For although no element is wanting in the
possible
real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated the conception possible posteriori.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
Nay, more, we are not even called upon to as sume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the de ductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in general --for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary.
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of reason ; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For the ideal, of which we are at pre sent speaking, is based, not upon an arbit. rary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises : how happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being ?
The answer is ready ; it is at once presented by the pro cedure of transcendental analytic. The possibility of sen suous objects is a relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical form) may be cogitated & priori; while that which constitutes the matter -- the renlity of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to sen sation) --must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely deter mined, when it has been compared with all phsenomenal pre dicates, and represented by means of these either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself --the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which tlto real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing, -- the material of the possibility of nll sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of tins whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction from ench other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no other ob jects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and these can be given only in connection with a possible experience ; it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it pre supposes the whob> o<* sura-total of empirical renlity as tha
? ? ? ? OF THE EXISTENCE OF A BtJPItEME BKIWO. 359
condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads i>> to consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous ob jects, as valid with regard to things in general. And thu. i we are induced to hold the empirical principle of our con ceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena, by leav ing out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental prin ciple of the possibility of things in general.
We proceed afterwards to hypostatise this idea of the sum- total of all reality, by chnnging the distributive unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole --a dialecticcl illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, con taining in itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete determination it presents. *
CHAPTER THIRD.
Section Thikd.
Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in proof oj the Existence of a Supreme Being.
Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for the complete determination of its con ceptions, the idealistic and factitious nature of such a presup position is too evident to allow reason for a moment to per suade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other considera tions which compel reason to seek out some resting-place in the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which
? This ideal of the ens reahtsimum --although merely a mental repre- ? entation --is first objeclhised, that is, has an objective existence attributed to then hypnttatited, and finally, by the natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, perionified, as we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience not based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the under- tttnding in eomeioutnett, and thus the unity of the supreme reality and
? the complete determinabiuty of all things, seem to Teside in understands, and consequently, in conscious intelligence.
supreme
? ? it, a
is a
a
? sen TBAWSCEUDEHTAL DIALECTIC.
is aot given as an actual existence from the mere conception of although alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first entered does not always continue to follow. It does not
begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and
basis actual existence. But this basis inse cure, unless rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely
requires
And this foundation itself unworthy of trust, leave under and above empty space, do not fill all, and leave no room for why or wherefore, be not, in
one word, infinite in its reality.
If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever
may be, we must also admit that there something which exists necessarily. For what contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which its cause and from this we must go On to conclude the existence of cause,
which not contingent, and which consequently exists neces sarily and unconditionally. Such the argument by whicii reason justifies its advances towards primal being.
necessary.
? Now reason looks round for the conception of
that may be admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the purpose of in ferring priori, from the conception of such being, its ob
existence, (for reason allowed itself to take this
course, would not require basis in given and actual exist
ence, but merely the support of pure conceptions), but for
the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of pos
sible things, that conception which possesses no element
consistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that there
must be some absolutely necessary existence, regards as truth already established. Now, can remove every exist ence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute neces sity, excepting one, -- this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity comprehensible us, that deducible from the conception of alone, or not.
Now that, the conception of which contains therefore to every wherefore, which not defective in any respect what ever, which all-sufficient as condition, seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity --for this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that pos
jective
beini
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a by is,
aa
;
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? or THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING. 361
lible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this view, it is su perior to all other concept'ons, which, as deficient and incom plete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the condition of all other things, must possess only a conditioned existence ; but as little can we assert the con trary, for this supposed being does not possess the only cha racteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an (t priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its existence.
The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary
being. The former conception does not satisfy all the require ments of the latter ; but we have no choice, we are obliged
? for we find that we cannot do without the necessary being and even although we admit out of our power to discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims
to adhere to existence of
we find
to such distinction. The following
reason. begins
therefore, the natural course of human persuading itself of the existence of In this being recognises the charac
some necessary being.
teristics of unconditioned existence. then seeks the con
ception of that which independent of all conditions, and finds in that which itself the sufficient condition of all other things-- other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all an absolute unity, and conceived
the mind as being one and supreme and thus reason con cludes that the supreme being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which absolutely necessary.
This conception must be regarded as some degree satis factory, we admit the existence of necessary being, and consider that there exists necessity for definite and final answer to these questions. Iu such case, we cannot make
better choice, or rather we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility of things. But there exists no motive for coming to defiitiU
? ? if
a
in
a
a
it, a
a
if
it
It
it
a it,
ais; Itit a
a
in
is
is
is is
is, by
by
;
? 362 TRANSCENDKMTAL DIALECTIC.
conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fiilly weighed both sides -- in other words, when we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know -- the above conclusion does not appear to so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective in the grounds upon which it is supported.
For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for ex ample,) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable ; that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely uncon ditioned -, and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without in consistency, absolute necessity -- it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in which the su preme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not dis cover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being --an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions, I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned ; just as I am Dot entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not exist, (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general conception which
we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without result.
This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and
an authority, which, in spite of ite objective insufficiency, it has never been divested of. For, granting that certain re
sponsibilities lie upon us, which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical application to 0111 nature, or, iu other words, would be responsibilities with
out motives, except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: ia
? ? ? ? OF THE EXISTENCE OF A 8UPBESSE BEING. 363
euch a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which, although objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter. Tin equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical addition ; indeed, Reason would be compelled to con demn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of the judgment, no superior to which we know -- however de fective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.
This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch
as it rests upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value. We see things around us change, arise, and pass away ; they, or their condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be made of the cause itself -- as a datum of experience. Now it is natural that we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, wc regard as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to and do not discover any reason for
proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which t'vese idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common understanding.
