No More Learning

When war came in 1790 Cornwallis was obliged to take
possession of the Carnatic, in order, says Sir John Malcolm,2 "to
secure the two states [the Carnatic and Madras] against the dangers
to which he thought them exposed from the mismanagement of the
Nawab's officers”. It was quite clear that it was impossible to leave
the "sword in one hand, the purse in another”. By the control now
assumed the success of the war with Tipu was made much more easy,
and it became obvious that a new treaty to stabilise this condition
of affairs had become necessary. In 1792 this was concluded. By
this the Company was to assume entire control of the Carnatic
during war, but to restore it when war ended. It was to occupy
specified districts if the nawab's payments should fall into arrears; the
1. See Cornwallls Correspondence, 0, 2, 3.
2 History of India, 1, 94.


## p. 357 (#385) ############################################

CORNWALLIS'S TREATY
357
poligars of Madura and Tinnevelly, whose resistance to the feeble
government of the nawab rendered the collection of revenue im-
possible, were transferred to the rule of the Company; and the nawab's
payments, for which these terms were a security, were to be nine
lakhs for the peace establishment and four-fifths of his revenues for
war expenses, his payment to his creditors being reduced from twelve
to six lakhs. From this treaty Cornwallis hoped for a new and stable
settlement of the most puzzling, if not the most dangerous problem,
with which successive representatives were confronted. In nothing
did he show more clearly his lack of political sagacity than in this
hope. The fact that the moment any war broke out the control of the
country should change hands made confusion worse confounded, and
an efficient native administration became impossible. The nawab too
was left exposed to all the schemes and intrigues which had enmeshed
him of old. The pavement of good intentions left Paul Benfield and
his companions more secure than before. English management for
a limited period gave no opportunity for the detailed knowledge
which is essential to good government, and the people naturally
preserved their allegiance to the rule to which they were soon to
return. The Board of Control saw the weakness of the scheme and
soon determined that new arrangements must be made : but nothing
was done, perhaps nothing could have been done, so long as Muham-
mad 'Ali lived. He died 13 October, 1795, at the age of seventy-eight,
an astute intriguer, never a serious foe, but always a serious trouble,
to the Company. He had played on ruler after ruler with the skill
of an expert, and he had continually succeeded in obtaining terms
much better than he deserved, if not always all that he desired.
The time of his death seemed propitious. A year before, 7 Sep-
tember, 1794, Lord Hobart, an honourable and intelligent personage,
had become governor of Madras; and in a minute immediately after
the nawab's death recording the ruinous results of the policy of the
past and tracing all to the usurious loans which had been effected by
Europeans for mortgages on the provinces of the Carnatic, he declared
that the whole system was "destructive to the resources of the Carnatic
and in some degree reflecting disgrace upon the British Government".
In the letter appears an early expression of English concern for the
welfare of the poorest class, a protest against that oppression of the
ryots which the misgovernment and financial disorder inevitably
produced. British power, it seemed, had actually increased the
capacity for evil-doing which native governments had never been
slow to exercise. The Europeans to whom control of this mortgaged
district was allowed came to terms with the military authorities, and
enforced their claims by their aid : the cultivators had recourse to
money-lenders, who completed their ruin.
The accession of 'Umdat-ul-Umara determined Lord Hobart to
press his views of needed reform on the new nawab and on the
English Government. He proposed to assume the whole military and


## p. 358 (#386) ############################################

358
OUDH AND THE CARNATIC, 1785-1801
civil administration of the districts pledged for the payment of the
tribute, and the cession of the sovereignty over the poligars and of
sonie specified forts. He declared that the treaty of 1792 was a total
failure. But he found the new nawab immovable. He sat tight” and
appealed to the dying injunctions of his flagitious parent. Hobart
felt that he could wait no longer. He proposed to annex Tinnevelly.
Sir John Shore, now governor-general, considered such a course
impolitic, unauthorised and unjust. He wrote' to his predecessor
declaring that nothing could be more irreconcilable than Lord
Hobart's principles and his own. The governor of Madras seemed to
him to be "pursuing objects without any regard to the rectitude of
the means or ultimate consequence”. Shore's principles, regarded
by many as the cause of future wars, could not be better expressed
than in one sentence of this letter ?
That the territories of the Nawab of Arcot . . . may be mismanaged in the
most rúinous manner, I doubt not; that he (Hobart) should be anxious to cor-
rect those evils which, from personal observation, may be more impressive, I
can readily admit; but the existing treaties propose limits even to mismanage-
ment, and let it be as great as is asserted, which I do not deny, these
people
are not to be dragooned into concessions.
In fine, let the nawab go on, and let us hope that our goodness,
without pressure, will make other people good. The Evangelical
.
idealist lost all touch with fact, and thus all power to succour the
oppressed. So, as James Mill, for once not too severe, expresses it,"
by the compound of opposition of the Supreme Government and of the power-
fuil class of individuals whose profit depended upon the misgovernment of the
country, no reform could be introduced.
A change in the directing principle was necessary; and it came. Lord
Hobart, defeated and discouraged, resigned his post. Lord Clive, his
successor, arrived at Madras un 21 August, 1798. Meanwhile Lord
Mornington had succeeded Sir John Shore. The new governor-general
had not only studied Indian affairs in general with more industry
and insight than any of his predecessors before their arrival in the
country, but as the intimate friend of Pitt was well acquainted with
the bitter criticisms directed against the India Act in its bearing upon
the affairs of the Carnatic. He saw the condition of the country from
much the sanie point of view as was described by his brother. Arthur
in 1806. The evils of the alliance, begun "in the infancy of the British
power in the peninsula of India", centred on the non-interference of
the Company in the nawab's internal affairs, the prominent feature
in the policy of the directors, while such interference was constantly
proved to be absolutely necessary, and in the necessity of borrowing
money to pay the tribute from those who had given assignments of
I To Cornwallis, Life of Lord Teignmouth, 1,. 371 sqq.
? Idem, p. 373.
3 History of India, vi, 49.
4 Wellington Supplementary Despatches, IV. 893:


