Sale has been criticised for not coming, as ordered, to help Elphin-
stone, and it is certainly difficult to understand how anyone in his
position could refuse to do so; but there seems no reason to doubt
his statement that his brigade could not reach Kabul, and certain
it is that with things as they were his force would have been of little
use.
stone, and it is certainly difficult to understand how anyone in his
position could refuse to do so; but there seems no reason to doubt
his statement that his brigade could not reach Kabul, and certain
it is that with things as they were his force would have been of little
use.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
The natural result, the only possible result,
was constant sporadic insurrection, or looting that might become
such, at any turn of events. The road to India through the Khaibar
was never safe, and communication that way was only kept up by
force and hribery. Kalat was taken by General Willshire on 13
November, 1839, as he was marching home, because the English terms
were not accepted. The khan himself, Mihrab, was killed and the new
khan Shah Nawaz, who was set up in his place was anything but
popular, the less so as the provinces of Shal, Mastung and Kachhi
were now handed over to Afghanistan. It may be doubted whether
these proceedings were wise, and it seems certain that they were
unjust
The news now began to filter through of a Russian expedition
under General Peroffsky from Orenburg into Central Asia and parti-
cularly against Khiva. The provocation was the slave trade in Russian
subjects which, there, as at Herat, was actively carried on and had
been so for over a hundred years; this and the constant plundering of
caravans. If proof were needed of the general nervousness as to
Russia, it could be found in a letter from Burnes written in November.
a
## p. 503 (#531) ############################################
THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITION
503
1839. He writes : "Ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and
those of Russia will touch-that is, the states dependent upon either
of us will—and that is the same thing". Kaye has shown the diffi-
culties of this winter--the Russian scare; trouble at Herat; trouble
with the Uzbegs; trouble in Bokhara where Colonel Stoddart, the
Resident, had been imprisoned under the most humiliating conditions,
and where Dost Muhammad had now found at once a refuge and
a prison; troubles in Kandahar, in Kohistan, and at Kalat; trouble
with the Sikhs who were ceaselessly intriguing with the disturbing
elements in Afghanistan. The tendency in all such cases is to try and
crush the symptoms rather than eradicate the causes of the mischief.
The English officials thought only of expeditions, and Macnaghten
planned one to the Hindu Kush. It is only fair to Auckland to say
that he consistently resisted. all such proposals, and a letter written
by him to Macnaghten on 22 March, 1840, shows what his views
were; 1 there are others of the same nature.
The wisdom of his attitude was shown when, about the middle of
March, 1840, the failure of the Russian expedition was announced.
Auckland had made proper preparations, and he was far from being
blind to the seriousness of the situation, had Russia obtained a hold
on Khiva and still more on Bokhara. But it must be recalled that the
difficulties of the Afghan position had been increased rather than
diminished by the death of Ranjit Singh (27 June, 1839) and the
confusion in the Lahore state which followed it. The matter is alluded
to by Lord Auckland in a letter of 11 May, 1840, to Hobhouse. It
was even suggested that various Sikh magnates were engaged in
treasonable intrigues with various rebels in Afghanistan, and there
is no doubt that the Khalsa and the heir to the throne, Nao Nihal
Singh, were strongly opposed to the passage of British troops through
the Panjab, at which, considering the language of Macnaghten, one
can hardly be surprised. Colvin had written to William Butterworth
Bayley on 23 January, 1840 :
There never was a time when the Sikh Durbar was more dependent upon
us than at present. They are conscious of their many dissensions and real
weakness and are, I imagine, surprised and in some measure distrustful at our
self-denial in taking no advantage of them. A serious quarrel with us at the
present time on the part of the Sikhs I look upon as an impossible thing. 3
With this may be compared his letter to Macnaghten on the following
13 June, which is impressive in its seriousness. There was soon to be
plenty of proof of the correctness of Colvin's suspicions.
The position at Herat was what might have been expected. Major
Todd and his associates did their best to put down the slave trade
there, and Captain Abbot was sent to Khiva with the same end in
view. The latter arranged a treaty which was disavowed, but his
successor, Captain Shakespeare, managed to get 400 Russian slaves
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37698, f. 89, verso.
2 Idem, 37699, f. 76, verso.
3 Idem, 37698, f. 6.
## p. 504 (#532) ############################################
504
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
set free. Much money was advanced to the ruler of Herat, but he
was far from loyal, and Macnaghten would have annexed the little
state to Afghanistan and Auckland, who was supported by the com-
mander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls; agreed. Major Todd we learn
afterwards came round to the same view.
The Ghilzais gave constant trouble; their chiefs had taken refuge
during the winter of 1839 in Peshawar, but, when the warm weather
came, they were in arms again between Kandahar and Kabul, and
took a good deal of repressing. There was failure in Kalat, which,
the same summer, was recaptured by Nasir Khan, the son of the
chief who fell when the British took the place. And when later he
was driven out he was not conquered. Quetta was besieged; and
everywhere there were indications that Shah Shuja inspired no sort
of fear or respect. Yet strangely enough Macnaghten wrote to Colvin :
"I have nothing more to say about His Majesty's character than I
have already said. I believe him to be the best and ablest man in
his Kingdom". Auckland in one of his letters to Hobhouse, when
speaking of the suppression of the Ghilzais, throws a little light on
the causes of the trouble :
But the business was ill and discreditably done. Blunders were made and
harshnesses committed. Our officers quarrelled with, and as is too often the
case counteracted, each other, and what as it appeared to me might have been
a business of ease and graciousness, has been very much the reverse.
Macnaghten could not prevail upon the Indian Government to
go to war with the Sikhs or to annex Herat, but he continued to
dream of the further extension of British influence in Central Asia.
In September, 1840, he sent Captain Arthur Conolly--something of a
visionary but a very gallant one-on a mission to Khiva and Kokand.
He subsequently proceeded to Bokhara where he and Colonel Stoddart
were cruelly murdered.
The brightest circumstance of this uncomfortable summer was
the assurance given by Russia that there would be no further attack
on Khiva. And equally important perhaps was the surrender of Dost
Muhammad. In July, 1840, the Nawab Jabbar Khan gave himself
up to the small force stationed at Bamiyan. Dost Muhammad, having
escaped with some difficulty, had taken refuge with his old ally the
wali of Khuium. He soon had a considerable force under him and
drove back the British outposts, a most distressing feature of the
business being the desertion to the enemy of some of the new national
levies raised to support Shah Shuja. There was evidence, as Torrens
wrote to the Resident at Lahore on 1 October, that the Sikhs were
not altogether neutral in the matter, and the government of India
promised considerable reinforcements as soon as possible. Macnaghten
still thought the remedy to be a forward policy, and characterised
as "drivelling" Auckland's sensible suggestion that we could hardly
expect co-operation from potentates whose territory we were always
talking of annexing.
1
## p. 505 (#533) ############################################
SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD
505
On 18 September, 1840, however, Brigadier Dennie defeated the.
forces under Dost Muhammad and the wali of Khulum: near Bamiyan,
and though Dost Muhammad and his son, Afzal Khan, escaped, the
wali came to terms on the 28th and promised not to give refuge or.
help to the ex-amir or any member of his family. Dost Muhammad,
Therefore, fled to Kohistan, where he was followed by Sale and
Burnes. There was some hard fighting in which Edward. Conolly,
Lord and others were killed, but Dost Muhammad, after winning an.
important if small success at Parwandurrah on 2 November, 1840,
galloped to Kabul and gave himself up to. Macnaghten. He was
treated honourably and taken to India.
The few months that followed were restless. Macnaghten was still
anxious for movement and for the break-up of the Tripartite Treaty,
to which Auckland, though he had Hobhouse against him, would not
consent. As he once said to the chairman of the East India Company,
the country was one of clans and tribes, and there was war and
lawlessness in one district whilst there was peace and contentment.
in another. The Ghilzais were seldom quiet, and the Duranis about
Kandahar strongly resented taxation. Shah Shuja showed no signs
of becoming either a capable or a popular rụler, and the cost of
Afghanistan to the Indian Government was becoming unbearably
great. Todd could no longer put up with the demands of Yar
Muhammad at Herat and broke up the mission there in February,
1841; but this could not draw Auckland into an attack upon the little
state, though it produced a very bad impression both in India and
in England. Expeditions quelled the Duranis and the Ghilzais, but
only for a time.
Thus the situation as 1841 wore on was critical: No proper system
of government had been established. The native army was unreliable.
and the only form of executive action, that of the tax-gatherer
increased the tension. The English were the only real authority and
they practically retained their hold by force and by the distribution
of money amongst the chiefs. Macnaghten was now appointed gover-
nor of Bombay and Burnes was designated his successor. The forces
were under the command of General Elphinstone, who in April, 1841,.
succeeded Cotton, and his appointment, made against his own wishes,
constitutes one of the most serious mistakes that Auckland committed. .
In a position requiring above all things activity and physical energy;
was placed an elderly invalid, personally brave, but, as he himself
stated, hardly able to walk. Nott, a man of will and resources, if of
strong temper, would have been a better choice. But those who spoke
of the dangers of the situation, like Brigadier Roberts, had no chance
of promotion. There were no doubt many men in the various garrisons
of talent as well as courage. All they required was capable leading,
and that they never got. There was another mistand. The troops
at Kabul had now been moved to the ill-constructed and ill-fortified
cantonments outside the city next to the mission compound but very
## p. 506 (#534) ############################################
516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
badly placed; whilst the commissariat stores were placed separately
and some distance away. It has always been maintained that the
placing of the troops in this wretched position instead of in the Bala
Hissar was the chief cause of the subsequent disaster, and for that
Cotton, and to some extent Macnaghten, must bear the blame.