There are only three modes of proving the existence of Deity, on the grounds of speculative reason.
All the paths conducting to this end, begin either from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rise, according to the laws of causality, from to the highest cause existing apart from the world,-- or from purely indeterminate experience, that some empirical existence, --or abstraction made of all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause concluded from a priori con ceptions alone. The first the physico- theological argument, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More
there are not, and more there cannot be. -- shall show as unsuccessful on the one path the
? ? ? I
it is
it,
is
is
is
a it
is,
a
? 364 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
empirical, as on the other -- the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain, to soar beyond the world of sense
by the mere might of speculative thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments, it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, 'n the progress of its development, attains to them --the order in which they are placed above. For it will be made manifest *. o the reader, that, although experience presents the occasion and the start ing-point, it is the trantcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage, and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire, what additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition of the empirical element.
CHAPTER III.
Section Foubth.
Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence
of God.
It is evident from what has been said, that the conception of
an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective re ality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations than, by the presentation of new objects, ex tends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold ; for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely necessary existence, seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being.
Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being, and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving, whether --and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to mention that its existence is actually demon strable. A verbal definition of the conception is certainly easy enough : it is something, the non-existence of which is im possible. But does this definition throw any light upon the con ditions which render it impossible to comitate the non-existence
? ? ? ? OF THE ONTOLOGICAIi AEGUMKKT. 366
of a thing --conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a being or not ? For the mere fact that I throw away, by means of the word Unconditioned, all the conditions which the understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all.
Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have endeavoured to explain by examples, which seemed to render any inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite need less. Every geometrical proposition--a triangle has three angles -- it was said, is absolutely necessary ; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our under standing as if it were perfectly plain what the conception of such a being meant.
All the examples adduced have been drawn, without ex ception, from judgments, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgment. The proposition above-mentioned, does not enounce that three angles necessarily wist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three angles must necessarily exist -- in it. And thus this logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an & priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in con cluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception, (that under the condition of my positing this thing as given,) the existence of the thing also posited necessarily, and that therefore absolutely necessary --merely because its existence has been cogitated in the con ception.
If, in an identical judgment, annihilate the predicate ra thought, and retain the subject, contradiction the result and hence say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter.
But suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises for there nothing at all, and therefore 30 means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the e*- stcncc of triangle and nut that of its three angles, self
? ? ? aI ;
is
is
aI is,
is is
is
if I
;
it
? 366
TBAKSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
rotitradictory ; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates ; how then can there be any room for contradiction ? Externally,* there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally ; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent-- that is a necessary judgment. His omnipo tence cannot be denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited -- the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed ; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.
You have thus seen, that when the predicate of a judgment is annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the conclusion --you find yourselves compelled to declare : There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is nothing more than say ing : There exist subjects which are absolutely necessary -- the very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which; when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction ; and contradiction is the onlv criterion of impossibility, in the sphere of pure h priori con ceptions.
Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed, that there is one Bnd only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is selt'-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens realissimutn. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feM yourselves justified in ad mitting the possibility of such a being. (This 1 am willing Ui grant for the present, although the existence of a conception which u not self-contradictory, is far from being sufficient to
* In relation to other thing! . -- 7V.
? ? ? ? OP THE UKT0LOQ1CAJ. ARGUMENT.
367
prove the possibility of an object. *) Now the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence ; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.
I answer : It is absurd to introduce -- under whatever term disguised --into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogi tated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, yon will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tau tology. I ask, ia the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition ? If the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence ; but then the conception in your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the exigence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility --which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing, reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that e< ery existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without con tradiction --a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions, alone.
1 should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for eve r to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion aris'ng from our confounding a
? A conception i>> always pots'hle, if it is not self-contradiclnry. This <<s the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of such . 1 conception from the nihil negaiivum. But it may be, notwithstanding, en empty conception, unless the objective reality of this synthesis, by which it is generated, ia demonstrated ; and a proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible experience, and not upon the principle c/ ana lysis or contradiction. This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from the possibility of a conception -- which is logical, the possibility of a thing -- which is real.
? ? ? ? 368 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the de termination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgment. But the determinatiou of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It mu9t not, therefore, be con tained in the conception.
Being is evidently not a real predicate, that conception of something which added to the conception of some other
? thing, or of certain de merely the copula of
omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have certain object or content the word t>>, no additional predicate -- merely indicates the relation
thing. merely the positing of terminations in it. Logically,
judgment.
The proposition, God
of the predicate to the subject. Now, take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God or, There a God, add no new predicate to the conception of God, merely posit or affirm the existence of
the subject with all its predicates -- posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both the same and there no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, my cogitating the object -- in the expression, -- as absolutely given or exist
Thus the real contains no more than the possible. hundred real dollars contain no more than hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would
ing.
be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in hundred real dollars, than in hundred possible dollars -- that
consequently
in the mere conception of them. For the real object -- the dollars-- not analytically contained in my conception, but forms synthetical addition to my conception (which merely
determination of my mental state), although this objective re? jity -- this existence -- apart from my conception, does not ir. the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates --even to the complete determination of --I may cogitate thing
? ? it
I
i>> is a
a
is
a
; A
a
is,
a is is
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it
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by a
is
if I
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is
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;
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? CF T11E ONTOtOGIOAi AHGUMEHT. 369
I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogi tated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists ; on the contrary, the thing exists --if it exist at all-- with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception ; other wise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains--" whether this being exists or not ?
For although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated the conception possible posteriori. And here the cause of
? the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question re garded an object of sense merely, would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate as con tained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, not to be
wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish from mere possibility. Whatever be the content of our conception of an object,
necessary to go beyond we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
but there no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because must be cognized com pletely priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be imme diately perception, or inferences connecting some object with perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience
perceptions
II
? ? a
a
by
;
is
is by
&
it-
it ; a
is, by I
is
it is
is
it, if
it it it a
if it
? 37C TliAHSCLNDENTAL DIALECTIC.
