We are to have planning--that is the present so-called controls, which are merely a
glorified
form of private monopolies
?
?
Brady - Business as a System of Power
Furthermore, the British Parlia- ment, by its enactment of July 27, last, has severely limited the political and economic activities of trade unions.
"
45 Another American observer, P. Harvey Middleton, writing in American Indus- tries, Nov. , 1924, on "Great Britain's Loud Speaker" (the FBI), listed among the FBI activities of merit, "meetings between the FBI Education Committee and the As- sociation of Headmasters of Public and Secondary Schools to discuss suggestions for bringing the schools of the country into closer relation with industry. "
? 174
BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
ing of the young that they may in the future follow the business men as "their natural leaders," instead of their own Trade Union representatives. *(R)
It is significant that this trend comes at a time when class- conscious employer organizations have been established with cen- tral headquarters, capable of both creating a climate of opinion amongst employers and of exercising some degree of united action in matters bearing on the combined interests of British employers as a whole. But it is of far greater import that these developments occur simultaneously with the cumulative dovetailing of organized business and the formal political machinery of the British imperial system.
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT: IN TIMES OF PEACE
This is not the place to discuss in detail the extent to which Tory domination in England has woven the political and economic ap- paratus of class interests into a unified system of social control. The details are too numerous, in part too well concealed, and in part too difficult to trace for elaboration here. Moreover, portions of the story have been told adequately in a series of recent books. *^
It will suffice here to summarize a few of the obvious trends in the British concentration movement, and to point out the role the FBI comes to assume as the political implications of these trends come ever more clearly to the fore.
1. The dominating concerns in the inner councils of the FBI are those organized on a monopoly or quasi-monopoly footing, or occupying leading positions in the rapidly spreading networks of cartel and cartel-like controls. This process was particularly rapid in the postwar years. 'Tor the first time since the earlier days of capitalism," wrote Professor Levy in 1927, a "large section of Eng- lish trade has become overrun with monopolist organisations. . . . The World War, its aftermath, and the world-wide economic crisis, lasting now for more than six years, have strengthened these tend-
46 "For my part I cannot look upon the evil or foolish faces of some of the leaders of labour without a sense of deep humility. How greatly must we capitalist employers have neglected our duty, if the workers choose to follow, not us their natural lead- ers, but such men as these. " Austin Hopkinson, Religio Militis (London, 1927), p. 113.
47 See, in particular, Simon Haxey, Tory M. P. (London, 1939), and Ernest Davies, National Capitalism (London, 1939).
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 175
encies. " *^ And since Levy wrote, as Lucas *(R) and others have shown, these tendencies have been doubly accelerated by the events of the great depression and the outbreak of the Second World War.
Typical of the combines which operate monopolistically are such concerns as Imperial Chemicals (capitalized around ? 75,000,- 000), Vickers in the iron and steel industry, Lever Brothers in the soap industry, J. and P. Coats in the thread industry, and the great banking systems with headquarters in London.
2. As Lucas has shown in his illuminating study, the trade asso- ciation "is without question the most common medium of control in the present time" ^? in Great Britain. This is to say, the British trade association typically begins its existence by exercising the powers and seeking to gain the restrictive objectives which the American trade association was able to achieve only after NRA. Hence for all practical purposes, these price-fixing, output- restricting, market-area allocating bodies, operating with the use of such familiar devices as resale price maintenance, tying contracts, rebate systems, trade boycotts, and the like, are cartel-like bodies. Nothing basic in principle separates their forms of organization nor the methods of operation from the cartel. It is highly significant that the two terms, trade associations and cartels, are used more or less interchangeably in the general British literature devoted to discussing these trends.
3. The trade association device has been growing in Britain, as indicated above (p. 157) by leaps and bounds. Growth here, as else- where, is along three principal lines. Every industry and trade, both locally and nationally, acquires its appropriate association; the pressure on "outsiders" to join tends increasingly to expand the coverage of each appropriate association so as to include every single business concern falling in each separate classification or cate- gory; these tend increasingly to band together first locally or region- ally, then nationally by industries, trades, and (cross-sectional) regions, in peak or central bodies, such as the FBI. Scattered, overlapping, confused as the organizational network is in many respects, still one finds in the literature clear indications that these
three trends are everywhere convergent and unidirectional.
4. Itisequallyclearthatthebulkofthelargerandmorepower-
48 Levy, Monopolies, Cartels, and Trusts, pp. 325-26.
49 Industrial Reconstruction. so ibid. , p. 203.
? 176 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
ful trade associations are dominated as a rule by a few large inside concerns. The examples offered by Lucas of the methods by which Lever Brothers dominates the soap industry through the United Kingdom Soap Manufacturers' Association, the Salt Union its in- dustry through the Salt Manufacturers' Association, and Imperial Chemicals the ammonia industry through the Sulphate of Am- monia Federation, Ltd. , are merely spectacular instances of tech- niques which have become extremely widespread throughout the British Isles. So far as this is true--and the general trends seem to be in this direction--the trade association becomes in effect a cartel instrument to promote the monopoly policies of a single or a small group of giant concerns.
5. Somewhatthesamethingcanbesaidofthecentralandpeak associations, such as the FBI. The large concern has an opportunity to make its weight felt first through a sort of triple membership: as individual corporate member, as member of constituent trade associations, and through membership in the regional bodies. Vot- ing power, in the second place, for both the Grand Council and the Executive Committee, is on a basis proportional to number of workmen employed, a practice which inevitably throws the center of gravity in the hands of the large concerns. Further, analysis will show that the work undertaken by the various subcommittees has to do in large part with matters which can only be of advantage to the large concern equipped with great resources. Finally, the con- stitution and by-laws of the FBI are subject to change by the inside groups of the Grand Council and the Executive Committee, in- cluding extension of powers of appointment and (in particular) cooptation of members to key positions.
6. The influence of the FBI in governmental circles appears to have become exceedingly great. It is expressed directly via two routes. First, in the number of positions its members hold on gov- ernmental committees and the extent to which its representations before governmental bodies result in decisions and pursuit of poli- cies favorable to its members and its general program; and second, the power possessed by its own officers, members of the Grand Council, Executive Committees, and various Subcommittees, on the one hand, and representatives of its leading companies and
trade associations on the other, to influence governmental policies as Members of Parliament.
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 177 As for the first line of cross-fertilization, the FBI claims to be
represented directly on the following governmental bodies:
Board of Trade: Board of Trade Advisory Council Board of Trade Council for Art and Industry
^'^
War Office: Technical co-ordinating Committee on General Stores Motor Transport Co-ordinating Committee
Ministry of Health: Joint Advisory Committee on River Pollution Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee
Mniistry of Agriculture: Standing Committee on River Pollution
Apparently representation is much wider than such a listing would appear to show. References are found scattered all through the literature, showing membership on ad hoc and smaller stand- ing committees established not only by the national, but also by numerous county, municipal, and other local governing bodies. But of equal importance would appear to be the effect of its insti- tutionalized pressure and lobby activities. A few examples taken from a single publication will suffice to show the general picture: "
Fiscal Policy: In 1930 the FBI secured an overwhelming mandate from its members to demand a change in our National Fiscal Policy. The publication early in 1931 of its proposals in "Industry and the Nation" was followed by an intensive campaign in Parliament and the Press, and in the Industrial districts. A special pamphlet 'The Passing of Free Trade" was prepared to assist speakers on the subject.
The National Government, returned to power in 1931, adopted the FBI's main recommendations, and Industry is now reaping substan- tial benefits from the protection of the Home market.
Imports: On the passing of the Import Duties Act 1932, the FBI set up a special department to assist members in preparing applications to the Import Duties Advisory Committee. . . . Concessions to the Dominions and foreign countries facilitating imports into Home markets are closely watched. The FBI has generally been successful in convincing the Government that no such agreement should be concluded before the industries affected have had an opportunity of producing information as to the effect of such imports upon British industry.
