No More Learning

Then, we mistake this mental or subjective connec-
tion for an objective connection. Necessary connection is not in
the objects, but only in the mind; yet custom is too strong for us,
and we attribute it to the objects.
This is a simple statement of the central argument of Hume's
most famous discussion. The 'powers' which Locke attributed to
bodies must be denied—as Berkeley denied them. The conscious-
ness of spiritual activity on which Berkeley relied is equally illusory
on Hume's principles.
'If we reason a priori,' says Hume, 'anything may appear able to produce
anything. The falling of a peeble may, for aught we know, extinguish the
sun, or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. '
This striking utterance is, strictly, little better than a truism. No
philosopher ever supposed that such knowledge about definite
objects could be got in any other way than by experience. But
Hume's negative criticism goes much deeper than this. We have
no right to say that the extinction of the sun needs any cause at
all, or that causation is a principle that holds of objects; all events
are loose and separate. The only connection which we have a
right to assert is that of an idea with an impression or with other
ideas—the subjective routine which is called 'association of ideas. '
Hume's constructive theory of causation is an explanation of how
we come to suppose that there is causal connection in the world,
although there is really nothing more than customary association
in our minds.
If we admit Hume's fundamental assumption about impressions
and ideas, it is impossible to deny the general validity of this
reasoning. Any assertion of a causal connection—the whole struc-
ture of natural science, therefore—is simply a misinterpretation of
certain mental processes. At the outset, Hume himself had spoken
of impressions as arising from unknown causes'; and some expres-
sions of the sort were necessary to give his theory a start and to
carry the reader along with him; but they are really empty words.
Experience is confined to impressions and ideas; causation is an
attitude towards them produced by custom-by the mode of
sequence of ideas; its applicability is only within the range of
impressions or ideas; to talk of an impression as caused by
something that is neither impression nor idea may have a very
6


## p. 330 (#356) ############################################

330
Philosophers
real meaning to any philosopher except Hume; but to Hume it
cannot have any meaning at all.
The discussion of causation brings out another and still more
general doctrine held by Hume-his theory of belief. When I say
that flame causes heat, I do not refer to a connection of ideas in
my own mind; I am expressing belief in an objective connection
independent of my mental processes. But Hume's theory of
causation reduces the connection to a subjective routine. Now,
some other impression than 'flame' might precede the idea of
heat-the impression cold,' for instance. How is it, then, that I
—“
do not assert 'cold causes heat'? The sequence 'cold-heat' may
be equally real in my mind with the sequence ‘flame-heat. ' How
is it that the former does not give rise to belief in the way that
the latter does ? Hume would say that the only difference is that
the association in the former case is less direct and constant than
in the latter, and thus leads to an idea of less force and liveliness.
Belief, accordingly, is simply a lively idea associated with a present
impression. It belongs to the sensitive, not to the rational, part
of our nature. And yet it marks the fundamental distinction
between judgment and imagination.
In the Treatise, at any rate, there is no faltering of purpose or
weakening of power when the author proceeds to apply his prin-
ciples to the fabric of knowledge. It is impossible, in this place,
to follow his subtle and comprehensive argument; but its issue is
plain. With objections not unlike Berkeley's, he dismisses the
independent existence of bodies, and then he turns a similar
train of reasoning against the reality of the self:
When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or
hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my
perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I
insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.
According to Hume's own illustration, the mind is but the stage on
which perceptions pass and mingle and glide away. Or, rather,
there is no stage at all, but only a phantasmagory of impressions
and ideas.
Hume's purpose was constructive; but the issue, as he faces it,
is sceptical. And he is a genuine sceptic; for, even as to his
scepticism, he is not dogmatic. Why should he assent to his own
reasoning ? he asks; and he answers, 'I can give no reason why
I should assent to it, and feel nothing but a strong propensity to
consider objects strongly in that view. The propensity, however,


## p. 331 (#357) ############################################

Hume's Scepticism
331
is strong only when the 'bent of mind' is in a certain direction; a
dinner, a game of backgammon, makes such speculations appear
ridiculous; and 'nature' suffices to 'obliterate all these chimeras. '
A year later, Hume referred again to this sceptical impasse, in an
appendix to the third volume of his Treatise; and there, with
remarkable insight, he diagnosed the causes of his own failure.
The passage deserves quotation, seeing that it has been often
overlooked, and is, nevertheless, one of the most significant utter-
ances in the history of philosophy.
In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it
in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions
are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion
among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something
simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among
them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead
the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my
understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insu-
perable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflexions, may
discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions.
Hume seems himself to have made no further attempt to solve the
problem. His followers have been content to build their systems
on his foundation, with minor improvements of their own, but
without overcoming or facing the fundamental difficulty which he
saw and expressed.
The logical result of his analysis is far from leading to that
'complete system of the sciences' which he had anticipated from
his 'new medium'; it leads, not to reconstruction, but to a sceptical
disintegration of knowledge; and he was clearsighted enough to
see this result. Thenceforward, scepticism became the characteristic
attitude of his mind and of his writings. But his later works ex-
hibit a less thorough scepticism than that to which his thinking
led. Even his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding shows
a weakening of the sceptical attitude, in the direction of a ‘miti-
gated scepticism' which resembles modern positivism and admits
knowledge of phenomena and of mathematical relations.
When he came to deal with concrete problems, his principles
were often applied in an emasculated form. But the 'new medium'
is not altogether discarded : appeal is constantly made to the
mental factor-impression and idea. This is characteristic of
Hume's doctrine of morality. 'Here is a matter of fact; but
'tis the object of feeling not of reason. It lies in yourself not
in the object. ' And from this results his famous definition of
virtue: 'every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous which
gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality which produces
6
>


