.
way. In another Sutra, he says that chandardga is a clinging. etc. , is what is called clinging to the objects of pleasure (kamopd-
The Latent Defilements 833
? 834
Chapter Five
39. They are atomic; they adhere; they nourish themselves in two ways; they continually bind: this is why they are
140
They are atomic, for their mode of existences is subtle, being difficult to know. They adhere through the adhesion of their prdptis\ they nourish themselves (anuferate) in two ways, both from the object and from the dharmas with which they are associated; and they continually bind, for, unless one makes an effort, and even when one creates an obstacle to them, they will
141 appear and reappear.
40. They fix and they flow, they carry away, they attach, they seize: such is the etymology of the words dsravas, etc.
The anusayas fix, "seat" (dsayanti) beings in transmigration;
they flow (dsravanti) from the highest heaven (Bhavagra =
Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana, iii. 3, 81) to Avici (iii. 58); they flow
oghas or floods.
The anusayas cause beings to be attached (slesayanti); they
are thus called yogas or yokes.
The anusayas seize (upagrhnanti); they are thus called
145 updddnas or clingings.
146 The best explanation is the following.
1. By means of the anusayas, the mental series flows into the objects; the anusayas are thus dsravas or cankerous influences. In conformity with the comparison of the Sutra "In the same way that one makes great efforts in order to steer a boat against the current but when these efforts begin to weaken, the boat is carried
termed anusayaj.
out (ksar) by the six organs which are as wounds. They are thus 142
called cankerous influences, or dsravas.
The anusayas carry away (haranti)', * they are thus called
14
144
? (haryate) with the stream; [so too, it is with great pains that the mental series is freed from its objects through the good dhar-
147
masV
2. When they are very violent, the anusayas are called oghas; in fact they carry away, as in a flood, those who are bound to them, and who necessarily yield to their impulses.
3. When they do not enter into activity with an extreme violence, the anusayas are called yogas, because they yoke one to the very many sufferings of transmigration; or rather because they adhere with obstinance.
4. The anufayas are called upadanas, because, through their action, one clings to things of the senses, etc. {kamadhyupada-
14 na). *
*#*
These same anusayas or latent defilements which make up four
categories--cankerous influences, floods, yokes, and clingings,--
also make up five categories: samyojanas or connections (v. 41-45),
bandhanas or bonds (v. 45d), anusayas, upaklesas (v. 46), and 149
paryavasthanas or wrappings (v. 47-49b).
41a-b. There are said to be five types by reason of their
150 division into connections, etc.
151
The nine samyojanas or connections are: 1) affection, 2)
aversion, 3) pride, 4) ignorance, 5) view, 6) unjustified estimation, 7) doubt, 8) envy, and 9) avarice.
Anunaya-samyojana or the attachment of affection is lust of the three Dhatus. One should understand the other connections in the same way, each according to its type: the second, the eighth, and ninth belong exclusively to Kamadhatu.
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Drsti-samyojana or the attachment to views is made up of the first three views (a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and false views); paramarsa-samyojana, the attachment to esteeming, is made up of the last two (namely, the esteeming of views and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices). The question is thus posed: Does it happen that a person is attached through the connection of affection, and not through the connection of views, to the dharmas associated with views (that is, to the sensations, etc. , associated with existence), while drsty anus aya, the latent defilement of views, is not active with respect to these dharmas}
Yes. Let us consider a person who has produced the knowledge
of the Arising of Suffering but not the knowledge of the Extinction
of Suffering. Within him arises a connection of affection with
respect to the dharmas associated with the views of esteeming
views and esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, dharmas
which are abandoned through the Truth of Extinction and the
Path. This person will be attached to these dharmas through the
connection of affection, but not through the connection of views;
for he has abandoned the universal connection of views which is
abandoned through the Truths of Suffering and the Arising of
Suffering, and there does not exist in him any non-universal
connection of views which bears on these dharmas or which is
152
associated with them.
active with respect to these dharmas, for the two drstis which are esteeming (the connection of esteeming) and which have not yet been abandoned, are active through association.
***
Why does one makes one connection--the connection of views--out of the first three views, and another connection,--the connection of esteeming--out of the last two?
