closeness to the church and to theological doctrine, her religious outlook has a
practical
coloring.
Adorno-T-Authoritarian-Personality-Harper-Bros-1950
"
In one sense this way of looking at religion has something in common with the externalized attitudes described above. However, it is our impression that
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1
l when the practical approach to religion appears in the thinking of the low l
'
scorer its content, or its context, can usually be distinguished from what is found in the thinking of the high scorer. Thus, although the young woman just quoted believes that religion is good for people, gives them "something to hold onto," she seems to mean that they need it at least for a humane and ideal purpose, that is, so that they may have more "understanding for each other," not simply in order to get along better or to function more efficiently. Low as well as high scorers are likely to consider that religion contributes to the mental hygiene of the individual; but whereas the high scorers charac- teristically indicate that it is good for other people because they are chronically weak, and possibly good for themselves in times of acute external stress ("fox-hole religion"), the low scorers are more likely to think of religion in internalized terms, as a means for reducing hatred, resolving inner conflicts,
relieving anxiety, and the like. Practically never do we encounter a low scorer who conceives of religion primarily in terms of external practical utility-as an aid to success, to status and power, or to a sense of being in accord with conventional values.
2. BELIEF IN GOD, DISBELIEF IN IMMORTALITY
The neutralization of religion is accompanied by its dissection. Just as emphasis on the practical uses of religion tends to sever religious truth from religious authority, so the specific contents of religion are continually sub- mitted to a process of selection and adaptation. The interview material sug- gests that the tendency to believe selectively in religion is a distinguishing feature of our prejudiced subjects. A fairly common phenomenon among them is belief in God accompanied by disbelief in immortality. Two examples
follow. In the case of 5009, a devout Baptist, the interviewer reports: sincerely feels deeply religious, believes in God, but has, as an educated man,
occasional doubts concerning the life after death. And in the case of 5002:
still is :i "Christian," believes in God, would like to believe in life after death, but has doubts and thinks that a sincere religious revival or a new religious myth would be a good thing for the world.
Particularly common are statements to the effect that interviewees regard themselves as religious, as followers of the church, but disagree with "some of its teachings," which sometimes refers to miracles, sometimes to immor- tality. This outlook seems corroborative of an underlying pattern of consid- erable significance the elements of which have been established in our psycho- logical analyses. The abstract idea of God is accepted as an expansion of the father idea, whereas general destructiveness makes itself felt in a reaction against the hope for the individual expressed by the dogma of immortality. Subjects with this point of view want a God to exist as the absolute authority
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIE"W MA TERIAL
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to which th<';y can bow, but 'they wish the individual to perish completely. The concept of God underlying this way of thinking is that of the absolute essence of punitiveness. It is therefore not astonishing that religious leanings of this particular brand are frequent in the high scorers among our group
of prison inmates . (cf. Chapter XXI).
M627, who is serving a life sentence for rape, is "having trouble with reli-
gion" and does not believe that "there should be a set way of worship. " But he believes, in spit~ of an undertone of religious rebelliousness,
"that every man should have his own way of worship as long as he believes in a power greater than himself. "
This power has the form of external authority, but remains completely ab- stract, nothing but the projective concept of power as such.
"Well, I have heard so many fellows talk about the powers they believed in . . . and I tried to recognize the power in myself and just couldn't . . . read all kinds of religious books . . . but still kind of foggy. "
The same line of thought is expressed by M656A, who is serving a term for forgery, "Robert" in Chapter XXI.
"Well, I'm not a man to discuss religion a great deal, because I don't know a lot about it. I believe in the Bible, I believe there is someone a lot bigger and stronger than anyone on this earth. . . . I don't attend church often but . . . try to live the right way. "
For this man all specific religious content is negligible compared with the idea of power and the closely related rigid, moralistic stereotypes of good and bad:
"The Catholic religion, for example, is just as good as the one I believe in. They all are patterned after the same type of living, right or wrong. I'm the type of person that doesn't believe in any particular denomination. "
This "abstract authoritarianism" in religious matters easily turns into cynicism and overt contempt for what one professes to believe. M664 C, asked about his religious views, answers:
"Oh, I don't pay much attention ? ? ? I believe in God and all that stuff but that is about all. "
The choice of the word "stuff" refutes the statement in which it occurs. One effect of neutralization in such cases is that little is left of God but the object of swearing.
The nihilistic aspect of the configuration here under consideration is clearly indicated in the case of the murderer M65z.
"The part I like about it is the fact that it makes other people happy, though it doesn't concern me, and you see so much hypocrisy. . . . "
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY Asked what is most important in religion, he says:
"Belief, I think that belietis everything. That is the thing that holds you to- gether. "
When this is pursued by the interviewer who wants to find out something about the subject's own religious feelings, he answers: ?
". . . I believe when you die you are through. . . . Life is short and eternity is forever. How could God send you to Hell for eternity, just on the basis of a short lifetime's record . . . it doesn't seem to be either merciful or just. "
This material is indicative of relationships among abstract belief in power, rejection of the more concrete and personal aspects of religion, particularly the idea of an eternal life, and thinly veiled impulses toward violence. As this violence is taboo within the individual, particularly in situations such as a prison, it is projected upon a Deity. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that an entirely abstract idea of the almighty Deity, as it prevailed during the eighteenth century, could be reconciled much more easily with the "scientific spirit" than could the doctrine of an immortal soul, with its "magical" con- notations. The process of demythification liquidates traces of animism earlier and more radically than it does the philosophical idea of the Absolute.
It may be noted, however, that just the opposite tendency can be observed among addicts of astrology and spiritualism. They often believe in the im- mortality of the soul, but strongly deny the existence of God, because of some kind of pantheism which ultimately results in exaltation of nature. Thus, case M651, not quite consistently with his previous confession of religious- ness for extraneous reasons, comes out with the statement that he:
believes in astrology because he doesn't believe in God.
There is reason to believe that the ultimate consequence of this attitude is sinister.
3. THE IRRELIGIOUS LOW SCORER
The difference beteen irreligious and religious low scorers may cor- respond to a difference between rational and emotional determinants of free- dom from prejudice. Subject M203 is characteristic of the former. He may be regarded as a genuine liberal with a somewhat abstract, rationalistic men- tality. His anti-religious attitude is based not so much on political persuasions as on a general positivistic outlook. He rejects religion for "logical reasons" but differentiates between "Christian ethics," which he regards as falling in line with his progressive views, and "organized religion. " Originally, his anti-religious attitude may have been derived from anticonventional rebellion: "I went to church because I was expected to. "
This rebellion is somewhat vaguely rationalized as being of a purely logical nature, perhaps on account of some unconscious guilt feelings. (He is un-
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL
739
emotional an? d apathetic in a? way suggesting neurotic traits, possibly a dis- turbance in his relation to objects. ) His rational critique of religion is formulated as follovvs:
"But I was always pretty skeptical of it; I thought it kind of phony, narrow, bigotted and snobbish, hypocritical . . . unsemantic, you might say. It violates the whole Christian ethics. "
Religion is here experienced both as a humanizing factor (Christian ethics) and as a repressing agency. There can be no doubt that this ambiguity has its basis in the double function of religion itself throughout history and it should, therefore, not be attributed solely to subjective factors.
The term hypocritical, used by M2o3, occurs very frequently in the inter- views of low scorers, and sometimes in those of high scorers, usually with reference to the organization of the church in contrast to "genuine" religious values. This expresses the historical emancipation of subjective religious ex- perience from institutionalized religion. The hatred of the hypocrite, how- ever, may work in two ways, either as a force toward enlightenment or as a rationalization of cynicism and contempt for man. It seems that the use of the term hypocrite, like that of the term "snob" obtains more and more the connotation of envy and resentment. It denounces those who "regard them- selves as something better" in order to glorify the average and to establish something plain and supposedly natural as the norm. 4 The struggle against the lie is often a mere pretext for coming into the open with destructive mo- tives rationalized by the supposed "hypocrisy" and "uppishness" of others.
This phenomenon can be understood against the background of democ- ratized culture. The critique of religion as "hypocritical," a critique which in Europe was either confined to small intellectual layers or countered by metaphysical philosophy, is in this country as widespread as Christian religion itself. Part of the ambivalence toward religion can be accounted for by the simultaneous ubiquity of both the Christian heritage and the "spirit of sci- ence. " This double cultural ubiquity may favor an inconsistent attitude toward religion without necessarily involving the individual's psychological make-up.
The fact that America, for all its interest in science, is still close to a religious climate may help to explain a more general trait of irreligious low scorers: their actual or fictitious "negative" conversion. Thus, for example, 5028 and 5058, like M2o3, report that they "broke away" from religion. In American culture one is rarely "born" as an irreligious person: one becomes irreligious through conflicts of childhood or adolescence, and these dynamics favor nonconformist sympathies which, in turn, go with opposition to prejudice.