## p. 332 (#358) ############################################

332
Philosophers
pain is called vicious. ' The 'sentiments of approbation or blame'
which thus arise depend, in all cases, on sympathy; sympathy
with the pleasures and pains of others is, thus, postulated by Hume
as an ultimate fact; the reasonings of Butler and Hutcheson pre-
vented him from seeking to account for it as a refined form of
selfishness, as Hobbes had done ; and yet, upon his own premises,
it remains inexplicable. In his Enquiry concerning the Principles
of Morals, bis differences from Hobbes, and even from Locke, are
still more clearly shown than in the Treatise; he defends the reality
of disinterested benevolence; and the sentiment of moral appro-
bation is described as “humanity,' or 'a feeling for the happiness
of mankind,' which, it is said, 'nature has made universal in the
species. ' This sentiment, again, is always directed towards qualities
which tend to the pleasure, immediate or remote, of the person
observed or of others. Thus, Hume occupies a place in the
utilitarian succession ; but he did not formulate a quantitative
utilitarianism, as Hutcheson had already done. He drew an
important distinction, however, between natural virtues, such as
benevolence, which are immediately approved and which have a
direct tendency to produce pleasure, and artificial virtues, of
which justice is the type, where both the approval and the
tendency to pleasure are mediated by the social system which
the virtue in question supports.
Hume exerted a profound influence upon theology, not only
by the general trend of his speculation but, also, through certain
specific writings. Of these writings, the most important are the
essay 'Of Miracles' contained in An Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding, the dissertation entitled “The Natural History
of Religion,' and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The
first-named is the most famous; it produced a crowd of answers,
and it had a good deal to do with public attention being attracted
to the author's works. It consists of an expansion of a simple
and ingenious argument, which had occurred to him when writing
his Treatise of Human Nature, but which, strangely enough, is
inconsistent with the principles of that work. It regards 'laws
of nature'as established by a uniform experience, 'miracles' as
violations of these laws and the evidence for these miracles as
necessarily inferior to the ‘testimony of the senses' which establishes
the laws of nature. Whatever validity these positions may have
on another philosophical theory, the meaning both of laws of
nature and of miracles as conflicting with these laws evaporates
under the analysis by which, as in Hume's Treatise, all events are
6


## p. 333 (#359) ############################################

6
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 333
seen as 'loose and separate. ' "The Natural History of Religion'
contains reflections of greater significance. Here, Hume distin-
guishes between the theoretical argument which leads to theism
and the actual mental processes from which religion has arisen.
Its 'foundation in reason' is not the same thing as its origin in
human nature’; and he made an important step in advance by
isolating this latter question and treating it apart. He held that
religion arose from a concern with regard to the events of life, and
from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind,'
and, in particular, from the 'melancholy' rather than from the
'agreeable' passions; and he maintained the thesis that polytheism
preceded theism in the historical development of belief.
*The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. '
Such is the concluding reflection of this work. But a further
and serious attempt to solve the riddle is made in Dialogues
concerning Natural Religion. This small book contains the
author's mature views on ultimate questions. It is written in his
most perfect style, and shows his mastery of the dialogue form.
There is none of the usual scenery of the dramatic dialogue; but
the persons are distinct, the reasoning is lucid, and the interest is
sustained to the end. The traditional arguments are examined
with an insight and directness which were only equalled afterwards
by Kant; but, unlike Kant, and with insight more direct if not
more profound, Hume finds the most serious difficulties of the
question in the realm of morals. The form of the work makes it
not altogether easy to interpret; and some commentators have
held that Hume's own views should not be identified with those of
the more extreme critic of theism. Hume himself says as much
at the close of the work; but his habitual irony in referring to
religious topics is part of the difficulty of interpretation. All the
speakers in the Dialogues are represented as accepting some kind
of theistic belief; and it is not necessary to attribute expressions
of this kind simply to irony. The trend of the argument is towards
a shadowy form of theism—that the cause or causes of order
in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human
intelligence'; and, in a remarkable footnote, the author seems to
be justifying his own right to take up such a position:
No philosophical Dogmatist depies, that there are difficulties both with
regard to the senses and to all science; and that these difficulties are in a
regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Sceptic denies, that we lie
under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking,
and believing, and reasoning with regard to all kind of subjects, and even
of frequently assenting with confidence and security.


## p. 334 (#360) ############################################

334
Philosophers
>
6
In other words, his logic leads to complete scepticism; but, just
because the difficulties are insoluble, he claims a right to dis-
regard them, and to act and think like other men, when action
and thought are called for.
For this reason, his theory of knowledge has little effect upon
bis political and economical essays, although they are closely
connected with his ethical and psychological views. The separate
essays were published, in various volumes, between 1741 and 1777 ;
and, in the interval, political philosophy was profoundly influenced
by the works of Montesquieu and Rousseau. The essays do not
make a system, and economics is in them not definitely distinguished
from politics; but both system and the distinction are suggested in
the remarks on the value of general principles and general reason-
ings which he prefixed to the essays on commerce, money and other
economical subjects. “When we reason upon general subjects, '
he says, 'our speculations can scarcely ever be too fine, provided
they be just. '
In both groups of essays, Hume was not merely a keen critic of
prevailing theories and conceptions; his knowledge of human nature
and of history guided his analysis of a situation. A growing clearness
of doctrine, also, may be detected by comparing his earlier with
his later utterances. In later editions, he modified his acceptance
of the traditional doctrines of the natural equality of men, and of
consent as the origin of society. The essay 'Of the Origin of
Government,' first published in 1777, makes no mention either
of divine right or of original contract. Society is traced to its
origin in the family; and political society is said to have been
established ‘in order to administer justice'-though its actual
beginnings are sought in the concert and order forced upon men
by war. Again, whereas, in an earlier essay, he had said that 'a
constitution is only so far good as it provides a remedy against
maladministration,' he came, later, to look upon its tendency to
liberty as marking the perfection of civil society-although there
must always be a struggle between liberty and the authority
without which government could not be conducted. His political
thinking, accordingly, tends to limit the range of legitimate govern-
mental activity ; similarly, in economics, he criticises the doctrine
of the mercantilists, and on various points anticipates the views
of the analytical economists of a later generation. Perhaps, how-
ever, nothing in these essays shows better his insight into the
principles of economics than the letter which, shortly before his
death, he wrote to Adam Smith upon receipt of a copy of The


