No More Learning

The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only, because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the external senses constitutes the material wi'h which the mind is occupied ; but because time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the consciousness of, these representations in experience, and which, as the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the successive, the co-existent, and of that which always must be co-existent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as represent ation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is intuition ; and when it contain nothing but relations, it is the
? ? ? ? ? MSWEBAL BEMAEKS ON TBANBCEnDETTTAL . ESTHETIC. 41
form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no icpre- sentation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity, to wit -- its presenting to itself represent ations, consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself ; that is, it can be nothing but an . internal sense in respect to its form. Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far phsenomenal ; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as phsenomenon, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that
were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the question --How the subject can have an internal intuition of itself? -- but this difficulty common to every theory. The consciousness " of self (apperception) the simple represent ation of the Ego and by means of that representation alone, all the manifold representations in the subject were
? then our internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which are pre
viously given in the subject and the manner in which these
spontaneously given,
representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), oe called sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness to apprehend what lies in the mind, must affect that, and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the representation of time, the manner in which the manifold representations are to combine themselves in the mind since the subject intuites itself, not as would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind internally affected, conse quently, as appears, and not as is.
III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that
as they appear, -- this by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phsenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really
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? 42 TRWrsCENDENTAL JESTJIKTIC.
given ; only that, in bo far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem o* appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-con sciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformrty to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere
? But this will not happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing every thing into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their
existence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor any thing really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the exist ence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated, -- we can not blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which
* The predicates of the phenomenon can he affixed to the ohject it self in relation to our sensuous faculty ; for example, the red colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can he attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason, that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in general, e. g. the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn. That which is never to be found in the ob ject itself, but always in the relation of the uliject to the subject, and which moreover is inseparable from our representation of the object, we
denominate phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly attributed to objects of the senses as st'. ch, and in this there is no illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness to the rose as a thing in itself, or to Saturn bis handles, or extension to all external objects, con sidered as things in themselves, without regarding the determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without limiting my judgment to that relation, --then, and then only, arises illusion.
illusory appearance. *
? ? ? GBNEBAi MMABKS OK TBiWSCT5nDEirrAil . SSTHETIO.
would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of
luch a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance --an absurdity which no ;ne has
as yet been guilty of. -- --IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object
God which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions or
space and time --and intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such moreover, as would con tinue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated ? For as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other way left than to make them sub jective forms of our mode of intuition --external and internal ; which is called sensuous, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object or the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is dependent on the ex istence of the object, is possible, therefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by the object.
It moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well be, that all finite thinking beings must neces sarily in this respect agree with man, (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that
deduced (intuitu* derivative), and not an original (in tuitu* originariut), consequently not an intellectual intuition; and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as an illus tration, and not as any proof of the truth of our testheticW theory.
43
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it is a
is,
? 44 TRANSCENDENTAL . ESTHETIC.
? 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental ^Esthetic.
We have now completely before us one part of the solution
of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy,
namely, the question --llow are synthetical propositions a priori possible '. That is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgment a priori we pass out
the given conception, something which is not dis coverable in that conception, but is certainly found a prion in the intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But thfc judgments which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects of pos-ible experience.
beyond
? ? ? ? TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP ELEMENTS. PART SECOND.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
INTRODUCTION.
IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
I.
Of Logic in general.
Oub knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, the first of which is the faculty or power of receiving repre sentations (receptivity for impressions) ; the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spon taneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us ; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, there fore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither con ceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cog nition. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empi rical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them ; and pure, when no sen sation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition con sequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are
possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected ;
and, on the other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously
producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our nature is so constituted, that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that contains
? ? ? is, it
? 46 fBAKSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
only the mode in which we are affected by objects.
other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous in tuition, is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are
void ; intuitions without conceptions,
necesscry for the mind to make its conceptions
sensuous to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its
(that
intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under concep tions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought,
blind. Hence it is as
On the
? on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed each we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that /Esthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that Logic. -- Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold, namely, as logic of the general [universal],* or of the particular
* Logic nothing but Me science of the lawi of thought, as thought. concerns itself only with the form of thought, and takes no cognizance
of the matter --that of the infinitude of the objects to which thought
applied.
Now Kant wrong, when he divides logic into logic of the genera)
and of the particular use of the understanding.