41c-d. Two views constitute separate connection by reason of their equal number of things, and by reason of their
Nevertheless latent defilement of views is
? 153
The first three views make up eighteen distinct things: false views of Kamadhatu are abandoned by each one of the four Truths, etc. (v. 4,5); the same for the last two (twelve esteeming of views and six esteeming of morality and ascetic practices).
The last two views are, by their nature, esteeming, but not the first three. They take the first ones as their object, but the opposite is not true.
***
Why do envy and avarice make up two connections, while the other wrappings {paryavasthdnas, v. 47) are not distinct connec- tions (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 258c21)?
42. Envy and avarice are each a connection because, among the wrappings, they are at one and the same time com- pletely bad and independent.
"Independent" means bound to a single ignorance (v. 14). These two characteristics are not encountered in the other wrappings.
According to another opinion--[according to the author]-- this reason is good for the master who admits only eight wrappings; but for the master who admits ten wrappings (below, p. 841), the reason proposed raises no difficulties, for anger and
hypocrisy also present the twofold characteristic of being bad and
154
common characteristic of esteeming.
independent: they are also classified as connections.
***
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155
The Blessed One said moreover, that, among the connec-
tions,
Namely a belief in a self, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, doubt, desire for the objects of sensual pleasure (kdmacchanda) and anger.
"Inferior" {avarabhagiya) means that which is in relation to, that which is favorable to the "inferior part" (avarabhdga), that is,
156
to Kamadhatu (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 252b25). Now, among these
five connections:
43b-c. Two cause one not to get out of Kamadhaatu; three cause one to return there.
Desire for the objects of sensual pleasure and anger obstruct leaving Kamadhatu; a belief in a self and the two remaining connections cause one, once he has left Kamadhatu, to return there: as the jailor of a prison and his helpers.
157
According to another opinion, it is by reason of the three
that one does not leave the state of being inferior, namely a Prthagjana; and it is by reason of the two that one does not get out of the inferior sphere, that is, out of Kamadhatu. This is why these five connections are termed "inferior. "
The Blessed One said, in fact, that one becomes a Srotaapanna by the complete abandoning of the three connections in questi-
158
on.
three desires: a belief in the extremes, false views, and the esteeming of views. It appears that the Blessed One should term these views connections favorable to the quality of Prthagjana.
43a. Five are inferior.
But, on the other hand, the Srotaapanna has also abandoned
43c-d. Three, because they make up the gate and the root.
? 159
There are three categories of klesa: 1. simple, to be
abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, namely a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes; 2. twofold, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Path, namely the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices; and 3. fourfold, to be abandoned through Seeing the Four Noble Truths, namely doubt, false views, and the esteeming of views. By indicating the first three as connections, the Blessed One indicates the gate to the other klesas, the beginning of each category.
He also indicates the root, for a belief in the extremes is set into motion by a belief in a self, the esteeming of views by the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, and false views by doubt.
***
160 Others say:
44. Three are indicated because three things create an obstacle to arriving at deliverance: a non-desire to go, error with respect to the Path, and doubt with respect to the Path.
In the same way that, in the world, these three things form an obstacle to progress to another place, in this same way they form an obstacle to progress towards deliverance: a. a belief in a self, which inspires a fear of deliverance and causes one not to desire to arrive at it; b. the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices through which, having recourse to another path, one becomes deluded about the Path; and c. doubts, doubt about the Path. The Blessed One, wishing to teach that the Srotaapanna has completely abandoned these three obstacles, says that he has abandoned three connections.
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***
In the same way that the Blessed One characterized five
161 connections as "inferior," in this same way
45a-c. Five are "superior/' namely two lusts, those which arise from Rupadhatu and from Arupyadhatu, namely dissipation, pride and ignorance.
They are "superior," which means that one cannot pass beyond the higher spheres when one has not abandoned them.
This exposition of the connections is finished. *#*
How many bandhanas or bonds are there?
Three, namely all lust, all hatred, and all ignorance. Why are only these three called bonds?
162
163
There are three bonds by reason of the three sensations. Lust creates anus ayana, that is, "becomes lodged in and grows" in agreeable sensation, both by taking it as its object and by association; hatred in disagreeable sensation; and ignorance, and--but not in the same manner--lust and hatred, in the
164 sensation of indifference (ii. 8c).