## p. 335 (#361) ############################################

Adam Smith
335
Wealth of Nations. In this letter, after a warm expression on
praise for, and satisfaction with, his friend's achievement, he
makes a single criticism-'I cannot think that the rent of farms
makes any part of the price of the produce, but that the price is
determined altogether by the quantity and the demand'—which
suggests that he himself had arrived at the theory of rent commonly
associated with the name of Ricardo.
sinni
: : :
al
II. ADAM SMITH
Adam Smith was born at Kirkcaldy on 5 June 1723. He was
educated at the university of Glasgow, where he had Hutcheson as
one of his teachers, and, in 1740, he proceeded to Oxford, where he
resided continuously through term and vacation for more than
six years. Like Hobbes in the previous century, and Gibbon and
Bentham shortly after his own day, he has nothing that is good to
say of the studies of the university. His own college of Balliol
gave small promise of its future fame: it was, then, chiefly distin-
guished as a centre of Jacobitism, and its authorities confiscated
his copy of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature; but its excellent
library enabled him to devote himself to assiduous study, mainly in
Greek and Latin literature. After some years spent at home, he
returned to Glasgow as professor of logic (1751) and, afterwards,
(1752) of moral philosophy. In 1759, he published his Theory of
Moral Sentiments, which brought him immediate fame. Early in
1764, he resigned his professorship in order to accompany the young
duke of Buccleuch on a visit to France which lasted over two years.
This marks the beginning of the second and more famous period of
his literary career. He found Toulouse (where they first settled)
much less gay than Glasgow, and, therefore, started writing a book
'in order to pass away the time. This is probably the first refer-
ence to the great work of his riper years. But it does not mark
the beginning of his interest in economics. By tradition and by
his own preference, a comprehensive treatment of social philo-
sophy was included in the work of the moral philosophy chair at
Glasgow; and there is evidence to show that some of his most
characteristic views had been written down even before he settled
there? . When, in 1765—6, Smith resided for many months in Paris
with his pupil, he was received into the remarkable society of
i Cf. Rae, J. , Life of Adam Smith, p. 179.
2 Cf. Stewart, Dugald, Life and Writings of Adam Smith in Works, vol. 1,
pp. 67, 68.


## p. 336 (#362) ############################################

336
Philosophers
'economists' (commonly known as the 'physiocrats? '). Quesnay,
the leader of the school, had published his Maximes générales
de gouvernement économique and his Tableau économique in 1758;
and Turgot, who was soon to make an effort to introduce their
common principles into the national finance, was, at this time, writing
his Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses,
although it was not published till some years later. Smith held
the work of the physiocrats, and of Quesnay in particular, in high
esteem; only death robbed Quesnay of the honour of having The
Wealth of Nations dedicated to him. The exact extent of Smith's
indebtedness to the school is matter of controversy. But, two things
seem clear, though they have been sometimes overlooked. He
shared their objection to mercantilism and their approval of com-
mercial freedom on grounds at which he had arrived before their
works were published; and he did not accept their special theory
that agriculture is the sole source of wealth, or the practical con-
sequence which they drew from the principle that the revenue of
the state should be derived from a single tax' on land. After his
return from France, Smith settled down quietly with his mother
and cousin at Kirkcaldy and devoted himself to the composition
of The Wealth of Nations, which was published in 1776. In 1778,
he removed to Edinburgh as commissioner of customs; he died on
17 July 1790.
Apart from some minor writings, Adam Smith was the author
of two works of unequal importance. These two works belong to
different periods of his life—the professorial, in which he is looked
upon as leading the ordinary secluded life of a scholar, and the
later period, in which he had gathered wider knowledge of men
and affairs. And the two works differ in the general impression
which they are apt to produce. According to the earlier, sympathy,
or social feeling, is the foundation of morality; the ideal of the
later work is that of a social system in which each person is left
free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and the author
throws gentle ridicule upon the 'affectation' of 'trading for the
public benefit. ' Undue stress has, however, been laid upon the
difference; it is superficial rather than fundamental, and results
from the diversity of subject and method in the two works rather
than from an opposition between their underlying ideas. Indeed,
it may be argued that the social factor in the individual, which
is brought out in the ethical treatise, is a necessary condition of
i This term was invented by Dupont de Nemours (1739—1817), a younger member
of the school.


