Only that way would it
actually
become severe, hard and sober.
Adorno-Jargon-of-Authenticity
Pre- cisely in the unconditioned state of any given momen- tary engagement, the existentialist is especially exposed to the temptation of inconstancy and of faithlessness.
23
All of these words draw from language, from which they are stolen, the aroma of the bodily, unmetaphorical; but in the jargon they become quietly spiritualized. In that way they avoid the dangers of which 'they are constantly palavering. The more ear- nestly the jargon sanctifies its everyday world, as
though in a mockery of Kierkegaard's insistence on the unity of the sublime and the pedestrian, the more sadly does the jargon mix up the literal with the figurative:
Heidegger's final remark aims at this fundamental meaning of residing for all human existence, and in this remark he focuses on the "need for residences" as one of the great difficulties of our time : "The true need for residence," he says here, "consists not first of all in the absence of residences," although this need should by no means be taken lightly; but behind this need a deeper one is hidden, that man has lost his own nature and so cannot come to rest. "The true need for residence consists in the fact that mortals must first learn to re- side. " But to learn to reside means : to grasp this neces- sity, that, in the face of what is threatening, man should make for himself a sheltering space and should settle into it with a trustful reliance. But, then, inversely, the possibility of this settling down is again connected in a menacing way with the availability of residences. 24
23. Bollnow, Geborgenheit, pp. 37 f. 24. Ibid. , p. 170.
33
The Being of the sheltering space of shelteredness is simply derived from the necessity that man should "make for himself" such a space. The linguistic care- lessness, in the unresisting mechanism of the jargon, admittedly lays shelteredness bare, as if out of com- pulsion; lays it bare as something that is merely posited. However, that which announces itself, in the game about the need for residences, is more serious
than the pose of existential seriousness. It is the fear of unemployment, lurking in all citizens of countries of high capitalism. This is a fear which is administra- tively fought off, and therefore nailed to the platonic firmament of stars, a fear that remains even in the glorious times of full employment. Everyone knows that he could become expendable as technology de- velops, as long as production is only carried on for production's sake; so everyone senses that his job is a disguised unemployment. It is a support that has ar- bitrarily and revocably pinched off something from the
total societal product, for the purpose of maintaining the status quO. 25 He who has not been given a life ticket could in principle be sent away tomorrow. That migra- tion of people could continue which the dictators al- ready once before set in motion and channeled into Auschwitz. Angst, busily distinguished from inner- worldly, empirical fear, need by no means be an ex- istential value. Since it is historical, it appears in fact that those who are yoked into a SOCiety which is socie- talized, but contradictory to the deepest core, con-
25. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Eingriffe: Neun kritische Madelle (Frankfurt, 1963), p. 137.
34
stantly feel threatened by what sustains them. They feel threatened without ever being able in specific in- stances to concretize this threat from the whole of sOciety. But in shelteredness the declassed person has his clumsy triumph-the declassed man who knows what he can get away with. On the one hand he has nothing to lose; on the other hand, the overadminis- trated world of today? still respects the compromise structure of bourgeois soci? ty, to the extent that that society-in its own interest-stops short before the ultimate, the liquidation of its members, stops short because, in the massive plans of its industry, it has the means of delay at its disposal. So Jaspers' "existence welfare" and social welfare-administrated grace- come into contact. On the social ground of the j argon's reinterpretation of complete negativity into what is positive, we suspect the coercive self-confidence of the uneasy consciousness. Even our cheap suffering from the loss of meaning, a suffering long since automatized into a formula, is not simply that emptiness which has
grown up through the whole movement of the Enlight- enment-as the more demanding viri obscuri willingly describe it. There are reports of taedium vitae even during periods of unchallenged state religion; it was as common among the Fathers of the Church as among those who carry over into the jargon Nietzsche's judg- ment about modern nihilism, and who imagine that in that way they have gone beyond both Nietzsche and nihilism-Nietzsche's concept of which they have sim- ply turned upside down. Socially, the feeling of mean- inglessness is a reaction to the wide-reaching freeing from work which takes place under conditions of con-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 35
tinuing social unfreedom. The free time of the subjects withholds from them the freedom which they secretly hope for; their free time chains them to the ever-same, the apparatus of production-even when this appa- ratus is giving them a vacation. With this situation they are forced to compare the obvious possibilities, and they grow the more confused the less the closed fa? ade of consciousness, which is modeled after that of so- ciety, lets through the conception of a possible freedom.
At the same time, in the feeling of meaninglessness which is the high-bourgeois expression of real need, the permanent threat of destruction is assimilated by consciousness. What this consciousness dreads it turns in such a way that the threat seems to be an innate part of it, and thus it weakens that element of the threat which can no longer be grasped in human terms. The fact that on all sides meaning of every kind seems to be impotent against evil, that the latter yields no mean- ing at all, and that the assertion of meaning may even promote evil, is registered as a lack of metaphysical content, especially in regard to religiOUS and social commitments. The falseness of this reinterpretation, using a mode of cultural criticism with which the stingy pathos of the authentics joins in, regularly be- comes visible in a particular fact: the fact that past ages-whichever one prefers-ranging from Bieder- meier to Pelasgic, appear as the ages of immanent meaning. Such reinterpretation follows an inclination
to set back the clock politically and socially, to bring to an end the dynamism inherent in a society which still, through the administrative measures of the most pow- erful cliques, appears to be all too open. As its present
? ? ? form can expect nothing good from such a dynamic, it stubbornly blinds itself to the recognition that the cure which society offers is itself the evil that it fears. This is brought to a head in Heidegger. Cleverly, he couples the appeal of unromantic, incorruptible purity with the prophecy of a saving element which, in consequence, can present itself as nothing other than this purity it- self. The hero of Mahagonny joined the wailing about a world in which there is nothing to hold on to. In Heidegger, as well as in the Brecht of the didactic plays, this is followed by the proclamation of compulsory order as salvation. The lack of something to hold on to is the mirror reflection of its opposite, of unfreedom. Only because mankind failed to define itself did it
grope for determination through something else : some- thing that was safely out of the reach of the dialectical movement. The anthropolOgical condition of so-called human emptiness, which for the sake of contrast the authentics are accustomed to daub out as an unhappy, but inevitable, consequence of the demystified world, could be changed. The longing for some completing factor could be fulfilled, as soon as it was no longer denied-but not fulfilled, of course, through the in- jection of a spiritual meaning or a merely verbal sub- stitution. The social constitution essentially trains mankind for the reproduction of itself, and the com- pulsion extends itself into society's psychology, as soon
as it lOoses its external power. Thanks to the factor of self-preservation, which has blown itself up into a to- tality, the following happens: what man is anyway once more becomes his goal. Perhaps with this nonsense the appearance of meaninglessness might also disap-
37
pear, the eagerly assured nothingness of the subject, a shadow of the state in which each person is literally his own neighbor. If it is the case that no metaphysical thought was ever created which has not been a constel- lation of elements of experience, then, in the present instance, the seminal experiences of metaphysics are simply diminished by a habit of thought which sub- limates them into metaphysical pain and splits them off from the real pain which gave rise to them. The jargon's whole hatred is directed against this con- sciousness. No distinction is made between Marx and the superstition of race :
Marxism, psychoanalysis, and racial theory are today the most widespread deceptions of mankind. The di- rectly brutal in hatred and praise, as it has come to dominance in human existence, finds its expression in these systems of thought; in Marxism, in the manner in which the mass postulates community; in psycho- analysis, in the way it seeks mere existence satisfaction; in racial theory, in the way it wants to be better than the other. . . . Without sociology no political strategy can be carried out. Without psychology no one becomes master of the reigning confusion, in his converse with himself and with the others. Without anthropology we would lose our consciousness of the dark causes of that in which we possess ourselves . . . . No sociology c an tell what fate I want, no psychology can clarify what I am, authentic being of man cannot be bred as race. Everywhere is the boundary of that which can be planned and made . For Marxism, psychoanalysis , and theory of race have characteristicaly destructive attri- butes. As Marxism thinks that it uncovers all spiritual being as Superstructure, psychoanalysis does the same in exposing spiritual being as sublimation of repressed drives. What, then, is still called culture is structured
? like an obsessive neurosis. Theory of race causes a con- ception of history which is without hope. Negative selection of the best will soon bring about the ruin of authentic humanity; or, it is the nature of man to produce during this process the highest possibilities in a mixture of races, in order to leave behind ad infinitum the marrowless average existence of his remains, after the mixing has come to an end in the course of a few centuries. All three tendencies are apt to destroy what has seemed to be of value for men. They are especially the ruin of anything absolute, for, as knowledge, they make themselves a false absolute which recognizes everything else as conditioned. Not only has God to fall
but also every form of philosophical belief. Both the highest and the lowest are labeled with the same termi- nology and, judged, step into nothingness! 6
The practical usability of the enlightening diSciplines is condescendingly granted in the beginning only to prevent more effectively any reflection on the truth content of criticism : by arousing our indignation at the desire to destroy. Passionate grief about obliviousness to being is given the appearance of the essential-to the point where one would rather like to forget all Be- ing. All of that is more ominously attended to in Der Grilne Heinrich:
There is an old saying which maintains that one must not only tear down but must also know how to build up; a commonplace constantly employed by cheery and superficial people who are uncomfortably confron ted with an activity which demands a decision from them. This way of speaking is in place where something is superficially settled or is denied out of stupid inclina- tion; otherwise, though, it is unintelligible. For one is