As has been indicated one great difficulty was obviously finance.
Afghanistan was going to cost at the lowest estimate a million and
a quarter a year, and the views of the home authorities on the subject
reached India early in 1841. They were beginning to feel that Shah
Shuja was not worth the money he cost. It was decided in consequ-
ence that economies must be effected, and it was unwisely thought
best to retrench the stipends paid to the various Afghan chiefs by
which alone their adherence was secured. This misplaced economy
produced its natural results. The Ghilzai chiefs, left Kabul and took up
their stand in the country near Jallalabad, plundering those who
came by and entirely preventing regular communication with India
proper. Auckland seems to have understood what was happening
better than Macnaghten, but he hoped for the best; he was misled
and made the most of any trifling success. Sale, who was soon after-
wards wounded, was directed to clear the passes; troops were hurried
out; and Macnaghten hoped that Macgregor, who had been serving
in the district near Jallalabad, would soon have the rising in hand. The
disaffectior. was, however, spreading and Kohistan was beginning to
be disturbed. There was plenty of fighting before Sale reached
Gandammak at the end of October, 1841, but by that time events of a
far more important and tragic nature were preparing in the capital.
It seems to have been known at Kabul that some sort of outbreak
was coming, and warnings were given but not heeded; we must not
press responsibility too far on that account, as wild rumours were
sure to be running round the bazaar. Still it seems extraordinary that
more should not have been known of a conspiracy which included
the heads of nearly all the important tribes in the country. The actual
outbreak seems to have been premature as, had the conspirators
waited a little, Macnaghten and a considerable body of troops would
have left Kabul. On 2 November a revolt broke out in the native
quarter; and, in Burnes' house in the city, Alexander Burnes, his
brother Charles, and William Broadfoot were murdered. The shah's
treasury was looted and the guards killed. Shah Shuja sent a regi.
ment of Hindustani soldiers to suppress the tumult, but they did
nothing, and were with difficulty brought into the Bala Hissar by
Brigadier Shelton who had been sent by Elphinstone. The move-
ment in force which might have restored order never came, and the
question, as Kaye truly says, is : “How came it that an insurrectionary
movement, which might have been vanquished at the outset by a
handful of men, was suffered to grow into a great revolution? " The
responsibility clearly seems to rest with Macnaghten and Elphinstone,
who did not consider the outbreak as serious when they first heard
## p. 507 (#535) ############################################
REVOLT AT KABUL
507
of it, and took no proper steps to quell it. Even the next day but
a trifling attempt was made and that ended in failure. Hurried
messages were sent to Sale and Nott for help, and the position became
more serious than ever when all the commissariat stores fell into the
enemy's hands. Day after day there was the same helpless story.
Almost at once the general took the heart out of everyone by sug-
gesting the possibility of negotiation, and Macnaghten began to give
and to promise money. By this time Muhammad Akbar Khan, the
son of Dost Muhammad, had reached. Bamiyan on his way from
Turkestan.
Elphinstone was worse, far worse, than useless, and on 9 Novem-
ber, 1841, he was persuaded to bring over Brigadier Shelton from the
Bala Hissar to give him charge of the cantonment. But even then
the general would not allow him to be independent; the two did not
agree, and no improvement resulted. Trifling successes at a fearful
cost in valuable lives—there were many brave men in the army of
occupation-brought no relief, and even they ceased about 13 Novem-
ber. On the 15th Pottinger came in from Kohistan, bringing news
of the loss of Charikar, the destruction of a Gurkha regiment, and
the march of Kohistanis to join the Kabul rebels. To add to this
Macnaghten now learned that Sale had gone to Jallalabad. Some
step had to be taken, so he wrote a formal letter on 18 November to
the general recommending that they should hold out in the canton-
ments as long as possible. He was not in favour of a removal to the
Bala Hissar, agreeing in this with Shelton. Both seem to have been
wrong; for though the change would have been attended with loss
and danger, the same could be said of any course decided upon, and
the move there would have been a better plan of action than the
retreat to Jallalabad. On 23 November the Afghans won a victory,
which Eyre thought decisive, over a force sent out to hold the
Bemaru hills, and it was evident from the conduct of the troops that
they were losing heart. Hence on the 24th it was decided to try
negotiation. When, however, the Afghans demanded unconditional
surrender the conference broke up.
From 25 November, 1841, onwards news of these terrible events
began to reach Auckland. He saw at once the real difficulty of the
situation. On 1 December he wrote to the commander-in-chief :
It is however I fear more likely that the national spirit has been] gene.
rally roused and in this case the difficulty will not be one of fighting and
gaining victories but of supplies, of movement, and of carriage. 2
He approved of the sending of reinforcements, but feared that they
would be too late. Sale, he thought, would have to fight his way to
Peshawar. In a letter of the 2nd he asked Anderson at Bombay how
1
1 Eyre, Kabul Insurrection, p. 163.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 197.
## p. 508 (#536) ############################################
508
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
all this could have come about when he had received nothing but
favourable reports; alluding, no doubt, to the letters, remarkable
enough, which Macnaghten had written just before the outbreak. On
4 December, when he knew of course of the death of Burnes, he wrote
to Macnaghten:
And yet under the most favourable events I would have you share in the
feeling which is growing strongly upon me—that the maintenance of the posi-
tion which we attempted to establish in Afghanistan is no longer to be looked
to, and that after our experience of the last few weeks it must appear to be
if not vain, yet upon every consideration of prudence far too hazardous and
. too costly in money and in life for us to continue to wrestle against the univer-
sal opinion, national and religious, which has been so suddenly and so strongly
brought in array against us. And it will be for you and for this government
to consider in what manner all that belongs to India mav be most immediately
and most honourably withdrawn from the country,
A bolder, even a wiser man would have struck a fiercer note, but
Auckland seems to have come to a decision, perhaps one that he
afterwards regretted, but to which he adhered in principle for the
few sad months which remained to him in India. On 8 December
Colvin wrote to Clerk that the policy of the government would be :
in the event of a reverse at Kabul to maintain indeed a high tone, and to speak
of plans of punishing the Afghan, but in reality to content ourselves with
remaining in collected strength along the line of the Satlej and Indus. '
Meanwhile Muhammad Akbar Khan had arrived in Kabul, and
provided a recognised leader for the rebellious Afghans. He was a
young man of daring and energy, but with all the wild characteristics
of his savage race. He saw that the easiest way to deal with the
English was to starve them out, and that, as provisions became scarce,
the rank and file would become demoralised. This truth was equally
clear to the besieged, and they realised, if there was to be a retreat,
the sooner it began the better. On 8 December, 1841, it was decided
to renew negotiations, and on the 11th Macnaghten's articles were
drawn up and in the main accepted by the Afghans. They provided
for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan by the English. The troops
were to leave as soon as possible and to be allowed to go in safety.
Shah Shuja was either to remain on an allowance or to go to India
with the British troops, and as soon as the British troops reached
Peshawar in safety Dost Muhammad and all the other Afghans were
to be allowed to return. When this had been effected the family of
Shah Shuja should be permitted to join him. Four British officers
were to be left as hostages, and Afghan chiefs were to accompany
the British army. Friendship was to be maintained between the
Afghans and the English, and the Afghans were not to ally themselves
with any other foreign power without the consent of the English. A
resident should be received in Kabul if the two nations so wished.
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 202, verso.
2 Idem, 37707, f. 14.
## p. 509 (#537) ############################################
MACNAGHTEN'S MURDER
509
>
It is perfectly obvious that the Afghans never drea, ned of carrying
out these articles, but on behalf of Macnaghten it has been said that
he was bound to make some such agreement because he realised that
no sort of reliance could be placed on the Military forces. And this
no doubt is true. But the further and more serious question remains
as to how far the whole position of affairs was not due to his own
previous folly, and to his want of prompt action when the revolt
began. On the whole he was at least as much to blame as the soldiers,
for whose leaders no excuse can be offered. Their plain duty, as
Wellington told Greville, was to have attacked the rebels in the city
the moment they realised what was going on, and those who refused
ör neglected to give orders to that effect involved the many brave
men who served under them, and who asked for nothing better than
to die sword in hand, in undeserved blame.
The evacuation was to begin in three days, and those troops that
were in the Bala Hissar left on the 13th, not without difficulty and
humiliation. The forts round the cantonment were ceded, and now,
amid . every circumstance of discouragement and dishonour, the
retreat towards Jallalabad must commence. While the force delayed
the snow began to fall, and on 19 December the last chance of help
vanished when it was known that the force which had set out from
Kandahar had returned there. The departure was fixed for the 22nd.
But useless, complicated, and not too honourable negotiations still
continued, for Macnaghten never lost the hope, a vain one, of dividing
the enemy. The result of this policy came on the 23rd when he was
murdered by Akbar Khan while at a conference. Shelton accidentally
escaped the same fate: but Trevor was killed and others present were
taken prisoners. It does not seem that Akbar Khan meant at first
to kill Macnaghten; but it is one more token of the envoy's essential
unfitness for the post he occupied that with his experience of the
character of the Afghans he should have trusted them as he did. As
Burnes said, he was an excellent man, but quite out of place in
Afghanistan. When at the end he descended to a policy of intrigue,
he followed the course which has usually led to failure in the East.
As to the murder, he must have known what a trifle a man's life was
in the eyes of an Afghan, and how many of those near at the moment
were thirsting for the blood of every. Englishman in their country.