That a subject is consciously irreligious under the prevailing cultural con- ditions suggests the existence of a certain strength of the ego. An example is
4 Cf. the section on F. D. R. in Chapter XVII.
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
M2o2, our "conservative but not fascist" person (see pp. 649, 707), who scores extremely low on the E scale.
As a child subject was very religious. He went to church with his family every- Sunday and he would "fall on my knees in the street" to pray for something. At the age of 19 he changed. He became disgusted by the gossip in church. They would tell him things about someone that were "none of their damned business. " Also these people would come and testify in church and do bad things again. He could not understand this inconsistency in their actions.
In this case the anti-religious attitude, as far as it goes, is overtly derived from resentment against outside interference with individual liberty and this, be it noted, is hardly less an element in American ideology than is Christianity itself. Here, as in many other respects, individual, psychological ambivalence toward religion on the part of the subject reflects objective antagonism in our culture.
Mpo, a genuine liberal, offers another example of the rebellious feature in irreligiousness. The subject, who rejects Christian tradition altogether, is the child of religious parents. He admits no open conflict with them, al- though relations with them were apparently very cool. In all probability he displaced his rebellion against the family upon their religion, thus avoiding the trouble of undergoing difficulties of a more personal kind. Often enough, strong ideological attachments or oppositions can be understood as such dis- placements of family conflicts, a device which allows the individual to express his hostilities on a level of rationalization and so dispense with the necessity of deep emotional entanglements-and which also allows the youngster to remain within the family shelter. It may also be in some respects mon; grati- fying to attack the infinite father than to attack the finite one. It should be emphasized, however, that the term rationalization does not imply, here or elsewhere, the allegation untrue. Rationalization is a psychological aspect of thinking which by itself decides neither truth nor untruth. A decision on this matter depends entirely on the objective merits of the idea in which the
process of rationalization terminates.
In contrast to those irreligious low scorers who underwent a "negative"
conversion are easy-going low scorers such as M711. His negative attitude toward religion is marked not so much by opposition as by an indifference that involves the element of a somewhat humorous self-reflection. This sub- ject professes rather frankly a certain confusion in religious matters but in a way which suggests that his apparent weakness is allowed to manifest itself on the basis of some considerable underlying strength of character. With people like him it is as if they could afford to profess intellectual inconsist- encies because they find more security in their own character structure and in the depth of their experience than in clear-cut, well-organized, highly ra- tionalized convictions. When asked about his attitude toward religion, he answers:
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL 741
"I don't really have any (laughs). More or less an absence of views. On organized religion I suppose I am confused (laughs) if anything. "
He does not need to reject religion because he is not under its spell; there are no traces of ambivalence, and therefore no signs of hatred, but rather a kind of humane and detached understanding. The religious idea he accepts is tolerance, in a characteristically nonconventional way demonstrated by his choice of negative expressions rather than high sounding "ideals. " "I think I became aware of intolerance. " But he does not use this awareness for ego enhancement but is rather inclined to attribute his religious emancipation to external accidental factors:
"If I'd stayed in Denver, I'd probably attended a church. I don't know. I don't think of it; I don't feel the need of organized religion particularly. "
Interesting is this subject's discussion of prayer. He admits the psychological efficacy of prayer, but is aware that this "therapeutic" aspect of religion is incompatible with the idea of religion itself. He regards prayer as a kind of al;ltosuggestion, which could "accomplish results" but "I certainly don't see there is anyone on the receiving end. "
This subject makes the bizarre but strangely profound statement:
"My religious curiosity did not last very long. Probably took up photography (laughs) about that time. "
Only an interpretation making full use of psychoanalytic categories would do justice to this sentence. The link between his early interest in religion and the later one in photography is apparently curiosity, the desire to "see" things-a sublimation of voyeurism. It is as if photography in a somewhat infantile way would fulfill the wish for "imagery" which underlies certain trends in religion and is at the same time put under a heavy taboo by both Judaism and Protestantism. This may be corroborated by the fact that the subject during his religious phase was attracted by theosophy, by religious ways of thinking which promised to "lift the curtain. "
It should be noted that this subject's attitude toward atheism is no more "radical" than is his opposition to religion. 5 He says:
"Well, I don't think any more about atheists than anything else. As a matter of fact I talked with several people who profess to be atheists and they don't even seem to agree. Perhaps I am an atheist (laughs) . . . you get into semantics, really. Professional atheists . . . just impress me as doing it because it seems to be a stunt. Don Quixote battling windmills. "
This may be indicative of the easy-going person's suspicion of the "ticket,"
5 The "easy-going" low scorer is rarely radical in any respect. This, however, does not make him a middle-of-the-roader. He is persistently aware of the nonidentity between concept and reality. He is fundamentally nontotalitarian. This is behind his specific idea of tolerance.
? 742
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his awareness of the tendency of any rigid formula to degenerate into a mere piece of propaganda. 6
Incidentally, the subject senses clearly what was formulated one hundred years ago in Baudelaire's Diary: that atheism becomes obsolescent in a world the objective spirit of which is essentially areligious. The meaning of atheism undergoes historical changes. What was one of the decisive impulses of the eighteenth century Enlightenment may function today as a manifestation of provincial sectarianism or even as a paranoid system. Half-mad Nazis such as Mathilde Ludendorff fought, besides the Jews and the Free Masons, the Roman-Catholics as an ultra-n10ntan conspiracy directed against Germany, transforming the tradition of Bismarck's Kulturkampf into a pattern of per- secution mania.
4. RELIGIOUS LOW SCORERS
A clear-cut example of a religious low scorer is the somewhat sketchy inter- view of Fz32, a young woman brought up in India where her parents are missionaries. Her combining positive Christianity with an outspoken concrete idea of tolerance ("equality for everyone") is derived from "life experience with the Indians. " She is passionate in matters of racial understanding. How- ever, her church affiliations make it impossible for her to draw the political consequences from her tolerance idea:
"I don't like Ghandi. I don't like radical people. He is a radical. He has done much to upset and disunite the country. "
Her association with the church involves an element of that religious con- ventionalism which is usually associated with ethnocentrism. In spite of her?
closeness to the church and to theological doctrine, her religious outlook has a practical coloring.
"It (religion) means a great deal. It makes a person happier-more satisfied. Gives them peace of mind. You know where you stand and have something to work for- an example to follow. Hope for an after-life. Yes, I believe in immortality. "7
This girl is probably atypical in many ways because of her colonial upbring- ing as well as because of the mixture of "official" religiosity and more spon-
6 More material on this subject is presented in Chapter XIX.
7 It would be a tempting task to analyze the change of meaning undergone by the word ? "belief. " It illustrates most clearly religious neutralization. Formerly the idea of belief was emphatically related to the religious dogma. Today it is applied to practically everything which a subject feels the right to have as his own, as his "opinion" (for everybody is en- titled to have opinion) without subjecting it to any criteria of objective truth. The secular- ization of "believing" is accompanied by arbitrariness of that which one believes: it is moulded after the preferences for one or the other commodity and has little relation to the idea of truth. ("I don't believe in parking," said a conventional high-scoring girl in her interview. ) This use of belief is almost an equivalent of the hackneyed, "I like it," which is about to lose any meaning. (Cf. the statement of Mack, given in Chapter II, "I like the
history and sayings of Christ. ")
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL
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taneous religious humanism. Her particular attitude is probably due, on the surface level at least, to her insight into ingroup-outgroup problems. How- ever, this example seems to offer some support for the hypothesis that only fully conscious, very articulate, unconventional Christians are likely to be free of ethnocentrism. At any rate, the rareness of religious low scorers in our sample is significant. As indicated above, the composition of the sample itself may be responsible for this. However, this rarity suggests something more fundamental. The tendency of our society to become split into "pro- gressive" and "status quo" camps may be accompanied by a tendency of all persons who cling to religion, as a part of the status quo, also to assume other features of the status quo ideology which are associated with the ethnocen- tric outlook. Whether this is true or whether religion can produce effective trends in opposition to prejudice, could be elucidated only after much exten- sive research.
? CHAPTER XIX TYPES AND SYNDROMES
T. W. Adorno
A. THE APPROACH
Hardly any concept in contemporary American psychology has been so thoroughly criticized as that of typology. Since "any doctrine of types is a halfway approach to the problem of individuality, and nothing more," (9) any such doctrine is subject to devastating attacks from both extremes: be- cause it never catches the unique, and because its generalizations are not statistically valid and do not even afford productive heuristic tools. From the viewpoint of general dynamic theory of personality, it is objected that typol- ogies tend towards pigeonholing and transform highly flexible traits into
static, quasi-biological' characteristics while neglecting, above all, the impact of historical and social factors. Statistically, the insufficiency of twofold typologies is particularly emphasized. As to the heuristic value of typologies, their overlapping, and the necessity of constructing "mixed types" which practically disavow the original constructs, is pointed out. At the hub of all these arguments is aversion against the application of rigid concepts to the supposedly fluid reality of psychological life.