26. Jaspers, Die geistige Situation, pp. 142 ff.
? 39
not always tearing down, in order to build again; on the contrary, one tears things down eagerly in order to win free space for light and air, which appear as it were by themselves, wherever some obstructing object is removed. When one looks matters right in the face and treats them in an upright maner, then nothing is negative, but al is positive-to use this old saw. 27
Then the old warriors had an easier time of it: they had no need of old saws; they only needed to breathe sense into doubters with the cudgel of fate and Nordic manhood. But they already had the jargon at their dis- posal :
An extreme intensification of al activity, and a sharp- ening of all creative powers, even the great political event as such, mark our time; and to the eyes of philosophy they have physically presented this phe- nomenon in its authenticity and unvarnished original- ity. Philosophy has grasped this phenomenon as a con- dition of the highes t philosophical relevance , in order to let itself be led, through its content and problematic structure, to a full and pure understanding of man and the world. . . . Human existence is not meaningless : that is the categorical assertion with which this exist- ence itself confronts the philosophy of life, in order to assert itself in opposition to and over against that phi- losophy. . . . To say yes to fate and to negate it in spite of that, to suffer it and yet to dominate it, i. e. , to face it and to take one's stand against it, that is the attitude of true humanity. This attitude corresponds to the ideal image of man because it represents nothing
27. Gottfried Keller, Der Griine Heinrich, IV, 2, quoted in Friedrich Pollock, "Somharts Widerlegung des Marxismus," in Beihefte zum Archiv filr die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, ed. Carl Grunberg (Leipzig, I926), III, 63.
? but the essence of man, universally valid and removed from all ties to time. At the same time, and at one with it, this attitude defines the deep and genuine meaning of fate, that meaning which has nothing to do with fatalism, a meaning to which especially a German opens himself. For the man of Nordic blood, this mean- ing takes on a deeply religious content and grounds what for him means his bond with fate and his belief in fate. 28
Language uses the word "meaning" for the harm- less epistemological intentional object of HusserI, as well as for the purpose of saying that something is justified as meaningful; as one would speak, for in- stance, of the meaning of history. It remains true that the factual particular has meaning to the extent that the whole, above all the system of society, appears in it; that the dispersed facts are always more than what they immediately seem, even if such meaning is mad- ness. The search for meaning as that which something is authentically, and as that which is hidden in it, pushes away, often unnoticed and therefore all the faster, the question as to the right of this something. Analysis of meaning becomes the norm in this de- mand, not only for the signs but also for that which they refer to. The sign system of language, by its mere existence, takes everything, to begin with, into something that is held in readiness by society; and it defends this society in its own form prior to all content. This is what reflection stands firm against. However, the jargon drifts with the current, and would be glad
28. From Wilhelm Grebe, Der deutsche Mensch: Unter- V suchungen zur Philosophie des Handelns (Berlin, I937).
? 41
to increase it, in union with the regressive formations of consciousness.
In its semantic directions positivism has constantly noted the historical break between language and that which it expresses. Linguistic forms, . as rei? ied-and only through reification do they become forms-have outlived what they once referred to, together with the context of that reference. The completely demytholo- gized fact would withhold itself from language; through the mere act of intending the fact becomes an other-at least measured in terms of its idol of pure accessibility. That without language there is no fact remains, even so, the thorn in the flesh and the theme of positivism, since it is here that the stub- bornly mythical remainder of language is revealed. Mathematics is, for good reason, the primal model of positivistic thought-even in its function as a lan- guageless system of signs. Looked at in reverse, the tenacious residuum of what is archaic in language be- comes fruitful only where language rubs itself critically against it; the same archaic turns into a fatal mirage when language spontaneously confirms and strength- ens it. The jargon shares with positivism a crude con- ception of the archaic in language; neither of them bothers about the dialectical moment in which lan- guage, as if it were something else, wins itself away from its magical origins, language being entangled in a progressing demythologization. That particular neg- lect authorizes the social using of linguistic anachro- nism. The jargon simply ennobles the antiquity of language, which the positivists just as simply long to
? ? ? eradicate-along with all expression in language. The disproportion between language and the rationalized society drives the authentics to plunder language, rather than to drive it on, through greater sharpness, to its proper due. They don't fail to notice that one cannot speak absolutely without speaking archaically; but what the positivists bewail as retrogressive the authentics eternalize as a blessing.
For them that block which language piles up be- fore the expression of undiminished experience be- comes an altar. If it does not allow itself to be broken through, then it offers us simply the omnipotence and indissolubility of what was precipitated into language. But the archaic takes vengeance on the jargon, whose greed for the ? archaic violates the proper distance. The archaic is objectified for a second time. In its example is repeated that which in any case happened to lan- guage historically. The nimbus in which the words are being wrapped, like oranges in tissue paper, takes under its own direction the mythology of language, as if the radiant force of the words could not yet quite be trusted. Mixed with artificial coloring the words them- selves, released from the relation to what is thought, are to speak a relation which should change them and so always demythologizes them. Language mythology and reification become mixed with that element which identifies language as antimythological and rational. The jargon becomes practicable along the whole scale, reaching from sermon to advertisement. In the medium of the concept the jargon becomes surprisingly similar to the habitual practices of advertising. The words of
43
the jargon and those like ]iigermeister, Alte Kloster- frau, Schiinke,29 are all of a piece. They exploit the hap- piness promised by that which had to pass on to the shadows. Blood is drawn from that which has its ap- pearance of concreteness only after the fact, by virtue of its downfall. At least in terms of their function, the words, nailed into fixity and covered with a luminous layer of insulation, remind us of the positivistic count- ers. They are useful for arbitrary effect-connotations, without regard to the pathos of uniqueness which they usurp, and which itself has its orgin on the market, on that market for which what is rare has exchange value.