The event then, while a tribute to Macnaghten's courage, cannot do
anything to clear his memory from the serious mistakes of which
he had been guilty. On 24 December it was known for certain in the
cantonments that he was dead, and yet nothing was done. Fresh
conditions were sent in, more and more humiliating; money, guns,
ammunition, and hostages were demanded, and though Pottinger in
vain protested, there seemed to be no depth of humiliation to which
the general would not descend. On 1 January, 1842, the final treaty
was ratified. English ladies were not to be left as hostages; other-
wise the Afghans had all they wished.
## p. 510 (#538) ############################################
510
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
And now the march through the snow, looked forward to with
dread, was to become a reality. On 6 January the soldiers, refusing
to wait any longer for the promised safeguard from the Afghan chiefs,
marched out of the cantonments. Their leaders would not fight, and
they had to do their best at running away. Sixteen thousand men,
brave men too, were to be sacrified to the utter incapacity of their
commanding officers; already they had become a disorderly rabble.
The sick and wounded were left behind in the Bala Hissar.
Sale has been criticised for not coming, as ordered, to help Elphin-
stone, and it is certainly difficult to understand how anyone in his
position could refuse to do so; but there seems no reason to doubt
his statement that his brigade could not reach Kabul, and certain
it is that with things as they were his force would have been of little
use. He probably could not realise that matters were in such a
desperate condition. Hence he took what he thought was the wisest
course, and fell back on Jallalabad which he surprised on 13 Novem-
ber, 1841, and where he prepared to hold out indefinitely. Broadfoot
especially distinguished himself in the laying out of the fortifications.
On 9 January a message was received from Pottinger, who was now
in political charge at Kabul, and Elphinstone, ordering the evacua-
tion of the fortress, but Macgregor and Sale declined to obey. On
the 13th as the men were at work on the fortifications they saw a
solitary horseman approaching along the Kabul road. It was Dr.
Brydon, almost the sole survivor of the army which had left Kabul.
The exact composition of the force which had disappeared is
known from Lady Sale's journal :
The advanced guard consisted of the 44th Queens, 4th Irregular Horse, and
Skinner's Horse, two horse artillery six-pounder guns, Sappers and miners
mountain train, and the late Envoy's escort. The main body included the 5th
and 37th Native Infantry, the latter in charge of the treasure; Anderson's
Horse, the Shah's 6th Regiment, two horse artillery six-pounder guns. The
rearguard was composed of the 54th Native Infantry, 5th Cavalry, and two
six-pounder horse artillery guns. The force consisted of about 4500 fighting
men, and 12,000 followers. 1
It left hurriedly without, as has been said, the Afghan escort,
herein acting against the advice of friendly Afghans. The progress
was slow, the suffering was intense, and pillage on the part of the
Afghans began from the start. Soon too the semblance of order was
abandoned and discipline vanishea. The Afghan horsemen continued
to hang upon the rear, taking what they could get hold of. It is
significant that in two days only ten miles were covered. In the
terrible pass of Khurd Kabul, which runs for five miles between high
mountains, the attacks on the retreating force became more serious,
and three thousand at least are said to have perished here. Akbar Khan
appears to have been unable to check the Ghilzais who were mad
1 Cf. Eyre, Kabul Insurrection, pp. 256-7.
## p. 511 (#539) ############################################
THE MASSACRE
511
with fanatical rage. The wives and widows of officers and the
married officers were now given into his charge, partly for protection,
partly, as hostages. But the murders continued and increased as the
march was resumed, and on 10 January not more than a quarter of
the force was left. Soon Elphinstone and Shelton were in the hands
of Akbar Khan, and at Jagdallak, where there was a barrier, the final
stage of the massacre began. A small number reached Gandammak
only to perish there, and of half a dozen who had pushed on to
Fatehabad only Dr Brydon, as has been said, got to Jallalabad. It is
computed that more died from cold than from the knives of the
Afghans—but who can say? The prisoners who had been taken by
the way numbered 120 : men, women, and children.
It is easy to gather from his correspondence that Auckland's first
feelings were those of utter astonishment. He had been entirely
misled, and that fact prevented him at first from thinking that matters
were as serious as they really were. But events told their own tale
and as the terrible details reached him he realised to the full the
responsibility which attached to him personally. He seems to have
given way to despair and at first only wished that one brigade with
artillery, which was placed under Brigadier Wild, should be sent to
Jallalabad. All that he desired now was to get out of Afghanistan
as best he could. And as Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief,
had always been opposed to the Afghan occupation, and thought it
dangerous to move more troops out of British India, he was not
likely to want support in this views. Fortunately, however, the initia-
tive was taken by men of determined character acting on their own
responsibility. Troops were hurried up by Clerk, the agent at
Peshawar, and Robertson, the lieutenant-governor of the North-West
Provinces. Aiding them were men like Henry Lawrence, who knew
what to do in a crisis; and on 4 January, 1842, the second brigade,
just over 3000 strong, crossed Satlej on its way to Peshawar. And
when later in the same month the command of the whole relief force
was given to General Pollock, everyone felt that at last a step had
been taken in the right direction,
It is needless to follow Auckland's varying thoughts as disaster
followed disaster. The letter of 23 January, 1842, written by Colvin
to his father before the fate of the Kabul army was known, illustrates
the vi:ws of the official world of Calcutta. It shows at once extra-
ordinary penetration and a corresponding lack of statesmanship, but
its closing sentences in which he speaks of his own position and
prospects will ever be read with pride by the members of the great
service of which he was so distinguished an ornament.
At the end of the month of January came the definite news of the
loss of the Kabul army and a proclamation couched in spirited
language was at once issued. But Auckland, doubtful as ever and
anxious not to embarrass his successor who was opposed to the
## p. 512 (#540) ############################################
512
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Afghan war,' had not really made up his mind. On 3 February he
wrote to the commander-in-chief that Jallalabad might have to be
abandoned, but that a strong force ought to be kept at Peshawar. ?
On the same day on fresh information he spoke in an undecided way
of retiring to Firozpur. This confirmed what he said in his letter home
of 18 February. Meanwhile Brigadier Wild had hurried from
Firozpur with four regiments of native infantry; guns he was sup-
posed to get from the Sikhs through the political agent. When he got
to Peshawar, however, at the end of December, 1841, he found the
Sikhs not at all disposed to lend guns, and what they had were hardly
worth borrowing. He managed to procure four very inferior guns
on 3 January, but he had difficulties about transport and very little
ammunition. The Sikhs under General Avitabile would only promise
at first to go as far as 'Ali Masjid. The importance of holding this,
the key to the Khaibar, was obvious, so, on 15 January, 1842, half
the brigade moved on there. When Wild followed on the 19th with
the rest, the Sikhs who were to have accompanied him refused to go;
and though he pushed on himself he was decisively beaten with
the loss of a gun at the entrance to the pass. The net result was
that on 24 January 'Ali Masjid was given up and the four regiments
fell back on Jamrud. All that could be done was to wait for the
arrival of Pollock, who reached Peshawar on 5 February, and by
that time so many of the troops were sick that an immediate advance
could not be thought of. So all through February and March, 1842,
the brigades remained at Peshawar, and Pollock resisted every temp-
tation to move, though Sale and Macgregor wished him to do so. We
must not forget toc that he quarters was strongly of opinion that
any movement should only be designed to relieve the garrisons.
At Jallalabad there was considerable anxiety. Sale knew that
he could not help those in Kandahar and Ghazni, and he felt under no
obligation to help Shah Shuja. And if Auckland, as seemed obviously
the case, did not wish him to go to Kabul, it was not much use staying
in Jallalabad, especially as he was bound under the treaty, as Shah
Shuja reminded him, to leave the country. There was of course the
question of the prisoners, but Sale knew that their position was not
likely to be improved by the movement of a small force to rescue
them. The heroic conduct of Broadfoot, backed by Havelock, pre-
vented a surrender in February, 1842; and though an earthquake on
the 19th of that month did great damage to the fortifications, the
garrison was not disheartened. Akbar Khan was close by, and on
11 March a successful sortie was made. It was not, however, till
31 March, 1842, when dragoons and horse artillery had reached him.
that Pollock began his famous march. His difficulties of transport
1 Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, p. 1.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS; 37707, f. 145.
3 Idern, 37707, £. 187.
## p. 513 (#541) ############################################
ELLENBOROUGH'S ARRIVAL
513
.
were great, and, though he had secured at last some sort of co-opera-
tion from the Sikhs, it was not till 5 April that he advanced to attack
the Khaibar. This was successfully managed. 'Ali-Masjid was aban-
doned by the Afghans. Pollock, leaving the Sikhs to guard the pass,
well or ill, pushed forward and marched into Jallalabad on the 16th.
Meanwhile Sale had on the 7th attacked and burnt Akbar Khan's
camp and all danger for the moment was over.
On 8 October, 1841, the post of governor-general of India in
succession to Auckland was offered to and accepted by Lord Ellen-
borough. He had long been closely connected with Indian affairs, as
he had been appointed president of the Board of Control in 1828.
Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta on 28 February, 1842. His
general policy as regards Afghanistan is indicated in the well-known
dispatch of 15 March to the commander-in-chief. It has been the
subject of much criticism, and yet it is difficult to see that he could
have said anything better. Sir Henry Hardinge has recorded that
he desired no stronger proof of Ellenborough's ability and soundness
of judgment than it afforded, and we can certainly add that it supplies
extraordinary evidence of his rapid grasp of the essential features of
the situation. After a brief historical review it continues :
All these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal
hostility of the whole people of Afghanistan, united at the present moment
against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as national charac-
ter, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Afghanistan,
could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength,
in resisting the invasion of any army from the west, and therefore, that the
ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country
mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.