He says the logic of the particular use of the understanding contains
the laws of right thinking upon any particular set of objects. This sort of logic he calls the organon of this or that science. It difficult to dis cover what he means by his logic of the particular use of the understand ing. From his description, we are left in doubt whether he means
this logic induction, that is, the organon of science in general, or the laws which regulate the objects, science of which he seeks to establish. -- In either case, the application of the term logic inadmissible. To regard logic as the organon of science, absurd, as indeed Kant himself afterwards shows (p. 51). It knows nothing of this or that object. The matter em ployed in syllogisms used for the sake of example only all forms of syllogisms might be expressed in signs. Logicians have never been able clearly to see this. They have never been able clearly to define the ex tent of their science, to know, in fact, what their science really treated of.
They have never seen that has to do only with the formal, and never with the material in thought. The science has broken down ils proper barriers to let in contributions from metaphysics, psychology, &c. It common enough, for example, to say that Bacon's Novum Organum entirely super
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? 1HTBOD0CTION. -- O1 tVOfllC ts GENBRJX 47
use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct think ing upon a particular class of objects. The former may be called elemental logic, --the latter, the organon of this or that particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the schools, as a propedeutic to the sciences, although, in
deed, according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion ; for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these
Dbjects can be established.
General logic is again either pure or applied. In the for
mer, we abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised ; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the phantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of inclination, &c. , conse quently also, the sources of prejudice, --in a word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise, because these causes regard the understanding under certain circum-
seded the Organon of Aristotle. But the one states the laws under which a knowledge of objects is possible ; the other the subjective laws of thought. The spheres of the two are utterly distinct.
Kant very properly states that pure logic is alone properly science. Strictly speaking, applied logic cannot be a division of general logic. It is more correctly applied psychology ;--psychology treating in a practical manner of the conditions under which thought is employed.
? It may be noted here, that what Kant calls Transcendental Logic is properly not logic at all, but a division of metaphysics. For his Categories
contain matter--as regards thought at least. Take, for example, the cate gory of Existence. These categories, no doubt, are the forms of the matter given to us by experience. They are, according to Kant, not de rived from experience, but purely a priori. But logic is concerned ex clusively about the form of thought, and has nothing to do with this or that conception, whether a priori or a potteriori.
See Sir William Hamilton's Edition of Beid'a Works, pauim. It is to Sir William Hamilton, one of the greatest logicians, perhaps the greatest, since Aristotle, and certainly one of the acutest thinkers of any time, that the Translator is indebted for the above view of the subject of log<e. -- 3>
? ? ? 43 tRASSCENMEKTAL LOGIC.
Stances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them et<< pcrience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, merely with pure & priori principles, and is a canon of un derstanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal pari of their use, be the content what it may, empirical or trans cendental. General logic is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use of the understanding, under the sub jective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general, that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the un derstanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.
In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic must be carefully distinguished from that which con stitutes applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly science, although short and dry, as the methodical exposition . of an elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this, therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules :--
1 . As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.
2. As pnre logic, it has no empirical principles, and con sequently draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology, which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated doctrine, and every thing in it must be certain completely & priori.
What I call applied logic (contrary to the common accep tation of this term, according to which it should contain cer tain exercises for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment in concreto, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which are *11 given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the origin of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction, &c, and to it in related pure general loit'. c in the same way t! iat
? ? ? ? IBTBODTJOTIOH. -- OF TKANBCKlTDElTTAIi LOOIO. 49
pare morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers these laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and passions to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish us with a true -nd demonstrated science, because as well as applied logic, requires empirical and psychological principles.
II.
Of Transcendental Logic.
General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, that of all relation of cognition to its object, and regards only the logical form the relation of cognitions to each other, that the form of thought in gene ral. But as we have both pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental esthetic proves), in like manner distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist kind of logic, in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cog nition for that logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of our cognitions of ob
jects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our representations, be they given primitively &-priori ourselves, or be they only of empirical' origin, solely according to the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought, in relation to each other. Conse quently, general logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen.
And here shall make remark, which the reader must bear well in mind in the course of the following consider- ations, to wit, that not every cognition priori, but only those through which wc cognize that and how certain repre sentations (intuitions, or conceptions) are applied or are possible
? only priori; that cognition and the Therefore neither
to say, the priori use of space, nor any
priori possibility of are transcendental.
priori geometrical
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determination of space, a transcendental representation, but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects of experience, although itself & priori, can be called transcen dental. So also, the application of space to objects in general, would be transcendental ; but if it be limited to objects of sense, it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the relation of these to their object.
Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate & priori to objects, not as pure or sen suous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought, (which nre therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor estheti- cal origin), --in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational* cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should deter mine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be called Transcendental Logic, because it has not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction, but concerns itself with thes* only in an a priori relation to objects.
III.
Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.
The old question with which people sought to push logi
cians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to
pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, "and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this, -- What is truth ? " The definition of the word truth, to wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed in the ques tion ; but we desire to be told, in the answer to what the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
To know what questions we may reasonably propose,
in itself strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For
50 TRAHSOENDENTAl
? be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of rational answer, attended with the danger-- not to
question
* Vernunfler/:enntniss.
confined in this translation to the rendering of Vernunft and its derira- tires,-- Tr
The words reason, rational, will always be
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if a
a
is a in
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? nrmoDUCTioiT. -- of akalytio atcd dialectic.
51
mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it -- of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) " milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve. "
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object must be, ipsofacto, distinguished from all others ; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cog nitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, must be utterly absurd to ask for mark of the truth of this content of cognition and that, accordingly, sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot
? possibly be found. As we have already termed the content of cogni tion its matter, we shall say " Of the truth of our cog
nitions in respect of their matter, no universal test can be demanded, because such demand self-contradictory. "
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), equally manifest that logic, in so far as exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules
false, because thereby the understanding made to contra dict its own universal laws of thought that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that of thought in general, and in so far they are per fectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that not self- contradictory, notwithstanding quite possible that may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, nothing more than the conditio tine qui non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, has no test to discover.
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? S2 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business oi
laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predi cate any thing of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole,
of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this--an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient --that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgment, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production of objective asser tions, and has thus been grossly misapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called Dialectic.
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of that with them was nothing else than logic of illusion-- sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colour
ing of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic* employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now may be taken as safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon,
The Topic (Topics) of the ancients was division of the intellectual instruction then prevalent, with the design of setting forth the proper method of reasoning on any given proposition --according to certain dis tinctions of the genus, the species, &c. of the subject and predicate words, analogies, and the . Ike. of course contained also code of laws iur svllogistical disputation. was nol necessarily an aid to sophistry -- 7V.
and reason into its elements, and exhibit*
nnderstanding
them as principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic may, therefore, be called Analytic, and is at least the negative test of truth, because all cognitions must first of all be estimated and tried according to these
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? IWTHODTTCTIOH. -- OP rSANSCEKDENfAl ANAlYTIC,
must always be a logic of illusion, that be dialectical, for, ta teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their ac cordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlnrge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appear ance of truth, any single assertion whatever.
Such instruction quite unbecoming the dignity of phi
For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic Dialectic, the sense of critique of dialectical illusion, and we wish the term to be so understood
this place.
IV.
Of the division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as
in transcendental esthetic the sensibility) and select from
our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin the understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cogni
tion, however, depends upon this as its condition, that ohjecta to which may be applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition, the whole of our cognition without objects, and therefore quite void. That part of transcen dental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought, transcen dental analytic, and at the same time logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict without losing at the same time all content, that losing all reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily seduced
into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding themselves, and that even beyond the boun daries of experience, which yet the only source whence we can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be employed, --understanding runs the risk of making, means of empty sophisms, material and objective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding, and of
losophy.
&C. 5. "i
? passing judgments on objects without distinction -- objecti
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;
by
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? 54 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
which arc no* given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to at in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the u lderatandhig, this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and
attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge synthe tically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term Transcendental Dialectic, -- not meaning it
as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of trans cendental principles, and shew that the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgments made by the pure un derstanding, and to guard it from sophistical delusion.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. FIRST DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.
* I.
Fran scendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is ne cessary, 1st, That the conceptions be pure and not empirical ; 2d, That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding ; 3d, That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from deduced ot compound conceptions ; 4th, That our table of these ele mentary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the gua
rantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggre
? ? ? ? TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC OP CONCEPTIONS.
53
gate formed only by means of repeated experiments and at tempts. The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the ik priori cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole ; con sequently, only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from every thing empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cogni tion constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea ; and the completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions, and the other the principles of pure understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. BOOK I.
Analytic
By the term "Analytic of Conceptions," I do not under stand the analysis of these, or the usual process in phi losophical investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves, according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birth-place, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy ; what remains is the logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until they are developed on occasions presented oy experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in theii unalloyed purity.