With the assertion of meaning at all costs, the old antisophistic emotion seeps into the so-called mass sOciety. Ever since the victory of Plato and Aristotle over the Socratic left, that emotion has dominated the official position of philosophy. Whatever refused sub- jection to it was pushed off into powerless undercur- rents. Only the more recent positivism has made so- phistic motives reputable by its alliance with science. The jargon struggles against this alliance. Without judgment it hands down the judgment of tradition. The shame of the sophists, opposed by Plato, was the fact that they did not fight against falsity in order to change the slave society, but rather raised doubts about truth
in order to arm thought for whatever was. Their kind of destruction was indeed similar to the totalitarian concept of ideology. Plato could caricature the Gorgias sophists as clowns because thought, once it has been
29. [Klosterfrau, jagermeister, Schanke: established brand names of well known liqueurs and wines. ]
44
freed from concrete knowledge and the nature of the object, reduces to farce that moment of play which is essential to thought-turns such a moment into a ghost of that mimesis which is combatted by every enlight- enment. 30 Nevertheless, the antisophistic movement misuses its insight into such misconstructions of free- wheeling thought-misuses them in order to discredit thought, through thought. This was the way Nietzsche criticized Kant, raising the charge of over-subtle think- ing in the same tone as that adopted magisterially by Hegel, when he spoke of "reasoning. " In the modish
antisophistic movement there is a sad confluence : of a necessary critique of isolated instrumental reason with a grim defense of institutions against thought. The jargon, a waste product of the modern that it at- tacks, seeks to protect itself-along with literally de- structive institutions-against the suspicion of being destructive : by Simultaneously accusing other, mostly anticonservative, groups of sinful intellectuality, of that sin which lies deep in the jargon's own unnaive, reflective principle of existence. Demagogically it uses the double character of the antisophistic. That con- sciousness is false which, externally, and, as Hegel says, without being in the thing, places itself above this thing and manages it from above; but criticism becomes equally ideological at the moment when it lets it be known, self-righteously, that thought must have a ground. Hegel's dialectic went beyond the doc-
trine that thought, in order to be true, needs some absolute starting point, free of doubt. This doctrine be-
30. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dia- lektik der Aufkliirung ( Amsterdam, I 947 ) , pp. 20 ff .
? 45
comes all the more terroristic in the jargon of authen- ticity, ? as it more autocratically locates its starting point outside of the texture of thought. Antisophistic atti- tudes, in the final stages of processed mythology, are hardened forms of causal thinking. The relapse of the risen metaphysics, behind dialectics, is chalked up by the jargon to a return to the mothers.
When everything has been cut off, the root lies bared. The root is the origin out of which we grew and which we have forgotten in the creepers of opinions, habits, and schemata of comprehension. 31
Even later in Vernunft und Existenz, Jaspers writes:
Only in this way could the true strength of man be realized. The power of the absolute in him, proven in every pOSSibility of struggle and questioning, would no longer need suggestion, hate, lust for cruelty in order to become active, no longer need the intoxication of big words and ununderstood dogmas in order to be- lieve in itself.
Only that way would it actually become severe, hard and sober. Only in this way can all the self-deceptions disappear without destroying man in the process of destroying his life-lies. Only in this way will the true ground reveal itself unveiled from the depth. 32
The authentic ones defame sophistry, but they drag its arbitrariness along in their programs, instead of prov-
31 . Karl Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube ( Munich, 1948), p. 125. [English translation by E. B. Ashton, Philosophi- cal Faith and Revelation (New York, 1967). The quotation is translated from the original German. ]
32. Karl Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz (Munich, 1960) pp. 98 ff. [English translation by W. Earle, Reason and Ex- istenz: Five Lectures (London, 1956). The quotation is trans- lated from the original German. ]
? ing to be a match for it. But they agree with the Sophists in their favorite thesis, that man alone is im- portant-that sententia of Homo mensura warmed over again with unexpected fulsomeness. As once be- fore, the social model of their chosen scapegoat is ur- ban freedom, which, in the past, helped thought to emancipate itself. The only diference is the fact that in the strict rational order of bourgeois society the mo- bility of person and spirit are less threatening to
groups, which in effect no longer exist in highly indus- trialized countries. But it constantly challenges the con- tinuing irrationality of the total system, which would like to prune away what is still vegetating on from the social modes of behavior developed under liberalism.
Therefore the jargon must defend, so as not to be lost, transitory social forms which are incompatible with the contemporary state of the forces of produc- tion. If it wanted to mount the barricades itself, then it would have to engage itself not only for a position much scorned among its believers, but possibly also for that rationality which the exchange society both promises and denies, and through which that society
could be transcended. The bourgeoiS form of rational- ity has always needed irrational supplements, in order to maintain itself as what it is, continuing injustice through justice. Such irrationality in the midst of the ration al is the working atmosphere of authenticity . The latter can support itself on the fact that over a long period of time literal as well as figurative mobility, a main element in bourgeois equality, always turned into injustice for those who could not entirely keep up. They experienced the progress of society as a verdict:
47
a pawned-off remembrance of their suffering, under that system, brings authenticity, along with its jargon, to a ferment. Its bubbles cause the true object of the suffering, the particular constitution of society, to disappear. For the selected victims of the feeling against mobility have themselves been condemned, ever since the sphere of circulation was fused into the sphere of production. The jargon strives to turn the bitterness of the indigenous, of the mute, into some- thing like a metaphysical-moral verdict of annhilation against the man who can speak out; and the jargon has had so much success only for this reason, because this verdict in question has already in effect been spoken,
and has been carried out in Germany against innumer- able people-because the gesture of rooted genuine- ness is at one with that of the historical conquerors. That is the substantial element in authenticity, the holy fount of its strength. Taciturnity and silence are the best counterpoint to existential and existentialist babble. The order which this babble aims at is itself one that reaches for speechlessness of sign and com- mand. In happy agreement with its consumers, the jargon fills the breach created by the societally neces- sary disintegration of language. Petit bourgeois have few acquaintances; they feel uncomfortable as soon as they come together with people they don't already know, and their duplicity turns this attitude into a vir- tue. Not lastly, the jargon bears some resemblance to the rough manners of a doorman, in ? an Alpine hotel, who hectors the guests as if they were intruders, and in this way wins their trust. In face of the social stasis
that once again is darkening the horizon, a shimmer of
? ? humanity is shed back onto the officiously persuasive word of the day before yesterday. If philosophy were to take back into society the experiences which were pre- cipitated in the jargon in the false forms of its dis- tilled essences-society being the place where they originated-and if the word "origin" had any meaning at all, then philosophy would be able to go beyond the
opposition of mobility and fixity, of groundlessness and authenticity. It would then recognize these oppositions as elements of the same guilty whole, in which heroes and businessmen are of value to each other. The liberalism that hatched the culture industry produced forms of reflection that are encountered indignantly by the jargon of authenticity, although it is itself one of them. This liberalism was the ancestor of the fascism which destroyed both it and its later potential cus- tomers. But of course the blood guilt of that which echoes today, in the jargon, is incomparably greater
than the deceptive maneuvers of mobility, whose prin- ciples are incompatible with those of immediate power. Heidegger is not the matador of such political strat-
egies, and in fact he protects himself against their blunt directness. It is true that he does use the word "authenticity" centrally in Sein und Zeit,33 and most of the familiar shorthand is spread around over his best- known text-spread with gestures, of incontestable authority, which the mass of the authentics then me- chanically imitate; there is unquestioned agreement
about the undiscussed core of all this. In the same way Heidegger struggles to show reserve toward all the
33. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 304 if. , also pp. 68 69. 49
? current phrases which he, with ease, can put aside as vulgar misunderstanding. Nevertheless, as soon as he loosens his voluntary self-censorship, he falls into the jargon, with a provinciality which cannot be excused on the grounds that it becomes thematic of itself. He has published a little volume of gnomic thoughts en- titled Out of the Experience of Thinking. Its form keeps to the middle ground between poetry and pre-Socratic fragment. Yet the sibylline character of the pre-Socra- tic fragments really results, at least in many of them, from the accident of a discontinuous tradition, and not from secretiveness. Heidegger has praise for the "splendor of the simple. " 34 He brings back the thread- bare ideology of pure materials, from the realm of handicrafts to that of the mind-as if words were pure, and, as it were, roughened material. But textiles of that sort are mediated, today, through their calcu- lated opposition to mass production; and in just that way Heidegger wants, synthetically, to create a primal sense for pure words.