## p. 359 (#387) ############################################

WELLESLEY'S VIEWS
359
territory and had no interest in anything heyond the security of their
own interests. Thence came, as Arthur Wellesley said,
a system which tended not only to the oppression of the inhabitants of the
country, to the impoverishment of the Nawab, and to the destruction of the
revenues of the Carnatic, but was carried into execution by the Company's
civil and military servants, and by British subjects.
It had become an evil of enormous magnitude. Arthur Wellesley
acutely observed that, apart from its other results, it created in Madras
a body of men who, though in the Company's service, were directly
opposed to its interests; and these men gave advice to the nawab
which was necessarily contrary to the requirements of the British
Government and encouraged him in his maintenance of a condition
of affairs which, though it kept him in wealth and nominal power,
tended directly to the impoverishment of his country. The payment
of interest to private persons at 36 per cent. meant ruin even in India;
and in order to discharge it assignments had been given on the
districts especially secured to the Company, in case of failure to pay
the subsidy due to the government. This was in direct contradiction
to the terms of Cornwallis's treaty of 1792.
Not a month elapsed that did not afford matter of speculation as to whether
he could continue to pay his stipulated subsidy; and not one in which (the
Nawab] did not procure the money on loan at a large interest by means which
tended to the destruction of the country.
In vain did Hobart, Mornington, and Clive endeavour to win
the nawab's consent to a modification of the treaty : persistent im-
mobility and trickery had been displayed to the full by Muhammad
'Ali, and 'Umdat-ul-Umara, his son, followed in his steps. It is more
than probable that Mornington, masterful, determined, and impartial
though he was, might have failed like his predecessors to cleanse the
Augean stable if the nawab's rash treachery had not delivered him
into the governor-general's hands.
Impartial and uninfluenced by underground intrigue was Morn-
ington: the directors can hardly be said to have deserved this praise.
Though not personally corrupt, as were not a few of their representa-
tives in India, they were obsessed with the idea that it was necessary
to maintain treaties in permanence which were proved to have been
drawn up on inadequate knowledge. They thought that Cornwallis
had established this "honourable principle". They declared to
Morningtor. that, while they agreed with the proposals of Hobart, they
could not authorise the use of "any powers than those of persuasion"
to induce the nawab to form a new arrangement. Mornington replied,
4. July, 1798, that he had taken immediate steps to negotiate but that
there was no hope at present of obtaining the nawab's consent. His
father's injunctions and his usurers' disapproval were the ostensible
and the real reasons of his obduracy.
Then came the war with Tipu, in which the nawab behaved


## p. 360 (#388) ############################################

360
OUDH AND THE CARNATIC, 1785-1801
rather as an enemy than a friend. Negotiations were conducted with
scrupulous courtesy but no success. Then suddenly the whole position
changed. The Home Government had begun to see through the
nawab's disguises : the government of Fort St George still hesitated :
Mornington thought that the rapid progress of the war made the
seizure of the pledged territories, though ordered by the directors,
unnecessary. He was soon to discover that it was pressingly urgent.
For the moment he was turned aside from what was already his
object, as it had been that of Cornwallis and Hobart, to assume entire
control of the Carnatic, by affairs in the district about which Lord
Pigot and Muhammad 'Ali had been embroiled—Tanjore. There in
1786 Amir Singh had been appointed regent for Sarboji, the nephew
by adoption of his late brother the raja. A council of pandits to whom
the question of right was referred by the Madras Government decided
against the claims of the nephew. Sir John Shore was as usual
conscientious and dissatisfied. He found that the pandits had been
corruptly influenced. He summoned more pandits, especially those of
Benares-a body, it might be thought, not less amenable to monetary
influence. They decided in favour of Sarboji. It was clear that the
land was grievously oppressed by Amir Singh's minister, Siva Rao,
and that the districts, mortgaged, like those in the Carnatic, for debt
to the Company, were on the verge of ruin. . Hobart persuaded the
raja to surrender his territory. But Shore would none of it. His
.
biographer l'says that the prize did not tempt him to forget what he
conceived to be the undue pressure by which it had been won.
He observed that the raja had been intimidated into compliance by the
repeated calling out of British troops, even after he had consented to the dis-
missal of his minister-that the employment of Mr Swartz, the avowed protec-
tor of the raja's competitor and public impeacher of his life, as interpreter in
the transaction, had been injudicious—that the punctuality of the raja's pay.
ments had precluded all pretext for taking possession of his territory-ihat if
maladministration of mortgaged districts could justify the forfeiture of them
the British Government might lay claim equally to Oudh and Travancore; and
he concluded by declaring that justice and policy alike prescribed the recission
of the treaty and the restoration of the ceded district to the Nawab, whatever
embarrassments might result from the proceeding.
Lord Hobart, the man on the spot, naturally protested, and Shore
writing to the omnipotent Charles Grant” at the Board of Directors,
was equally emphatic on the error of Madras, which he attributed
to want of judgment and to ignoring his opinion "that honesty is, in
all situations, the best policy" But that same honesty made him
temper his criticism by a warm eulogy of the missionary, Swartz, one
of the greatest of the men whose services were at that time given
unreservedly to Southern India. Shore was indeed, one cannot but
1
2
1 His son, the second Lord Teignmouth, Life, I, 356.
2 Idem, pp. 374 sqq.


## p. 361 (#389) ############################################

SERINGAPATAM PAPERS
361
feel as one reads the documents, completely muddled over the affair.
It needed a Wellesley to straighten out the problem.
In October, 1797, the directors requested Lord Mornington to
"make a short stay at Madras". He did so, and he studied the cases
of Tanjore and Arcot on the spot. On 21 March, 1799, Dundas wrote
hoping that in the former case a settlement might be made by which
there could be expected from the raja "a pure and virtuous adminis-
tration of the affairs of his country". 1 Mornington went into all
the questions involved most thoroughly, and brought "the several
contending parties to a fair discussion (or rather to a bitter contest)”
in his own presence. Finally, 25 October, 1799, a treaty drawn up
by him was signed by which Sarboji was recognised as raja, but
the whole civil and military administration of the country was placed
in British hands, and the raja was given an allowance of £40,000, and
Amir Singh £10,000. The arrangement was undoubtedly beneficial
to English interests, but it
was far more beneficial to the people of Tanjore. It delivered them from the
effects of native oppression and European cupidity. It gave them what they
had never before possessed the security derived from the administration of
Justice. 2
From this settlement we pass to one much more difficult to achieve,
which was, as we have said, secured by the discovery of the treachery
of the nawab of Arcot.
At the capture of Seringapatam a mass of secret correspondence,
hitherto entirely unknown, between Muhammad 'Ali and his son and
the ruler of Mysore; fell into British hands. It was investigated by
Colonel Close and Mr Webbe and submitted to the Board of Control
and the Court of Directors. Wellesley would run no risk of again being
the victim of ingeniously manufactured delays. This investigation
was thorough. Witnesses as well as documents were most carefully
examined and a report 3 was signed at Seringapatam, 18 May, 1800.
The conclusion was—and it is reiterated in calm judicial terms by
Arthur Wellesley—that by their correspondence with the Company's
enemies the rulers of the Carnatic had broken their treaties with the
English and forfeited all claim to consideration as friends or allies.
The timely death of 'Umdat-ul-Umara, 15 July, 1801, gave further
facilities for the change of system which the English had long believed
to be necessary and inevitable. The succession was offered to the
"son, or supposed son” of the nawab, 'Ali Husain, if he would accept
the terms offered-a sum sufficient for his maintenance in state and
dignity and the transference of the government to the Company. He
rashly refused. Accordingly the nephew of the late nawab, 'Azim-
ud-daula, was approached. He was the eldest legitimate son of Amir-
1 Wellesley Despatches, il, 110.
• Thornton, History of India, in, 103-4.
? Wellesley Despatches, n, 515.