The development of modern psychological typologies, as contrasted, for example, with the old scheme of "temperaments," has its origin in psychiatry, in the therapeutic need for a classification of mental diseases as a means of facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Kraepelin and Lombroso are the fathers of psychiatric typology. Since the clear-cut division of mental diseases has in the meantime completely broken down, the basis of typological classifications of the "normal," derived from the former, seems to vanish. It is stigmatized as a remnant of the "taxonomic phase of behavior theory" the formulation
of which "tended to remain descriptive, static and sterile" (So). If not even the mentally diseased, whose psychological dynamics are largely replaced by rigid patterns, can be sensibly divided according to types, how, then, is there any chance of success for procedures such as the famous one of Kretsch- mer, the raison d'etre of which was the standard classification of manic- depression and dementia praecox?
744
? TYPES AND SYNDROMES
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The present state of the discussion on typology is summed up by Anne Anastasi (I I) as follows:
"Type theories have been most commonly criticized because of their attempt to classify individuals into sharply divided categories. . . . Such a procedure implies a multi-modal distribution of traits. The introverts, for example, would be expected to cluster at one end of the scale, the extroverts at the other end, and the point of demarcation between them should be clearly apparent. Actual measurement, how- ever, reveals a unimodal distribution of all traits, which closely resembles the bell- shaped normal curve.
"Similarly, it is often difficult to classify a given individual definitely into one type or the other. The typologists, when confronted with this difficulty, have frequently proposed intermediate or 'mixed' types to bridge the gap between the extremes. Thus Jung suggested an ambivert type which manifests neither introvert nor extrovert tendencies to a predominant degree. Observation seems to show, however, that the ambivert category is the largest, and the decided introverts and extroverts are relatively rare. The reader is referred, for example, to the distribution curve obtained by Heidbreder with an introversion questionnaire administered to zoo college students. . . . It will be recalled that the majority of scores were inter- mediate and that as the extremes of either introversion or extroversion were ap- proached, the number of cases became progressively smaller. The curve, too, showed no sharp breaks, but only a continuous gradation from the mean to the two extremes. As was indicated in Chapter II, the same may be said of all other measurable traits of the individual, whether social, emotional, intellectual, or physical.
"It is apparent, then, that insofar as type theories imply the classification of indi- viduals into clear-cut classes, they are untenable in the face of a mass of indisputable data. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily inherent in all systems of human typology. It is more characteristic of the popular versions and adaptations of type theories than of the original concepts. To be sure, type psychologists have often attempted to categorize individuals, but this was not an indispensable part of their theories; their concepts have occasionally been sufficiently modified to admit of a normal distribution of traits. "
In spite of such concessions to more satisfactory categorizations, the "nom- inalistic" exclusion of typological classifications has triumphed to such a degree that it is almost tantamount to a taboo, no matter how urgent the scientific and pragmatic need for such classifications may be. It should be noted that this taboo is closely related to the notion, still taught by numerous academic psychiatrists, that mental diseases are essentially inexplicable. If one would assume, for the argument's sake, that psychoanalytic theory has really succeeded in establishing a number of dynamic schemata of psychoses, by which the latter become "meaningful" within the psychological life of
the individual in spite of all their irrationality and the disintegration of the psychotic personality, the problem of typology would be completely redefined.
It cannot be doubted that the critique of psychological types expresses a truly humane impulse, directed against that kind of subsumption of individ- uals under pre-established classes which has been consummated in Nazi
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
Germany, where the labeling of live human beings, independently of their specific qualities, resulted in decisions about their life and death. It is this motive which has been stressed particularly by Allport (9); and Boder has demonstrated in great detail in his study of "Nazi Science" the interconnec- tions of psychological pro et contra schemes, the repressive function of categories such as Jaensch's "Gegentypus" and the arbitrary manipulation of empirical findings (47). Thus, enquiries devoted to the study of preju- dice have to be particularly cautious when the issue of typology comes up. To express it pointedly, the rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of that "stereopathic" mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially fascist character. We need only to refer, in this connection, to our high scorer of Irish descent who attributes his personal traits unhesi- tatingly to his national extraction. Jaensch's "anti-type," for example, is an almost classic case of the mechanism of projection, the effectiveness of which in the make-up of our high scorers has been established, and which in Jaensch's has wormed its way into the very same science whose task it would be to account for this mechanism. The essentially undynamic, "antisociological," and quasi-biological nature of classifications of the Jaensch brand is directly opposed to the theory of our work as well as to its empirical results. 1
Yet all these objections do not dispose altogether of the problem of typol- ogy. Not all typologies are devices for dividing the world into sheep and buck, but some of them reflect certain experiences which, though hard to systema- tize, have, to put it as loosely as possible, hit upon something. Here one has to think primarily of Kretschmer, Jung, and Freud. It should be particularly emphasized that Freud, whose general emphasis on psychological dynamics puts him above the suspicion of any simple "biologism" and stereotypical thinking, published as late as 1931 (39) a rather categorical typology with- out bothering much about the methodological difficulties of which he must have been aware very well, and even, with apparent naivete, constructing "mixed" types out of the basic ones. Freud was too much led by concrete
1 It should be remembered that Jaensch's anti-type is defined by synaesthesia, that is to say, the supposed or actual tendency of certain people "to have color experiences when listening to a tone, or to music in general, and to have tone experiences when looking at colors or pictures" (Boder, in (47), p. 15). This tendency is interpreted by Jaensch as a symptom of degeneracy. It may well be assumed that this interpretation is based on his- torical reminiscence rather than on any factual psychological findings. For the cult of synaesthesia played a large role within the lyrical poetry of the same French authors who introduced the concept of decadence, particularly Baudelaire. It can be noted, however, that synaesthetic imagery fulfills a specific function in their works. By clouding the division between different realms of sense perception, they simultaneously try to efface the rigid classification of different kinds of objects, as it is brought about under the practical requirements of industrial civilization. They rebel against reification. It is highly characteristic that an entirely administrative ideology chooses as its archfoe an attitude which is, above all, rebellion against stereotypy. The Nazi cannot stand anything which does not fit into his scheme and even less anything which does not recognize his own reified, "stereopathic" way of looking at things.
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insights into the matters themselves, had too intimate a relationship to his scientific objects, to waste his energy on the kind of methodological reflec- tions which may well turn out to be acts of sabotage of organized science against productive thinking. This is not to say that his typology has to be accepted as it stands. Not only can it be criticized by the usual antitypological arguments to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter; as Otto Fenichel has pointed out, it is also problematic from the viewpoint of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. What counts, however, is that Freud found such a classification worthwhile. One has only to look at the relatively easy and convincing integration of different kinds of twofold typologies in Donald W. MacKinnon's Structure of Personality (in 55) to gain the impression that typologies are not altogether arbitrary, do not necessarily do violence to the manifoldness of the human, but have some basis in the structure of psycho-
logical reality.
The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, how-
ever, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. The fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men. The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. The French sociologist Durkheim in particular has shown how and to what extent hierarchical social orders permeate the individual's thinking, attitudes, and behavior. People form psychological "classes," inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes. This in all probability holds good for our own standardized mass culture to even higher a degree than for previous periods. The relative rigidity of our high scorers, and of some of our low scorers, reflects psychologically the increas- ing rigidity according to which our society falls into two more or less crude opposing camps. Individualism, opposed to inhuman pigeonholing, may ulti- mately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually is inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the "subsumption" of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, "individuals" in the sense of traditional nine- teenth-century philosophy. Ticket thinking is possible only because the actual existence of those who indulge in it is largely determined by "tickets," standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes which leave to the "individual" but little freedom for action and true individuation. Thus the problem of typology is put on a different basis. There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and "pro- duces" different "types" of persons. Only by identifying stereotypical traits
in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged. The construction of psychological types does not merely imply an arbi- trary, compulsive attempt to bring some "order" into the confusing diversity
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of human personality. It represents a means of "conceptualizing" this diver- sity, according to its own structure, of achieving closer understanding. Thf radical renunciation of all generalizations beyond those pertaining to thf most obvious findings would not result in true empathy into human individ- uals but rather in an opaque, dull description of psychological "facts": every step which goes beyond the factual and aims at psychological meaning-a~ it has been defined in Freud's basic statement that all our experiences aH meaningful ("dass aile unsere Erlebnisse einen Sinn haben")-inevitably in- volves generalizations transcending the supposedly unique "case," and it happens that these generalizations more frequently than not imply the exist- ence of certain regularly recurring nuclei or syndromes which come rather close to the idea of "types. " Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compul- sive character, though apparently derived from highly individualized studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named, and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative, no matter how "unique" the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology per se. Methodological "purity" in this respect would be tantamount to renouncing the conceptual medium or any theoretical penetration of the given material, and would result in an irrationality as complete as the arbitrary subsumptive- ness of the "pigeonholing" schools.