Another specifically social element plays into the category of the simple : the elevation of the cheap, in accordance with the wishes of the proudly declining elite-an elevation related to youth music, which gladly goes along with the jargon and lets itself be ac- companied by it. Being behind the times historically is no less eagerly converted into the feeling of the fate- fully tragic, than into that of something higher; that too goes along with the silent identification of the
1954), p. 13? 50
34. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens ( Pfullingen,
archaic with the genuine. But the triviality of the sim- ple is not, as Heidegger would like it to be, attributable to the value-blindness of thought that has lost being. Such triviality comes from thinking that is supposedly in tune with being and reveals itself as something supremely noble. Such triviality is the sign of that c1as- sifying thought, even in the simplest word, from which Heidegger pretends that he has escaped: namely, ab- straction. Already in the first version of Geist der Utopie, Ernst Bloch says that symbol intentions, which arefor him the traces of messianic light in the darkened world, are in fact not expressed by the most simple basic relationships and basic words, like "the old man, the mother, and death. " But Heidegger, in his fastidious Humanism letter, lets us hear these words :
Man is not the lord of existence. Man is the shepherd of being. In this '1ess" man loses nothing, but rather wins, by reaching the truth of Being. He wins the essen- tial poverty of the shepherd, whose worth consists in being called, by Being itself, into the trueness of its truth. This call comes as the throwing from which the thrownness of existence stems. In his being-historical, [seinsgeschichtlich] essence, man is the existent whose being as ek-sistence consists in his living in the neigh- borhood of Being. Man is the neighbor of Being. 85
Philosophical banality is generated when that magical participation in the absolute is ascribed to the general concept-a participation which puts the lie to that con- cept's conceivability.
3 5 . Heidegger, tJber den Humanismus ( Frankfurt, I 949 ) P? 29?
? 5I
Philosophizing, according to Heidegger, is a danger to thought. 36 But the authentic thinker, harsh toward anything so modernistic as philosophy, writes : "When in early summer isolated narcissi bloom hidden in the meadow, and the mountain rose glistens under the maple tree . . . " 37 or : "When from the slopes of the high valley, where the herds are slowly passing, the cow bells ring and ring . . . " 38 Or verses :
The woods make camp the streams rush on the cliffs remain
the rain runs.
The meadows wait
the fountains spring
the winds dwell blessing takes thought. 39
The renewing of thinking through outmoded language can be judged by these instances. The archaic is the expressive ideal of this language : "The oldest element of the old comes up behind us in our thinking and yet meets us head on. " 40 But Jungnickel knows how to put it: the revenge of the myth on the person who is curious about it, on the denouncer of thinking. "The poetic character of thinking is still concealed,"41 Heidegger adds, in order to forestall criticism at all costs: "where it shows itself, it for a long time re-
36. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung, p. I S .
37. Ibid. , p. 12.
38. Ibid. , p. 22.
39. Ibid. , p. 27?
40. Ibid. , p. 19.
41. Ibid. , p. 23.
? sembles the utopia of a half-poetic intellect. " 42 Still the half-poetic intellect which babbles forth those pieces of wisdom bears less resemblance to this, or to any other unsuccessful utopia, than to the work of some trusty folk art, which after all is not used to speaking well about those things. During the Hitler period, and we can feel with him, Heidegger turned down an academic appointment in Berlin. He justifies that in an article, "Why Do We Remain in the Province? " With wily strategy he disarms the charge that he is provincial; he uses the term "provincialism" in a positive sense. His strategy takes this form: "When on a deep winter night a wild snowstorm rages around the cabin, and covers and conceals everything, then the time is ripe for philosophy. Its question must then become simple and essential. " 43 Whether ques- tions are essential can in any case only be judged by the answers given; there is no way of anticipating, and certainly not by the criterion of a simplicity based on meteorological events. That simplicity says as little about truth as about its opposite; Kant, Hegel were as complicated and as simple as their content forced them to be. But Heidegger insinuates a preestablished harmony between essential content and homey mur- muring. Therefore, the echoes of Jungnickel here are not just loveable lapses. They are there to deafen any suspicion that the philosopher might be an intellectual : "And philosophical work does not take place as the
42. Ibid.
43. Quoted in Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger, Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern, 1962), p. 216.
? 53
spare-time activity of a crank. It belongs right in the midst of the labor of farmers. " 44 One would like at least to know the farmers' opinion ,about that. Heideg- ger does not need their opinion. For "during the time of the evening work-pause, he sits, on the stove bench along with the farmers . . . or at the table in the corner, under the crucifix, and then we usually don't talk at all. We smoke our pipes in silence. " 45 "One's own work's inner belonging, to the Black Forest and its people, comes from a century-long Germanic- Swabian rootedness, which is irreplaceable. " 46 Mter all, Heidegger says it himself. Johann Peter Hebel, who comes from the same region, and to whom Heideg- ger would like to give the place of honor on the mantel- piece, hardly ever appealed to this rootedness; instead he passed on his greetings to the peddlers Scheitele and Nausel, in one of the most beautiful pieces of prose in defense of the Jews that was ever written in German. 47 Rootedness, however, puffs itself up:
Recently I got a second invitation to the University of Berlin. On such an occasion I leave the city and go back to my cabin. I hear what the mountains and woods and farmyards say. On the way I drop in on my oId friend, a seventy-five-year-old farmer. He has read in the news- paper about the Berlin invitation. What will he say? He slowly presses the sure glance of his clear eyes against mine, holds his mouth tightly closed, lays his faithful and cautious hand on my shoulder-and almost im-
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. , p. 217?
46. Ibid.
47. Cf. Johann Peter Hebel, Werke (Berlin, I874) II, 254.
54
perceptibly shakes his head. That means: absolutely
No! 48
While the philosopher complains to other Blubo-friends about their advertising of the Blubo,'9 which would be detrimental to his monopoly, his reflected unreflective- ness degenerates into chummy chit-chat, for the sake of the rural setting with which he wants to stand on a confidential footing. The description of the old farmer reminds us of the most washed-out cliches in plough- and-furrow novels, from the region of a Frenssen; and it reminds us equally of the praise of being silent, which the philosopher authorizes not only for his farmers but also for himself. Here we find an ignorance of everything we have learned about rural people : for instance in French realism from Balzac's late work to Maupassant; from a literature not attuned to the musty instincts of German petit-bourgeois kitsch; from a literature which would be available in translation even to a pre-Socratic. The small farmer owes his con- tinuing existence entirely to gracious gifts from that exchange SOciety by which his very ground and foun- dation, even in appearance, have been removed; in the face of this exchange the farmers have nothing on the:ir horizon except something worse-the immediate exploitation of the family without which they would be bankrupt: this hollowed-out state, the perpetual crisis of the small farmer's business, has its echo in the hollowness of the jargon. The subsidies which are
48 . Schneeberger, Nachlese, p. 2 I 8 .
49. [B lubo: catchword o f the Nazi movement, emphasizing the interdependence of one's life with one's native soil. A provincial version of pro patria mori. ]
55
paid to the small farmers are ,the very ground of that which the primal words of the jargon add to that which in fact they mean. Like less prominent porte- paroles of authenticity, Heidegger is filled with the disdainful pride of inwardness, which he touches on philosophically, in his thought about Hegel's critique of it. 50 Whoever is forced by the nature of his work to stay in one place, gladly makes a virtue out of ne- cessity. He tries to convince himself and others that his bound-ness is of a higher order. The financially threatened farmer's bad experiences with middlemen substantiate this opinion. The socially clumsy person who may be partially excluded from society hates those middlemen as jacks of all trades. This hatred joins with resistance against all agents, from the cattle dealer to the journalist. In 1956 the stable professions, which are themselves a stage of social development, are still the norms for Heidegger. He praises them in the name of a false eternity of agrarian conditions: "Man tries in vain to bring the globe to order through planning, when he is not in tune with the consoling voice of the country lane. " 51 North America knows no country lanes, not even villages. Philosophy, which is ashamed of its name, needs the sixth-hand symbol of the farmer as a proof of its primalness, as a way of acquiring some otherwise unavailable distinctiveness. However, Lessing's insight still applies, as it did in his time : the insight that the aesthetic critic does not need to do better himself than what he criticizes. That which
50. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 248 fr.