## p. 362 (#390) ############################################

362
OUDH AND THE CARNATIĆ, 1785-1801
ul-Umara, who was the second son of Muhammad 'Ali and brother of
'Umdat-ul-Umara.
“This prince", in Wellington's words, “having agreed to the arrangement,
a treaty was concluded by which the whole of the civil and military govern-
ment of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company, and the Nawab,
Azim-ud-daula, and his heirs were to preserve their title and dignity and to
receive one-fifth of the net revenues of the country. ”
An arrangement was also made for the gradual liquidation of the
long-standing and enormous debt.
Wellesley's justification of the treatment of 'Ali Husain 1 falls into
four divisions, which sum up the whole history of the last fifty years.
The nawabs were not independent princes but the creatures of the
Company, established and maintained by their assistance. Muham-
mad 'Ali and 'Umdat-ul-Umara had by their treachery forfeited all
claim to consideration for themselves or their line. The condition of
the Carnatic was a standing menace to the British position in Southern
India, and a scandalous blot on the principles of peace, justice and
prosperity which English rulers had endeavoured to introduce. A
definite settlement was absolutely demanded. And no injustice was
done to 'Ali Husain, for he rejected the terms offered which his
successor accepted. Thus a stable and honest government was at last
given by Wellesley to the land which had been the earliest to enter
into close association with England. And the political errors ci
earlier statesmen were put aside. The nawab of Arcot was in truth
no independent prince. He was merely an officer of the subahdar of
the Deccan of whom he had been rendered independent, ignorantly
or generously, by the English. A political error had been committed
in ever treating him as independent; and political errors, however
generously originated, are often as dangerous as intentional crimes.
Wellesley, in the annexation of the Carnatic, vindicated political
justice as well as political wisdom.
1 Declar:
on of the Annexation of the Carnatic.
2 Idem.


## p. 363 (#391) ############################################

CHAPTER XXII
THE FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE
MARATHAS, 1784-1818
THE Treaty of Salbai, which was signed 17 May, 1782, and was
ratified by the Peshwa in February of the following year, assured
peace between the East India Company and the Maratha power for
the next twenty years, and marked a stage in the acquisition by the
English of a controlling voice in Indian politics. The treaty left
Mahadaji Sindhia, through whom it was negotiated, in a virtually
independent position, and the history of the decade preceding his
death in 1794 is largely the story of his efforts to re-establish Maratha
control over Northern India and to outwit the design of Nana
Phadnavis, who sought to maintain the Peshwa's hegemony over the
whole Maratha confederacy. While the mutual jealousy of these two
able exponents of Maratha policy and power prevented their acting
wholeheartedly in unison, they were restrained from overt antagonism
by a natural apprehension of the growing power of the English, this
apprehension in Mahadaji Sindhia's case being augmented by his
experience of the military ability displayed by the English in 1780
and 1781. These views and considerations determined their attitude
towards the transactions of the English with Mysore. An attempt to
force Tipu Sultan to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Salbai
ended with the unfortunate Treaty of Mangalore, concluded between
the English in Madras and the sultan in March, 1784, which provided
for the mutual restitution of conquests and left Tipu free to mature
fresh plans for the expulsion of the English from India. The Marathas,
who wished Tipu Sultan to be regarded as their dependent and
tributary, disapproved of the terms of the treaty quite as strongly as
Warren Hastings, who had no little difficulty in persuading Sindhia
and other leaders that he was in no way responsible for the compact.
But, desirous of prosecuting their own policy and intrigues in other
parts of India, the Marathas gave a grudging assent to the fait accompli
and reverted for the time being to matters of more immediate
importance
Sindhia's political influence in Northern India synchronised with
an enhancement of his military power, which resulted from his em-
ployment of Count Benoît de Boigne and other European muitary
adventurers to train and lead his infantry. ! With these forces, drilled
and equipped on European lines, he obtained the surrender of the
1 Compton, European Military Adventurers in Hindustan, pp. 15 sqq. anu
223 sgg.


## p. 364 (#392) ############################################

364
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
fortress of Gwalior, made an incursion into Bundelkhand, and secured
complete control of affairs at Delhi, whither he had been invited in
the name of the emperor, Shah 'Alam, to assist in quelling the revolt
of Muhammad Beg, governor of the province of Agra. Chaos reigned
in the Moghul capital in October, 1784; and the emperor, powerless
to assert his will and anxious to secure by any means the tranquillity
to which he had long been a stranger, permitted Sindhia to assume
full control of affairs at Delhi, appointed him deputy of the Peshwa,
who was formally honoured in absentia with the title of Wakil-i-mutlak
or vice-regent of the empire, and bestowed upon him the command
of the Moghul army and the administrative charge of Agra and Delhi
provinces. In return for these official honours, which gave him
executive authority over Hindustan and a rank superior to that of
the Peshwa's other ministers, Sindhia undertook to contribute 65,000
rupees monthly towards the expenses of the imperial household, and
subsequently such additional amount as the increasing revenues of
the two provinces might justify. By the close of 1785 Sindhia had
secured the submission of Muhammad Beg and had recovered by
force of arms the Doab, Agra, and Aligarh, which had fouted the
authority of the titular emperor. In the first flush of his success and
emboldened, perhaps, by the disappearance of Warren Hastings, who
had retired from office in February, 1785, Sindhia demanded, in the
name of the Moghul, the tribute of the British provinces in Bengal.
But he met with a flat denial of the claim from Sir John Macpherson,
a
,
who endeavoured to counteract Sindhia's influence by making over-
tures through the Bombay Government to Mudaji Bhonsle, raja of
Berar, and by suggesting to Nana Phadnavis the substitution for
Sindhia of a British Resident as representative of the Company's
interests at the court of the Peshwa.
Meanwhile Nana Phadnavis, who viewed Sindhia's ascendancy
in Northern India with disfavour, had been prosecuting his designs
against Mysore, as part of his policy of recovering the territories south
of the Narbada, which once formed part of the Maratha possessions.
After issuing a formal demand upon Tipu for arrears of tribute, he
concluded a general treaty of alliance with the Nizam in July, 1784,
to which Tipu replied by overt preparations for the invasion of the
Nizam's territory south of the Krishna. Hostilities were, however,
postponed by mutual agreement, as Tipu was conscious of his own
incapacity to support a lengthy campaign and the Nizam was unable
to count for the moment on the active support of the Marathas. Nana
Phadnavis's attention was wholly engaged in countering a plot to
depose the Peshwa, Madhu Rao Narayan, in favour of Baji Rao son
of Raghunath Rao, who had died in retirement at Kopargaon on the
Godavari a few months after the Treaty of Salbai. The minister
succeeded without difficulty in quashing the movement, which had
1 Francklin, The History of the Reign of Shah-Aulum, pp. 119-37.