Within the context of our study, another reflection of an entirely different nature points in the same direction. It is a pragmatic one: the necessity that science provide weapons against the potential threat of the fascist mentality. It is an open question whether and to what extent the fascist danger really can be fought with psychological weapons. Psychological "treatment" of prejudiced persons is problematic because of their large number as well as because they are by no means "ill," in the usual sense, and, as we have seen, at least on the surface level are often even better "adjusted" than the non- prejudiced ones. Since, however, modern fascism is inconceivable without a mass basis, the inner complexion of its prospective followers still maintains its crucial significance, and no defense which does not take into account the subjective phase of the problem would be truly "realistic. " It is obvious that psychological countermeasures, in view of the extent of the fascist potential among modern masses, are promising only if they are differentiated in such a way that they are adapted to specific groups. An over-all defense would move on a level of such vague generalities that it would in all probability fall flat. It may be regarded as one of the practical results of our study that such a differentiation has at least to be also one which follows psychological lines, since certain basic variables of the fascist character persist relatively inde- pendently of marked social differentiations. There is no psychological defense against prejudice which is not oriented toward certain psychological "types. "
? TYPES AND SYNDROMES
749
We would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology and jeopardize each attempt of coming psychologically to grips with prejudiced persons if a number of very drastic and extreme differences-such as the one between the psychological make-up of a conventional anti-Semite and a sado- masochistic "tough guy"-were excluded simply because none of these types is ever represented in classic purity by a single individual.
The possibility of constructing largely different sets of psychological types has been widely recognized. As the result of the previous discussions, we base our own attempt on the three following major criteria:
a. We do not want to classify human beings by types which divide them neatly statistically, nor by ideal types in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by "mixtures. " Our types are justified only if we succeed in organizing, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits. We regard those types as being scientifically most productive which integrate traits, otherwise dispersed, into meaningful continuities and bring to the fore the interconnection of elements which belong together according to their inherent "logic," in terms of psychological understanding of under- lying dynamics. No mere additive or mechanical subsumption of traits under the same type should be permitted. A major criterion for this postulate would be that, confronted with "genuine" types, even so-called deviations would no longer appear as accidental but would be recognizable as meaningful, in a structural sense. Speaking genetically, the consistency of meaning of each type would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from cer- tain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts, and their resolutions.
b. Our typology has to be a critical typology in the sense that it compre- hends the typification of men itself as a social function. The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. Its major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly "individualized" and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience. The individual types will be specific configurations with- in this general division. The latter differentiates prima facie between high and low scorers. At closer view, however, it also affects the low scorers themselves: the more they are "typified" themselves, the more they express unwittingly the fascist potential within themselves. 2
2 It should be stressed that two concepts of types have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who are types in the proper sense, typified persons, individuals who are largely reflecting set patterns and social mechanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can be called types only in a formal-logical sense and who often may be characterized just by the absence of standard qualities. It is essential to distinguish the real, "genuine" type structure of a person and his merely belonging to a logical class by which he is defined from outside, as it were.
? 75: Tho type? m~::. :":? ~:;:,thoy m? y hocomo l productive pragmatically, that is to say, that they can be translated into rela- i tively drastic defense patterns which are organized in such a way that dif- ~ ferences of a more individual nature play but a minor role. This makes for ~
a certain conscious "superficiality" of typification, comparable to the situa- 1 tion in a sanatorium where no therapy could ever be initiated if one did not divide the patients into manic-depressives, schizophrenics, paranoiacs, and
so forth, though one is fully aware of the fact that these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper one goes. In this connection, however, the hypoth-
esis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep enough, at the end of the differentiation just the more universal "crude" structure would reappear: some basic libidinous constellations. An analogy from the history of the arts may be permitted. The traditional, crude distinction between Romanesque and Gothic style was based on the characteristic of round and pointed arches. It became apparent that this division was insufficient; that both traits were overlapping and that there were much deeper-lying contrasts of construction between the two styles. This, however, led to such compli- cated definitions that it proved impossible to state in their terms whether a given building was Romanesque or Gothic in character though its structural totality rarely left any doubt to the observer to which epoch it belonged.
Thus it ultimately became necessary to resume the primitive and naive classi- fication. Something similar may be advisable in the case of our problem. An apparently superficial question such as "What kind of people do you find among the prejudiced? " may easily do more justice to typological require- ments than the attempt to define types at first sight by, say, different fixations at pregenital or genital developmental phases and the like. This indispensable simplification can probably be achieved by the integration of sociological criteria into the psychological constructs. Such sociological criteria may refer to the group memberships and identifications of our subjects as well as to social aims, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. The task of relating psychological type criteria to sociological ones is facilitated because it has been established in the course of our study that a number of "clinical" cate- gories (such as the adulation of a punitive father) are intimately related to social attitudes (such as belief in authority for authority's sake). Hence, we may well "translate" for the hypothetical purposes of a typology a number of our basic psychological concepts into sociological ones most closely akin to them.
These considerations have to be supplemented by a requirement prescribed by the nature of our study. Our typology, or rather, scheme of syndromes, has to be organized in such a way that it fits as "naturally" as possible our empirical data. It should be borne in mind that our material does not exist in an empty space, as it were, but that it is structurally predetermined by our tools, particularly the questionnaire and the interview schedule. Since
? TYPES AND SYNDROMES 75 1
our hypotheses were formulated according to psychoanalytic theory, the orientation of our syndromes toward psychoanalytic concepts is reinforced. Of course, the limitations of such an attempt are narrow since we did not "analyze" any of our subjects. Our characterization of syndromes has to concentrate on traits that have proved to be psychoanalytically significant rather than on the ultimate dynamic patterns of depth psychology.
In order to place the following typological draft into its proper perspec- tive, it should be recalled that we have pointed out in the chapter on the F scale that all the clusters of which this scale is made up belong to one single, "over-all" syndrome. It is one of the outstanding findings of the study that "highness" is essentially one syndrome, distinguishable from a variety of "low" syndromes. There exists something like "the" potentially fascist char- acter, which is by itself a "structural unit. " In other words, traits such as conventionality, authoritarian submissiveness and aggressiveness, projectiv- ity, manipulativeness, etc. , regularly go together. Hence, the "subsyndromes" which we outline here are not intended to isolate any of these traits. They are all to be understood within the general frame of reference of the high scorer. What differentiates them is the emphasis on one or another of the features or dynamics selected for characterization, not their exclusiveness. However, it seems to us that the differential profiles arising within the over- all structure can readily be distinguished. At the same time, their interconnec- tion by the over-all potentially fascist structure is of such a nature that they are "dynamic" in the sense that transitions from one to the other could easily be worked out by analyzing the increase or decrease of some of the specific factors. Such a dynamic interpretation of them could achieve more ade- quately-that is to say, with a better understanding of the underlying proc- esses-what is usually done in a haphazard way by the "mixed types" of static typologies. However, theory and empirical substantiation of these dynamic relations among the syndromes could not be touched upon within the present research.
The principle according to which the syndromes are organized is their "type-being" in the sense of rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the order of our syndromes represents a more dynamic "scale of measurement. " It pertains to potentialities, and accessibility to countermeasures, but not to overt prejudice-basically to the problem of "over-all highness" vs. "lowness. " It will be seen, for example, that the case illustrating the psychologically relatively harmless syndrome at the bottom of our scheme is extremely high in terms of overt antiminority prejudice.
Pragmatic requirements as well as the idea that the high scorers are gener- ally more "typed" than the low scorers seem to focus our interest on the prejudiced person. Yet, we deem it necessary also to construct syndromes of low scorers. The general direction of our research leads us to stress, with
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a certain one-sidedness, psychological determinants. This, however, should never make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological, "subjective" phenomenon. It has to be remembered what we pointed out in Chapter XVII: that "high" ideology and mentality are largely fomented by the objective spirit of our society. Whereas different individuals react differ- ently, according to their psychological make-up, to the ubiquitous cultural stimuli of prejudice, the objective element of prejudice cannot be neglected if we want to understand the attitudes of individuals or psychological groups. It is therefore not sufficient to ask, "Why is this or that individual ethno- centric? " but rather: "Why does he react positively to the omnipresent stimuli, to which this other man reacts negatively?