51. Heidegger, Der Feldweg (Frankfurt, I956) p. 4.
? ? ? ? was right for the Hamburg Dramaturgy is also reason- able for philosophical theory : the self-awareness of its limitations does not obligate it to authentic poetic creation.
All of these words draw from language, from which they are stolen, the aroma of the bodily, unmetaphorical; but in the jargon they become quietly spiritualized. In that way they avoid the dangers of which 'they are constantly palavering. The more ear- nestly the jargon sanctifies its everyday world, as
though in a mockery of Kierkegaard's insistence on the unity of the sublime and the pedestrian, the more sadly does the jargon mix up the literal with the figurative:
Heidegger's final remark aims at this fundamental meaning of residing for all human existence, and in this remark he focuses on the "need for residences" as one of the great difficulties of our time : "The true need for residence," he says here, "consists not first of all in the absence of residences," although this need should by no means be taken lightly; but behind this need a deeper one is hidden, that man has lost his own nature and so cannot come to rest. "The true need for residence consists in the fact that mortals must first learn to re- side. " But to learn to reside means : to grasp this neces- sity, that, in the face of what is threatening, man should make for himself a sheltering space and should settle into it with a trustful reliance. But, then, inversely, the possibility of this settling down is again connected in a menacing way with the availability of residences. 24
23. Bollnow, Geborgenheit, pp. 37 f. 24. Ibid. , p. 170.
33
The Being of the sheltering space of shelteredness is simply derived from the necessity that man should "make for himself" such a space. The linguistic care- lessness, in the unresisting mechanism of the jargon, admittedly lays shelteredness bare, as if out of com- pulsion; lays it bare as something that is merely posited. However, that which announces itself, in the game about the need for residences, is more serious
than the pose of existential seriousness. It is the fear of unemployment, lurking in all citizens of countries of high capitalism. This is a fear which is administra- tively fought off, and therefore nailed to the platonic firmament of stars, a fear that remains even in the glorious times of full employment. Everyone knows that he could become expendable as technology de- velops, as long as production is only carried on for production's sake; so everyone senses that his job is a disguised unemployment. It is a support that has ar- bitrarily and revocably pinched off something from the
total societal product, for the purpose of maintaining the status quO. 25 He who has not been given a life ticket could in principle be sent away tomorrow. That migra- tion of people could continue which the dictators al- ready once before set in motion and channeled into Auschwitz. Angst, busily distinguished from inner- worldly, empirical fear, need by no means be an ex- istential value. Since it is historical, it appears in fact that those who are yoked into a SOCiety which is socie- talized, but contradictory to the deepest core, con-
25. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Eingriffe: Neun kritische Madelle (Frankfurt, 1963), p. 137.
34
stantly feel threatened by what sustains them. They feel threatened without ever being able in specific in- stances to concretize this threat from the whole of sOciety. But in shelteredness the declassed person has his clumsy triumph-the declassed man who knows what he can get away with. On the one hand he has nothing to lose; on the other hand, the overadminis- trated world of today? still respects the compromise structure of bourgeois soci? ty, to the extent that that society-in its own interest-stops short before the ultimate, the liquidation of its members, stops short because, in the massive plans of its industry, it has the means of delay at its disposal. So Jaspers' "existence welfare" and social welfare-administrated grace- come into contact. On the social ground of the j argon's reinterpretation of complete negativity into what is positive, we suspect the coercive self-confidence of the uneasy consciousness. Even our cheap suffering from the loss of meaning, a suffering long since automatized into a formula, is not simply that emptiness which has
grown up through the whole movement of the Enlight- enment-as the more demanding viri obscuri willingly describe it. There are reports of taedium vitae even during periods of unchallenged state religion; it was as common among the Fathers of the Church as among those who carry over into the jargon Nietzsche's judg- ment about modern nihilism, and who imagine that in that way they have gone beyond both Nietzsche and nihilism-Nietzsche's concept of which they have sim- ply turned upside down. Socially, the feeling of mean- inglessness is a reaction to the wide-reaching freeing from work which takes place under conditions of con-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 35
tinuing social unfreedom. The free time of the subjects withholds from them the freedom which they secretly hope for; their free time chains them to the ever-same, the apparatus of production-even when this appa- ratus is giving them a vacation. With this situation they are forced to compare the obvious possibilities, and they grow the more confused the less the closed fa? ade of consciousness, which is modeled after that of so- ciety, lets through the conception of a possible freedom.
At the same time, in the feeling of meaninglessness which is the high-bourgeois expression of real need, the permanent threat of destruction is assimilated by consciousness. What this consciousness dreads it turns in such a way that the threat seems to be an innate part of it, and thus it weakens that element of the threat which can no longer be grasped in human terms. The fact that on all sides meaning of every kind seems to be impotent against evil, that the latter yields no mean- ing at all, and that the assertion of meaning may even promote evil, is registered as a lack of metaphysical content, especially in regard to religiOUS and social commitments. The falseness of this reinterpretation, using a mode of cultural criticism with which the stingy pathos of the authentics joins in, regularly be- comes visible in a particular fact: the fact that past ages-whichever one prefers-ranging from Bieder- meier to Pelasgic, appear as the ages of immanent meaning. Such reinterpretation follows an inclination
to set back the clock politically and socially, to bring to an end the dynamism inherent in a society which still, through the administrative measures of the most pow- erful cliques, appears to be all too open. As its present
? ? ? form can expect nothing good from such a dynamic, it stubbornly blinds itself to the recognition that the cure which society offers is itself the evil that it fears. This is brought to a head in Heidegger. Cleverly, he couples the appeal of unromantic, incorruptible purity with the prophecy of a saving element which, in consequence, can present itself as nothing other than this purity it- self. The hero of Mahagonny joined the wailing about a world in which there is nothing to hold on to. In Heidegger, as well as in the Brecht of the didactic plays, this is followed by the proclamation of compulsory order as salvation. The lack of something to hold on to is the mirror reflection of its opposite, of unfreedom. Only because mankind failed to define itself did it
grope for determination through something else : some- thing that was safely out of the reach of the dialectical movement. The anthropolOgical condition of so-called human emptiness, which for the sake of contrast the authentics are accustomed to daub out as an unhappy, but inevitable, consequence of the demystified world, could be changed. The longing for some completing factor could be fulfilled, as soon as it was no longer denied-but not fulfilled, of course, through the in- jection of a spiritual meaning or a merely verbal sub- stitution. The social constitution essentially trains mankind for the reproduction of itself, and the com- pulsion extends itself into society's psychology, as soon
as it lOoses its external power. Thanks to the factor of self-preservation, which has blown itself up into a to- tality, the following happens: what man is anyway once more becomes his goal. Perhaps with this nonsense the appearance of meaninglessness might also disap-
37
pear, the eagerly assured nothingness of the subject, a shadow of the state in which each person is literally his own neighbor. If it is the case that no metaphysical thought was ever created which has not been a constel- lation of elements of experience, then, in the present instance, the seminal experiences of metaphysics are simply diminished by a habit of thought which sub- limates them into metaphysical pain and splits them off from the real pain which gave rise to them. The jargon's whole hatred is directed against this con- sciousness. No distinction is made between Marx and the superstition of race :
Marxism, psychoanalysis, and racial theory are today the most widespread deceptions of mankind. The di- rectly brutal in hatred and praise, as it has come to dominance in human existence, finds its expression in these systems of thought; in Marxism, in the manner in which the mass postulates community; in psycho- analysis, in the way it seeks mere existence satisfaction; in racial theory, in the way it wants to be better than the other. . . . Without sociology no political strategy can be carried out. Without psychology no one becomes master of the reigning confusion, in his converse with himself and with the others. Without anthropology we would lose our consciousness of the dark causes of that in which we possess ourselves . . . . No sociology c an tell what fate I want, no psychology can clarify what I am, authentic being of man cannot be bred as race. Everywhere is the boundary of that which can be planned and made . For Marxism, psychoanalysis , and theory of race have characteristicaly destructive attri- butes. As Marxism thinks that it uncovers all spiritual being as Superstructure, psychoanalysis does the same in exposing spiritual being as sublimation of repressed drives. What, then, is still called culture is structured
? like an obsessive neurosis. Theory of race causes a con- ception of history which is without hope. Negative selection of the best will soon bring about the ruin of authentic humanity; or, it is the nature of man to produce during this process the highest possibilities in a mixture of races, in order to leave behind ad infinitum the marrowless average existence of his remains, after the mixing has come to an end in the course of a few centuries. All three tendencies are apt to destroy what has seemed to be of value for men. They are especially the ruin of anything absolute, for, as knowledge, they make themselves a false absolute which recognizes everything else as conditioned. Not only has God to fall
but also every form of philosophical belief. Both the highest and the lowest are labeled with the same termi- nology and, judged, step into nothingness! 6
The practical usability of the enlightening diSciplines is condescendingly granted in the beginning only to prevent more effectively any reflection on the truth content of criticism : by arousing our indignation at the desire to destroy. Passionate grief about obliviousness to being is given the appearance of the essential-to the point where one would rather like to forget all Be- ing. All of that is more ominously attended to in Der Grilne Heinrich:
There is an old saying which maintains that one must not only tear down but must also know how to build up; a commonplace constantly employed by cheery and superficial people who are uncomfortably confron ted with an activity which demands a decision from them. This way of speaking is in place where something is superficially settled or is denied out of stupid inclina- tion; otherwise, though, it is unintelligible. For one is