## p. 365 (#393) ############################################

GHULAM KADIR
365
possibly been secretly fomented by Mahadaji Sindhia, in pursuance
of his general policy of restricting Nana's influence.
'Nana Phadnavis was thus free to commence hostilities, when Tipu
made an unprovoked attack in 1785 on the desai of Nargund, and
aroused Maratha anger still further by forcibly circumcising and
otherwise maltreating many Hindu inhabitants of the districts south
of the Krishna. Believing that the Mysore troops were superior to
those of the Peshwa and the Nizam, and being doubtful of the aid of
the latter, Nana sought the help of the English, but without success; and
consequently the Maratha army, which left Poona. at the close of
1785 under the command of Hari Pant Phadke, had to depend upon
the co-operation of Tukoji Holkar and the raja of Berar, and on the
dubious assistance of the Nizam. After a series of comparatively futile
operations, which were rather more favourable to the Marathas than
to Tipu, the latter, assuming that the appointment of Charles Malet
as. Resident. at Poona and certain military preparations in Bombay
and elsewhere betokened the intention of the English to intervene,
persuaded the Marathas to conclude peace in April, 1787. By this
pact Tipu agreed to pay forty-five lakhs of rupees and to cede the
towns of Badami, Kittur, and Nargund to the Peshwa, who on his
side restored to Mysore the other districts overrun by the Maratha
forces. 1
During the progress of these events in the south, Mahadaji Sindhia
found his position in Northern India far from secure. His decision
to organise a regular standing army on the European model necessi-
tated the sequestration of many of the jagirs bestowed in the past
for military service-a course which alienated their Muhammadan
holders; while his pressing need of money obliged him to demand
a heavy tribute from the Rajput chiefs, who resisted the claim and,
aided by the disaffected Muhammadan jagirdars, drove his forces
from the gates of Jaipur. His difficulties were aggravated by the
faction in Delhi, which supported the invertebrate emperor, and by
the hostility of the Sikhs. When he finally gave battle to the united
Rajput forces, he witnessed the desertion to the enemy of a large
contingent of the. Moghul forces. under Muhammad Beg and his
nephew Ismail, and. was consequently. obliged to beat a hasty retreat
to Gwalior. His flight . emboldened a young Rohilla, Ghulam Kadir,
to renew the . claims of his father, Zabita Khan, upon the Moghul
emperor and obtain for himself the dignity of Amiru'l-umara. Having
seized Aligarh and repulsed an attack by Sindhia and a Jat army
under Lestineau 2 near Fatehpur Sikri, the Rohilla took possession of
Delhi in June, 1788, plundered the palace, and treated the wretched
Shah 'Alam, whom he blinded, and his household with barbaric
cruelty. His. crimes, however, were speedily avenged. Nana Phad-
navis, who had no wish to see a permanent diminution of Maratha
1 Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, chap. xxx
2 Compton, op. cit. p. 368.


## p.
366 (#394) ############################################

366
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
2
influence in Hindustan, dispatched reinforcements from Poona under
'Ali Bahadur and Tukoji Holkar. With these and his own battalions
under de Boigne and Appa Khande Rao, Sindhia succeeded in
recovering Delhi in 1789, and, after taking a bloody revenge upon
the usurper, reseated the blind emperor upon the throne,
These events resulted in the jagir of Ghulam Kadir, the greater
part of the Doab, and the provinces of Delhi and Agra being annexed
to the Maratha dominions; while Sindhia had leisure to organise his
army with the help of de Boigne, who ultimately commanded three
brigades of eight battalions each, equipped in European style and
composed of both Rajputs and Muhammadans, with the necessary
complement. of cavalry and artillery. With these forces Sindhia finally
defeated Ismail Beg at Patan (Rajputana) in 1790, and the Rajput
allies of that chief at Mirtha (Mairta) in Jodhpur territory in the
following year. Sindhia's supremacy in Northern India still suffered,
however, from the hostile intrigues of Holkar, who declined overtures
of conciliation and, in sympathy with the secret policy of Nana
Phadnavis, showed little inclination to assist his rival to impose his
authority upon the Sikhs and Rajputs. The veiled enmity between
the two Maratha chiefs burst into open hostilities after Ismail Beg's
submission to Perron, Sindhia's second-in-command, at Kanund
Mohendargarh. Their armies, which at the moment were jointly
devastating Rajput territory, suddenly attacked one another and
fought a battle at Lakheri (Kotah) in September, 1792, which ended
in the complete defeat of Holkar's troops under the command of a
French adventurer named Dudrenec. This success finally assured
Sindhia's predominance in Northern India.
At the close of December, 1789, war between the Company and
Mysore was precipitated by Tipu Sultan's attack upon the lines of
Travancore. Hostilities had been preceded by curious negotiations
between Lord Cornwallis and the Nizam, which resulted in the
cession to the Company of the Guntoor district and in a promise by
Cornwallis that in certain future circumstances he would sanction
the restoration to the Nizam and the Marathas of the Carnatic uplands
(balaghat), which were at that date included in the Mysore state. On
the outbreak of hostilities with Tipu, Nana Phadnavis made imme-
diate overtures to the governor-general, and in the names of both the
Peshwa and the Nizam concluded an offensive and defensive alliance
with the Company against Tipu in June, 1790. The support afforded
by ihe Marathas and the Nizam was, however, of little value, and it
was not until March, 1792, that Lord Cornwallis succeeded in forcing
Tipu to sign the Treaty of Seringapatam, which gave the Company
possessior, of districts commanding the passes to the Mysore table-land,
and handed over to the Nizam and the Marathas territory on the
north-east and north-west respectively of Tipu's possessions. This
1 Francklin, Shah-Aului, pp. 141-86; Scott, History of Dekkan, 1, 280-307.
:: Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, 1, 171-2.


## p. 367 (#395) ############################################

DEATH OF MAHADAJI
367
policy of partial annexation, in lieu of the complete subjugation of
Mysore, was forced upon Lord Cornwallis by the desire of the directors
for immediate peace, and by a disinclination to displease the Nizam
and the Marathas, neither of whom were wholly loyal to their alliance
with the Company. '
Mahadaji Sindhia had offered to join the confederacy against Tipu
on terms which the governor-general was not prepared to accept, and
he therefore seized the opportunity of this enforced neutrality to
pursue his private object of establishing his authority at the Peshwa's
capital against all rivals, including the English, and of checking
Holkar's interference with his position and plans in Hindustan. Shortly
after his defeat of Ismail Beg, he obliged Shah 'Alam to issue a fresh
patent, making the Peshwa's office of Wakil-i-mutlak, as well as his
Owl: appointment as deputy, hereditary. The delivery of the imperial
orders and insignia of office to the Peshwa gave him the desired excuse
for a personal visit to Poona, where he duly arrived with a small
military escort in June, 1792. His arrival caused great dissatisfaction
to Nana Phadnavis, who made every effort to prevent the investiture
of the Peshwa. Sindhia, however, while avoiding an open rupture
with the minister, won his object, after obtaining the formal consent
of the raja of Satara to the Peshwa's acceptance of the honour; and
then directed all his efforts towards ingratiating himself with the
young Peshwa, Madhu Rao, allaying the antipathy shown against
himself by the Brahman entourage of Nana Phadnavis and the lead-
ing Maratha jagirdars, and securing open recognition by the Poona
Government of his paramount position in Northern India. The
rivalry between Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis was, however, sum-
marily terminated by the sudden death of the former at Poona in
February, 1794, and the Brahman minister was thus left in practically
sole control of Maratha policy and affairs. A thirteen-year-old
nephew, Daulat Rao, succeeded to the possessions of Mahadaji. who
left no direct male issue 2
The constitutional position of the Maratha confederacy at this
date has been described as "a curious and baffling political puzzle".
While the powers of the raja of Satara, the nominal head of the con-
federacy, who was virtually a prisoner in his palace, had long been
usurped by the Pesława, the subordinate members of the confederacy
had thrown off all but the nominal control of the Brahman govern-
ment in Poona. Among these virtually independent leaders, who
ranked as hereditary generals of the Peshwa, was Raghuji Bhonsle,
raja of Berar, whose possessions stretched in a broad belt from his
capital Nagpur to Cuttack on the Bay of Bengal. After the death of
his father Mudaji in 1788, Raghuji and his younger brothers quarrel.
led about the succession; but the death of one of the latter and the
bestowal upon the other of the Chanda and Chattisgarh districts
1 Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, chap. xxxiv.
2 Idem, chap. xxxv.
>