In one sense this way of looking at religion has something in common with the externalized attitudes described above. However, it is our impression that
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1
l when the practical approach to religion appears in the thinking of the low l
'
scorer its content, or its context, can usually be distinguished from what is found in the thinking of the high scorer. Thus, although the young woman just quoted believes that religion is good for people, gives them "something to hold onto," she seems to mean that they need it at least for a humane and ideal purpose, that is, so that they may have more "understanding for each other," not simply in order to get along better or to function more efficiently. Low as well as high scorers are likely to consider that religion contributes to the mental hygiene of the individual; but whereas the high scorers charac- teristically indicate that it is good for other people because they are chronically weak, and possibly good for themselves in times of acute external stress ("fox-hole religion"), the low scorers are more likely to think of religion in internalized terms, as a means for reducing hatred, resolving inner conflicts,
relieving anxiety, and the like. Practically never do we encounter a low scorer who conceives of religion primarily in terms of external practical utility-as an aid to success, to status and power, or to a sense of being in accord with conventional values.
2. BELIEF IN GOD, DISBELIEF IN IMMORTALITY
The neutralization of religion is accompanied by its dissection. Just as emphasis on the practical uses of religion tends to sever religious truth from religious authority, so the specific contents of religion are continually sub- mitted to a process of selection and adaptation. The interview material sug- gests that the tendency to believe selectively in religion is a distinguishing feature of our prejudiced subjects. A fairly common phenomenon among them is belief in God accompanied by disbelief in immortality. Two examples
follow. In the case of 5009, a devout Baptist, the interviewer reports: sincerely feels deeply religious, believes in God, but has, as an educated man,
occasional doubts concerning the life after death. And in the case of 5002:
still is :i "Christian," believes in God, would like to believe in life after death, but has doubts and thinks that a sincere religious revival or a new religious myth would be a good thing for the world.
Particularly common are statements to the effect that interviewees regard themselves as religious, as followers of the church, but disagree with "some of its teachings," which sometimes refers to miracles, sometimes to immor- tality. This outlook seems corroborative of an underlying pattern of consid- erable significance the elements of which have been established in our psycho- logical analyses. The abstract idea of God is accepted as an expansion of the father idea, whereas general destructiveness makes itself felt in a reaction against the hope for the individual expressed by the dogma of immortality. Subjects with this point of view want a God to exist as the absolute authority
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIE"W MA TERIAL
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to which th<';y can bow, but 'they wish the individual to perish completely. The concept of God underlying this way of thinking is that of the absolute essence of punitiveness. It is therefore not astonishing that religious leanings of this particular brand are frequent in the high scorers among our group
of prison inmates . (cf. Chapter XXI).
M627, who is serving a life sentence for rape, is "having trouble with reli-
gion" and does not believe that "there should be a set way of worship. " But he believes, in spit~ of an undertone of religious rebelliousness,
"that every man should have his own way of worship as long as he believes in a power greater than himself. "
This power has the form of external authority, but remains completely ab- stract, nothing but the projective concept of power as such.
"Well, I have heard so many fellows talk about the powers they believed in . . . and I tried to recognize the power in myself and just couldn't . . . read all kinds of religious books . . . but still kind of foggy. "
The same line of thought is expressed by M656A, who is serving a term for forgery, "Robert" in Chapter XXI.
"Well, I'm not a man to discuss religion a great deal, because I don't know a lot about it. I believe in the Bible, I believe there is someone a lot bigger and stronger than anyone on this earth. . . . I don't attend church often but . . . try to live the right way. "
For this man all specific religious content is negligible compared with the idea of power and the closely related rigid, moralistic stereotypes of good and bad:
"The Catholic religion, for example, is just as good as the one I believe in. They all are patterned after the same type of living, right or wrong. I'm the type of person that doesn't believe in any particular denomination. "
This "abstract authoritarianism" in religious matters easily turns into cynicism and overt contempt for what one professes to believe. M664 C, asked about his religious views, answers:
"Oh, I don't pay much attention ? ? ? I believe in God and all that stuff but that is about all. "
The choice of the word "stuff" refutes the statement in which it occurs. One effect of neutralization in such cases is that little is left of God but the object of swearing.
The nihilistic aspect of the configuration here under consideration is clearly indicated in the case of the murderer M65z.
"The part I like about it is the fact that it makes other people happy, though it doesn't concern me, and you see so much hypocrisy. . . . "
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY Asked what is most important in religion, he says:
"Belief, I think that belietis everything. That is the thing that holds you to- gether. "
When this is pursued by the interviewer who wants to find out something about the subject's own religious feelings, he answers: ?
". . . I believe when you die you are through. . . . Life is short and eternity is forever. How could God send you to Hell for eternity, just on the basis of a short lifetime's record . . . it doesn't seem to be either merciful or just. "
This material is indicative of relationships among abstract belief in power, rejection of the more concrete and personal aspects of religion, particularly the idea of an eternal life, and thinly veiled impulses toward violence. As this violence is taboo within the individual, particularly in situations such as a prison, it is projected upon a Deity. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that an entirely abstract idea of the almighty Deity, as it prevailed during the eighteenth century, could be reconciled much more easily with the "scientific spirit" than could the doctrine of an immortal soul, with its "magical" con- notations. The process of demythification liquidates traces of animism earlier and more radically than it does the philosophical idea of the Absolute.
It may be noted, however, that just the opposite tendency can be observed among addicts of astrology and spiritualism. They often believe in the im- mortality of the soul, but strongly deny the existence of God, because of some kind of pantheism which ultimately results in exaltation of nature. Thus, case M651, not quite consistently with his previous confession of religious- ness for extraneous reasons, comes out with the statement that he:
believes in astrology because he doesn't believe in God.
There is reason to believe that the ultimate consequence of this attitude is sinister.
3. THE IRRELIGIOUS LOW SCORER
The difference beteen irreligious and religious low scorers may cor- respond to a difference between rational and emotional determinants of free- dom from prejudice. Subject M203 is characteristic of the former. He may be regarded as a genuine liberal with a somewhat abstract, rationalistic men- tality. His anti-religious attitude is based not so much on political persuasions as on a general positivistic outlook. He rejects religion for "logical reasons" but differentiates between "Christian ethics," which he regards as falling in line with his progressive views, and "organized religion. " Originally, his anti-religious attitude may have been derived from anticonventional rebellion: "I went to church because I was expected to. "
This rebellion is somewhat vaguely rationalized as being of a purely logical nature, perhaps on account of some unconscious guilt feelings. (He is un-
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL
739
emotional an? d apathetic in a? way suggesting neurotic traits, possibly a dis- turbance in his relation to objects. ) His rational critique of religion is formulated as follovvs:
"But I was always pretty skeptical of it; I thought it kind of phony, narrow, bigotted and snobbish, hypocritical . . . unsemantic, you might say. It violates the whole Christian ethics. "
Religion is here experienced both as a humanizing factor (Christian ethics) and as a repressing agency. There can be no doubt that this ambiguity has its basis in the double function of religion itself throughout history and it should, therefore, not be attributed solely to subjective factors.
The term hypocritical, used by M2o3, occurs very frequently in the inter- views of low scorers, and sometimes in those of high scorers, usually with reference to the organization of the church in contrast to "genuine" religious values. This expresses the historical emancipation of subjective religious ex- perience from institutionalized religion. The hatred of the hypocrite, how- ever, may work in two ways, either as a force toward enlightenment or as a rationalization of cynicism and contempt for man. It seems that the use of the term hypocrite, like that of the term "snob" obtains more and more the connotation of envy and resentment. It denounces those who "regard them- selves as something better" in order to glorify the average and to establish something plain and supposedly natural as the norm. 4 The struggle against the lie is often a mere pretext for coming into the open with destructive mo- tives rationalized by the supposed "hypocrisy" and "uppishness" of others.
This phenomenon can be understood against the background of democ- ratized culture. The critique of religion as "hypocritical," a critique which in Europe was either confined to small intellectual layers or countered by metaphysical philosophy, is in this country as widespread as Christian religion itself. Part of the ambivalence toward religion can be accounted for by the simultaneous ubiquity of both the Christian heritage and the "spirit of sci- ence. " This double cultural ubiquity may favor an inconsistent attitude toward religion without necessarily involving the individual's psychological make-up.
The fact that America, for all its interest in science, is still close to a religious climate may help to explain a more general trait of irreligious low scorers: their actual or fictitious "negative" conversion. Thus, for example, 5028 and 5058, like M2o3, report that they "broke away" from religion. In American culture one is rarely "born" as an irreligious person: one becomes irreligious through conflicts of childhood or adolescence, and these dynamics favor nonconformist sympathies which, in turn, go with opposition to prejudice.