26. Jaspers, Die geistige Situation, pp. 142 ff.
? 39
not always tearing down, in order to build again; on the contrary, one tears things down eagerly in order to win free space for light and air, which appear as it were by themselves, wherever some obstructing object is removed. When one looks matters right in the face and treats them in an upright maner, then nothing is negative, but al is positive-to use this old saw. 27
Then the old warriors had an easier time of it: they had no need of old saws; they only needed to breathe sense into doubters with the cudgel of fate and Nordic manhood. But they already had the jargon at their dis- posal :
An extreme intensification of al activity, and a sharp- ening of all creative powers, even the great political event as such, mark our time; and to the eyes of philosophy they have physically presented this phe- nomenon in its authenticity and unvarnished original- ity. Philosophy has grasped this phenomenon as a con- dition of the highes t philosophical relevance , in order to let itself be led, through its content and problematic structure, to a full and pure understanding of man and the world. . . . Human existence is not meaningless : that is the categorical assertion with which this exist- ence itself confronts the philosophy of life, in order to assert itself in opposition to and over against that phi- losophy. . . . To say yes to fate and to negate it in spite of that, to suffer it and yet to dominate it, i. e. , to face it and to take one's stand against it, that is the attitude of true humanity. This attitude corresponds to the ideal image of man because it represents nothing
27. Gottfried Keller, Der Griine Heinrich, IV, 2, quoted in Friedrich Pollock, "Somharts Widerlegung des Marxismus," in Beihefte zum Archiv filr die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, ed. Carl Grunberg (Leipzig, I926), III, 63.
? but the essence of man, universally valid and removed from all ties to time. At the same time, and at one with it, this attitude defines the deep and genuine meaning of fate, that meaning which has nothing to do with fatalism, a meaning to which especially a German opens himself. For the man of Nordic blood, this mean- ing takes on a deeply religious content and grounds what for him means his bond with fate and his belief in fate. 28
Language uses the word "meaning" for the harm- less epistemological intentional object of HusserI, as well as for the purpose of saying that something is justified as meaningful; as one would speak, for in- stance, of the meaning of history. It remains true that the factual particular has meaning to the extent that the whole, above all the system of society, appears in it; that the dispersed facts are always more than what they immediately seem, even if such meaning is mad- ness. The search for meaning as that which something is authentically, and as that which is hidden in it, pushes away, often unnoticed and therefore all the faster, the question as to the right of this something. Analysis of meaning becomes the norm in this de- mand, not only for the signs but also for that which they refer to. The sign system of language, by its mere existence, takes everything, to begin with, into something that is held in readiness by society; and it defends this society in its own form prior to all content. This is what reflection stands firm against. However, the jargon drifts with the current, and would be glad
28. From Wilhelm Grebe, Der deutsche Mensch: Unter- V suchungen zur Philosophie des Handelns (Berlin, I937).
? 41
to increase it, in union with the regressive formations of consciousness.
In its semantic directions positivism has constantly noted the historical break between language and that which it expresses. Linguistic forms, . as rei? ied-and only through reification do they become forms-have outlived what they once referred to, together with the context of that reference. The completely demytholo- gized fact would withhold itself from language; through the mere act of intending the fact becomes an other-at least measured in terms of its idol of pure accessibility. That without language there is no fact remains, even so, the thorn in the flesh and the theme of positivism, since it is here that the stub- bornly mythical remainder of language is revealed. Mathematics is, for good reason, the primal model of positivistic thought-even in its function as a lan- guageless system of signs. Looked at in reverse, the tenacious residuum of what is archaic in language be- comes fruitful only where language rubs itself critically against it; the same archaic turns into a fatal mirage when language spontaneously confirms and strength- ens it. The jargon shares with positivism a crude con- ception of the archaic in language; neither of them bothers about the dialectical moment in which lan- guage, as if it were something else, wins itself away from its magical origins, language being entangled in a progressing demythologization. That particular neg- lect authorizes the social using of linguistic anachro- nism. The jargon simply ennobles the antiquity of language, which the positivists just as simply long to
? ? ? eradicate-along with all expression in language. The disproportion between language and the rationalized society drives the authentics to plunder language, rather than to drive it on, through greater sharpness, to its proper due. They don't fail to notice that one cannot speak absolutely without speaking archaically; but what the positivists bewail as retrogressive the authentics eternalize as a blessing.
For them that block which language piles up be- fore the expression of undiminished experience be- comes an altar. If it does not allow itself to be broken through, then it offers us simply the omnipotence and indissolubility of what was precipitated into language. But the archaic takes vengeance on the jargon, whose greed for the ? archaic violates the proper distance. The archaic is objectified for a second time. In its example is repeated that which in any case happened to lan- guage historically. The nimbus in which the words are being wrapped, like oranges in tissue paper, takes under its own direction the mythology of language, as if the radiant force of the words could not yet quite be trusted. Mixed with artificial coloring the words them- selves, released from the relation to what is thought, are to speak a relation which should change them and so always demythologizes them. Language mythology and reification become mixed with that element which identifies language as antimythological and rational. The jargon becomes practicable along the whole scale, reaching from sermon to advertisement. In the medium of the concept the jargon becomes surprisingly similar to the habitual practices of advertising. The words of
43
the jargon and those like ]iigermeister, Alte Kloster- frau, Schiinke,29 are all of a piece. They exploit the hap- piness promised by that which had to pass on to the shadows. Blood is drawn from that which has its ap- pearance of concreteness only after the fact, by virtue of its downfall. At least in terms of their function, the words, nailed into fixity and covered with a luminous layer of insulation, remind us of the positivistic count- ers. They are useful for arbitrary effect-connotations, without regard to the pathos of uniqueness which they usurp, and which itself has its orgin on the market, on that market for which what is rare has exchange value.