Foreign Countries: The FBI is the main channel of consultation with the Government in Commercial Treaty negotiations, and it also pro- vides special facilities for international arrangements within particu- lar industries.
51 "Industry and Action," pamphlet of the FBI (undated), p. 11. 52 Ibid. , pp. 4-5.
? 178 BRITAIN'S 'TEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
De-Rating of Machinery: The Rating and Valuation Act of 1925 records a notable achievement for Industry. The Bill introduced, after prolonged negotiations, by the Government contained a defini- tion of the machinery to be included for Rating by the Local Author- ities, which embodied the essentials of the FBI proposals.
Similar to these are the claim of successful cooperation with the government in matters dealing with exports, Empire problems, taxation, commercial law. Various annual reports elaborate and detail the picture at length. One writer summarizes FBI activities in a typical case as follows:
In the determination of the scope and nature of that policy [protection] the FBI has played a triumphant part. It has not hesitated to boast of its successful influence upon the Government. . . . By creation of the Tariff Advisory Committee with power to alter tariffs without reference to Parliament, the Government has in fact handed over to a body in close association with the owners of industry an important legislative function. ^*
The other side of this picture is the influence of organized busi- ness circles in the formation of governmental policy through mem- bership in Parliament. A recent compilation from the Directory of Directors, the Stock Exchange Year-Book, and other sources shows that of 415 Parliamentary supporters of the National Government, some 181 possessed 775 corporate directorships. ^* These ranged over the entire business field, but appear to be largely concentrated in the big, national and Empire-wide trading, shipping, manufac- turing, and financial enterprises. Through family and almost in- definitely ramifying intercorporate connections, corporate influ- ence of these business M. P. 's likewise extends to the outer reaches of the entire British economic system. Thus in large--perhaps in decisive--part the influences, personalities, interests, and powers that go to shape up policies of individual business firms, the trade associations to which they belong, and the central policy- coordinating bodies, such as the FBI which they direct, go also to determine the objectives of governmental policies, and to guide and control the execution of those policies through the complex
machinery of government administration and regulation.
7. Someconceptionofthelong-runimplicationsofthisfusionof
53 H. R. Greaves, Reactionary England (London, 1936), p. 146. 64 Haxey, op. cit. , p. 37.
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 179
business and government may be had by looking over the various schemes for industrial reorganization that have come to the fore with increasing frequency in recent years. Such plans as embodied in the Coal Mines Acts, the Iron and Steel Reorganization Scheme, the "Reconstruction Levy" and various schemes proposed for re- organizing different industries by PEP (Political and Economic Planning) call for no less than extension of the principle of cor- porate organization to entire industries. It is worth while pointing out the following as typical of all such plans:
They are initially advocated, promoted, and lobbied for primarily (in some cases exclusively) by the larger, better organized and more powerful business interests. "Liberal" and labor groups have assented to such plans only tardily, only with many stipulated conditions (mostly ignored) or not at all.
They all visualize the establishment of a central governing body, capable in whole or in part of restricting competition, controlling ca- pacity, regulating markets, prices and production.
They all wish for governmental sanctions in enforcing compliance with decisions arrived at, but wish freedom from "government coer- cion" in the process of exercising the decisions.
The central governing authorities projected are made up exclusively of business men, who govern the industry or trade as a unit. (The Board of Trade, or similar bodies are only to "regulate" in a general sense of the term. )
Central peak associations, such as the FBI and those with which it is affiliated, have not opposed any of these schemes on principle. On the contrary, except for specific features of specific programs, they have uniformly favored such plans, the moving figures in these schemes being simultaneously the leading lights in the central associations.
They do not, as a rule, oppose very considerable extension of govern- mental influence (so long as the government is "sympathetic") along what might be called "auxiliary lines. " For example, they did not oppose:
a) The establishment of governmentally owned, or "mixed" (owned partly by government and partly by private interests) enterprises, such as The London Passenger Transport Board, The Central Electricity Board and The London Port Authority (mixed enter- prises). The Post Office (which includes the telephone and tele- graph systems of Great Britain. (Government ownership. )
b) Government aid in establishing monopolies in the home market (autarchy), and protection in Empire and foreign markets.
c) Provision of authority and machinery for punishment of "out-
--
? i8o BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM**
siders" through regular legal channels, or provision by govern- ment with powers for eliminating the problem of the "outsider" entirely.
Somewhat different in origin were the Agricultural Marketing Acts ^^ tracing back to 1931. Yet under the National Government, these Acts, which were intended to make possible organization of farmer-producers into cooperative or semicooperative bodies, had come largely under the influence of packing houses, agricultural processors and distributors, and other allied interests. ^^ Hence, even this application of the new type of ''corporative" organization has come under the domination of groups whose first allegiance is to the interests and outlook represented by the Federation of British Industries.
8. There remains the fact to be mentioned, alluded to above, that opposition to this cumulative fusion of governmental and highly organized business systems seems almost completely to have dwindled away. Conservative and Tory elements want the new forms of corporate organization, and they desire the cooperation of the government in effecting the necessary changes against recal- citrant minority interests. And labor and liberal circles have ap- parently concurred in the movement, having asked--in the main only for minor safeguards for their interests. The famous Liberal Report of 1926 recommended autonomous and "self-governing" bodies as one of the leading ways of solving Britain's industrial dilemma. ^^ The first comprehensive plans for industrial reorgan- ization along lines slowly evolved by monopoly-oriented business organization were laid down by the British Labour Party in 1931.
In a speech delivered, significantly enough, at the University of Berlin in 1926, the great British liberal and iconoclast J. M. Keynes held "that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control
55 Different only in the sense that the Agricultural Marketing Acts were promoted primarily by farming interests, while the industrial reorganization schemes were originally the Labour Government's answer to the various proposals which had been advanced by private industry. Needless to say, the form in which the Labour Govern- ment proposed industrial reorganization was not far removed from that proposed by a private enterprise, as may be shown by the nature and quality of the remarks and criticisms made at the time in business circles.
56 See pp. 183-86.
57 Britain's Industrial Future (London, 1938), the Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry; see in particular Books II and III. In its conclusions it refers to "the growth of cooperative self-government, which is the true aim of industrial policy" (p. 466).
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 181
and organisation lies somewhere between the individual and the modern State. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the State . . . a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies. " ^^ Later he was to become even more ex- plicit when, on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War which he had forecast so many years before, he declared that an "amalgam of private capitalism and State Socialism . . . is the
^^
only practicable recipe for present conditions. "
Just how far State control was to reach in this British version of
National Socialism it is hard to gather from the writings of Mr. Keynes or his contemporaries, but clearly self-government in busi- ness under the auspices of a regime determined "to make the pri- vate property system work better" ^? (italics in original) is en route to the goal. All of which does not prove, of course, that all British business is in favor either of the abandonment of "free competi- tion" and "laissez faire" on the one hand, nor of the particular forms under which they cede control to central policy-controlling bodies on the other. An examination of any of the numerous pro- posals for control in any given industry will put the reader's mind at rest on that score. ^^ But what is clear, is that the center of gravity has shifted in this direction, and that on the present showing there will shortly be no alternative to the British business man except to make the most of it.
RELATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT: WAR TIMES
British war organization rests squarely on the associational ma- chinery evolved over the peacetime interlude. A recent issue of the
58 True, the "criterion of action" of each "is solely the public good as they under- stand it" but what public-relations counselor would oflEer any other explanation of any given act of any represented business? See J. M. Keynes, The End of Laissez- Faire (London, 1926), pp. 41-42.