After saying that the British can be no longer bound to support the
cause of Shah Shuja it proceeds:
Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military
considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the de-
tached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and
Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary
risk, and finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the
infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make
it appear to them, to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the
power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate
their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any
deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that
the King we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the
support of the nation over which he has been placed.
Very significant are the paragraphs of Lord Ellenborough’s
dispatch to which most attention has been directed. They run :
We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward
position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs,
or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Afghanistan would have
the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of
confidence and strength. That which will really, and will alone control the
33
## p. 514 (#542) ############################################
514
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and
within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army; perfect in its
equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its com-
munications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements
are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any
enemy.
In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure
of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more pro-
bable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers,
and most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result
of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would,
therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in
Afghanistan and Sind the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of
bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full
scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time,
we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some
risk; and we should therefore consider that the object of striking a decisive
blow at the Afghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in com-
bination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee-a blow which might re-
establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impres-
sion of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish
an atrocious enemy,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incur-
red, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such unnecessary
risk, and to secure decisive success.
The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will in all
the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions
of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to
relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan, which are now surrounded by the
enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military
character of the army, and deeply interesting to the feelings of their country;
but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a rea-
sonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men
who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose
preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the
release of the prisoners taken at Cabool is an object likewise deeply interesting
in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accom-
plished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may
come into, our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of
the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question in the event of Major-
General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united
force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward
position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabool. 1
The conditions of such further advance are then stated. This long
extract (with which may be compared Lord Ellenborough's memo-
randum to Queen Victoria of 18 March and his letter home of 21
March, 1842)2 is sufficiently complete to show Lord Ellenborough's
real meaning. What he obviously intended to convey was that, as
soon as it was possible safely to do so, everyone must retire from
Afghanistan, that before they did so some decisive blow must be
struck if possible, and that those on the spot, subject to certain general
conditions of caution, must make the decision.
How necessary
caution was is evident enough; even so well informed an officer as
Major Rawlinson had suggested that Kandahar should be handed
1 Ellenborough MSS. (P. R. O. ), 83.
2 Colchester, Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, pp. 17 and 176.
2
## p. 515 (#543) ############################################
KANDAHAR RELIEVED
516
over to Shah Kamran and that we should give him our general
support, though the attitude of Persia was uncertain.
On 6 April, 1842, the governor-general left Calcutta and no one
can accuse him of want of activity. We must look at the situation
from his point of view. At Kandahar was Nott, who had been asked
in the early days of the trouble at Kabul to send Maclaren's brigade
to Elphinstone's assistance. It was sent but returned, because unable
to advance, on 8 December, 1841. Its return has been criticised on
.
several grounds, but Nott at all events was glad enough to see it back
again. The country round Kandahar was in a state of insurrection,
and after much tortuous negotiation an army of insurgents settled
down about five miles from the city on 12 January, 1842. Nott went
out and scattered them, but his victory only seemed to bring the
surro! 'nding Durani chiefs into more open hostility, and under Mirza
Ahmad th gave active resistance to the enemy. On 21 February
Nott received the belated message from Elphinstone and Pottinger
ordering the evacuation of Kandahar and Kħilat-i-Ghilzai, the latter
a fort under Leech about half way to Ghazni. He felt under no
obligation to obey this command, for the position of the English in
the country, as was pointed out by the Durani chiefs, was now sone-
what anomalous, and required independent consideration. Nott
decided, therefore, to stay where he was. On 10 March the city was
wellnigh captured by a stratagem. On the 31st news came of the
fall of Ghazni; Khilat-i-Ghilzai was still holding out. But where was
the rescue party from Sind? About the close of February, 1842,
Brigadier England approached the Bolan Pass. He left Dadur on
7 March and reached Quetta on the 16th. But on the 28th he was
beaten at Hakulzai and retreated, with some discredit, to Quetta.
At last, on 30 April, aided by Nott's men from Kandahar, he got
through the Khojak Pass and the two brigades entered the city on
10 May.
The position was now somewhat clearer, and it had been simpli-
fied still further by what had happened at the capital. Shah Shuja,
who had continued to reign as the nominal king at the Bala Hissar,
on 5 April was shot down by men posted by Shuja-ud-daula, son of
Zaman Shah, as he set out for Jallalabad. There is much uncertainty
as to the cause of the murder, but it was doubtless the inevitable
outcome of Barakzai feeling whatever the immediate occasion.
We have therefore now this position. A strong force on the west
at Kandahar, with very uncertain means of communication with its
base, and a strong force at Jallalabad in an even worse position as
regards supplies and reinforcements. Both forces, as things were, ,
were unable to move forward. When, therefore, Lord Ellenborough
on his march up-country heard of General England's repulse and the
fall of Ghazni he gave the instructions which have been the subject
of so much controversy. On 18 April he wrote to the commander-
in-chief :
## p. 516 (#544) ############################################
516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
I cannot think that Major-General Pollock will under his instructions of
the 15th ult. remain at or near Jellalabad. Your Excellency is so much nearer
to Peshawar than I am that I depend upon your giving any instructions upon
that head to Major-General Pollock which you may think necessary. His
position is far from satisfactory, even during his operation; with an active
enemy in his front and a large force of Sikhs in his rear he is placed almost in
the fauces caudinae if there should be treachery. Then this horrible climate,
so much more destructive than any battle, which in three days may deprive
him of two thirds of his force. . . . 1
On the 19th he reviewed the whole position, allowing the com-
mander-in-chief to decide as to General Pollock, but pointing out the
advantages of the force remaining at Jallalabad during the hot
weather on the ground of health and on account of the influence
which the presence of this force might have upon negotiations for
the exchange of prisoners. On the other hand he spoke of the decision
which had been taken in favour of ultimate retirement to the Indus
and the difficulties in which the force would find itself "at one end
of a long and difficult pass with an enemy in front and an ally not
to be entirely depended upon, in its rear”? The orders to Nott were
as follows. The letter is dated Benares, 19 April, 1842 :
1. I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take imme-
diate measures for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie. You will
effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently bring away. You
will destroy the fort likewise unless, at the time at which the operation shall
be effected which is hereinbefore enjoined, Prince Timur having remained
faithful to the British interests shall possess sufficient force to be reasonably
expected to be able to maintain that fort upon your giving it into his charge.
2. You will evacuate the city of Candahar giving that too into the charge
of Prince Timur under the circumstances above mentioned. You will other-
wise ruin its defences before you abandon it.
3. You will then proceed to take up a position at Quetta until the season
may enable you to return upon Sukkur.
4. The object of the above directed measures is to withdraw all our forces
to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season, and other circumstances,
may permit you to take up a new positior. there. The manner of effecting this
now necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.
5. You will understand that, in the event of Prince Timur having conti-
med faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means
of preserving by his own native troops or any other troops in his pay the city
of Candahar and the fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, but no British guns must be left
which you can carry away, and no British officer must remain in his service
retaining his commission in the British army. 3
It has often been stated that Lord Ellenborough at this period
was in a state of panic, but a letter to Peel of 21 April, 1842, does not
give any such impression; it runs :
At last we have got a victory, and our military character is re-established.
Sir Robert Sale has completely defeated the Afghans under the walls of Jellala-
bad. Major-General Pollock has forced the Khyber Pass and is in march on Jella-
labad. These events took place on the 6th and 7th of this month. The garrison
of Khilat-i-Ghilzye is safe, but is not yet drawn off. Candahar has been nearly
lost by the error of General Nott. Brigadier Eragland was repulsed in a move.
ment he should never have made towards Candahar with an insufficient force
1 Ellenborough MSS, 83. ? Idem, 83.
3 Idem, 95.
## p. 517 (#545) ############################################
ELLENBOROUGH'S ORDERS
617
I am satisfied that the momentary success of Sale and of Pollock must not
lead us to change our view of what ought to be our permanent policy. We
mụst draw back our forces into positions in which they may have certain and
easy communication with India. You will see all I think in my letters to the
Commander-in-Chief and the Secret Committee. The victory of Jellalabad
does not change my opinion. Send us every man you can. We want them
all, as you will see when you read the letter to the Secret Committee. I am
making the most of my victory with the troops here and everywhere. . . .
The commander-in-chief did not give the suggested instructions
to Pollock till 29 April, 1842, and even then he specified conditions
under which retirement might be delayed. But on 29 April a letter
had been sent by the governor-general informing Pollock that:
The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan appears to be such according
to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his lordship cannot
but contemplate the possibility of your having been led by the absence of
serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst
the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you muzi, in common with every
true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph. upon the
scene of our late disasters, to advance upon and occupy the city of Cabool.
Those who have criticised this letter have often forgotten that it was
sent just when the news had reached the governor-general that Shah
Shuja had been assassinated. Hitherto Lord Ellenborough had had to
resist those who were pressing for a fresh occupation of Afghanistan.
A letter which he wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 17 May, 1842,
has often been misunderstood because only partially quoted; it runs :
But I must tell you that in not ordering the army to Ghuznee and Cabul
without the means of movement or supply, and in giving up the irrational
schemes of extending our dominions to the westward, I stand alone and have
to; withstand against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I have
acted altogether in all that I have done upon my own judgment. 1
But that he contemplated considerable exercise of individual judg-
ment even at this early stage is evident from the letter to Nott of
13 May, 1842 :
Your position when supplied with treasure, ammunition, and medicines,
will be more favourable than the Governor-General had reason to suppose it
would be when the instructions of the 19th ultimo were addressed to you, but
this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary.
the instructions, in as far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur.
That movement you will make at such period and with such precautions
as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the
efficiency of your army.
The Governor-General understands that consistently with the necessary
regard to these objects of primary importance you cannot retire below the
passes till October.