## p. 337 (#363) ############################################

a
The Theory of Moral Sentiments 337
that view of a harmony between public and private interests
which underlies the doctrine of 'natural liberty' taught in The
Wealth of Nations.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments covers much ground already
traversed by preceding British moralists. It is an elaborate analysis
of the various forms and objects of the moral consciousness. It is
written in a flowing and eloquent, if rather diffuse, style; it is full
of apt illustration, and the whole treatise is dominated by a leading
idea. Smith's central problem, like that of his predecessors, is to
explain the fact of moral approval and disapproval. He discards
the doctrine of a special “moral sense,' impervious to analysis, which
had been put forward by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Like Hume,
he regards sympathy as the fundamental fact of the moral con-
sciousness; and he seeks to show, more exactly than Hume had
done, how sympathy can become a test of morality. He sees that
it is not, of itself, a sufficient test. A spectator may imaginatively
enter into the emotional attitude of another man, and this is
sympathy; but it is not a justification of the man's attitude. The
spectator may have misunderstood the circumstances, or his own
interests may have been involved. Accordingly, the only sympathy
that has ethical value is that of an 'impartial and well-informed
spectator. ' But this impartial and well-informed spectator, whose
sympathy with our passions and affections would be their adequate
justification, is not an actual but an ideal person ; and, indeed,
Smith recognises as much when he says that we have to appeal
from the opinions of mankind' to 'the tribunal of (our) own
conscience'-to the man within the breast. The great merit
'
of the theory, as worked out by Smith, is its recognition of the
importance of the social factor in morality, and of sympathy as the
means by which this social factor operates. The individual man, in
his view, is a being of social structure and tendencies. But the
social side of his nature is not exaggerated: if man 'can subsist
only in society, it is equally true that 'every man is by nature
first and principally recommended to his own care. ' These points
modify the contrast between the teaching of his first work and the
individualism' of his economic theory.
Adam Smith is frequently spoken of as the founder of political
economy. By this is meant that he was the first to isolate economic
facts, to treat them as a whole, and to treat them scientifically.
But, nine years before the publication of The Wealth of Nations,
another work appeared which may be regarded as having antici-
pated it in this respect-Sir James Steuart's Inquiry into the
22
6
6
E. L. X.
CH. XIV.


## p. 338 (#364) ############################################

338
Philosophers
Principles of Political Economy, Steuart was a Jacobite laird,
who, in 1763, returned from a long exile abroad. He had travelled
extensively, and his work contains the result of observation of
different states of society as well as of systematic reflection ; but
it is without merit in respect of literary form. It is presented to
the public as 'an attempt towards reducing to principles, and
forming into a regular science, the complicated interests of
domestic policy. ' It deals with 'population, agriculture, trade,
industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange,
public credit, and taxes'; and the author has a definite view of
scientific method. He speaks, indeed, of 'the art of political
economy,' using the term “political economy' in much the same
sense as that in which Smith used it in dealing with 'systems of
political economy' in the fourth book of his great work. But this
art is the statesman's business; and behind the statesman stands
'the speculative person, who, removed from the practice, extracts the
principles of this science from observation and reflection. Steuart
does not pretend to a system, but only to 'a clear deduction of
principles. ' These principles, however, are themselves gathered
from experience. His first chapter opens with the assertion, 'Man
we find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all
climates, from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty and
passion. ' And, of these, “the ruling principle' which he follows is
'the principle of self-interest. ' From this point, the author's
method may be described as deductive, and as resembling that
of Smith's successors more than it does Smith's own. Further, he
recognises that the conclusions, like the principles from which they
proceed, are abstract and may not fit all kinds of social conditions,
so that the political economy in each [country] must necessarily
be different. How far Smith took account of Steuart's reasonings
we cannot say; he does not mention his name: though he is
reported to have said that he understood Steuart's system better
from his talk than from his book.
Adam Smith does not begin with a discourse on method; he
was an artist in exposition; and he feared, perhaps unduly, any
appearance of pedantry. He plunges at once into his subject :
"The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally
supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which
it annually consumes. ' These first words suggest the prevailing
theme. Wealth consists not in the precious metals, but in the
goods which men use or consume; and its source or cause is
labour. On this foundation, he builds the structure of his science;
6
6
6


## p. 339 (#365) ############################################

The Wealth of Nations
339
and—although he says nothing about it—we can trace the method
which he regarded as appropriate to his enquiry. It may be
described shortly as abstract reasoning checked and reinforced
by historical investigation. The main theorems of the analytical
economics of a later period are to be found expressed or suggested
in his work; but almost every deduction is supported by concrete
instances. Rival schools have, thus, regarded him as their founder,
and are witnesses to his grasp of principles and insight into facts.
He could isolate a cause and follow out its effects; and, if he was
apt sometimes to exaggerate its prominence in the complex of
human motives and social conditions, it was because the facts at
his disposal did not suggest the necessary qualifications of his
doctrine, although more recent experience has shown that the
qualifications are needed.
Adam Smith isolates the fact of wealth and makes it the
subject of a science. But he sees this fact in its connections
with life as a whole. His reasonings are grounded in a view of
human nature and its environment, both of which meet in labour,
the source of wealth and also, as he thinks, the ultimate standard
of the value of commodities. In the division of labour, he sees the
first step taken by man in industrial progress. His treatment of
this subject has become classical, and is too well known for quota-
tion; it is more to the purpose to point out that it was an
unerring instinct for essentials which led him, in his first chapter,
to fix attention on a point so obvious that it might easily have
been overlooked and yet of far-reaching importance in social
development generally. The division of labour, according to
Smith, is the result of the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another. ' But his analysis of motives
goes deeper than this; and, so far as they are concerned with
wealth, human motives seem to be reduced by him to two: 'the
passion for present enjoyment' which 'prompts to expense,' and
'the desire of bettering our condition’ which 'prompts to save.
'
Both are selfish; and it is on this motive of self-interest, or a view
of one's own advantage, that Smith constantly relies. He con-
structs an economic commonwealth which consists of a multitude
of persons, each seeking his own interest and, in so doing, un-
wittingly furthering the public good—thus promoting an end
which was no part of his intention. '
• The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition,' he says,
•when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a
principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of
1
6
22-2