59 Debate between J. M. Keynes and Mr. Kingsley-Martin on "Democracy and Efficiency," New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 28, 1939. Mr Keynes hopes that this amalgam in defense of "private property and capitalism" will be "liberal," so that he may refer to it as "liberal socialism," and by "liberal" he means nonmonopolisti- cally organized capitalism. Mr. Keynes has not been called a "semanticist. "
60 Idem.
61 See discussions relating to the establishment of the Petroleum, Cotton, and Ship- ping Control Boards in recent issues of The Economist, and New Statesman and Na- tion, and similar sources.
? i82 BRITAIN'S 'FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM**
Economist refers to this as the Conservative program which comes to rest in a
set of notions that sees its ideal of an economic system in an orderly organisation of industries, each ruled feudally from above by the busi- ness firms already established in it, linked in associations and confedera- tions and, at the top, meeting on terms of sovereign equality such other Estates of the Realm as the Bank of England and the Government. Each British industry, faithful to the prescription, has spent the past decade in delimiting its fief, in organising its baronial courts, in secur- ing and entrenching its holdings and in administering the legal powers of self-government conferred on it by a tolerant State. This is the order of ideas that has transformed the trade association from a body of doubt- ful legality, a conspiracy in restraint of trade, into a favoured instru- mentality of the State, until membership in such a body has become as necessary to the business man who wishes to be successful as an old school tie has been to the ambitious Conservative politicians. It is the order of ideas that led to the Import Duties Act being drafted in such a way as to put a premium on self-seeking monopolies and a discount on the public interest; that turned "high profits and low turn-over" into the dominant slogan of British business; that raised the level of British costs to the highest in the world. It is a set of ideas that is ad- mirable for obtaining security, "orderly development" and remunera- tive profits for those already established in the industry--at the cost of an irreducible body of general unemployment. It is emphatically not a set of ideas that can be expected to yield the maximum of production, or to give the country wealth in peace and strength in war. ^^
In an earlier issue ^^ the Economist pointed out that this comes out simply to mean that
under the cover of wartime needs, the principle of Self-government of Industry has been given an official blessing. This is, in effect, merely the expansion and continuation of the Industrial policy that has been pur- sued by the Conservative Government for the past eight years, for in their hands control has nearly always meant the conferment of legal privileges on the organized producers already established in the indus- try . . . industries are being encouraged to control themselves. ^*
62 "A Check on Production," Economist, June 15, 1940.
63 "The Economic Front," Economist, Dec. 9, 1939.
S64 While government officials are thinking of post war planning, comments ISlew
Statesman and Nation (March 8, 1941), "the hard-faced men from the Midlands quietly get on with their job, Mr. Bevin and the other Socialist leaders utter blood- curdling threats, but the monopoly interests (just as in America under the NRA) are taking steps to safeguard their interests.
We are to have planning--that is the present so-called controls, which are merely a glorified form of private monopolies
? BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM' 83
In contrast to the last war, when "the controllers were selected in the main from outside the industry to be controlled," in "this war industry is controlling itself. " This "feudalistic system of cartel control" it illustrates with a list of controllers appointed by the two
^^
leading war-control ministries:
Ministry of Supply
Commodity
Aluminium
Alcohol, molasses and solvents
Cotton Flax
Hemp
Iron and Steel
Head Controller
Hon. G. Cunliffe Mr. A. V. Board
Sir Percy Ashley Sir H. Lindsay
Mr. J. S. Ferrier {Deputy)
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Director, British Alu- minium Company, Ltd. Chairman, British In- dustrial Solvents, Ltd. ; Director, Distillers Co. Ltd. , and International Sugar and Alcohol Co. , Ltd.
Member of Import Du- ties Advisory Committee Director of the Imperial Institute
Director, Wm. F. Mal- colm & Co. , Ltd. (flax, hemp and jute mer- chants)
Mr. A. M. Landauer Landauer & Co. (Hemp and fibre merchants)
Sir A. Duncan
Chairman, British Iron and Steel Federation; Member of Supply Coun- cil
the Italian fascist economy--impossible to unscramble. Unfortunately the influence of Trade Union leaders is exerted--unwittingly--in the same direction to the ulti- mate disadvantage of those whose interests they think they represent. But the record of the Duce's system surely does not invite imitation. "
<<5 "The Economic Front," Economist, Dec. 9, 1939.
run on a restrictive basis, are to be maintained. .
private monopolies fighting to win by State compulsion as big a share of the total real income for as little service as possible. " Another writer in the same issue adds, "If this so-called self-government of industry is permitted to crystallize itself we shall be gravely prejudicing the problem of reconstruction. We shall find that we have lost our liberty to choose between a return to a competitive system and the establishment of a planned economic system. We shall be confronted with a strongly entrenched co-operative organization of industry on a restrictionist basis--not unlike
. .
What we shall get is a set of
? i84 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM
Commodity
Jute
Leather
Non-ferrous metals
Paper
Silk and artificial silks
Sulphuric acid fer- tilizers
Head Controller
Mr. G. Malcolm
Dr. E. C. Snow Capt. O. Lyttelton
Mr. A. Ralph Reed
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Director, Ralli Bros. , Ltd. (Merchant bank- ers)
United Tanners' Feder- ation
Chairman, Anglo-Orien- tal & General Investment Trust, Ltd. ; chairman or director of various tin and other non-ferrous metal companies; man- aging director, British Metal Corporation, Ltd.
Chairman and managing director, Albert E. Reed & Co. , Ltd. (paper manu- facturers), and chairman of other paper compa- nies
Timber
Mr. Howard Cun- Director, Scottish Agri- ningham cultural Industries, Ltd.
Major A. I. Harris Louis Bamberger & Sons (timber importers); Past- President, Timber Trade
Association
Mr. H. O. Hambleton Wm. Frost and Co. (Silk throwsters)
Mr. F. C. O. Speyer
Director, Imperial Chemicals Industries, I. C. I. (Fertilizer and Synthetic Products) Ltd. , (delegate). International Nitrogen Association, Ltd. , Scottish Agricul- tural Industries, Ltd. (Subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries)
Mr. N. Garrod Thom- as
? Commodity
Wool
Head Controller Principal business interests or previous
occupation
Sir H. B. Schackleton Taylor, Schackleton k Co. (weavers); Hon. Pres- ident, Bradford Manu- facturers' Federation; chairman, Wool Tex- tile Delegation; presi- dent. Woolen & Worsted
BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM 185
Butter
Cereals and cereal products
Feeding stufiEs Tea
Canned fish
Meat and livestock
Ministry of Foods Mr. H. E. Davis
Sir Alan Anderson
Sir Bruce Burt Sir Hubert Can-
Mr. Dan Tobey
Sir Francis Boys
Trades Federation
London Manager of Do- minion of New Zealand Dairy Sales Division Chairman, Anderson, Green & Co. (shipbro- kers and managers); member of Royal Com- mission on Wheat Sup- plies, 1914-19
Indian Agricultural Service
Late managing director, Balmer, Lawrie and Co. , Ltd. , controlled by Law- rie (Alex. ) 8c Co. , Ltd. , managing agents to tea estate companies Chairman, companies controlled by Associated Canners, Ltd. (subsidi- ary. Lever Brothers & Unilever, Ltd. ); direc- tor. Associated Canners, Ltd.
Vice-chairman, Livestock Commission; Member Bacon Development Board; Director and
? i86 BRITAIN'S Commodity
FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM'
Bacon and ham
Dried fruits
Sugar
Imported eggs
Potatoes
Oils and fats Condensed milk
Mr. J. F. Bodinnar
Mr. A. E. Gough (Designate)
Col. F. C. C. Balfour (Chairman of Board)
Mr. J. A. Peacock
Capt. J. M. Mollett (Designate)
Mr. Herbert Davis
Mr. E. W. Brown
Head Controller
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Vice-chairman, New Zea- land Refrigerating Co. ,
Ltd. , 1923-33 Chairman, Bacon Mar- keting Board; Member, Bacon Development Board; Deputy-chair- man, various bacon com- panies
Managing Director, Overseas Farmers Co- operative Federation, Ltd.