? of Conceftions. ? 2.
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TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Analytic of Conceptions.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
Introductory. *
? 3.
When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different
conceptions manifest themselves according to the different cir cumstances, and make known this faculty, and assemble them selves into a more or less extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has been applied to the consider ation of them. Where this process, conducted as it me chanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover in this nap-hazard manner present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to resemblances to each other, and arranged series, according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the more complex, -- series which are anything but systematic, though not altogether without certain kind of method in their construction.
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conception's according to prin ciple; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be as signed to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined priori, --both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.
TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURS CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
Sect. Of the Logical use the Understanding in general.
4.
The understanding was defined above only negatively, a>>
non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; rui
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THE LOGICAL USE OF UNDEBBTANDIWO.
57
sequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except
through conceptions ; consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through conceptions, -- not iutuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function, I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common
representation. Conceptions, then, are based ou the spon
taneity of thought, ns sensuous intuitions are on the recepti
vity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no representation, except an intuition, relates immedi ately to its object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conception. A judgment, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a con ception which applies to, and is valid for many other concep tions, and which among these comprehends also a given repre sentation, (his last being immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgment -- "All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to vnrious other conceptions ; among these, however, it is here particularly applied to the
? of body, and this conception of body relates to certain phecuomena which occur to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All
judgments, accordingly, are functions of unity in our represent ations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher repre sentation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cogui- tions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be re presented as the faculty ofjudging. For it according to what has been said above, faculty of thought. Now thought
means of conceptions. But conceptions, as pre dicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of
yet undetermined object. Thus the conception of body in dicates something --forexample, metal--which can be cognized
means of that conception. therefore conception. for the reason alone that other representations are contained under by means of which can relate to objects. therefore th>>
cognition
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? 68 TEASSOElTDiiNTAL LOGIC.
predicate to a possible judgment ; for example, "Every inetal is a body. " All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the func tions of unity in judgments. And that this may be effected very easily, the following section will shew.
Sect. II. -- Of the Logical Function in Judgments.
* 5-
If we abstract all the content of a judgment, and consider
only the intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. These may be con veniently represented in the following table :--
I.
Quantity of judgments.
points,
II. Quality.
Affirmative.
Negative. Infinite.
Universal. Particular.
Singular.
IT. Modality. Problematical.
Assertorical. Apodeictical.
in. Relation.
Categorical. Hypothetical.
Disjunctive.
As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential
from the usual technic of logicians, the following ob servations, for the prevention of otherwise possible misunder standing, will not be without their use.
1 . Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments may be treated like universal ones. For, precisely because a singular judgment has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is con tained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate applied. On the other hand, let us compare
.
of the Understanding
? ? ? ? THE LOGICAL f UNCTION IN JUDGMENTS. 59
? singular with a general judgment, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular judgment relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essen tially different. Thus, if we estimate a singular judgment (judicium singulars) not merely according to its intrinsic valid ity as a judgment, but also as a cognition generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general judgment (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate place, --though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgments in reference to each other.
2. 1 n like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite mustbe dis tinguished from affirmative j udgments, although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logicabstracts allcontentof thepredicate (though it be negative), and only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content of this logical affirmation --an affirmation
by means of a merely negative predicate, and enquires how much the sum total of our cognition"gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul, It is not mortal," --by this ne gative judgment I should at least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, " The soul is not mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because, of the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition, than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this proceeding we accom plish only this much, that the infinite sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited, that the mortal is excluded from and the soul placed in the remaining part of the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the wholesphere, withoutintheslightestdegreethereby augmenting or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These judgments, therefore, infinite inrespectof their logical extent, arc, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely limitative and are consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgments, because tha
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? 60 TBANSCEKDENTAL LOOIC.
function of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure h priori cognition.
3. All relations of thought in judgments are those (a) of the
predicate to the subject; (6) of the principle to its consequence ; (c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two conceptions; in the second, two judgments; in the third, several judgments in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition, " If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are
punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely, " Perfect justice exists," and " The ob stinately wicked are punished. " Whether these propositions are in themselves true, is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgment except a certain conse quence. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other, --a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it con tains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cog nition. The disjunctive judgment contains, therefore, the rela tion of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal neces sity, or through an external cause. " Each of these propo sitions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world ; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others ; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. There therefore, in disjunctive
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