With the assertion of meaning at all costs, the old antisophistic emotion seeps into the so-called mass sOciety. Ever since the victory of Plato and Aristotle over the Socratic left, that emotion has dominated the official position of philosophy. Whatever refused sub- jection to it was pushed off into powerless undercur- rents. Only the more recent positivism has made so- phistic motives reputable by its alliance with science. The jargon struggles against this alliance. Without judgment it hands down the judgment of tradition. The shame of the sophists, opposed by Plato, was the fact that they did not fight against falsity in order to change the slave society, but rather raised doubts about truth
in order to arm thought for whatever was. Their kind of destruction was indeed similar to the totalitarian concept of ideology. Plato could caricature the Gorgias sophists as clowns because thought, once it has been
29. [Klosterfrau, jagermeister, Schanke: established brand names of well known liqueurs and wines. ]
44
freed from concrete knowledge and the nature of the object, reduces to farce that moment of play which is essential to thought-turns such a moment into a ghost of that mimesis which is combatted by every enlight- enment. 30 Nevertheless, the antisophistic movement misuses its insight into such misconstructions of free- wheeling thought-misuses them in order to discredit thought, through thought. This was the way Nietzsche criticized Kant, raising the charge of over-subtle think- ing in the same tone as that adopted magisterially by Hegel, when he spoke of "reasoning. " In the modish
antisophistic movement there is a sad confluence : of a necessary critique of isolated instrumental reason with a grim defense of institutions against thought. The jargon, a waste product of the modern that it at- tacks, seeks to protect itself-along with literally de- structive institutions-against the suspicion of being destructive : by Simultaneously accusing other, mostly anticonservative, groups of sinful intellectuality, of that sin which lies deep in the jargon's own unnaive, reflective principle of existence. Demagogically it uses the double character of the antisophistic. That con- sciousness is false which, externally, and, as Hegel says, without being in the thing, places itself above this thing and manages it from above; but criticism becomes equally ideological at the moment when it lets it be known, self-righteously, that thought must have a ground. Hegel's dialectic went beyond the doc-
trine that thought, in order to be true, needs some absolute starting point, free of doubt. This doctrine be-
30. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dia- lektik der Aufkliirung ( Amsterdam, I 947 ) , pp. 20 ff .
? 45
comes all the more terroristic in the jargon of authen- ticity, ? as it more autocratically locates its starting point outside of the texture of thought. Antisophistic atti- tudes, in the final stages of processed mythology, are hardened forms of causal thinking. The relapse of the risen metaphysics, behind dialectics, is chalked up by the jargon to a return to the mothers.
When everything has been cut off, the root lies bared. The root is the origin out of which we grew and which we have forgotten in the creepers of opinions, habits, and schemata of comprehension. 31
Even later in Vernunft und Existenz, Jaspers writes:
Only in this way could the true strength of man be realized. The power of the absolute in him, proven in every pOSSibility of struggle and questioning, would no longer need suggestion, hate, lust for cruelty in order to become active, no longer need the intoxication of big words and ununderstood dogmas in order to be- lieve in itself.
Only that way would it actually become severe, hard and sober. Only in this way can all the self-deceptions disappear without destroying man in the process of destroying his life-lies. Only in this way will the true ground reveal itself unveiled from the depth. 32
The authentic ones defame sophistry, but they drag its arbitrariness along in their programs, instead of prov-
31 . Karl Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube ( Munich, 1948), p. 125. [English translation by E. B. Ashton, Philosophi- cal Faith and Revelation (New York, 1967). The quotation is translated from the original German. ]
32. Karl Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz (Munich, 1960) pp. 98 ff. [English translation by W. Earle, Reason and Ex- istenz: Five Lectures (London, 1956). The quotation is trans- lated from the original German. ]
? ing to be a match for it. But they agree with the Sophists in their favorite thesis, that man alone is im- portant-that sententia of Homo mensura warmed over again with unexpected fulsomeness. As once be- fore, the social model of their chosen scapegoat is ur- ban freedom, which, in the past, helped thought to emancipate itself. The only diference is the fact that in the strict rational order of bourgeois society the mo- bility of person and spirit are less threatening to
groups, which in effect no longer exist in highly indus- trialized countries. But it constantly challenges the con- tinuing irrationality of the total system, which would like to prune away what is still vegetating on from the social modes of behavior developed under liberalism.
Therefore the jargon must defend, so as not to be lost, transitory social forms which are incompatible with the contemporary state of the forces of produc- tion. If it wanted to mount the barricades itself, then it would have to engage itself not only for a position much scorned among its believers, but possibly also for that rationality which the exchange society both promises and denies, and through which that society
could be transcended. The bourgeoiS form of rational- ity has always needed irrational supplements, in order to maintain itself as what it is, continuing injustice through justice. Such irrationality in the midst of the ration al is the working atmosphere of authenticity . The latter can support itself on the fact that over a long period of time literal as well as figurative mobility, a main element in bourgeois equality, always turned into injustice for those who could not entirely keep up. They experienced the progress of society as a verdict:
47
a pawned-off remembrance of their suffering, under that system, brings authenticity, along with its jargon, to a ferment. Its bubbles cause the true object of the suffering, the particular constitution of society, to disappear. For the selected victims of the feeling against mobility have themselves been condemned, ever since the sphere of circulation was fused into the sphere of production. The jargon strives to turn the bitterness of the indigenous, of the mute, into some- thing like a metaphysical-moral verdict of annhilation against the man who can speak out; and the jargon has had so much success only for this reason, because this verdict in question has already in effect been spoken,
and has been carried out in Germany against innumer- able people-because the gesture of rooted genuine- ness is at one with that of the historical conquerors. That is the substantial element in authenticity, the holy fount of its strength. Taciturnity and silence are the best counterpoint to existential and existentialist babble. The order which this babble aims at is itself one that reaches for speechlessness of sign and com- mand. In happy agreement with its consumers, the jargon fills the breach created by the societally neces- sary disintegration of language. Petit bourgeois have few acquaintances; they feel uncomfortable as soon as they come together with people they don't already know, and their duplicity turns this attitude into a vir- tue. Not lastly, the jargon bears some resemblance to the rough manners of a doorman, in ? an Alpine hotel, who hectors the guests as if they were intruders, and in this way wins their trust. In face of the social stasis
that once again is darkening the horizon, a shimmer of
? ? humanity is shed back onto the officiously persuasive word of the day before yesterday. If philosophy were to take back into society the experiences which were pre- cipitated in the jargon in the false forms of its dis- tilled essences-society being the place where they originated-and if the word "origin" had any meaning at all, then philosophy would be able to go beyond the
opposition of mobility and fixity, of groundlessness and authenticity. It would then recognize these oppositions as elements of the same guilty whole, in which heroes and businessmen are of value to each other. The liberalism that hatched the culture industry produced forms of reflection that are encountered indignantly by the jargon of authenticity, although it is itself one of them. This liberalism was the ancestor of the fascism which destroyed both it and its later potential cus- tomers. But of course the blood guilt of that which echoes today, in the jargon, is incomparably greater
than the deceptive maneuvers of mobility, whose prin- ciples are incompatible with those of immediate power. Heidegger is not the matador of such political strat-
egies, and in fact he protects himself against their blunt directness. It is true that he does use the word "authenticity" centrally in Sein und Zeit,33 and most of the familiar shorthand is spread around over his best- known text-spread with gestures, of incontestable authority, which the mass of the authentics then me- chanically imitate; there is unquestioned agreement
about the undiscussed core of all this. In the same way Heidegger struggles to show reserve toward all the
33. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 304 if. , also pp. 68 69. 49
? current phrases which he, with ease, can put aside as vulgar misunderstanding. Nevertheless, as soon as he loosens his voluntary self-censorship, he falls into the jargon, with a provinciality which cannot be excused on the grounds that it becomes thematic of itself. He has published a little volume of gnomic thoughts en- titled Out of the Experience of Thinking. Its form keeps to the middle ground between poetry and pre-Socratic fragment. Yet the sibylline character of the pre-Socra- tic fragments really results, at least in many of them, from the accident of a discontinuous tradition, and not from secretiveness. Heidegger has praise for the "splendor of the simple. " 34 He brings back the thread- bare ideology of pure materials, from the realm of handicrafts to that of the mind-as if words were pure, and, as it were, roughened material. But textiles of that sort are mediated, today, through their calcu- lated opposition to mass production; and in just that way Heidegger wants, synthetically, to create a primal sense for pure words.