Neither does the decease of Shah Shoojah induce the Governor-General
to vary those instructions as far as they relate to the measures you were direc-
ted to adopt on evacuating the fort of Knelat-i-Ghilzye and the city of Candahar.
was constant sporadic insurrection, or looting that might become
such, at any turn of events. The road to India through the Khaibar
was never safe, and communication that way was only kept up by
force and hribery. Kalat was taken by General Willshire on 13
November, 1839, as he was marching home, because the English terms
were not accepted. The khan himself, Mihrab, was killed and the new
khan Shah Nawaz, who was set up in his place was anything but
popular, the less so as the provinces of Shal, Mastung and Kachhi
were now handed over to Afghanistan. It may be doubted whether
these proceedings were wise, and it seems certain that they were
unjust
The news now began to filter through of a Russian expedition
under General Peroffsky from Orenburg into Central Asia and parti-
cularly against Khiva. The provocation was the slave trade in Russian
subjects which, there, as at Herat, was actively carried on and had
been so for over a hundred years; this and the constant plundering of
caravans. If proof were needed of the general nervousness as to
Russia, it could be found in a letter from Burnes written in November.
a
## p. 503 (#531) ############################################
THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITION
503
1839. He writes : "Ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and
those of Russia will touch-that is, the states dependent upon either
of us will—and that is the same thing". Kaye has shown the diffi-
culties of this winter--the Russian scare; trouble at Herat; trouble
with the Uzbegs; trouble in Bokhara where Colonel Stoddart, the
Resident, had been imprisoned under the most humiliating conditions,
and where Dost Muhammad had now found at once a refuge and
a prison; troubles in Kandahar, in Kohistan, and at Kalat; trouble
with the Sikhs who were ceaselessly intriguing with the disturbing
elements in Afghanistan. The tendency in all such cases is to try and
crush the symptoms rather than eradicate the causes of the mischief.
The English officials thought only of expeditions, and Macnaghten
planned one to the Hindu Kush. It is only fair to Auckland to say
that he consistently resisted. all such proposals, and a letter written
by him to Macnaghten on 22 March, 1840, shows what his views
were; 1 there are others of the same nature.
The wisdom of his attitude was shown when, about the middle of
March, 1840, the failure of the Russian expedition was announced.
Auckland had made proper preparations, and he was far from being
blind to the seriousness of the situation, had Russia obtained a hold
on Khiva and still more on Bokhara. But it must be recalled that the
difficulties of the Afghan position had been increased rather than
diminished by the death of Ranjit Singh (27 June, 1839) and the
confusion in the Lahore state which followed it. The matter is alluded
to by Lord Auckland in a letter of 11 May, 1840, to Hobhouse. It
was even suggested that various Sikh magnates were engaged in
treasonable intrigues with various rebels in Afghanistan, and there
is no doubt that the Khalsa and the heir to the throne, Nao Nihal
Singh, were strongly opposed to the passage of British troops through
the Panjab, at which, considering the language of Macnaghten, one
can hardly be surprised. Colvin had written to William Butterworth
Bayley on 23 January, 1840 :
There never was a time when the Sikh Durbar was more dependent upon
us than at present. They are conscious of their many dissensions and real
weakness and are, I imagine, surprised and in some measure distrustful at our
self-denial in taking no advantage of them. A serious quarrel with us at the
present time on the part of the Sikhs I look upon as an impossible thing. 3
With this may be compared his letter to Macnaghten on the following
13 June, which is impressive in its seriousness. There was soon to be
plenty of proof of the correctness of Colvin's suspicions.
The position at Herat was what might have been expected. Major
Todd and his associates did their best to put down the slave trade
there, and Captain Abbot was sent to Khiva with the same end in
view. The latter arranged a treaty which was disavowed, but his
successor, Captain Shakespeare, managed to get 400 Russian slaves
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37698, f. 89, verso.
2 Idem, 37699, f. 76, verso.
3 Idem, 37698, f. 6.
## p. 504 (#532) ############################################
504
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
set free. Much money was advanced to the ruler of Herat, but he
was far from loyal, and Macnaghten would have annexed the little
state to Afghanistan and Auckland, who was supported by the com-
mander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls; agreed. Major Todd we learn
afterwards came round to the same view.
The Ghilzais gave constant trouble; their chiefs had taken refuge
during the winter of 1839 in Peshawar, but, when the warm weather
came, they were in arms again between Kandahar and Kabul, and
took a good deal of repressing. There was failure in Kalat, which,
the same summer, was recaptured by Nasir Khan, the son of the
chief who fell when the British took the place. And when later he
was driven out he was not conquered. Quetta was besieged; and
everywhere there were indications that Shah Shuja inspired no sort
of fear or respect. Yet strangely enough Macnaghten wrote to Colvin :
"I have nothing more to say about His Majesty's character than I
have already said. I believe him to be the best and ablest man in
his Kingdom". Auckland in one of his letters to Hobhouse, when
speaking of the suppression of the Ghilzais, throws a little light on
the causes of the trouble :
But the business was ill and discreditably done. Blunders were made and
harshnesses committed. Our officers quarrelled with, and as is too often the
case counteracted, each other, and what as it appeared to me might have been
a business of ease and graciousness, has been very much the reverse.
Macnaghten could not prevail upon the Indian Government to
go to war with the Sikhs or to annex Herat, but he continued to
dream of the further extension of British influence in Central Asia.
In September, 1840, he sent Captain Arthur Conolly--something of a
visionary but a very gallant one-on a mission to Khiva and Kokand.
He subsequently proceeded to Bokhara where he and Colonel Stoddart
were cruelly murdered.
The brightest circumstance of this uncomfortable summer was
the assurance given by Russia that there would be no further attack
on Khiva. And equally important perhaps was the surrender of Dost
Muhammad. In July, 1840, the Nawab Jabbar Khan gave himself
up to the small force stationed at Bamiyan. Dost Muhammad, having
escaped with some difficulty, had taken refuge with his old ally the
wali of Khuium. He soon had a considerable force under him and
drove back the British outposts, a most distressing feature of the
business being the desertion to the enemy of some of the new national
levies raised to support Shah Shuja. There was evidence, as Torrens
wrote to the Resident at Lahore on 1 October, that the Sikhs were
not altogether neutral in the matter, and the government of India
promised considerable reinforcements as soon as possible. Macnaghten
still thought the remedy to be a forward policy, and characterised
as "drivelling" Auckland's sensible suggestion that we could hardly
expect co-operation from potentates whose territory we were always
talking of annexing.
1
## p. 505 (#533) ############################################
SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD
505
On 18 September, 1840, however, Brigadier Dennie defeated the.
forces under Dost Muhammad and the wali of Khulum: near Bamiyan,
and though Dost Muhammad and his son, Afzal Khan, escaped, the
wali came to terms on the 28th and promised not to give refuge or.
help to the ex-amir or any member of his family. Dost Muhammad,
Therefore, fled to Kohistan, where he was followed by Sale and
Burnes. There was some hard fighting in which Edward. Conolly,
Lord and others were killed, but Dost Muhammad, after winning an.
important if small success at Parwandurrah on 2 November, 1840,
galloped to Kabul and gave himself up to. Macnaghten. He was
treated honourably and taken to India.
The few months that followed were restless. Macnaghten was still
anxious for movement and for the break-up of the Tripartite Treaty,
to which Auckland, though he had Hobhouse against him, would not
consent. As he once said to the chairman of the East India Company,
the country was one of clans and tribes, and there was war and
lawlessness in one district whilst there was peace and contentment.
in another. The Ghilzais were seldom quiet, and the Duranis about
Kandahar strongly resented taxation. Shah Shuja showed no signs
of becoming either a capable or a popular rụler, and the cost of
Afghanistan to the Indian Government was becoming unbearably
great. Todd could no longer put up with the demands of Yar
Muhammad at Herat and broke up the mission there in February,
1841; but this could not draw Auckland into an attack upon the little
state, though it produced a very bad impression both in India and
in England. Expeditions quelled the Duranis and the Ghilzais, but
only for a time.
Thus the situation as 1841 wore on was critical: No proper system
of government had been established. The native army was unreliable.
and the only form of executive action, that of the tax-gatherer
increased the tension. The English were the only real authority and
they practically retained their hold by force and by the distribution
of money amongst the chiefs. Macnaghten was now appointed gover-
nor of Bombay and Burnes was designated his successor. The forces
were under the command of General Elphinstone, who in April, 1841,.
succeeded Cotton, and his appointment, made against his own wishes,
constitutes one of the most serious mistakes that Auckland committed. .
In a position requiring above all things activity and physical energy;
was placed an elderly invalid, personally brave, but, as he himself
stated, hardly able to walk. Nott, a man of will and resources, if of
strong temper, would have been a better choice. But those who spoke
of the dangers of the situation, like Brigadier Roberts, had no chance
of promotion. There were no doubt many men in the various garrisons
of talent as well as courage. All they required was capable leading,
and that they never got. There was another mistand. The troops
at Kabul had now been moved to the ill-constructed and ill-fortified
cantonments outside the city next to the mission compound but very
## p. 506 (#534) ############################################
516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
badly placed; whilst the commissariat stores were placed separately
and some distance away. It has always been maintained that the
placing of the troops in this wretched position instead of in the Bala
Hissar was the chief cause of the subsequent disaster, and for that
Cotton, and to some extent Macnaghten, must bear the blame.
As has been indicated one great difficulty was obviously finance.