## p. 340 (#366) ############################################

340
Philosophers
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a
hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too
often encumbers its operations. '
6
Smith, like many other philosophers of the time, assumed that
there was a natural identity of public and private interest. It is
a comfortable belief that society would be served best if everybody
looked after his own interests; and, in an economist, this belief was,
perhaps, an inevitable reaction from a condition in which state regu-
lation of industry had largely consisted in distributing monopolies
and other privileges. In Smith's mind, the belief was also bound
up with the view that this identity of interests resulted from the
guidance of the invisible hand' that directs the fate of mankind.
But the belief itself was incapable of verification, and subsequent
industrial history refutes it. Indeed, in various places in his work,
Smith himself declines to be bound by it. He thinks that the
interests of the landowners and of the working class are in
close agreement with the interest of society, but that those of
'merchants and master manufacturers' have not the same connec-
tion with the public interest. 'The interest of the dealers,' he
says, “is always in some respects different from, and even opposite
to, that of the public. The harmony of interests, therefore, is
incomplete. Nor would it be fair to say that Smith had
relinquished, in The Wealth of Nations, his earlier view of the
social factor in human motive. What he did hold was, rather,
that, in the pursuit of wealth, that is to say, in industry and
commerce, the motive of self-interest predominates; in famous
passages, he speaks as if no other motive need be taken into
account; but he recognises its varying strength; and it is only
in the class of 'merchants and master manufacturers' that he
regards it as having free course: they are acute in the perception
of their own interest and unresting in its pursuit; in the country
gentleman, on the other hand, selfish interest is tempered by
generosity and weakened by indolence.
From the nature of man and the environment in which he is
placed, Smith derives his doctrine of the natural progress of
opulence. ' Subsistence is ‘prior to conveniency and luxury’;
agriculture provides the former, commerce the latter; the culti-
vation of the country, therefore, precedes the increase of the
town; the town, indeed, has to subsist on the surplus produce of
the country; foreign commerce comes later still. This is the
natural order, and it is promoted by man's natural inclinations.
But human institutions have thwarted these natural inclinations,


## p. 341 (#367) ############################################

6
The System of Natural Liberty 341
and, ‘in many respects, entirely inverted' the natural order. Up
to Adam Smith's time, the regulation of industry had been almost
universally admitted to be part of the government's functions;
criticism of the principles and methods of this regulation had not
been wanting; the theory of the balance of trade,' for instance,
important in the doctrine of the mercantilists, had been ex-
amined and rejected by Hume and by others before him. But
Smith made a comprehensive survey of the means by which, in
agriculture, in the home trade and in foreign commerce, the state
had attempted to regulate industry; these attempts, he thought,
were all diversions of the course of trade from its 'natural channels';
and he maintained that they were uniformly pernicious. Whether
it acts by preference or by restraint, every such system ‘retards,
instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real
wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the
real value of the annual produce of its land and labour. ' When
all such systems are swept away, the obvious and simple system of
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. '
The ideas and arguments of Adam Smith were influential, at a
later date, in establishing the system of free trade in Great Britain;
and, perhaps, it would be not far wrong to say that a generation
of economists held his views on this question to be his most solid
title to fame. He regarded liberty as natural in contrast with the
artificiality of government control; and the term “natural' plays
an ambiguous part in his general reasonings, changing its shade of
meaning, but always implying a note of approval. In this, he only
used the language of his time—though Hume had pointed out that
the word was treacherous. But it has to be borne in mind that,
while he extolled this 'natural liberty' as the best thing for trade,
he did not say that it was in all cases the best thing for a country.
He saw that there were other things than wealth which were worth
having, and that of some of these the state was the guardian.
Security must take precedence of opulence, and, on this ground,
he would restrict natural liberty, not only to defend the national
safety, but, also, for the protection of individual traders.
III. OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WRITERS
As we look back upon the development of philosophical
problems, it might seem that, for a philosophical writer after
Hume, there was but one thing worth doing—to answer him, if
possible; and, if that were not possible, to keep silent. But the


## p. 342 (#368) ############################################

342
Philosophers
issue was not quite so clear to his contemporaries. Indeed, his
own example did not press it home. It showed, on the contrary,
that work of importance might be done in certain departments
even when the contradiction was ignored to which Hume had
reduced the theory of knowledge. Soon after the publication of
A Treatise of Human Nature, valuable writings appeared on
psychology, and on moral and political theory; there were also
critics of Hume in considerable number, and one of that number
had both the insight to trace Hume's scepticism to its logical origin
and the intellectual capacity to set forth a theory of knowledge in
which the same difficulty should not arise.
Among the psychologists, the most important place belongs to
David Hartley, a physician, and sometime fellow of Jesus college,
Cambridge, whose Observations on Man: his frame, his duty, and
his expectations appeared in 1749. The rapid march of philosophical
thought in the previous forty years was ignored by, and probably
unknown to, the author. The whole second part of his book in
which he works out a theological theory may be regarded as
antiquated. He does not mention Berkeley; he seems never to
have heard of David Hume. But the first or psychological part
of the book has two striking features: it is a systematic attempt
at a physiological psychology, and it developed the theory of
the association of ideas in a way which influenced, far more than
Hume did, the views of the later associational school of James Mill
and his successors. The physiological doctrine was suggested by
certain passages in Newton's Optics. Hartley supposes that the
contact of an external object with the sensory nerves excites
vibrations in the æther residing in the pores of these nerves ';
these vibrations enter the brain, are 'propagated freely every
way over the whole medullary substance,' and sensations are the
result; further, they leave vestiges or traces behind them, and this
is the origin of ideas which depend on minute vibrations or 'vibra-
tiuncles. ' Motor activity is explained in a similar way. This
physiological view is the basis of his whole doctrine of mind, and,
more particularly, of the doctrine of association. In respect of the
latter doctrine, Hartley wrote under the influence of Locke; but he
has left it on record that the suggestion to make use of association
as a general principle of psychological explanation came from John
Gay, who had written A Dissertation prefixed to Law's English
translation of archbishop King's Origin of Evil (1731), in which
the doctrine was used to explain the connection of morality with
6