Or rather the preceeding rule refers to the sensation of personality.
45d. There are three bonds by reason of sensation.
? 165 The anusayas have been explained above.
***
We must now explain the upaklesas. The klesas are upaklesas because they defile the mind.
46. Defiled mental states, forming part of the samskdras- kandha, but different from the klesas, are also upaklesas without being kiefas.
Dharmas different from the klesas, defiled mental states,
included within the samskaraskandha (i. 15), are solely upaklesas.
Upaklesas means that which is found near (upa) the klesa, or close
to which the klesa is found, (i. e. , which is produced following the 166
klesa). Not being roots, they are not klesas,: the upaklesas are 161
enumerated in the Ksudravastuka. #**
Let us now explain the relationship of the klesas with the wrappings and the klesamalas (see p. 846, line 13).
What are the paryavasthanas or wrappings?
A klesa is also a wrapping, as we can see from the text: "One
experiences a suffering which proceeds from the wrapping which
168 is lust. "
The Prakaranapadasastra (TD 26, p. 693c20) teaches that there are eight wrappings:
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47. There are eight types of wrappings: disrespect, absence of fear, envy, avarice, dissipation, regret, torpor, and languor.
The system of the Vaibhasikas admits ten, by adding
48a.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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108
non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati). If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
*##
Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
***
116
When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
? ^
The Latent Defilements 821
with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
118
Seeing of Arising. He has abandoned the things (vastu) which
are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, but he is not yet disjoined from these things by this: for he continues to be bound to
119
these first things
whose abandoning depends on the Seeing of Arising and which are relative to these first things.
In the Path of Meditation wherein one sucessively expells nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of defilements, when the first category is abandoned and not the others, these other categories of defilements, which bear upon the first category, continue to bind. (vi. 33)
###
How many anusayas attach themselves (anuserate) to each object?
We would never finish were we to examine this problem in detail. The Vaibhasikas (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6) give a summary exposition of this.
In general one can say that there are sixteen types of dharmas, objects to which the anusayas attach themselves: for each sphere there are five categories (categories to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. ); plus the pure dharmas. The conscious- nesses are of the same sixteen types.
When we know which dharmas are the objects of which consciousness, we are then able to calculate how many anusayas
through the universal defilements (v. 12)
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attach themselves to these dharmas.
29. Abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and
Arising, abandoned through Meditation, the dharmas in
Kamadhatu are the sphere of three consciousnesses of this
sphere, of one consciousness of Rupadhatu and the pure
120 consciousness.
In all, these dharmas are the object of five consciousnesses. The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, through the Seeing of Arising, and through Meditation {abhydsa = bhdvand). One consciousness of Rupadhatu is abandoned through Meditation.
30a-b. The same three categories of dharmas in Rupadhatu
are the object of three consciousnesses of Rupadhatu, three
of Kamadhatu, one of Arupyadhatu and the pure con-
121 sciousness.
The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu are the same as above: they are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and its Arsing, and through Meditation. Consciousness in Arupyadhatu is abandoned through Meditation. In all, these dharmas are the objects of eight consciousnesses.
30c-d. The same categories of dharmas in Arupyadhatu are the objects of three consciousnesses of the three spheres and pure conscousness.
The same three consciousnesses. In all, these dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses.
31a-b. The dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of
? Extinction and the Path are all the objects of the same consciousnesses with the addition of the consciousness of their own category.
(a)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction: in all six consciousnesses.
(b)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path: in all six consciousnesses.
(c)The dharmas of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path: they are the objects, respectively, of nine and eleven consciousnesses.
31c-d. The pure dharmas are the object of the last three consciousnesses of the three spheres and of pure conscious- ness.
They are the objects of ten consciousnesses, the conscious- nesses of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, through Meditation, and the pure consciousness.
Here are two summarizing slokas: "The dharmas of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering and through Meditation, are, in the order of the spheres, the domain of five, of eight, of ten consciousnesses. " "To the abandoning through Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path, add the mind of their class. The pure dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses. "
Such are the sixteen types of dharmas, objects of sixteen types of consciousness. We shall now examine what anusaya attaches
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itself to what dharma.