--which is in perfect unity with iUelf ; and although an exist ence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.
The notion of a supreme being is in many respects a highly useful idea ; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is
incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the exist ence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an & priori judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us spe cifically ; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of ex perience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish upon & priori grounds the possibility of this sublime ideal being.
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient ; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash-account.
CHAPTER THIRD. Seotion Ftjth.
Of the Impotsibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Exist ence of God.
It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the existence of n neces
? ? ? ? Or TllK COSMOLOGICAL AROVMENT. 371
>>ary being as a basis for the empirical regress, ami that, ai this necessity must be unconditioned and 4 prion, reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, this requirement, and enable us to attain to the h priori cog nition of such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens rerilissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a better defined know ledge of a necessary being, of the existence of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was ? educed from her natural course ; and, instead of concluding with the conception of an ens realissimvm, an attempt was made to begin with for the purpose of inferring from that idea of necessary existence, which was in fact called
to complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher.
The eosmolnr/ieal proof, which we are about to examine, retains the connection between absolute necessity, and the highest reality; but, instead of reasoning from this highest reality to necessary existence, like the preceding argument,
concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track pursues, whether rational or sophistical, at least natural, and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the argu ments employed natural theology -- arguments which always have been, and still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under whatever embellish ments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, termed by Leibnitz the argumentum contingent id mundi, shall now lay before the reader, and subject to strict exa mination. --
at least, exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor contains an experience, the major reason? from general experience to the existence of
? framed in the following manner
exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now
If something
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a
a
in
is
it,
I, it in It
is
a
a I it
it
it
it
a
a
? lltA. VSC*KDE>>TAX DIALECTIC.
necessary aeing. * Thus this argument really begins at ex perience, and is not completely a priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the cosmologieal proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which this world o( sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds ; and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar consti- tution of our sensuous world. --
The proof proceeds thus : A necessary being can be de termined only in one way, that can be determined
only one of all possible opposed predicates consequently, must be completely determined in and its conception. But there only single conception of thing possible, which completely determines the thing priori that the con ception of the etis realissimum. follows that the conception of the ens realissimum the only conception, and in which we can cogitate necessary being. Consequently, supreme being necessarily exists.
In this cosmological argument are assembled so many so phistical propositions, that speculative reason seems to have exerted in all her dialectical skill to produce transcendental illusion of the most extreme character. We shall postpone
an investigation of this argument for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by which imposes upon us an old argument in new dress, and appeals to the agree ment of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism while, in fact,
only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That may possess secure foundation, bases its conclu sions upon experience, and thus appears to be completely
distinct from the ontological argument, which places its con-
* This inference too well known to require more detailed discus- ? ion. It bated upon the spurious transcendental law of causality,^ that everything which contingent has cause, which, itself contin gent, must also have cause and so on, till the series of subordinated
tauses must end with aa absolutely necessary cause, without which would not possess completeness.
Set note on page 175. -- Tr
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a ;
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a
'i
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it by
a
is,
if
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it is
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it is
a
a is
it :
a
by
;
it
a
It ct
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;
? OT Till! COSHOLOSIOAL AB8UMENT. 373
fldence entirely in pure h priori conceptions. But this expe rience merely aid* reason in making one step -- to the exist ence of a necessary being. What the properties of this being are, cannot be learned from experience ; and therefore reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conceptions, for the purpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that
what among all possible things contain the conditions (requistta) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens realis- simum -- and alone, and hence concludes The entrealis- simum an absolutely necessary being. But evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception of an eiu ren/issimum perfectly adequate to the conception of being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the ex istence of the latter from that of the former --
? proposition, which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and
which now employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to the wish and professions of its in ventors. For the existence of an absolutely necessary being
given conceptions alone. But say -- the conception of the eiui realissimum conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which adequate to our idea of necessary being, am obliged to admit, that the latter may be inferred from the former. Thus properly the ontological argument which figures the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the latter while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than to conduct ns to the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute any deter minate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of ex
perience, and rise to that of pure conceptions, which we exa mine with the purpose of discovering whether any one con tains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely neces sary being. But the possibility of such being thus demonstrated, its existence also proved for we may then assert that, of all possible beings there one which possesses the attribute of necessity --in other words, this being possesses an absolutely necessary existence.
All illusions au argument are more easily detected, when
? ? in it Iisit
is
;
if is
in
is a
a
:
is
it
in
;
it
is is
if I
is
is,
in
is
is
aa
a
it is
? 574 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
they are presented in the formal manner employed by th<< schools, which we now proceed to do.
If the proposition, Every absolutely necessary being is like wise an ens realissimum, is correct (and it is this which con
stitutes the nervus probanJi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conver sion --the eonversio per accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia reulissima are absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, and whnt is valid of some, is valid of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion,* and say, Every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as this pro position is determined h priori by the conceptions contained in the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this exactly what was maintained the ontological argument, and not recognised the cosmological, although formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.
Thus the second mode employed speculative reason of demonstrating the existence of Supreme Being, not only,
like the first, illusory and inadequate, but possesses the addi tional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi -- professing to conduct us
new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call. mentioned above, that this cosmological argument contains
perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendents* criticism does not find difficult to expose and to dissipate.
shall merely enumerate these, leaving to the reader, who must this time be well practised in such matters, to inves tigate the fallacies residing therein.