## p. 343 (#369) ############################################

Abraham Tucker
343
private happiness. Hartley offered a physiological explanation of
association itself, gave a generalised statement of its laws and
applied it to the details of mental life. He did not see, as Hume
had seen, the special difficulty of applying it so as to explain
judgment, assent, or belief.
Abraham Tucker was a psychologist of a different temper from
Hartley. He was a constant critic of Hartley's physiological
doctrines, and he excelled in that introspective analysis which
has been practised by many English writers. Tucker was a
country gentleman whose chief employment was a study of the
things of the mind. The first fruit of his reflection was a fragment
Freewill, Foreknowledge and Fate (1763), published under the
pseudonym of Edward Search ; certain criticisms of this piece
produced, also in 1763, Man in quest of Himself: or a Defence
of the Individuality of the Human Mind, ‘by Cuthbert Com-
ment. ' Thereafter, he did not turn aside from his great work, The
Light of Nature pursued, of which the first four volumes were
published by himself (again under the name of Search) in 1765,
and the last three appeared after his death (1774). The author
was a man of leisure himself, and he wrote for men of leisure; he
was not without method ; but his plan grew as he proceeded;
when new fields of enquiry opened, he did not refuse to wander in
them; and he liked to set forth his views de omnibus rebus et
quibusdam aliis. Indeed, it is a work of inordinate length, and
the whole is of unequal merit. Many of the long chapters have
lost their interest through lapse of time and the changes which
time has brought. Others, perhaps, may appeal to us only when
we can catch the author's mood. Such are the speculations-put
forward as purely hypothetical-concerning the soul's vehicle, the
mundane soul and the vision of the disembodied soul. Mysticism
is apt to appear fantastic when expressed in language so matter of
fact; but the writer has a rare power of realising his fancies.
The chapters, however, which deal more specifically with human
nature are a genuine and important contribution to the litera-
ture of mind and morals. The writer was as innocent of Hume
as was Hartley; he criticised Berkeley, though seldom with insight
and never with sympathy; and he took Locke as his master. But
he was not a slavish follower; it would be difficult to instance
finer or more exhaustive criticism than his examination of the
Lockean view that all action has for its motive the most pressing
uneasiness. His moral doctrine is, perhaps, still more remarkable


## p. 344 (#370) ############################################

344
Philosophers
for the candour and elaboration with which he discussed the
problem which faced all followers of Locke—the consistency of
an analysis of action in terms of personal pleasure and pain with
a theory of morality in which benevolence is supreme. Herein, he
provided most of the material afterwards made use of by Paley.
Into the details of his teaching it is impossible to enter. But,
perhaps, it is not too much to say that only his diffuseness has
prevented him from becoming a classic. The mere mass of the
book is deterrent. Yet he would be an unlucky reader who could
spend half-an-hour over its pages without finding something to
arrest his attention and even to enthral his interest. The author
sees mankind and the human lot with a shrewd but kindly eye;
his stores of illustration are inexhaustible and illuminate subjects
which in other hands would be dull; even the subtlest points
are made clear by a style which is free and simple and varied ;
there is never any trace of sentimentality; but there are passages
of humour and of pathos worthy of Goldsmith.
Richard Price, a native of Glamorgan, who became a unitarian
minister in London, left his mark on more than one department
of thought. His Observations on Reversionary Payments (1771) a
made a distinct advance in the theory of life assurance.
His
Appeal to the Public on the Subject of the National Debt (1771)
is said to have contributed to the reestablishment of the sinking
fund. He was drawn into the current of revolutionary politics and
became a leading exponent of their ideas. His Observations on
the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and
the Justice and Policy of the War with America made him famous
in two continents. The preface to the first edition was dated
8 February, that to the fifth edition 12 March, 1776. Additional
Observations on the same subject appeared in 1777, and a General
Introduction and Supplement to the two tracts in 1778. The
revolution in France was the occasion for A Discourse on the
Love of our Country, delivered on Nov. 4, 1789; and this he
closed with a Nunc dimittis: ‘After sharing in the benefits of one
Revolution, I have been spared to be a witness to two other Revo-
lutions, both glorious. ' This Discourse had the further distinction
of provoking Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France.
But, famous as his political partisanship made him at the time,
Price has a better title to be remembered for his first work,
A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1757; 3rd edn,
revised and enlarged, 1787).
a


## p. 345 (#371) ############################################

Price and Priestley
345
Price has the mathematician's interest in intellectual concepts
and his power of dealing with abstractions. In philosophy, he is a
successor of Cudworth and Clarke, and the theories of knowledge
of both Locke and Hume are attacked at the roots. The under-
standing or reason (he argues) has its own ideas, for which it does
not depend upon sense-impression. Necessity, possibility, identity,
cause are instances of such abstract ideas. They are 'intelligible
objects' discovered by the eye of the mind. ' Reason is thus 'the
source of new ideas'; and among them are the ideas of right and
wrong; these are simple ideas and perceived by an immediate
'intuition of the understanding: 'morality is a branch of neces-
sary truth. ' The system which Price bases on this view has become,
more than any other, the type of modern intuitional ethics.
6
6
Joseph Priestley had many points of sympathy with Price. They
belonged to the same profession--the unitarian ministry—and they
were prominent on the same side in the revolutionary politics of
the day. But, in spite of this similarity and of their personal
friendship, they represent different attitudes of mind. Price was
a mathematician, familiar with abstract ideas, and an intellectualist
in philosophy. Priestley was a chemist, busied in experiments, a
convinced disciple of the empirical philosophy and a supporter of
materialism. He was the author of The History and present State
of Electricity (1767), and, afterwards, of numerous papers and
treatises on chemical subjects, which recorded the results of his
original investigations and have established his fame as a man of
science. He came early under the influence of Hartley and pub-
lished a simplification of his book-omitting the doctrine of
vibrations and laying stress solely on the principle of the asso-
ciation of ideas; but he rejected Hartley's view of mind as an
immaterial principle and held that the powers termed mental are
the result of such an organical structure as that of the brain. '
His philosophical views were expressed and defended in Disqui-
sitions relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), in The Doctrine of
Philosophical Necessity (1777) and in A Free Discussion (1778) on
these topics with Price; and he also published (1774) An Exami-
nation of the doctrines of Reid and others of the new school of
Scottish philosophers. Of greater interest than these, however, is
the short Essay on the First Principles of Government (1768).
This forms a contrast to the a priori arguments in which Price
delighted-although its practical tendency is the same. It pro-
pounds 'one general idea,' namely, 'that all people live in
6


