Therefore these names are
entirely
synonymous.
Summa Theologica
It is not possible, therefore, that the
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i. e. to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is
said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God
face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure
representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of
prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as
will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of
prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some
exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so
also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the
minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to
the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all
things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we
know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i. e. , by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in
the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this
life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
simple form. " But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above
([60]Q[3], A[7] ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The
weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless
purified by the justice of faith. " Therefore God cannot be known by
natural reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them. "
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are
not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because
He superexceeds them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is. "
Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i),
retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in
prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth. ' For it
can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i. e.
by natural reason.
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Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural
reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils. " Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Ev. ) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge. " Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract
from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears
in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices,
are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism,
the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the
Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life
we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to
one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by
the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the
intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object
by the vision and understanding of first principles.
__________________________________________________________________
THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
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Whether a name can be given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest? " (Prov. 30:4).
Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with
quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns
the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be
applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be
described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing
mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns.
Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name. "
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and
also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be
named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man"
expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the
definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by
the name is the definition.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to
compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a
thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for
instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God
is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as
He is.
Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify
the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all
time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by
way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple
eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a
natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative
pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what
is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him.
Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or
expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or
operation. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God. "
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand
it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the
being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
simplicity whereby His substance is signified. " Therefore all names of
this kind signify the divine substance.
I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
Himself.
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
names.
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God
would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as
healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only
the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
inanimate bodies.
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know
Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as
far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ([62]Q[4], A[2])
that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures,
being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature
represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection;
yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus,
but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short,
although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms
of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained
above ([63]Q[4], A[3]), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore
the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect
manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say,
"God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
"God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to
creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way.
Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness;
but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is
good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32),
"Because He is good, we are. "
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify
what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed
what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
creatures represent Him imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the
name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the
fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to
signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind
of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone
[*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no
place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are
imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse
processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of
God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows
and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless
these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if
when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but
to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists
in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be
understood or signified.
Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life,
as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed
by us signify Him in that manner only.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all
names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
above [64](A[1]). But the names of creatures are applied to God
metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like.
Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Objection 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if
it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God
than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a
metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names
imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up
with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all
these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which
express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are
applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude. " Therefore not all
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some
which are said of Him in their literal sense.
I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God
is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which
perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our
intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
applied to God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification
applies to creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: There are some names which signify these
perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the
imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part
of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and
such names can be literally applied to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are
denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not
belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more
eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance
and all life.
Reply to Objection 3: These names which are applied to God literally
imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards
their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
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Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the
goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the
same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an
idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if
these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all
these ideas are vain notions.
Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is
more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing. " Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is
Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would
be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would
follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things
denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above [65](A[2]), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear
from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For
the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of
the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God
from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions
proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures
they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the
different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple
principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a
various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied
conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple
principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.
Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still
because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are
not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through
the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly.
Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in
idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as
things represent Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of
them?
Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although
the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the
first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal
agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated
univocally.
Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the
word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.
Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for
instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is
said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from
each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the
sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in
all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article,
all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist
in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to
a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other
perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we
signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct
from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when
we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from
His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied
to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing
signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but
it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the
signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is
not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to
other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of
creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a
purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it
follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these
names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i. e.
according to proportion.
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according
as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of
medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the
animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal
sense. For we can name God only from creatures [66](A[1]). Thus
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community
of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For
in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same,
yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is
thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one
thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal
health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced
to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal
efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause
of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular
cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of
participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is
not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the
particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal,
nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not
produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical
agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first
non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect,
for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ([67]Q[4],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things
measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in
the same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
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Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?
Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas. " But we
know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures. " But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De
Mystica Theol. ). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is
applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of
animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore
these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.
On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
rather than to creatures.
I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all
are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this
one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that
expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is
put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these
others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for
instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of
"healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the
cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of
"healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far
as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied
metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than
to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such
creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the
field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human
smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God
means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his.
Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be
defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not
applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if
they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For
when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the
cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God
would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown
above [68](A[2]), these names are applied to God not as the cause only,
but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these
exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to
creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as
regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us
to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above [69](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the
name.
Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
"healthy" is applied to medicine.
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Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God
temporally?
Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are
not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine
substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that
this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance;
and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now
the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these
names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.
Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God
temporally.
Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God
implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity
He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved
thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names
implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to
God from eternity.
Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore
that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in
God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God
temporally.
Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the
relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows
that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist
without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But
relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied
to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself. " For reason
apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a
certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to
relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason,
apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and
intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to
the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no
real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as
creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these
names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of
God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of
the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal,
without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and
"son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently
the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and
these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names
are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either
principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either
directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in
the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the
action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that
the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the
same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but
if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with
science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is
known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
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Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?
Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all
things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire
consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all
things. " But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
signify the divine nature.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
operation, or its property; e. g. we name the substance of a stone from
its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name
and its source are the same.
Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His
universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend
to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and
goodness. " But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to
signify the divine nature.
Reply to Objection 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence;
which is the source of the signification of the name "God. "
Reply to Objection 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we
have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we
can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now
from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so
as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
causality, and of negation as stated above ([70]Q[12], A[12]). Thus the
name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
signify all this.
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Whether this name "God" is communicable?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great
[Vulg. : 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg. :
'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. 1:4).
Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.
Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from
the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You
are gods" (Ps.
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i. e. to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is
said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God
face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure
representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of
prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as
will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of
prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some
exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so
also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the
minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to
the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all
things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we
know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i. e. , by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in
the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this
life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
simple form. " But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above
([60]Q[3], A[7] ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The
weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless
purified by the justice of faith. " Therefore God cannot be known by
natural reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them. "
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are
not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because
He superexceeds them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is. "
Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i),
retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in
prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth. ' For it
can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i. e.
by natural reason.
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Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural
reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils. " Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Ev. ) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge. " Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract
from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears
in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices,
are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism,
the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the
Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life
we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to
one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by
the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the
intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object
by the vision and understanding of first principles.
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THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
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Whether a name can be given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest? " (Prov. 30:4).
Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with
quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns
the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be
applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be
described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing
mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns.
Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name. "
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and
also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be
named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man"
expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the
definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by
the name is the definition.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to
compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a
thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for
instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God
is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as
He is.
Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify
the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all
time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by
way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple
eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a
natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative
pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what
is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him.
Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or
expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or
operation. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God. "
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand
it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the
being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
simplicity whereby His substance is signified. " Therefore all names of
this kind signify the divine substance.
I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
Himself.
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
names.
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God
would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as
healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only
the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
inanimate bodies.
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know
Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as
far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ([62]Q[4], A[2])
that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures,
being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature
represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection;
yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus,
but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short,
although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms
of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained
above ([63]Q[4], A[3]), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore
the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect
manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say,
"God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
"God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to
creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way.
Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness;
but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is
good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32),
"Because He is good, we are. "
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify
what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed
what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
creatures represent Him imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the
name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the
fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to
signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind
of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone
[*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no
place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are
imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse
processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of
God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows
and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless
these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if
when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but
to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists
in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be
understood or signified.
Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life,
as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed
by us signify Him in that manner only.
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Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all
names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
above [64](A[1]). But the names of creatures are applied to God
metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like.
Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Objection 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if
it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God
than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a
metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names
imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up
with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all
these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which
express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are
applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude. " Therefore not all
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some
which are said of Him in their literal sense.
I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God
is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which
perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our
intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
applied to God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification
applies to creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: There are some names which signify these
perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the
imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part
of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and
such names can be literally applied to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are
denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not
belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more
eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance
and all life.
Reply to Objection 3: These names which are applied to God literally
imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards
their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the
goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the
same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an
idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if
these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all
these ideas are vain notions.
Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is
more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing. " Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is
Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would
be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would
follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things
denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above [65](A[2]), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear
from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For
the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of
the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God
from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions
proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures
they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the
different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple
principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a
various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied
conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple
principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.
Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still
because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are
not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through
the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly.
Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in
idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as
things represent Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of
them?
Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although
the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the
first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal
agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated
univocally.
Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the
word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.
Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for
instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is
said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from
each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the
sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in
all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article,
all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist
in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to
a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other
perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we
signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct
from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when
we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from
His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied
to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing
signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but
it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the
signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is
not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to
other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of
creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a
purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it
follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these
names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i. e.
according to proportion.
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according
as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of
medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the
animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal
sense. For we can name God only from creatures [66](A[1]). Thus
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community
of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For
in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same,
yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is
thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one
thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal
health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced
to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal
efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause
of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular
cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of
participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is
not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the
particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal,
nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not
produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical
agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first
non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect,
for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ([67]Q[4],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things
measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in
the same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?
Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas. " But we
know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures. " But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De
Mystica Theol. ). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is
applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of
animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore
these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.
On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
rather than to creatures.
I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all
are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this
one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that
expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is
put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these
others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for
instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of
"healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the
cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of
"healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far
as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied
metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than
to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such
creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the
field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human
smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God
means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his.
Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be
defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not
applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if
they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For
when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the
cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God
would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown
above [68](A[2]), these names are applied to God not as the cause only,
but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these
exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to
creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as
regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us
to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above [69](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the
name.
Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
"healthy" is applied to medicine.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God
temporally?
Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are
not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine
substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that
this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance;
and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now
the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these
names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.
Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God
temporally.
Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God
implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity
He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved
thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names
implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to
God from eternity.
Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore
that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in
God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God
temporally.
Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the
relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows
that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist
without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But
relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied
to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself. " For reason
apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a
certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to
relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason,
apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and
intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to
the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no
real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as
creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these
names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of
God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of
the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal,
without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and
"son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently
the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and
these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names
are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either
principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either
directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in
the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the
action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that
the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the
same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but
if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with
science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is
known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
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Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?
Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all
things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire
consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all
things. " But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
signify the divine nature.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.
I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
operation, or its property; e. g. we name the substance of a stone from
its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name
and its source are the same.
Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His
universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend
to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and
goodness. " But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to
signify the divine nature.
Reply to Objection 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence;
which is the source of the signification of the name "God. "
Reply to Objection 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we
have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we
can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now
from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so
as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
causality, and of negation as stated above ([70]Q[12], A[12]). Thus the
name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
signify all this.
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Whether this name "God" is communicable?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great
[Vulg. : 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg. :
'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. 1:4).
Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.
Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from
the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You
are gods" (Ps.