The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable this mode of proof: The transcendental principle, Ev<<ry thing that contingent must have cause -- principle without sig nificance, except in the sensuous world. For the purely in tellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phsenomenal world. But in the present case employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. From the im possibility of an infinite ascending series of causes th*
Contersio inira seu simplex. --Tr,
? ? ? *
1.
by
in
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in
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it
is
by
it,
a
in a
a
by
I
I
it
it
a
a
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a is
? Or THB CO8MOLOGI0AL ARGUMENT. 376
worlJ of sense a first cause is inferred; --a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in tiie spltere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place) ; and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the con ception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possi bility of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction J is con founded with the transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis --a principle which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on.
? The aim of the cosmologies! argument is to avoid the ne cessity of proving the existence of a necessary being & priori
from mere conceptions --a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual existence -- an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary condition of that ex istence. It is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the ques tion regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look out for some being the conception which would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being --
for if we could do this, an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary ; no, we try to discover merely the negative con dition (conditio sine qud non), without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its principle ; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this ab solute necessity a priori. --That must be possible to reason conversely," and say the thing, to which the concep
tion of the highest reality belongs, absolutely necessary. But cannot reason thus --and cannot, unless believe in
? ? if I
I
is,
I
is it
? 376
THAITSCTODTOTAX DIALECTIC.
the sufficiency of the ontoiogical argument --I fud insnr* mountable obstacles in my new path, and am really no further than the point from which I set out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding the internal determinations of n thing, and is for this reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence --which was the purpose of all our enquiries ; and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer the question --What of all things in the world must be regarded as such ?
It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all- sufficient being -- a cause of all possible effects, for the purpose of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enun ciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty ; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary, must itself possess that character.
The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind either to discover conception which shall harmonise with the idea of absolute necessity, or conception which shall contain that idea. If the one possible, so the other for reason recognises that alone as absolutely necessary, which necessary from its conception. * But both attempts ,are equally beyond our power --we find impossible to satisfy the under standing upon this point, and as impossible to induce to remain at rest in relation to this incapacity.
Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support
and stay of all existing things, an indispensable require ment of the mind, an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, ter rible and sublime as as depicted by Haller, does not pro duce upon the mental vision such feeling of awe and terror for, although measures the duration of things, does not support tbem. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves the thought, that beiDg, which we regard as the greatest
all possible existences, should say to himself: am from That is, wliicli cannot In erplalf' >>s other thsn necefsary --Tr
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ofof ;
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? Or THE ILLUSION IN THE FOBEfcOlNO ABGTJMEST8.
eternity to eternity ; beside me there is nothing, except that winch exists by my will ; but whence then am I? Here all sinks away from under us ; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other.
Many physic. il powers, which evidence their existence by their effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature ; they elude all our powers of observation. The transcendental ob ject which forms the basis of phenomena, and, in connection with the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision the fact there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its reality the need of felt by reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical
An ideal not even given as cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable on the contrary, must, as mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions -- upon objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.
Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion till Transcendental Arguments for the Existence a Necessary
Being.
Both of the above arguments are transcendental in other words, they do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological argument professed to lay basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning, did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason -- in relation to an existence given empirical consciousness utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its assertion!
unity.
Now what the cause, these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and
entirely upon pure conceptions.
tupreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anj
377
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of ;
in
a
a
in
;
it
is
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it a
;
it,
? 378 TRANSCENDENTAL DIAXLCTCC.
tLing but an idea ? What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing tilings must be necessary, while it falls back from tiie assertion of the existence of such a being as from an Abyss ? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and re luctant approbation --always again withdrawn, arrive at a calm nud settled insight into its cause? thj
It is something very remarkable that, on
that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference, that some
thing exists necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural -- but not on that account reliable--inference doea the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me--be the thing or being what it may -- from cogitnting its non-existence, I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or indivi dual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never com plete the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this be ing-
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the nasis of existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable in ference that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves -- otherwise an internal contradiction would result that consequently neither of these principles ue objective, but merely subjective principles of reason -- the one requiring us to seek for necessary ground for every thing that exists, that to be satisfied with no other expla nation than that which complete priori, the other forbid ding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that to regard no member of the empirical world as un conditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in uaeir purely heuristic and regulative character, and as con cerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite con sistent with each other. The one says -- you must philoso phise upon nature, as there existed necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing
supposition
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is is,
a
is,
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? OF THE ILLUBION IN THE FOBEGOING AHGUMEWT8. 379
systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing nn idea of this chnracter --a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate ; while the other warns you to consider no indi vidual determination, concerning the existence of things, ns such an ultimate foundation, that as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every determination as determined some other. But all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary, impossible that anything which
empirically given should be absolutely necessary.
follows from this, that you must accept the absolutely
necessary as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as useful only as principle of the highest possible unity in ex
perience, ancLyou cannot discover any such necessary existence in the world, the second rule requiring you to regard all em pirical causes of unity as themselves deduced.
? The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent; while matter was considered by them, id accordance with the judgment of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But they had regarded matter, not relatively --as the substratum of phsenomena, but absolutely and itself -- ns an independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For there nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence on the contrary, can annihilate in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But thought alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion.
In fact, extension and impenetrability--which together con stitute our conception of matter --form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phsenomena, and this principle, in so far as empirically unconditioned, possesses the property of regulative principle. But, as every determinntion ol matter which constitutes what real in --and consequently
impenetrability --
an effect, which must have cause, and for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonise with the idea of necessary being, in its character
of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of its
real properties, being derived, mast be only conditionally ne cessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thonght and thus the whole existence of matter can be bo annihilated 01
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a
if
it a
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? 380 TRANSCMTDENTAL DIALECTIC.
If this were not the case, we siunld have fcnnd in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unity --which is impossible, according to the second regu lative principle. It follows, that matter, and, in general, all that farms part of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, ncr even a principle of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect con fidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their ex istence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no ne cessary being ; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our de duction, just as if such a being --the supreme condition of all existences -- were presupposed by the mind.