## p. 346 (#372) ############################################

346
Philosophers
society for their mutual advantage,' and draws the conclusion
that their happiness is 'the great standard by which every
thing relating to that state must finally be determined. ' Priestley
thus set the example, which Bentham followed, of taking utili-
tarian considerations for the basis of a philosophical radicalism,
instead of the dogmas about natural rights common with other
revolutionary thinkers of the period. He did not anticipate Bentham
in using the famous utilitarian formula (as he is often said to have
done”), but he did precede him in taking the happiness of the
majority as the test in every political question, and he made it
easier for Bentham to use the same standard in judging private
conduct.
In a somewhat similar way, the exhaustive analyses of Tucker
led to the theological utilitarianism of William Paley, sometime
fellow of Christ's college, Cambridge, and senior wrangler in 1763.
Paley was not a writer of marked originality. If, in his Principles
of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), he owed much to
Tucker, in his View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794), he
depended on the Criterion (1752) of John Douglas, bishop of
Salisbury--a reply to Hume's argument against miracles—and on
Nathaniel Lardner's Credibility of the Gospel History (1723—55);
and, in his Natural Theology (1804), he drew much material from
John Ray's The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the
Creation (1691), from William Derham's Physico-Theology (1713)
and from the work of the Dutchman Nieuwentyt, which had been
translated into English in 1730 as The Religious Philosopher.
His Horæ Paulino (1790) is said to be the most original, and to
have been the least successful, of his publications. These four
books form a consistent system. Probably, no English writer has
ever excelled Paley in power of marshalling arguments or in
clearness of reasoning ; and these merits have given some of his
works a longer life as academic text-books than their other
merits can justify. Paley was, essentially, a man of his time and
his views were its views, though expressed with a skill which was
all his own.
In his Moral Philosophy, there is no trace of the vacillation at
critical points which marks most of his empirical predecessors. The
only criticism to which it lies open is that morality vanishes when
reduced to a calculation of selfish interests. A man's own happiness
is always his motive; he can seek the general happiness only when
I See ante, vol. IX, p. 302 note.


## p. 347 (#373) ############################################

Paley. Thomas Reid
347
that way of acting is made for his own happiness also; and this
can be done only by the rewards and punishments of a lawgiver.
Locke distinguished three different sorts of law, and Paley followed
him rather closely. But the law of honour is insufficient, as having
little regard to the general happiness; and the law of the land is
inadequate for it omits many duties as not fit objects for compulsion,
and it permits many crimes because incapable of definition; there
remains, therefore, only the law of Scripture (that is, of God) which,
alone, is obviously sufficient. Hence, the famous definition, ‘Virtue
is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and
for the sake of everlasting happiness. '
This conclusion leads up to the argument of his later works.
His Horce Paulince and Evidences have to demonstrate the credi-
bility of the New Testament writings and the truth of the Christian
revelation; and this position assumes the existence of God which,
in his Natural Theology, he proves from the marks of design in
the universe and, in particular, in the human body. In these works,
we see how complete is the shifting of interest to which reference
has been previously made'. Attention is concentrated on the
question of external evidences, and the content of religion is almost
entirely overlooked. God is the superhuman watchmaker who has
put the world-machine together with surprising skill, and inter-
venes miraculously, on rare occasions, when the works are getting
out of order. Paley developed a familiar analogy with unequalled
impressiveness; he should not be blamed for failing to anticipate
the effect upon his argument which has been produced by the
biological theory of natural selection; but he did not pause to
examine the underlying assumptions of the analogy which he
worked out; he had no taste for metaphysics; and his mind moved
easily only within the range of the scientific ideas of his own day.
a
The most powerful reply to Hume-indeed, the only com-
petent attempt to refute his philosophy as a whole-came from
a group of scholars in Aberdeen who had formed themselves
into a philosophical society. Of this group, Thomas Reid, a
professor in King's college, was the most notable member, and
he was the founder of the school of Scottish philosophy known
as the commonsense school. With him were associated George
Campbell and James Beattie', professors (the former afterwards
principal) in Marischal college, as well as other men of mark in
1 See ante, vol. IX, p. 289.
? As to Beattie's poetry of. chap. VII, pp. 154 f. , ante.