Chairman of Sugar Com- mission; formerly Sudan Political Service Director and Secretary, Nurdin & Peacock, Ltd. (provision, egg and but- ter importers) Chairman, Potato Mar- keting Board
Director of Lever Bros, and Unilever, Ltd. Director of Napier, Brown & Co. , Ltd. (sugar merchants)
The Economist finds ^^ that for all practical purposes these Head Controllers can be said to be the direct representatives of the lead- ing trade association or the allied nuclei of trade associations dom- inant in its field. Such an arrangement would seem, then, to be merely the wartime adaptation of a program ^^ which calls for a
<<6 "In this war-time organization of control the representative board of trade as- sociation is, it is true, replaced (usually) by the single controller. But the principle stands: industries are being encouraged to control themselves. " Ibid.
67 "This method of proceeding is . . . in line with the present Government's pre- war record. It is a continuation of the policy of handing over powers to such bodies as the colliery-owners, the Iron and Steel Federation, and the shipowners, and other capitalist groups which have been given authority to control production and prices, or to distribute public subsidies, or to impose levies for eliminating "redundant" plant, or what not. The present Government is pre-eminently a capitalist Govern-
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 187
centrally controlled "plutodemocracy," a sort of "new feudal sys- tem, with the British market, instead of the British land, parcelled out among the barons. " ^^
Another example treated by the Economist (Feb. 15, 1941) as typical and symptomatic of the extent to which organized British business is taking advantage of the war situation to further con- solidate monopolistic controls, is given by the development of the "Retailers' Front. " It is worth quoting at length:
Associations of retail traders have grown very much in strength since the war started. Indeed, within their own ranks, it is often said that a few months of war have brought them nearer to their objectives than many years of hard work in peacetime. The reason is not far to seek. These associations aim to speak for entire trades with a single voice in accord- ance with a common policy; and the control of supplies and regulation of prices by the Government have brought home to "independent" re- tailers the need of some spokesman or intermediary between them and the authorities. Individual traders are in no position to make constant approaches to public departments and official committees for informa- tion or to bombard these bodies with complaints and suggestions. So in every branch of trade, they flock into associations in search of aid or shelter.
The tendency is natural and the result unexceptionable insofar as it makes wartime organization easier. In war economy cooperative groups can undoubtedly exercise useful functions. But some of the conse- quences must be suspect. The direction of these associations is always quasi-monopolistic domination of their trades, and in wartime this trend is encouraged in many ways. In every business scarcity and the limitations of supplies check newcomers. Prices tend to go up, and price cutters--hitherto the chief obstacles to the associations* j>olicy of keep- ing prices up--fare badly. The associations wax while their rivals wane.
Moreover, the various associations work together. Representations on any question relating to, say, retail tobacconists will possibly be made, not only by their own associations, but also by the associations, unions and federations, local and national, of confectioners, newsagents, hotels and restaurants and off-license holders--perhaps even with the backing of that active general body, the Retail Distributors Association. Each trade is a hierarchy, beginning with the local or district organization and rising to a National Council or Federation, and as all these hierar-
raent, and almost its one idea in matters of economic policy has been to endow the big capitalist associations and combines with authority over the consumers. " New Statesman and Nation, April 2, 1938.
88 "The New Feudalism," Economist, April 2, 1938.
? i88 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
chies interlock in their activities, it means that horizontally, as well as vertically, over the whole field of retailing they exercise a nation-wide power in pursuit of aims which are often by no means national. (R)^
As policy coordinator for this swiftly unfolding and cartel-like apparatus of trade associations, given an added fillip for more rapid extension of their powers and influence in the current national emergency, the Federation of British Industries takes on a new and far-reaching significance. Commanded at the top by a small coterie of officials who are drawn chiefly from large concerns or from concerns under the influence or control of the giants in their respective fields, and with both officials and controlling concerns bound together by an infinity of interconnections--personal, fam- ily, and institutional
--
vested with political powers of propaganda and coercion, this is the
into a tightly meshed business oligarchy
British pattern in the making; in trend, at least, it does not seem very different from that already dominant in states formally com- mitted to the "corporate idea. " The eventuality remains to be seen.
69 "Retailers' Front," Economist, Feb. 15, 1941, pp. 206-7.
? Chapter VI
THE AMERICAN WAY: 'BUSINESS SELF-REGIMENTATION''
THE ORIGIN of the National Association of Manufacturers stems
from a decade of combinations par excellence. Between 1890
and 1900 more and larger combinations took place than in the
entire preceding history of this country. This is true whether one
directs attention to mere number of consolidations, number of
workmen employed, or amount of capital involved. A speaker
arguing for a federal law of incorporation before the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers in 1904 summarized the amazing rec-
^
ord:
Statistics show that in the decade between i860 and 1870 only two in- dustrial trusts, formed by the combination of formerly competing con- cerns, had been created, and that with a total capitalization of only thirteen millions of dollars. In the next decade between 1870 and 1880, four more were formed, with a capitalization of one hundred and thirty- five million dollars. Between 1880 and 1890 eighteen more were formed, with a capitalization of two hundred twenty-eight millions of dollars; while the last census shows one hundred eighty-three combinations with a capitalization of $3,619,039,200 . . . In 1902 it is claimed that there were 213 combinations, with a capitalization of seven billions of dollars; while now it is claimed that there are nearly 1,000 industrial combina- tions, not including railroads, with a nominal capitalization of $9,000,- 000,000. 2
McCrary, "Another View of National Incorporation Needs," American
1 Alvin
Industries, Oct. 1, 1904, p. 13.
J.
2 ". . . by 1904 the trusts controlled fully two-fifths of the manufacturing capital of the country. " Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems (New York, 1929), p. 61. These authors define trusts somewhat more nar- rowly than the speaker before the NAM, their total estimated "trust" capitalization of 1904 being given as $5,000,000,000.
? igo THE AMERICAN WAY
THE HISTORICAL SETTING: A TREND TOWARDS MONOPOLY
Few fields of business activity escaped this flight from "free competition" entirely. In one form or another--corporate con- solidations, pools, gentlemen's agreements, interlocking direc- torates--the larger movement affected the leading branches of in- dustry, commerce, finance, and transportation. Though in line with trends reaching back through the preceding decades, the process was so swift and so far-reaching that it appeared to many that shortly it must engulf the whole of the American economic system. As the facts became generally known clamor against the trusts mounted, for it seemed that when, of the outstanding com- binations, "26 controlled 80 per cent or more of the aggregate pro- duction in their fields; 57, 60 per cent or more; and 78, 50 per cent or more," ^ it was time that all classes sit up and take notice of the revolutionary changes being brought about in the American eco- nomic scene.
Smaller businessmen throughout the country concurred in the antitrust movement. But although then, as now,* the bulk of the complaints looking toward legislative and judicial action against the trusts emanated from affected business circles, businessmen showed little inclination to organize to such an end. Leaving these matters to the government, they chose, instead, to pool their re- sources so as to present a united front in promoting more extensive aid and grants of privilege from the political authorities which would prove of common value to them all. Thus arose, along with, and at first entirely independent of, the large combinations, the trade-association movement. The "trusts" had dramatized the ad- vantages of massed and centrally directed economic power. The trade associations hoped not to level down the trusts, but to "de- mocratize" analogous privileges for the business community as a whole.
>> Idem.
4 "It is business men and business men alone who file practically all the complaints with my division, and it is for business men that the anti-trust laws must be enforced.