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the Supreme Being, far from being an cnounce- ment of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle as constitutive, and hypostatising this unity. Pre cisely similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it ; and thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing -- as an object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be esta blished as a principle for the empirical employment of reason,
unless it is based upon the idea of an en* realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition, as ab solutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) ne cessary, as a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity in or by any conception, and it
suppressed.
? ? ? ? 01' THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGiCAL ARGUMENT. 381
rliaU merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of thought, bat not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of reason ; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For the ideal, of which we are at pre sent speaking, is based, not upon an arbit. rary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises : how happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being ?
The answer is ready ; it is at once presented by the pro cedure of transcendental analytic. The possibility of sen suous objects is a relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical form) may be cogitated & priori; while that which constitutes the matter -- the renlity of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to sen sation) --must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely deter mined, when it has been compared with all phsenomenal pre dicates, and represented by means of these either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself --the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which tlto real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing, -- the material of the possibility of nll sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of tins whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction from ench other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no other ob jects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and these can be given only in connection with a possible experience ; it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it pre supposes the whob> o<* sura-total of empirical renlity as tha
? ? ? ? OF THE EXISTENCE OF A BtJPItEME BKIWO. 359
condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads i>> to consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous ob jects, as valid with regard to things in general. And thu. i we are induced to hold the empirical principle of our con ceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena, by leav ing out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental prin ciple of the possibility of things in general.
We proceed afterwards to hypostatise this idea of the sum- total of all reality, by chnnging the distributive unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole --a dialecticcl illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, con taining in itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete determination it presents. *
CHAPTER THIRD.
Section Thikd.
Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in proof oj the Existence of a Supreme Being.
Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for the complete determination of its con ceptions, the idealistic and factitious nature of such a presup position is too evident to allow reason for a moment to per suade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other considera tions which compel reason to seek out some resting-place in the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which
? This ideal of the ens reahtsimum --although merely a mental repre- ? entation --is first objeclhised, that is, has an objective existence attributed to then hypnttatited, and finally, by the natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, perionified, as we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience not based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the under- tttnding in eomeioutnett, and thus the unity of the supreme reality and
? the complete determinabiuty of all things, seem to Teside in understands, and consequently, in conscious intelligence.
supreme
? ? it, a
is a
a
? sen TBAWSCEUDEHTAL DIALECTIC.
is aot given as an actual existence from the mere conception of although alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first entered does not always continue to follow. It does not
begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and
basis actual existence. But this basis inse cure, unless rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely
requires
And this foundation itself unworthy of trust, leave under and above empty space, do not fill all, and leave no room for why or wherefore, be not, in
one word, infinite in its reality.
If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever
may be, we must also admit that there something which exists necessarily. For what contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which its cause and from this we must go On to conclude the existence of cause,
which not contingent, and which consequently exists neces sarily and unconditionally. Such the argument by whicii reason justifies its advances towards primal being.
necessary.
? Now reason looks round for the conception of
that may be admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the purpose of in ferring priori, from the conception of such being, its ob
existence, (for reason allowed itself to take this
course, would not require basis in given and actual exist
ence, but merely the support of pure conceptions), but for
the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of pos
sible things, that conception which possesses no element
consistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that there
must be some absolutely necessary existence, regards as truth already established. Now, can remove every exist ence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute neces sity, excepting one, -- this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity comprehensible us, that deducible from the conception of alone, or not.
Now that, the conception of which contains therefore to every wherefore, which not defective in any respect what ever, which all-sufficient as condition, seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity --for this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that pos
jective
beini
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a by is,
aa
;
is
is
is
if a
a
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it
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? or THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING. 361
lible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this view, it is su perior to all other concept'ons, which, as deficient and incom plete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the condition of all other things, must possess only a conditioned existence ; but as little can we assert the con trary, for this supposed being does not possess the only cha racteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an (t priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its existence.
The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary
being. The former conception does not satisfy all the require ments of the latter ; but we have no choice, we are obliged
? for we find that we cannot do without the necessary being and even although we admit out of our power to discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims
to adhere to existence of
we find
to such distinction. The following
reason. begins
therefore, the natural course of human persuading itself of the existence of In this being recognises the charac
some necessary being.
teristics of unconditioned existence. then seeks the con
ception of that which independent of all conditions, and finds in that which itself the sufficient condition of all other things-- other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all an absolute unity, and conceived
the mind as being one and supreme and thus reason con cludes that the supreme being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which absolutely necessary.
This conception must be regarded as some degree satis factory, we admit the existence of necessary being, and consider that there exists necessity for definite and final answer to these questions. Iu such case, we cannot make
better choice, or rather we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility of things. But there exists no motive for coming to defiitiU
? ? if
a
in
a
a
it, a
a
if
it
It
it
a it,
ais; Itit a
a
in
is
is
is is
is, by
by
;
? 362 TRANSCENDKMTAL DIALECTIC.
conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fiilly weighed both sides -- in other words, when we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know -- the above conclusion does not appear to so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective in the grounds upon which it is supported.
For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for ex ample,) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable ; that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely uncon ditioned -, and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without in consistency, absolute necessity -- it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in which the su preme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not dis cover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being --an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions, I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned ; just as I am Dot entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not exist, (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general conception which
we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without result.
This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and
an authority, which, in spite of ite objective insufficiency, it has never been divested of. For, granting that certain re
sponsibilities lie upon us, which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical application to 0111 nature, or, iu other words, would be responsibilities with
out motives, except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: ia
? ? ? ? OF THE EXISTENCE OF A 8UPBESSE BEING. 363
euch a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which, although objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter. Tin equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical addition ; indeed, Reason would be compelled to con demn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of the judgment, no superior to which we know -- however de fective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.