Afghanistan was going to cost at the lowest estimate a million and
a quarter a year, and the views of the home authorities on the subject
reached India early in 1841. They were beginning to feel that Shah
Shuja was not worth the money he cost. It was decided in consequ-
ence that economies must be effected, and it was unwisely thought
best to retrench the stipends paid to the various Afghan chiefs by
which alone their adherence was secured. This misplaced economy
produced its natural results. The Ghilzai chiefs, left Kabul and took up
their stand in the country near Jallalabad, plundering those who
came by and entirely preventing regular communication with India
proper. Auckland seems to have understood what was happening
better than Macnaghten, but he hoped for the best; he was misled
and made the most of any trifling success. Sale, who was soon after-
wards wounded, was directed to clear the passes; troops were hurried
out; and Macnaghten hoped that Macgregor, who had been serving
in the district near Jallalabad, would soon have the rising in hand. The
disaffectior. was, however, spreading and Kohistan was beginning to
be disturbed. There was plenty of fighting before Sale reached
Gandammak at the end of October, 1841, but by that time events of a
far more important and tragic nature were preparing in the capital.
It seems to have been known at Kabul that some sort of outbreak
was coming, and warnings were given but not heeded; we must not
press responsibility too far on that account, as wild rumours were
sure to be running round the bazaar. Still it seems extraordinary that
more should not have been known of a conspiracy which included
the heads of nearly all the important tribes in the country. The actual
outbreak seems to have been premature as, had the conspirators
waited a little, Macnaghten and a considerable body of troops would
have left Kabul. On 2 November a revolt broke out in the native
quarter; and, in Burnes' house in the city, Alexander Burnes, his
brother Charles, and William Broadfoot were murdered. The shah's
treasury was looted and the guards killed. Shah Shuja sent a regi.
ment of Hindustani soldiers to suppress the tumult, but they did
nothing, and were with difficulty brought into the Bala Hissar by
Brigadier Shelton who had been sent by Elphinstone. The move-
ment in force which might have restored order never came, and the
question, as Kaye truly says, is : “How came it that an insurrectionary
movement, which might have been vanquished at the outset by a
handful of men, was suffered to grow into a great revolution? " The
responsibility clearly seems to rest with Macnaghten and Elphinstone,
who did not consider the outbreak as serious when they first heard
## p. 507 (#535) ############################################
REVOLT AT KABUL
507
of it, and took no proper steps to quell it. Even the next day but
a trifling attempt was made and that ended in failure. Hurried
messages were sent to Sale and Nott for help, and the position became
more serious than ever when all the commissariat stores fell into the
enemy's hands. Day after day there was the same helpless story.
Almost at once the general took the heart out of everyone by sug-
gesting the possibility of negotiation, and Macnaghten began to give
and to promise money. By this time Muhammad Akbar Khan, the
son of Dost Muhammad, had reached. Bamiyan on his way from
Turkestan.
Elphinstone was worse, far worse, than useless, and on 9 Novem-
ber, 1841, he was persuaded to bring over Brigadier Shelton from the
Bala Hissar to give him charge of the cantonment. But even then
the general would not allow him to be independent; the two did not
agree, and no improvement resulted. Trifling successes at a fearful
cost in valuable lives—there were many brave men in the army of
occupation-brought no relief, and even they ceased about 13 Novem-
ber. On the 15th Pottinger came in from Kohistan, bringing news
of the loss of Charikar, the destruction of a Gurkha regiment, and
the march of Kohistanis to join the Kabul rebels. To add to this
Macnaghten now learned that Sale had gone to Jallalabad. Some
step had to be taken, so he wrote a formal letter on 18 November to
the general recommending that they should hold out in the canton-
ments as long as possible. He was not in favour of a removal to the
Bala Hissar, agreeing in this with Shelton. Both seem to have been
wrong; for though the change would have been attended with loss
and danger, the same could be said of any course decided upon, and
the move there would have been a better plan of action than the
retreat to Jallalabad. On 23 November the Afghans won a victory,
which Eyre thought decisive, over a force sent out to hold the
Bemaru hills, and it was evident from the conduct of the troops that
they were losing heart. Hence on the 24th it was decided to try
negotiation. When, however, the Afghans demanded unconditional
surrender the conference broke up.
From 25 November, 1841, onwards news of these terrible events
began to reach Auckland. He saw at once the real difficulty of the
situation. On 1 December he wrote to the commander-in-chief :
It is however I fear more likely that the national spirit has been] gene.
rally roused and in this case the difficulty will not be one of fighting and
gaining victories but of supplies, of movement, and of carriage. 2
He approved of the sending of reinforcements, but feared that they
would be too late. Sale, he thought, would have to fight his way to
Peshawar. In a letter of the 2nd he asked Anderson at Bombay how
1
1 Eyre, Kabul Insurrection, p. 163.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 197.
## p. 508 (#536) ############################################
508
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
all this could have come about when he had received nothing but
favourable reports; alluding, no doubt, to the letters, remarkable
enough, which Macnaghten had written just before the outbreak. On
4 December, when he knew of course of the death of Burnes, he wrote
to Macnaghten:
And yet under the most favourable events I would have you share in the
feeling which is growing strongly upon me—that the maintenance of the posi-
tion which we attempted to establish in Afghanistan is no longer to be looked
to, and that after our experience of the last few weeks it must appear to be
if not vain, yet upon every consideration of prudence far too hazardous and
. too costly in money and in life for us to continue to wrestle against the univer-
sal opinion, national and religious, which has been so suddenly and so strongly
brought in array against us. And it will be for you and for this government
to consider in what manner all that belongs to India mav be most immediately
and most honourably withdrawn from the country,
A bolder, even a wiser man would have struck a fiercer note, but
Auckland seems to have come to a decision, perhaps one that he
afterwards regretted, but to which he adhered in principle for the
few sad months which remained to him in India. On 8 December
Colvin wrote to Clerk that the policy of the government would be :
in the event of a reverse at Kabul to maintain indeed a high tone, and to speak
of plans of punishing the Afghan, but in reality to content ourselves with
remaining in collected strength along the line of the Satlej and Indus. '
Meanwhile Muhammad Akbar Khan had arrived in Kabul, and
provided a recognised leader for the rebellious Afghans. He was a
young man of daring and energy, but with all the wild characteristics
of his savage race. He saw that the easiest way to deal with the
English was to starve them out, and that, as provisions became scarce,
the rank and file would become demoralised. This truth was equally
clear to the besieged, and they realised, if there was to be a retreat,
the sooner it began the better. On 8 December, 1841, it was decided
to renew negotiations, and on the 11th Macnaghten's articles were
drawn up and in the main accepted by the Afghans. They provided
for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan by the English. The troops
were to leave as soon as possible and to be allowed to go in safety.
Shah Shuja was either to remain on an allowance or to go to India
with the British troops, and as soon as the British troops reached
Peshawar in safety Dost Muhammad and all the other Afghans were
to be allowed to return. When this had been effected the family of
Shah Shuja should be permitted to join him. Four British officers
were to be left as hostages, and Afghan chiefs were to accompany
the British army. Friendship was to be maintained between the
Afghans and the English, and the Afghans were not to ally themselves
with any other foreign power without the consent of the English. A
resident should be received in Kabul if the two nations so wished.
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37706, f. 202, verso.
2 Idem, 37707, f. 14.
## p. 509 (#537) ############################################
MACNAGHTEN'S MURDER
509
>
It is perfectly obvious that the Afghans never drea, ned of carrying
out these articles, but on behalf of Macnaghten it has been said that
he was bound to make some such agreement because he realised that
no sort of reliance could be placed on the Military forces. And this
no doubt is true. But the further and more serious question remains
as to how far the whole position of affairs was not due to his own
previous folly, and to his want of prompt action when the revolt
began. On the whole he was at least as much to blame as the soldiers,
for whose leaders no excuse can be offered. Their plain duty, as
Wellington told Greville, was to have attacked the rebels in the city
the moment they realised what was going on, and those who refused
ör neglected to give orders to that effect involved the many brave
men who served under them, and who asked for nothing better than
to die sword in hand, in undeserved blame.
The evacuation was to begin in three days, and those troops that
were in the Bala Hissar left on the 13th, not without difficulty and
humiliation. The forts round the cantonment were ceded, and now,
amid . every circumstance of discouragement and dishonour, the
retreat towards Jallalabad must commence. While the force delayed
the snow began to fall, and on 19 December the last chance of help
vanished when it was known that the force which had set out from
Kandahar had returned there. The departure was fixed for the 22nd.
But useless, complicated, and not too honourable negotiations still
continued, for Macnaghten never lost the hope, a vain one, of dividing
the enemy. The result of this policy came on the 23rd when he was
murdered by Akbar Khan while at a conference. Shelton accidentally
escaped the same fate: but Trevor was killed and others present were
taken prisoners. It does not seem that Akbar Khan meant at first
to kill Macnaghten; but it is one more token of the envoy's essential
unfitness for the post he occupied that with his experience of the
character of the Afghans he should have trusted them as he did. As
Burnes said, he was an excellent man, but quite out of place in
Afghanistan. When at the end he descended to a policy of intrigue,
he followed the course which has usually led to failure in the East.
As to the murder, he must have known what a trifle a man's life was
in the eyes of an Afghan, and how many of those near at the moment
were thirsting for the blood of every. Englishman in their country.
The event then, while a tribute to Macnaghten's courage, cannot do
anything to clear his memory from the serious mistakes of which
he had been guilty. On 24 December it was known for certain in the
cantonments that he was dead, and yet nothing was done. Fresh
conditions were sent in, more and more humiliating; money, guns,
ammunition, and hostages were demanded, and though Pottinger in
vain protested, there seemed to be no depth of humiliation to which
the general would not descend. On 1 January, 1842, the final treaty
was ratified. English ladies were not to be left as hostages; other-
wise the Afghans had all they wished.