A complete analysis would take us too far afield; we will
content ourselves with studying a typical case.
1. Let us choose, among the objects of attachment, agreeable sensation, and let us see how many anusayas attach themselves to it.
Agreeable sensation is of seven types: (1) belonging to Kamadhatu, to be abandoned through Meditation; (2-6) belonging to Rupadhatu, of five categories; and (7) pure.
When it is pure, the anusayas do not attach themselves to it, as we have shown.
When they belong to Kamadhatu, the anusayas abandoned through Meditation and all the universal anusayas attach them- selves to it.
When they belong to Rupadhatu, all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.
2. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object is of twelve types: (1-4) belong to Kamadhatu, for categories of consciousness (excepting the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering); (5-9) belong to Rupadhatu, five categories; (10-11) belong to Arupyadhatu, the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path and the one abandoned through Meditation; and (12) the pure consciousness.
Attaching themselves to it are, according to their types: 1. four categories of Meditation; anusaya of the sphere of Kamadhatu; 2. the anusayas of the sphere of Rupadhatu which have conditioned things for their object; 3. two categories of anusayas of the sphere of Arupyadhatu; and 4. the universal anusayas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 452c20).
3. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness
? which has for its object the consciousness having an agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has an agreeable sensation for its object, and which is of twelve types, is itself the object of a consciousness which can be of fourteen types, namely the twelve aforementioned types with the addition (13-14) of the conscious- nesses of the sphere of Arupyadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of the Arising of Suffering.
Attaching themselves to this consciousness are, according to their types, the anusayas described above in the first two spheres, plus four categories in Arupyadhatu (by excluding the anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering).
The other dharmas (the twenty-two indriyas, i. 48c-d, etc. ) will 122
be examined on the basis of this example.
***
The mind is termed sanusaya, "havinganusaya" from the fact of the anusayas. Should we think that, necessarily, the anusayas
125
nourish themselves, and lodge in (anuserate) the sanusaya
mind?
Those which lodge in it are the non-abandoned anusayas, whose object is not abandoned (v. 61c-d), and which are associated with the mind in question.
Those which do not lodge in it are the abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind in question.
32a-b. The defiled mind is sanusaya in two ways; the non-defiled mind solely from the fact of the anusayas which
124 lodge therein.
The defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas
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which lodge therein: the anusayas with which it is associated, whose object is not abandoned, which takes an object; and (2) from the fact of the anuiayas which are not therein: the abandoned anuiayas and that to which it is associated: for this mind continues to have them as companions.
The non-defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein: the non-abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind.
##*
In what order are the ten anusayas produced (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 245b28 and following)?
Any one can arise after any one: there is thus no rule which applies to all of them. Nevertheless, for the order of their production:
32c. From moha9 there is doubt.
At first, bound by ignorance (moha=avidya)> a person is in confusion with respect to the Truths: he does not take pleasure in the Truth of Suffering; he does not admit it.
From this state of confusion, there arises doubt; he undertands the two thesis; he doubts whether suffering is true, or if non-suffering is true.
32d. From whence false views;
From doubt there arises false views: by reason of false teaching and false reflection, he comes to the judgement "This is not suffering. "
32e. From whence a belief in a self;
? From false view there arises the view of personality; for, not recognizing the skandhas as suffering, he considers these skandhas as constituting a "self. "
33a. From whence a belief in the extremes;
From whence there is the view of the two extremes, for a person, believing in a self, becomes attached to the idea of the eternity or the annihilation of the self.
33b. From whence the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices;
From this there is an esteeming of morality and practices considered to be a means of purification.
33c. From whence the esteeming of bad views;
From this, there is an esteeming of that which is inferior, the esteeming of what he considers as a means of purification.
33d. From whence lust and pride relative to one's own views;
From this there is attachment to one's own views, and pride and pleasure in these views.
33e. And hatred with respect to another:
From this there is dislike: for, quite full of his own views, he detests the views of others which are contrary to his own.
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According to other masters, there is hatred for one's own opinions when . one changes them; for lust and the other anusayas which are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths are those which have for their object the person himself and his own views.