This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch
as it rests upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value. We see things around us change, arise, and pass away ; they, or their condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be made of the cause itself -- as a datum of experience. Now it is natural that we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, wc regard as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to and do not discover any reason for
proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which t'vese idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common understanding.
There are only three modes of proving the existence of Deity, on the grounds of speculative reason.
All the paths conducting to this end, begin either from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rise, according to the laws of causality, from to the highest cause existing apart from the world,-- or from purely indeterminate experience, that some empirical existence, --or abstraction made of all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause concluded from a priori con ceptions alone. The first the physico- theological argument, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More
there are not, and more there cannot be. -- shall show as unsuccessful on the one path the
? ? ? I
it is
it,
is
is
is
a it
is,
a
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empirical, as on the other -- the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain, to soar beyond the world of sense
by the mere might of speculative thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments, it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, 'n the progress of its development, attains to them --the order in which they are placed above. For it will be made manifest *. o the reader, that, although experience presents the occasion and the start ing-point, it is the trantcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage, and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire, what additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition of the empirical element.
CHAPTER III.
Section Foubth.
Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence
of God.
It is evident from what has been said, that the conception of
an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective re ality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations than, by the presentation of new objects, ex tends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold ; for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely necessary existence, seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being.
Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being, and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving, whether --and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to mention that its existence is actually demon strable. A verbal definition of the conception is certainly easy enough : it is something, the non-existence of which is im possible. But does this definition throw any light upon the con ditions which render it impossible to comitate the non-existence
? ? ? ? OF THE ONTOLOGICAIi AEGUMKKT. 366
of a thing --conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a being or not ? For the mere fact that I throw away, by means of the word Unconditioned, all the conditions which the understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all.
Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have endeavoured to explain by examples, which seemed to render any inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite need less. Every geometrical proposition--a triangle has three angles -- it was said, is absolutely necessary ; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our under standing as if it were perfectly plain what the conception of such a being meant.
All the examples adduced have been drawn, without ex ception, from judgments, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgment. The proposition above-mentioned, does not enounce that three angles necessarily wist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three angles must necessarily exist -- in it. And thus this logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an & priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in con cluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception, (that under the condition of my positing this thing as given,) the existence of the thing also posited necessarily, and that therefore absolutely necessary --merely because its existence has been cogitated in the con ception.
If, in an identical judgment, annihilate the predicate ra thought, and retain the subject, contradiction the result and hence say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter.
But suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises for there nothing at all, and therefore 30 means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the e*- stcncc of triangle and nut that of its three angles, self
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rotitradictory ; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates ; how then can there be any room for contradiction ? Externally,* there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally ; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent-- that is a necessary judgment. His omnipo tence cannot be denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited -- the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed ; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.
You have thus seen, that when the predicate of a judgment is annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the conclusion --you find yourselves compelled to declare : There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is nothing more than say ing : There exist subjects which are absolutely necessary -- the very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which; when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction ; and contradiction is the onlv criterion of impossibility, in the sphere of pure h priori con ceptions.
Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed, that there is one Bnd only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is selt'-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens realissimutn. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feM yourselves justified in ad mitting the possibility of such a being. (This 1 am willing Ui grant for the present, although the existence of a conception which u not self-contradictory, is far from being sufficient to
* In relation to other thing! . -- 7V.
? ? ? ? OP THE UKT0LOQ1CAJ. ARGUMENT.
367
prove the possibility of an object. *) Now the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence ; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.
I answer : It is absurd to introduce -- under whatever term disguised --into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogi tated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, yon will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tau tology. I ask, ia the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition ? If the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence ; but then the conception in your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the exigence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility --which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing, reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that e< ery existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without con tradiction --a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions, alone.
1 should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for eve r to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion aris'ng from our confounding a
? A conception i>> always pots'hle, if it is not self-contradiclnry. This <<s the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of such . 1 conception from the nihil negaiivum. But it may be, notwithstanding, en empty conception, unless the objective reality of this synthesis, by which it is generated, ia demonstrated ; and a proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible experience, and not upon the principle c/ ana lysis or contradiction. This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from the possibility of a conception -- which is logical, the possibility of a thing -- which is real.
? ? ? ? 368 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the de termination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgment. But the determinatiou of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It mu9t not, therefore, be con tained in the conception.
Being is evidently not a real predicate, that conception of something which added to the conception of some other
? thing, or of certain de merely the copula of
omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have certain object or content the word t>>, no additional predicate -- merely indicates the relation
thing. merely the positing of terminations in it. Logically,
judgment.
The proposition, God
of the predicate to the subject. Now, take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God or, There a God, add no new predicate to the conception of God, merely posit or affirm the existence of
the subject with all its predicates -- posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both the same and there no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, my cogitating the object -- in the expression, -- as absolutely given or exist
Thus the real contains no more than the possible. hundred real dollars contain no more than hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would
ing.
be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in hundred real dollars, than in hundred possible dollars -- that
consequently
in the mere conception of them. For the real object -- the dollars-- not analytically contained in my conception, but forms synthetical addition to my conception (which merely
determination of my mental state), although this objective re? jity -- this existence -- apart from my conception, does not ir. the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates --even to the complete determination of --I may cogitate thing
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I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogi tated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists ; on the contrary, the thing exists --if it exist at all-- with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception ; other wise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains--" whether this being exists or not ?