## p. 368 (#396) ############################################

368
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
enabled. Raghuji: to secure public recognition of his claim: to rule
Berar, and by the date of Mahadaji Sindhia's death he was in undis-
turbed possession of his inherited fief. Holding, as he did, the
hereditary post of Sena Sahib Subah of the Maratha army, Raghuji
should have complied with the Peshwa's orders to participate in the
operations against Tipu in 1791, but on his personal representation
that the intrigues of his brother Khanduji obliged him to remain in
Nagpur, he was permitted by Nana Phadnavis to purchase exemption
from the campaign by a contribution of ten lakhs to the Maratha
war-chest. 1
Another important member of the confederacy was the Gaekwad,
whose ill-defined territories roughly included Gujarat and the
Kathiawad peninsula. The ruler, Sayaji
, being imbecile, the territory
was administered from 1771 to 1789 by his younger brother Fateh
Singh, who died in the latter year. A conflict for the regency then
ensued between his brothers Manaji Rao, whose claim was admitted
by the Peshwa, and Govind Rao, who secured the support of Mahadaji
Sindhia. In 1792, while the dispute was still undecided, the imbecile
Sayaji Rao died, and Govind Rao, who had been allowed by the
Peshwa to purchase the title Sena Khas Khel, sought the approval
of the Poona Government to his succession to the throne. His rival,
Manaji, also died in 1793; but, despite this fact, the price of his
recognition, demanded by the Peshwa, was so heavy that the British
Government was compelled to intervene, in order to prevent the dis-
memberment of Baroda territory. Eventually, in December, 1793,
,
owing to the representations of the British Resident, the Peshwa
waived his demands and assented to Govind Rao's assumption of
full authority over the state. His rule, which terminated with his
death in 1800, was disturbed by the rebellious intrigues of his
illegitimate son, Kanhoji, and by the hostility of Aba Selukar, who
had been granted by the Peshwa the revenue management of the
Ahmadabad district. After several engagements Aba was captured
and imprisoned and in 1799 the Peshwa consented to lease Ahmadabad
to the Gaekwad. ”
The territories of Holkar, which embraced the south-western part
of Malwa, were ruled at this date by the widow of Malhar Holkar,
the famous Ahalya Bai, who assumed the government as sole repre-
sentative of her husband's dynasty in 1766 and ruled with exceptional
wisdom until her death in 1795. Tukoji Holkar, who was no relation
of the reigning family, though a member of the same class, was
chosen - by Ahalya Bai to bear titular honours and command her
armies, and in that capacity. co-operated loyally with the queen and
established the first regular battalions with the help of the Chevalier
Dudrenec, the American soldier, J. P. Boyd, and others. Ahalya Bai's
i Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, chap. xxxvi.
' Idem, chap. xlii


## p. 369 (#397) ############################################

THE PIRATE STATES
369
internal administration of the state was described by Sir John Mal-
colm as "altogether wonderful". During her reign of thirty years
"
the country was free from internal disturbance and foreign attack;
Indore, the capital, grew from a village to a wealthy city; her subjects
enjoyed in full measure the blessings of righteous and beneficent
government. It is not surprising, therefore, that she was regarded by
her own subjects as an avatar or incarnation of divinity, and by an
experienced foreigner as "within her limited sphere one of the purest
and most exemplary rulers that ever existed". She was succeeded by
the aged Tukoji
, who strove to administer the state according to her
example until his death two years later (1797) at the age of seventy-
two. With his departure chaos and confusion supervened, which
lasted until the final settlement imposed by the British power in 1818. "
Among the minor figures of the Maratha confederacy were the
piratical chiefs of Western India. When Raghuji Angria, who held
Kolaba fort as a feudatory of the Peshwa, died in 1793, he was suc-
ceeded by an infant son, Manaji, who was deposed and imprisoned
four years later by Daulat Rao Sindhia. His place was usurped by
Baburao Angria, the maternal uncle of Sindhia. The Company
suffered considerable annoyance from the piratical habits of both
Angria and the Sidi or Abyssinian chief of Janjira. On the death of
Sidi Abdul Rahim in 1784, a dispute for the succession arose between
his son Abdul Karim Khan alias Balu Mian and Sidi Johar. Lord
Cornwallis, to whom the matter was referred, was at first disposed
to leave the task of settling the dispute to the Peshwa, who had
already befriended Balu Mian; but a premature attempt on the part
of the Maratha Government to seize Janjira by stealth caused him
to reconsider the matter. A compromise was not reached until 1791,
when the Peshwa, in return for the grant to Balu Mian of a tract of
land near Surat-the modern Sachin state was recognised as superior
owner of the Janjira principality. His rights over the island, how-
ever, were never acknowledged by Sidi Johar, who, repelling all
efforts to oust him, was still master of the principality at the date of
the Peshwa's downfall. The third principal instigator of piracy was
Khem Savant of Wadi, who had married a niece of Mahadaji Sindhia
and was on that account created Raja Bahadur by the Moghul
emperor in 1763. His rule, which lasted till 1803, was a tale of
continuous piracies by his seafaring subjects in Vengurla and of
conflict with the British, the Peshwa, and the raja of Kolhapur.
Eventually in 1812 the Bombay Government forced his successor to
enter into a treaty and cede the port of Vengurla. They also in the
same year obtained the cession of the port of Malwan, an equally
notorious stronghold of pirates, from the raja of Kolhapur. Owing
3
1 Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, 1, 156-95.
2 Bombay Gazetteer, XI, 157.
Idem, pp. 418-9:
4 Idem, x, 442-3.
3
24