## p. 510 (#538) ############################################
510
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
And now the march through the snow, looked forward to with
dread, was to become a reality. On 6 January the soldiers, refusing
to wait any longer for the promised safeguard from the Afghan chiefs,
marched out of the cantonments. Their leaders would not fight, and
they had to do their best at running away. Sixteen thousand men,
brave men too, were to be sacrified to the utter incapacity of their
commanding officers; already they had become a disorderly rabble.
The sick and wounded were left behind in the Bala Hissar.
Sale has been criticised for not coming, as ordered, to help Elphin-
stone, and it is certainly difficult to understand how anyone in his
position could refuse to do so; but there seems no reason to doubt
his statement that his brigade could not reach Kabul, and certain
it is that with things as they were his force would have been of little
use. He probably could not realise that matters were in such a
desperate condition. Hence he took what he thought was the wisest
course, and fell back on Jallalabad which he surprised on 13 Novem-
ber, 1841, and where he prepared to hold out indefinitely. Broadfoot
especially distinguished himself in the laying out of the fortifications.
On 9 January a message was received from Pottinger, who was now
in political charge at Kabul, and Elphinstone, ordering the evacua-
tion of the fortress, but Macgregor and Sale declined to obey. On
the 13th as the men were at work on the fortifications they saw a
solitary horseman approaching along the Kabul road. It was Dr.
Brydon, almost the sole survivor of the army which had left Kabul.
The exact composition of the force which had disappeared is
known from Lady Sale's journal :
The advanced guard consisted of the 44th Queens, 4th Irregular Horse, and
Skinner's Horse, two horse artillery six-pounder guns, Sappers and miners
mountain train, and the late Envoy's escort. The main body included the 5th
and 37th Native Infantry, the latter in charge of the treasure; Anderson's
Horse, the Shah's 6th Regiment, two horse artillery six-pounder guns. The
rearguard was composed of the 54th Native Infantry, 5th Cavalry, and two
six-pounder horse artillery guns. The force consisted of about 4500 fighting
men, and 12,000 followers. 1
It left hurriedly without, as has been said, the Afghan escort,
herein acting against the advice of friendly Afghans. The progress
was slow, the suffering was intense, and pillage on the part of the
Afghans began from the start. Soon too the semblance of order was
abandoned and discipline vanishea. The Afghan horsemen continued
to hang upon the rear, taking what they could get hold of. It is
significant that in two days only ten miles were covered. In the
terrible pass of Khurd Kabul, which runs for five miles between high
mountains, the attacks on the retreating force became more serious,
and three thousand at least are said to have perished here. Akbar Khan
appears to have been unable to check the Ghilzais who were mad
1 Cf. Eyre, Kabul Insurrection, pp. 256-7.
## p. 511 (#539) ############################################
THE MASSACRE
511
with fanatical rage. The wives and widows of officers and the
married officers were now given into his charge, partly for protection,
partly, as hostages. But the murders continued and increased as the
march was resumed, and on 10 January not more than a quarter of
the force was left. Soon Elphinstone and Shelton were in the hands
of Akbar Khan, and at Jagdallak, where there was a barrier, the final
stage of the massacre began. A small number reached Gandammak
only to perish there, and of half a dozen who had pushed on to
Fatehabad only Dr Brydon, as has been said, got to Jallalabad. It is
computed that more died from cold than from the knives of the
Afghans—but who can say? The prisoners who had been taken by
the way numbered 120 : men, women, and children.
It is easy to gather from his correspondence that Auckland's first
feelings were those of utter astonishment. He had been entirely
misled, and that fact prevented him at first from thinking that matters
were as serious as they really were. But events told their own tale
and as the terrible details reached him he realised to the full the
responsibility which attached to him personally. He seems to have
given way to despair and at first only wished that one brigade with
artillery, which was placed under Brigadier Wild, should be sent to
Jallalabad. All that he desired now was to get out of Afghanistan
as best he could. And as Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief,
had always been opposed to the Afghan occupation, and thought it
dangerous to move more troops out of British India, he was not
likely to want support in this views. Fortunately, however, the initia-
tive was taken by men of determined character acting on their own
responsibility. Troops were hurried up by Clerk, the agent at
Peshawar, and Robertson, the lieutenant-governor of the North-West
Provinces. Aiding them were men like Henry Lawrence, who knew
what to do in a crisis; and on 4 January, 1842, the second brigade,
just over 3000 strong, crossed Satlej on its way to Peshawar. And
when later in the same month the command of the whole relief force
was given to General Pollock, everyone felt that at last a step had
been taken in the right direction,
It is needless to follow Auckland's varying thoughts as disaster
followed disaster. The letter of 23 January, 1842, written by Colvin
to his father before the fate of the Kabul army was known, illustrates
the vi:ws of the official world of Calcutta. It shows at once extra-
ordinary penetration and a corresponding lack of statesmanship, but
its closing sentences in which he speaks of his own position and
prospects will ever be read with pride by the members of the great
service of which he was so distinguished an ornament.
At the end of the month of January came the definite news of the
loss of the Kabul army and a proclamation couched in spirited
language was at once issued. But Auckland, doubtful as ever and
anxious not to embarrass his successor who was opposed to the
## p. 512 (#540) ############################################
512
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Afghan war,' had not really made up his mind. On 3 February he
wrote to the commander-in-chief that Jallalabad might have to be
abandoned, but that a strong force ought to be kept at Peshawar. ?
On the same day on fresh information he spoke in an undecided way
of retiring to Firozpur. This confirmed what he said in his letter home
of 18 February. Meanwhile Brigadier Wild had hurried from
Firozpur with four regiments of native infantry; guns he was sup-
posed to get from the Sikhs through the political agent. When he got
to Peshawar, however, at the end of December, 1841, he found the
Sikhs not at all disposed to lend guns, and what they had were hardly
worth borrowing. He managed to procure four very inferior guns
on 3 January, but he had difficulties about transport and very little
ammunition. The Sikhs under General Avitabile would only promise
at first to go as far as 'Ali Masjid. The importance of holding this,
the key to the Khaibar, was obvious, so, on 15 January, 1842, half
the brigade moved on there. When Wild followed on the 19th with
the rest, the Sikhs who were to have accompanied him refused to go;
and though he pushed on himself he was decisively beaten with
the loss of a gun at the entrance to the pass. The net result was
that on 24 January 'Ali Masjid was given up and the four regiments
fell back on Jamrud. All that could be done was to wait for the
arrival of Pollock, who reached Peshawar on 5 February, and by
that time so many of the troops were sick that an immediate advance
could not be thought of. So all through February and March, 1842,
the brigades remained at Peshawar, and Pollock resisted every temp-
tation to move, though Sale and Macgregor wished him to do so. We
must not forget toc that he quarters was strongly of opinion that
any movement should only be designed to relieve the garrisons.
At Jallalabad there was considerable anxiety. Sale knew that
he could not help those in Kandahar and Ghazni, and he felt under no
obligation to help Shah Shuja. And if Auckland, as seemed obviously
the case, did not wish him to go to Kabul, it was not much use staying
in Jallalabad, especially as he was bound under the treaty, as Shah
Shuja reminded him, to leave the country. There was of course the
question of the prisoners, but Sale knew that their position was not
likely to be improved by the movement of a small force to rescue
them. The heroic conduct of Broadfoot, backed by Havelock, pre-
vented a surrender in February, 1842; and though an earthquake on
the 19th of that month did great damage to the fortifications, the
garrison was not disheartened. Akbar Khan was close by, and on
11 March a successful sortie was made. It was not, however, till
31 March, 1842, when dragoons and horse artillery had reached him.
that Pollock began his famous march. His difficulties of transport
1 Law, India under Lord Ellenborough, p. 1.
2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS; 37707, f. 145.
3 Idern, 37707, £. 187.
## p. 513 (#541) ############################################
ELLENBOROUGH'S ARRIVAL
513
.
were great, and, though he had secured at last some sort of co-opera-
tion from the Sikhs, it was not till 5 April that he advanced to attack
the Khaibar. This was successfully managed. 'Ali-Masjid was aban-
doned by the Afghans. Pollock, leaving the Sikhs to guard the pass,
well or ill, pushed forward and marched into Jallalabad on the 16th.
Meanwhile Sale had on the 7th attacked and burnt Akbar Khan's
camp and all danger for the moment was over.
On 8 October, 1841, the post of governor-general of India in
succession to Auckland was offered to and accepted by Lord Ellen-
borough. He had long been closely connected with Indian affairs, as
he had been appointed president of the Board of Control in 1828.
Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta on 28 February, 1842. His
general policy as regards Afghanistan is indicated in the well-known
dispatch of 15 March to the commander-in-chief. It has been the
subject of much criticism, and yet it is difficult to see that he could
have said anything better. Sir Henry Hardinge has recorded that
he desired no stronger proof of Ellenborough's ability and soundness
of judgment than it afforded, and we can certainly add that it supplies
extraordinary evidence of his rapid grasp of the essential features of
the situation. After a brief historical review it continues :
All these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal
hostility of the whole people of Afghanistan, united at the present moment
against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as national charac-
ter, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Afghanistan,
could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength,
in resisting the invasion of any army from the west, and therefore, that the
ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country
mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.
After saying that the British can be no longer bound to support the
cause of Shah Shuja it proceeds:
Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military
considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the de-
tached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and
Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary
risk, and finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the
infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make
it appear to them, to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the
power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate
their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any
deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that
the King we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the
support of the nation over which he has been placed.