45 Another American observer, P. Harvey Middleton, writing in American Indus- tries, Nov. , 1924, on "Great Britain's Loud Speaker" (the FBI), listed among the FBI activities of merit, "meetings between the FBI Education Committee and the As- sociation of Headmasters of Public and Secondary Schools to discuss suggestions for bringing the schools of the country into closer relation with industry. "
? 174
BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
ing of the young that they may in the future follow the business men as "their natural leaders," instead of their own Trade Union representatives. *(R)
It is significant that this trend comes at a time when class- conscious employer organizations have been established with cen- tral headquarters, capable of both creating a climate of opinion amongst employers and of exercising some degree of united action in matters bearing on the combined interests of British employers as a whole. But it is of far greater import that these developments occur simultaneously with the cumulative dovetailing of organized business and the formal political machinery of the British imperial system.
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT: IN TIMES OF PEACE
This is not the place to discuss in detail the extent to which Tory domination in England has woven the political and economic ap- paratus of class interests into a unified system of social control. The details are too numerous, in part too well concealed, and in part too difficult to trace for elaboration here. Moreover, portions of the story have been told adequately in a series of recent books. *^
It will suffice here to summarize a few of the obvious trends in the British concentration movement, and to point out the role the FBI comes to assume as the political implications of these trends come ever more clearly to the fore.
1. The dominating concerns in the inner councils of the FBI are those organized on a monopoly or quasi-monopoly footing, or occupying leading positions in the rapidly spreading networks of cartel and cartel-like controls. This process was particularly rapid in the postwar years. 'Tor the first time since the earlier days of capitalism," wrote Professor Levy in 1927, a "large section of Eng- lish trade has become overrun with monopolist organisations. . . . The World War, its aftermath, and the world-wide economic crisis, lasting now for more than six years, have strengthened these tend-
46 "For my part I cannot look upon the evil or foolish faces of some of the leaders of labour without a sense of deep humility. How greatly must we capitalist employers have neglected our duty, if the workers choose to follow, not us their natural lead- ers, but such men as these. " Austin Hopkinson, Religio Militis (London, 1927), p. 113.
47 See, in particular, Simon Haxey, Tory M. P. (London, 1939), and Ernest Davies, National Capitalism (London, 1939).
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 175
encies. " *^ And since Levy wrote, as Lucas *(R) and others have shown, these tendencies have been doubly accelerated by the events of the great depression and the outbreak of the Second World War.
Typical of the combines which operate monopolistically are such concerns as Imperial Chemicals (capitalized around ? 75,000,- 000), Vickers in the iron and steel industry, Lever Brothers in the soap industry, J. and P. Coats in the thread industry, and the great banking systems with headquarters in London.
2. As Lucas has shown in his illuminating study, the trade asso- ciation "is without question the most common medium of control in the present time" ^? in Great Britain. This is to say, the British trade association typically begins its existence by exercising the powers and seeking to gain the restrictive objectives which the American trade association was able to achieve only after NRA. Hence for all practical purposes, these price-fixing, output- restricting, market-area allocating bodies, operating with the use of such familiar devices as resale price maintenance, tying contracts, rebate systems, trade boycotts, and the like, are cartel-like bodies. Nothing basic in principle separates their forms of organization nor the methods of operation from the cartel. It is highly significant that the two terms, trade associations and cartels, are used more or less interchangeably in the general British literature devoted to discussing these trends.
3. The trade association device has been growing in Britain, as indicated above (p. 157) by leaps and bounds. Growth here, as else- where, is along three principal lines. Every industry and trade, both locally and nationally, acquires its appropriate association; the pressure on "outsiders" to join tends increasingly to expand the coverage of each appropriate association so as to include every single business concern falling in each separate classification or cate- gory; these tend increasingly to band together first locally or region- ally, then nationally by industries, trades, and (cross-sectional) regions, in peak or central bodies, such as the FBI. Scattered, overlapping, confused as the organizational network is in many respects, still one finds in the literature clear indications that these
three trends are everywhere convergent and unidirectional.
4. Itisequallyclearthatthebulkofthelargerandmorepower-
48 Levy, Monopolies, Cartels, and Trusts, pp. 325-26.
49 Industrial Reconstruction. so ibid. , p. 203.
? 176 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
ful trade associations are dominated as a rule by a few large inside concerns. The examples offered by Lucas of the methods by which Lever Brothers dominates the soap industry through the United Kingdom Soap Manufacturers' Association, the Salt Union its in- dustry through the Salt Manufacturers' Association, and Imperial Chemicals the ammonia industry through the Sulphate of Am- monia Federation, Ltd. , are merely spectacular instances of tech- niques which have become extremely widespread throughout the British Isles. So far as this is true--and the general trends seem to be in this direction--the trade association becomes in effect a cartel instrument to promote the monopoly policies of a single or a small group of giant concerns.
5. Somewhatthesamethingcanbesaidofthecentralandpeak associations, such as the FBI. The large concern has an opportunity to make its weight felt first through a sort of triple membership: as individual corporate member, as member of constituent trade associations, and through membership in the regional bodies. Vot- ing power, in the second place, for both the Grand Council and the Executive Committee, is on a basis proportional to number of workmen employed, a practice which inevitably throws the center of gravity in the hands of the large concerns. Further, analysis will show that the work undertaken by the various subcommittees has to do in large part with matters which can only be of advantage to the large concern equipped with great resources. Finally, the con- stitution and by-laws of the FBI are subject to change by the inside groups of the Grand Council and the Executive Committee, in- cluding extension of powers of appointment and (in particular) cooptation of members to key positions.
6. The influence of the FBI in governmental circles appears to have become exceedingly great. It is expressed directly via two routes. First, in the number of positions its members hold on gov- ernmental committees and the extent to which its representations before governmental bodies result in decisions and pursuit of poli- cies favorable to its members and its general program; and second, the power possessed by its own officers, members of the Grand Council, Executive Committees, and various Subcommittees, on the one hand, and representatives of its leading companies and
trade associations on the other, to influence governmental policies as Members of Parliament.
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 177 As for the first line of cross-fertilization, the FBI claims to be
represented directly on the following governmental bodies:
Board of Trade: Board of Trade Advisory Council Board of Trade Council for Art and Industry
^'^
War Office: Technical co-ordinating Committee on General Stores Motor Transport Co-ordinating Committee
Ministry of Health: Joint Advisory Committee on River Pollution Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee
Mniistry of Agriculture: Standing Committee on River Pollution
Apparently representation is much wider than such a listing would appear to show. References are found scattered all through the literature, showing membership on ad hoc and smaller stand- ing committees established not only by the national, but also by numerous county, municipal, and other local governing bodies. But of equal importance would appear to be the effect of its insti- tutionalized pressure and lobby activities. A few examples taken from a single publication will suffice to show the general picture: "
Fiscal Policy: In 1930 the FBI secured an overwhelming mandate from its members to demand a change in our National Fiscal Policy. The publication early in 1931 of its proposals in "Industry and the Nation" was followed by an intensive campaign in Parliament and the Press, and in the Industrial districts. A special pamphlet 'The Passing of Free Trade" was prepared to assist speakers on the subject.
The National Government, returned to power in 1931, adopted the FBI's main recommendations, and Industry is now reaping substan- tial benefits from the protection of the Home market.
Imports: On the passing of the Import Duties Act 1932, the FBI set up a special department to assist members in preparing applications to the Import Duties Advisory Committee. . . . Concessions to the Dominions and foreign countries facilitating imports into Home markets are closely watched. The FBI has generally been successful in convincing the Government that no such agreement should be concluded before the industries affected have had an opportunity of producing information as to the effect of such imports upon British industry.