For although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated the conception possible posteriori. And here the cause of
? the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question re garded an object of sense merely, would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate as con tained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, not to be
wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish from mere possibility. Whatever be the content of our conception of an object,
necessary to go beyond we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
but there no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because must be cognized com pletely priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be imme diately perception, or inferences connecting some object with perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience
perceptions
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? 37C TliAHSCLNDENTAL DIALECTIC.
--which is in perfect unity with iUelf ; and although an exist ence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.
The notion of a supreme being is in many respects a highly useful idea ; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is
incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the exist ence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an & priori judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us spe cifically ; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of ex perience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish upon & priori grounds the possibility of this sublime ideal being.
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient ; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash-account.
CHAPTER THIRD. Seotion Ftjth.
Of the Impotsibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Exist ence of God.
It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the existence of n neces
? ? ? ? Or TllK COSMOLOGICAL AROVMENT. 371
>>ary being as a basis for the empirical regress, ami that, ai this necessity must be unconditioned and 4 prion, reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, this requirement, and enable us to attain to the h priori cog nition of such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens rerilissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a better defined know ledge of a necessary being, of the existence of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was ? educed from her natural course ; and, instead of concluding with the conception of an ens realissimvm, an attempt was made to begin with for the purpose of inferring from that idea of necessary existence, which was in fact called
to complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher.
The eosmolnr/ieal proof, which we are about to examine, retains the connection between absolute necessity, and the highest reality; but, instead of reasoning from this highest reality to necessary existence, like the preceding argument,
concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track pursues, whether rational or sophistical, at least natural, and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the argu ments employed natural theology -- arguments which always have been, and still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under whatever embellish ments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, termed by Leibnitz the argumentum contingent id mundi, shall now lay before the reader, and subject to strict exa mination. --
at least, exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor contains an experience, the major reason? from general experience to the existence of
? framed in the following manner
exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now
If something
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necessary aeing. * Thus this argument really begins at ex perience, and is not completely a priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the cosmologieal proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which this world o( sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds ; and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar consti- tution of our sensuous world. --
The proof proceeds thus : A necessary being can be de termined only in one way, that can be determined
only one of all possible opposed predicates consequently, must be completely determined in and its conception. But there only single conception of thing possible, which completely determines the thing priori that the con ception of the etis realissimum. follows that the conception of the ens realissimum the only conception, and in which we can cogitate necessary being. Consequently, supreme being necessarily exists.
In this cosmological argument are assembled so many so phistical propositions, that speculative reason seems to have exerted in all her dialectical skill to produce transcendental illusion of the most extreme character. We shall postpone
an investigation of this argument for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by which imposes upon us an old argument in new dress, and appeals to the agree ment of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism while, in fact,
only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That may possess secure foundation, bases its conclu sions upon experience, and thus appears to be completely
distinct from the ontological argument, which places its con-
* This inference too well known to require more detailed discus- ? ion. It bated upon the spurious transcendental law of causality,^ that everything which contingent has cause, which, itself contin gent, must also have cause and so on, till the series of subordinated
tauses must end with aa absolutely necessary cause, without which would not possess completeness.
Set note on page 175. -- Tr
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? OT Till! COSHOLOSIOAL AB8UMENT. 373
fldence entirely in pure h priori conceptions. But this expe rience merely aid* reason in making one step -- to the exist ence of a necessary being. What the properties of this being are, cannot be learned from experience ; and therefore reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conceptions, for the purpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that
what among all possible things contain the conditions (requistta) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens realis- simum -- and alone, and hence concludes The entrealis- simum an absolutely necessary being. But evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception of an eiu ren/issimum perfectly adequate to the conception of being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the ex istence of the latter from that of the former --
? proposition, which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and
which now employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to the wish and professions of its in ventors. For the existence of an absolutely necessary being
given conceptions alone. But say -- the conception of the eiui realissimum conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which adequate to our idea of necessary being, am obliged to admit, that the latter may be inferred from the former. Thus properly the ontological argument which figures the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the latter while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than to conduct ns to the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute any deter minate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of ex
perience, and rise to that of pure conceptions, which we exa mine with the purpose of discovering whether any one con tains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely neces sary being. But the possibility of such being thus demonstrated, its existence also proved for we may then assert that, of all possible beings there one which possesses the attribute of necessity --in other words, this being possesses an absolutely necessary existence.
All illusions au argument are more easily detected, when
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? 574 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
they are presented in the formal manner employed by th<< schools, which we now proceed to do.
If the proposition, Every absolutely necessary being is like wise an ens realissimum, is correct (and it is this which con
stitutes the nervus probanJi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conver sion --the eonversio per accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia reulissima are absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, and whnt is valid of some, is valid of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion,* and say, Every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as this pro position is determined h priori by the conceptions contained in the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this exactly what was maintained the ontological argument, and not recognised the cosmological, although formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.
Thus the second mode employed speculative reason of demonstrating the existence of Supreme Being, not only,
like the first, illusory and inadequate, but possesses the addi tional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi -- professing to conduct us
new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call. mentioned above, that this cosmological argument contains
perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendents* criticism does not find difficult to expose and to dissipate.
shall merely enumerate these, leaving to the reader, who must this time be well practised in such matters, to inves tigate the fallacies residing therein.
The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable this mode of proof: The transcendental principle, Ev<<ry thing that contingent must have cause -- principle without sig nificance, except in the sensuous world. For the purely in tellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phsenomenal world. But in the present case employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. From the im possibility of an infinite ascending series of causes th*
Contersio inira seu simplex. --Tr,
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? Or THB CO8MOLOGI0AL ARGUMENT. 376
worlJ of sense a first cause is inferred; --a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in tiie spltere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place) ; and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the con ception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possi bility of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction J is con founded with the transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis --a principle which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on.