That a subject is consciously irreligious under the prevailing cultural con- ditions suggests the existence of a certain strength of the ego. An example is
4 Cf. the section on F. D. R. in Chapter XVII.
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
M2o2, our "conservative but not fascist" person (see pp. 649, 707), who scores extremely low on the E scale.
As a child subject was very religious. He went to church with his family every- Sunday and he would "fall on my knees in the street" to pray for something. At the age of 19 he changed. He became disgusted by the gossip in church. They would tell him things about someone that were "none of their damned business. " Also these people would come and testify in church and do bad things again. He could not understand this inconsistency in their actions.
In this case the anti-religious attitude, as far as it goes, is overtly derived from resentment against outside interference with individual liberty and this, be it noted, is hardly less an element in American ideology than is Christianity itself. Here, as in many other respects, individual, psychological ambivalence toward religion on the part of the subject reflects objective antagonism in our culture.
Mpo, a genuine liberal, offers another example of the rebellious feature in irreligiousness. The subject, who rejects Christian tradition altogether, is the child of religious parents. He admits no open conflict with them, al- though relations with them were apparently very cool. In all probability he displaced his rebellion against the family upon their religion, thus avoiding the trouble of undergoing difficulties of a more personal kind. Often enough, strong ideological attachments or oppositions can be understood as such dis- placements of family conflicts, a device which allows the individual to express his hostilities on a level of rationalization and so dispense with the necessity of deep emotional entanglements-and which also allows the youngster to remain within the family shelter. It may also be in some respects mon; grati- fying to attack the infinite father than to attack the finite one. It should be emphasized, however, that the term rationalization does not imply, here or elsewhere, the allegation untrue. Rationalization is a psychological aspect of thinking which by itself decides neither truth nor untruth. A decision on this matter depends entirely on the objective merits of the idea in which the
process of rationalization terminates.
In contrast to those irreligious low scorers who underwent a "negative"
conversion are easy-going low scorers such as M711. His negative attitude toward religion is marked not so much by opposition as by an indifference that involves the element of a somewhat humorous self-reflection. This sub- ject professes rather frankly a certain confusion in religious matters but in a way which suggests that his apparent weakness is allowed to manifest itself on the basis of some considerable underlying strength of character. With people like him it is as if they could afford to profess intellectual inconsist- encies because they find more security in their own character structure and in the depth of their experience than in clear-cut, well-organized, highly ra- tionalized convictions. When asked about his attitude toward religion, he answers:
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL 741
"I don't really have any (laughs). More or less an absence of views. On organized religion I suppose I am confused (laughs) if anything. "
He does not need to reject religion because he is not under its spell; there are no traces of ambivalence, and therefore no signs of hatred, but rather a kind of humane and detached understanding. The religious idea he accepts is tolerance, in a characteristically nonconventional way demonstrated by his choice of negative expressions rather than high sounding "ideals. " "I think I became aware of intolerance. " But he does not use this awareness for ego enhancement but is rather inclined to attribute his religious emancipation to external accidental factors:
"If I'd stayed in Denver, I'd probably attended a church. I don't know. I don't think of it; I don't feel the need of organized religion particularly. "
Interesting is this subject's discussion of prayer. He admits the psychological efficacy of prayer, but is aware that this "therapeutic" aspect of religion is incompatible with the idea of religion itself. He regards prayer as a kind of al;ltosuggestion, which could "accomplish results" but "I certainly don't see there is anyone on the receiving end. "
This subject makes the bizarre but strangely profound statement:
"My religious curiosity did not last very long. Probably took up photography (laughs) about that time. "
Only an interpretation making full use of psychoanalytic categories would do justice to this sentence. The link between his early interest in religion and the later one in photography is apparently curiosity, the desire to "see" things-a sublimation of voyeurism. It is as if photography in a somewhat infantile way would fulfill the wish for "imagery" which underlies certain trends in religion and is at the same time put under a heavy taboo by both Judaism and Protestantism. This may be corroborated by the fact that the subject during his religious phase was attracted by theosophy, by religious ways of thinking which promised to "lift the curtain. "
It should be noted that this subject's attitude toward atheism is no more "radical" than is his opposition to religion. 5 He says:
"Well, I don't think any more about atheists than anything else. As a matter of fact I talked with several people who profess to be atheists and they don't even seem to agree. Perhaps I am an atheist (laughs) . . . you get into semantics, really. Professional atheists . . . just impress me as doing it because it seems to be a stunt. Don Quixote battling windmills. "
This may be indicative of the easy-going person's suspicion of the "ticket,"
5 The "easy-going" low scorer is rarely radical in any respect. This, however, does not make him a middle-of-the-roader. He is persistently aware of the nonidentity between concept and reality. He is fundamentally nontotalitarian. This is behind his specific idea of tolerance.
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his awareness of the tendency of any rigid formula to degenerate into a mere piece of propaganda. 6
Incidentally, the subject senses clearly what was formulated one hundred years ago in Baudelaire's Diary: that atheism becomes obsolescent in a world the objective spirit of which is essentially areligious. The meaning of atheism undergoes historical changes. What was one of the decisive impulses of the eighteenth century Enlightenment may function today as a manifestation of provincial sectarianism or even as a paranoid system. Half-mad Nazis such as Mathilde Ludendorff fought, besides the Jews and the Free Masons, the Roman-Catholics as an ultra-n10ntan conspiracy directed against Germany, transforming the tradition of Bismarck's Kulturkampf into a pattern of per- secution mania.
4. RELIGIOUS LOW SCORERS
A clear-cut example of a religious low scorer is the somewhat sketchy inter- view of Fz32, a young woman brought up in India where her parents are missionaries. Her combining positive Christianity with an outspoken concrete idea of tolerance ("equality for everyone") is derived from "life experience with the Indians. " She is passionate in matters of racial understanding. How- ever, her church affiliations make it impossible for her to draw the political consequences from her tolerance idea:
"I don't like Ghandi. I don't like radical people. He is a radical. He has done much to upset and disunite the country. "
Her association with the church involves an element of that religious con- ventionalism which is usually associated with ethnocentrism. In spite of her?
closeness to the church and to theological doctrine, her religious outlook has a practical coloring.
"It (religion) means a great deal. It makes a person happier-more satisfied. Gives them peace of mind. You know where you stand and have something to work for- an example to follow. Hope for an after-life. Yes, I believe in immortality. "7
This girl is probably atypical in many ways because of her colonial upbring- ing as well as because of the mixture of "official" religiosity and more spon-
6 More material on this subject is presented in Chapter XIX.
7 It would be a tempting task to analyze the change of meaning undergone by the word ? "belief. " It illustrates most clearly religious neutralization. Formerly the idea of belief was emphatically related to the religious dogma. Today it is applied to practically everything which a subject feels the right to have as his own, as his "opinion" (for everybody is en- titled to have opinion) without subjecting it to any criteria of objective truth. The secular- ization of "believing" is accompanied by arbitrariness of that which one believes: it is moulded after the preferences for one or the other commodity and has little relation to the idea of truth. ("I don't believe in parking," said a conventional high-scoring girl in her interview. ) This use of belief is almost an equivalent of the hackneyed, "I like it," which is about to lose any meaning. (Cf. the statement of Mack, given in Chapter II, "I like the
history and sayings of Christ. ")
? RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN INTERVIEW MA TERIAL
743
taneous religious humanism. Her particular attitude is probably due, on the surface level at least, to her insight into ingroup-outgroup problems. How- ever, this example seems to offer some support for the hypothesis that only fully conscious, very articulate, unconventional Christians are likely to be free of ethnocentrism. At any rate, the rareness of religious low scorers in our sample is significant. As indicated above, the composition of the sample itself may be responsible for this. However, this rarity suggests something more fundamental. The tendency of our society to become split into "pro- gressive" and "status quo" camps may be accompanied by a tendency of all persons who cling to religion, as a part of the status quo, also to assume other features of the status quo ideology which are associated with the ethnocen- tric outlook. Whether this is true or whether religion can produce effective trends in opposition to prejudice, could be elucidated only after much exten- sive research.
? CHAPTER XIX TYPES AND SYNDROMES
T. W. Adorno
A. THE APPROACH
Hardly any concept in contemporary American psychology has been so thoroughly criticized as that of typology. Since "any doctrine of types is a halfway approach to the problem of individuality, and nothing more," (9) any such doctrine is subject to devastating attacks from both extremes: be- cause it never catches the unique, and because its generalizations are not statistically valid and do not even afford productive heuristic tools. From the viewpoint of general dynamic theory of personality, it is objected that typol- ogies tend towards pigeonholing and transform highly flexible traits into
static, quasi-biological' characteristics while neglecting, above all, the impact of historical and social factors. Statistically, the insufficiency of twofold typologies is particularly emphasized. As to the heuristic value of typologies, their overlapping, and the necessity of constructing "mixed types" which practically disavow the original constructs, is pointed out. At the hub of all these arguments is aversion against the application of rigid concepts to the supposedly fluid reality of psychological life.