Foreign Countries: The FBI is the main channel of consultation with the Government in Commercial Treaty negotiations, and it also pro- vides special facilities for international arrangements within particu- lar industries.
51 "Industry and Action," pamphlet of the FBI (undated), p. 11. 52 Ibid. , pp. 4-5.
? 178 BRITAIN'S 'TEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
De-Rating of Machinery: The Rating and Valuation Act of 1925 records a notable achievement for Industry. The Bill introduced, after prolonged negotiations, by the Government contained a defini- tion of the machinery to be included for Rating by the Local Author- ities, which embodied the essentials of the FBI proposals.
Similar to these are the claim of successful cooperation with the government in matters dealing with exports, Empire problems, taxation, commercial law. Various annual reports elaborate and detail the picture at length. One writer summarizes FBI activities in a typical case as follows:
In the determination of the scope and nature of that policy [protection] the FBI has played a triumphant part. It has not hesitated to boast of its successful influence upon the Government. . . . By creation of the Tariff Advisory Committee with power to alter tariffs without reference to Parliament, the Government has in fact handed over to a body in close association with the owners of industry an important legislative function. ^*
The other side of this picture is the influence of organized busi- ness circles in the formation of governmental policy through mem- bership in Parliament. A recent compilation from the Directory of Directors, the Stock Exchange Year-Book, and other sources shows that of 415 Parliamentary supporters of the National Government, some 181 possessed 775 corporate directorships. ^* These ranged over the entire business field, but appear to be largely concentrated in the big, national and Empire-wide trading, shipping, manufac- turing, and financial enterprises. Through family and almost in- definitely ramifying intercorporate connections, corporate influ- ence of these business M. P. 's likewise extends to the outer reaches of the entire British economic system. Thus in large--perhaps in decisive--part the influences, personalities, interests, and powers that go to shape up policies of individual business firms, the trade associations to which they belong, and the central policy- coordinating bodies, such as the FBI which they direct, go also to determine the objectives of governmental policies, and to guide and control the execution of those policies through the complex
machinery of government administration and regulation.
7. Someconceptionofthelong-runimplicationsofthisfusionof
53 H. R. Greaves, Reactionary England (London, 1936), p. 146. 64 Haxey, op. cit. , p. 37.
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 179
business and government may be had by looking over the various schemes for industrial reorganization that have come to the fore with increasing frequency in recent years. Such plans as embodied in the Coal Mines Acts, the Iron and Steel Reorganization Scheme, the "Reconstruction Levy" and various schemes proposed for re- organizing different industries by PEP (Political and Economic Planning) call for no less than extension of the principle of cor- porate organization to entire industries. It is worth while pointing out the following as typical of all such plans:
They are initially advocated, promoted, and lobbied for primarily (in some cases exclusively) by the larger, better organized and more powerful business interests. "Liberal" and labor groups have assented to such plans only tardily, only with many stipulated conditions (mostly ignored) or not at all.
They all visualize the establishment of a central governing body, capable in whole or in part of restricting competition, controlling ca- pacity, regulating markets, prices and production.
They all wish for governmental sanctions in enforcing compliance with decisions arrived at, but wish freedom from "government coer- cion" in the process of exercising the decisions.
The central governing authorities projected are made up exclusively of business men, who govern the industry or trade as a unit. (The Board of Trade, or similar bodies are only to "regulate" in a general sense of the term. )
Central peak associations, such as the FBI and those with which it is affiliated, have not opposed any of these schemes on principle. On the contrary, except for specific features of specific programs, they have uniformly favored such plans, the moving figures in these schemes being simultaneously the leading lights in the central associations.
They do not, as a rule, oppose very considerable extension of govern- mental influence (so long as the government is "sympathetic") along what might be called "auxiliary lines. " For example, they did not oppose:
a) The establishment of governmentally owned, or "mixed" (owned partly by government and partly by private interests) enterprises, such as The London Passenger Transport Board, The Central Electricity Board and The London Port Authority (mixed enter- prises). The Post Office (which includes the telephone and tele- graph systems of Great Britain. (Government ownership. )
b) Government aid in establishing monopolies in the home market (autarchy), and protection in Empire and foreign markets.
c) Provision of authority and machinery for punishment of "out-
--
? i8o BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM**
siders" through regular legal channels, or provision by govern- ment with powers for eliminating the problem of the "outsider" entirely.
Somewhat different in origin were the Agricultural Marketing Acts ^^ tracing back to 1931. Yet under the National Government, these Acts, which were intended to make possible organization of farmer-producers into cooperative or semicooperative bodies, had come largely under the influence of packing houses, agricultural processors and distributors, and other allied interests. ^^ Hence, even this application of the new type of ''corporative" organization has come under the domination of groups whose first allegiance is to the interests and outlook represented by the Federation of British Industries.
8. There remains the fact to be mentioned, alluded to above, that opposition to this cumulative fusion of governmental and highly organized business systems seems almost completely to have dwindled away. Conservative and Tory elements want the new forms of corporate organization, and they desire the cooperation of the government in effecting the necessary changes against recal- citrant minority interests. And labor and liberal circles have ap- parently concurred in the movement, having asked--in the main only for minor safeguards for their interests. The famous Liberal Report of 1926 recommended autonomous and "self-governing" bodies as one of the leading ways of solving Britain's industrial dilemma. ^^ The first comprehensive plans for industrial reorgan- ization along lines slowly evolved by monopoly-oriented business organization were laid down by the British Labour Party in 1931.
In a speech delivered, significantly enough, at the University of Berlin in 1926, the great British liberal and iconoclast J. M. Keynes held "that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control
55 Different only in the sense that the Agricultural Marketing Acts were promoted primarily by farming interests, while the industrial reorganization schemes were originally the Labour Government's answer to the various proposals which had been advanced by private industry. Needless to say, the form in which the Labour Govern- ment proposed industrial reorganization was not far removed from that proposed by a private enterprise, as may be shown by the nature and quality of the remarks and criticisms made at the time in business circles.
56 See pp. 183-86.
57 Britain's Industrial Future (London, 1938), the Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry; see in particular Books II and III. In its conclusions it refers to "the growth of cooperative self-government, which is the true aim of industrial policy" (p. 466).
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 181
and organisation lies somewhere between the individual and the modern State. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the State . . . a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies. " ^^ Later he was to become even more ex- plicit when, on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War which he had forecast so many years before, he declared that an "amalgam of private capitalism and State Socialism . . . is the
^^
only practicable recipe for present conditions. "
Just how far State control was to reach in this British version of
National Socialism it is hard to gather from the writings of Mr. Keynes or his contemporaries, but clearly self-government in busi- ness under the auspices of a regime determined "to make the pri- vate property system work better" ^? (italics in original) is en route to the goal. All of which does not prove, of course, that all British business is in favor either of the abandonment of "free competi- tion" and "laissez faire" on the one hand, nor of the particular forms under which they cede control to central policy-controlling bodies on the other. An examination of any of the numerous pro- posals for control in any given industry will put the reader's mind at rest on that score. ^^ But what is clear, is that the center of gravity has shifted in this direction, and that on the present showing there will shortly be no alternative to the British business man except to make the most of it.
RELATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT: WAR TIMES
British war organization rests squarely on the associational ma- chinery evolved over the peacetime interlude. A recent issue of the
58 True, the "criterion of action" of each "is solely the public good as they under- stand it" but what public-relations counselor would oflEer any other explanation of any given act of any represented business? See J. M. Keynes, The End of Laissez- Faire (London, 1926), pp. 41-42.