? The aim of the cosmologies! argument is to avoid the ne cessity of proving the existence of a necessary being & priori
from mere conceptions --a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual existence -- an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary condition of that ex istence. It is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the ques tion regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look out for some being the conception which would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being --
for if we could do this, an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary ; no, we try to discover merely the negative con dition (conditio sine qud non), without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its principle ; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this ab solute necessity a priori. --That must be possible to reason conversely," and say the thing, to which the concep
tion of the highest reality belongs, absolutely necessary. But cannot reason thus --and cannot, unless believe in
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the sufficiency of the ontoiogical argument --I fud insnr* mountable obstacles in my new path, and am really no further than the point from which I set out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding the internal determinations of n thing, and is for this reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence --which was the purpose of all our enquiries ; and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer the question --What of all things in the world must be regarded as such ?
It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all- sufficient being -- a cause of all possible effects, for the purpose of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enun ciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty ; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary, must itself possess that character.
The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind either to discover conception which shall harmonise with the idea of absolute necessity, or conception which shall contain that idea. If the one possible, so the other for reason recognises that alone as absolutely necessary, which necessary from its conception. * But both attempts ,are equally beyond our power --we find impossible to satisfy the under standing upon this point, and as impossible to induce to remain at rest in relation to this incapacity.
Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support
and stay of all existing things, an indispensable require ment of the mind, an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, ter rible and sublime as as depicted by Haller, does not pro duce upon the mental vision such feeling of awe and terror for, although measures the duration of things, does not support tbem. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves the thought, that beiDg, which we regard as the greatest
all possible existences, should say to himself: am from That is, wliicli cannot In erplalf' >>s other thsn necefsary --Tr
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? Or THE ILLUSION IN THE FOBEfcOlNO ABGTJMEST8.
eternity to eternity ; beside me there is nothing, except that winch exists by my will ; but whence then am I? Here all sinks away from under us ; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other.
Many physic. il powers, which evidence their existence by their effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature ; they elude all our powers of observation. The transcendental ob ject which forms the basis of phenomena, and, in connection with the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision the fact there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its reality the need of felt by reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical
An ideal not even given as cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable on the contrary, must, as mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions -- upon objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.
Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion till Transcendental Arguments for the Existence a Necessary
Being.
Both of the above arguments are transcendental in other words, they do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological argument professed to lay basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning, did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason -- in relation to an existence given empirical consciousness utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its assertion!
unity.
Now what the cause, these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and
entirely upon pure conceptions.
tupreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anj
377
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? 378 TRANSCENDENTAL DIAXLCTCC.
tLing but an idea ? What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing tilings must be necessary, while it falls back from tiie assertion of the existence of such a being as from an Abyss ? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and re luctant approbation --always again withdrawn, arrive at a calm nud settled insight into its cause? thj
It is something very remarkable that, on
that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference, that some
thing exists necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural -- but not on that account reliable--inference doea the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me--be the thing or being what it may -- from cogitnting its non-existence, I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or indivi dual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never com plete the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this be ing-
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the nasis of existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable in ference that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves -- otherwise an internal contradiction would result that consequently neither of these principles ue objective, but merely subjective principles of reason -- the one requiring us to seek for necessary ground for every thing that exists, that to be satisfied with no other expla nation than that which complete priori, the other forbid ding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that to regard no member of the empirical world as un conditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in uaeir purely heuristic and regulative character, and as con cerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite con sistent with each other. The one says -- you must philoso phise upon nature, as there existed necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing
supposition
? ? ? if
is is,
a
is,
a &
is, ;
? OF THE ILLUBION IN THE FOBEGOING AHGUMEWT8. 379
systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing nn idea of this chnracter --a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate ; while the other warns you to consider no indi vidual determination, concerning the existence of things, ns such an ultimate foundation, that as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every determination as determined some other. But all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary, impossible that anything which
empirically given should be absolutely necessary.
follows from this, that you must accept the absolutely
necessary as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as useful only as principle of the highest possible unity in ex
perience, ancLyou cannot discover any such necessary existence in the world, the second rule requiring you to regard all em pirical causes of unity as themselves deduced.
? The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent; while matter was considered by them, id accordance with the judgment of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But they had regarded matter, not relatively --as the substratum of phsenomena, but absolutely and itself -- ns an independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For there nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence on the contrary, can annihilate in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But thought alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion.
In fact, extension and impenetrability--which together con stitute our conception of matter --form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phsenomena, and this principle, in so far as empirically unconditioned, possesses the property of regulative principle. But, as every determinntion ol matter which constitutes what real in --and consequently
impenetrability --
an effect, which must have cause, and for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonise with the idea of necessary being, in its character
of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of its
real properties, being derived, mast be only conditionally ne cessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thonght and thus the whole existence of matter can be bo annihilated 01
? ? ;
is
a
if
it a
A
if it
is
it is
by
is
it
a
is It
it is
is ;
in
a is
in
it
is,
? 380 TRANSCMTDENTAL DIALECTIC.
If this were not the case, we siunld have fcnnd in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unity --which is impossible, according to the second regu lative principle. It follows, that matter, and, in general, all that farms part of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, ncr even a principle of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect con fidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their ex istence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no ne cessary being ; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our de duction, just as if such a being --the supreme condition of all existences -- were presupposed by the mind.
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the Supreme Being, far from being an cnounce- ment of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle as constitutive, and hypostatising this unity. Pre cisely similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it ; and thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing -- as an object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be esta blished as a principle for the empirical employment of reason,
unless it is based upon the idea of an en* realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition, as ab solutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) ne cessary, as a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity in or by any conception, and it
suppressed.
? ? ? ? 01' THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGiCAL ARGUMENT. 381
rliaU merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of thought, bat not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.