## p. 370 (#398) ############################################

370
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
to the constant losses inflicted on British vessels, the Company had
dispatched an expedition against the raja in 1792 and forced him to
pay compensation and to permit the establishment of factories at
Malwan and Kolhapur; and during the following decade internal
dissension and wars with neighbouring territorial chiefs so weakened
the Kolhapur state that in 1812 the raja was glad to sign a permanent
treaty with the British, under the terms of which his territory was
guaranteed against foreign attack, in return for the cession of several
strong places and an undertaking to refer all disputes with other
powers to the Company's arbitration 1
Mutual distrust and selfish intrigue effectually prevented the
leaders of the Maratha confederacy from offering a united front to
their opponents, though they were not averse from temporary com-
bination for any special object which offered a chance of gratifying
their personal avarice. In 1794 the renewal by the Peshwa of Maratha
claims upon the Nizam for arrears of chauth and sardesmukhi, in
which all the chiefs expected to share, offered them an occasion for
acting in concert with the Poona Government. The Nizam, alarmed
at the imminence of the combined Maratha attack, appealed to the
governor-general, Sir John Shore, for the military assistance which
he had been led to expect, and had certainly earned, by his cession of
Guntoor. But Sir John Shore, who dreaded a war with the Maratha
confederacy, sheltered himself behind the words of the act of parlia-
ment of 1784 and declared his neutrality, leaving the Nizam to bear
the whole brunt of the Maratha attack. The issue was not long in
doubt. In March, 1795, the Nizam's army, which had been trained by
the Frenchman Raymond, was overwhelmed by the Marathas and
their Pindari followers at Kharda, fifty-six miles south-east of Ahmad-
nagar, and the Nizam was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty,
which imposed upon him heavy pecuniary damages and deprived him
of considerable territory.
This victory, coupled with the spoils distributed among the
Maratha chiefs, restored for the moment the prestige of the Peshwa's
government and placed Nana Phadnavis at the height of his power.
It was, however, the last occasion on which "the chiefs of the Mahratta
nation assembled under the authority of their Peshwa", and the
inevitable domestic dissensions, which shortly followed, resulted in
the Marathas forfeiting much of the results of their victory. The
young Peshwa, Madhu Rao Narayan, tired of the control of Nana
Phadnavis and disheartened by the latter's refusal to countenance his
friendship with his cousin Baji Rao Raghunath, committed suicide
in October, 1795, by throwing himself from the terrace of the Sanivar
Wada at Poona. Baji Rao at once determined to secure for himself.
the vacant throne, and had no sooner overcome Nana's profound and
2
1 Bombay Gazetteer, XXIV, 236.
2 Malcolm, Political History of India, 1, 127-47.


## p. 371 (#399) ############################################

CONFUSION AT POONA
371
instinctive opposition by false professions of friendship and loyalty
than he was faced with the hostility of Daulat Rao Sindhia and
another faction, bent upon opposing. Nana's plans. This faction
contrived to place Chimnaji Appa, the brother of Baji Rao, on the
throne at the end of May, 1796, whereupon Nana took refuge in the
Konkan and there matured a counter-stroke, which ended in Baji
Rao's return as Peshwa and his own restoration as chief minister in
the following December. In preparing his plans, Nana secured the
goodwill of Sindhia, Holkar, the Bhonsle raja, and the raja of Kolha-
pur, and also obtained the approval of the Nizam by promising to
restore to him the districts ceded to the Peshwa after the battle of
Kharda and to remit the balance of the fine imposed by the Marathas.
The return of Baji Rao to Poona was the signal for grave disorder,
engendered by his determination to ruin Nana, to whom he owed his
position and to rid himself of the influence of Sindhia, who had
financial claims upon him. Nana was arrested, and his house plun-
dered, by a miscreant named Sarji Rao Ghatke, father-in-law of
Sindhia, who was also given carte blanche to extort from the citizens
of Poona by atrocious torture the money which Sindhia claimed from
the Peshwa. The confusion was aggravated by open hostilities carried
on in the Peshwa's territories between Sindhia and the widows of
Mahadaji Sindhia, by the growing inefficiency of the Peshwa's army,
whose pay was seriously in arrears, and by the continuous intrigues
and counter-plotting of Baji Rao and Sindhia. The confirmation by
Baji Rao of the arrangement made between Nana and the Nizam,
which the latter demanded as the price of his assistance against
Sindhia, was immediately followed by Sindhia's release of Nana
Phadnavis, who once again acquiesced in a hollow reconciliation
with his avowed enemy and resumed his old position at Poona. '
In 1798 Lord Wellesley arrived in Calcutta, determined to shatter
for ever all possibility of French competition in India. The political
outlook was far from favourable, for, largely in consequence of Sir
John Shore's invertebrate policy of non-interference in Indian politics,
Tipu Sultan had regained his strength; French influence, supported
by troops under French commanders, had become paramount at the
courts of Sindhia and the Nizam; the raja of Berar had indulged in
intrigues against British interests; and the Carnatic was in a condition
bordering on anarchy. Wellesley's first step was to persuade the
Nizam to accept a form of "subsidiary alliance"; and he then pro-
ceeded to deal with Tipu. The Peshwa was invited to send troops in
support of the British and promised to do so; but, true to his character,
he carried on secret intrigues with Tipu up to the last and gave the
English no appreciable help. Surprised by the rapid and complete
downfall of the ruler of Mysore, he endeavoured to excuse his inacti-
vity by putting the blame upon Nana Phadnavis. The state of his
1 Grant Duff, op. cit. chaps. xxxviii-xl.
2 Malcolm, Political History of India, I, 196-236.


## p. 372 (#400) ############################################

372
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
1
own territories would have served as a more valid excuse. The
contest between Sindhia and the ladies of his family was still being
hotly pursued on both sides; the ruler of Kolhapur, a lineal descend-
ant of Sivaji, who had always been in more or less permanent
opposition to the Peshwa, was laying waste the southern Maratha
country, and was aided for a time by Chitur Singh, brother of the
raja of Satara; while, more dangerous and violent than the rest,
Jasvant Rao Holkar, who had escaped from confinement in Nagpur
during the feud of 1795 between the legitimate and natural sons of
Tukoji Rao Holkar, was carrying fire and sword through Sindhia's
territory in Malwa, with a large force composed of Indian and
Afghan freebooters,
Such was the state of affairs in March, 1800, when Nana Phadnavis
died. “With him", remarked the Resident, "has departed all the
wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government. " He had
controlled Maratha politics for the long period of thirty-eight years,
and his demise may be said to mark the commencement of the final
débâcle. Nana being beyond his reach, Baji Rao, who was the per-
sonification of treachery and cowardice, sought revenge upon Nana's
friends and agreed to support Sindhia against Holkar, in return for
a promise by Davilat Rao to assist his policy of vengeance. While
Sindhia was absent from Poona. endeavouring to protect his lands
from Holkar's devastations, Baji Rao, giving free rein to his passions,
perpetrated a series of atrocious cruelties in Poona, which alienated
his subjects and brought upon his head the impiacable wrath of the
savage Jasvant Rao. Among those whom he barbarously murdered
in 1801 was Jasvant Rao's brother, Vithuji; and it was to avenge this
crime that Jasvant Rao invaded the Deccan in the following year.
The English endeavoured to set a limit to this internecine warfare by
offering terms and treaties to both parties. But their efforts were of
no avail.
In October, 1802, Holkar defeated the combined forces of Sindhia
and the Peshwa at Poona, placed on the throne Amrit Rao, brother
by adoption of Baji Rao, and then plundered the capital. Baji Rao,
as pusillanimous as he was perfidicus, fled to Mahad in the Konkan
and thence to Bassein, whence he besought the help of the English
and placed himself unreservedly in their hands. On the last day of
the year (1802) he signed the Treat of Bassein, which purported to
be a general defensive alliance for the reciprocal protection of the
possessions of the East India Company, the Peshwa, and their respec-
tive allies. The Peshwa bound himself to maintain a subsidiary
force of not less than six battalions, to be stationed within his do-
minions; to exclude from his service all Europeans of nations hostile
to the English; to relinquish all claims on Surat; to recognise the
engagements between the Gaekwad and the British; to abstain from
1 Malcolm, Central India, I, 107-225