The development of modern psychological typologies, as contrasted, for example, with the old scheme of "temperaments," has its origin in psychiatry, in the therapeutic need for a classification of mental diseases as a means of facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Kraepelin and Lombroso are the fathers of psychiatric typology. Since the clear-cut division of mental diseases has in the meantime completely broken down, the basis of typological classifications of the "normal," derived from the former, seems to vanish. It is stigmatized as a remnant of the "taxonomic phase of behavior theory" the formulation
of which "tended to remain descriptive, static and sterile" (So). If not even the mentally diseased, whose psychological dynamics are largely replaced by rigid patterns, can be sensibly divided according to types, how, then, is there any chance of success for procedures such as the famous one of Kretsch- mer, the raison d'etre of which was the standard classification of manic- depression and dementia praecox?
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? TYPES AND SYNDROMES
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The present state of the discussion on typology is summed up by Anne Anastasi (I I) as follows:
"Type theories have been most commonly criticized because of their attempt to classify individuals into sharply divided categories. . . . Such a procedure implies a multi-modal distribution of traits. The introverts, for example, would be expected to cluster at one end of the scale, the extroverts at the other end, and the point of demarcation between them should be clearly apparent. Actual measurement, how- ever, reveals a unimodal distribution of all traits, which closely resembles the bell- shaped normal curve.
"Similarly, it is often difficult to classify a given individual definitely into one type or the other. The typologists, when confronted with this difficulty, have frequently proposed intermediate or 'mixed' types to bridge the gap between the extremes. Thus Jung suggested an ambivert type which manifests neither introvert nor extrovert tendencies to a predominant degree. Observation seems to show, however, that the ambivert category is the largest, and the decided introverts and extroverts are relatively rare. The reader is referred, for example, to the distribution curve obtained by Heidbreder with an introversion questionnaire administered to zoo college students. . . . It will be recalled that the majority of scores were inter- mediate and that as the extremes of either introversion or extroversion were ap- proached, the number of cases became progressively smaller. The curve, too, showed no sharp breaks, but only a continuous gradation from the mean to the two extremes. As was indicated in Chapter II, the same may be said of all other measurable traits of the individual, whether social, emotional, intellectual, or physical.
"It is apparent, then, that insofar as type theories imply the classification of indi- viduals into clear-cut classes, they are untenable in the face of a mass of indisputable data. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily inherent in all systems of human typology. It is more characteristic of the popular versions and adaptations of type theories than of the original concepts. To be sure, type psychologists have often attempted to categorize individuals, but this was not an indispensable part of their theories; their concepts have occasionally been sufficiently modified to admit of a normal distribution of traits. "
In spite of such concessions to more satisfactory categorizations, the "nom- inalistic" exclusion of typological classifications has triumphed to such a degree that it is almost tantamount to a taboo, no matter how urgent the scientific and pragmatic need for such classifications may be. It should be noted that this taboo is closely related to the notion, still taught by numerous academic psychiatrists, that mental diseases are essentially inexplicable. If one would assume, for the argument's sake, that psychoanalytic theory has really succeeded in establishing a number of dynamic schemata of psychoses, by which the latter become "meaningful" within the psychological life of
the individual in spite of all their irrationality and the disintegration of the psychotic personality, the problem of typology would be completely redefined.
It cannot be doubted that the critique of psychological types expresses a truly humane impulse, directed against that kind of subsumption of individ- uals under pre-established classes which has been consummated in Nazi
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Germany, where the labeling of live human beings, independently of their specific qualities, resulted in decisions about their life and death. It is this motive which has been stressed particularly by Allport (9); and Boder has demonstrated in great detail in his study of "Nazi Science" the interconnec- tions of psychological pro et contra schemes, the repressive function of categories such as Jaensch's "Gegentypus" and the arbitrary manipulation of empirical findings (47). Thus, enquiries devoted to the study of preju- dice have to be particularly cautious when the issue of typology comes up. To express it pointedly, the rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of that "stereopathic" mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially fascist character. We need only to refer, in this connection, to our high scorer of Irish descent who attributes his personal traits unhesi- tatingly to his national extraction. Jaensch's "anti-type," for example, is an almost classic case of the mechanism of projection, the effectiveness of which in the make-up of our high scorers has been established, and which in Jaensch's has wormed its way into the very same science whose task it would be to account for this mechanism. The essentially undynamic, "antisociological," and quasi-biological nature of classifications of the Jaensch brand is directly opposed to the theory of our work as well as to its empirical results. 1
Yet all these objections do not dispose altogether of the problem of typol- ogy. Not all typologies are devices for dividing the world into sheep and buck, but some of them reflect certain experiences which, though hard to systema- tize, have, to put it as loosely as possible, hit upon something. Here one has to think primarily of Kretschmer, Jung, and Freud. It should be particularly emphasized that Freud, whose general emphasis on psychological dynamics puts him above the suspicion of any simple "biologism" and stereotypical thinking, published as late as 1931 (39) a rather categorical typology with- out bothering much about the methodological difficulties of which he must have been aware very well, and even, with apparent naivete, constructing "mixed" types out of the basic ones. Freud was too much led by concrete
1 It should be remembered that Jaensch's anti-type is defined by synaesthesia, that is to say, the supposed or actual tendency of certain people "to have color experiences when listening to a tone, or to music in general, and to have tone experiences when looking at colors or pictures" (Boder, in (47), p. 15). This tendency is interpreted by Jaensch as a symptom of degeneracy. It may well be assumed that this interpretation is based on his- torical reminiscence rather than on any factual psychological findings. For the cult of synaesthesia played a large role within the lyrical poetry of the same French authors who introduced the concept of decadence, particularly Baudelaire. It can be noted, however, that synaesthetic imagery fulfills a specific function in their works. By clouding the division between different realms of sense perception, they simultaneously try to efface the rigid classification of different kinds of objects, as it is brought about under the practical requirements of industrial civilization. They rebel against reification. It is highly characteristic that an entirely administrative ideology chooses as its archfoe an attitude which is, above all, rebellion against stereotypy. The Nazi cannot stand anything which does not fit into his scheme and even less anything which does not recognize his own reified, "stereopathic" way of looking at things.
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insights into the matters themselves, had too intimate a relationship to his scientific objects, to waste his energy on the kind of methodological reflec- tions which may well turn out to be acts of sabotage of organized science against productive thinking. This is not to say that his typology has to be accepted as it stands. Not only can it be criticized by the usual antitypological arguments to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter; as Otto Fenichel has pointed out, it is also problematic from the viewpoint of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. What counts, however, is that Freud found such a classification worthwhile. One has only to look at the relatively easy and convincing integration of different kinds of twofold typologies in Donald W. MacKinnon's Structure of Personality (in 55) to gain the impression that typologies are not altogether arbitrary, do not necessarily do violence to the manifoldness of the human, but have some basis in the structure of psycho-
logical reality.
The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, how-
ever, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. The fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men. The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. The French sociologist Durkheim in particular has shown how and to what extent hierarchical social orders permeate the individual's thinking, attitudes, and behavior. People form psychological "classes," inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes. This in all probability holds good for our own standardized mass culture to even higher a degree than for previous periods. The relative rigidity of our high scorers, and of some of our low scorers, reflects psychologically the increas- ing rigidity according to which our society falls into two more or less crude opposing camps. Individualism, opposed to inhuman pigeonholing, may ulti- mately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually is inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the "subsumption" of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, "individuals" in the sense of traditional nine- teenth-century philosophy. Ticket thinking is possible only because the actual existence of those who indulge in it is largely determined by "tickets," standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes which leave to the "individual" but little freedom for action and true individuation. Thus the problem of typology is put on a different basis. There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and "pro- duces" different "types" of persons. Only by identifying stereotypical traits
in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged. The construction of psychological types does not merely imply an arbi- trary, compulsive attempt to bring some "order" into the confusing diversity
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of human personality. It represents a means of "conceptualizing" this diver- sity, according to its own structure, of achieving closer understanding. Thf radical renunciation of all generalizations beyond those pertaining to thf most obvious findings would not result in true empathy into human individ- uals but rather in an opaque, dull description of psychological "facts": every step which goes beyond the factual and aims at psychological meaning-a~ it has been defined in Freud's basic statement that all our experiences aH meaningful ("dass aile unsere Erlebnisse einen Sinn haben")-inevitably in- volves generalizations transcending the supposedly unique "case," and it happens that these generalizations more frequently than not imply the exist- ence of certain regularly recurring nuclei or syndromes which come rather close to the idea of "types. " Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compul- sive character, though apparently derived from highly individualized studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named, and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative, no matter how "unique" the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology per se. Methodological "purity" in this respect would be tantamount to renouncing the conceptual medium or any theoretical penetration of the given material, and would result in an irrationality as complete as the arbitrary subsumptive- ness of the "pigeonholing" schools.