33f. Such is the order.
This is the order of the arising of the ten klesas, ***
How many causes give rise to the klesas?
34. Klesas [with complete causes] arise from the non-aban- doning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object,
125
For example, lust arises (1) when the anus aya of lust is non-abandoned--not-completely-known {aparijnata)--its opposi- tion not having arisen (v. 64); (2) when the dharmas which provoke the manifestation of lust, namely visible things, etc. , are found in the field of experience {abhasagata~visayarupata-apanna)\ and (3) when there is erroneous judgment.
T h e anus ay a is cause; t h e dharmas a r e its object; and incorrect judgment is its immediate preparation: three distinct forces.
The same holds for the other klesas
34a. With complete causes.
This is the case for the klesas which proceed from all causes. For, according to the School, a klesa can arise through the mere force of its object; as in the case of the Arhat who is subject to
and from erroneous judgment.
? falling away (vi. 58b).
In a Sutra, the Blessed One said that the ninety-eight anusayas, with the ten wrappings of attachment (the paryavasthanas), are made up of three cankerous influences (dsravas), the cankerous influence of objects of pleasure (kdmasrava), the cankerous influence of existence (bhavdsrava), and the cankerous influence of ignorance (avidydsrava); four floods (oghas), the flood of the objects of pleasure (kdmaugha), the flood of existence (bha- vaugha), the flood of views (drstyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidhaugha); four yokes (yogas), the yoke of the objects of pleasure (kdmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (drstiyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidydyoga); and four clingings (updddnas), clinging to the objects of pleasure (kdmopdddna), the clinging to views (drsfyupdddna), the clinging to morality and ascetic practices (stlavratopadana), and the clinging to a belief in a self (atmavddopdddna).
***
What is the definition of the cankerous influences (dsravas)?
35a.
In Kamadhatu, the defilements, with the exception of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, consti- tute dsravas;
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v. 47) make up forty-one things: this is the cankerous influence of the objects of pleasure.
35b. In Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, only the anus ayas themselves constitute the cankerous influence of existen-
126 ce.
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But there are, in the two higher spheres, two wrappings,
127 namely torpor and dissipation (ii. 26a-c, v. 47). The Prakarana
says, "What is the cankerous influence of existence? With the exception of ignorance, it is the other connections (samyojanas), bonds (bandhanas), anusayas, upaklesas and wrappings (paryavas- thanas) of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. "
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmlr say that the wrappings of attach- ment are not mentioned as forming part of the cankerous influence of existence because, in the two higher spheres, they are
128 not independent.
##*
Why are the anusayas of the two higher spheres placed together in order to make one single cankerous influence of existence?
36a-b. They are morally neutral, proceed inwards, and belong to the stage of absorption: this is why they are put together.
They both present the threefold common characteristics of being morally neutral, of being turned inward (that is, of not depending on objects), and of belonging to the spheres of absorption: they are thus united into a single cankerous influence.
And again they are called the cankerous influence of existence for the same reason that one distinguishes the cankerous influence of existence (v. 2).
From the above, it results that the avidyds, "the ignorances," of the three spheres,--in all fifteen things,--(v. 4) constitute the cankerous influence of ignorance.
Why do the ignorances constitute a separate cankerous influence?
? 36c d. Ignorance is the root: it is thus said to constitute a
129 separate cankerous influence.
In the manner in which the cankerous influences are explained,
37a-b. So too for the floods and the yokes. But views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke by reason of their acuteness.
The "floods" and the "yokes" are explained in the same manner. The cankerous influence of the objects of sensual pleasure (kdma-ogha) without views, is both the flood of the objects of sensual pleasure and the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure; so too the cankerous influence of existence, without views, is both the flood of existence and the yoke of existence.
130
According to the School,
tic of sharpness that views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke.
[Why are they not a separate cankerous influence? ]
37c-d. They are not a separate cankerous influence, because, without companions, they are not favorable to installation.
[We shall explain below, v. 40, the etymology of the word dsrava or cankerous influence. ]The dsravas are so called because they seat themselves (asayantUy dsravandm nirvacanam). Isolated (asahdya) views are not favorable to installation (dsana), being acute. Thus one does not make a separate place among the dsravas or cankerous influences for them; they figure in the category of the cankerous influences, but are not mixed with the other anusayas.