## p. 373 (#401) ############################################

TREATY OF BASSEIN
373
hostilities or negotiations with other states, unless in consultation
with the English Government; and to accept the arbitration of the
British' in disputes with the Nizam or the Gaekwad. Having thus
persuaded Baji Rao to sacrifice his independence, the Company lost
no time in restoring him to the throne. By a series of rapid forced
marches, General Arthur Wellesley saved Poona from destruction,
obliged Holkar to retire to Malwa, and reinstalled the Peshwa in
May, 1803.
The Treaty of Bassein gave the Company the supremacy of the
Deccan. Although it was regarded askance by some authorities in
England and by the directors, as likely to involve the government in
the "endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Maratha
empire", it entirely forestalled for the moment a combination of the
Maratha states against the Company, and by placing the Peshwa's
foreign policy under control, it made the governor-general really
responsible for every war in India in which the Poona Government
might be engaged. In short, "the Treaty by its direct and indirect
operations gave the Company the empire of India”, in contra-
distinction to the British Empire in India, which had hitherto existed.
On the other hand, while the support and protection of the English
power saved the Peshwa from becoming the puppet of one of the
other Maratha leaders, they'averted the fear of a popular rebellion,
which alone restrains an unprincipled despot from gratifying his evil
passions, and inevitably inclined his mind to substitute intrigue
against his foreign defenders for the military excursions which had
formed the principal activity of the Marathà state since the
seventeenth century. The period of fifteen years between Baji Rao's
restoration and his final surrender is a continuous story of oppressive
maladministration and of shameless plotting against the British
power in India.
The other Maratha leaders regarded Baji Rao's assent to the treaty
with open alarm and anger. Jasvant Rao Holkar declared that the
Peshwa had sold the Maratha power to the English; Sindhia and the
raja of Berar, who disliked particularly the provisions regarding
British arbitration in disputes between the Peshwa and other Indian
rulers, realised that at last they were face to face with the British
power, and that Wellesley's system of subsidiary alliances would
reduce them to impotence as surely as the Maratha claim to chauth
had ruined the Moghul power. With the secret approval of the
Peshwa, the leading Marathas, therefore, addressed themselves to the
problem of a joint plan of defence. But a general combination was
frustrated by the neutrality of the Gaekwad and the withdrawal of
Holkar to Malwa. Sindhia and the raja of Berar, who had crossed
the Narbada with obviously hostile intent, were requested by the
English to separate their forces and recross the river; and on their
refusal to comply, war was declared in August, 1803, with the avowed
object of conquering Sindhia's territory between the Ganges and


## p. 374 (#402) ############################################

374
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
Jumna, destroying the French force which protected Sindhia's frontier,
capturing Delhi and Agra, and acquiring Bundelkhand, Cuttack and
Broach. General Wellesley and General Lake commanded the two
major operations in the Deccan and Hindustan respectively, while
subsidiary campaigns were planned in Bundelkhand and Orissa, in
crder to secure the southern frontier of Hindustan and the districts
lying between the boundaries of Bengal and Madras.
The operations were speedily successful. Wellesley captured
Ahmadnagar in August, 1803, broke the combined armies of Sindhia
and the Bhonsle raja at Assaye in September, and then, after forcing
on Sindhia a temporary suspension of hostilities, defeated the raja
decisely at Argaon in November, stormed the strong fortress of
Gawilgarh, and thus forced the raja to sign the Treaty of Deogaon,
15 December, under the terms of which the latter ceded Cuttack to
his conquerors and accepted a position similar to that assigned to the
Peshwa by the Treaty of Bassein. Equally decisive were the results
achieved by Lake. Marching from Cawnpore, he captured Aligarh
at the end of August, causing Perron to retire in dejection from
Sindhia's service. He then defeated Perron's successor, Louis Bour-
quin, at Delhi in September; took possession of the old blind emperor,
Shah 'Alam; made a treaty with the raja of Bharatpur; and finally in
November vanquished Sindhia's remaining forces at Laswari in
Alwar state. Sindhia was thus rendered impotent; his regular troops,
commanded by French officers, were destroyed; and he was conse-
quently obliged to accept a "subsidiary alliance" and sign the Treaty
of Surji Arjungaon, 30 December, 1803. In the course of the subsi-
diary campaign, Broach was captured and all Sindhia's territories
annexed. Thus within five months the most powerful heads of the
"
Maratha confederacy had been reduced to comparative harmlessness.
Holkar alone remained unpacified. At the end of 1803 Lord Lake
opened negotiations with him without avail; and on his preferring
extravagant demands and plundering the territory of the raja of
Jaipur, war was declared against him in April, 1804. With Lake
operating in Hindustan, Wellesley advancing from the Deccan, and
Murray marching from Gujarat, it was hoped to hem in the Maratha
chief. But the plan miscarried, owing to the failure of Colonel Murray
and Colonel Monson, who was acting under Lord Lake, to carry out
their instructions. Monson, who according to Wellesley "advanced
without reason and retreated in the same manner", allowed himself
to be overwhelmed by Holkar in the Mukund Dara pass, thirty miles
south of Kotah, and beat a disorderly retreat to Agra at the end of
August. This disaster gave fresh courage to the Company's enemies.
Sindhia showed a disposition to fight again, and the Jat raja of
Bharatpur, renouncing his alliance with the English, joined with
Holkar in an attack on Delhi, which was successfully repulsed by
1 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, v, 1-69.