Very significant are the paragraphs of Lord Ellenborough’s
dispatch to which most attention has been directed. They run :
We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward
position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs,
or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Afghanistan would have
the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of
confidence and strength. That which will really, and will alone control the
33
## p. 514 (#542) ############################################
514
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and
within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army; perfect in its
equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its com-
munications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements
are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any
enemy.
In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure
of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more pro-
bable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers,
and most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result
of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would,
therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in
Afghanistan and Sind the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of
bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full
scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time,
we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some
risk; and we should therefore consider that the object of striking a decisive
blow at the Afghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in com-
bination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee-a blow which might re-
establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impres-
sion of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish
an atrocious enemy,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incur-
red, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such unnecessary
risk, and to secure decisive success.
The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will in all
the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions
of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to
relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan, which are now surrounded by the
enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military
character of the army, and deeply interesting to the feelings of their country;
but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a rea-
sonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men
who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose
preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the
release of the prisoners taken at Cabool is an object likewise deeply interesting
in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accom-
plished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may
come into, our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of
the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question in the event of Major-
General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united
force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward
position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabool. 1
The conditions of such further advance are then stated. This long
extract (with which may be compared Lord Ellenborough's memo-
randum to Queen Victoria of 18 March and his letter home of 21
March, 1842)2 is sufficiently complete to show Lord Ellenborough's
real meaning. What he obviously intended to convey was that, as
soon as it was possible safely to do so, everyone must retire from
Afghanistan, that before they did so some decisive blow must be
struck if possible, and that those on the spot, subject to certain general
conditions of caution, must make the decision.
How necessary
caution was is evident enough; even so well informed an officer as
Major Rawlinson had suggested that Kandahar should be handed
1 Ellenborough MSS. (P. R. O. ), 83.
2 Colchester, Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, pp. 17 and 176.
2
## p. 515 (#543) ############################################
KANDAHAR RELIEVED
516
over to Shah Kamran and that we should give him our general
support, though the attitude of Persia was uncertain.
On 6 April, 1842, the governor-general left Calcutta and no one
can accuse him of want of activity. We must look at the situation
from his point of view. At Kandahar was Nott, who had been asked
in the early days of the trouble at Kabul to send Maclaren's brigade
to Elphinstone's assistance. It was sent but returned, because unable
to advance, on 8 December, 1841. Its return has been criticised on
.
several grounds, but Nott at all events was glad enough to see it back
again. The country round Kandahar was in a state of insurrection,
and after much tortuous negotiation an army of insurgents settled
down about five miles from the city on 12 January, 1842. Nott went
out and scattered them, but his victory only seemed to bring the
surro! 'nding Durani chiefs into more open hostility, and under Mirza
Ahmad th gave active resistance to the enemy. On 21 February
Nott received the belated message from Elphinstone and Pottinger
ordering the evacuation of Kandahar and Kħilat-i-Ghilzai, the latter
a fort under Leech about half way to Ghazni. He felt under no
obligation to obey this command, for the position of the English in
the country, as was pointed out by the Durani chiefs, was now sone-
what anomalous, and required independent consideration. Nott
decided, therefore, to stay where he was. On 10 March the city was
wellnigh captured by a stratagem. On the 31st news came of the
fall of Ghazni; Khilat-i-Ghilzai was still holding out. But where was
the rescue party from Sind? About the close of February, 1842,
Brigadier England approached the Bolan Pass. He left Dadur on
7 March and reached Quetta on the 16th. But on the 28th he was
beaten at Hakulzai and retreated, with some discredit, to Quetta.
At last, on 30 April, aided by Nott's men from Kandahar, he got
through the Khojak Pass and the two brigades entered the city on
10 May.
The position was now somewhat clearer, and it had been simpli-
fied still further by what had happened at the capital. Shah Shuja,
who had continued to reign as the nominal king at the Bala Hissar,
on 5 April was shot down by men posted by Shuja-ud-daula, son of
Zaman Shah, as he set out for Jallalabad. There is much uncertainty
as to the cause of the murder, but it was doubtless the inevitable
outcome of Barakzai feeling whatever the immediate occasion.
We have therefore now this position. A strong force on the west
at Kandahar, with very uncertain means of communication with its
base, and a strong force at Jallalabad in an even worse position as
regards supplies and reinforcements. Both forces, as things were, ,
were unable to move forward. When, therefore, Lord Ellenborough
on his march up-country heard of General England's repulse and the
fall of Ghazni he gave the instructions which have been the subject
of so much controversy. On 18 April he wrote to the commander-
in-chief :
## p. 516 (#544) ############################################
516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
I cannot think that Major-General Pollock will under his instructions of
the 15th ult. remain at or near Jellalabad. Your Excellency is so much nearer
to Peshawar than I am that I depend upon your giving any instructions upon
that head to Major-General Pollock which you may think necessary. His
position is far from satisfactory, even during his operation; with an active
enemy in his front and a large force of Sikhs in his rear he is placed almost in
the fauces caudinae if there should be treachery. Then this horrible climate,
so much more destructive than any battle, which in three days may deprive
him of two thirds of his force. . . . 1
On the 19th he reviewed the whole position, allowing the com-
mander-in-chief to decide as to General Pollock, but pointing out the
advantages of the force remaining at Jallalabad during the hot
weather on the ground of health and on account of the influence
which the presence of this force might have upon negotiations for
the exchange of prisoners. On the other hand he spoke of the decision
which had been taken in favour of ultimate retirement to the Indus
and the difficulties in which the force would find itself "at one end
of a long and difficult pass with an enemy in front and an ally not
to be entirely depended upon, in its rear”? The orders to Nott were
as follows. The letter is dated Benares, 19 April, 1842 :
1. I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take imme-
diate measures for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie. You will
effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently bring away. You
will destroy the fort likewise unless, at the time at which the operation shall
be effected which is hereinbefore enjoined, Prince Timur having remained
faithful to the British interests shall possess sufficient force to be reasonably
expected to be able to maintain that fort upon your giving it into his charge.
2. You will evacuate the city of Candahar giving that too into the charge
of Prince Timur under the circumstances above mentioned. You will other-
wise ruin its defences before you abandon it.
3. You will then proceed to take up a position at Quetta until the season
may enable you to return upon Sukkur.
4. The object of the above directed measures is to withdraw all our forces
to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season, and other circumstances,
may permit you to take up a new positior. there. The manner of effecting this
now necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.
5. You will understand that, in the event of Prince Timur having conti-
med faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means
of preserving by his own native troops or any other troops in his pay the city
of Candahar and the fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, but no British guns must be left
which you can carry away, and no British officer must remain in his service
retaining his commission in the British army. 3
It has often been stated that Lord Ellenborough at this period
was in a state of panic, but a letter to Peel of 21 April, 1842, does not
give any such impression; it runs :
At last we have got a victory, and our military character is re-established.
Sir Robert Sale has completely defeated the Afghans under the walls of Jellala-
bad. Major-General Pollock has forced the Khyber Pass and is in march on Jella-
labad. These events took place on the 6th and 7th of this month. The garrison
of Khilat-i-Ghilzye is safe, but is not yet drawn off. Candahar has been nearly
lost by the error of General Nott. Brigadier Eragland was repulsed in a move.
ment he should never have made towards Candahar with an insufficient force
1 Ellenborough MSS, 83. ? Idem, 83.
3 Idem, 95.
## p. 517 (#545) ############################################
ELLENBOROUGH'S ORDERS
617
I am satisfied that the momentary success of Sale and of Pollock must not
lead us to change our view of what ought to be our permanent policy. We
mụst draw back our forces into positions in which they may have certain and
easy communication with India. You will see all I think in my letters to the
Commander-in-Chief and the Secret Committee. The victory of Jellalabad
does not change my opinion. Send us every man you can. We want them
all, as you will see when you read the letter to the Secret Committee. I am
making the most of my victory with the troops here and everywhere. . . .
The commander-in-chief did not give the suggested instructions
to Pollock till 29 April, 1842, and even then he specified conditions
under which retirement might be delayed. But on 29 April a letter
had been sent by the governor-general informing Pollock that:
The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan appears to be such according
to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his lordship cannot
but contemplate the possibility of your having been led by the absence of
serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst
the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you muzi, in common with every
true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph. upon the
scene of our late disasters, to advance upon and occupy the city of Cabool.
Those who have criticised this letter have often forgotten that it was
sent just when the news had reached the governor-general that Shah
Shuja had been assassinated. Hitherto Lord Ellenborough had had to
resist those who were pressing for a fresh occupation of Afghanistan.
A letter which he wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 17 May, 1842,
has often been misunderstood because only partially quoted; it runs :
But I must tell you that in not ordering the army to Ghuznee and Cabul
without the means of movement or supply, and in giving up the irrational
schemes of extending our dominions to the westward, I stand alone and have
to; withstand against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I have
acted altogether in all that I have done upon my own judgment. 1
But that he contemplated considerable exercise of individual judg-
ment even at this early stage is evident from the letter to Nott of
13 May, 1842 :
Your position when supplied with treasure, ammunition, and medicines,
will be more favourable than the Governor-General had reason to suppose it
would be when the instructions of the 19th ultimo were addressed to you, but
this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary.
the instructions, in as far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur.
That movement you will make at such period and with such precautions
as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the
efficiency of your army.
The Governor-General understands that consistently with the necessary
regard to these objects of primary importance you cannot retire below the
passes till October.
Neither does the decease of Shah Shoojah induce the Governor-General
to vary those instructions as far as they relate to the measures you were direc-
ted to adopt on evacuating the fort of Knelat-i-Ghilzye and the city of Candahar.