Therefore we have:
a. The flood of the objects of sensual pleasure is made up of five
The Latent Defilements 831
it is by reason of their characteris-
? 832 Chapter Five
lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all twenty-nine things.
b. The flood of existence is made up of ten lusts, ten egotisms, eight doubts: in all twenty-eight things.
c. The flood of views is made up of the twelve views of the three Dhatus: in all thirty-six things.
d. The flood of ignorance is made up of the five ignorances of the three Dhatus: in all fifteen things.
The same for the yokes.
38a-c. So too the upadanas (the clingings), by placing ignorance [with the first two] and by dividing the fastis into two.
We have five clingings:
a. Clinging to the objects of sensual pleasure (kdmayoga) is made up of the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure plus the ignorances of Kamadhatu, that is, five lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, five ignorances, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all thirty-four things.
151
b. Clinging to the belief in a soul (atmavadopadana) is made
up of the yoke of existence plus the ignorances of the two higher spheres, that is, ten lusts, ten egotisms, ten ignorances, and eight doubts: in all thirty-eight things.
c. The clinging to views is made up of the yoke of views without the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices: in all thirty things.
d. Clinging to morality and ascetic practices is made up of the six remaining things.
Why distinguish "the presumption of morality and of ascetic practices" from the other views and make it a separate clinging?
? Because it is in opposition to the Path and deludes the two classes of devotees: holding as path that which is not Path, the laity are deluded with expectations of obtaining heaven through
132
abstinence, etc. ,
and clerics are deluded with expectations of
133
38c-d. Ignorance is not the grasper; like clinging, it is mixed 135
Ignorance has non-intellection for its characteristic; it is not at all sharp; thus it does not grasp; therefore, say the School, it is only mixed with the other defilements as is clinging.
136
But, we would say, the Blessed One said in the Sutra, "What
is the yoke of the object of sensual pleasure (kdmayoga)? With
regard to the objects of pleasure (kdmas), within the person who
does not know the origin of the object of pleasure, it is kdmardga,
kdmaprema, kdmecchd, kdmamurchd, kdmagrddha, kdmaparigard-
dha, kdmanandt, kdmaniyanti, and kdmddhyavasdna which
overpowers the mind: these are the yokes of the objects of sensual
137
pleasure. " The Blessed One defines the other yokes in the same
138 Thus chandardga with respect to the objects of pleasure, views,
139 ddna), etc.
***
What is the meaning of the words anus ay a (latent defilement), dsrava (cankerous influence), ogha (flood),yoga (yoke) and upddana (clinging)?
obtaining purity through the renouncing of agreeable things. 134
(Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 284a4).
But why doesn't ignorance constitute a separate clinging?
with the other anusayas.
way. In another Sutra, he says that chandardga is a clinging. etc. , is what is called clinging to the objects of pleasure (kamopd-
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Chapter Five
39. They are atomic; they adhere; they nourish themselves in two ways; they continually bind: this is why they are
140
They are atomic, for their mode of existences is subtle, being difficult to know. They adhere through the adhesion of their prdptis\ they nourish themselves (anuferate) in two ways, both from the object and from the dharmas with which they are associated; and they continually bind, for, unless one makes an effort, and even when one creates an obstacle to them, they will
141 appear and reappear.
40. They fix and they flow, they carry away, they attach, they seize: such is the etymology of the words dsravas, etc.
The anusayas fix, "seat" (dsayanti) beings in transmigration;
they flow (dsravanti) from the highest heaven (Bhavagra =
Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana, iii. 3, 81) to Avici (iii. 58); they flow
oghas or floods.
The anusayas cause beings to be attached (slesayanti); they
are thus called yogas or yokes.
The anusayas seize (upagrhnanti); they are thus called
145 updddnas or clingings.
146 The best explanation is the following.
1. By means of the anusayas, the mental series flows into the objects; the anusayas are thus dsravas or cankerous influences. In conformity with the comparison of the Sutra "In the same way that one makes great efforts in order to steer a boat against the current but when these efforts begin to weaken, the boat is carried
termed anusayaj.
out (ksar) by the six organs which are as wounds. They are thus 142
called cankerous influences, or dsravas.