59 Debate between J. M. Keynes and Mr. Kingsley-Martin on "Democracy and Efficiency," New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 28, 1939. Mr Keynes hopes that this amalgam in defense of "private property and capitalism" will be "liberal," so that he may refer to it as "liberal socialism," and by "liberal" he means nonmonopolisti- cally organized capitalism. Mr. Keynes has not been called a "semanticist. "
60 Idem.
61 See discussions relating to the establishment of the Petroleum, Cotton, and Ship- ping Control Boards in recent issues of The Economist, and New Statesman and Na- tion, and similar sources.
? i82 BRITAIN'S 'FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM**
Economist refers to this as the Conservative program which comes to rest in a
set of notions that sees its ideal of an economic system in an orderly organisation of industries, each ruled feudally from above by the busi- ness firms already established in it, linked in associations and confedera- tions and, at the top, meeting on terms of sovereign equality such other Estates of the Realm as the Bank of England and the Government. Each British industry, faithful to the prescription, has spent the past decade in delimiting its fief, in organising its baronial courts, in secur- ing and entrenching its holdings and in administering the legal powers of self-government conferred on it by a tolerant State. This is the order of ideas that has transformed the trade association from a body of doubt- ful legality, a conspiracy in restraint of trade, into a favoured instru- mentality of the State, until membership in such a body has become as necessary to the business man who wishes to be successful as an old school tie has been to the ambitious Conservative politicians. It is the order of ideas that led to the Import Duties Act being drafted in such a way as to put a premium on self-seeking monopolies and a discount on the public interest; that turned "high profits and low turn-over" into the dominant slogan of British business; that raised the level of British costs to the highest in the world. It is a set of ideas that is ad- mirable for obtaining security, "orderly development" and remunera- tive profits for those already established in the industry--at the cost of an irreducible body of general unemployment. It is emphatically not a set of ideas that can be expected to yield the maximum of production, or to give the country wealth in peace and strength in war. ^^
In an earlier issue ^^ the Economist pointed out that this comes out simply to mean that
under the cover of wartime needs, the principle of Self-government of Industry has been given an official blessing. This is, in effect, merely the expansion and continuation of the Industrial policy that has been pur- sued by the Conservative Government for the past eight years, for in their hands control has nearly always meant the conferment of legal privileges on the organized producers already established in the indus- try . . . industries are being encouraged to control themselves. ^*
62 "A Check on Production," Economist, June 15, 1940.
63 "The Economic Front," Economist, Dec. 9, 1939.
S64 While government officials are thinking of post war planning, comments ISlew
Statesman and Nation (March 8, 1941), "the hard-faced men from the Midlands quietly get on with their job, Mr. Bevin and the other Socialist leaders utter blood- curdling threats, but the monopoly interests (just as in America under the NRA) are taking steps to safeguard their interests.
We are to have planning--that is the present so-called controls, which are merely a glorified form of private monopolies
? BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM' 83
In contrast to the last war, when "the controllers were selected in the main from outside the industry to be controlled," in "this war industry is controlling itself. " This "feudalistic system of cartel control" it illustrates with a list of controllers appointed by the two
^^
leading war-control ministries:
Ministry of Supply
Commodity
Aluminium
Alcohol, molasses and solvents
Cotton Flax
Hemp
Iron and Steel
Head Controller
Hon. G. Cunliffe Mr. A. V. Board
Sir Percy Ashley Sir H. Lindsay
Mr. J. S. Ferrier {Deputy)
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Director, British Alu- minium Company, Ltd. Chairman, British In- dustrial Solvents, Ltd. ; Director, Distillers Co. Ltd. , and International Sugar and Alcohol Co. , Ltd.
Member of Import Du- ties Advisory Committee Director of the Imperial Institute
Director, Wm. F. Mal- colm & Co. , Ltd. (flax, hemp and jute mer- chants)
Mr. A. M. Landauer Landauer & Co. (Hemp and fibre merchants)
Sir A. Duncan
Chairman, British Iron and Steel Federation; Member of Supply Coun- cil
the Italian fascist economy--impossible to unscramble. Unfortunately the influence of Trade Union leaders is exerted--unwittingly--in the same direction to the ulti- mate disadvantage of those whose interests they think they represent. But the record of the Duce's system surely does not invite imitation. "
<<5 "The Economic Front," Economist, Dec. 9, 1939.
run on a restrictive basis, are to be maintained. .
private monopolies fighting to win by State compulsion as big a share of the total real income for as little service as possible. " Another writer in the same issue adds, "If this so-called self-government of industry is permitted to crystallize itself we shall be gravely prejudicing the problem of reconstruction. We shall find that we have lost our liberty to choose between a return to a competitive system and the establishment of a planned economic system. We shall be confronted with a strongly entrenched co-operative organization of industry on a restrictionist basis--not unlike
. .
What we shall get is a set of
? i84 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM
Commodity
Jute
Leather
Non-ferrous metals
Paper
Silk and artificial silks
Sulphuric acid fer- tilizers
Head Controller
Mr. G. Malcolm
Dr. E. C. Snow Capt. O. Lyttelton
Mr. A. Ralph Reed
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Director, Ralli Bros. , Ltd. (Merchant bank- ers)
United Tanners' Feder- ation
Chairman, Anglo-Orien- tal & General Investment Trust, Ltd. ; chairman or director of various tin and other non-ferrous metal companies; man- aging director, British Metal Corporation, Ltd.
Chairman and managing director, Albert E. Reed & Co. , Ltd. (paper manu- facturers), and chairman of other paper compa- nies
Timber
Mr. Howard Cun- Director, Scottish Agri- ningham cultural Industries, Ltd.
Major A. I. Harris Louis Bamberger & Sons (timber importers); Past- President, Timber Trade
Association
Mr. H. O. Hambleton Wm. Frost and Co. (Silk throwsters)
Mr. F. C. O. Speyer
Director, Imperial Chemicals Industries, I. C. I. (Fertilizer and Synthetic Products) Ltd. , (delegate). International Nitrogen Association, Ltd. , Scottish Agricul- tural Industries, Ltd. (Subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries)
Mr. N. Garrod Thom- as
? Commodity
Wool
Head Controller Principal business interests or previous
occupation
Sir H. B. Schackleton Taylor, Schackleton k Co. (weavers); Hon. Pres- ident, Bradford Manu- facturers' Federation; chairman, Wool Tex- tile Delegation; presi- dent. Woolen & Worsted
BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM 185
Butter
Cereals and cereal products
Feeding stufiEs Tea
Canned fish
Meat and livestock
Ministry of Foods Mr. H. E. Davis
Sir Alan Anderson
Sir Bruce Burt Sir Hubert Can-
Mr. Dan Tobey
Sir Francis Boys
Trades Federation
London Manager of Do- minion of New Zealand Dairy Sales Division Chairman, Anderson, Green & Co. (shipbro- kers and managers); member of Royal Com- mission on Wheat Sup- plies, 1914-19
Indian Agricultural Service
Late managing director, Balmer, Lawrie and Co. , Ltd. , controlled by Law- rie (Alex. ) 8c Co. , Ltd. , managing agents to tea estate companies Chairman, companies controlled by Associated Canners, Ltd. (subsidi- ary. Lever Brothers & Unilever, Ltd. ); direc- tor. Associated Canners, Ltd.
Vice-chairman, Livestock Commission; Member Bacon Development Board; Director and
? i86 BRITAIN'S Commodity
FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM'
Bacon and ham
Dried fruits
Sugar
Imported eggs
Potatoes
Oils and fats Condensed milk
Mr. J. F. Bodinnar
Mr. A. E. Gough (Designate)
Col. F. C. C. Balfour (Chairman of Board)
Mr. J. A. Peacock
Capt. J. M. Mollett (Designate)
Mr. Herbert Davis
Mr. E. W. Brown
Head Controller
Principal business interests or previous occupation
Vice-chairman, New Zea- land Refrigerating Co. ,
Ltd. , 1923-33 Chairman, Bacon Mar- keting Board; Member, Bacon Development Board; Deputy-chair- man, various bacon com- panies
Managing Director, Overseas Farmers Co- operative Federation, Ltd.