Within the context of our study, another reflection of an entirely different nature points in the same direction. It is a pragmatic one: the necessity that science provide weapons against the potential threat of the fascist mentality. It is an open question whether and to what extent the fascist danger really can be fought with psychological weapons. Psychological "treatment" of prejudiced persons is problematic because of their large number as well as because they are by no means "ill," in the usual sense, and, as we have seen, at least on the surface level are often even better "adjusted" than the non- prejudiced ones. Since, however, modern fascism is inconceivable without a mass basis, the inner complexion of its prospective followers still maintains its crucial significance, and no defense which does not take into account the subjective phase of the problem would be truly "realistic. " It is obvious that psychological countermeasures, in view of the extent of the fascist potential among modern masses, are promising only if they are differentiated in such a way that they are adapted to specific groups. An over-all defense would move on a level of such vague generalities that it would in all probability fall flat. It may be regarded as one of the practical results of our study that such a differentiation has at least to be also one which follows psychological lines, since certain basic variables of the fascist character persist relatively inde- pendently of marked social differentiations. There is no psychological defense against prejudice which is not oriented toward certain psychological "types. "
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We would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology and jeopardize each attempt of coming psychologically to grips with prejudiced persons if a number of very drastic and extreme differences-such as the one between the psychological make-up of a conventional anti-Semite and a sado- masochistic "tough guy"-were excluded simply because none of these types is ever represented in classic purity by a single individual.
The possibility of constructing largely different sets of psychological types has been widely recognized. As the result of the previous discussions, we base our own attempt on the three following major criteria:
a. We do not want to classify human beings by types which divide them neatly statistically, nor by ideal types in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by "mixtures. " Our types are justified only if we succeed in organizing, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits. We regard those types as being scientifically most productive which integrate traits, otherwise dispersed, into meaningful continuities and bring to the fore the interconnection of elements which belong together according to their inherent "logic," in terms of psychological understanding of under- lying dynamics. No mere additive or mechanical subsumption of traits under the same type should be permitted. A major criterion for this postulate would be that, confronted with "genuine" types, even so-called deviations would no longer appear as accidental but would be recognizable as meaningful, in a structural sense. Speaking genetically, the consistency of meaning of each type would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from cer- tain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts, and their resolutions.
b. Our typology has to be a critical typology in the sense that it compre- hends the typification of men itself as a social function. The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. Its major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly "individualized" and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience. The individual types will be specific configurations with- in this general division. The latter differentiates prima facie between high and low scorers. At closer view, however, it also affects the low scorers themselves: the more they are "typified" themselves, the more they express unwittingly the fascist potential within themselves. 2
2 It should be stressed that two concepts of types have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who are types in the proper sense, typified persons, individuals who are largely reflecting set patterns and social mechanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can be called types only in a formal-logical sense and who often may be characterized just by the absence of standard qualities. It is essential to distinguish the real, "genuine" type structure of a person and his merely belonging to a logical class by which he is defined from outside, as it were.
? 75: Tho type? m~::. :":? ~:;:,thoy m? y hocomo l productive pragmatically, that is to say, that they can be translated into rela- i tively drastic defense patterns which are organized in such a way that dif- ~ ferences of a more individual nature play but a minor role. This makes for ~
a certain conscious "superficiality" of typification, comparable to the situa- 1 tion in a sanatorium where no therapy could ever be initiated if one did not divide the patients into manic-depressives, schizophrenics, paranoiacs, and
so forth, though one is fully aware of the fact that these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper one goes. In this connection, however, the hypoth-
esis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep enough, at the end of the differentiation just the more universal "crude" structure would reappear: some basic libidinous constellations. An analogy from the history of the arts may be permitted. The traditional, crude distinction between Romanesque and Gothic style was based on the characteristic of round and pointed arches. It became apparent that this division was insufficient; that both traits were overlapping and that there were much deeper-lying contrasts of construction between the two styles. This, however, led to such compli- cated definitions that it proved impossible to state in their terms whether a given building was Romanesque or Gothic in character though its structural totality rarely left any doubt to the observer to which epoch it belonged.
Thus it ultimately became necessary to resume the primitive and naive classi- fication. Something similar may be advisable in the case of our problem. An apparently superficial question such as "What kind of people do you find among the prejudiced? " may easily do more justice to typological require- ments than the attempt to define types at first sight by, say, different fixations at pregenital or genital developmental phases and the like. This indispensable simplification can probably be achieved by the integration of sociological criteria into the psychological constructs. Such sociological criteria may refer to the group memberships and identifications of our subjects as well as to social aims, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. The task of relating psychological type criteria to sociological ones is facilitated because it has been established in the course of our study that a number of "clinical" cate- gories (such as the adulation of a punitive father) are intimately related to social attitudes (such as belief in authority for authority's sake). Hence, we may well "translate" for the hypothetical purposes of a typology a number of our basic psychological concepts into sociological ones most closely akin to them.
These considerations have to be supplemented by a requirement prescribed by the nature of our study. Our typology, or rather, scheme of syndromes, has to be organized in such a way that it fits as "naturally" as possible our empirical data. It should be borne in mind that our material does not exist in an empty space, as it were, but that it is structurally predetermined by our tools, particularly the questionnaire and the interview schedule. Since
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our hypotheses were formulated according to psychoanalytic theory, the orientation of our syndromes toward psychoanalytic concepts is reinforced. Of course, the limitations of such an attempt are narrow since we did not "analyze" any of our subjects. Our characterization of syndromes has to concentrate on traits that have proved to be psychoanalytically significant rather than on the ultimate dynamic patterns of depth psychology.
In order to place the following typological draft into its proper perspec- tive, it should be recalled that we have pointed out in the chapter on the F scale that all the clusters of which this scale is made up belong to one single, "over-all" syndrome. It is one of the outstanding findings of the study that "highness" is essentially one syndrome, distinguishable from a variety of "low" syndromes. There exists something like "the" potentially fascist char- acter, which is by itself a "structural unit. " In other words, traits such as conventionality, authoritarian submissiveness and aggressiveness, projectiv- ity, manipulativeness, etc. , regularly go together. Hence, the "subsyndromes" which we outline here are not intended to isolate any of these traits. They are all to be understood within the general frame of reference of the high scorer. What differentiates them is the emphasis on one or another of the features or dynamics selected for characterization, not their exclusiveness. However, it seems to us that the differential profiles arising within the over- all structure can readily be distinguished. At the same time, their interconnec- tion by the over-all potentially fascist structure is of such a nature that they are "dynamic" in the sense that transitions from one to the other could easily be worked out by analyzing the increase or decrease of some of the specific factors. Such a dynamic interpretation of them could achieve more ade- quately-that is to say, with a better understanding of the underlying proc- esses-what is usually done in a haphazard way by the "mixed types" of static typologies. However, theory and empirical substantiation of these dynamic relations among the syndromes could not be touched upon within the present research.
The principle according to which the syndromes are organized is their "type-being" in the sense of rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the order of our syndromes represents a more dynamic "scale of measurement. " It pertains to potentialities, and accessibility to countermeasures, but not to overt prejudice-basically to the problem of "over-all highness" vs. "lowness. " It will be seen, for example, that the case illustrating the psychologically relatively harmless syndrome at the bottom of our scheme is extremely high in terms of overt antiminority prejudice.
Pragmatic requirements as well as the idea that the high scorers are gener- ally more "typed" than the low scorers seem to focus our interest on the prejudiced person. Yet, we deem it necessary also to construct syndromes of low scorers. The general direction of our research leads us to stress, with
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a certain one-sidedness, psychological determinants. This, however, should never make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological, "subjective" phenomenon. It has to be remembered what we pointed out in Chapter XVII: that "high" ideology and mentality are largely fomented by the objective spirit of our society. Whereas different individuals react differ- ently, according to their psychological make-up, to the ubiquitous cultural stimuli of prejudice, the objective element of prejudice cannot be neglected if we want to understand the attitudes of individuals or psychological groups. It is therefore not sufficient to ask, "Why is this or that individual ethno- centric? " but rather: "Why does he react positively to the omnipresent stimuli, to which this other man reacts negatively?