The anusayas carry away (haranti)', * they are thus called
14
144
? (haryate) with the stream; [so too, it is with great pains that the mental series is freed from its objects through the good dhar-
147
masV
2. When they are very violent, the anusayas are called oghas; in fact they carry away, as in a flood, those who are bound to them, and who necessarily yield to their impulses.
3. When they do not enter into activity with an extreme violence, the anusayas are called yogas, because they yoke one to the very many sufferings of transmigration; or rather because they adhere with obstinance.
4. The anufayas are called upadanas, because, through their action, one clings to things of the senses, etc. {kamadhyupada-
14 na). *
*#*
These same anusayas or latent defilements which make up four
categories--cankerous influences, floods, yokes, and clingings,--
also make up five categories: samyojanas or connections (v. 41-45),
bandhanas or bonds (v. 45d), anusayas, upaklesas (v. 46), and 149
paryavasthanas or wrappings (v. 47-49b).
41a-b. There are said to be five types by reason of their
150 division into connections, etc.
151
The nine samyojanas or connections are: 1) affection, 2)
aversion, 3) pride, 4) ignorance, 5) view, 6) unjustified estimation, 7) doubt, 8) envy, and 9) avarice.
Anunaya-samyojana or the attachment of affection is lust of the three Dhatus. One should understand the other connections in the same way, each according to its type: the second, the eighth, and ninth belong exclusively to Kamadhatu.
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Drsti-samyojana or the attachment to views is made up of the first three views (a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and false views); paramarsa-samyojana, the attachment to esteeming, is made up of the last two (namely, the esteeming of views and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices). The question is thus posed: Does it happen that a person is attached through the connection of affection, and not through the connection of views, to the dharmas associated with views (that is, to the sensations, etc. , associated with existence), while drsty anus aya, the latent defilement of views, is not active with respect to these dharmas}
Yes. Let us consider a person who has produced the knowledge
of the Arising of Suffering but not the knowledge of the Extinction
of Suffering. Within him arises a connection of affection with
respect to the dharmas associated with the views of esteeming
views and esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, dharmas
which are abandoned through the Truth of Extinction and the
Path. This person will be attached to these dharmas through the
connection of affection, but not through the connection of views;
for he has abandoned the universal connection of views which is
abandoned through the Truths of Suffering and the Arising of
Suffering, and there does not exist in him any non-universal
connection of views which bears on these dharmas or which is
152
associated with them.
active with respect to these dharmas, for the two drstis which are esteeming (the connection of esteeming) and which have not yet been abandoned, are active through association.
***
Why does one makes one connection--the connection of views--out of the first three views, and another connection,--the connection of esteeming--out of the last two?
41c-d. Two views constitute separate connection by reason of their equal number of things, and by reason of their
Nevertheless latent defilement of views is
? 153
The first three views make up eighteen distinct things: false views of Kamadhatu are abandoned by each one of the four Truths, etc. (v. 4,5); the same for the last two (twelve esteeming of views and six esteeming of morality and ascetic practices).
The last two views are, by their nature, esteeming, but not the first three. They take the first ones as their object, but the opposite is not true.
***
Why do envy and avarice make up two connections, while the other wrappings {paryavasthdnas, v. 47) are not distinct connec- tions (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 258c21)?
42. Envy and avarice are each a connection because, among the wrappings, they are at one and the same time com- pletely bad and independent.
"Independent" means bound to a single ignorance (v. 14). These two characteristics are not encountered in the other wrappings.
According to another opinion--[according to the author]-- this reason is good for the master who admits only eight wrappings; but for the master who admits ten wrappings (below, p. 841), the reason proposed raises no difficulties, for anger and
hypocrisy also present the twofold characteristic of being bad and
154
common characteristic of esteeming.
independent: they are also classified as connections.
***
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155
The Blessed One said moreover, that, among the connec-
tions,
Namely a belief in a self, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, doubt, desire for the objects of sensual pleasure (kdmacchanda) and anger.