Chairman of Sugar Com- mission; formerly Sudan Political Service Director and Secretary, Nurdin & Peacock, Ltd. (provision, egg and but- ter importers) Chairman, Potato Mar- keting Board
Director of Lever Bros, and Unilever, Ltd. Director of Napier, Brown & Co. , Ltd. (sugar merchants)
The Economist finds ^^ that for all practical purposes these Head Controllers can be said to be the direct representatives of the lead- ing trade association or the allied nuclei of trade associations dom- inant in its field. Such an arrangement would seem, then, to be merely the wartime adaptation of a program ^^ which calls for a
<<6 "In this war-time organization of control the representative board of trade as- sociation is, it is true, replaced (usually) by the single controller. But the principle stands: industries are being encouraged to control themselves. " Ibid.
67 "This method of proceeding is . . . in line with the present Government's pre- war record. It is a continuation of the policy of handing over powers to such bodies as the colliery-owners, the Iron and Steel Federation, and the shipowners, and other capitalist groups which have been given authority to control production and prices, or to distribute public subsidies, or to impose levies for eliminating "redundant" plant, or what not. The present Government is pre-eminently a capitalist Govern-
? BRITAIN'S"FEUDALISTICSYSTEM" 187
centrally controlled "plutodemocracy," a sort of "new feudal sys- tem, with the British market, instead of the British land, parcelled out among the barons. " ^^
Another example treated by the Economist (Feb. 15, 1941) as typical and symptomatic of the extent to which organized British business is taking advantage of the war situation to further con- solidate monopolistic controls, is given by the development of the "Retailers' Front. " It is worth quoting at length:
Associations of retail traders have grown very much in strength since the war started. Indeed, within their own ranks, it is often said that a few months of war have brought them nearer to their objectives than many years of hard work in peacetime. The reason is not far to seek. These associations aim to speak for entire trades with a single voice in accord- ance with a common policy; and the control of supplies and regulation of prices by the Government have brought home to "independent" re- tailers the need of some spokesman or intermediary between them and the authorities. Individual traders are in no position to make constant approaches to public departments and official committees for informa- tion or to bombard these bodies with complaints and suggestions. So in every branch of trade, they flock into associations in search of aid or shelter.
The tendency is natural and the result unexceptionable insofar as it makes wartime organization easier. In war economy cooperative groups can undoubtedly exercise useful functions. But some of the conse- quences must be suspect. The direction of these associations is always quasi-monopolistic domination of their trades, and in wartime this trend is encouraged in many ways. In every business scarcity and the limitations of supplies check newcomers. Prices tend to go up, and price cutters--hitherto the chief obstacles to the associations* j>olicy of keep- ing prices up--fare badly. The associations wax while their rivals wane.
Moreover, the various associations work together. Representations on any question relating to, say, retail tobacconists will possibly be made, not only by their own associations, but also by the associations, unions and federations, local and national, of confectioners, newsagents, hotels and restaurants and off-license holders--perhaps even with the backing of that active general body, the Retail Distributors Association. Each trade is a hierarchy, beginning with the local or district organization and rising to a National Council or Federation, and as all these hierar-
raent, and almost its one idea in matters of economic policy has been to endow the big capitalist associations and combines with authority over the consumers. " New Statesman and Nation, April 2, 1938.
88 "The New Feudalism," Economist, April 2, 1938.
? i88 BRITAIN'S "FEUDALISTIC SYSTEM"
chies interlock in their activities, it means that horizontally, as well as vertically, over the whole field of retailing they exercise a nation-wide power in pursuit of aims which are often by no means national. (R)^
As policy coordinator for this swiftly unfolding and cartel-like apparatus of trade associations, given an added fillip for more rapid extension of their powers and influence in the current national emergency, the Federation of British Industries takes on a new and far-reaching significance. Commanded at the top by a small coterie of officials who are drawn chiefly from large concerns or from concerns under the influence or control of the giants in their respective fields, and with both officials and controlling concerns bound together by an infinity of interconnections--personal, fam- ily, and institutional
--
vested with political powers of propaganda and coercion, this is the
into a tightly meshed business oligarchy
British pattern in the making; in trend, at least, it does not seem very different from that already dominant in states formally com- mitted to the "corporate idea. " The eventuality remains to be seen.
69 "Retailers' Front," Economist, Feb. 15, 1941, pp. 206-7.
? Chapter VI
THE AMERICAN WAY: 'BUSINESS SELF-REGIMENTATION''
THE ORIGIN of the National Association of Manufacturers stems
from a decade of combinations par excellence. Between 1890
and 1900 more and larger combinations took place than in the
entire preceding history of this country. This is true whether one
directs attention to mere number of consolidations, number of
workmen employed, or amount of capital involved. A speaker
arguing for a federal law of incorporation before the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers in 1904 summarized the amazing rec-
^
ord:
Statistics show that in the decade between i860 and 1870 only two in- dustrial trusts, formed by the combination of formerly competing con- cerns, had been created, and that with a total capitalization of only thirteen millions of dollars. In the next decade between 1870 and 1880, four more were formed, with a capitalization of one hundred and thirty- five million dollars. Between 1880 and 1890 eighteen more were formed, with a capitalization of two hundred twenty-eight millions of dollars; while the last census shows one hundred eighty-three combinations with a capitalization of $3,619,039,200 . . . In 1902 it is claimed that there were 213 combinations, with a capitalization of seven billions of dollars; while now it is claimed that there are nearly 1,000 industrial combina- tions, not including railroads, with a nominal capitalization of $9,000,- 000,000. 2
McCrary, "Another View of National Incorporation Needs," American
1 Alvin
Industries, Oct. 1, 1904, p. 13.
J.
2 ". . . by 1904 the trusts controlled fully two-fifths of the manufacturing capital of the country. " Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems (New York, 1929), p. 61. These authors define trusts somewhat more nar- rowly than the speaker before the NAM, their total estimated "trust" capitalization of 1904 being given as $5,000,000,000.
? igo THE AMERICAN WAY
THE HISTORICAL SETTING: A TREND TOWARDS MONOPOLY
Few fields of business activity escaped this flight from "free competition" entirely. In one form or another--corporate con- solidations, pools, gentlemen's agreements, interlocking direc- torates--the larger movement affected the leading branches of in- dustry, commerce, finance, and transportation. Though in line with trends reaching back through the preceding decades, the process was so swift and so far-reaching that it appeared to many that shortly it must engulf the whole of the American economic system. As the facts became generally known clamor against the trusts mounted, for it seemed that when, of the outstanding com- binations, "26 controlled 80 per cent or more of the aggregate pro- duction in their fields; 57, 60 per cent or more; and 78, 50 per cent or more," ^ it was time that all classes sit up and take notice of the revolutionary changes being brought about in the American eco- nomic scene.
Smaller businessmen throughout the country concurred in the antitrust movement. But although then, as now,* the bulk of the complaints looking toward legislative and judicial action against the trusts emanated from affected business circles, businessmen showed little inclination to organize to such an end. Leaving these matters to the government, they chose, instead, to pool their re- sources so as to present a united front in promoting more extensive aid and grants of privilege from the political authorities which would prove of common value to them all. Thus arose, along with, and at first entirely independent of, the large combinations, the trade-association movement. The "trusts" had dramatized the ad- vantages of massed and centrally directed economic power. The trade associations hoped not to level down the trusts, but to "de- mocratize" analogous privileges for the business community as a whole.
>> Idem.
4 "It is business men and business men alone who file practically all the complaints with my division, and it is for business men that the anti-trust laws must be enforced.