## p. 348 (#374) ############################################

348
Philosophers
their day. The earliest contribution to the controversy-Campbell's
Dissertation on Miracles (1763)-dealt with a side issue; but it is
of interest for its examination of the place of testimony in know-
ledge; whereas experience (it is argued) leads to general truths
and is the foundation of philosophy, testimony is the foundation
of history, and it is capable of giving absolute certainty. Campbell's
later work, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), contains much
excellent psychology. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Im-
mutability of Truth (1770) is not a work of originality or of
distinction; but it is a vigorous polemic; it brought him great
temporary fame, and he has been immortalised by the art of
Reynolds as serenely clasping his book whilst Hume and other
apostles of error are being hurled into limbo. About the same
time, James Oswald, a Perthshire clergyman, published An
Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of Religion (1766—72).
Reid, Beattie and Oswald were placed together by Priestley
for the purpose of his Examination; and the same collocation
of names was repeated by Kant; but it is entirely unjust to
Reid.
Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of
Common Sense was published in 1764 ; shortly afterwards, he
removed to Glasgow, to fill the chair vacated by Adam Smith.
His later and more elaborate works—Essays on the Intellectual
Powers of Man and Essays on the Active Powers of Man-
appeared in 1785 and 1788 respectively. In his philosophical
work, Reid has the great merit of going to the root of the matter,
and he is perfectly fair-minded in his criticism. He admits the
validity of Hume's reasonings; he does not appeal to the vulgar
against his conclusions ; but he follows the argument back to its
premises and tests the truth of these premises. This is his chief
.
claim to originality. He finds that the sceptical results of Hume
are legitimate inferences from the ideal theory' which Locke took
over from Descartes, and he puts to himself the question, what
evidence have I for this doctrine, that all the objects of my
knowledge are ideas in my own mind ? ' He points out (what is
undoubtedly true) that neither Locke nor Berkeley nor Hume
produced any evidence for the assumption. They started with
.
the view that the immediate object of knowledge is something in
the mind called ideas; and they were consequently unable to
prove the existence of anything outside the mind or even of mind
itself. 'Ideas,' says Reid, seem to have something in their nature
6
6


## p. 349 (#375) ############################################

6
6
The Principles of Commonsense 349
unfriendly to other existences. ' He solves the difficulty by denying
the existence of ideas. There are no such 'images of external
‘
things' in the mind, but sensation is accompanied by an act of
perception, and the object of perception is the real external
thing.
Hume had said that his difficulties would vanish if our percep-
tions inhered in something simple and individual, or if the mind
perceived some real connection among them; and Reid proposes
a positive theory of knowledge which will give the required assur-
ance on this point. Every sensation is accompanied by a ‘natural
and original judgment' which refers the sensation to mind as its
act. We do not need, first of all, to get the two things 'mind and
'sensation and then to connect them; 'one of the related things-
to wit sensation-suggests to us both the correlate and the relation. '
Reid's terminology is not happy. The word 'suggests' is badly
.
chosen, though he distinguishes this natural suggestion' from the
suggestion which is the result of experience and habit. And his
term 'common sense' has given rise to more serious misunder-
standings, for which he is by no means blameless. Even his
doctrine of immediate perception is far from clear. But, if we
read him sympathetically, we may see that he had hold of a
truth of fundamental importance. The isolated impressions or
ideas with which Locke and Hume began are fictions; they do
not correspond to anything real in experience. The simplest
portion of our experience is not separate from its context in
this way; it implies a reference to mind and to an objective
order, and thus involves the relations which Reid ascribed to
'natural suggestion' or 'common sense. '
>


## p. 350 (#376) ############################################

CHAPTER XV
DIVINES
6
With the beginning of the eighteenth century, we reach a period
in English theological literature of which the character is not less
definite because there were individual writers who struggled against
it. The matter and the style alike were placid and unemotional,
rational rather than learned, tending much more to the common-
place than to the pedantic, and, above all, abhorrent of that
dangerous word, and thing, enthusiasm. Johnson's definition gives
a significant clue to the religious literature in which his con-
temporaries had been educated. Enthusiasm, in his Dictionary,
is (from Locke) 'a vain belief of private revelation, a vain con-
fidence of divine favour,' to which even the nonconformists, if one
may judge by the subjects of their books, had, in the early
eighteenth century, abandoned all special claim; and, also, it im-
plied, in Johnson's own view, 'heat of imagination' and 'violence
of passion. ' From this, the main current of theological writing,
for more than fifty years, ran conspicuously away. The mystics,
such as William Law, as has been shown in an earlier chapter",
were strange exceptions, rari nantes in gurgite vasto of this
decorous self-restraint or complacency. It was not till count
Zinzendorf and the Moravians completed the impression which
A Serious Call had made on the heart of John Wesley that the
literature of religion received a new impetus and inspiration ; and
the old school fought long and died hard. It was not till the word
enthusiasm could be used in their condign praise that English
theologians began to feel again something of the fire and poetry of
their subject, and, once more, to scale its heights and sound its
depths. And yet, as we say this, we are confronted by evident
1 See vol. ix, chap. XII, ante, and cf. Byrom's poem 'Enthusiasm,' with introduction
on the use of the word, in The Poems of John Byrom, ed. Ward, A. W. , vol. 11 (1895).
See, also, ibid. vol. III (1912), p. 113 and note.


## p. 351 (#377) ############################################

Samuel Johnson. Atterbury 351
exceptions. No one can deny the power of Butler’s writing, what-
ever it may be the fashion to assert as to the depth of his thought;
and, while there was fire enough in Atterbury, in Wilson there
was certainly the delicate aroma of that intimate sincerity which
has in all literature an irresistible charm. Some earlier writers
may be left aside, such as Richard Cumberland, who, though a
bishop, was rather a philosopher than a theologian, and Samuel
Johnson, the Ben Jochanan of Dryden, whose divinity was not
more than an excrescence on his fame as a whig pamphleteer who
suffered excessively for his opinions. His manner of writing was
unquestionably savage. Julian the Apostate: Being a Short
Account of his Life; the sense of the Primitive Christians about
his Succession; and their Behaviour towards him. Together with
a comparison of Popery and Paganism (1682), is more vehement
and obnoxious than most of those bitter attacks on James duke
of York with which the press groaned during the last years of
Charles II ; yet its author hardly deserved degradation from the
priesthood, the pillory and whipping from Newgate to Tyburn.
As the chaplain of Lord William Russell, Johnson might be ex-
pected to speak boldly: and his writing was full of sound and
fury, as a characteristic sentence a solitary one, be it observed
- from his Reflections on the History of Passive Obedience may
show.