## p. 375 (#403) ############################################

WELLESLEY RECALLED
376
1
Ochterlony. In November one of Holkar's armies was defeated at
Dig, and another, led by Holkar himself, was routed by Lake a few
days later at Farrukhabad. The most serious reverse suffered by the
English was Lake's failure to capture Bharatpur early in 1805. He
was eventually obliged to make peace with the raja in April of that
year, leaving him in possession of the fortress, which had repulsed
four violent assaults by the Company's troops.
Monson's disaster and Lake's failure before Bharatpur caused
grave apprehension to the authorities in England, who had watched
the Company's debt increase rapidly under the strain of Wellesley's
forward policy, and were disposed to think that England's conquests
were becoming too large for profitable management. As a necessary
preliminary to a change of policy, they determined to recall the
governor-general and to entrust the task of making peace with the
arid Indian powers to Lord Cornwallis, now in his sixty-seventh
year and physically infirm. They failed to realise that, despite the
misfortune of Monson, Wellesley's operations had actually broken
Holkar's power and had left no single Maratha chief strong enough
to withstand the English. Moreover, as the resentment felt by every
Maratha chief towards the English at this juncture was too deep to
be assuaged by a policy of concession and forbearance, the abandon-
ment of Wellesley's programme merely amcunted to a postponement
of the final hour of reckoning. The peace concluded with the Marathas
in 1805 was unfortunately marked by a spirit of weak conciliation,
which caused future embarrassment to the Company's government
in India, handed over weak states like Jaipur, which relied on British
support, to the mercy of their rapacious neighbours, and ultimately
forced the Marquess of Hastings thirteen years later to consummate
the task which Wellesley was forbidden by the timidity of the ruling
party at the India House to bring to a successful conclusion. The
arrangements made by Lord Cornwallis and his successor, Sir George
Barlow, amounted practically to a renunciation of most of the Com-
pany's gains for the sake of a hollow peace and to the abandonment
of the Rajput states to the cruelty of the Maratha hordes and their
Pindari allies. Sindhia recovered Gohad, Gwalior, and other territory,
while to Holkar were restored the districts of Rajputana, which had
been taken from him by the Treaty of Rajpurghat. In two instances
only did Sir G. Barlow refuse to traverse Wellesley's policy. He
declined to allow the Nizam freedom to indulge in anti-English
intrigue, and he rejected a suggestion from England to modify the
position of the Peshwa under the Treaty of Bassein.
The Gaekwad of Baroda had taken no part in the struggle outlined
above. On the death of Govind Rao in 1800, the inevitable feud
about the succession broke out between Anand Rao, his legal suc-
cessor, who was of weak mind, and his illegitimate brother Kanhoji,
1 Fortescue, op. cit. V, 70-137.


## p. 376 (#404) ############################################

376
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
who was supported by the restless Malhar Rao. In 1802 the Company
sent a force from Cambay to support. Anand Rao, and in return
secured the cession of a good deal of territory and an acknowledgment
of their right to supervise the political affairs of the state. A little
later they frustrated an attempt by Sindhia and Holkar to meddle
with the Gaekwad's rights in Gujarat, and in April, 1805, concluded
a treaty whereby the Gaekwad undertook to maintain a subsidiary
force and to submit to British control his foreign policy and his
differences with the Peshwa. In 1804 the Peshwa renewed the lease
of Ahmadabad territory to Baroda for four and a half years at a rent
of ten lakhs per annum.
The decade following the hollow peace of 1805 was marked by
increasing disorder and anarchy throughout Central India and
Rajputana. Internal maladministration and constant internecine
warfare had produced the inevitable result, and the leading Maratha
states were forced to try and avert their impending bankruptcy by
means of contributions extorted from reluctant tributaries. In Holkar's
territories the peaceful progress, which had marked Ahalya Bai's wise
rule, had vanished beyond recall. In 1806 Jasvant Rao poisoned his
nephew Khande Rao and his brother Kashi Rao, who were suspected
of intriguing with his disaffected soldiery, and died a raving lunatic
at Bhanpura in 1811. His favourite concubine, Tulsi Bai, contrived
to place his illegitimate son, Malhar Rao, on the throne, with Amir
Khan, the leader of the Pathan banditti, as regent. Acute friction
between this Pathan element and the Maratha faction under Tulsi
Bai involved the state in chaos; revenue was collected at the sword's
point from the territory of Sindhia, the Ponwars, and Holkar himself
indiscriminately; the machinery of administration fell to pieces; and
a semblance of authority only remained with a vagrant and predatory
court, dominated by the profligate ex-concubine. The country had
no respite from disorder, until the murder of Tulsi Bai by a Pathan,
20 December, 1817, and the failure of British overtures for peace
obliged Sir Thomas Hislop to ford the Sipra river and extinguish at
Mahidpur the last embers of anarchy and hostility.
Sindhia's dominions were in no better plight. His troops, in default
of pay, were forced to subsist on the peasantry, who were already
impoverished by the mutual hostilities of their own ruler and Holkar.
The intermingled possessions of these two chiefs in Malwa became
the common hunting-ground of every band of marauders; Amir Khan
and his Pathan followers overran the raja of Berar's territory; the
Rajput states were swept by Sindhia, Holkar, the Pathans and the
Pindaris.
“Never”, in the words of a modern writer, "had there been such intense
and general suffering in India; the native states were disorganised, and society
on the verge of dissolution; the people crushed by despots and ruined by
1 Malcolm, Central India, I, 260-324.


## p. 377 (#405) ############################################

THE PINDARIS
377
Exactions; the country overrun by bandits and its resources wasted by enemies;
armed forces existed only to plunder, torture and mutiny; government had
ceased to exist; there remained only oppression and misery. "
The one sentiment uniting the warring units was hatred of the
English. All the Marathas, from the Peshwa downwards, realised
that if they were to regain their independence and make their preda-
tory power supreme in India, they must exterminate the foreign
government. It was to Baji Rao they all looked for support in this
desperate and ill-omened enterprise; and had the Peshwa shown any
spark of courage and statesmanship, the final struggle of the Company
for complete supremacy might conceivably have been more protracted.
But, while from 1803 the Peshwa never ceased to court disaster by
intriguing against his foreign supporters, he alienated the Maratha
feudal nobility by his tyrannous behaviour, as illustrated by the over-
throw and degradation of the Pant Pratinidhi. He also failed com-
pletely to protect his own territory from Pindari inroads and to check
the hostilities of the raja of Kolhapur and the Savant of Wadi. In the
case of the former, peace was not assured until 1811, when the English
forced the raja to sign the Treaty of Karvir.
The hesitation of the Company's government to assert its authority
as paramount power resulted between 1805 and 1814 in the rapid
growth of the destructive spirit of the Maratha hordes and Pathan
freebooters and a dangerous increase of the power of the Pindaris,
who were closely related to the two former organisations. The
Pindaris, consisting of lawless persons of all castes and classes,
originally attached loosely to the Maratha armies, developed, “like
masses of putrefaction in animal matter out of the corruption of weak
and expiring states", into a formidable menace to the whole of India.
Under their leaders, Chitu, Wasil Muhammad, and Karim Khan,
they made rapid raids across India, inflicting appalling devastation
upon the countryside and cominitting most atrocious outrages upon
all classes of the inhabitants. In 1812 they commenced to raid the
Company's territory by harrying Mirzapur and the southern districts
of Bihar; but it was not until 1816, when they attacked the Northern
Sarkars, plundering, torturing and killing the peaceful inhabitants,
that the directors in England, who still cherished an exaggerated
dread of Maratha power, became alive to the need for action and
authorised Lord Hastings in September of that year to extirpate the
cvil.
The Pindaris would have met their doom much earlier but that
the governor-general had been obliged to postpone his measures for a
while. A new power had been founded in the Himalayan regions by
the Gurkhas, a warlike race of hardy hillmen.