"Inferior" {avarabhagiya) means that which is in relation to, that which is favorable to the "inferior part" (avarabhdga), that is,
156
to Kamadhatu (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 252b25). Now, among these
five connections:
43b-c. Two cause one not to get out of Kamadhaatu; three cause one to return there.
Desire for the objects of sensual pleasure and anger obstruct leaving Kamadhatu; a belief in a self and the two remaining connections cause one, once he has left Kamadhatu, to return there: as the jailor of a prison and his helpers.
157
According to another opinion, it is by reason of the three
that one does not leave the state of being inferior, namely a Prthagjana; and it is by reason of the two that one does not get out of the inferior sphere, that is, out of Kamadhatu. This is why these five connections are termed "inferior. "
The Blessed One said, in fact, that one becomes a Srotaapanna by the complete abandoning of the three connections in questi-
158
on.
three desires: a belief in the extremes, false views, and the esteeming of views. It appears that the Blessed One should term these views connections favorable to the quality of Prthagjana.
43a. Five are inferior.
But, on the other hand, the Srotaapanna has also abandoned
43c-d. Three, because they make up the gate and the root.
? 159
There are three categories of klesa: 1. simple, to be
abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, namely a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes; 2. twofold, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Path, namely the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices; and 3. fourfold, to be abandoned through Seeing the Four Noble Truths, namely doubt, false views, and the esteeming of views. By indicating the first three as connections, the Blessed One indicates the gate to the other klesas, the beginning of each category.
He also indicates the root, for a belief in the extremes is set into motion by a belief in a self, the esteeming of views by the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, and false views by doubt.
***
160 Others say:
44. Three are indicated because three things create an obstacle to arriving at deliverance: a non-desire to go, error with respect to the Path, and doubt with respect to the Path.
In the same way that, in the world, these three things form an obstacle to progress to another place, in this same way they form an obstacle to progress towards deliverance: a. a belief in a self, which inspires a fear of deliverance and causes one not to desire to arrive at it; b. the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices through which, having recourse to another path, one becomes deluded about the Path; and c. doubts, doubt about the Path. The Blessed One, wishing to teach that the Srotaapanna has completely abandoned these three obstacles, says that he has abandoned three connections.
? 840 Chapter Five
***
In the same way that the Blessed One characterized five
161 connections as "inferior," in this same way
45a-c. Five are "superior/' namely two lusts, those which arise from Rupadhatu and from Arupyadhatu, namely dissipation, pride and ignorance.
They are "superior," which means that one cannot pass beyond the higher spheres when one has not abandoned them.
This exposition of the connections is finished. *#*
How many bandhanas or bonds are there?
Three, namely all lust, all hatred, and all ignorance. Why are only these three called bonds?
162
163
There are three bonds by reason of the three sensations. Lust creates anus ayana, that is, "becomes lodged in and grows" in agreeable sensation, both by taking it as its object and by association; hatred in disagreeable sensation; and ignorance, and--but not in the same manner--lust and hatred, in the
164 sensation of indifference (ii. 8c).
Or rather the preceeding rule refers to the sensation of personality.
45d. There are three bonds by reason of sensation.
? 165 The anusayas have been explained above.
***
We must now explain the upaklesas. The klesas are upaklesas because they defile the mind.
46. Defiled mental states, forming part of the samskdras- kandha, but different from the klesas, are also upaklesas without being kiefas.
Dharmas different from the klesas, defiled mental states,
included within the samskaraskandha (i. 15), are solely upaklesas.
Upaklesas means that which is found near (upa) the klesa, or close
to which the klesa is found, (i. e. , which is produced following the 166
klesa). Not being roots, they are not klesas,: the upaklesas are 161
enumerated in the Ksudravastuka. #**
Let us now explain the relationship of the klesas with the wrappings and the klesamalas (see p. 846, line 13).
What are the paryavasthanas or wrappings?
A klesa is also a wrapping, as we can see from the text: "One
experiences a suffering which proceeds from the wrapping which
168 is lust. "
The Prakaranapadasastra (TD 26, p. 693c20) teaches that there are eight wrappings:
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Chapter Five
47. There are eight types of wrappings: disrespect, absence of fear, envy, avarice, dissipation, regret, torpor, and languor.
The system of the Vaibhasikas admits ten, by adding
48a.