Another specifically social element plays into the category of the simple : the elevation of the cheap, in accordance with the wishes of the proudly declining elite-an elevation related to youth music, which gladly goes along with the jargon and lets itself be ac- companied by it. Being behind the times historically is no less eagerly converted into the feeling of the fate- fully tragic, than into that of something higher; that too goes along with the silent identification of the
1954), p. 13? 50
34. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens ( Pfullingen,
archaic with the genuine. But the triviality of the sim- ple is not, as Heidegger would like it to be, attributable to the value-blindness of thought that has lost being. Such triviality comes from thinking that is supposedly in tune with being and reveals itself as something supremely noble. Such triviality is the sign of that c1as- sifying thought, even in the simplest word, from which Heidegger pretends that he has escaped: namely, ab- straction. Already in the first version of Geist der Utopie, Ernst Bloch says that symbol intentions, which arefor him the traces of messianic light in the darkened world, are in fact not expressed by the most simple basic relationships and basic words, like "the old man, the mother, and death. " But Heidegger, in his fastidious Humanism letter, lets us hear these words :
Man is not the lord of existence. Man is the shepherd of being. In this '1ess" man loses nothing, but rather wins, by reaching the truth of Being. He wins the essen- tial poverty of the shepherd, whose worth consists in being called, by Being itself, into the trueness of its truth. This call comes as the throwing from which the thrownness of existence stems. In his being-historical, [seinsgeschichtlich] essence, man is the existent whose being as ek-sistence consists in his living in the neigh- borhood of Being. Man is the neighbor of Being. 85
Philosophical banality is generated when that magical participation in the absolute is ascribed to the general concept-a participation which puts the lie to that con- cept's conceivability.
3 5 . Heidegger, tJber den Humanismus ( Frankfurt, I 949 ) P? 29?
? 5I
Philosophizing, according to Heidegger, is a danger to thought. 36 But the authentic thinker, harsh toward anything so modernistic as philosophy, writes : "When in early summer isolated narcissi bloom hidden in the meadow, and the mountain rose glistens under the maple tree . . . " 37 or : "When from the slopes of the high valley, where the herds are slowly passing, the cow bells ring and ring . . . " 38 Or verses :
The woods make camp the streams rush on the cliffs remain
the rain runs.
The meadows wait
the fountains spring
the winds dwell blessing takes thought. 39
The renewing of thinking through outmoded language can be judged by these instances. The archaic is the expressive ideal of this language : "The oldest element of the old comes up behind us in our thinking and yet meets us head on. " 40 But Jungnickel knows how to put it: the revenge of the myth on the person who is curious about it, on the denouncer of thinking. "The poetic character of thinking is still concealed,"41 Heidegger adds, in order to forestall criticism at all costs: "where it shows itself, it for a long time re-
36. Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung, p. I S .
37. Ibid. , p. 12.
38. Ibid. , p. 22.
39. Ibid. , p. 27?
40. Ibid. , p. 19.
41. Ibid. , p. 23.
? sembles the utopia of a half-poetic intellect. " 42 Still the half-poetic intellect which babbles forth those pieces of wisdom bears less resemblance to this, or to any other unsuccessful utopia, than to the work of some trusty folk art, which after all is not used to speaking well about those things. During the Hitler period, and we can feel with him, Heidegger turned down an academic appointment in Berlin. He justifies that in an article, "Why Do We Remain in the Province? " With wily strategy he disarms the charge that he is provincial; he uses the term "provincialism" in a positive sense. His strategy takes this form: "When on a deep winter night a wild snowstorm rages around the cabin, and covers and conceals everything, then the time is ripe for philosophy. Its question must then become simple and essential. " 43 Whether ques- tions are essential can in any case only be judged by the answers given; there is no way of anticipating, and certainly not by the criterion of a simplicity based on meteorological events. That simplicity says as little about truth as about its opposite; Kant, Hegel were as complicated and as simple as their content forced them to be. But Heidegger insinuates a preestablished harmony between essential content and homey mur- muring. Therefore, the echoes of Jungnickel here are not just loveable lapses. They are there to deafen any suspicion that the philosopher might be an intellectual : "And philosophical work does not take place as the
42. Ibid.
43. Quoted in Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger, Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern, 1962), p. 216.
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spare-time activity of a crank. It belongs right in the midst of the labor of farmers. " 44 One would like at least to know the farmers' opinion ,about that. Heideg- ger does not need their opinion. For "during the time of the evening work-pause, he sits, on the stove bench along with the farmers . . . or at the table in the corner, under the crucifix, and then we usually don't talk at all. We smoke our pipes in silence. " 45 "One's own work's inner belonging, to the Black Forest and its people, comes from a century-long Germanic- Swabian rootedness, which is irreplaceable. " 46 Mter all, Heidegger says it himself. Johann Peter Hebel, who comes from the same region, and to whom Heideg- ger would like to give the place of honor on the mantel- piece, hardly ever appealed to this rootedness; instead he passed on his greetings to the peddlers Scheitele and Nausel, in one of the most beautiful pieces of prose in defense of the Jews that was ever written in German. 47 Rootedness, however, puffs itself up:
Recently I got a second invitation to the University of Berlin. On such an occasion I leave the city and go back to my cabin. I hear what the mountains and woods and farmyards say. On the way I drop in on my oId friend, a seventy-five-year-old farmer. He has read in the news- paper about the Berlin invitation. What will he say? He slowly presses the sure glance of his clear eyes against mine, holds his mouth tightly closed, lays his faithful and cautious hand on my shoulder-and almost im-
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. , p. 217?
46. Ibid.
47. Cf. Johann Peter Hebel, Werke (Berlin, I874) II, 254.
54
perceptibly shakes his head. That means: absolutely
No! 48
While the philosopher complains to other Blubo-friends about their advertising of the Blubo,'9 which would be detrimental to his monopoly, his reflected unreflective- ness degenerates into chummy chit-chat, for the sake of the rural setting with which he wants to stand on a confidential footing. The description of the old farmer reminds us of the most washed-out cliches in plough- and-furrow novels, from the region of a Frenssen; and it reminds us equally of the praise of being silent, which the philosopher authorizes not only for his farmers but also for himself. Here we find an ignorance of everything we have learned about rural people : for instance in French realism from Balzac's late work to Maupassant; from a literature not attuned to the musty instincts of German petit-bourgeois kitsch; from a literature which would be available in translation even to a pre-Socratic. The small farmer owes his con- tinuing existence entirely to gracious gifts from that exchange SOciety by which his very ground and foun- dation, even in appearance, have been removed; in the face of this exchange the farmers have nothing on the:ir horizon except something worse-the immediate exploitation of the family without which they would be bankrupt: this hollowed-out state, the perpetual crisis of the small farmer's business, has its echo in the hollowness of the jargon. The subsidies which are
48 . Schneeberger, Nachlese, p. 2 I 8 .
49. [B lubo: catchword o f the Nazi movement, emphasizing the interdependence of one's life with one's native soil. A provincial version of pro patria mori. ]
55
paid to the small farmers are ,the very ground of that which the primal words of the jargon add to that which in fact they mean. Like less prominent porte- paroles of authenticity, Heidegger is filled with the disdainful pride of inwardness, which he touches on philosophically, in his thought about Hegel's critique of it. 50 Whoever is forced by the nature of his work to stay in one place, gladly makes a virtue out of ne- cessity. He tries to convince himself and others that his bound-ness is of a higher order. The financially threatened farmer's bad experiences with middlemen substantiate this opinion. The socially clumsy person who may be partially excluded from society hates those middlemen as jacks of all trades. This hatred joins with resistance against all agents, from the cattle dealer to the journalist. In 1956 the stable professions, which are themselves a stage of social development, are still the norms for Heidegger. He praises them in the name of a false eternity of agrarian conditions: "Man tries in vain to bring the globe to order through planning, when he is not in tune with the consoling voice of the country lane. " 51 North America knows no country lanes, not even villages. Philosophy, which is ashamed of its name, needs the sixth-hand symbol of the farmer as a proof of its primalness, as a way of acquiring some otherwise unavailable distinctiveness. However, Lessing's insight still applies, as it did in his time : the insight that the aesthetic critic does not need to do better himself than what he criticizes. That which
50. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 248 fr.
51. Heidegger, Der Feldweg (Frankfurt, I956) p. 4.
? ? ? ? was right for the Hamburg Dramaturgy is also reason- able for philosophical theory : the self-awareness of its limitations does not obligate it to authentic poetic creation.
